The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Respondent is guilty of the violation alleged in the administrative complaint dated August 7, 1989; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency authorized to regulate and discipline licensees pursuant to Chapters 455 and 473, Florida Statutes. The Respondent is a licensed certified public accountant, license number AC 3214 (election of rights submitted by Respondent). In connection with an investigation of another licensee (not at issue herein), the Respondent submitted to the Department a financial report that Respondent had performed for the entity identified as Moreil Interiors, Inc. (Moreil). That document (Department's exhibit 1) consisted of four pages and represented financial information related to Moreil for a 6 month period ending December 31, 1984. Certified public accounts are required to utilize specific guidelines in the performance of accounting services. Those guidelines are codified in the Statements on standards for Accounting and Review Services (SSARS). The failure to abide by the SSARS guidelines constitutes performance below acceptable accounting standards. The financial report identified in paragraph 3 failed to comply with the SSARS in at least four material ways. The level of service indicated by the Respondent's report is not accepted practice for certified public accountants and has been rejected by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. The type and number of the deficiencies in that report constitute negligence on Respondent's part and establish a failure to exercise professional competence and due professional care in the performance of accounting services.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Accountancy enter a final order requiring the Respondent to complete 24 hours of continuing education regarding compliance with the SSARS guidelines, and placing the Respondent on probation with his work to be reviewed, at his expense, by a consultant or certified public accountant approved by the Board, for a period of one year following completion of the continuing education. DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Tobi Pam Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Frank Berman P.O. Box 14156 North Palm Beach, Florida 33408 Martha Willis Executive Director Board of Accountancy Suite 16 4001 Northwest 43rd Street Gainesville, Florida 32606 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is Barbara Clark and Company, a CPA firm. Barbara Clark owns and operates the company. The Respondent issued a Request for Proposal, RFP Number 7112, for CPA audit services. The Petitioner responded to the RFP along with four other proposers. The award for RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services, was to be made to the two (2) companies who received the highest number of points based on individual evaluations by four (4) people selected for the RFP review committee. The evaluation criteria to be used by the review committee members was specified in Section 1.16 of the RFP and involved review of the management and technical aspects of a given proposal. The committee members for the RFP were instructed by the FAMU Purchasing Director to use the criteria as outlined in Section 1.16 in the process of evaluating the management and technical plans of the respective proposals and that each member should evaluate and score each proposal independent from the other committee members. The evaluations by each member were placed in a sealed envelope. The proposals submitted in response to RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services, were reviewed by the evaluation committee members. After the members completed their review, they met as a group with the Purchasing Director. The sealed envelopes which contained the individual committee members' evaluation sheets for each proposal were opened and the points for each proposer were determined by adding the points for each respective proposal. The evaluation of RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services, occurred pursuant to the evaluation criteria in RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services. No committee member testified. There was absolutely no evidence submitted by Petitioner which demonstrated that the committee members did not follow the specifications of the RFP. Likewise, there was a lack of evidence that the evaluation process established in the RFP was arbitrary or capricious. The two (2) proposers that received the highest number of points were recommended for the award of RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services. Petitioner's proposal was not evaluated as having either of the highest point totals for RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services and therefore did not receive an award of the contract. The FAMU Purchasing Director, Oscar Martinez, sent to each proposer by certified letter, return receipt, notification of the intended award of RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services, to the two proposers with the highest number of points. The FAMU Purchasing Director, Oscar Martinez, discussed the results of RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services, with Barbara Clark after he mailed the intended award notification to the proposers. A mathematical error in the calculation of points for one of the proposers was discovered and corrected. The error had no effect on the rankings of the proposers and was therefore an immaterial discrepancy in the award of the RFP. Petitioner utterly failed to establish that the intended award pursuant to RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services, was not in good faith and not the result of a fair, full and honest exercise of the agency's discretion in making such an award. Likewise Petitioner utterly failed to establish that Respondent acted arbitrarily or capriciously in its intended award of RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services. After a review of the evidence Petitioner's protest of the intended award of RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services, was clearly without merit and lacked factual or legal support and was therefore frivolous and improper. Indeed the barest attempt was made by Petitioner to prepare or pursue evidence for the hearing in this matter. Although Respondent consulted with Petitioner and provided Petitioner information regarding RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services, Petitioner persisted in pursuing its protest of the intended award of the RFP. Petitioner continued its protest of RFP Number 7112, CPA audit services, long after it was or should have been aware that it had no factual or legal grounds for such a protest causing Respondent's attorney to spend 13 hours in preparation for this case. However, Respondent did not submit an affidavit from another attorney who reviewed the file and number of hours spent by Respondent's attorney and attested to the reasonableness of the hours spent or the fee charged. Therefore, Respondent's motion for attorney's fees is denied.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the protest be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of May, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANNE CLEAVINGER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of May, 1996. APPENDIX CASE NO. 96-1371 1. The facts contained in paragraphs 1-28 of Respondent's proposed findings of fact are adopted, in substance, in so far as material. COPIES FURNISHED: George W. Butler, Esquire Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University Office of the General Counsel 300 Lee Hall Tallahassee, Florida 32307 Barbara A. Clark Barbara A. Clark and Company 270 First Avenue South, Suite 101 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Frank T. Brogan, Commissioner Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Michael Olenick, Esquire Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Bishop Holifield, Esquire Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University 300 Lee Hall Tallahassee, Florida 32307-3100
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following factual findings. Respondent, at times material hereto, was actively licensed to practice public accounting in the State of Florida, such license issued by the Petitioner, Board of Accountancy, Department of Professional Regulation. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1) Respondent has been issued license number AC 5470. After becoming licensed as a certified public accountant, Respondent met Ronald Demon, another CPA, while both were employed with a national "Big 8" public accounting firm in Miami--Pete, Marwick and Mitchell. Thereafter, they became social friends and worked for each other at various times performing per diem work for each other. (TR 165, 167) Respondent's first contact with the Housing Authority for the City of Dania was in 1981 when he performed the two-year audit for the Authority on behalf of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), thereafter becoming the fee accountant for that Authority on a monthly retainer. For the succeeding two years as fee accountant, Respondent provided the Authority's monthly accounting information, posting to the general ledger, cash disbursements, bank reconciliations and filing the required reports to HUD. Respondent had limited involvement with classifying bank checks for purposes of posting to the general ledger. In 1983, another two-year audit of the Dania Housing Authority was required to be performed and Respondent submitted a proposal to the Housing Authority to perform same. That proposal was rejected by HUD on the basis of contract and rule provisions that the contracting CPA not have provided accounting or bookkeeping services for the Housing Authority during the period covered by the audit. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1, pages 8, 10) Upon HUD' s rejection of his engagement proposal on behalf of the Housing Authority, Respondent contacted another CPA, Bernard Koon, seeking his submission of an engagement proposal to HUD. Koon's proposal was rejected by HUD based upon the high price quoted for his audit services. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1, pages 8-11) Koon and Respondent had agreed to an arrangement whereby Koon would sign the accountant's report and financial statements of the audit in question, after performance of the work by Respondent and his staff for an agreed fee of $1000. (TR 60; Petitioner's Exhibit 2, pages 11-12) When Koon's engagement proposal was rejected, Respondent contacted Ronald Demon concerning the audit engagement for the Dania Housing Authority. Ronald Demon was then working as a full-time accountant with the City of Miami. At the time, Demon was performing 4 other audit engagements other than his full- time position with the City of Miami, a practice which appears to be fairly common among accountants. Demon was asked by Respondent to contact the Executive Director of the Housing Authority, Frank W. Peterman. Respondent also related to Demon his availability to assist him (Demon) in performing the audit engagement, if Demon needed, which offer was based upon the fact that Respondent knew that Demon was working in a full-time employment relationship. Respondent told Demon that the contract amount would be approximately $4500 which was $500 less than the amount Respondent had proposed, and which proposal had been rejected by HUD. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1, pages 7, 10-15) Respondent advised Demon that to earn a stated portion of that fee, $500 of the $4500, he would merely have to sign the audit report. Respondent would be in charge of conducting all field work, preparation of the audit report and all other related work with Demon having no day to day involvement concerning preparation of the accountant's report and related financial statements. After Demon contacted the Authority's Executive Director, Respondent prepared for his (Demon's) signature, the engagement proposal which was signed in the parking lot of a Denny's Restaurant at 36th Street and Biscayne Boulevard in North Miami and Respondent later either mailed or hand-delivered the engagement proposal to the Housing Authority offices. Respondent admits that he informed the Executive Director of the Authority of Demon's availability, the fact that he was a CPA and that he was black. Unknown to Respondent, Demon was an inactive licensee at that time. Shortly after Demon's contract proposal was submitted to the Authority, it was awarded to him and, at that time, Demon and Respondent had reached an agreement wherein, as stated earlier, the field work in preparation of the audit report and related finances would be prepared by Respondent and his staff for subsequent signature by Demon. Respondent characterized their agreement as one whereby he was the "orchestrator" of the engagement for financial review and approval of the reports by Demon. (TR 170; Petitioner's Exhibit 1, pages 22-24) Respondent's accounting firm employed two accountants, who were not CPAs, to perform the field work for the subject audit report. Respondent's involvement consisted initially of planning the audit with the staffers and providing them a copy of HUD's Audit Guide. These employees of Respondent were not known by Demon nor did he (Demon) engage in any of the initial planning of the field work; provided no written instructions, audit programming or scheduling of the work plans for completion of the field work. Respondent's supervision of his staff for the subject audit was limited, consisting primarily of being available to answer specific questions they had, a visit to the job site and performed the initial review of work papers that were generated by the staff. After his initial review of the work papers, Respondent submitted the work papers and a draft of the financial statements and accountant report to Demon for his