Findings Of Fact Martin R. McAndrew is a licensed general contractor and licensed pool contractor holding general contractor's license number RG 0020560 and pool contractor's license number RP 0024861. Martin R. McAndrew was provided notice in accordance with the applicable rules and statutes of the formal hearing to consider the allegations of the administrative complaint filed against him by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. Ray Dowell identified a notice of violation served on McAndrew by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board which was received into evidence as Exhibit 1. This notice of violation related to the construction undertaken by McAndrew for Lynn McMillan. Melvin C. Huebschman entered into a contract with McAndrew for the construction of a pool. The contract price for the pool was $5,000.00. Huebschman paid McAndrew $2,000 in two payments. The first payment was in the amount of $300.00 to cover the cost of transportation of the pool materials to Pensacola, Florida. The second payment in the amount of $1,700.00 was for the first phrase of construction on the pool. Subsequent to receiving payment McAndrew provided no materials or labor pursuant to the contract. Huebschman talked with McAndrew concerning completion of the work pursuant to the contract and McAndrew failed to perform under the contract throughout the spring and summer of 1977. In August, 1977, Huebschman wrote McAndrew advising him that it had been over ninety days since they entered into the contract and McAndrew had not performed any services pursuant to the contract. Huebschman gave McAndrew thirty days within which to commence work. McAndrew did not respond to this notice. McAndrew did not return any portion of the $2,000.00 paid to him by Huebschman. Lynn McMillan entered into a contract, identified as a portion of Exhibit 4, with McAndrew. This contract called for the construction of a pool for a contract price of $5,800.00. Pursuant to that contract, McMillan paid to McAndrew $4,350.00. Subsequent to payment of the third draw, McAndrew failed to complete the job. The last work performed by McAndrew on this construction project was on May 17, 1977. Prior to May 17, 1977, all materials for completing the pool were on the site and installed. Before abandoning the project, McAndrew removed from the building site all portions of the pool construction except the poured concrete and vinyl lining. McMillan subsequently entered into a contract with Surf Side Pools for the completion of the pool. The contract price was $1275.00, which included $800.00 for equipment and materials necessary to complete the pool. In addition, McMillan found it necessary to pay $230.00 to O'Brian Enterprises to remove stumps and spoil left on the construction project by McAndrew. McMillan also paid $200.00 to Warrick Electric Company to satisfy a claim by Warrick for materials and labor provided by Warrick to McAndrew. Finally, American Ready Mix Concrete filed a claim of lien in the amount of $436.80 against the property of Lynn McMillan for labor and materials provided under the contract with McAndrew which McAndrew did not pay. On May 27, 1977, McAndrew wrote a letter to McMillan advising that he would like the opportunity to finish the pool and was invited to do so. However, McAndrew did not return to the construction site or provide any further labor or materials pursuant to the contract. Sarah White Witt entered into a contract with McAndrew for the construction of a pool at a contract price of $4,500.00. Witt paid McAndrew $500.00; however McAndrew did not finish the pool construction. Subsequently, Witt was advised by the materialmen and labors of various liens against her property totalling $2,200.00. Daryl Jernigan, electrical and pool inspector for Escambia County, inspected the work done by McAndrew on the McMillan pool. He found that the pool had been filled with water but that the equipment necessary to recirculate and chlorinate the water had been removed from the pool, thereby permitting the water to stagnate. This inspection was conducted in June, 1977. Prior to that time, Jernigan had found it necessary to order work on a pool begun by McAndrew halted because McAndrew had failed to acquire a building permit prior to commencing construction.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer recommends that Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board revoke the licenses of Martin R. McAndrew as a general contractor and as a pool contractor, and further fined a sum of $500.00. DONE and ORDERED this 24th day of May, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: J. K. Linnan Executive Director Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board P. O. Box 8621 Jacksonville, Florida 32211 Michael E. Egan, Esquire Attorney at Law 217 South Adams Tallahassee, Florida Martin R. McAndrew 3313 N. 17th Avenue Pensacola, Florida 32502
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent is guilty of the allegations in the Administrative Complaint filed against him, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him, if any.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent Clivalee Mundle was the holder of a slot machine occupational license issued by the State of Florida and numbered 7937616-1051. That license expired June 30, 2008, and has not been re-issued. At all times material hereto, Respondent was employed as a slot supervisor at The Isle Casino and Racing at Pompano Park, a licensed Florida pari-mutuel and slot machine facility located in Pompano Beach, Florida. On November 16, 2007, a senior attendant reported to the slot chip manager an incident involving Respondent. She reported that she had gone to the cage service window to use the computer. The cage is where the money is held in a casino. She reported that while she was there, Respondent came in and began assisting her. When he reached into his coat, a $100 bill fell out and onto the floor. She placed her foot next to the bill and asked Respondent if it were his. Respondent picked it up and acted, in her opinion, nervous. Employees