The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, the Department of Transportation (DOT), arbitrarily refused to accept the low bid submitted by the Petitioner, Quinn Construction, Inc. (Quinn), and Bay Machine, Inc., for State Project No. 15200-3902.
Findings Of Fact On or about December 7, 1994, the Petitioner, Quinn Construction, Inc. (Quinn), submitted a $1,695,534.84 bid on behalf of Quinn and Bay Machine, Inc., in response to a November, 1994, Department of Transportation (DOT) solicitation for bids on State Project No. 15200-3902. State Project No. 15200-3902 was essentially the same project for which the DOT previously solicited bids on or about July 1, 1994. The earlier solicitation for bids was cancelled when all bids were rejected, and the bid solicitation process was reinitiated. All bidders were required to furnish a bid guaranty, and the parties stipulate that any bid not accompanied by a bid guaranty would be declared nonresponsive. Attached to the Quinn/Bay Machine bid was a Bid or Proposal Bond on DOT Form 375-020-09. There was only one bridge rehabilitation project for Pinellas County among the projects for which the DOT was opening bids on December 7, 1994, and the bid bond was attached to the bid proposal of Quinn and Bay Machine for State Project No. 15200-3902. Utilizing the DOT form, the Quinn bid bond described the proposal being bonded as being "for constructing or otherwise improving a road(s) and/or bridge(s) or building(s) in Pinellas County; particularly known as Bayway 7918 Bridge Rehab." The part of the form calling for identification of the "Project No." was left blank. The bid bond was executed by James M. Moore as attorney- in-fact for North American Specialty Insurance Company. In addition to calling for the "Project No." in DOT Bid or Proposal Bond Form 375-020-09, the DOT routinely furnishes all bidders a Bidder's Checklist which reminds bidders to use the form and to identify the project on the form by county, by the federal aid number(s), if applicable, and by the State Project Job Number. Although the Bidder's Checklist was not in the bid package received by Quinn in connection with the November, 1994, solicitation for bids, Quinn received a Bidder's Checklist for the July, 1994, solicitation for bids on the same project and for many other previous bid solicitations. In prior bid proposal submissions, including the bid proposal submitted for the same project in August, 1994, Quinn had its surety use the "Project No." to identify the project on the bid bond. The attorney-in-fact for the bond company testified that the number 7918 on the bond was a typographical error. He testified that he thought 798 was the number that was supposed to be on the bond to identify the project. The WPI No. for the project was 7116982. The applicable State Road number was 679. The applicable bridge number was 150049. Although DOT Bid or Proposal Bond on DOT Form 375-020-09 called for identification of the "Project No.," DOT would have accepted a bid bond that identified the project by any of these numbers or by the official name of the bridge, if any. The bridge in question has no official name. It was not even proven that the bridge is commonly known as the Bayway 7918 Bridge, or even as the Bayway Bridge. The bridge in question is part of the Pinellas Bayway, which is a system of roads, causeways and bridges connecting St. Petersburg and St. Petersburg Beach and several small keys in Boca Ciega Bay. There are two state roads on the Pinellas Bayway: State Road 682, which connects State Road 699 to the west on St. Petersburg Beach to Interstate 275 to the east in St. Petersburg; and State Road 679, which intersects State Road 682 and runs south through Tierra Verde into Fort DeSoto Park on Mullet Key. Both 682 and 679 have combination fixed-span and bascule (draw) bridges. The bridge in question is on 679. When the DOT opened the bid of Quinn and Bay Machine, the incorrect identification of the project on the bid bond was noticed, and the question was referred to the Technical Review Committee. During its meeting on December 21, 1994, the Technical Review Committee sought the advice of its legal counsel and was advised that the bond probably would not be enforceable due to the inaccurate identification of the project to which it pertained. Based in part on the advice of counsel, the Technical Review Committee voted unanimously to recommend to the DOT Contract Awards Committee that the bid proposal be rejected as being non-responsive because of the bid bond. On December 23, 1994, the Contract Awards Committee met and voted unanimously to reject the bid proposal as being non-responsive because of the bid bond. Instead, the Committee accepted the bid proposal of M & J Construction Company of Pinellas County, Inc. (M & J). It was not arbitrary for the DOT to conclude that the Quinn bid bond was, or might well have been, unenforceable due to the inaccurate identification of the project to which it pertained. The DOT did not even consider whether the Quinn bid bond also may have been invalid and unenforceable because it named just Quinn as the principal, instead of both Quinn and Bay Machine, the actual entity that was prequalified to bid on the project and the actual entity bidding on the project. It also was not arbitrary for the DOT to conclude that submitting an unenforceable bid bond is not a minor irregularity. If a successful bidder does not enter into a contract, the project would be delayed while it is being rebid. The delay itself would result in a monetary loss. In addition, rebidding the project would result in additional costs to the DOT. Submitting an unenforceable bid bond could give a bidder the competitive advantage of feeling able to escape from having to contract and perform in accordance with a low bid, if advantageous to the bidder, without being liable under the bid bond.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Transportation enter a final order dismissing the Petitioner's bid protest and awarding State Project No. 15200-3902 to M & J Construction Company of Pinellas County, Inc. RECOMMENDED this 26th day of April, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-0564BID To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. (It appears that the Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are found at pages 2-5 of its Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. For purposes of these rulings, the unnumbered paragraphs on those pages are assigned consecutive numbers.) Rejected in part. (Joint Exhibit 2 refers to State Road 679, not the project, as having the "Local Name: Pinellas Bayway." Joint Exhibit 5 also only refers to State Road 679, not the project, by the name "Pinellas Bayway." Only the front covers of the technical specs refer to the "Pinellas Bayway Bridge." The other pages refer to the "Pinellas Bayway," and all of the pages also include the State Project Number.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. First sentence, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Second and last sentences, rejected as not proven. Rejected in part as argument and in part as not proven. Last sentence accepted, but ambiguous and not legally significant, subordinate and unnecessary, whether DOT could "tie" the bid bond to the bid. Penultimate sentence, rejected in part as not proven (that Exhibit 4 "identified the project as the Pinellas Bayway"); otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. The rest is accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. First sentence, rejected as not proven. (The evidence was clear that the DOT form requires a state project number and that the Bidder's Checklist provided to bidders by the DOT reminds bidders to use the form and identify the project by county, federal aid number(s), if applicable, and State Project Job Number.) Second sentence, subordinate and cumulative. Rejected as conclusion of law. Last sentence rejected as not proven that North American identified the project or that it used the local name of the bridge. The rest is rejected as not proven because the evidence was clear that the DOT form requires a state project number and that the Bidder's Checklist provided to bidders by the DOT reminds bidders to use the form and identify the project by county, federal aid number(s), if applicable, and State Project Job Number.) Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Rejected as not proven that DOT was arbitrary. The rest is subordinate, in part cumulative and in part argument. Subordinate, cumulative and argument. Rejected in part as conclusion of law, in part as argument and in part as not proven. Respondent's and Intervenor's Proposed Findings of Fact. All of the DOT's and the Intervenor's proposed findings of fact are accepted and are incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary or argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Suzanne Quinn, Esquire 1321 77th Street East Palmetto, Florida 34221 Thomas H. Duffy, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Joseph G. Thresher, Esquire One Mack Center 501 E. Kennedy Bouelvard, Suite 725 Tampa, Florida 33602 Ben G. Watts Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thornton J. Williams, Esquire General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue Whether the Department of General Services should award state contracts for "walk-up convenience copiers" to Xerox Corporation in categories where Xerox was the only responsive bidder, or should reject Xerox's bid and solicit new bids on grounds that competitive bids were not received and there is no basis or excepting the award from competitive bid requirements; Whether the Department should disqualify Xerox's bid in one category for alleged material deviation from bid specifications where Xerox failed to initial a change in its bid price.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That DGS reject Xerox's single responsive bids and readvertise; and That Xerox's bid for category Group-I, Type 3, Class 12, monthly rental acquisition plan, be rejected as nonconforming. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of July, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of July, 1984.
The Issue Petitioner and Lyell Hintz protest the Department's intent to award the bid for Lease No. 550-0209 to Southeastern Investment Properties, Inc. Issues derived from the pleadings, the joint prehearing stipulation and the evidence and argument at hearing are: Whether Petitioner has standing to protest the bid award; Whether Petitioner and Lyell Hintz have waived the right to contest evaluation criteria; If not, whether those criteria are valid; Whether the Respondent has properly applied the criteria to the bid proposals; Whether Southeastern's bid was nonresponsive; Whether Southeastern changed its bid after opening; Whether Petitioner's bid was defective for failure to include a waiver of existing lease; Whether the bid should be awarded to Lyell Hintz or Petitioner; and Whether all bids should be rejected and the lease re-bid.