approval and signature. After at least a two-week period, Respondent contacted Demon to ask if there were any problems with his submittal to him whereupon Demon signed and returned the papers to Miller with only grammatical changes in the management letter which accompanied the report and finances, and the submittal was typed in final form on Demon's letterhead by Respondent's office staff. Respondent was unaware that Demon did not review the accountant's report or related financial statements. Demon considered that his agreement for the fee with Miller did not entail that duty and he relied upon Respondent's prior knowledge and experience, supervision and review of the work performed to correct any problems with the report. Upon submission of the audit report to HUD, a check was sent payable to Ronald Demon for $2250 or half of the $4500 engagement fee, with the remainder of the fee to be remitted when the audit report was approved by the client. That fee was first obtained by Miller who called Demon and arranged to meet him at Respondent's bank for negotiation of the check. Respondent had already stamped the check payable to Demon with his deposit stamp and Demon signed above the stamp and Respondent thereafter deposited that check into his (Respondent's) account. Respondent then gave Demon a check for $250 which represented half of the agreed fee. (Deposition testimony of Ronald Demon) HUD rejected the audit report signed by Demon and engaged the services of a public accounting firm--Deloitte, Haskins and Sells to perform another audit. Upon rejection of the audit report, but prior to the employment of Deloitte, Haskins and Sells, Respondent, Demon and Executive Director Peterman met to confer on the matter to seek a resolution of the situation. Neither Respondent nor Demon corrected the deficiency cited in the HUD report requiring HUD to employ another public accounting firm to complete the audit. Respondent did not return to HUD the monies received by him. Demon remitted to HUD all the monies paid to either him or Respondent. (TR 49, 51) Marlyn Felsing, CPA, was received as an expert in these proceedings in the areas of public accounting with specific emphasis on audited financial statements and related accountant's reports and work papers. Felsing has had extensive experience in auditing and has been engaged on behalf of the Petitioner and others in numerous peer reviews of accounting firms. Without regard to the arrangement between Respondent and Demon, both individuals, as certified public accountants, are responsible for practicing public accounting in accordance with generally accepted and prevailing standards of accounting. Respondent was required to comply with generally accepted accounting principles and generally accepted accounting standards in preparation of the audit report for Dania Housing Authority. Rules 21A-20.07; 20.08 and 21A-21.02 and 21A-21.03, Florida Administrative Code. (TR 88, 92, and 94) As an assistant to the auditor (Demon), Respondent, as required by the standards on auditing services, was responsible for the work performed. Respondent acknowledged his accountability under published standards and generally accepted and prevailing standards of accounting practice. (TR 204- 206) Felsing completed an investigative report and analysis of the field audit conducted by Respondent's staff and noted specific departures from generally accepted accounting principles and auditing standards and generally accepted and prevailing standards of accounting practice within the questioned audit report. They are, in summary, as follows: Violation of the "independence" requirements; Failure to exercise professional care respecting his review of staff work; Failure to adequately plan and assist staff in completion of field work and the supervision thereof; Failure to maintain safety of the work papers (the work papers have disappeared); Failure to refer to prior years' audit reports demonstrating a lack of consistency; and Failure to delineate footnote disclosures, improper labeling of financial statements, failure to disclose conflicts between the re- quirements of the HUD Audit Guide and generally accepted and prevailing standards of account- ing practice including the published generally accepted accounting principles and auditing standards. Felsing found it especially troublesome and a violation of the HUD requirements on independence based on Respondent's conduct based on his engagement with Demon in performing the auditing services in violation of generally accepted and prevailing standards of accounting and auditing practice. Rule 21A-22.01, Florida Administrative Code. Finally, Felsing noted that the deficiencies and departures from generally accepted and prevailing standards were not simply matters of professional judgment but were deficiencies which were objective and clear-cut in nature. (TR 143, 147, 148, 154, 156, and 158) Respondent's major contention was that his level of responsibility was limited inasmuch as Demon, as signatory of the audit report, owed a greater duty and responsibility for the statements and the report in question. As found herein, and as pointed out by Mr. Felsing, as licensees sharing in the performance of the accounting engagement, both were liable for the deficiencies found in the statement and the audit report for the Dania Housing Authority.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby recommended that the Respondent's licensure as a certified public accountant be suspended for a period of six (6) months, with reinstatement under such probationary terms and conditions as shall be established by the Board of Accountancy, including continuing professional education in the areas of accounting and auditing in monitoring of his professional practice under such terms and conditions as shall be established by the Board. RECOMMENDED this 17th day of July, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of July, 1985.
Findings Of Fact Shechet holds Certificate No. R-0573 as a certified public accountant practicing in the State of Florida, which he received by virtue of reciprocal status, having previously practiced in the State of Ned York. Shechet began his accounting career in 1924 and has practiced his profession continuously for the fifty-three years since that time. The records of the Board reflect that Shechet provided no evidence of the completion of any courses or studies that would give him credits towards the reestablishment of his professional competency in the period between January 1, 1974, and April 2, 1977. On September 15, 1975, Shechet sat for an examination which was approved by the Hoard and given to practicing certified public accountants pursuant to applicable law requiring reestablishment of professional competency. Shechet received a score of 3 out of a possible score of 100. The established passing grade for the examination is 75. The examination consisted of 100 multiple choice questions, each with 4 responses. The approved method of answering the questions was to select one response and then, on the answer sheet, darken the circle corresponding to the letter assigned to the selected response. If more than one circle is darkened in a given set of responses, the answer is marked wrong. In each of the 100 answers, Shechet marked more than one response either by darkening, check mark or "X". On May 13, 1977, the State Board of Accountancy suspended Shechet's certificate R-0573 as a certified public accountant for failing to comply with requirements for the reestablishment of his professional knowledge and competency to practice public accounting.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether the allegations of the Amended Administrative Complaint are correct, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Respondent was a certified residential real estate appraiser, holding Florida license number RD3233. At all times material to this case, James Berry was a registered real estate appraiser trainee, holding Florida license number RI16607. Mr. Berry was in training with the Respondent, who was his supervisory appraiser. On December 11, 2006, the Respondent and Mr. Berry issued an appraisal report for residential property located at 9602 Whilehall Street, Naples, Florida, 34109, the "subject property." Mr. Berry conducted the appraisal and prepared the computer-generated appraisal report. He thereafter affixed his digital signature to the report as the appraiser. The Respondent reviewed Mr. Berry's appraisal and thereafter affixed his digital signature to the report as the supervisory appraiser. The appraisal report was on a form designated as "Freddie Mac Form 70, March 2005" and "Fannie Mae Form 1004, March 2005." Beginning on page five and continuing onto page six of the form was an "appraiser's certification." Included within the appraiser's certification was a statement that the appraiser "performed a complete visual inspection of the interior and exterior areas of the subject property." Page six of the form included a "supervisory appraiser's certification." The supervisory appraiser's certification did not state that the supervisory appraiser conducted a visual inspection of the property. The lower part of page six contained a boxed portion containing separate parts that were divided only by space between blocks of text. On the left side of the boxed portion was a part titled "APPRAISER" that included the appraiser's name, license number, company name and address, and appraisal date. It also included the appraiser's digital signature and the date of signature. Below the appraiser's information was a part titled "ADDRESS OF PROPERTY APPRAISED" that included the address and valuation of the subject property. Below the part titled "ADDRESS OF PROPERTY APPRAISED" was a part titled "LENDER/CLIENT" that included the relevant information. On the right side of the boxed portion was a part titled "SUPERVISORY APPRAISER (ONLY IF REQUIRED)" that included the supervisory appraiser's name, license number, company name and address, the supervisory appraiser's digital signature, and the date of signature. Below the part titled "SUPERVISORY APPRAISER (ONLY IF REQUIRED)" was a part titled "SUBJECT PROPERTY," which included the following boxes and text: Did not inspect subject property Did inspect exterior of subject property from street Date of Inspection Did inspect interior and exterior of subject property Date of Inspection Below the part titled "SUBJECT PROPERTY" was a part titled "COMPARABLE SALES," which included the following boxes and text: Did not inspect exterior of comparable sales from street Did inspect exterior of comparable sales from street Date of Inspection The appraisal form contained no instructions to specifically indicate whether the appraiser or the supervisory appraiser was responsible for completing the "SUBJECT PROPERTY" part. Mr. Berry had performed the interior and exterior inspection of the subject property. In completing the form on the computer, Mr. Berry checked the box within the "SUBJECT PROPERTY" part indicating that the interior and exterior of the property had been inspected. The Respondent did not inspect the interior and exterior of the subject property. The evidence is insufficient to establish that either Mr. Berry or the Respondent knew that the supervisory appraiser was apparently responsible for completing the "SUBJECT PROPERTY" part of the boxed section. The Petitioner asserted that the client for the appraiser at issue in this proceeding ("Landwatch/Countryside") required that a supervisory appraiser perform an interior and exterior inspection of the subject property. The assertion was not supported by credible evidence and is rejected.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, enter a final order finding Frank LaPlatte in violation of one count of Subsection 475.624(14), Florida Statutes (2006), and imposing an administrative fine of $2,500 and a six-month suspension, during which an appropriate USPAP course must be completed, followed by a three-year period of probation. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert Minarcin, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 801N Orlando, Florida 32801-1757 David F. Garber, Esquire Garber, Hooley & Holloway, LLP 700 Eleventh Street South, Suite 202 Naples, Florida 34102 Ned Luczynski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Thomas W. O'Bryant, Jr., Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 802N Orlando, Florida 32801