at the casino are instructed to keep their own money in their wallets and to not have loose cash on them when they are on the casino floor. They are also instructed to keep any casino money in sight so that the money surveillance cameras can track it. Based upon the report he received, the slot chip manager contacted surveillance personnel and requested them to view the surveillance videos that recorded the incident. Upon doing so, those employees reported to him that Respondent had earlier obtained a $100 bill from the cage to pay out a jackpot on slot machine A-50-02 but that he subsequently never went to that machine to do so. Further, the videos showed that the jackpot on that machine had already been paid before Respondent obtained the $100 bill he obtained from the cage. Based upon that surveillance report, the slot chip manager viewed surveillance videos from prior dates. The review of the surveillance videos revealed the following transactions. On November 8, 2007, Respondent was at the cage service window filling out a paid-out cash slip to obtain a $100 bill when the slot chip manager came in. Rather than completing what he was doing, Respondent folded the form and put it in his pocket. Later that day, he turned in the paid-out slip and received a $100 bill. The form he filled out stated that he needed the money to settle a guest dispute. However, he never gave the money to anyone between the time he obtained it and the time he left the casino at the end of his shift. The surveillance videos for November 9, 2007, show Respondent filling out a paid-out slip at the cage, receiving a $100 bill, and concealing that bill inside a piece of paper in his coat pocket. The slip he filled out represented that he was obtaining the money for a guest dispute at machine A-15-05. Later that same day, he filled out another cage slip for a jackpot pay-out at machine A-50-08. When he received the $100 bill requested, he put it under a piece of paper on a clipboard. Surveillance videos showed that the jackpot on that machine had been paid out before Respondent obtained the $100. Surveillance videos did not show Respondent giving either of those $100 bills he obtained on November 9 to anyone in the casino. The videos show that on November 13, 2007, Respondent paid a jackpot to a customer who then gave Respondent her player's card. Respondent took her player's card to the player's card window, had a discussion with the attendant, and then returned to the player and returned her card. He then went to the cage service area, filled out a cage paid-out slip for $100 for guest satisfaction, placed the $100 underneath papers on a clipboard, and left the cage area. Between that time and the end of his shift, Respondent did not give that money to anyone. None of the monies Respondent obtained from the casino cage as described in the above Findings of Fact was used for a legitimate business purpose. Respondent failed to complete the transactions for which he allegedly received the monies. Rather, Respondent retained these monies for his own use. Respondent admits to dropping the $100 bill on November 16, 2007. His explanation is that he had previously left the casino and had picked up some relatives and taken them to his home. He stated that the $100 bill was given to him by one of those relatives so he could pick up formula and diapers on his way home. The surveillance videos do not show Respondent leaving the casino or returning prior to the incident. On November 29, 2007, Respondent was terminated from his employment by the casino. On February 7, 2008, The Isle Casino and Racing at Pompano Park issued to Respondent a Notice of Barrment [sic], which barred Respondent from the premises of the casino permanently.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered (1) finding Respondent guilty of the allegations in the Administrative Complaint filed against him, (2) excluding Respondent from all facilities of all slot machine licensees in the State of Florida, and (3) finding Respondent ineligible for a slot machine occupational license. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of February, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Clivalee Mundle 4689 Northwest 22nd Street Coconut Creek, Florida 33063 David Perry, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 40 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Ned Luczynski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 40 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 David J. Roberts, Director Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 40 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
The Issue The issue for determination in this cause is whether petitioner is entitled to a refund in the amount of $6,306.32 paid into the state treasury as sales tax. More specifically, the issue is whether the registration or participation fee charged by petitioner to its members at the 1975 summer national bridge tournament is taxable as an "admission" under Florida Statutes 212.02(16) and 212.04.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: The petitioner, the American Contract Bridge League, Inc., is a nonprofit corporation incorporated under the laws of New York in 1938. Its membership is approximately 200,000, representing areas all over the North American continent. Its purposes include educational, cultural and charitable pursuits. Among other things, petitioner annually sponsors three national tournaments in various areas of the United States. In August of 1975, petitioner held its summer national tournament at the Americana Hotel in Bal Harbour, Dade County, Florida. Over 1,000 tables for approximately 5,500 members were in operation for the nine-day event. Many of these 5,500 members played in two or more events. In order to participate in each event, the member was required to pay a registration fee ranging from $3.00 to $4.50. No sales tax was included by petitioner in its registration fee. While spectators at the tournament were permitted, it was not intended as a spectator event. No special provision was made for the seating of spectators, whose number rarely exceeded one hundred and who were composed primarily of relatives or friends of the actual players or participants. No admission charges were made to spectators. On previous occasions, petitioner has held bridge events in Florida. On no such occasion has the State of Florida attempted to assess the sales tax on petitioner's registration or participation fees. No other state in which petitioner has held its tournaments has assessed petitioner for sales or other taxes on this fee. The respondent Department of Revenue informed petitioner that the registration fees collected at the 1975 summer national tournament constituted a taxable event, subject to the Florida sales tax, and petitioner, under protest, forwarded a check in the amount of $6,306.32. Thereafter, petitioner applied for a refund pursuant to the provisions of F.S. 215.26. The Comptroller denied the refund application.