Findings Of Fact The Bid Solicitation On or about January 31, 1991, the Florida Department of Transportation (DOT) advertised its request for proposals (RFP) for a full service lease for its District Five, Operations and Planning Office, Public Transportation Office and Construction Office. The RFP is identified as lease #550:0209. Specifications include net square footage of 13,640 + 3% (13,231 - 14,049), divided into 90% office and 10% storage space, to be available by July 1, 1991, or within 30 days of notice of bid award, whichever occurs last. The space is to be available in a northern section of Orange County designated on a map attached to the RFP, in the Winter Park/Maitland/Orlando area surrounding the intersection of Lee Road and I-4. The following evaluation criteria (award factors) are included in the RFP: The successful bid will be that one determined to be the lowest and best. All bids will be evaluated based on the award factors enumerated below: Rental, using total present value methodology for basic term of lease... (weighting: 15) Conformance of and susceptibility of the design of the space offered to efficient layout and good utilization and to the specific requirements contained in the Invitation to Bid (not to exceed a weight of 10 award factors). (weighting: 10) Provision of the aggregate square footage on a single floor. Proposals will be considered, but fewer points given, which offer the aggregate square footage in not more than two floors. (weighting: 25) The effect of environmental factors, including the physical characteristics of the building and the area surrounding it, on the efficient and economical conduct of Departmental operation planned for the requested space. (not to exceed a weight of 10 award factors) (weighting: 10) Offers providing 100 s.f. of street-level secured storage. (weighting: 10) * * * [deleted criteria given 0 weight and not relevant] Option period rental rate proposed is within projected budgetary restraints of the department. (weighting: 15) Accessibility to an I-4 Interchange. (weighting: 15) total award factors = 100 (Joint Exhibit #1, p. 7 of 10) Paragraph D.1., General Provisions, includes a notice that failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in Section 120.53(5), F.S., constitutes a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, F.S. The notice references an attachment which includes the text of Chapter 90-224, Laws of Florida, requiring posting of a bond at the time of formal written protest. Paragraph D.6.A., General Provisions states: Each proposal shall be signed by the owner(s), corporate officers, or legal representatives(s). The corporate, trade, or partnership title must be either stamped or typewritten beside the actual signature(s). If the Bid Submittal is signed by an Agent, written evidence from the owner of record of his/her authority must accompany the proposal. If the agent is to execute the lease, the authority must be supported by a properly executed Power of Attorney. If the Bid Submittal is offered by anyone other than the owner or owner's agent, proof of the bidder's authority to offer the facility, i.e., copy of bidder's Option to Purchase, must accompany the proposal. This option must be valid through the validity date established for bids. If a corporation foreign to the State of Florida is the owner of record, written evidence of authority to conduct business in Florida must accompany the Bid Submittal. If there is an existing lease extending beyond the required availability date for all or any portion of the premises being offered to the agency a release of the applicable lease must accompany the Bid Submittal. (Joint Exhibit #1, p. 8 of 10) Paragraph D.8., General Provisions, provides the Department reserves the right to reject any and all bid proposals, waive any minor informality or technicality in bids, to accept that bid deemed to be the lowest and in the best interest of the state, and if necessary, to reinstate procedures for soliciting competitive proposals. Paragraphs D.12 and 13, General Provisions, establish a March 4, 1991 bid opening and a February 11, 1991 preproposal conference, respectively. On the RFP/Bid Proposal Submittal form, below the bidder's signature space, there is a list of required attachments and notice that failure to include such, if applicable, "...shall render the proposal nonresponsive and such proposal shall be rejected". (Joint Exhibit #1, p. 10 of 10) The relevant attachments include a map with location of the facility, photograph, floor plan, authorization as agent for bidder, and release of existing leases. The RFP/Bid Proposal Submittal Form was furnished to the DOT by the Department of General Services (DGS). As permitted, DOT made some modifications to the criteria to meet the specific needs of the agency. No protests of the bid solicitation were filed by any party. The Bid Responses Four proposals were timely received at the bid opening deadline, March 4, 1991: Clayton's Realty (Petitioner) submitted two proposals, Lyell Hintz submitted one proposal, and Southeastern Investment Properties, Inc., submitted one proposal. Clayton's bid for its building at 611 Wymore Road, Winter Park ("Clayton Bldg.") offers 13,984 square feet for $1,136,200.00 for the five-year rental period and $1,398,400.00 for the option years. Some of DOT's offices are already in this building. Clayton's bid for its building at 5600 Diplomat Circle, Orlando, ("Promenade Building") offers 14,049 square feet at $965,868.75 for the 5-year rental term, and $1,229,287.50 for the option period. Both of Clayton's buildings offer space on two floors. Lyell Hintz offers 14,049 square feet at 1241 S. Orlando Avenue, Maitland. The five year rental cost is $895,623.75, and the option period rental is $1,123,920.00. All of the space is offered on a single first floor. Southeastern Investment Properties, Inc., offers 14,049 square feet in the Adlee Building at 5151 Adamson Street, Orlando, for $1,009,139.67 for the 5- year rental term and $1,288,012.32 for the option period. Southeastern contends that it is offering 100 square feet of storage space on the first floor and the remainder of space on the second floor. Committee Analysis of the Bids An evaluation committee comprised of four DOT employees met on March 6, and March 12, 1991, to evaluate the bids. Their evaluation included a visit to each site with pre-established questions. The four employees were Nancy Houston, District Five District Director for Planning and Public Transportation; Donna Sovern, Ms. Houston's Administrative Assistant; Jim Hamelin, Resident Engineer in charge of construction in District Five; and Steven J. Nunnery, Office Manager for District Five Construction. The committee had prior experience in the leasing process on only one occasion. In November 1990, this same lease #550:0209 was bid. Lyell Hintz and Southeastern were the bidders. All bids were rejected after it was discovered that Southeastern's bids included typewritten language added by the bidder and in conflict with standard requirements. No protest was filed from that agency decision. In the November bid the committee simply utilized the criteria provided in the DGS packet. Later the Committee learned that criteria could be modified by the individual agency. With this understanding, the Committee changed the criteria for the March 1991 bids to provide that space be offered on no more than two floors, rather than two buildings; that points would be awarded for offers of 100 square feet of street level storage space, rather than all space on the street level; and that accessibility to an I-4 Interchange would be an additional evaluation factor. The committee felt these criteria appropriately addressed agency need to collocate programs and share facilities, to have ground floor storage for heavy samples and equipment, and to provide easy access by field staff and others using I-4 regularly. The committee devised a methodology for awarding points to each bidder in each category described in paragraph 3, above. The methodology is stated in the minutes of the evaluation committee meeting dated March 6, 1991. For item no. 1, the committee awarded 15 points (the highest) to the lowest bid. The percentage of difference between each bid and the lowest bid was multiplied by 15 to determine the point value. Hintz received 15 points; Clayton (Promenade Building) received 14 points; Southeastern received 13 points; and Clayton (Clayton Building) received 12 points. For item no 2, the committee stated it would take into account the design and other factors in the description of this item, including the parking requirement addressed in the invitation to bid. Southeastern received the maximum, 10 points; Hintz received 8 points; and the two Clayton buildings received 6 points each. As part of the November bid process, when the agency initially intended to make the award to Southeastern, Nancy Houston's husband, an architect in private practice, prepared without charge a layout of Southeastern's building to see if Southeastern could meet DOT's needs. At Clayton's and Southeastern's requests, that layout was provided to the bidders, except for Hintz. Since Hintz' building is basically a shell, and he assured DOT he would make the renovations they needed, Ms. Houston did not feel that he needed the floor plan. After the bids were rejected in November, the layout became a public record, available to anyone upon request. However, Ms. Houston opined at hearing that they could not get a good layout that would work for the Hintz building. This contradicts Mr. Hintz' testimony that the suggested floor plan attached to the RFP could easily fit in his building. The floor plan attached to the RFP is not the same floor plan prepared by Ms. Houston's husband for the Southeastern building and the fact that Hintz' building is a shell capable of a vast variety of layouts impeaches Ms. Houston's opinion. Item no. 3 requests aggregate square footage on a single floor, with fewer points for space on two floors. The committee methodology was to give 25 points for space on one floor and "reduction given accordingly" for two floors. (Joint Exhibit #6, attachment A, page 1) Hintz and Southeastern were each granted 25 (maximum) points. Although various committee members testified that two floors should have warranted 1/2 the points, or 13, Clayton's buildings were awarded 16 points each. Southeastern is not proposing to provide all space on one floor, as it is offering storage on the first floor and office space on the second floor. The committee considered this worthy of full points, as all of the office space is on one floor. Item no. 4 is related to environmental factors such as aesthetics of the building and surrounding areas. The committee methodology states that aesthetics of the building and area would be considered along with "...the economical factor relating to the conduct of our everyday activities from and in each space proposed." (Joint Exhibit #6, Attachment A) Southeastern was awarded 10 points (maximum); Clayton's Clayton Building and Promenade Building were awarded 6 and 8 points respectively; and Hintz was awarded 3 points. Item no. 5 relates to provision of 100 square feet of storage on the street level. The committee methodology provides that full ten points will be awarded if this is met; if not, the score would be "adjusted accordingly". Each