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant, Respondents Wardlaw and Etue were Certified Public Accountants licensed by the State of Florida. A Complaint for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief was filed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) which alleged, among other charges against other codefendants, that Wardlaw and Etue had engaged and, unless enjoined, would engage directly and indirectly in aiding and abetting others (notably A.T. Bliss & Co. and some of its principals), in acts, practices and a course of business that constituted and would constitute violations of Section 17(a) of the Federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 78m(a), Rules 13a-1 and 13a-13, 71 C.F.R. 240.13a-1 and 240.13a-13. Individual consents to Entry of Final Judgment of Permanent Injunction were entered by each Respondent by which they each consented to the entry of a Final Judgment of Permanent Injunction against themselves. By a Final Judgment of Permanent Injunction as to each Respondent, each Respondent was permanently restrained and enjoined in connection with the offer or sale of any securities issued by A. T. Bliss and Company, Inc. and from other certain wrongful acts. By an Order Instituting Proceedings and Accepting Resignation from Practice Before the Commission pursuant to Rule 2(e) [See 17 C.F.R. Section 2O1.2(e)] of the Commission's Rule of Practice, each Respondent was separately identified as a Certified Public Accountant who has appeared and practiced before the Securities and Exchange Commission, and based upon certain stated facts, the Commission stated in its separate Orders as to each Respondent the following: In view of the foregoing, the Commission finds that it is in the public interest to institute proceedings and to impose a remedial sanction. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED: Proceedings pursuant to Rule 2(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice be and hereby are instituted against Stuart C. Wardlaw (James E. Etue). The resignation of Stuart C. Wardlaw (James E. Etue) from practicing before the Commission is hereby accepted. Stuart C. Wardlaw (James E. Etue) shall not, in his capacity as an independent public accountant, directly or indirectly perform any audit service or render any opinion concerning financial statements which he has reason to believe will be contained in any filing with the Commission or prepare financial statements which he has reason to believe will be included in filings with the Commission. (Emphasis supplied) The public accounting firm of Etue, Wardlaw, and Company, C.P.A., performed accounting services in connection with the issuance of audits of financial statements of A. T. Bliss and Company for the years 1979 and 1980. Respondents Etue and Wardlaw were each 50 percent shareholders of the certified public accounting firm, which was formed December 1, 1979. Etue was President and Wardlaw was Vice-President and Secretary-Treasurer. Neither Wardlaw nor Etue had extensive experience in the field of auditing prior to formation of the firm, having only been licensed as certified public accountants since 1976. A. T. Bliss and Company (hereafter, Bliss) only became a public corporation in 1980. However, during the latter part of the calendar year 1979, Bliss entered into the business of manufacturing and distributing solar hot water heating systems. Sales were made to various investors, who financed the purchase through 15 and 30 year notes, plus a cash downpayment, with the notes receivable consisting of both recourse and nonrecourse long-term notes. The 1979 and 1980 audited financial statements prepared by Respondents recognized revenue on the accrual basis. It is the auditor's responsibility to determine whether the company issuing those statements has chosen a method of revenue recognition that complies with generally accepted accounting principles. The accrual method of revenue recognition is the generally accepted and preferred method in public accounting, unless the collectibility of the sales price is not reasonably assured. When collection is over an extended period and because of the terms of the transactions or other conditions there is no reasonable basis for estimating the degree of collectibility, the installment sales or cost recovery methods of revenue recognition may be used and are normally preferred. Bliss' revenue recognition policy in 1979 and 1980 recognized the sale at the time of executing the contract and receiving the cash down payment, with a recording of all costs of sales and establishing an allowance for doubtful collections. Petitioner contends that there was insufficient information gathered and sufficient information could not have been gathered by Wardlaw and Etue due to the lack of history of the relatively new company's (Bliss') collections and the length of the extended collection period (15 to 30 years) by which they could reasonably use the accrual method of revenue recognition instead of either the installment method or cost recovery method of revenue recognition, preferably the latter. Respondents contend that sufficient information was collected but not documented. By either assessment, it is clear that there was a violation of generally accepted accounting principles simply in the Respondents' failure to document. The greater weight of the credible expert testimony is accepted that the information gathered or "known" or "understood" by the Respondents concerning the collectibility of a few notes was both of insufficient quantity and quality so as to further offend generally accepted accounting principles. Further, the applicable accounting publications and pronouncements, particularly Accounting Principles Board Opinion 10, (APB 10) strongly suggest that if the collection of the receivables is not reasonably assured, the cost recovery or installment method of revenue recognition should be utilized. In making this finding of fact, the undersigned specifically rejects Respondents' suggestion that both the recourse and non-recourse notes had a high collectibility factor based on the present personal wealth of a small sampling of makers of these notes and based upon the assumption from a still smaller sampling that most solar unit purchasers would stay in for the long haul because they were investing for tax advantages. Equally unpersuasive is the Respondents' argument that because solar units may be attached to buildings and financed over a long period of time Respondents were entitled to utilize real estate sales accounting principles in their financial statements and accountants' reports, all without adequate documentation in their work papers. Based upon the absence of any collection information in the work papers, the 15-30 year collection periods and the fact that none of the notes had any lengthy collection period, those expert opinions that the installment method or cost recovery method of revenue recognition would have more appropriately presented the financial condition of the company in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and generally accepted and prevailing standards of accounting practice are accepted. Although Respondent Etue is correct that APB 10 is couched in permissive not mandatory language, it is significant that Respondents' C.P.A. expert, David Levy testified that the lack of documentation in Respondents' work papers precluded him from forming an opinion that the accrual method of revenue recognition fairly presented the financial position of Bliss and that Respondents' financial statements and accountants' reports do not comply with generally accepted accounting principles. Bliss' net income, if determined by either of the preferred methods (installment or cost recovery) rather than by the accrual method selected by Respondents would be materially lower than the amount reported in the 1979 and 1980 audited financial statements. See Finding of Fact 8, below. The significance of this variation could have been minimized or at least lessened by making a full and specific disclosure within the respective financial statements that the accrual method of revenue recognition had been utilized. This was not done by Respondents. Instead, the Summary of Significant Accounting Policies presented in the notes to the 1979 and 1980 financial statements did not disclose the revenue recognition policy utilized, except by a blanket statement that the financial statements (not necessarily the revenue recognition method of the client company) were presented on the accrual basis. Bliss' revenue recognition policy would materially affect its financial position, results of operations, and changes in financial position. Generally accepted and prevailing standards of accounting practice would require the disclosure of such a significant accounting policy in light of the doubtfulness of collectibility of the long term notes. In making this finding of fact, the undersigned specifically rejects the Respondents' basically antithetical propositions advanced at hearing that either (1) anyone reading these financial statements is so sufficiently knowledgeable that he would automatically infer from the notes thereto that the accrual method of cost recovery had been utilized or (2) most persons reading the financial statements would not have the accounting background to appreciate the information if properly disclosed. Respondent Etue maintains that the fact that there is a difference in net income using the accrual method versus a cost recovery or installment sales method is immaterial or has little meaning as there is always a difference using the different methods and because depending upon the total volume of sales, there could be differences of billions of dollars. Even accepting this proposal and Respondent Etue's additional proposition that Certified Public Accountant Reilly's demonstrative figures utilized at hearing may have been slightly distorted, it still appears that concerning the revenue recognition policy alone, Bliss' 1979 financial statement showed close to a $735,000 net income rather than a $20,000-plus loss, as reflected by subsequent audits/restatements of that year. Showing close to a 2.3 million dollar net income rather than about $77,000 in the second year (again as reflected by subsequent audits/restatements) surely reflects at least that the Respondents' accounting decisions were major enough to warrant outside consultation or substantial research and documentation of decisions. Respondents failed to consult and failed to document substantial research and decision factors. These deviations of practice by Respondents are clearly material. There is no reference whatsoever in the 1979 work papers to the determination of the reasonableness of the 60 percent allowance for doubtful collections for notes receivable. Note Two (2) to the 1980 Bliss financial statements disclosed that 50 percent of the total notes receivable in 1980 constituted the allowance for doubtful collections for notes receivable. There is no documentation in the audit work papers to substantiate any audit review to determine the reasonableness of the allowance for doubtful collections for notes receivable except the following statement: "Reserve of 50 percent is reasonable Client has now a full year of experience and knows better the collectibility. Additionally, the ratio of nonrecourse to recourse has changed dramatically in 1980, with more people taking recourse loans. Accordingly, management felt there would be less losses than the 60 percent reserve in 1979 due to the shift. Although there are no dollar statistics to support the 50 percent reserve, it seems to be a reasonable conservative estimate." Considerable testimony was heard from each Respondent as to how this note came to be created. Recitation of most would be subordinate and unnecessary and contrary to the concept of ultimate findings of fact. However, the basic facts adduced are that it arose through collaboration of Wardlaw and Etue to at least some degree. See Finding of Fact 14, below. Despite all of the foregoing the uncertainty in determining a 50 percent allowance suggests strongly that Respondents as auditors merely accepted representations from Bliss' principals without adequate empirical testing and auditing of the judgment and further demonstrates the uncertainty of collections, thereby more strongly indicating that a different approach than the accrual method of revenue recognition should have been selected, because in the accrual method of revenue recognition, the sale is recognized at the time of the entry into a long term note and here, under the circumstances of the instant case, there was inadequate data to form a conclusion as to the collectibility of all monies due under the note. Pursuant to the most credible expert accountants' testimony, this failure in the audit with regard to the 50 percent reserve was a failure to comply with generally accepted and prevailing standards of accounting practice and constituted a departure from generally accepted accounting principles and generally accepted auditing standards, but it also appears from the evidence as a whole to be at least partly attributable to Respondents' inexperience in auditing, which was alluded to earlier. The greater violation occurred by the Respondents' failure to recognize the impartiality required of them in certified public accounting practice and their willingness to impose, as it were, their C.P.A. "imprimatur" upon the Bliss financial statements by an opinion without any qualifying language (an unqualified opinion). See Finding of Fact 7, above. Pursuant to Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) provisions 169.105 and 165.109, receivables of the nature retained by Bliss, must be recorded at their present value. The discount resulting from the determination of the present value should be reported on the balance sheet as a direct deduction to the face amount of the note, or properly disclosed in the footnotes to the financial statements. There was no adjustment to present value for lower than prevailing interest rates in the 1979 financial statements, nor any disclosure in the footnotes to the financial statements beyond that previously discussed. The 1980 financial statement, disclosed in Note 2 that the 50 percent allowance for doubtful collections included both a provision for uncollectibility as well as a reduction in value due to a lower than prevailing interest rate. The footnote did not distinguish between the two and the total allowance was included in the operating expenses, when the greater weight of the credible expert witness testimony is that the adjustment to present value for lower than prevailing interest rates should have been made as a reduction of sales. The failure to separately disclose the discount and the reserve for doubtful accounts fails to conform with generally accepted accounting principles, specifically APB 21, which requires that the discount is to be made as a reduction of sales. The audit note disclosed that the entire 50 percent allowance was management's estimated allowance for doubtful collections and, after the fact, and without any supportable calculations, the 50 percent figure now included the adjustment in value due to a lower than prevailing interest rate. Proceeding as Respondents did resulted in a material misstatement of gross revenue and operating expenses for 1980, which fails to comply with generally accepted and prevailing standards of accounting practice and