Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made. On October 11, 1991, DOT's District Four office let out for bid district contracts E4551 and E4554. Contract E4551 calls for the mechanical sweeping of Interstate 95 in Broward County. Contract E4554 calls for the mechanical sweeping of Interstate 95 in Palm Beach County. At a mandatory pre-bid conference, the bidders for the Contracts were provided with a packet which included a Notice to Contractors and Standard Specifications. The Notice to Contractors is a four page document which is specific to each contract. The Standard Specifications are the same for all district contracts. Both the Notice to Contractors and the Standard Specifications to the bidders required bidders to submit proof of the ability to acquire a performance and payment bond in an amount equal to the contract bid price. Bidders could satisfy this requirement by submitting a bid guarantee of 5% of the bid, submitting a notarized letter of intent from a bonding company or by providing a Certificate of Qualification issued by Respondent. The Notice to Contractors for both Contracts provided as follows: Failure to provide the following with each bid proposal will result in rejection of the contractor's bid.... District contracts of $150,000 or less require the following as proof of ability to acquire a performance and payment bond: A notarized letter from a bonding company, bank or other financial institution stating that they intend to issue a performance and payment bond in the amount of your bid, should your firm be awarded the project; in lieu of a notarized letter the following may be substituted: (1) a bid guarantee of five percent (5%); or (2) a copy of the Contractor's Certificate of Qualification issued by the Department. (No emphasis added) Similarly, the first Standard Specification provides: 1.1 Bidders (contractors) A contractor shall be eligible to bid on this contract if:... (2) Proof of ability to acquire a performance and payment bond in an amount equal to the contract bid price is provided to the District Contract Administrator with the bid proposal. As such proof all bids must be accompanied by a notarized letter from a bonding company, bank or other financial institution stating that they intend to issue a bond in the amount of your bid, should your firm be awarded the project.... The requirement to submit proof of the ability to acquire a performance and payment bond has been imposed on the Districts by DOT Directive 375-00-001-a (hereinafter the "Directive".) This Directive was in place at all times material to this proceeding. Section 3.2.2 of the Directive provides: A contractor shall be eligible to bid if: ...Proof of ability to acquire a performance and payment bond in an amount equal to the contract bid price is provided to the minicontract administrator with the bid proposal. As such proof all bids must be accompanied by a notarized letter from a bonding company, bank or other financial institution stating that they intend to issue a bond in the amount of the bid, should the firm be awarded the project. A bid guaranty as specified above may substitute as proof of ability to obtain a performance and payment bond. This applies to bids amount over or under $150,000. A copy of the Contractor's Certificate of Qualification issued by the Department may be substituted in lieu of a notarized letter for those contracts not requiring a bid bond. The bids for the Contracts were opened on October 11, 1991 in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Bids were received from four bidders: CPM, SCA, Florida Sweeping, Inc. and P. F. Gomez Construction Co., Inc. In its bid proposals, SCA included executed bid bonds in an amount sufficient to cover the amount of each bid proposal. Each bid bond cost $55.00. CPM did not submit executed bid bonds with its proposals. Instead, CPM submitted letters from Mark A. Latini dated September 25, 1991. Those letters were provided on the stationery of Bonina-McCutchen-Bradshaw, Insurance and indicate that Mr. Latini is the "bond manager." The letters provide as follows: Amwest Surety Insurance Company is the surety for the above-referenced contractor and stands ready to provide the necessary performance and payment bond for the referenced bid should Certified Property Maintenance, Inc., be low and awarded the referenced contract. All bonds are subject to normal underwriting requirements at the time of the bond request.... The letters submitted by CPM with its bid proposals were not notarized and were not binding obligations to issue bonds since they were conditioned upon meeting certain unspecified underwriting requirements at the time of the bond requests. The submitted bids were reviewed by the District Four Contractual Services Office. The bids submitted by CPM were the lowest for each contract. Its bid for Contract No. E4551 was $109,343.97. Its bid for Contract No. E4554 was $30,312.63. SCA's bids for the Contracts were $139,442.14 and $44,100.00, respectively. During the initial review of the bid proposals, the Contractual Services Office rejected CPM's bids for failure to have its bonding company "letters of intent" notarized. In addition, the bid proposals submitted by Florida Sweeping, Inc. were rejected for failure to note a required addendum and the bids submitted by P. F. Gomez Construction Co., Inc. were rejected because the "proposal bond was not of proper character". On October 18, 1991, DOT posted its Notice of Intent to Award the Contracts to SCA, the only bidder for the Contracts whose proposals had not been rejected. CPM timely filed protests of the proposed awards to SCA on October 22, 1991. The protests filed by CPM argued that its bids should not have been invalidated simply because the bonding company's letters did not include notary seals. At this point, the sole basis for the disqualification of CPM's bids was the failure to have the bonding company letters notarized. Respondent contends that, except for the absence of the notary seal, the letters submitted by CPM met the requirements of the Notice to Contractor and the Standard Specifications cited above. However, those letters are equivocal and do not evidence a binding commitment to issue a bond upon award of the contract. The DOT officials admit that they do not know what "normal underwriting requirements" would or could be required by CPM's bonding company. This conditional language makes it uncertain whether CPM could obtain the necessary bond. Therefore, it is concluded that those letters do not meet the requirements of the Notice to Contractors, the Standard Specifications or the Directive. A hearing on CPM's protest was not held. CPM's president, Raymond Hanousek, who prepared CPM's bid and attended the pre-bid meeting, called DOT's District office the day the bids were opened and was informed that his company's bid was low, but was rejected because its bond commitment letter was not notarized. Mr. Hanousek spoke with Joseph Yesbeck, the District's Director of Planning and Programs. After their conversation, Mr. Yesbeck reviewed the file and met with Teresa Martin, the District's contract administrator for construction and maintenance contracts, and other members of the contracting staff. Ms. Martin explained why CPM's bid had been disqualified, and the matter was thereafter discussed with the District and Department attorneys. After reviewing the situation, Mr. Yesbeck determined that the failure to submit notarized letters should be considered a non-material deviation and the bids submitted by CPM should be accepted and considered the low responsive bids. Mr. Yesbeck concluded that the absence of the notary seal did not give any competitive advantage to CPM and that defects of this nature are routinely allowed to be cured. Therefore, he reversed the contract administrator's decision to disqualify CPM on both Contracts. The District secretary concurred in the decision reached by Mr. Yesbeck to repost the award of the Contracts. Mr. Yesbeck prepared a joint letter of reposting which removed CPM's disqualification and declared CPM to be the low bidder for both Contracts. At the time Mr. Yesbeck made his decision, he had not reviewed the Directive from the Assistant Secretary's office stating that there must be a notarized letter showing proof of ability to obtain a performance and payment bond. Mr. Yesbeck did not review the Directive until his deposition was taken one week prior to the hearing in this case. According to Ms. Martin, the option to provide a notarized letter from a bonding company as an alternative to the posting of a 5% bid guarantee or obtaining prequalification was designed to promote participation in state contracting by small business and minority business enterprise applicants. While DOT was apparently trying to make it easier and cheaper for companies to bid by not requiring a bond to be posted, the DOT Directive and the bid documents still clearly required unconditional proof that a bid bond would be issued if the contract was awarded to the bidder. CPM was not prequalified nor did it post a bond. Thus, in order to meet the requirements of the Notice to Contractors and the Standard Specifications, CPM's only option was to submit a notarized letter showing proof of ability to obtain a performance and payment bond. DOT was never provided with any proof that CPM had been prequalified by the bonding company for a