bid was awarded the full 10 points. The committee members learned that Southeastern was willing to provide street level storage when they made their site visit and inquired. The space was not described in Southeastern's written proposal. Item no. 11 relates to rental cost for the option period. The methodology adopted by the committee for this item is the same as for item no. Hintz, the lowest bidder for the option term, received 15 points; Clayton's Promenade Building received 14 points; Southeastern received 13 points; and the Clayton Building received 12 points. Item no. 12, accessibility to an I-4 Interchange, is worth 15 points maximum. For its methodology the committee devised a formula of granting the closest building a full 15 points. The I-4/Lee Road interchange was selected as the reference hub. The Clayton Building, .2 miles from the interchange, was given 15 points. Southeastern's building .6 miles away, three times as far, was given 1/3 value, 5 points; the Promenade Building, .4 miles away, or twice as far, was given 1/2 full value, or 7.5, rounded to 8 points; and Hintz' building, 2 miles away, or 10 times as far, was given 1.5 points, rounded to 2. The total values thus awarded by the committee were: 86 points to Southeastern; 78 points to Hintz; 77 points to Clayton (Clayton Bldg.); and 76 points to Clayton (Promenade Bldg.). The committee, after meeting on March 6th and making its awards, decided to meet again on March 12th, after obtaining more information on phone service, zoning regulations, crime, and bidder's previous experience in renovations. Although some additional information was obtained and the committee did meet again, it determined that the additional information (not clearly related to any of the seven criteria above) did not warrant changing any of the scores. The committee recommended award of the lease to Southeastern. Southeastern's Bid Allegedly Defective Southeastern's bid is signed by Gilmore E. Daniel, Vice President of Southeastern Investment Properties, Inc., as agent for the owner, Cynwyd Investments, a partnership which operates under about 150 different partnerships. The building in issue is owned by an entity designated "Adlee Building, Cynwyd Investments General Partnership". Attached to Southeastern's bid is a letter on Cynwyd Investments letterhead, dated February 7, 1991, addressed to Mr. Gil Daniel, re: Adlee Building, 5151 Adamson Street, Orlando, Florida, stating: As leasing and managing agent for the above captioned property, you are hereby authorized to negotiate on our behalf with the State of Florida in order to procure the Department of Transportation as a tenant in our building. (Joint Exhibit #5) The letter is signed by Stephen Cravitz, CSM. Although the language of the letter is inartful (the agent was not "negotiating" a lease), the intent is plain on its face that the agent procure a lease. This is sufficient to convey authority for Gil Daniel to act on behalf of the owner. The requirement of the RFP, paragraph 6.A. is met. (see paragraph 5, above) There are several tenants currently occupying space proposed to be leased to DOT under lease no. 550:0209. There are three "agreements" attached to Southeastern's bid proposal for three tenants. Each agreement provides the tenant will move by April 15, 1991 "...contingent upon the landlord being the successful bidder for the State of Florida Department of Transportation lease no. 550:0209, and having an executed lease with the State." (Joint Exhibit #5) The tenants have not moved, but neither has the contingency been satisfied; and when or if it is, the tenants will move. These agreements are sufficient "release" to meet the requirements of RFP paragraph 6.A. The remaining tenant does not have a lease. Clayton's Bid Allegedly Defective Clayton's bids did not include any releases from tenants. There is a tenant currently in part of the space offered in the Clayton Building. There is also a lease agreement dated August 28, 1989, between the Claytons and Canam Steel Corporation describing a lease term of three years and termination date of September 14, 1992. Edward Fielding, Jr. is Director of Operations in the Leasing Department for Charles and Malcolm Clayton. He is well aware of the requirements for state leasing as he and the Claytons have been involved for several years in leasing space to state agencies. Canam Steel Corporation provided a letter in April 26, 1990, stating that it is closing its Orlando operation and requesting that its lease be terminated. It still occupies the space, but Edward Fielding is assured that it wishes to leave, and will do so immediately upon approval by Clayton. The lease and release was not included with the bid packet, as Fielding properly determined that it was no longer binding on the landlord. The Clayton Building bid does not violate the requirement of RFP, Paragraph 6.A. F. Alleged Bias of the Committee in Favor of Southeastern and Improper Award of Points Hintz and Clayton contend that the bid process was thoroughly tainted with a bias in favor of an award to Southeastern. Clayton did not respond to the November bid; Hintz did, and did not protest the earlier process, although he apparently brought to DOT's attention the language added to Southeastern's bid response that led to the rejection of all bids and reinitiation of the process. The committee changed its evaluation criteria when it learned that DGS's form criteria are not binding on the agency. The committee's alterations and addition of the I-4 accessibility requirement were intended to better meet the specific needs of the programs that would be using the space. The changes did not specifically benefit Southeastern; it was neither the closest nor next closest building to the I-4 interchange. For those criteria which could be objectively quantified, such as rental rate and proximity to I-4, the committee attempted in good faith to devise formulae. That the point spread for the I-4 criteria was substantially wider than for rental rates does not invalidate those formulae. For those criteria requiring a subjective analysis, the conformance/design and environmental factors, Petitioner and Hintz failed to prove the committee's point awards were patently wrong or fraudulent. One committee member, James Hamelin, admitted that Clayton should have received 13, rather than 16 points for providing space on more than one floor, but that error, if it indeed was an error, inured to the benefit of Petitioner and made no impact on Hintz, the next highest scorer. None of the floor plans presented by the bidders with their proposals are attached to the exhibits received in evidence, and those floor plans are not part of the record in this proceeding. One committee member, Donna Sovern, admitted that all of the square footage proposed by Southeastern was initially on the second floor. When the site visit was made and the committee discussed the space, Southeastern offered 100 square feet of storage on the first floor. (Transcript, pp 200-201) Because of this, Southeastern was awarded the full 10 points for Item No. 5, requiring 100 square feet of street-level secured storage. Allowing Southeastern to change its bid thus provided an advantage of 10 additional points. Assuming that the change was appropriate, Southeastern should not have also received the full 25 points for Item No. 3, provision of aggregate square footage on a single floor, since the remainder of its space is on the second floor. The award of points in these two items by the committee is inconsistent and erroneous. Page 4 of 10 of the RFP describes the space to be included in the 13,640 square feet to be leased. The description includes storage areas. (Joint Exhibit #1) The bidders were on notice that "aggregate" square footage includes storage space. The total number of points awarded to Southeastern must be reduced by either 10 (the after-the-fact storage space on the first floor) or 9 (the difference between the full 25 points and 16, the points awarded to Clayton for space on two floors). This results in a total of either 76 or 77 points for Southeastern. In either case, Hintz becomes the highest scorer, and Clayton and Southeastern are tied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the agency enter its Final Order awarding lease no. 550:0209 to Lyell Hintz. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 12th day of June, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of June, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties: Petitioner's Proposed Findings Adopted in paragraphs 1 and 7. - 5. Adopted in paragraph 11. Adopted in paragraph 20. Adopted in paragraph 31. Adopted in summary in paragraph 18. Rejected as immaterial. and 11. Adopted in part in paragraph 5, otherwise rejected as immaterial. Southeastern's name is typewritten. Rejected as immaterial. Adopted in part in paragraph 31, otherwise rejected as immaterial. and 15. Adopted in part in paragraph 33, otherwise rejected as immaterial. Adopted in paragraphs 17 and 18. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. Adopted in paragraph 19. Rejected as immaterial. Adopted in part in paragraphs 20 and 27, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 21, 26 and 27. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 37. Adopted in part in paragraph 29, otherwise rejected as irrelevant as points were not awarded or subtracted for the additional factors. Rejected as irrelevant. Lyell Hintz' Proposed Findings Adopted in paragraphs 1 and 2. Adopted in paragraph 11. Adopted in paragraphs 13, 15, 16 and 21. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in paragraphs 17 and 18. Adopted in paragraph 5. Adopted in paragraph 8. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraphs 31 and 32. - 11. Rejected as immaterial and contrary to the weight of evidence. The letter attached to the bid was sufficient authority. 12. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 13. and 14. 15. Adopted Adopted in in paragraph 25. paragraphs 3 and 25. 16. Adopted in paragraph 38. 17. - 21. Adopted in paragraphs 3 and 22. 22. Rejected as argument rather than finding of fact. 23. Rejected as immaterial and unsupported by the evidence. 24. Adopted in paragraph 3. 25. - 34. Adopted in summary in paragraphs 23, 14 and 16. 35. and 36. Adopted in paragraph 38. Adopted in paragraphs 3 and 24. - 50. Rejected as immaterial. According to the evidence these factors did not change the committee's evaluation. 51. - 53. Rejected as immaterial and, as to the DGS requirement, unsupported by the record. Respondent and Southeastern's Proposed Findings Adopted in paragraph 1. Adopted in paragraph 9. Adopted in paragraph 11. Adopted in paragraph 10. Adopted in paragraph 17. Adopted in paragraphs 18 and 19. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in part in paragraph 3, otherwise unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 23. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 25. Adopted in paragraph 19. Adopted in paragraph 27. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in paragraph 28. Adopted in paragraph 24. Rejected as contrary to the evidence, specifically the RFP which unambiguously included all storage and office space in the "aggregate." - 19. Rejected as irrelevant or unsupported by the record. Adopted in paragraph 31. Adopted in paragraph 33. Adopted in part in paragraph 34, but the letter requesting its lease be terminated is sufficient release. Adopted in part in paragraph 12. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Marvin L. Beaman, Jr., Esquire 605 North Wymore Road Winter Park, FL 32789 Wings L. Benton, Esquire P. O. Box 5676 Tallahassee, FL 32314-5676 Susan P. Stephens, Esquire Dept. of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450 Kenneth M. Meer, Esquire 423 Country Club Drive Winter Park, FL 32789 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S. #58 Dept. of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams, General Counsel Dept. of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