which fails to conform to generally accepted accounting principles. Cost of sales were not presented separately in the 1979 and 1980 audited Bliss financial statements or auditors' notes thereto. Although there is expert testimony by Leo T. Hury, C.P.A., to the effect that failure to separately present cost of sales is a violation of the custom of accounting and not a violation of generally accepted accounting principles, Mr. Hury also felt it departed from generally accepted auditing standards. Moreover, APB 4 states that separate disclosure of the important components of the income statements, such as sales and other sources of revenue, including costs of sales, is presumed to make the financial statement more useful. The cost of sales as a separate item permits the reader of the financial statement to determine the gross profit on sales before other income items come into play. Under the circumstances of the instant case the best that can be said of this violation of "custom" is that it constituted only one of several components of a material misstatement of financial condition, which, if not an independent and specific departure from generally accepted and prevailing standards of public accounting practice, generally accepted accounting principles, and generally accepted auditing standards, was one component of such a departure. The 1979 and 1980 work papers associated with the Bliss audit do not document or justify Respondents' study of accounting policy issues in relation to the financial statements so as to accord with generally accepted auditing standards. In making this finding of fact, the undersigned specifically rejects Respondent Etue's proposal that sufficient competent evidential matter was obtained but not documented in the 1979 work papers while the 1980 work papers evidence compliance with generally accepted auditing standards. The proposal is rejected because the expert testimony is consistent that an accountant's "work papers" are to be a "catch all" of supporting documentation for not only the final figures reported but for his studies of accounting issues, judgment calls of accounting policies and principles, and his explanation of selected methodologies as well. Failure of the work papers to adequately reveal how these decisions were reached either indicates that the studies were not done, not documented, or the work papers were defectively maintained, any of which constitutes at least minimal noncompliance with generally accepted and prevailing standards of accounting practice. The Respondents only minimally agree upon what separate responsibilities each had with regard to Bliss' account and financial statements. As might be expected, the elements of "control," "final authority," "sign-off authority," "final say," and "ultimate authority" were used by both Respondents with some considerable variation of meaning. Where there was agreement or only minor deviation, those portions of their respective evidence has been reconciled and accepted. However, each Respondent has a high stake in the outcome of these proceedings and where each characterized their respective responsibilities with regard to the Bliss account generally, and with regard to the 1979 and 1980 Bliss financial statements specifically, in diametrically different ways, greater reliance has been placed on the testimony of Allan Karp, the independent contract accountant who performed the 1980 field work. By any and all points of view, however, and for want of better legal terminology, it would appear that this was a situation that fluctuated from both to neither of the C.P.A. Respondents "minding the store." Respondent Wardlaw was the titular "partner in charge" of both the 1979 and 1980 Bliss audits. Respondent Etue had obtained the client initially and both he and Wardlaw initially met with the client. Prior to introducing Wardlaw to the Bliss principals Etue advised them that he, Etue, was on probation with the Board of Accountancy and Wardlaw would be in charge of the audit. Etue had performed two audits prior to the formation of the public accounting corporation that came under the review of the Florida Board of Accountancy and both of which led to the imposition of the discipline of probation in 1978 and 1981. 1/ Etue's reasons for Wardlaw taking charge of the audits were the language in his prior stipulation with the Board of Accountancy and because he believed he needed improvement in auditing. Petitioner desires that the inference be drawn from portions of each Respondent's testimony taken out of context that Etue concealed from Wardlaw that he, Etue, had done previous audits and represented that he, Etue, was precluded from doing Bliss' audits, and that by these misrepresentations Etue maneuvered Wardlaw into assuming the partner-in-charge responsibilities for the express purpose of avoiding oversight by the Board of Accountancy of the Bliss audits. However, the full context of the Respondents' respective testimony, the internal contradictions of Wardlaw's testimony, and the general vagueness of both Respondents' testimony do not support Petitioner's inference and preclude its acceptance. The custom of the profession of certified public accounting is that the "partner-in-charge" bears the ultimate responsibility of the conduct of a certified audit, including supervision of subordinates, final review of the auditor's work, and recommendations for corrections and changes. That is not precisely what occurred as between these Respondents. Although Wardlaw was responsible for the field work in the 1979 audit, one Sherry Carasik in Wardlaw's office nine miles from where Etue's office was located did the bulk of the work under his supervision, including preparation of the work papers and tests of transactions involved in the field work. Etue had no supervisory responsibility for the 1979 audit and did little if any of the actual field work. Etue did, at Wardlaw's request, however, prepare a list of items to be performed in the audit. This does not support the inference that Etue deferred to Wardlaw's superior auditing experience but quite the opposite, supports the inference that Etue was instructing Wardlaw or they were jointly deciding courses of action with Wardlaw deferring to Etue. Later, Etue also drafted the confirmation letters to be mailed to all investors and edited Wardlaw's letter to Bliss recommending changes to the footnote disclosure. Respondent Wardlaw testified that all major decisions concerning accounting policies re Bliss were discussed with Respondent Etue and concurrence and "joint decisions" were reached between them. Allan Karp materially confirms this testimony with regard to the 1980 audit procedure on the few occasions he was able to view the two Respondents together. It was Karp's view that Respondent Etue was his primary employer who supervised Karp in performance of the 1980 Bliss audit with Wardlaw dropping by periodically but mostly operating out of his separate office. Wardlaw's involvement in the 1980 audit was in the nature of a review partner performing a "cold review" after audit completion but before finalization. In 1980, Etue also assisted Karp with inventory as part of the field work, discussed with Karp his concerns about related parties, and helped Karp locate materials for a portion of the audit. The joint decisions with regard to assessing collectibility have been discussed supra.
The Issue Whether or not existing Rule 21A-20.012 F.A.C. is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. See, Sections 120.52(8) and 120.56 F.S.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Silvia S. Ibanez is a practicing attorney and a member of the Florida Bar, and holds active Florida CPA License No. 10842, currently in good standing. She is also a Registered Investment Advisor with the Florida Division of Securities and a certified financial planner (CFP). She has been charged with violating Rule 21A-20.012 F.A.C. in DOAH Case No. 91-4100 which is currently pending before the Division of Administrative Hearings. As a licensee with the federal Securities and Exchange Commission, Petitioner is required to, and does, disclose the fact that she is a CPA. Petitioner Ibanez is listed in the yellow pages under the heading "Attorneys" as "Ibanez, Silvia, S., CPA, CFP." On its face, there is nothing false or fraudulent about this listing. As an attorney, Petitioner also places CPA after her name on her business cards and on her letterhead. Respondent contends that because Petitioner "holds out" to the public as a CPA, uses accounting skills, and provides one or more types of management, advisory, or consulting services, she is currently "practicing public accounting." Intervenor James R. Brewster is also a practicing attorney, a Board- certified tax lawyer, and a member of the Florida Bar, and holds an active Florida CPA license. Mr. Brewster has been charged with violating Rule 21A- 20.012 F.A.C. in DOAH Case No. 90-3278 which is currently pending before the Division of Administrative Hearings. The administrative complaint therein charges violations of Rule 21A-20.012 F.A.C. and Sections 473.323(1)(a), (g), and (h) F.S. on the basis that Brewster's law firm letterhead designates him as a "CPA" and the law firm is not licensed by the Board of Accountancy as a public accounting firm. Intervenor American Association of Attorney Public Accountants (AAA- CPA) is a not-for-profit corporation with its principal place of business in Mission Viejo, California. Founded in 1964, the AAA-CPA is an active professional organization of persons dually qualified as both attorneys and CPAs. Its membership is comprised of practitioners in public accounting, law, government, education, and other activities. One of the functions of the AAA- CPA is to engage in the analysis and discussion of ethical and other issues related to practitioners who are dually licensed in the accounting and law professions. This includes monitoring and commenting upon legislation affecting the practice of law and public accountancy and participating in the development of ethical standards of lawyers and CPAs. AAA-CPA's substantial interests are affected by this proceeding in that its members are CPAs who are directly affected by the definition, scope, and regulation of the practice of public accounting by Florida statutes and rules. Respondent Board of Accountancy is an agency of the State of Florida established pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 473 F.S. Pursuant to Section 473.301 F.S., the Board is authorized in the following language to regulate the "practice of public accounting": Purpose.--The Legislature recognizes that there is a public need for independent and objective public accountants and that it is necessary to regulate the practice of public accounting to assure the minimum competence of practitioners and the accuracy of audit statements upon which the public relies and to protect the public from dishonest practitioners and, therefore, deems it necessary in the interest of public welfare to regulate the practice of public accountancy in this state. Respondent Department of Professional Regulation is an umbrella agency for the Board of Accountancy, established under the provisions of Section 20.16 and Chapter 455 F.S. Intervenor Florida Institute of Certified Public Accountants (FICPA) is a Florida not-for-profit corporation with its principal place of business in Tallahassee. Founded in 1905, the FICPA is an active professional organization with approximately 17,800 members. Its membership is comprised of practitioners in public accounting, industry, government, education, law, and other activities. One of the functions of the FICPA is to engage in the analysis and discussion of issues related to the accounting profession. This includes monitoring the scope of services provided by certified public accountants in Florida and throughout the United States, monitoring legislation affecting the practice of public accountancy, and participating in the development of auditing, accounting, and ethical standards of CPAs. Intervenor FICPA's substantial interests are affected by this proceeding in that its members are CPAs who are directly affected by the definition, scope, and regulation of the practice of public accounting by Florida statutes and rules. It is even recognized in the statute. See, Section 473.302 F.S., infra. Challenged existing Rule 21A-20.012 F.A.C., also referred to as the "holding out" rule, provides as follows: 21A-20.012 Holding Out. "Holding himself or itself out" as used in Section 473.302(4), F.S. is defined as publicizing that the licensee is a certified public accountant when providing, or offering to provide services or products to the public, in such a manner that an uninformed person may not be able to differentiate whether or not the licensee may also be in the practice of public accounting. The display of the CPA certificate and license issued by the Department of Professional Regulation shall not constitute holding out under the terms of this rule. All other publication of the fact that a licensee is a CPA constitutes holding oneself out. The specific statutory authorities currently cited by the agency for the rule are Sections 473.302, 473.304 and 473.307 F.S. and the law implemented is cited as Section 473.302 F.S. Section 473.307, dealing with "experience," does not impinge on these proceedings. The remaining authorities provide as follows: Definitions.