bond and/or that a bond would unconditionally be issued if CPM was awarded the Contracts. Because the letters stated they were "subject to normal underwriting requirements at the time of the bond request", there was some possibility CPM would not be able to obtain a bond. Such a condition was not permissible under the bid doucments. The decision to accept CPM's bid was contrary to the DOT Directive, the Notice to Contractors and the bid specifications which require that a bidder demonstrate proof of ability to obtain a performance and payment bond. Consequently, it is concluded that DOT's decision to accept the conditional, unnotarized letters submitted by CPM was arbitrary and capricious. There is some indication that other DOT Districts have, on occasion, waived the notarization requirement for the bond letter. However, it is not clear whether the language in the bid documents was the same or similar in those cases and/or whether the bond letters were conditional. In the past, whenever District Four has gotten a bid without a notarized bond letter, the bid was rejected. Apparently, there has never been a protest based on such a denial in District Four. Under Section 337.18, DOT does not need to require notarized, unconditional bond letters on contracts under $150,000. Indeed, there was a suggestion that some DOT Districts have dropped the requirement for certain contracts under $150,000. However, the bid documents in this case clearly required some proof that the bidder could acquire a performance and payment bond upon award of the Contracts. It was incumbent for all bidders to meet this requirement. It was arbitrary to delete this requirement after the bids were submitted.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding the bids submitted by CPM to be non-responsive and rejecting those bids. Petitioner should enter into negotiations with SCA regarding the award of the contract. In the absence of a favorable negotiation, Petitioner should enter a Final Order rejecting all bids and opening the Contracts up for new bids. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of March, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of March, 1992.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, PFO, is a professional corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Florida. Petitioner's principal office is located in West Palm Beach, Florida. At all times material to the claims of this case, Petitioner had fewer than 25 full-time employees. At all times material to the claims of this case, Petitioner had a net worth of less than $2 million. On May 22, 1995, the Department provided Petitioner with a clear point of entry to a formal administrative hearing pursuant to Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes. At that time the Department issued an intent to award the Palm Beach County (Intrastate) CSE contract to a third party. This dispute evolved into DOAH case no. 95-3138BID or "the bid case." The Department was not a "nominal party" in the bid case. A recommended order was entered in the bid case on September 5, 1995. Except for a minor point not relevant to the issues of this matter, the Department adopted the findings and conclusions of the recommended order and entered its final order on December 1, 1995. The final order in DOAH case no. 95-3138BID awarded the Palm Beach County (Intrastate) contract for CSE legal services to Petitioner. Such award was based upon the conclusions that the third party's proposal was nonresponsive and that aspects of the evaluation process were arbitrary. No appeal was timely filed against the final order. Petitioner is, therefore, a prevailing small business party within the meaning of Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner timely filed its request for attorneys' fees and costs in the instant case pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes. The total amount of attorneys' fees and costs incurred by Petitioner in the bid case was $63,495.25. Of that amount, at least $15,000 was reasonable and necessary for Petitioner to incur in the preparations for, and attendance at, the hearing in the bid case. The solicitation package for the bid case contained mandatory requirements with which all applicants were to comply. The final order in the bid case concluded that the successful applicant had failed to satisfy all mandatory requirements. Its bid was, therefore, nonresponsive to the solicitation. Additionally, the final order determined that the instructions regarding how the proposals were to be evaluated were unclear and that points were inappropriately assigned to the successful applicant. The overall conclusion of the final order found that the Department had acted arbitrarily in the intended award to this third party applicant. All of the material deficiencies relied on in the recommended order and the final order to reach the conclusion that the Department had acted arbitrarily were known to the Department at the time of its initial review and evaluation of the proposals. For example, the Department knew that the applicant had not identified two attorneys who would be expected to perform services under the contract, and had not included certificates of good standing from the Florida Bar for them. Additionally, the applicant had not provided references from three persons as specified in the solicitation package. This was evident upon the opening of the proposal. Nevertheless, the Department scored the nonresponsive proposal and awarded it sufficient points to be the apparent winner among the applicants. An award of attorneys fees' and costs under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, is capped at $15,000. The agency has not disputed the reasonableness nor the amount of fees claimed in connection with the bid case. The agency has not offered evidence to specify each item of cost or fee in dispute. Discovery requested by the Department sought information for the period September 1995 through January 1996 which included runner logs of Petitioner's counsel, itemized bills regarding another party (not a party to the bid case nor this case), and the deposition of Don Pickett. None of the requested discovery addressed the issue of whether the Department's actions in the bid case were substantially justified. None of the requested discovery addressed facts which the Department had placed in issue by its response to the petition. None of the discovery addressed the issue of whether there are special circumstances which would make an award of reasonable fees and costs unjust. Moreover, the parties have stipulated that there are no special circumstances which would make an award of reasonable fees and costs unjust. No new information pertinent to the claim for fees and costs herein which was unknown to the Department as a result of the bid case proceeding was discovered from the deposition of Don Pickett. No new information pertinent to the reasonableness or amount of the fees claimed was discovered from the deposition of Don Pickett or the other discovery requested. The factual circumstances argued in Respondent's Proposed (sic) Recommended Order, ie. that the agency had relied on findings and conclusions from an unrelated DOAH case in connection with the review of the underlying bid case, were not set forth in the response filed by the agency in the instant case and have not been deemed credible in determining the issues of this case. The proposal submitted by the third party in the bid case was nonresponsive. The Department has stipulated that the award of a contract to a nonresponsive bidder is arbitrary.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent’s proposed award of a contract to Intervenor is contrary to statutes, rules, policies, or the specifications, pursuant to Section 120.57(3)(f), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On February 15, 2002, Respondent advertised for bids for Contract E4D18 (ITB). The ITB requires bidders to submit their bids with a bid bond and power of attorney no later than 11:00 a.m. on March 8, 2002. Petitioner and Intervenor timely submitted bids at the specified location. Petitioner’s bid price was $2,094,748.99, and Intervenor’s bid price was $2,095,530.00. Petitioner and Intervenor have standing to participate in this case. In preparing its bid, Petitioner obtained a bid bond and power of attorney from Great American Insurance Company through its local bonding agent, Nielson, Alter and Associates. (All references to bid bonds shall mean the bid bond and accompanying power of attorney.) Nielson, Alter and Associates and its predecessor has provided bid bonds for Petitioner for 12 years. Pursuant to its standard business practice, Petitioner received the bid bond from Nielson, Alter and Associates the day prior to the deadline for submitting bids. The bond was in proper form, duly authorized, and validly executed, so it was enforceable upon delivery from Petitioner to Respondent. If Petitioner in fact delivered the bond with the bid on the following day, Respondent would have no basis to reject Petitioner’s bid as unresponsive. Petitioner’s employee responsible for assembling and delivering Petitioner’s bid has been so employed by Petitioner for three and one-half years. She testified that she placed the bid bond in the package with the bid itself, sealed the package, drove it to the assigned location, and submitted the sealed bid package to Respondent by 10:30 a.m. on March 8, 2002. Respondent’s employees accepted Petitioner’s sealed bid package and, without opening it, placed it in a locked filing cabinet, where they placed the three other timely submitted bids for the subject project. At 11:00 a.m.