Findings Of Fact The Respondent issued an Invitation to Bid by which sought to lease approximately 21,000 net useable square feet of office space to be located in Tampa, Florida. This Invitation to Bid is referred to as Lease Number 590:1946. Three bids were received in response to the Invitation to Bid, and they were opened on July 29, 1988. Bids were received from the Petitioner, Structures, Inc., and a third bidder that has not filed a protest, and is therefore not relevant to this proceeding. All bidders were initially determined to be responsive to the Invitation to Bid. Petitioner and Structures, Inc., submitted bids involving the same office space and real property. Petitioners' bid for this space was lower that the bid filed by Structures, Inc., when compared on a present value rental cost analysis. Despite Petitioners' lower bid, Respondent awarded this lease to Structures, Inc., due to the receipt of a letter dated August 2, 1988, from Intervenor, the owner of the subject property, stating that, "Mr. Hartley (Petitioner) has no right to propose this property to the Department as Mr. Hartley and I have no agreements with respect to my leasing the property to him." On the basis of this letter, the Respondent concluded that Petitioners had no legal interest in the subject property and therefore did not have the requisite control over the property to submit this bid. The Petitioners' bid was determined to be nonresponsive. Petitioners did not present competent substantial evidence to discredit or refute Intervenor's contention that they lacked any legal interest in this property. It is undisputed that Intervenor owns the property, and Intervenor was present at the hearing to confirm that the letter of August 2, 1988, was, in fact, his letter. The Petitioner, James C. Hartley, was not present at the hearing. The only evidence presented by Petitioners of any alleged interest in this property is a copy of a telecopy letter dated June 29, 1988, filed with its bid, which purports to express the intention of Intervenor and Petitioner Hartley to enter into a lease for certain property described on an Exhibit A, which was not presented in evidence. Thus, there is no indication on the face of this document that the telecopy letter relates to the subject property. However, even if the letter does relate to the property owned by Intervenor, the agreement specifically states that Intervenor's obligation to enter into a lease with Petitioner is expressly conditioned upon Intervenor's approval, In his sole discretion, of any sublease with the Respondent. If for any reason the Intervenor disapproved of the Petitioners' bid and lease with the Respondent, according to this agreement, he could simply refuse to enter into any lease of the subject property with Petitioners, and thus, Petitioners would have no interest or control over the property, and could not then sublease it to the Respondent. Finally, there is no recital of consideration in the purported agreement set forth in the telecopy letter. Based upon a complete review of the evidence presented, it is found that Petitioners did not have a valid, legal interest in the subject property which would be sufficient to allow them to file this bid and propose this lease to the Respondent. As such, Petitioners' bid was unresponsive.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Respondent enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioners' protest Lease Number 590:1946. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 3rd day of November, 1988. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-4645BID Rulings on Petitioners' and Intervenor's Proposed Findings of Fact: Petitioners and Intervenor did not timely file a Proposed Recommended Order containing proposed findings of fact. Rulings on the Respondent' Proposed Finding of Fact: Adopted in Findings of Fact 1 and 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 3-5. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 6-8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 9. Rejected in Finding of Fact 2, and as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph D. McFarland, Esquire 520 Second Avenue, South St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Robert L. Rocke, Esquire Post Office Box 3433 Tampa, Florida 33601 Jack Farley, Esquire W. T. Edwards facility 4000 West Buffalo Fifth Floor, Room 520 Tampa, Florida 33614 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact A request for bids to remodel and make additions to Washington Elementary School was issued by Respondent on August 15, 1990, for Project No. 0191-8210. The request for bids included requests for a base work (the "base bid") and additional work described in various alternates (the "total bid"). Respondent had the option of selecting one or more alternates or none of the alternates. Bids were filed by four bidders on January 15, 1990. Bid tabulations were posted on January 23, 1991. Petitioner was the lowest bidder, and Select Contracting, Inc. ("Select"), was the second lowest bidder. Petitioner's base bid was in the amount of $1,406,500. Petitioner's bid for the alternates eventually selected by Respondent was in the amount of $1,594,300. 2/ The bid documents required bidders to include a bid bond in an amount not less than five percent of the bid. Petitioner included a bid bond with its bid in the amount of $75,000 which was more than five percent of its base bid but less than five percent of the total bid calculated after taking into account the alternates selected by Respondent. Respondent recommended to its Superintendent that the contract should be awarded to Petitioner. Select filed a bid protest on January 25, 1991, seeking an informal hearing. Select alleged that Petitioner's bid was not responsive because it failed to include a bid bond for five percent of Petitioner's total bid, including the alternates selected by Respondent. Select included a bid bond for five percent of its total bid, including the alternates selected by Respondent. Respondent conducted an informal hearing on February 6, 1991, and proposed that all bids should be rejected and the project re-advertised. Respondent determined that Petitioner's bid was non-responsive in that it failed to include a bid bond in an amount equal to five percent of the total bid, including all alternates selected by Respondent. Respondent further determined that relevant language in the bid documents is ambiguous and may create an economic advantage for bidders who provide a bid bond in an amount less than that provided by other bidders. In a written analysis of the basis for recommending the rejection of all bids, the General Counsel stated: In the instant case, since bid amount is not specifically defined by the SCHOOL BOARD, one bidder may receive an unfair economic advantage over another by only including in its bid amount the cost for obtaining a bond which was less than the actual bid amount, (i.e. base bid plus alternates). The only reason that Respondent did not regard the amount of Petitioner's bid bond as a minor irregularity was that Respondent wanted to assure that all bidders were placed on ". . . an equal playing field . . ." by avoiding an unfair economic advantage for one or more bidders. 3/ Relevant language in the bid documents which defines the amount of the required bid bond is ambiguous. The Advertisement For Bid, in relevant part, requires that bids ". . . must be accompanied by a bid bond or cashier's check in an amount not less than five percent (5%) of the bid . . . ." Section 3.05(d) of the Instructions to Bidders refers bidders to Section 3.08 for purposes of the bid bond. Section 3.08 in relevant part requires bids to be accompanied by a bid bond ". . . of not less than five percent (5%) of the amount of the Bid . . . ." The bid proposal form, however, provides that the bidder ". . . further agrees that the security in the form of a Bid Bond, or Cashier's Check in the amount of not less that five percent (5%) of the total Bid Price . . . accompanies this Bid " A bid bond in an amount equal to five percent of the base bid satisfies the requirements in the bid documents for a bid bond in all but one instance. A bid bond in an amount not less than five percent of the base bid is not consistent with the representation in the proposal form that a bidder has included a bid bond equal to five percent of the total bid price. Respondent's bid documents have historically required a bid bond for only five percent of the base bid. The reference in the bid proposal form to a bid bond equal to five percent of the total bid is a recent change made by Respondent and is limited to the bid proposal form. The inclusion of a bid bond for only five percent of the base bid is consistent with Petitioner's historical practice in bidding previous jobs offered by Respondent. Petitioner obtained no unfair economic advantage over Select by including a bid bond for only five percent of the base bid while Select included a bid bond equal to five percent of the total bid, including the alternates selected by Respondent. The uncontroverted evidence establishes that both Petitioner and Select obtained their respective bid bonds at no cost to either bidder. Companies that issue bid bonds, including the companies that issued bid bonds to Petitioner and Select, do not impose a charge for issuing a bid bond in the ordinary course of doing business. Such companies make their money if and when they issue a performance and payment bond for the successful bidder. 4/ Respondent did not know at the time it formulated its proposed agency action that no unfair economic advantage was gained by a bidder who submitted a bid bond for five percent of the base bid rather than five percent of the total bid. Respondent was uncertain of the economic advantage derived from submitting a lower bid bond, if any. Counsel for Select represented that an economic advantage was gained by Petitioner. Respondent decided to reject all bids and look ". . . for . . . direction from a Hearing Officer. " Petitioner is ready, willing, and able to contract for and perform the work necessary to complete the Project. Petitioner is a pre-qualified contractor for projects undertaken by Respondent. Petitioner has a bonding limit substantially in excess of that required to complete the Project and substantial experience in similar projects for the Broward County School Board. Respondent is confident and has no concern over Petitioner's ability to complete the Project. 5/
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's written formal protest be GRANTED and the contract awarded to Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 3rd day of April, 1991. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 1991.