--As used in this act: "Board" means the Board of Accountancy. "Department" means the Department of Professional Regulation. "Certified public accountant" means a person who holds a license to practice public accounting in this state under the authority of this act. "Practice of," "practicing public accountancy," or "public accounting" means: Offering to perform or performing for the public one or more types of services involving the use of accounting skills or one or more types of management advisory consulting services, by a certified public accountant or firm of certified public accountants, of this state, including the performance of such services in the employ of another person; or Offering to perform or performing for the public one or more types of services involving the use of accounting skills or one or more types of management advisory or consulting services, by any other person holding himself or itself out as a certified public accountant or firm of certified public accountants, including the performance of such services by a certified public accountant in the employ of a person so holding himself or itself out. However, these terms shall not include services provided by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the Florida Institute of Certified Public Accountants, or any full service association of certified public accounting firms whose plans of administration have been approved by the board, to their members or services performed by these entities in reviewing the services provided to the public by members of these entities. [Emphasis supplied] 473.304 Rules of board.--The board shall adopt all rules necessary to administer this act. Every licensee shall be governed and controlled by this act and the rules adopted by the Board. Also relevant to these proceedings is Section 473.322 F.S. which provides as follows: 473.322 Prohibitions; penalties.-- No person shall knowingly: Practice public accounting unless the person is a certified public accountant or a public accountant; Assume or use the titles or designations "certified public accountant" or "public accountant" or the abbreviations "C.P.A." or any other title, designation, words, letters, abbreviations, sign, card, or device tending to indicate that such person holds an active license under this act, unless such person holds an active license under this act; Attest as an expert in accountancy to the reliability or fairness of presentation of financial information or utilize any form of disclaimer of opinion which is intended or conventionally understood to convey an assurance of reliability as to matters not specifically disclaimed unless such person holds an active license under this act. This subsection shall not prevent the performance by persons other than certified public accountants of other services involving the use of accounting skills including the preparation of tax returns and the preparation of financial statements without expression of opinion thereon. Present as his own the license of another; Give false or forged evidence to the board or a member thereof for the purpose of obtaining a license; Use or attempt to use a public accounting license which has been suspended, revoked, or placed on inactive status; Employ unlicensed persons to practice public accounting; or Conceal information relative to violations of this act. Any person who violates any provisions of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. [Emphasis supplied] Although it has not been challenged, Rule 21A-21.009 F.A.C., the "other business activity rule," is relevant to these proceedings. That existing rule currently provides as follows: 21A-21.009 Other Business Activities. A licensee engaged in the practice of public accounting may concurrently engage in another business, occupation, or profession if: The licensee does not hold himself out as a certified public accountant in that activity, The activity is conducted under a name which the public will not associate with licensee's practice of public accounting, The other business, occupation, or profession is not used to promote the practice of public accounting in any manner prohibited by Chapter 473, F.S., Facilities used by the licensee in his public accounting practice and other activity conform to the requirements of 21A-26.001(3), The entity's dealings with the licensee's public accounting clients shall not violate the provisions of Chapter 473, F.S., and 21A, Florida Administrative Code, relating to integrity and objectivity, The entity does not interpret financial statements, forecasts or projections audited, reviewed, compiled or prepared by others. [Emphasis supplied] Although it has not been challenged, Rule 21A-20.011 F.A.C. is relevant to these proceedings. That existing rule currently provides as follows: 21A-20.011 Practice of, or Practicing Public Accountancy. "Practice of, or practicing public accountancy" as defined by Section 473.302(4), F.S., shall exclude any of the following: Services rendered by a licensee as an employee of a governmental unit or an employee rendering accounting services only to his employer as long as that employer is not required to be licensed under F.S. 473, or Activities of licensees who do not hold themselves out as CPAs and who are not associated with financial statements, or Activities of licensees who do not hold themselves out as certified public accountants. [Emphasis supplied] Petitioner's and Intervenor Brewster's CPA certificates (like all Florida CPA certificates) authorize them to display their CPA credentials. The CPA certificate represents that the recipient . . . has passed all examinations and has met all other requirements prescribed by law and by rule of this board for certification as an expert public accountant, and is therefore entitled to append the letters CPA after this registrant's name to evidence registration by this board as a Certified Public Accountant. [Emphasis supplied] The Board's only classifications of CPA licenses/licensees are "active" or "inactive." "Active" and "inactive" refer to the status of the CPA license and do not refer to or imply that the licensee is actively practicing public accounting. One can be an actively licensed CPA and not be practicing public accounting. Attainment of the CPA credential is an accomplishment that is recognized in the business community. The CPA credential of a Florida-licensed CPA connotes high competency and achievement levels in the discipline of accounting. Truthful communication of the CPA credential by actively licensed CPAs for identification purposes constitutes valuable disclosure to the public. The use of the term "CPA" implies a specific competency to the public. The fact that Petitioner Ibanez or Intervenor Brewster is a CPA is valuable to their respective legal clients. CPA status is a valuable property right to each CPA, and the ability of a practicing attorney to publicize the fact that s/he also holds an active CPA license is a valuable asset to that individual. It is conceded by all parties that it is possible to practice law and public accounting in the same business activity. There are firms that simultaneously hold themselves out as law firms and public accounting firms. The activities of other regulated professionals, such as members of the Florida Bar, which overlap those of practicing CPAs are subject to the regulatory standards of their principal regulated professions and applicable judicial and administrative remedies for malpractice and negligence. It is conceded by all parties that many activities conducted by professionals and nonprofessionals, other than by CPAs and other than by attorneys, are identical to activities performed by CPAs engaged in public accounting. For instance, anyone can legally prepare a tax return. Bookkeepers and free-lance tax assistors of all sorts are unregulated in any way. The only activity among public accounting activities that is a unique activity of CPAs is the "attest" function. See, Section 473.322(1)(c) F.S. Truthful use, communication, or disclosure of the CPA credential by an actively licensed CPA does not per se constitute false, misleading, or deceptive advertising. The evidence does not support a finding that withholding truthful disclosure that one has earned the CPA credential benefits the public welfare or effects the purposes of the enabling legislation, or indeed, how such nondisclosure could promote them, particularly since it has been shown that persons of considerably lesser competency and achievement levels in the discipline of accounting may legally offer to the public almost all the services provided by CPAs. Prior to 1984, when the "holding out" rule was adopted, a Florida- licensed CPA who offered one or more types of accounting services to the public or who offered one or more types of management advisory or consulting services to the public was considered to be "practicing public accountancy," whether or not that person appended the initials "CPA" after his or her name. The "holding out" rule became effective on September 17, 1984. Chapter 89-87 Laws of Florida amended Section 473.302(4) F.S. (i.e., the definition of public accountancy) but the amendment did not change the previously existing "holding out" language therein. The "holding out" rule was adopted more than one year before the initiation of this rule challenge. There is no dispute among the parties that the definition within the challenged Rule 21A-20.012 F.A.C. is circular. In attempting to define the term "holding out" so that the use of that term in Section 473.302(4) F.S. may be clarified, the rule incorporates the statutory phrase "practice of public accounting," and the term "practice of public accountancy/accounting" in Section 473.302(4)(b) F.S. incorporates the term "holding out," 1/ as does Rule 21A- F.A.C., 2/ which creates exemptions to the statute. At least one purpose of the second sentence of the existing rule seems to have been to allow all CPAs to display their CPA certificates on their inner office walls without fear of disciplinary action by the Board. The Board's expressed rationale for excluding "display of a CPA certificate" from its "holding out" rule is premised on the fact that during an office visit, a CPA can immediately disabuse any individual of the fact that s/he is practicing public accounting once that individual is inside the CPA's office. However, Petitioner demonstrated, and the Board conceded, that an individual may have the opportunity to disabuse members of the public that s/he is engaged in the activity of the practice of public accounting or that s/he is offering all the services normally associated with a CPA, as opposed to law or some other profession, at least where there is direct contact by letter or telephone. Clearly, there are many ways a nonattesting, actively licensed CPA who is dually licensed can clarify to those seeking his or her services which profession, function, or service s/he is willing to perform for that client. On the other hand, the challenged rule does not deal with all members of the public, or members of the public specifically seeking CPA services, or members of the public seeking some other service. The rule deals with "uninformed persons." As used in the rule, the term "uninformed person" is undefined and has been subject to differing speculative interpretations by the Board and by non-Board witnesses, some of which interpretations address such broad categories as anyone using a telephone book. The Board also suggested that only display of the original CPA certificate on an inside office wall would be exempt from prosecution for publication, but a reasonable person could interpret the rule on its face to permit posting the CPA certificate or an exact facsimile of the certificate on a sign outside an office building or circulating as business cards exact reduced- size copies of the certificate even though these types of "publication" or "display" would not provide the same opportunity as an office visit would provide for the CPA to disclose to individuals the actual services the CPA was offering to perform. Accordingly, there has been no rational basis for the "holding out" rule's distinction between "display" of the licensee's CPA certificate and other forms of truthful, nonmisleading publication of the CPA licensure/status. The agency's expressed rationale behind its adoption of the "holding out" rule was to define the meaning of the statutory term "holding out," as used in Section 473.302(4) F.S., a term which has also been adopted into a number of other rules (see, supra), so as to provide guidance on when a person who has been licensed as a CPA is engaged in the "practice of public accounting." Specifically, the Board maintained that the "holding out rule" and the "other business activity rule" give licensees two options. Under the first option, the "holding out" rule permits licensees to retain their CPA certificates when not in compliance with all of the provisions of Chapter 473 F.S. and the rules promulgated thereunder, as long as they do not publicize themselves as CPAs. Alternatively, the Board perceives that under the second option, if licensees do publicize themselves as CPAs when performing services for the public, licensees become subject to regulation by the Board and are held to the standards of competency and conduct which are applicable to all CPAs who use their accounting skills for the public while trading on the fact of their licensure as a Florida CPA. However, the words "publicizing" and "publication" as used in the "holding out" rule are also undefined. Although Respondents submitted that the "common usage" of these words is sufficient to embrace listings in the yellow pages, it is also quite possible to give these words a far broader reading to encompass the "assumption" and "use" of the designation "CPA" and the "assumption" and "use" of the CPA credential, which "assumption" and "use" are specifically reserved to all actively licensed CPAs and which designation is permitted to be inserted after their names on signs, cards, or devices by Section 473.322(1)(b) F.S. [see Finding of Fact No. 11] and by the CPA certificate itself which permits them to "append" CPA after their names [see Finding of Fact No. 14]. The rule has actually subjected CPAs, and specifically has subjected Petitioner and Intervenor Brewster, to DPR disciplinary proceedings independent of any other act or wrongdoing merely for any "publication" of the CPA credential in a form other than display of the original CPA certificate on an inner office