--the time specified for the opening of bids--one of Respondent’s employees removed the four sealed bid packages and took them to the conference room for the opening of the bids in response to the ITB. At the same time and place, Respondent’s employees were opening 21 other bids in response to five other invitations to bid on projects unrelated to the subject project. The conference room was small and contained a table. On one side of the table sat three of Respondent’s employees, who remained with the bid packages continuously from when they arrived in the conference room until, after they were opened, they were taken upstairs to a data processing center. On the other side of the table sat Petitioner’s employee and a representative of another bidder. The 25 bid packages were in six separate piles, divided by project. One of Respondent’s employees opened each bid and handed it to a second employee who announced the name of the bidder and the amount of the bid. The second employee then passed the bid to the third employee who recorded the bid. As was consistent with Respondent’s past practice, no one announced whether each bid was complete. At the end of the opening of the bids in response to the ITB, Respondent’s employee announced that Intervenor had submitted the lowest bid. Due to a mathematical error in Intervenor’s bid, it appeared from the cover sheets that Intervenor’s bid was the lowest. Only later, after the mathematical error was corrected, did Respondent’s employees discover that Petitioner had submitted the lowest bid. After Petitioner’s employee and the representative of the other bidder had left the conference room, Respondent’s three employees examined the bid packages more closely. They could not find the bid bond in Petitioner’s bid package, nor could they find the bid bond in the bid package of a bidder for one of the other contracts. The first of Respondent’s employees to discover that she could not find the bid bond in Petitioner’s bid package reexamined Petitioner’s bid package in search of the documents. The three employees then checked inside every envelope for the documents that were missing from the bid packages of Petitioner and the other bidder, but they could not find the missing documents. It was highly unusual for a bid bond to be missing from a bid package and probably unprecedented for bid bonds to be missing from two bids for separate jobs opened at the same time. Consistent with their practice then and now, Respondent’s employees separated the bidders’ checks from the bid packages and placed the checks in a secure location. Consistent with their practice then and now, one of Respondent’s employees then delivered the remainder of each bid package to the data processing center upstairs. Consistent with their practice then, but not now, Respondent’s employees did not document that the bid bond was missing for several days after the bid opening. Petitioner contends that Respondent’s employees did not discover that the bid bond was missing until days after the bid opening. Petitioner reasons, in part, that Respondent’s employees were not as attentive to Petitioner’s bid because they thought that it was only the second lowest bid. Petitioner contends that the discovery of the missing bid bond several days after its submittal provides Respondent’s employees with considerable opportunity to mishandle the bid package and inadvertently misplace the bid bond. In support of its contention that Respondent’s employees did not immediately discover the missing bid bond, Petitioner offered the testimony to this effect of its president and proffered similar testimony of another witness. The bases of this testimony were separate statements from the employee who supervised the three employees who opened, announced, and recorded the bids. However, this testimony, even from both witnesses, could not overcome the clear and unequivocal testimony of all three of Respondent’s employees that they discovered that Petitioner’s bid package was missing the bid bond on the day of the bid opening. Any statement to the contrary by Respondent's supervisory employee may have been based on her misrecollection or ignorance of the facts or misunderstanding of the questions posed to her, although it is also possible that both listeners separately misunderstood what she was saying. A bid bond is a crucial component of a bid. Its omission confers a competitive advantage upon a bidder, which, after bid opening, could elect not to cure the omission and thus be relieved of the obligation that it otherwise appeared to have offered to undertake by submitting its bid. Intervenor's post-hearing memorandum adds a perceptive discussion of the dullness of memory when attesting to a matter of routine, as was the testimony of Petitioner's employee who "always" attached bid bonds to bids, compared to the vividness of memory when attesting to a rare deviation from routine, as was the testimony of Respondent's three employees who were startled to find that bid bonds were missing from two bid packages, looked for the missing documents, and could not find them. On the present record, it would be slightly less troubling to find that Petitioner's bid package lacked the bid bond, but, as noted below, the burden of proof is on Petitioner, so it suffices to find that Petitioner has failed to prove that its bid package contained the bid bond.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order dismissing the bid protest of Petitioner and awarding the contract to Intervenor. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of August, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of August, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Barbara Gasper Hines Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwanee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Joseph W. Lawrence, II Vezina, Lawrence & Piscitelli, P.A. 360 East Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1130 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 F. Alan Cummings Smith, Currie & Hancock LLP 1004 DeSoto Park Drive Post Office Box 589 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0589
Findings Of Fact By Invitation to Bid for Lease NO. 590:1944, Respondent invited lease proposals for approximately 15,206 square feet of office space "located within the following boundaries: On the North, Aloma Avenue/Fairbanks Avenue the East, Semoran Boulevard the South, Colonial Drive, and on the West, Mills Avenue." The geographic area includes as many as 100 office buildings, although the invitation only generated three bids. The Invitation to Bid announced a Pre-Bid Conference on December 22, 1987. Interested parties were directed to contact Linda N. Treml, whose telephone number was provided, for "bid specifications and information regarding the space." The Invitation to Bid stated that "[a]ny questions concerning this project are to be directed to [Ms. Treml]" and "prospective bidders are encouraged to consult with [Ms. Treml] beforehand in an attempt to enable as correct a bid submittal as possible." The Invitation to Bid required that certain attachments accompany the bid proposal and referred the prospective bidder to paragraph 9 of the Bid submittal Form. The required attachments included a scaled floorplan "showing present configurations with measurements," net rentable square footage calculations using floorplan measurements, and a preliminary site layout. The Invitation to Bid stated that Respondent reserved the right to waive any minor informalities or technicality and seek clarification" of bids received, when such is in the best interest of the state. Responding to Respondent's newspaper advertisement and direct-mail solicitation for bids, James W. Boyle, who is a real estate broker active in leasing and property management, requested from Ms. Treml an Invitation to Bid and Bid Submittal Form. Mr. Boyle regularly reviews announcements of forthcoming leasing activity by state agencies. If he is aware of a building that appears to meet the agency's requirements, he contacts the building's owner or manager and informs him or her that he may have a prospective tenant. After receiving the bid materials for Lease No. 590:1944, Mr. Boyle contacted Kathryn Doyle, who is the leasing manager of Petitioner, and learned that Petitioner could accommodate Respondent's space needs for the term sought in the Lakeview 436 office building. Mr. Boyle assisted Ms. Doyle in the preparation of the Bid Submittal Form for Petitioner. In his first conversation with Ms. Doyle, Mr. Boyle ascertained that Petitioner's building carried a Semoran Boulevard street address and in fact had direct access to Semoran Boulevard. Petitioner's building lies on the east side of Semoran Boulevard, which serves as the eastern boundary of the geographic area described in the Invitation to Bid. Three bids were submitted in response to the subject Invitation to Bid. When they were opened, Ms. Treml and her supervisor, George A. Smith, determined that bids of Petitioner and a third party were nonresponsive because their office buildings were outside the geographic area specified in the Invitation