The Issue This is a bid challenge case in which the primary issue is whether the Petitioner's bid is responsive to the RFP.
Findings Of Fact Some basic background facts The Department issued Request for Proposals No. 700:0652, Office Space (the "RFP"). The RFP requested bidders to submit proposals to provide 7,750 square feet of office space (+/- 3 percent) in Broward County to be leased by the Department for a probation and parole office. Under the RFP terms the space had to be available by June 1, 1993. Proposals had to be filed with the Department by January 5, 1993. In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., and Janc, Inc., submitted bids. Pursuant to an evaluation of the bids conducted by the Department, In- Rel Acquisitions, Inc., was given a contingent award of the lease on March 31, 1993, as the vendor with the lowest price and the overall highest evaluation score. The contingent award letter of March 31, 1993, read as follows in pertinent part: It is the intent of the Department of Corrections to award the above referenced bid to In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., as the vendor with the lowest bid price and the overall highest evaluation score. The award to In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., is contingent upon: (a) obtaining the necessary zoning approval to operate a probation and parole office at the bid premises by May 6, 1993, and (b) the Department obtaining sufficient assurances from the Resolution Trust Corporation that the bid premises will not be taken over by the RTC and the Department's leasehold interest will not be affected. On May 18, 1993, the Department issued a letter awarding the subject lease to Janc, Inc., because the Department was of the view that In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., had not met the conditions of the contingent award of March 31, 1993. The award letter of May 18, 1993, read as follows, in pertinent part: This letter is to inform you that the Department of Corrections has determined that the award of the lease for the above referenced bid is hereby made to Janc, Inc. The bid from In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc. has been rejected because it has not met either of the conditions stipulated on the March 31st award letter, and the property has not been properly maintained under the existing lease agreement. Both the contingent award letter of March 31, 1993, and the award letter of May 18, 1993, contained "boiler-plate" language advising the addressee of the basic details of the written protest process. In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., filed a timely protest of the award to Janc, Inc. Facts about the zoning situation The award of the lease to In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., was made contingent because the property was not properly zoned to support a probation and parole office for the Department. At the time of soliciting bids on the subject project, the Department was currently leasing the space proposed by In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., and had done so for almost five years. Shortly after the deadline for the submission of bids, the Department was notified that it was in violation of the Plantation City Code because the office was not properly zoned, and the Department was subject to fines if it did not obtain proper zoning or leave the premises by June 1. The fine was at the rate of $200.00 per day. In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., did not obtain necessary zoning approval by May 6, 1993. First, the zoning approval passed by the City of Plantation limited the hours of operation of the probation office. As approved by the City of Plantation, the Department can only operate its probation office Monday through Friday from 8:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., plus one evening a week until 7:00 p.m. These time limits do not satisfy the contingency placed in the March 31, 1993, award because the Department cannot operate a probation and parole office within these limited hours. The Department has 14,000 probationers in Broward County under its supervision. The caseload puts a severe strain on the caseworkers making it essential that they have flexible hours to get their job done. The caseload also requires working evenings and weekends. For example, some probation officers must maintain evening hours to test offenders for drugs. Although the officers could make the offenders visit the Department's office during the day, this would jeopardize the employment status of many offenders. Therefore, the Department needs flexible evening hours to do the drug testing. One of the major functions of the probation officer is to help rehabilitate the offender. That means that the Department must do what it can to help the offender stay employed. In addition, the probation officers need evening and weekend hours to do their paperwork, including preparing weekly reporting schedules, and recording their contacts. The officers also need evening hours to receive monetary payments due from offenders, meet with offenders who must report in person into the office each month, and counsel offenders in the office. Under the prior lease with In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., the Department had operated and held evening hours at a minimum of three nights per week. This included both probation officers and offenders appearing at the office during the evenings. The RFP specifically notified bidders that there would be evening hours. Section B(14) of the RFP states: Staff of both sexes will be required to work in this facility during both daylight and evening hours. An environment in which staff can expect to be safe is essential. Section D(11) of the General Provisions of the subject RFP reads as follows: Federal, state, county, and local laws, ordinances, rules, and regulations that in any manner affect the items covered herein apply. Lack of knowledge by the bidder will in no way be a cause for relief from responsibility. The records of the City of Plantation meetings show that the May 5, 1993, vote was not final. A mandatory second reading of the zoning change took place on May 12, 1993, and the minutes were approved on May 19, 1993, and June 2, 1993, with respect to the first and second reading. Even if the zoning change with its limited hours had been sufficient to meet the terms of the contingent award, the limited zoning approval was not received before May 6, 1993; and therefore, the mandatory second reading of May 12, 1993, caused the limited zoning approval to be untimely. Finally, the limited and untimely zoning change as approved on May 5, 1993, was itself contingent on satisfying all concerns of the Landscape Architect. Facts regarding the RTC assurances The second award contingency required In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., to provide the Department with sufficient assurances from the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) that the bid premises would not be taken over by the RTC and that the Department's leasehold interest would not be affected. The property submitted by In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., was in litigation; the RTC as successor mortgagee, had filed or secured a Notice of Lis Pendens, an Amended Complaint, a Summary Final Foreclosure Judgment, and a Notice of Sale. The RTC has an interest in the property offered by In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc. Paragraph 1(E) of the Summary Final Foreclosure Judgment provides that the Summary Final Foreclosure Judgment shall eliminate the interest of anyone that has acquired an interest since the filing of the Lis Pendens, including the Department's leasehold interest if it were to enter into a lease on the property. The property bid by In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., was subject to a second mortgage. The record does not reflect that the first mortgagee and the second mortgagee entered into any type of written agreement not to disturb the leasehold interest of the Department. By letter dated May 11, 1993, an attorney for the RTC responded to the Department's request for assurances. The May 11, 1993, letter included the following: Pursuant to your request of yesterday, I am writing to belatedly confirm the April 19, 1993 telephone conference had you, Robert Gellman of Real Estate Recovery, Inc., and I. This telephone conversation was had to provide the Department of Corrections (the "Department") with the assurances requested from the RTC in the Department's March 31, 1993 letter of intent to award the subject least [sic] to In Rel Acquisitions, Inc. During this discussion you expressed the concern of the Department that the RTC intended to take title to the property and would then utilize special powers and privileges to dispossess the Department. If that were to be the case, you indicated that the Department would want an assurance that it would receive 90-days' notice before it could be dispossessed. (You indicated that 90-days is how long it would take to complete the bid process that would have to precede the Department's move.) Robert Gellman indicated that he was pursing [sic] numerous resolutions to the pending litigation, some of which might involve the RTC's taking title to the property and others which might not. Mr. Gellman assured you, however, that the RTC perceived it to be in its own best interest, and in the interest of any subsequent landlord, that the Department be kept happy and its tenancy undisturbed. Mr. Gellman also explained that he could not agree to anything at the time, as the appropriate committee approval had to be secured, but that he anticipated no problem in obtaining the necessary approvals of any writing consistent with our discussions once those writings were prepared. (I believe at the time we contemplated a written lease and a written assurance letter from the appropriate RTC official.) You indicated that your concerns had been satisfied and that these assurances were sufficient to satisfy the Department. The three of us discussed that it would not make sense to begin drafting anything at that time as the issues regarding the property's zoning still had to be cleared up and our efforts might otherwise "be all for not." Accordingly, it was mutually decided that we would wait to see the outcome of the May 5, 1993 hearing on the zoning issue before proceeding further. In the interim you indicated that you would be providing us with a list of the specific items of tenant improvements that your local officials expected to have made to the property. (We received this list on May 3, 1993.) On May 5, 1993 the Plantation City Council approved In-Rel Acquisition Inc.'s, request for a rezoning of its property and for a "special use" condition by a 4-0 vote, thus effectively resolving the zoning issue. Yesterday you and I spoke on this issue and discussed the situation. I indicated that the RTC is now in a position to provide you with written assurance that it has no intention of dispossessing the Department or interfering with its lease tenancy (either under the old or the new lease), and that the Department's leasehold interest would not be affected by the RTC taking title to the property (if it ever does). I asked and you indicated that this would give you what you needed and everything would be fine. In addition, I indicated that once the lease by and between the Department and In Rel is finalized, the RTC, if it still owns the note and mortgage, would be able to approve same. In light of the foregoing your call to me this morning, indicating that the Department had decided to withdraw its award to In Rel Acquisitions, Inc. and make the award to "Viloci" (phonetic(?), the next ranked bidder. During this discussion you indicated that Viloci's legal counsel had stated that the RTC would never be able to provide the Department with the requisite assurances. It is unfair for you to make decisions based in whole or in part on any statements made by Viloci's counsel regarding what the RTC can and cannot do without giving us an opportunity to respond -- especially in light of your indications on April 19th and again yesterday that the Department was satisfied with the RTC. The record reflects that the "Notice of Sale" failed to contain language providing that the property would be sold subject to any leasehold interest, either previously or subsequently acquired.