wall. The rule may automatically subject attorney-CPA licensees to DPR disciplinary proceedings independent of any other act or wrongdoing merely on the basis of passive, truthful communications which are otherwise in full compliance with the standards of the Florida Supreme Court and Florida Bar. The rule has the potential for being interpreted so as to prohibit CPAs such as Petitioner and Intervenor Brewster from making disclosures of their earned status as CPAs to various regulatory bodies to which they are required by law to disclose that information. See, Findings of Fact 1 and 2, supra. The rule can be invoked to limit their income by chilling their appearances as expert CPA witnesses for a fee even if they never work for an uninformed layman at all. Applicants for certain state employments and candidates for public office may run afoul of the rule due to the disclosure requirements of public office. Even at risk is the CPA called as a factual witness who is then sworn to tell the truth and asked innocuous biographical information. One's desire to attain a CPA credential may be chilled by the hazard of using it. Chapter 473 F.S. contains limitations on competitive negotiation, prohibits accepting contingent fees, prohibits the payment of certain commissions, and establishes other prohibitions to which persons who are deemed to be "practicing public accountancy" must adhere. Some of these prohibitions are contrary to normal, ethical practice of other professions, i.e., acceptance of contingent fees by lawyers. If the rule remains intact, the Board and DPR under Chapters 473 and 455 F.S. have the potential of breaching the confidentiality of CPA-attorneys' legal clients' files. See, Section 473.316(5) and 473.318 F.S. Since attorneys are exclusively overseen by the Florida Supreme Court, the rule potentially violates the doctrine of "separation of powers" among the three branches of state government. Therefore, the definitional rule creates a wedge whereby the Board may insinuate its discipline into other professions and confuses dually licensed CPAs from knowing how they may behave in each profession without running afoul of discipline in the other. In application with other rules, the "holding out" rule sets confusing and varying standards for agency decisions involving attorneys, bankers, CPAs employed by private corporate employers, and CPAs with their own financial consultant firms. The Board of Accountancy has issued a series of letter opinions based on the "holding out rule" or based on that rule read in conjunction with Rule 21A-21.009 F.A.C., the "other business activity rule," which indicate that a Florida CPA who does not "hold out" to the public as a CPA and who is not associated with financial statements is permitted by the Board to engage in other business activities without complying with the provisions of Chapter 473 F.S., that is, not being subject to DPR discipline, because the Board does not view that CPA in those activities as "practicing public accountancy." Also, the Board of Accountancy has issued a series of opinions to the effect that, by virtue of Section 473.302(4) F.S. and the "holding out rule," a CPA who "holds out" (publicizes his or her status as a CPA) is automatically, by definition, "practicing public accounting," regardless of what actual business activity s/he is performing. These opinions also indirectly insinuate the Board of Accountancy into many other professions, including the practice of law, which the Board has no statutory mandate to regulate pursuant to Section 473.301 F.S. The plethora of opinions issued by the Board dramatize the confusion experienced by CPAs who have sought to have the Board interpret the rule in question on a case-by-case basis. Testimony of the Chairman of the Board was offered to establish that absent the challenged rule, the Board cannot reasonably regulate negligence in the profession and that absent the rule, only fraud could be prosecuted by the Board. He testified that, in his opinion, the challenged rule means that a CPA performing tax services for a client is not doing "public accounting" if "CPA" is not appended after the CPA's name in advertising and that that CPA cannot be disciplined by the Board for negligence, any more than he could be disciplined if he were a non-CPA doing tax services. The Chairman further opined that a CPA doing tax services is doing public accounting only if he appends CPA after his name, and in that instance, the Board can and will discipline that CPA for negligence, should he commit any. Further, the Chairman indicated that if Rules 21A-21.009, 21A-20.011, and 21A-20.012 F.A.C. were not simultaneously in place, the actively licensed CPA who places CPA after his name could not be disciplined by the Board for negligence, but only for fraud. Precisely how this would occur was not made clear, but upon the foregoing, together with the Board opinions admitted in evidence, it is concluded that the Board has utilized what purports to be purely a definitional rule to establish disciplinary jurisdiction and that in certain instances the rule puts DPR in the precarious position of only being able to prosecute CPAs with "CPA" appended after their names, but not CPAs who perform the same services and who do not append "CPA" after their names. Such a result is nonsensical. The Board does not seriously suggest that if Rule 21A-20.012 F.A.C. is invalidated, Rule 21A-20.011 would provide a blanket exclusion from all provisions of Chapter 473 F.S. for CPAs "using" or "assuming" or "publicizing" their status. At a minimum, such CPAs would have to maintain their credential as would any other CPA for good character, payment of fees, and recertification for competency based on continuing education. What has actually occurred here is that the Board has consciously utilized Rules 21A-20.011 and 21A-20.012 F.A.C. so as to not enforce Section 473.302(4)(a) as written and so as to selectively enforce only Section 473.302(4)(b) F.S. Then, by its selective enforcement of Rule 21A-20.012, the Board has gone a step further. The Board has "interpreted" Section 473.302(4)(b) to include within Board jurisdiction not those functions, activities, or skills a CPA practices or holds out to the public for a fee as constituting "practicing public accountancy" but has made the definition of "practicing public accountancy" encompass any disclosure of CPA status or skill attainment, regardless of the disclosure's truth and regardless of whether or not the CPA is utilizing any of the functions, activities, or skills of a CPA. By so doing, the Board has exceeded its statutory mandate and legislative purpose as set forth in Section 473.301 F.S. On its face, Rule 21A-20.012 F.A.C. consists of three sentences, which, in relationship to each other, are inconsistent and contradictory. Specifically, sentence ONE seems to be based on the overall representation made by a CPA to "uninformed persons." It simultaneously presumes fraud in the communication of what otherwise would be truthful, passive information. 3/ Sentence THREE subjects the CPA to discipline absent any fraud and totally without consideration to the impression formed by "uninformed persons" from the use of the CPA designation in any manner other than display of the certificate. 4/ Because there are two incompatible definitions in the challenged rule as now drafted, the Board is at liberty to selectively enforce the statute. One CPA could be prosecuted for simple disclosure of credential status or neutral biographical information (Ibanez). Another CPA might be prosecuted only after examination of the totality of his circumstances to determine if the circumstances mislead "uninformed persons" into believing he abides by all the regulations promulgated under Chapter 473 F.S., and still another CPA would never be prosecuted unless he performs the attest function. This is nonsensical and clearly unfair.
The Issue The issue in these consolidated cases is whether disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent's license to practice as a certified public accountant in the state of Florida based upon the alleged violations of Chapter 473, Florida Statutes, set forth in the Amended Administrative Complaints filed by Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: At all times pertinent to these proceedings, Respondent was licensed to practice as a certified public accountant ("CPA") in the state of Florida, having been issued license number AC0001638. Respondent's most recent business address was 224 North Federal Highway, Suite #4, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301. Petitioner has presented evidence of a number of Final Orders entered by the Florida Board of Accountancy (the "Board") against Respondent as a result of prior disciplinary action initiated by Petitioner. While the records presented are somewhat confusing and bear several different case numbers, it appears that, as a result of the various cases, Respondent has been on probation for approximately the last 12 years. According to the records presented, the first action taken against Respondent's license is reflected in a Final Order dated December 31, 1981 and filed on February 8, 1982 in DPR Case Number 0000499. That Final Order indicates that a stipulation executed by Respondent "as to facts, law and discipline" was accepted by the Board "with no changes." The stipulation referenced in that Final Order was not included with the exhibits entered into evidence in this proceeding. Thus, the "facts, law and discipline" are not of record in this case. Next, the Board entered a Final Order dated May 11, 1982 and filed on May 17, 1982 in DPR Case Numbers 16369, 16370 and 15399 imposing a $1,000 fine against Respondent and suspending his license for eighteen (18) months. An Amended Final Order dated September 3, 1982 was filed in DPR Case Numbers 16369, 16370 and 15399 on September 15, 1982. That Amended Final Order accepted a signed stipulation dated July 30, 1982 and modified the Final Order entered on May 11, 1982. In lieu of the fine and suspension imposed in the May 11 Final Order, the Amended Final Order placed Respondent on probation for five years with a requirement for a review of Respondent's practice at the end of each year by a CPA selected by the Department at Respondent's expense. The independent certified public accountant was supposed to submit written and oral reports to the Board and the Department regarding Respondent's compliance with the applicable statutes and rules governing the accounting profession. The Stipulation which was incorporated into the Amended Final Order specifically required Respondent to comply "with all provisions of Chapter 455 and 473, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto." The Stipulation provided in part as follows: The Board shall determine at a public hearing whether [Respondent] has complied with Chapters 455 and 473, F.S. and the rules promulgated thereto. The Board may restrict or prohibit [Respondent's] practice of public accountancy during his period of probation as it deems necessary to protect the public safety and welfare. It is clearly understood and agreed that, in the event the DEPARTMENT, the BOARD or the BOARD'S Probable Cause Panel find sufficient evidence to believe reasonable cause exists that [Respondent] has violated any of the conditions of probation as outlined above, a notice of said violation shall be sent to [Respondent], by certified mail, setting forth the nature of the alleged violation and an emergency hearing will be held by the BOARD or the BOARD'S Probable Cause Panel, and upon a find [sic] of probable cause, [Respondent's] probation may be vacated and his license to practice accountancy in the State of Florida, subject to automatic suspension, with further disciplinary proceedings, pursuant to Chapters 455 and 473, F.S. If Respondent has not complied with all the terms and conditions of this joint stipulation and final order of the BOARD, the BOARD shall enter an Order imposing such further terms and conditions of probation pursuant to the statutory powers set forth in 473.323(1)(3), F.S., and shall further cause said matter to be referred to the BOARD'S Probable Cause Panel or such other jurisdictional authority as may be established for purposes of determining probable cause and initiating further administrative and/or judicial action against the Respondent. * * * [Respondent] expressly waives all further procedural steps and expressly waives all rights to seek judicial review of, or to otherwise challenge or contest the validity of a joint stipulation of facts, conclusions of law and imposition of discipline, and the final order of the BOARD incorporating said stipulation. At a meeting on January 21, 1985, the Florida Board of Accountancy reviewed a report from the consultant hired to conduct the inspection and review of Respondent's public accountancy practice in accordance with the terms of the Amended Final Order entered on September 15, 1982. Based upon its review of the consultant's report, the Board imposed an additional condition of probation that all audits, reviews and compilations prepared by Respondent were to be reviewed prior to their issuance by a CPA selected by Respondent at Respondent's expense. This additional aspect of Respondent's probation was incorporated in a Final Order dated February 15, 1985 and entered on February 28, 1985 in DPR Case Number 0016369. In an Administrative Complaint dated December 4, 1985, Petitioner charged Respondent with violating the terms of his probation by issuing compilations without prior review by another CPA. This Administrative Complaint was assigned DPR Case Number 0063064. As reflected in a Final Order dated February 23, 1987 and filed on March 10, 1987 in DPR Case Number 0063064, Respondent's probation was extended until September 1988 based upon a signed Stipulation dated November 16, 1986 which was accepted by the Board during its meeting on January 30, 1987. As a result of the March 10, 1987 Final Order extending Respondent's probation, Respondent was required to continue to obtain review and approval by an independent CPA prior to issuance of any audited financial statements, reviewed financial statements and compiled financial statements and related accountant's reports. In an Administrative Complaint dated December 7, 1989 in DPR Case Number 0063064, Petitioner charged Respondent with violating Section 473.323(1)(g), Florida Statutes, as a result of his issuance of financial statements without prior review by a CPA as required by the previous Final Orders entered against Respondent. The Complaint did not specify any date(s) or specific financial statements involved. At a meeting on February 22, 1990, the Board accepted a Counter- Settlement Stipulation signed by Respondent on March 26, 1990 in Case Number 0063064. The Board entered a Final Order dated April 4, 1990 and filed on April 10, 1990 confirming its acceptance of the Counter-Stipulation. 