to Bid. These bids were not considered further. Mr. Boyle had previously represented the owners of the FARE building several months earlier in a bid for Lease No. 590:1895. The Invitation to Bid in that case, which was issued by Respondent and named Ms. Treml as the contact person, provided that the proposed office space must be located within the following boundaries: Beginning at the intersection of US 17-92 and Colonial Drive, then west on Colonial Drive to the intersection of Edgewater Drive, then north on Edgewater Drive to the intersection of Kennedy Blvd. . ., then east on Kennedy Blvd. . . . to the intersection of US 17-92, then south on US 17- 92 to the point of beginning." Although Mr. Boyle's client was not awarded Lease NO. 590:1895 for reasons not relevant here, his client's bid, as well as the bid of another unsuccessful bidder owning a building on the east side of the highway serving as the east boundary of the geographic area, were considered responsive and thus within the specified geographic area. Ms. Treml interpreted the boundary description in Lease NO. 590:1944 differently from the boundary description in Lease NO. 590:1895. The description for Lease NO. 590:1895 defined the boundaries by "beginning" at a certain intersection, then proceeding "on" a highway, and so on. The description for Lease NO. 590:1944 defined the boundaries by identifying landmarks "on the north," then the "east," and so on. At the time of assisting in the preparation of Petitioner's bid, Mr. Boyle was also aware of an Invitation to Bid issued by Respondent for Lease NO. 590:1875. In this case, Respondent specified office space "in the following area of Brevard County, Florida: Beginning at the intersection of U.S. Highway 1 and State Road 50, then West on SR-50 to the intersection of 1-95, then North on 1-95 to the intersection of SR-406 . . . then East on SR-406 to the intersection of U.S. 1, then South on U.S. 1 to the point of beginning." In the case of Lease NO. 590:1875, the bid contact person, Lynn Mobley, issued a clarification letter stating that any building located on either side of the boundary road with an address on the boundary road would be considered to be within the boundary. Ms. Mobley and her supervisor, Ernest Wilson, who are Respondent's District 7 Facilities Services Assistant Manager and Manager, respectively, have consistently advised potential bidders that a building located on a boundary highway is included in the geographic area even though it would be outside the area if the dividing line were the centerline of the highway. Mary Goodman, Chief, Bureau of Property Management of the Department of General Services, testified that, in the course of her review of leasing activities by various state agencies, she has historically guided agencies that, if a building abuts a boundary highway but is not, strictly speaking, within it, the agency "could waive that as a minor technicality and consider it a responsive bid." Neither Mr. Boyle, Ms. Doyle, or any other representative of Petitioner spoke to Ms. Goodman prior to submitting the subject bid proposal. Ms. Treml customarily waives minor irregularities in bid submittals. However, she does not treat the location of a building outside the geographic area as a minor irregularity. To do so would be unfair to owners of other buildings outside the geographic area who took the geographic description at its face value and never submitted bids. Ms. Doyle received the bid materials from Mr. Boyle after the Pre-Bid Conference had taken place. However, Mr. Boyle elected not to attend the Pre- Bid Conference at which Ms. Treml explained, among other things, her interpretation of the specific geographic area. He chose not to attend because he felt that he would not learn anything relevant at the conference, which was attended by a representative of Intervenor. Neither Mr. Boyle, Ms. Doyle, or any other representative of Petitioner contacted Ms. Treml prior to submitting Petitioner's bid. Mr. Boyle, whose compensation in this case is entirely contingent upon a successful bid, estimates that he spent about 20 hours working on Petitioner's bid. Ms. Doyle estimates that she spent about 40 hours working on the bid. Petitioner also spent $800 in obtaining an "as-built" drawing of the space that accompanied its proposal. By letter dated February 22, 1988, Respondent notified the bidders of its decision to award the lease contract to Intervenor. Petitioner filed a notice of intent to protest the award by letter dated February 24, 1988. Ms. Treml met Mr. Boyle and Ms. Doyle on March 1, 1988, and cited the location of Petitioner's building as the only reason for the determination of nonresponsiveness. The attempt at mediation having failed, Petitioner filed a formal written protest of the award by letter dated March 3, 1988. Petitioner attached to its bid proposal an "as-built" drawing. Although drawn to scale, the drawing did not bear the measurements of the then- present interior tenant improvements, mostly walls, nor did it disclose on its face any calculations showing how the rentable area was computed from the gross area. These omissions were due to Mr. Boyle's advice to Ms. Doyle that such information would be unnecessary in this case. The omissions from Petitioner's "as-built" drawing were rendered less critical by the fact that Respondent would have the right under the lease to require the landlord, at its expense, to remove the present improvements and re- configure the space to Respondent's demands. However, one purpose of the floorplan is to show where the space is located within the building. Another purpose is to verify the rentable area calculation by showing the measurements of items, such as restrooms, that should not be included in the rentable area for which Respondent is charged rent. The drawing is supposed to show the rentable area computation. Additionally, even though Respondent could insist on a total renovation of the premises, Respondent might wish to evaluate whether it could use a portion of the existing space in order to reduce the possibility of construction delays. George A. Smith, the Senior Management Analyst for Respondent who reviewed Ms. Treml's determination of nonresponsiveness prior to the award of the subject lease, testified that the deficiencies in Petitioner's "as-built" drawing were not a "minor irregularity."
Findings Of Fact By invitation to bid for Architect's Project No. 9129-A, the Board solicited bids for "construction of one new single story building at Lecanto School Complex in Lecanto, Florida." Joint Exhibit No. 1, p. 01010.1. Specifications (Re)stated The invitation to bid gave notice of a mandatory pre-bid conference at two o'clock on the afternoon of June 10, 1993, at Lecanto Vocational Center at the project site. Joint Exhibit No. 1, A-1. ("BIDDERS MUST ATTEND . . . TO BE ABLE TO BID") The invitation to bid consisted of a project manual, amended seriatim in a series of four addenda. Joint Exhibit No. 1. The project manual required substantial completion of the project within 250 days of written notice to proceed, Joint Exhibit No. 1, p. 00700.8, but on another page the same document required substantial completion by July 13, 1993. Id. at 00100.8. Later Addendum No. 1 put the date for substantial completion at "250 days after Notice to Proceed is given," but superseding Addendum No. 2 reverted to July 13, 1993. Addendum No. 3 directed prospective bidders to "[d]elete all previously issued Proposal Forms and replace with the Proposal Form attached." The attached form states: The undersigned agrees that if this bid is accepted, construction of this project will begin after receipt of "Notice to Proceed" and shall be substantially completed within 250 calendar days and finally completed within thirty (30) calendar days from substantial completion. Directions concerning the form specify that it is to "be copied on Contractor's business letterhead." Addendum No. 3, p. 5. Among the specifications were bond requirements, including minimum ratings for companies writing the bonds: To be acceptable to the owner as surety for Bid Bonds, Performance Bond, and Payment Bonds, a surety company shall comply with the following provisions: 3. The surety shall have at least the following ratings: . . . 