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued in this case dismissing the Petition of In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., and awarding the subject lease to the Intervenor, Janc, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 17th day of September 1993. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of September 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-3438BID The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties. Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by Petitioner Paragraph 1: First three sentences accepted in substance. Fourth sentence rejected as constituting primarily irrelevant or subordinate details. Last sentence reject as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence to the extent it is intended to imply that the zoning change obtained was sufficient. Paragraph 2 and 3: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 4 and 5: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 6: The first two sentences are rejected as irrelevant or as subordinate and unnecessary details. Last sentence rejected as irrelevant and also as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and as suggesting implications not warranted by the evidence. Paragraph 7: Rejected because it goes further than the evidence and suggests inferences not warranted by the evidence. Messrs. Gellman and Guerra told Mr. Ferst that they did not expect that the Department would have any problems with RTC, but the statements of Messrs. Gellman and Guerra stopped short of making any guarantees or of binding the RTC. Paragraph 8: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 9: Accepted in substance, with the deletion of the words "in ignoring the foregoing." Paragraph 10: Rejected as constituting a summary of a party's argument or statement of position, rather than a proposed finding of fact. Paragraph 11: First sentence is accepted in substance. Second sentence is accepted as literally true, but as also substantially irrelevant because during most of the original five-year lease there was no issue about hours of operation because there was no effort at restriction of hours of operation. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Paragraph 12: The first two sentences are rejected as constituting a summary of a party's argument or statement of position, rather than a proposed finding of fact. The third and fourth sentences are rejected because they go further than the evidence and suggest inferences not warranted by the evidence. As noted above, Messrs. Gellman and Guerra told Mr. Ferst that they did not expect that the Department would have any problems with RTC, but the statements of Messrs. Gellman and Guerra stopped short of making any guarantees or of binding the RTC. Paragraph 13: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed conclusions of law, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 14: First two sentences accepted in substance. Last sentence rejected as constituting argument or proposed conclusions of law, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 15: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed conclusions of law, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 16: It is accepted that Messrs. Gellman and Guerra made statements as to what they expected the RTC's position to be, but, as noted several times above, the statements of Messrs. Gellman and Guerra stopped short of making any guarantees or of binding the RTC. Proposed findings submitted by Respondent Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9: Accepted. Paragraph 10: Rejected as constituting subordinate and unnecessary restatement of a party's position. Paragraphs 11, 12 and 13: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 14: Rejected as repetitious. Paragraphs 15, 16 and 17: Accepted. Paragraph 18: First sentence is accepted. The second sentence is rejected as constituting argument, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraphs 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 29: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 30: Accepted. Paragraph 31 and 32: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraphs 33 and 34: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 35 and 36: Rejected as irrelevant or as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 37: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraphs 38, 39, 40 and 41: Rejected as irrelevant or as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraphs 42, 43, 44 and 45: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraphs 46, 47, 48 and 49: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 50: Accepted. Paragraph 51: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 52: First sentence rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Second sentence rejected as repetitious. Paragraphs 53, 54 and 55: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 56: First sentence accepted in substance. Second sentence rejected as constituting argument, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 57: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 58: Rejected as irrelevant or as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraphs 59, 60, 61, 62, 63 and 64: Rejected as primarily constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Proposed findings submitted by Intervenor Although there are some differences in the numerical sequence, the vast majority of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Intervenor are identical to those submitted by the Respondent. It would serve no useful purpose to repeat the rulings on all of those findings. The following rulings address the few proposed findings submitted by the Intervenor that are different from the ones submitted by the Respondent. Paragraph 11: Rejected as constituting subordinate and unnecessary restatement of a party's position. Paragraph 30: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 37: Rejected as irrelevant or as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 44: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 54: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraphs 55, 56, 57, 58, 59 and 60: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 61: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraphs 62, 63 and 64: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 65, 66 and 67: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael S. Riley, Esquire 200 East Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Steven S. Ferst, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Joseph J. Villacci, Esquire 315 Northeast Third Avenue, Suite 200 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Harry K. Singletary, Jr., Secretary Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Louis A. Vargas, General Counsel Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a corporation organized under the laws of Florida with its principal place of business in Tampa, Florida. It was formed in October, 1973 and is in the business of building bridges throughout west/central Florida. It is an independent construction company which specializes solely in bridge and fender construction. Its business relies solely on contracts from public authorities, especially the Respondent herein. On March 19, 1984, in the United States District Court, Northern District of Florida, Petitioner and its president, Gerald H. Stanley were convicted of violating Title 15, United States Code, Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, for participating in a conspiracy to rig bids by DOT on June 27, 1979. Petitioner was fined $50,000.00 and Mr. Stanley was fined $20,000.00, ordered to perform 200 hours of community service and placed on three years unsupervised probation. Petitioner did not renew its Certificate of Qualification to bid on Florida bridge projects when it expired on or about April 30, 1984. However, on June 12, 1984, both Petitioner and Mr. Stanley filed a Petition for a determination that they are eligible to apply for and hold a Certificate of Qualification under the provision of Section 337.165(2)(d), Florida Statutes, alleging such reapplication to be in the public interest. Marine Structures, Inc. adopted a formal, written antitrust compliance policy in July, 1984, and the record fails to show any instance of bid rigging or antitrust involvement since the one incident in June, 1979. Because of the limited number of companies involved in the road and bridge construction business, the existing companies, who were formerly involved in bidding misconduct, must, of necessity, deal with each other, but there is no indication or reason to assume that such necessary dealings will result in future misconduct. In addition to the written antitrust compliance policy referenced above, Marine has also taken remedial action to assure that all of its employees conduct their business activities in strict compliance with the law and the rules and regulations of both the state and federal governments. Due to Marine's inability to bid on DOT contracts, it has suffered and continues to suffer extreme financial hardship. In its past dealings with DOT, it has performed quality work and has cooperated fully with the Department. DOT indicates it has not been made aware of any particular circumstances involving Marine's or Mr. Stanley's participation in the instant bid rigging incident which would make that incident any more detrimental to DOT than any of the bid rigging conspiracies by the 26 other companies which have been reinstated by the Department. These 26 companies which have been reinstated, submitted themselves to DOT's independent investigations and agreed to comply with the safeguards required in their individual cases to help to assure that contract crimes would not occur on Department projects. Mr. Stanley, on behalf of Marine Structures, Inc., has offered the same assurances. In a letter dated May 1, 1985, to the Secretary, Department of Transportation, the Honorable Jim Smith, Attorney General of the State of Florida, indicated that though Respondent has, in a confidential sworn statement to attorneys for the State, denied any involvement in bid rigging activities other than in connection with that of which he was convicted in federal court, the State investigation, in