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that petitioner's request for a refund in the amount of $6,306.32 be denied. Respectfully submitted and entered this 21st day of March, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 1977. COPIES FURNISHED: Comptroller Gerald Lewis The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Patricia Turner, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Bloxham Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Paul J. Levine, Esquire 2100 First Federal Building One Southeast 3rd Avenue Miami, Florida 33131
The Issue Whether subsections (1) and (2) of Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A-1.074 enlarge, modify or contravene the specific provisions of law implemented, or are arbitrary or capricious, and thus constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulated facts and the uncontested affidavit of H. French Brown, IV, the following findings of facts are made. The rule provisions at issue in this proceeding are subsections (1) and (2) of Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A- 1.074, hereinafter referenced as "the Rule." The Rule provides: 12A-1.074 Trade-Ins. Where used articles of tangible personal property, accepted and intended for resale, are taken in trade, or a series of trades, at the time of sale, as a credit or part payment on the sale of new articles of tangible personal property, the tax levied by Chapter 212, F.S., shall be paid on the sales price of the new article of tangible personal property, less credit for the used article of tangible personal property taken in trade. A separate or independent sale of tangible personal property is not a trade- in, even if the proceeds from the sale are immediately applied by the seller to a purchase of new articles of tangible personal property. Where used articles of tangible personal property, accepted and intended for resale, are taken in trade, or a series of trades, at the time of sale, as a credit or part payment on the sale of used articles, the tax levied by Chapter 212, F.S., shall be paid on the sales price of the used article of tangible personal property, less credit for the used articles of tangible personal property taken in trade. A separate or independent sale of tangible personal property is not a trade-in, even if the proceeds from the sale are immediately applied by the seller to a purchase of new articles of tangible personal property.1/ The Rule states that it is intended to implement the following statutory provisions: Sections 212.02(15), 212.02(16), 212.07(2), 212.07(3), and 212.09, Florida Statutes. Section 212.02, Florida Statutes, provides, in relevant part: 212.02 Definitions -- The following terms and phrases when used in this chapter have the meanings ascribed to them in this section, except where the context clearly indicates a different meaning: * * * "Sale" means and includes: (a) Any transfer of title or possession, or both, exchange, barter, license, lease, or rental, conditional or otherwise, in any manner or by any means whatsoever, of tangible personal property for a consideration. . . . "Sales price" means the total amount paid for tangible personal property, including any services that are a part of the sale, valued in money, whether paid in money or otherwise, and includes any amount for which credit is given to the purchaser by the seller, without any deduction therefrom on account of the cost of the property sold, the cost of materials used, labor or service cost, interest charged, losses, or any other expense whatsoever. . . Trade-ins or discounts allowed and taken at the time of sale shall not be included within the purview of this subsection. . . Section 212.07(2), Florida Statutes, set forth the method and manner by which a dealer is to charge and collect sales tax. Section 212.07(3), Florida Statutes, sets forth penalties for a dealer who fails to collect sales tax. Neither of these provisions affects the matters at issue in this proceeding. part: Section 212.09, Florida Statutes, provides, in relevant 212.09 Trade-ins deducted; exception.-- Where used articles, accepted and intended for resale, are taken in trade, or a series of trades, as a credit or part payment on the sale of new articles, the tax levied by this chapter shall be paid on the sales price of the new article, less the credit for the used article taken in trade. Where used articles, accepted and intended for resale, are taken in trade, or a series of trades, as a credit or part payment on the sale of used articles, the tax levied by this chapter shall be paid on the sales price of the used article less the credit for the used article taken in trade. [2/] GameStop is a Minnesota corporation that is authorized to do business in the State of Florida, and a registered dealer for purposes of collecting and remitting sales and use tax to the Department. GameStop is a publicly held international retailer of new and used video game hardware, software, and accessories, with over 6,000 stores worldwide, including stores in Florida. One of GameStop's customary business practices is to accept from its customers used gaming software, hardware, and accessories that the GameStop store manager