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 A Class XI Joint Exhibit No. 1, p. 00600.1. Addendum No. 2 "delete[d] the Class ratings" but not Best's Policyholder's Ratings. Although the copy of the invitation to bid that came in evidence as Joint Exhibit No. 1 lacked pages 00400.1 and 00400.2, the table of contents indicates that these pages contain a bid bond requirement. The proposal form also calls for a bid bond. In its proposed recommended order, moreover, petitioner states that the Board "set forth in its project manual a provision that bidders should submit a bid bond from a company with an 'A 11' rating." The Project Manual states, at page 00100.3, that a contract "will be awarded only to a responsible Bidder, qualified by experience . . . . " Joint Exhibit No. 1. Bidders were required to submit forms along with their bids which called for, among other things, lists of major construction projects in process and major projects completed in the last five years. Joint Exhibit No. 1, p. 00110.3. Compliance Attempted When, on the afternoon of June 10, 1993, Greg Cecil, Grubbs' general manager, arrived for the pre-bid conference, he was erroneously "instructed that Lakeview was at another site in Hernando." T.70. When he arrived there, "somebody on site . . . said . . . Lakeview Relocation is going to be moved to the site that you were previously at." Id. By the time he again reached his original, correct destination, he "ended up being late for the meeting." Id. It was about quarter of three and only Tom Williford, who is the Board's Director for General Services, and an electrical subcontractor remained. T.78. Mr. Williford recounted what had occurred before the other contractors had dispersed, and told Mr. Cecil "that there would be an addendum issue[d] reflecting any items that occurred that day." T.211. The Board's Addendum No. 2 lists Mr. Cecil as having been "in attendance at the Mandatory Pre-Bid Conference." Bids Submitted Grubbs, Caldwell and others submitted bids for Architect's Project No. 9129A. Grubbs' bid was low, at one million one hundred five thousand dollars ($1,105,000.00). Dated June 17, 1993, Grubbs' proposal offered to bring construction to substantial completion by July 13, 1993. In a blank for "Bond Rating," "A- 11" was inserted. Joint Exhibits No. 2 and 3.11. The bid documents contained no other rating information. A form bid bond executed by Grubbs' president and by Sandra McCullough, as attorney in fact both for Reliance Insurance Company, a Pennsylvania Corporation, and for Employees Reinsurance Corporation, a Missouri corporation, accompanied Grubbs' bid. Best rates the former company A- and the latter A++, evidence at hearing showed. The body of the bond begins: KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that we JOHN G. GRUBBS, INC. P.O. BOX 10262, BROOKSVILLE, FLORIDA 34601 as Principal, hereinafter called the Principal, and RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY AND EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE CORPORATION, P.O. BOX 945090 MAITLAND, FLORIDA 32751 a corporation duly organized under the laws of the State of PENNSYLVANIA as Surety, hereinafter called the Surety, are held and firmly bound unto SCHOOL BOARD OF CITRUS COUNTY . . . . Joint Exhibits Nos. 2 and 3. Attached to the bid is a power of attorney appointing Ms. McCullough attorney in fact for Reliance Insurance Company and another limited power of attorney appointing her attorney in fact for Employees Reinsurance Company, which authorizes her to execute "any bond . . . in co- suretyship with RELIANCE INSURANCE COMPANY." Id. Grubbs' bid included a list of five "open contracts" for amounts ranging from $98,749 to $1,362,252 for projects ranging from a water storage system to sanitary sewer installation to road construction; and a list of some 95 completed projects including roads, sewers, clearing, earthwork, a $53,387 reroofing job, and a $116,772 job installing a canopy and sidewalks for a middle school in Hernando County. Joint Exhibit Nos. 2 and 3. After the bids had been opened, John G. Grubbs told the Board's architect of still other projects Grubbs had completed. On July 1, 1993, a principal of the architectural firm the Board had engaged wrote Mr. Williford, as follows: Dear Tom: We have reviewed the bids received and would recommend that the low bid from John G. Grubbs, Inc. be rejected for being in non- conformance with the Bid Documents for the following reasons: The bid by John G. Grubbs, Inc. was submitted on a proposal form that contained an error in the completion date. Their form indicated construction to be completed by July 13, 1993; rather than 250 days as required by the Bid Documents, per addendum #3. Bid Bond received was written by a bonding company having a Best rating of "A minus" (A-). The Documents require an "A" rating. (Section 00600, Page 00600.1, Third Paragraph) The Contractor's Qualification form indicates that John G. Grubbs, Inc. has been in the Site and Drainage business for ten (10) years but has not constructed any School Facilities. It also shows having completed construction of only two buildings and one under construction. These 3 buildings are small fire stations in the $300,000 range each. Due to the above outlined concerns we would recommend the contract be awarded to Caldwell Construction Company, the next low bidder. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. The Board met on July 8, 1993. During the meeting, one Board member opined, "the critical thing here is probably the bond rating." Id., p. 26. The Board voted to reject Grubbs' bid and, separately, to accept Caldwell's.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the Board dismiss Grubbs' petition and award the contract for Architectural Project No. 9129-A to Caldwell. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of October, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 1993. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 93-4325BID Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are not separately numbered. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1-11 and 14-19 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 12, respondent's Mr. Williford concluded at the time that Grubbs had complied. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 13 pertains to a subordinate matter. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 20, Grubbs built a canopy and sidewalks at a school. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 21, both the bid rating and the completion date were deviations. Intervenor's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1-22, 25, 26, 27 and 28 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. Intervenor's proposed findings Nos. 23 and 24 pertain to subordinate matters. With respect to intervenor's proposed finding of fact No. 29, the completion date and bond rating were both deviations. COPIES FURNISHED: Carl E. Austin, Superintendent Citrus County School Board 1007 W. Main Street Inverness, Florida 34450-4698 Thomas S. Hogan, Jr. 20 South Broad Street Brooksville, Florida 34605 Richard S. Fitzpatrick 213 North Apopka Avenue Inverness, Florida 34450-4239 Clark S. Stillwell Post Office Box 250 Inverness, Florida 34451-0250
The Issue Whether Weston Professional Title Group, Inc. (Respondent) committed the violations alleged in Counts I, II, III, V, VI, and VII of the Amended Administrative Complaint and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times, Petitioner has been the entity of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility to regulate title insurance agencies. At all times relevant to this proceeding Respondent was licensed by Petitioner as a title insurance agent in the State of Florida. As of the formal hearing, Respondent had ceased its operations due to the lack of business. Petitioner's investigation of Respondent was initiated by a complaint from a man named Robert Anderson. Mr. Anderson represented to Petitioner that he discovered that his name and address had been used as the buyer of the two residences discussed above. Respondent was the title and settlement agent for both transactions. The Collonade Drive transaction settled on November 14, 2006, with disbursement of the funds on November 16, 2006. The Vignon Place transaction settled and the funds were disbursed on December 15, 2006. Mr. Anderson reported to Petitioner his belief that his identity had been stolen by a person named Pamela Higgins. Mr. Anderson reported to Petitioner that he had not participated in either transaction, and asserted that he did not sign any of the documents that purport to contain his signature as the buyer. Respondent was required to comply with the provisions of RESPA in completing the HUD-1 for the Collonade Drive closing and the Vignon Place closing. RESPA required that disbursements at closing be consistent with the HUD-1 as approved by the parties to the transaction and by the lender. COLLONADE DRIVE CLOSING On September 15, 2006, Robert Anderson (or someone impersonating Mr. Anderson) signed a "Contract for Sale and Purchase" (Collonade contract), agreeing to buy the Collonade Drive property from Mark Mariani and Kathy Mariani, for the purchase price of $1,375,000.00. The Collonade contract reflected that a deposit had been made to "FLORIDA TITLE & ESC." in the amount of $5,000 with an additional deposit of $5,000 to be made within ten days. Two loans with separate mortgages constituted the financing for the purchase of the Collonade Drive property. The first mortgage was $962,500.00. The second mortgage, as reflected on the HUD-1 Settlement Statement with the disbursement date of November 14, 2006, was $263,430.08.3/ First Magnus Financial Corporation, an Arizona corporation, was the lender for both loans. Agents of America Mortgage Corp. served as the mortgage broker for the transaction. Juan Carlos Rodriguez, an employee of Agents of America Mortgages, signed Mr. Anderson's loan application as the "interviewer." The following was a special clause of the Collonade contract: "BUYER AGREES TO PAY FOR TITLE INSUANCE [sic] FEE ONLY (LINE 1108 OF SELLERS' SETTLEMENT STATEMENT), ONLY [SIC] IF SELLERS AGREE TO USE BUYER'S TITLE COMPANY OF CHOICE. BUYER IS A LICENSED FLORIDA REAL ESTATE AGENT." Petitioner established that Robert Anderson was not a licensed Florida real estate agent. The Collonade contract represented that there were no real estate brokers representing either party. On or about November 1, 2006, Respondent received a "Request for