2/ The Counter- Settlement Stipulation incorporated in the April 1990 Final Order extended Respondent's probation "until the terms of probation have been met." The terms of probation were stated to be: That the Respondent shall not violate the provisions of Chapters 455 or 473, Florida Statutes or the rules promulgated pursuant thereto or the terms and conditions of this joint stipulation. A Department of Professional Regulation Certified Public Accountant consultant shall interview the Respondent's clients to determine the type of work product they are receiving from the Respondent. A Department of Professional Regulation Certified Public Accountant Consultant shall conduct a review of the Respondent's tax practice along with work papers at the Respondent's expense. The Counter-Stipulation further provided that: Respondent and the Department fully understand that this Stipulation, and the subsequent Final Order incorporating same, will not in any way preclude additional proceedings by the Board and/or Department against the Respondent for acts or omissions not specifically detailed in the investigative findings of the Department upon which a finding of probable cause was made. Respondent and the Department expressly waive all further procedural steps, and expressively waives [sic] all rights to seek judicial review of or to otherwise challenge or contest the validity of the joint stipulation and the Final Order of the Board, if said stipulation is accepted by the Board and incorporated in the Final Order.... In early 1991, Marlyn Felsing, a CPA retained as a consultant to conduct a review of Respondent's work pursuant to the terms of his probation, met with Respondent and reviewed financial statements, work papers and various tax returns prepared by Respondent for his clients. Felsing reviewed the financial statements and/or business tax returns for approximately four of Respondent's business clients and reviewed the personal income tax returns for approximately three of Respondent's clients who were business owners. He also reviewed all of the related work papers and discussed his review with Respondent. Felsing prepared a report dated April 23, 1991 detailing several problems and deficiencies he found during his review. A copy of Felsing's report was offered into evidence in this case and he testified at the hearing regarding many of those findings. This evidence was offered in support of the charges in the First DOAH Complaint (DOAH Case Number 92-3421) as amended. Neither Felsing's report nor any of his findings are specifically alleged in the First DOAH Complaint. That Complaint referenced a probation report which "revealed deficiencies which were brought before the Probable Cause Panel, and it was determined that Respondent had violated the terms of the Final Order." As noted in the Preliminary Statement above, the First DOAH Complaint was filed on January 23, 1992. As reflected in a Final Order dated June 19, 1991, and filed on July 1, 1991 in DPR Case Number 0063064, the Board reviewed a probation report during its meeting on May 21, 1991 and approved a settlement stipulation extending the probation imposed by the April 4, 1990 Final Order for a period of one (1) year. The settlement stipulation referenced in this July 1, 1991 Order has not been offered into evidence in this proceeding. As best can be determined from the evidence presented in this case, the Final Order entered in DPR Case Number 0063064 on July 1, 1991, was entered after review of the probation report prepared by Marlyn Felsing on April 23, 1991. Thus, it appears that the Board has already taken final action with respect to the deficiencies found in Felsing's report. During the Board Meeting on May 21, 1991, the Board also considered whether disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent with respect to another Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent on January 7, 1991. That new Administrative Complaint was assigned DPR Case Number 95979 and contained allegations that Respondent "was associated with personal financial statements for Michael Raybeck which did not meet the appropriate standards." As reflected in a Final Order dated June 19, 1991 and filed on July 1, 1991 in DPR Case Number 95979, the Board during its May 21, 1991 meeting accepted a settlement stipulation signed by Respondent on April 15, 1991. In that settlement stipulation, Respondent admitted the allegations in the Administrative Complaint in DPR Case Number 95979. The Settlement Stipulation provided as follows: * * * Stipulated Disposition 2. Respondent's license to practice public accounting is currently on probation in case number 63064. Probation in this case shall run concurrently with the probation in case number 63064. The same CPA consultant who is assigned to review the Respondent's practice in Case Number 63064 shall also review the personal financial statements the Respondent's office prepares. The consultant shall also review the Respondent's records to determine whether he is accepting commissions. These additional terms shall also be paid for by the Respondent. * * * 5. Respondent and the Department fully under- stand that this Stipulation, and the subsequent Final Order incorporating same, will not in any way preclude additional proceedings by the Board and/or Department against the Respondent for acts or omissions not specifically detained [sic] in the investigative findings of the Department upon which a finding of probable cause was made. * * * 8. This Settlement Stipulation is [sic] an admission of any liability on behalf of the Respondent and is being entered into merely to resolve a dispute. It shall not be admissible in any court of law or any subsequent adminis- trative proceeding for any purpose. As reflected in an Order dated September 29, 1992 and filed on September 30, 1992 in DPR Case Number 90-95979, the Board reviewed a probation report during its September 24, 1992 meeting and determined "that the probation imposed upon Respondent by the Final Order dated July 1, 1991, shall be extended and/or modified as follows: extend probation and defer action until Case Number 90-13254 is resolved." Case Number 90-13254 is the Second DOAH Complaint, which was filed on July 6, 1992 (DOAH Case Number 92-5696). The Second DOAH Complaint includes specific allegations against Respondent based upon his purported preparation of misleading financial statements for American British Enterprises, Inc. and Federal Restaurants, Inc. The Second DOAH Complaint The evidence presented in this case established that Respondent provided a number of accounting services to American British Enterprises, Inc. and Federal Restaurants, Inc. The exact nature and scope of the services provided by Respondent are not entirely clear. Respondent's records of his engagement include a balance sheet of Federal Restaurants as of August 17, 1987; Consolidated Financial Statements of American British Enterprises, Inc. as of August 25, 1987; Interim Compiled Financial Statements, American British Enterprises, March 31, 1988; Financial Statements of American British Enterprises, Inc. November 30, 1988; and Financial Statements of American British Enterprises, Inc., December 31, 1988. The Second DOAH Complaint, as amended, alleges that the financial statements referenced in paragraph 19 above were included in due diligence packages for American British Enterprises and were distributed to broker- dealers. No persuasive evidence was presented regarding any such distribution. The Second DOAH Complaint also alleges that "Respondent distributed misleading financial statements to brokers with the purpose of driving up the price of the stock so they could sell shares they controlled at a profit." No evidence was presented to support this allegation. Respondent's counsel suggested that all of the financial statements in question were simply drafts and were not intended to be issued. The evidence established that Respondent executed a letter in connection with the August 17, 1987 Balance Sheet of Federal Restaurants which provided as follows: I have examined the accompanying Balance Sheet of Federal Restaurants, Inc., as of August 17, 1987 whose sole Assets are Cash and [sic] Purchase Deposit. My examination was made in accordance with standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and accordingly, included such procedures as I considered necessary in the circumstances. In my opinion the enclosed Balance Sheet represents the financial position of Federal Restaurants, Inc., as of August 17, 1987 in accordance with generally accepted accounting principals. Similarly, Respondent's records include a signed letter to the Board of Directors of American British Enterprises in connection with the August 28, 1987 Consolidated Balance Sheet. That letter provides that Respondent conducted an examination "in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards and accordingly, included such tests of the accounting records and such other auditing procedures as I considered necessary in the circumstances." The letter further opines that the financial statements "present fairly the Consolidated Financial Position...[of the companies] in conformity with generally accepted accounting principals." Respondent's records also include a signed letter regarding both the November, 1988 and December, 1988 Financial Statements for American British Enterprises indicating that Respondent had conducted an audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards and that, in his opinion, the financial statements "present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position" of the company as of the stated date. There is no indication on any of these financial statements that they were drafts that were not to be issued. Aside from the letters noted in paragraph 22, the only evidence presented that any of the financial statements listed in paragraph 19 above were issued was the testimony of one of Petitioner's experts who suggested that the statements had to have been issued since they were found in the SEC's files. However, no direct evidence was presented to establish that any investors or potential investors received the financial statements. Moreover, no evidence was presented that any such investors suffered a loss as a result of their reliance upon the financial statements. Certified public accountants are required to utilize specific guidelines in the performance of accounting services. Those guidelines are codified in the Statements on Standards for Accounting and Review Services ("SSARS"). The failure to abide by the SSARS guidelines constitutes performance below acceptable accounting standards. Petitioner has presented testimony from two experts regarding the deficiencies in the various financial statements referenced in paragraph 19 above. Many of the problems cited by Petitioner's experts relate to alleged deficiencies in Respondent's work papers. Respondent's expert has challenged some of those alleged deficiencies. Because the work papers have not been offered into evidence, it is impossible to resolve some of the conflicts in the experts' opinions. Nonetheless, the evidence was sufficient to clearly and convincingly demonstrate that Respondent's work was not in accordance with generally accepted accounting principals in several respects and the financial reports identified in paragraph 19 failed to comply with the SSARS in several ways. The August 17, 1987 balance sheet of Federal Restaurants indicates that the only assets of the company were cash and a purchase deposit on a contract to acquire a restaurant. The balance sheet of Federal Restaurants as of August 17, 1987 has no notes to it. Accounting Principals Board ("APB") Opinion 22 provides that a description of all significant accounting policies of the reporting entities should be included as an integral part of the financial statements. In this particular instance, the omission of accounting policies is of minor importance since the balance sheet only reflects two assets: cash being held in escrow and a deposit on a contract to purchase a restaurant (the "Purchase Contract"). As discussed below, none of the financial statements prepared by Respondent disclosed the terms of the Purchase Contract. Furthermore, it appears from other documents in Respondent's records that the corporation is wholly owned by American British Enterprises and/or is jointly controlled, but there is no disclosure of that relationship in the financial statements. These omissions are significant deficiencies which have not been explained. Statement of Auditing Standards ("SAS") 41 requires work papers to support the conclusions of an audit. According to SAS 41, the work papers constitute the principal record of the work that the auditor has done and the conclusions that he has reached concerning significant matters. Respondent's records do not include work papers for the August 17, 1987 audit. SAS 22 provides guidance to an independent auditor making an examination in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards on the considerations and procedures applicable to planning and supervision, including preparing an audit program, obtaining knowledge of the entity's business, and dealing with differences of opinion among firm personnel. While there is conflicting evidence as to what was included in Respondent's work papers, the evidence was clear that Respondent's records for the August 17, 1987 audit do not comply with the requirements of SAS 22, because there was no clearly identified planning memos or audit programs. In fact, there is not even an engagement letter. SAS 19 requires an independent auditor to obtain certain written representations from management as part of an examination made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards and provides guidance concerning the representations to be obtained. Petitioner's experts contend that Respondent's work papers do not include an appropriate representation letter from management for any of the Financial Statements. Respondent's expert contends there was such a letter with respect to the August 27, 1987 Consolidated Financial Statements. While it is not clear what is contained in the records, it is clear that the records do not clarify conflicting documentation in Respondent's work papers regarding the relationship between Federal Restaurants and American British Enterprises. Furthermore, Respondent's records do not include a clear statement from management regarding the terms of the Purchase Contract and the apparent contingencies involved with that Contract. Consequently, Respondent has failed to comply with SAS 19 and SAS 45 (which addresses related-party disclosures). The August 27, 1987 Consolidated Financial Statements are not properly consolidated in accordance with Accounting Research Bulletin ("ARB") 51. In addition, the consolidated Financial Statements do not include the disclosures required by Accounting Principals Board Opinion 22. Respondent's expert contends that the statements were mistakenly entitled and they should have been captioned as "combined" rather than consolidated financial statements. Even if this after the fact justification is accepted, the statements do not adequately disclose the relationship between the companies. Respondent's expert suggests that the August 25 Consolidated Financial Statement for American British Enterprises and Federal Restaurants reflects a voidable acquisition of Federal Restaurants by American British Enterprises. If this interpretation is accepted, the August 17, 1987 Balance Sheet for Federal Restaurants was not necessarily misleading for failure to disclose its relationship with American British Enterprises. However, the August 25, 1987 Consolidated Financial Statements are incomplete since the transaction is not fully explained. Moreover, there is no disclosure that the companies were apparently under common control or ownership. With respect to the November, 1988 balance sheet of American British Enterprises, the evidence established that there was a discrepancy between the amount reflected in the financial statement for a note receivable which was the major asset of the corporation and the confirmation in the work papers regarding that asset. While this discrepancy may have been due to a discount and/or accrued interest, no explanation is provided. The discrepancy constitutes a violation of SAS 1, Section 331, which addresses the appropriate background information for receivables, and SAS 1, Section 530 which addresses the dating of the auditor's report. If the discrepancy is due to a discount, Respondent failed to comply with APB Opinion 6, paragraph 14 which requires unearned discounts to be shown as a deduction from the related receivable and/or APB Opinion 21, paragraph 16 which provides for the discount or premium to be reported on the balance sheet as a direct deduction from or addition to the face amount of the note. The work papers for the November audit do not include a reconciliation between the 1982 financial statements of the predecessor corporation and the 1987 statements. There is no documentation of efforts to communicate with the prior auditor nor is there any discussion of the consistency of application of accounting principals between the two statements. As a consequence, the statements do not conform with SAS 7 which addresses communications with a prior auditor. The work papers fail to reflect any audit work being performed on the appraisal for the equipment collateralizing the note. In addition, the work papers include a confirmation from the stock transfer agent that doesn't agree with the number of shares reflected on the financial statement. There is no explanation for this discrepancy nor is there any clear indication of the audit work performed. The financial statements also include a footnote referencing a joint venture agreement. Respondent's records do not include any evidence of audit work performed with respect to this venture agreement. The deficiencies noted in paragraph 33 also appear in the December 31, 1988 financial statements for American British Enterprises. Furthermore, Respondent's records do not contain an audit file for this December statement. The November 30, 1988 and the December 31, 1988 audits of American British Enterprises do not contain a segregation between current and noncurrent assets. This deficiency is relatively insignificant since the company was essentially just a holding company. However, it does constitute a violation of ARB 43. Similarly, the cash flows in the financial statements were not presented in the appropriate format or style required by Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 95. However, it appears that all of the necessary information was present. The deficiencies found in the financial statements prepared for Federal Restaurants and American British Enterprises constitute negligence on the Respondent's part and establish a failure to exercise professional competence and due professional care in the performance of accounting services. On or about June 14, 1990, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") filed a civil lawsuit against Respondent and three other defendants alleging the preparation of false and misleading financial statements for American British Enterprises, Inc. On August 5, 1991, Respondent executed a Consent of Edwin Tunick to the Entry of a Final Judgement of Permanent Injunction in the civil action initiated by the SEC. On September 2, 1991, a Final Judgement of Permanent Injunction as to Edwin Tunick was entered by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida (Fort Lauderdale Division) in Case Number 90-6483CIV-ZLOCH. That Final Judgment "permanently restrained and enjoined" Respondent from violating Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. 77q(a) and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C 78 (j)b and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. The Final Judgment did not include any specific findings of any violations of the federal securities laws.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Accountancy enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed in DOAH Case Number 92-3421 (DPR Case Number 91-09729); finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 473.323(1)(a), (g) and (h), Florida Statutes, and Rules 21A-22.0001, 21A-22.0002, and 21A-22.003, Florida Administrative Code, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed in DOAH Case Number 92-5696 (DPR Case Number 90-13254) and dismissing the other charges in that Complaint. As penalty for the violations, Respondent should be fined $1,000, and his license should be suspended for three years. Before resuming practice, Respondent should be required to complete such mandatory continuing education courses as may be mandated by the Board and he should be placed on probation for three (3) years. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of November, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of November, 1994.
Findings Of Fact Respondent's name was one of about three hundred on a list of public accountants certified in Florida for whom, at the close of the initial period following institution of the requirement, petitioner had no record of the taking of continuing professional education courses or of the passing of a written professional examination. As a result, petitioner mailed respondent a form letter advising him of the situation, in February of 1977. Receiving no reply, petitioner mailed a second letter to respondent on April 28, 1977, stating that he "ha[d] failed to comply with F.S. 473.111(4) and Rule 21A-15" and that his suspension had been recommended to petitioner for that reason. On May 11, 1977, respondent visited petitioner's offices in Gainesville and spoke to George Thomas McCall, at the time petitioner's coordinator for continuing professional education. Mr. McCall gave respondent three reporting forms on which respondent proceeded, without reference to any notes, to list various titles in the column styled "Name of Course or Program," filling in corresponding blanks in columns for the dates of the courses, for their sponsors and for "Credit Hours Claimed." Petitioner's exhibit No. 1. Douglas H. Thompson, Jr., petitioner's executive director, asked Jean P. Finegold, Mr. McCall's successor, to attempt to verify that respondent had taken the continuing professional education courses he had listed. Ms. Finegold wrote respondent requesting documentation. Petitioner sent this letter by certified mail, but it was returned unclaimed. Ms. Finegold also wrote each of the four institutions listed by respondent as sponsors of continuing professional education courses that he had taken. The United States Department of Labor, listed by respondent as the sponsor of 48 hours of course work he had taken in the auditing and accounting category, never replied to Ms. Finegold's inquiry. Because respondent had indicated, on the reporting form for 1974, that he took courses named "Estate Planning" and "Banking" sponsored by the Florida Institute of Certified Public Accountants (FICPA), Ms. Finegold wrote FICPA asking, inter alia, for verification of respondent's attendance at those courses. Respondent listed no other courses sponsored by FICPA on any of the reporting forms. Under the supervision of FICPA's assistant Director, John Scharbaugh, Vicki Ware researched the FICPA's records without finding the course names "Banking" or "Estate Planning." Later, after an extended telephone conversation between respondent and Mr. Scharbaugh, the FICPA verified that respondent had attended "Income Taxation of Estates and Trusts" on January 10, 1974; Basic Concepts in Estate Planning" on January 11, 1974; "Workshop on Fiduciary Income Tax Returns" on December 14, 1973; "Seminar on Bank Audits, Accounting, Taxes and Regulations" (Seminar) on November 16, 1973; and another course on May 17 and 18, 1973. The three more recent courses "each qualify for eight hours of other CPE credit," composite exhibit No. 8, deposition of Jean P. Finegold, as did the seminar. The other course "Management Advisory Services Conference" is the course respondent referred to on his 1974 reporting form as "Computer Advisory," mistakenly indicating sponsorship by Florida State University rather than by the FICPA. In response to Ms. Finegold's inquiry, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) indicated that the AICPA had offered no courses entitled "Capital Investments--Long Term Debt," "Tax Reform Act of 1975" or "Tax Course," and Rex B. Cruse, Jr., director of the Continuing Professional Education Division of the AICPA, executed an affidavit to that effect. Composite exhibit No. 7, deposition of Jean P. Finegold. Respondent had indicated on his 1974 and 1976 reporting forms that he had taken courses with such names, sponsored by the AICPA. A subsequent search of the AICPA's bad debt file revealed that respondent had ordered self-study materials for courses named "Capital Structure and Long-Term Objectives," "Ins and Outs of IRS Practice and Procedures" and "Tax Reduction Act of 1975," but respondent "did not officially complete the courses by returning examinations. . .for grading." Composite exhibit No. 6, deposition of Jean P. Finegold. Otha L. Brandon, a certified public accountant in Memphis, Tennessee, first engaged respondent's services in 1975. On four or five occasions thereafter, respondent was in Memphis for orientation and instruction in auditing certain types of accounts, including assignments from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Toward the end of 1976, Mr. Brandon entered into a contract with the EPA to audit construction grants to certain municipalities, including eight Florida cities. He hired respondent to perform the Florida audits. On January 3, 1977, Mr. Brendon wrote respondent directing him to go ahead with the work. At the time, Mr. Brandon contemplated completing the job in mid-February, thinking he would send additional manpower to Florida to assist respondent. Unassisted, respondent made submissions to Mr. Brandon on the last of the eight cities in July or August of 1977. Mr. Brandon allocated approximately nine thousand dollars ($9,000.00) to the Florida portion of the project. Upon receipt of respondent's work, people in Mr. Brandon's office revised the reports to make them conform to EPA regulations and directives. This was taken into account when Mr. Brandon paid respondent in excess of seven thousand two hundred dollars ($7,200.00) for his services. Respondent has been a certified public accountant in Florida since 1972.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner suspend respondent's certificate for three (3) years. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of February, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 1979. COPIES FURNISHED: James S. Quincey, Esquire 226 South Main Street Gainesville, Florida 32602 Thomas B. Calhoun, Esquire 3656 Shamrock Way Tallahassee, Florida 32308