determines is in resalable or re-furbishable condition. In return for the used articles, a GameStop customer may choose among three options: Option 1: The customer may receive cash in exchange for the used items. Option 2: The customer may apply the value assigned to the item by the store manager as part payment toward the immediate purchase of another new or used item from GameStop. Option 3: The customer may receive a credit for the value of the used item, which may be used only toward the purchase of new or used items from GameStop at some time in the future. If the GameStop customer elects Option 1, he receives 20 percent less value in the cash exchange than he would have received pursuant to the part payment offered by Option 2 or the credit toward a future purchase offered by Option 3. For a customer who chooses Option 3, GameStop tracks outstanding credits by issuing to the customer an "EdgeCard." When the customer returns to a GameStop store and requests to apply credits toward the purchase of a new or used item, the GameStop salesperson can swipe the electronic strip on the back of the EdgeCard and learn the credit amount available to the customer. The EdgeCard system merely tracks the amount of ongoing credits available to the customer. It does not record any request made by the customer to reserve or identify a specific item toward which the credits will later be used. The credits on an EdgeCard never expire. Once the customer has chosen Option 3, he may go to a GameStop store or access the GameStop website at any time thereafter and apply the credit on his account toward the purchase of new or used items from GameStop. GameStop also offers traditional gift cards that are purchased via cash or credit card rather than in exchange for used articles. Purchases made using a gift card or gift certificate are taxable for the full purchase price.3/ When a customer uses a gift card to purchase an item at a GameStop store, GameStop does not reduce the taxable sales price by the amount of the credit or value stored on the gift card and used in the purchase. GameStop assigns no redeemable cash value to the EdgeCard or to traditional gift cards. GameStop does not allow a gift card to be used to store credits obtained through the exchange of used items, reserving that function exclusively to the EdgeCard. The value of a GameStop gift card can be redeemed only through the purchase of new or used items from GameStop. Credits can be added to an EdgeCard only by turning over used articles to GameStop. A customer may not purchase credits. A credit on an EdgeCard can only be redeemed by the subsequent purchase of new or used items from GameStop. The GameStop customer who selects Option 3 first submits his used game or item of hardware to the GameStop store, which assigns it a dollar value and credits that amount to the customer's EdgeCard account in exchange for the item. At some later date, the customer returns to the GameStop store and trades the credit stored on the EdgeCard for some used or new item. The customer may build up credits on the EdgeCard with any number of transactions over any length of time before trading in the credits for an item from GameStop. The customer is not required to identify the item toward which he wishes to apply his EdgeCard credits until the time he actually trades the credits for the item. The Edge Card system replaced GameStop's former practice of requiring a customer who chose to obtain a credit for the submission of used articles to retain a cash register receipt showing the amount of the credit. This "paper credit" would then be redeemable toward the purchase of another item at a later date. There is no expiration date on an EdgeCard, a gift card, or a paper credit. GameStop does not replace the credits on a lost EdgeCard or a lost gift card. For purposes of accounting, GameStop carries unredeemed EdgeCard credits on its books for a period of three years as customer liabilities. GameStop does the same for unredeemed value on gift cards. GameStop continues to honor unredeemed EdgeCard credits and gift card values that are more than three years old, but no longer carries them on its books as customer liabilities. Prior to 2007, for the purpose of collecting sales tax from its customers, GameStop deducted the value of EdgeCard or any paper credits used in the purchase of new or used items from the purchase price for the purpose of calculating sales tax due. GameStop has remitted to the Department tax for the entire sales price of new or used items purchased from approximately January 2007 through August 31, 2007, in response to an audit by the Department, without reducing the taxable sales price by the value of any EdgeCard or paper credits used. GameStop has a return policy that allows a customer who is not satisfied with an item purchased from GameStop to return the item within a certain period of time and under certain conditions. When a customer returns an item in compliance with GameStop's return policy, the customer receives full retail value back, including the amount of the tax paid on the original purchase. A customer who returns an item in compliance with GameStop's return policy can elect to receive the return value in the form of cash, as a reimbursement to the customer's credit card, or as value stored on a GameStop merchandise card. The GameStop merchandise card does not record credits received via the return of used articles. The Department states that its historical administration and interpretation of the Rule and the statutes it implements do not strictly limit trade-in credits to a simultaneous exchange situation, or to transactions occurring within any particular time frame. However, the Department states that it does require the customer to identify the merchandise to be purchased with the EdgeCard credits at the time the credits are acquired. The Department does not consider the transaction to constitute a "trade-in" unless the item to be purchased with the EdgeCard credits has been specifically identified by the customer at the time the customer first returned a used item to GameStop.