the opinion of the Attorney General, raises substantial doubt as to the truth of Mr. Stanley's denials of misconduct. The Attorney General indicates that in an effort to resolve this apparent inconsistency, Mr. Stanley was asked, through his counsel, to take a polygraph examination which he refused. Mr. Stanley denies having refused to take the polygraph at any time. Further, the Attorney General relates that Marine Structures, Inc. has not offered to pay any amount of damages to the State, yet Mr. Stanley contends that he has never, to this day, been asked to make any reimbursement or restitution to the State. Mr. Stanley, on behalf of the Petitioner, does not deny that he committed error and that this error constituted an offense against the state and federal governments. He tells a story, however, regarding it which puts it in a somewhat less serious light than is described by the State. According to Mr. Stanley, he gave a bid figure to two other contractors, who he had previously asked to subcontract in his bid, over which they should bid in order to assure Petitioner of having the lowest bid of the three on this particular contract. Both other contractors, Mr. Carroll and Mr. Conner, submitted bids which were higher than that of Petitioner as did a four potential contractor, Square G, and notwithstanding this, Petitioner's bid was lower than the State estimate. In light of this factor he contends that his misconduct, while technically a violation for which he was tried and convicted, did not cost the State one extra cent. He regrets having done it and would not do it again. Both Carroll and Conner, the two other contractors involved with Petitioner in this incident, pleaded guilty and were convicted, but both have been reinstated as eligible bidders on State work. As to the letter of the Attorney General, Mr. Stanley contends that the comment regarding his veracity relates to a situation involving his testimony before the Attorney General's staff about the Citrus County project. Though he had been advised he would be asked about that specific project, in reality, the questions he was asked related to a different project in Alachua County on which he had bid but which involved no bid rigging on his part. Mr. Stanley contends he told his interrogators what he knew but they were not satisfied as to his knowledge regarding another bidder by the name of Hewitt. His denials of any knowledge of Hewitt's bid were not believed and Mr. Stanley feels he was somewhat threatened by members of the Attorney General's staff who reportedly indicated they would keep him off the bidder's list for some time and would "break" him. He contends that he has cooperated fully with state and federal prosecutors not only because of his desire to be reinstated, but also because the terms of his federal probation require him to cooperate fully. He has, in fact, met with state and federal attorneys on two occasions without being subpoenaed, has made his records available to investigative authorities, and has made copies of any documents desired by the investigators. Other than the one incident involved herein, Mr. Stanley contends that neither he nor his company have ever been involved in any other bid rigging situation. He has given statements to both the Florida Attorney General's office and the Antitrust Division on many occasions other than those referenced in the paragraph above. He has given testimony to a U.S. grand jury and the documents and files which he released to the investigative agencies were released prior to his being granted any immunity from State prosecution by the Attorney General. In short he has cooperated fully with state and federal authorities without holding back any information and will continue to do so even if he is reinstated. He feels, therefore, that it is unnecessary for his reinstatement to be withheld as a threat over his head to coerce testimony from him regarding Mr. Hewitt. Admittedly, neither his personal fine nor that assessed against the company have been paid. He has not, however, been dunned for payment and this is just as well because having been barred from bidding on State business, he is finding it difficult to meet his monthly bills much less pay $70,000.00 in fines. As to the purpose behind the State's manner of handling those companies identified as being involved in bid rigging, the Attorney General very clearly established the action philosophy in a statement made to Florida Trend Magazine on May 29, 1984. In the press release in question he stated: "If we forced these companies into bankruptcy we would not be cleaning up the industry, we'd be abolishing it, putting thousands of employees on the streets and destroying competition in a multi-million dollar industry in which the State is a major purchaser . . . . By obtaining the cooperation of settling defendants we greatly facilitated botch the investigation and the willingness of subsequent defendant to . . . (settle)." Respondent has not shown by any evidence that Petitioner was any worse in its misconduct than any other bidder which has already been reinstated, nor has it exhibited any justification for treating Petitioner more harshly than others.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent’s proposed award of a contract to Intervenor is contrary to statutes, rules, policies, or the specifications, pursuant to Section 120.57(3)(f), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On February 15, 2002, Respondent advertised for bids for Contract E4D18 (ITB). The ITB requires bidders to submit their bids with a bid bond and power of attorney no later than 11:00 a.m. on March 8, 2002. Petitioner and Intervenor timely submitted bids at the specified location. Petitioner’s bid price was $2,094,748.99, and Intervenor’s bid price was $2,095,530.00. Petitioner and Intervenor have standing to participate in this case. In preparing its bid, Petitioner obtained a bid bond and power of attorney from Great American Insurance Company through its local bonding agent, Nielson, Alter and Associates. (All references to bid bonds shall mean the bid bond and accompanying power of attorney.) Nielson, Alter and Associates and its predecessor has provided bid bonds for Petitioner for 12 years. Pursuant to its standard business practice, Petitioner received the bid bond from Nielson, Alter and Associates the day prior to the deadline for submitting bids. The bond was in proper form, duly authorized, and validly executed, so it was enforceable upon delivery from Petitioner to Respondent. If Petitioner in fact delivered the bond with the bid on the following day, Respondent would have no basis to reject Petitioner’s bid as unresponsive. Petitioner’s employee responsible for assembling and delivering Petitioner’s bid has been so employed by Petitioner for three and one-half years. She testified that she placed the bid bond in the package with the bid itself, sealed the package, drove it to the assigned location, and submitted the sealed bid package to Respondent by 10:30 a.m. on March 8, 2002. Respondent’s employees accepted Petitioner’s sealed bid package and, without opening it, placed it in a locked filing cabinet, where they placed the three other timely submitted bids for the subject project. At 11:00 a.m.--the time specified for the opening of bids--one of Respondent’s employees removed the four sealed bid packages and took them to the conference room for the opening of the bids in response to the ITB. At the same time and place, Respondent’s employees were opening 21 other bids in response to five other invitations to bid on projects unrelated to the subject project. The conference room was small and contained a table. On one side of the table sat three of Respondent’s employees, who remained with the bid packages continuously from when they arrived in the conference room until, after they were opened, they were taken upstairs to a data processing center. On the other side of the table sat Petitioner’s employee and a representative of another bidder. The 25 bid packages were in six separate piles, divided by project. One of Respondent’s employees opened each bid and handed it to a second employee who announced the name of the bidder and the amount of the bid. The second employee then passed the bid to the third employee who recorded the bid. As was consistent with Respondent’s past practice, no one announced whether each bid was complete. At the end of the opening of the bids in response to the ITB, Respondent’s employee announced that Intervenor had submitted the lowest bid. Due to a mathematical error in Intervenor’s bid, it appeared from the cover sheets that Intervenor’s bid was the lowest. Only later, after the mathematical error was corrected, did Respondent’s employees discover that Petitioner had submitted the lowest bid. After Petitioner’s employee and the representative of the other bidder had left the conference room, Respondent’s three employees examined the bid packages more closely. They could not find the bid bond in Petitioner’s bid package, nor could they find the bid bond in the bid package of a bidder for one of the other contracts. The first of Respondent’s employees to discover that she could not find the bid bond in Petitioner’s bid package reexamined Petitioner’s bid package in search of the documents. The three employees then checked inside every envelope for the documents that were missing from the bid packages of Petitioner and the other bidder, but they could not find the missing documents. It was highly unusual for a bid bond to be missing from a bid package and probably unprecedented for bid bonds to be missing from two bids for separate jobs opened at the same time. Consistent with their practice then and now, Respondent’s employees separated the bidders’ checks from the bid packages and placed the checks in a secure location. Consistent with their practice then and now, one of Respondent’s employees then delivered the remainder of each bid package to the data processing center upstairs. Consistent with their practice then, but not now, Respondent’s employees did not document that the bid bond was missing for several days after the bid opening. Petitioner contends that Respondent’s employees did not discover that the bid bond was missing until days after the bid opening. Petitioner reasons, in part, that Respondent’s employees were not as attentive to Petitioner’s bid because they thought that it was only the second lowest bid. Petitioner contends that the discovery of the missing bid bond several days after its submittal provides Respondent’s employees with considerable opportunity to mishandle the bid package and inadvertently misplace the bid bond. In support of its contention that Respondent’s employees did not immediately discover the missing bid bond, Petitioner offered the testimony to this effect of its president and proffered similar testimony of another witness. The bases of this testimony were separate statements from the employee who supervised the three employees who opened, announced, and recorded the bids. However, this testimony, even from both witnesses, could not overcome the clear and unequivocal testimony of all three of Respondent’s employees that they discovered that Petitioner’s bid package was missing the bid bond on the day of the bid opening. Any statement to the contrary by Respondent's supervisory employee may have been based on her misrecollection or ignorance of the facts or misunderstanding of the questions posed to her, although it is also possible that both listeners separately misunderstood what she was saying. A bid bond is a crucial component of a bid. Its omission confers a competitive advantage upon a bidder, which, after bid opening, could elect not to cure the omission and thus be relieved of the obligation that it otherwise appeared to have offered to undertake by submitting its bid. Intervenor's post-hearing memorandum adds a perceptive discussion of the dullness of memory when attesting to a matter of routine, as was the testimony of Petitioner's employee who "always" attached bid bonds to bids, compared to the vividness of memory when attesting to a rare deviation from routine, as was the testimony of Respondent's three employees who were startled to find that bid bonds were missing from two bid packages, looked for the missing documents, and could not find them. On the present record, it would be slightly less troubling to find that Petitioner's bid package lacked the bid bond, but, as noted below, the burden of proof is on Petitioner, so it suffices to find that Petitioner has failed to prove that its bid package contained the bid bond.