Title Commitment" from Claudit Casanova, a mortgage broker with Agents of America Mortgage Corp., for the Collonade Drive transaction. This was a revised request. The first request had been sent to Respondent on or about October 3, 2006. A copy of the Collonade contract had been forwarded to Respondent with the first request. In connection with the Collonade Drive transaction, Respondent prepared two HUD-1s,4/ each of which was approved by the parties and the lender.5/ The first HUD-1 had an anticipated closing date of November 14, 2006. That HUD-1 was revised in response to the lender's instruction to move the disbursement date from November 14, 2006, to November 16, 2006. The revision of the HUD-1 slightly reduced the amount of cash the buyer needed to close as a result of interest beginning to run on the loans as of November 16 instead of November 14. This was a mail-away closing, in that a packet of the documents the buyer was to sign was sent to someone named Laurie Martin at a title agency in Glendale, Arizona. Ms. Marrero testified she mailed the packet pursuant to instructions without specifying who gave her those instructions. The packet of documents was returned to Respondent, with signatures purporting to be Mr. Anderson's. Laurie Martin appears to have served as the notary public when the documents were signed. The transaction closed pursuant to the revised HUD-1 with the disbursement date of November 16, 2006, which, as approved by the parties and the lender, reflected that the sellers were to receive $477,884.93 upon closing. Upon closing, Respondent drafted a check in the amount of $477,884.93 made payable to the sellers. The sellers voided the check and based on instructions from the sellers, Ms. Marrero redistributed the sellers' proceeds by wire transfer as follows: $116,112.85 to sellers; $170,250.00 to Pamela Higgins; and $191,508.08 to Unlimited Advertising USA. Fourteen dollars were spent on wire transfer charges. The actual disbursement of the seller's proceeds was inconsistent with the HUD-1 and unknown to the buyer and the lender. Respondent violated the provisions of RESPA by disbursing the proceeds of the sale in a manner that was inconsistent with the HUD-1. $195,000 DEPOSIT The Collonade contract reflected that a $5,000 deposit had been made to "Fla. Title & Esc." required for the buyer to pay an additional deposit of $5,000 within ten days. There was no evidence establishing any relationship between Respondent and "Fla. Title & Esc." Both HUD-1s for the Collonade Drive transaction reflected that the buyer had provided to the sellers a deposit in the amount of $195,000. These HUD-1s, reflecting that the sellers were holding a deposit in the amount of $195,000, were approved by the parties and the lender. Ms. Marrero testified that she was instructed to include the $195,000 deposit on the HUD-1s without specifying who gave her those instructions. Ms. Marrero did not attempt to verify that the $195,000 deposit was actually being held by the sellers. FRAUD Petitioner alleged that the Collonade Drive transaction was fraudulent. Mr. Wenger's testimony, based in part on reports of mortgage fraud prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, supported that allegation. Other evidence supporting that allegation included the following facts The first mortgage quickly went into foreclosure; A mailing address given for Robert Anderson did not (as of April 19, 2011) exist. The address of Unlimited Advertising USA was also the address of Claudia Rodriguez, a former Florida title agent whose license had been suspended by Petitioner for failing to disburse in accordance with HUD statements and disbursing on uncollected funds; The address of Unlimited Advertising USA was also the address of Juan Carlos Rodriguez (the person who supposedly took the credit application from Robert Anderson); The address of Unlimited Advertising USA was also the address of Agents of America Mortgage Corporation (the mortgage broker for the Collonade closing. Juan Carlos Rodriguez supposedly notarized the document authorizing disbursement of part of the sellers' proceeds to Pamela Higgins. Mr. Anderson's purported signatures on different documents are inconsistent. The address for Mr. Anderson as it appears on the HUD- 1 Settlement Statements is 14233 W. Jenan Drive, Surprise, Arizona. Prior to the closing Ms. Marrero sent by Federal Express a copy of the unexecuted closing documents to "Pam Higgins c/o Robert S. Anderson" 12211 N. 85th Street, Scottsdale, Arizona. Following the closing, Ms. Marrero sent a copy of the closing documents by Federal Express to Robert S. Anderson, at the address 12211 N. 85th Street, Scottsdale, Arizona. Ms. Marrero testified that she acted on instructions in sending the two packages, without identifying who gave her those instructions. There was no evidence that anyone employed by Respondent knew anyone connected to this transaction prior to being asked to provide a title commitment. There was insufficient evidence to establish that Respondent had anything to do with the buy-sell agreement between the buyer and the sellers or the efforts by Mr. Anderson (or the person or persons impersonating Mr. Anderson) to obtain financing for the purchase. While there was significant evidence that the Colonnade Closing was a fraudulent transaction, there was insufficient evidence to establish that Respondent was complicit in that fraud. VIGNON COURT CLOSING On a date prior to November 6, 2006, Maribel and Timothy Graves signed a "Contract for Sale and Purchase" offering to sell their Vignon Court residence to Robert Anderson for the purchase price of $1,975,000.00. Mr. and Mrs. Graves were represented by counsel during this transaction. The copy of the contract admitted into evidence had not been signed by Mr. Anderson and did not bear a legible date. The contract provided an acceptance date of November 6, 2006. The fully executed contract was not admitted into evidence. On October 4, 2006, Claudit Casanova of Agents of America Mortgage requested Respondent to provide a title commitment for the Vignon Court transaction. In that request, the sales price was stated as being $1,975,000; the loan amount was $1,481,250 and the mortgagee was American Brokers Conduit. Preferred Properties, Int., Inc., was listed as being the real estate broker for the transaction. Respondent prepared a HUD-1 for the Vignon Court transaction that reflected a closing and disbursement date of December 15, 2006. DEPOSIT The unexecuted (by the buyer) and undated copy Purchase Agreement required a deposit of $100,000 at the time of acceptance with an additional $50,000 being due within ten days thereafter. There was no evidence as to the terms of the completely executed Purchase Agreement. Line 201 of the HUD-1 reflected a deposit of $250,000 paid on behalf of the buyer. Respondent did not verify that deposit had been made. The HUD-1 specified that the deposit was being held by the sellers. The buyer, sellers, and lender approved the HUD-1, which reflected the existence of a deposit of $250,000, prior to closing. GASPARE VALENTINO On December 6, 2006, Mr. and Mrs. Graves entered into a "Joint Venture and Property Resale Agreement" (Resale Agreement) pertaining to the sale of the Vignon Court residence with Gaspare Valentino. On February 5, 2002, Gaspare Rino Valentino was issued a license by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation of the type "Real Estate Broker or Sales" and of the rank "Sales Associate." That license was valid at the times relevant to this proceeding. Paragraph 2 of the Resale Agreement provides as follows: (2) SALE EFFORTS: CONTRACT PROCEEDS. Valentino agrees to use reasonable efforts to obtain a third party purchaser (a "Purchaser") for the Property. Valentino is not required to advertise the Property or list the Property for sale, but shall have such right to do so. Valentino does not guaranty [sic] the procurement of a Purchaser. The parties agree that the intention is for Valentino to secure a Purchaser who will pay a purchase price sufficient in order to (i) satisfy the existing debt upon the Property, (ii) pay ordinary and reasonable closing costs of the transaction, (iii) generate a net proceeds [illegible] to Owner not less than ONE HUNDERED THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($100,000); and (iv) generate such further sums beyond the foregoing in order to pay Valentino a fee for services rendered as set forth in this Agreement. In accordance with such understanding, Owner agrees to enter into and fully execute a Contract for Purchase and Sale with a Purchaser procured by Valentino which is consistent with the terms set forth in this Agreement, including without limitation, a designated sales price which enables Owner to receive at closing a net proceeds sum equal to ONE HUNDERED THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($100,000) (the "Owner's Sale Proceeds") after payment of the Property Sale Expenses, hereinafter defined as set forth in Paragraph 3. Owner agrees that any net sales proceeds in excess of the Owner's Sale Proceeds shall be payable to Valentino (the "Excess Proceeds Fee), as Valentino's fee for the efforts of Valentino as set forth herein. Paragraph 3 (i) of the Resale Agreement reiterates that after the payment of the "Property Sale Expenses" as follows: Owner shall receive the Owner Sale Proceeds consisting of