The Issue The issue is whether the word, "internal," in Florida Administrative Code Rule 61D-14.041(1) is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because Respondent exceeded its grant of rulemaking authority or because this word enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the law implemented, in violation of sections 120.56(3) and 120.52(8)(b) and (c). In sum, Petitioner and Intervenor challenge rule 61D-14.041(1) only to the extent that this rule requires that each slot machine contain an internal random number generator.
The Issue The issue in this case concerns the application of Section 24.115(4), Florida Statutes, to a claim for payment of a $5,000.00 lottery prize where the winning lottery ticket was purchased by two individuals, one of whom has a substantial court-ordered child support arrearage, one of whom does not, and the prize claim form is submitted by the individual who owes child support. The Petitioners contend that only half of the prize should be subject to the outstanding child support debt. The Respondents contend that the entire prize should be subject to the outstanding child support debt. Shortly after the filing of the request for hearing in this case, the Office of the Comptroller filed a Motion To Join Indispensable Parties, by means of which it sought to join the Department of the Lottery and the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services as parties to this case. Both of the last mentioned agencies agreed to being joined as parties and neither Petitioner objected to the joinder. Accordingly, the Department of the Lottery and the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services were joined as parties respondent. At the hearing both Petitioners testified and also offered exhibits. The Respondents presented the testimony of several witnesses and also offered several exhibits. At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties were allowed ten days within which to submit proposed recommended orders. All parties filed post-hearing submissions containing proposed findings of fact. All proposed findings of fact are specifically addressed in the appendix to this recommended order.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits received in evidence at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact. Shortly after the Florida Department of the Lottery began selling lottery tickets, the two Petitioners, Lawrence R. Lindbom and Donald Johnston, began the regular practice of buying lottery tickets together. They agreed that they would make equal contributions to the cost of the lottery tickets and that they would share equally in the proceeds of any lottery prizes resulting from their co-purchased lottery tickets. On January 26, 1988, consistent with the foregoing agreement, Petitioner Lindbom purchased four instant game lottery tickets. Petitioner Johnston had contributed funds to pay half of the cost of the four tickets. Lindbom retained two of the tickets and gave the other two tickets to Johnston. At Johnston's place of employment, Lindbom scratched the two lottery tickets he had retained. One of the two was a $5,000.00 winning ticket. At the suggestion of some third party, Lindbom wrote his name on the winning ticket. He then showed the ticket to Johnston, and the other people present congratulated the two of them on their good fortune. The two Petitioners agreed that Lindbom would submit the ticket for payment in both of their names. On January 27, 1988, Lindbom traveled to the Jacksonville District Office of the Department of the Lottery, where he inquired about filling out a claim form in two names. He also inquired as to whether any money would be deducted from the prize. Upon being advised that only one name could be placed on the claim form and that no money would be deducted from the prize, Petitioner Lindbom called Petitioner Johnston to advise him of what he had been told at the Jacksonville District Office. Johnston told Lindbom to go ahead and file the claim in Lindbom's name and they would split the prize when it was received. Thereupon, Petitioner Lindbom filled out a Florida Lottery Winner Claim Form. The information he placed on the claim form included information about the lottery ticket and Lindbom's name, address, telephone number, and social security number. At the bottom of the claim form, Lindbom signed a printed statement reading as follows, in pertinent part. "Under penalty of law, I swear that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the name, address, and social security number correctly identify me as the recipient of this payment." The claim form and winning ticket were submitted to the Tallahassee office of the Department of the Lottery for validation and payment in accordance with that Department's procedures. The Department of the Lottery provided the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services a list of $5,000.00 winners which contained the name of Lawrence Lindbom. DHRS determined from its records that there was an arrearage in child support payments by Lawrence Lindbom in the amount of $12,014.65. On February 1, 1988, DHRS certified the child support arrearage to the Department of the Lottery in accordance with Section 24.115(4), Florida Statutes (1987). On February 5, 1988, the Department of the Lottery forwarded the entire $5,000.00 claimed by Lindbom to the Office of the Comptroller of the State of Florida. On February 8, 1988, the Office of the Comptroller notified Lindbom by certified mail of its intention to apply the entire $5,000.00 prize toward Lindbom's unpaid court-ordered child support, with the result that no payment would be made to Lindbom. Following receipt of the letter from the Office of the Comptroller, Lindbom and Johnston jointly wrote a letter to the Comptroller protesting the proposed disposition of the prize and requesting a hearing. At all times material to this case, the Department of the Lottery had in effect Rule No. 53ER87-43, F.A.C., titled "Procedure for awarding prizes." That rule reads as follows, in pertinent part: (6) Until such time as a name is imprinted or placed upon the back portion of the lottery ticket in the designated area a lottery ticket shall be owned by the physical possessor of such ticket. When a name is placed on the rear of the ticket in the designated place, the person whose name appears in that area shall be the owner of the ticket and shall be entitled to any prize attributable thereto.