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order dismissing the bid protest of Petitioner and awarding the contract to Intervenor. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of August, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of August, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Barbara Gasper Hines Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwanee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Joseph W. Lawrence, II Vezina, Lawrence & Piscitelli, P.A. 360 East Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1130 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 F. Alan Cummings Smith, Currie & Hancock LLP 1004 DeSoto Park Drive Post Office Box 589 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0589
Findings Of Fact By Invitation to Bid for Lease NO. 590:1944, Respondent invited lease proposals for approximately 15,206 square feet of office space "located within the following boundaries: On the North, Aloma Avenue/Fairbanks Avenue the East, Semoran Boulevard the South, Colonial Drive, and on the West, Mills Avenue." The geographic area includes as many as 100 office buildings, although the invitation only generated three bids. The Invitation to Bid announced a Pre-Bid Conference on December 22, 1987. Interested parties were directed to contact Linda N. Treml, whose telephone number was provided, for "bid specifications and information regarding the space." The Invitation to Bid stated that "[a]ny questions concerning this project are to be directed to [Ms. Treml]" and "prospective bidders are encouraged to consult with [Ms. Treml] beforehand in an attempt to enable as correct a bid submittal as possible." The Invitation to Bid required that certain attachments accompany the bid proposal and referred the prospective bidder to paragraph 9 of the Bid submittal Form. The required attachments included a scaled floorplan "showing present configurations with measurements," net rentable square footage calculations using floorplan measurements, and a preliminary site layout. The Invitation to Bid stated that Respondent reserved the right to waive any minor informalities or technicality and seek clarification" of bids received, when such is in the best interest of the state. Responding to Respondent's newspaper advertisement and direct-mail solicitation for bids, James W. Boyle, who is a real estate broker active in leasing and property management, requested from Ms. Treml an Invitation to Bid and Bid Submittal Form. Mr. Boyle regularly reviews announcements of forthcoming leasing activity by state agencies. If he is aware of a building that appears to meet the agency's requirements, he contacts the building's owner or manager and informs him or her that he may have a prospective tenant. After receiving the bid materials for Lease No. 590:1944, Mr. Boyle contacted Kathryn Doyle, who is the leasing manager of Petitioner, and learned that Petitioner could accommodate Respondent's space needs for the term sought in the Lakeview 436 office building. Mr. Boyle assisted Ms. Doyle in the preparation of the Bid Submittal Form for Petitioner. In his first conversation with Ms. Doyle, Mr. Boyle ascertained that Petitioner's building carried a Semoran Boulevard street address and in fact had direct access to Semoran Boulevard. Petitioner's building lies on the east side of Semoran Boulevard, which serves as the eastern boundary of the geographic area described in the Invitation to Bid. Three bids were submitted in response to the subject Invitation to Bid. When they were opened, Ms. Treml and her supervisor, George A. Smith, determined that bids of Petitioner and a third party were nonresponsive because their office buildings were outside the geographic area specified in the Invitation to Bid. These bids were not considered further. Mr. Boyle had previously represented the owners of the FARE building several months earlier in a bid for Lease No. 590:1895. The Invitation to Bid in that case, which was issued by Respondent and named Ms. Treml as the contact person, provided that the proposed office space must be located within the following boundaries: Beginning at the intersection of US 17-92 and Colonial Drive, then west on Colonial Drive to the intersection of Edgewater Drive, then north on Edgewater Drive to the intersection of Kennedy Blvd. . ., then east on Kennedy Blvd. . . . to the intersection of US 17-92, then south on US 17- 92 to the point of beginning." Although Mr. Boyle's client was not awarded Lease NO. 590:1895 for reasons not relevant here, his client's bid, as well as the bid of another unsuccessful bidder owning a building on the east side of the highway serving as the east boundary of the geographic area, were considered responsive and thus within the specified geographic area. Ms. Treml interpreted the boundary description in Lease NO. 590:1944 differently from the boundary description in Lease NO. 590:1895. The description for Lease NO. 590:1895 defined the boundaries by "beginning" at a certain intersection, then proceeding "on" a highway, and so on. The description for Lease NO. 590:1944 defined the boundaries by identifying landmarks "on the north," then the "east," and so on. At the time of assisting in the preparation of Petitioner's bid, Mr. Boyle was also aware of an Invitation to Bid issued by Respondent for Lease NO. 590:1875. In this case, Respondent specified office space "in the following area of Brevard County, Florida: Beginning at the intersection of U.S. Highway 1 and State Road 50, then West on SR-50 to the intersection of 1-95, then North on 1-95 to the intersection of SR-406 . . . then East on SR-406 to the intersection of U.S. 1, then South on U.S. 1 to the point of beginning." In the case of Lease NO. 590:1875, the bid contact person, Lynn Mobley, issued a clarification letter stating that any building located on either side of the boundary road with an address on the boundary road would be considered to be within the boundary. Ms. Mobley and her supervisor, Ernest Wilson, who are Respondent's District 7 Facilities Services Assistant Manager and Manager, respectively, have consistently advised potential bidders that a building located on a boundary highway is included in the geographic area even though it would be outside the area if the dividing line were the centerline of the highway. Mary Goodman, Chief, Bureau of Property Management of the Department of General Services, testified that, in the course of her review of leasing activities by various state agencies, she has historically guided agencies that, if a building abuts a boundary highway but is not, strictly speaking, within it, the agency "could waive that as a minor technicality and consider it a responsive bid." Neither Mr. Boyle, Ms. Doyle, or any other representative of Petitioner spoke to Ms. Goodman prior to submitting the subject bid proposal. Ms. Treml customarily waives minor irregularities in bid submittals. However, she does not treat the location of a building outside the geographic area as a minor irregularity. To do so would be unfair to owners of other buildings outside the geographic area who took the geographic description at its face value and never submitted bids. Ms. Doyle received the bid materials from Mr. Boyle after the Pre-Bid Conference had taken place. However, Mr. Boyle elected not to attend the Pre- Bid Conference at which Ms. Treml explained, among other things, her interpretation of the specific geographic area. He chose not to attend because he felt that he would not learn anything relevant at the conference, which was attended by a representative of Intervenor. Neither Mr. Boyle, Ms. Doyle, or any other representative of Petitioner contacted Ms. Treml prior to submitting Petitioner's bid. Mr. Boyle, whose compensation in this case is entirely contingent upon a successful bid, estimates that he spent about 20 hours working on Petitioner's bid. Ms. Doyle estimates that she spent about 40 hours working on the bid. Petitioner also spent $800 in obtaining an "as-built" drawing of the space that accompanied its proposal. By letter dated February 22, 1988, Respondent notified the bidders of its decision to award the lease contract to Intervenor. Petitioner filed a notice of intent to protest the award by letter dated February 24, 1988. Ms. Treml met Mr. Boyle and Ms. Doyle on March 1, 1988, and cited the location of Petitioner's building as the only reason for the determination of nonresponsiveness. The attempt at mediation having failed, Petitioner filed a formal written protest of the award by letter dated March 3, 1988. Petitioner attached to its bid proposal an "as-built" drawing. Although drawn to scale, the drawing did not bear the measurements of the then- present interior tenant improvements, mostly walls, nor did it disclose on its face any calculations showing how the rentable area was computed from the gross area. These omissions were due to Mr. Boyle's advice to Ms. Doyle that such information would be unnecessary in this case. The omissions from Petitioner's "as-built" drawing were rendered less critical by the fact that Respondent would have the right under the lease to require the landlord, at its expense, to remove the present improvements and re- configure the space to Respondent's demands. However, one purpose of the floorplan is to show where the space is located within the building. Another purpose is to verify the rentable area calculation by showing the measurements of items, such as restrooms, that should not be included in the rentable area for which Respondent is charged rent. The drawing is supposed to show the rentable area computation. Additionally, even though Respondent could insist on a total renovation of the premises, Respondent might wish to evaluate whether it could use a portion of the existing space in order to reduce the possibility of construction delays. George A. Smith, the Senior Management Analyst for Respondent who reviewed Ms. Treml's determination of nonresponsiveness prior to the award of the subject lease, testified that the deficiencies in Petitioner's "as-built" drawing were not a "minor irregularity."