exactly ONE HUNDERED THOUSAND AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($100,000) from the net sales proceeds . . . Paragraph 3 (ii) of the Resale Agreement reiterates that after the payment of the "Property Sale Expenses" and the "Owner Sale Proceeds": Valentino shall receive the Excess Proceeds Fees, constituting all remaining net sales proceeds in excess of the Owner Sale Proceeds, as a fee for services rendered by Valentino pursuant to this Agreement. Paragraph 7 of the Resale Agreement is as follows: 7. Licensed Agent: Valentino represents and discloses that Valentino is a licensed real estate agent in the State of Florida. Notwithstanding such, Valentino is individually entering into this Agreement using his own resources to assist Owner in the improvement and sale of the Property, and as such is a principal in this transaction earning the Excess Proceeds Fee. The parties acknowledge that Valentino is an investor in this transaction and as such at closing is entitled to and shall receive the Excess Proceeds Fee as set forth in Section [Paragraph] 3(ii) of this Agreement. Under RESPA, Section 700 of a HUD-1 is appropriately used for reporting the payments for commissions to real estate salesmen and/or brokers as part of the "Settlement Charges." Such payments can also be reported under Section 1300 ("Additional Settlement Charges"), if the payments are appropriately labeled. Respondent reflected the payment of $527,656.92 as "Payoff" to Gaspare Valentino at line 1307 of Section 1300." Prior to closing the buyer, sellers, and lender had approved the HUD-1 for the Vignon Court transaction. The lender was aware of the Resale Agreement. Mr. Marrero is an attorney licensed to practice law in Florida. Mr. Marrero construed the payments to Mr. Valentino to be other than a real estate commission. Although it is clear that Petitioner considers that payment to Mr. Valentino to be a real estate commission, the terms of the Resale Agreement entitled Mr. Marrero to treat that payment as being to an investor. Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent erroneously stated the payment to Mr. Valentino on the HUD-1. SURETY BOND As a condition of licensure, a title agency is required to provide to Petitioner a $35,000 security deposit or a $35,000 surety bond. In connection with its application for licensure on August 29, 2002, Respondent filed the required surety bond with Petitioner. The bond was issued by Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland with bond number 133046577. On July 14, 2004, Petitioner received from Respondent a surety bond issued by Western Surety Company in the amount of $35,000, effective as of August 29, 2004. The bond number was 69728435. On May 28, 2010, Petitioner received a letter from his surety dated May 24, 2010, which advised that bond number 69728435 would be voided or cancelled as of August 29, 2010. That letter of cancellation showed a copy being furnished to Respondent at the address "1820 North. Corporate Lakes Boulevard, Suite 105, Weston, Florida 33326." On June 11, 2010, Petitioner advised Respondent by letter sent to "1820 North Corporate Lakes Boulevard, Suite. 105, Weston, Florida 33326" that it had received the cancellation letter. The letter stated, in part, as follows: If we do not receive a replacement bond within 30 days of the dated letter, we will forward your file to the appropriate division for disciplinary action. If you do not plan to continue transacting business and wish to terminate your license, you must submit a request to us immediately. Prior to May 24, 2010, Respondent moved its offices from 1802 North Corporate Lakes Boulevard, Suite 105, Weston, Florida, to Suite 304 of the same building. Mr. Marrero testified that he had no recollection of receiving the letters cancelling the surety bond or the letter from Petitioner dated June 11, 2010. Respondent was without a surety bond between August 29, 2010, and November 18, 2010. Petitioner did not establish that Respondent's failure to maintain it surety bond during that period was willful within the meaning of section 626.8437(9). No prior disciplinary action has been brought against Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating the provisions of subsections 626.8473(2) and (4) as alleged in Count I of the Amended AC; and guilty of failing to maintain a surety bond as required by section 626.8418(2) in violation of section 626.8437(1), as alleged in Count III of the Amended AC. It is further recommended that the final order find Respondent not guilty of all other violations alleged in the Amended AC. For the violations found as to Count I, it is recommended that Respondent's licensure be suspended for a period of six months. For the violations found in Count III, it is recommended that Respondent's licensure be suspended for a period of three months. It is further recommended that the periods of suspension run concurrently. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of February, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February, 2012
Findings Of Fact A request for bids to remodel and make additions to Washington Elementary School was issued by Respondent on August 15, 1990, for Project No. 0191-8210. The request for bids included requests for a base work (the "base bid") and additional work described in various alternates (the "total bid"). Respondent had the option of selecting one or more alternates or none of the alternates. Bids were filed by four bidders on January 15, 1990. Bid tabulations were posted on January 23, 1991. Petitioner was the lowest bidder, and Select Contracting, Inc. ("Select"), was the second lowest bidder. Petitioner's base bid was in the amount of $1,406,500. Petitioner's bid for the alternates eventually selected by Respondent was in the amount of $1,594,300. 2/ The bid documents required bidders to include a bid bond in an amount not less than five percent of the bid. Petitioner included a bid bond with its bid in the amount of $75,000 which was more than five percent of its base bid but less than five percent of the total bid calculated after taking into account the alternates selected by Respondent. Respondent recommended to its Superintendent that the contract should be awarded to Petitioner. Select filed a bid protest on January 25, 1991, seeking an informal hearing. Select alleged that Petitioner's bid was not responsive because it failed to include a bid bond for five percent of Petitioner's total bid, including the alternates selected by Respondent. Select included a bid bond for five percent of its total bid, including the alternates selected by Respondent. Respondent conducted an informal hearing on February 6, 1991, and proposed that all bids should be rejected and the project re-advertised. Respondent determined that Petitioner's bid was non-responsive in that it failed to include a bid bond in an amount equal to five percent of the total bid, including all alternates selected by Respondent. Respondent further determined that relevant language in the bid documents is ambiguous and may create an economic advantage for bidders who provide a bid bond in an amount less than that provided by other bidders. In a written analysis of the basis for recommending the rejection of all bids, the General Counsel stated: In the instant case, since bid amount is not specifically defined by the SCHOOL BOARD, one bidder may receive an unfair economic advantage over another by only including in its bid amount the cost for obtaining a bond which was less than the actual bid amount, (i.e. base bid plus alternates). The only reason that Respondent did not regard the amount of Petitioner's bid bond as a minor irregularity was that Respondent wanted to assure that all bidders were placed on ". . . an equal playing field . . ." by avoiding an unfair economic advantage for one or more bidders. 3/ Relevant language in the bid documents which defines the amount of the required bid bond is ambiguous. The Advertisement For Bid, in relevant part, requires that bids ". . . must be accompanied by a bid bond or cashier's check in an amount not less than five percent (5%) of the bid . . . ." Section 3.05(d) of the Instructions to Bidders refers bidders to Section 3.08 for purposes of the bid bond. Section 3.08 in relevant part requires bids to be accompanied by a bid bond ". . . of not less than five percent (5%) of the amount of the Bid . . . ." The bid proposal form, however, provides that the bidder ". . . further agrees that the security in the form of a Bid Bond, or Cashier's Check in the amount of not less that five percent (5%) of the total Bid Price . . . accompanies this Bid " A bid bond in an amount equal to five percent of the base bid satisfies the requirements in the bid documents for a bid bond in all but one instance. A bid bond in an amount not less than five percent of the base bid is not consistent with the representation in the proposal form that a bidder has included a bid bond equal to five percent of the total bid price. Respondent's bid documents have historically required a bid bond for only five percent of the base bid. The reference in the bid proposal form to a bid bond equal to five percent of the total bid is a recent change made by Respondent and is limited to the bid proposal form. The inclusion of a bid bond for only five percent of the base bid is consistent with Petitioner's historical practice in bidding previous jobs offered by Respondent. Petitioner obtained no unfair economic advantage over Select by including a bid bond for only five percent of the base bid while Select included a bid bond equal to five percent of the total bid, including the alternates selected by Respondent. The uncontroverted evidence establishes that both Petitioner and Select obtained their respective bid bonds at no cost to either bidder. Companies that issue bid bonds, including the companies that issued bid bonds to Petitioner and Select, do not impose a charge for issuing a bid bond in the ordinary course of doing business. Such companies make their money if and when they issue a performance and payment bond for the successful bidder. 