Recommendation For all of the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Office of the Comptroller issue a final order in this case providing for payment to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services of the entire $5,000.00 prize originally claimed by Petitioner Lindbom. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of June, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of June, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-1176 The following are my specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties. Findings proposed by the Petitioners The Petitioners' proposal consisted of a letter in which they assert three specific reasons that entitle them to the relief sought. The factual aspects of those three reasons are addressed below. The legal aspects have been addressed in the conclusions of law. Reason 1. Accepted as finding of fact. Reason 2. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Reason 3. Rejected as constituting argument rather than facts. Findings proposed by the Respondents The Respondents filed a joint proposed recommended order. The paragraph references which follow are to the paragraphs of the Findings of Fact section of the Respondents' proposed recommended order. Paragraphs 1 and 2) Accepted in substance, with the exception of the implication that the Petitioners were not co- purchasers of the lottery tickets. Paragraph 3: First sentence accepted. Second sentence rejected as inconsistent with the evidence. Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, and 7: Accepted. Paragraph 8: Omitted as unnecessary procedural details covered by introduction. Paragraph 9: Accepted. Paragraph 10: Accepted in substance. First unnumbered paragraph following Paragraph 10: Rejected as constituting subordinate and unnecessary details. Second unnumbered paragraph following Paragraph 10: Accepted. Third unnumbered paragraph following Paragraph 10: Rejected as irrelevant. Fourth unnumbered paragraph following Paragraph 10: Rejected as irrelevant or subordinate and unnecessary details. Fifth unnumbered paragraph following Paragraph 10: First sentence accepted. The reminder is rejected as argument rather than proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Lawrence R. Lindbom 3542 Tiara Way, West Jacksonville, Florida 32217 Mr. Donald Johnston 12888 Beaubien Road Jacksonville, Florida 32225 Jo Ann Levin, Esquire Senior Attorney Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Chriss Walker, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Thomas A. Bell, Esquire Department of Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Section 489.127(1)(f), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent in this proceeding and should be disciplined.
Findings Of Fact At no time material to the allegations was Respondent licensed or certified as a contractor of any type by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. On or about June 2000, Respondent entered into a written contractual agreement with Harold Knowles to construct a swimming pool at Mr. Knowles' residence located at 235 North Rosehill Drive, Tallahassee, Florida. The contract price for the swimming pool was $18,650.00. Mr. Knowles paid directly to Respondent $9,400.00. Respondent performed some work on the pool project and then stopped work on the project. Respondent failed to return to Mr. Knowles any monies received for the project. The homeowner was forced to pay out-of-pocket expenses to have a second, licensed pool contractor finish the pool that Respondent left unfinished. These expenses total in excess of $24,000.00. Respondent acknowledges that he had no license. Respondent testified at hearing along with his wife. It was clear that Respondent was sorry for his actions. He was unaware of the gravity of his acts. He does not have any financial resources, and a significant fine will not benefit Mr. Knowles. A substantial fine adversely impact Respondent's family more than Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent be fined $500.00, together with the investigation and prosecution costs. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of February, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Patrick Creehan, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32388-2202 Robert Footman 2702 Lake Mary Street Tallahassee, Florida 32310 Gail Scott-Hill, Esquire Lead Professions Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0771 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