4/ Respondent did not know at the time it formulated its proposed agency action that no unfair economic advantage was gained by a bidder who submitted a bid bond for five percent of the base bid rather than five percent of the total bid. Respondent was uncertain of the economic advantage derived from submitting a lower bid bond, if any. Counsel for Select represented that an economic advantage was gained by Petitioner. Respondent decided to reject all bids and look ". . . for . . . direction from a Hearing Officer. " Petitioner is ready, willing, and able to contract for and perform the work necessary to complete the Project. Petitioner is a pre-qualified contractor for projects undertaken by Respondent. Petitioner has a bonding limit substantially in excess of that required to complete the Project and substantial experience in similar projects for the Broward County School Board. Respondent is confident and has no concern over Petitioner's ability to complete the Project. 5/
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's written formal protest be GRANTED and the contract awarded to Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 3rd day of April, 1991. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 1991.
The Issue This is a bid challenge case in which the primary issue is whether the Petitioner's bid is responsive to the RFP.
Findings Of Fact Some basic background facts The Department issued Request for Proposals No. 700:0652, Office Space (the "RFP"). The RFP requested bidders to submit proposals to provide 7,750 square feet of office space (+/- 3 percent) in Broward County to be leased by the Department for a probation and parole office. Under the RFP terms the space had to be available by June 1, 1993. Proposals had to be filed with the Department by January 5, 1993. In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., and Janc, Inc., submitted bids. Pursuant to an evaluation of the bids conducted by the Department, In- Rel Acquisitions, Inc., was given a contingent award of the lease on March 31, 1993, as the vendor with the lowest price and the overall highest evaluation score. The contingent award letter of March 31, 1993, read as follows in pertinent part: It is the intent of the Department of Corrections to award the above referenced bid to In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., as the vendor with the lowest bid price and the overall highest evaluation score. The award to In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., is contingent upon: (a) obtaining the necessary zoning approval to operate a probation and parole office at the bid premises by May 6, 1993, and (b) the Department obtaining sufficient assurances from the Resolution Trust Corporation that the bid premises will not be taken over by the RTC and the Department's leasehold interest will not be affected. On May 18, 1993, the Department issued a letter awarding the subject lease to Janc, Inc., because the Department was of the view that In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., had not met the conditions of the contingent award of March 31, 1993. The award letter of May 18, 1993, read as follows, in pertinent part: This letter is to inform you that the Department of Corrections has determined that the award of the lease for the above referenced bid is hereby made to Janc, Inc. The bid from In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc. has been rejected because it has not met either of the conditions stipulated on the March 31st award letter, and the property has not been properly maintained under the existing lease agreement. Both the contingent award letter of March 31, 1993, and the award letter of May 18, 1993, contained "boiler-plate" language advising the addressee of the basic details of the written protest process. In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., filed a timely protest of the award to Janc, Inc. Facts about the zoning situation The award of the lease to In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., was made contingent because the property was not properly zoned to support a probation and parole office for the Department. At the time of soliciting bids on the subject project, the Department was currently leasing the space proposed by In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., and had done so for almost five years. Shortly after the deadline for the submission of bids, the Department was notified that it was in violation of the Plantation City Code because the office was not properly zoned, and the Department was subject to fines if it did not obtain proper zoning or leave the premises by June 1. The fine was at the rate of $200.00 per day. In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., did not obtain necessary zoning approval by May 6, 1993. First, the zoning approval passed by the City of Plantation limited the hours of operation of the probation office. As approved by the City of Plantation, the Department can only operate its probation office Monday through Friday from 8:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., plus one evening a week until 7:00 p.m. These time limits do not satisfy the contingency placed in the March 31, 1993, award because the Department cannot operate a probation and parole office within these limited hours. The Department has 14,000 probationers in Broward County under its supervision. The caseload puts a severe strain on the caseworkers making it essential that they have flexible hours to get their job done. The caseload also requires working evenings and weekends. For example, some probation officers must maintain evening hours to test offenders for drugs. Although the officers could make the offenders visit the Department's office during the day, this would jeopardize the employment status of many offenders. Therefore, the Department needs flexible evening hours to do the drug testing. One of the major functions of the probation officer is to help rehabilitate the offender. That means that the Department must do what it can to help the offender stay employed. In addition, the probation officers need evening and weekend hours to do their paperwork, including preparing weekly reporting schedules, and recording their contacts. The officers also need evening hours to receive monetary payments due from offenders, meet with offenders who must report in person into the office each month, and counsel offenders in the office. Under the prior lease with In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., the Department had operated and held evening hours at a minimum of three nights per week. This included both probation officers and offenders appearing at the office during the evenings. The RFP specifically notified bidders that there would be evening hours. Section B(14) of the RFP states: Staff of both sexes will be required to work in this facility during both daylight and evening hours. An environment in which staff can expect to be safe is essential. Section D(11) of the General Provisions of the subject RFP reads as follows: Federal, state, county, and local laws, ordinances, rules, and regulations that in any manner affect the items covered herein apply. Lack of knowledge by the bidder will in no way be a cause for relief from responsibility. The records of the City of Plantation meetings show that the May 5, 1993, vote was not final. A mandatory second reading of the zoning change took place on May 12, 1993, and the minutes were approved on May 19, 1993, and June 2, 1993, with respect to the first and second reading. Even if the zoning change with its limited hours had been sufficient to meet the terms of the contingent award, the limited zoning approval was not received before May 6, 1993; and therefore, the mandatory second reading of May 12, 1993, caused the limited zoning approval to be untimely. Finally, the limited and untimely zoning change as approved on May 5, 1993, was itself contingent on satisfying all concerns of the Landscape Architect. Facts regarding the RTC assurances The second award contingency required In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., to provide the Department with sufficient assurances from the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) that the bid premises would not be taken over by the RTC and that the Department's leasehold interest would not be affected. The property submitted by In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., was in litigation; the RTC as successor mortgagee, had filed or secured a Notice of Lis Pendens, an Amended Complaint, a Summary Final Foreclosure Judgment, and a Notice of Sale. The RTC has an interest in the property offered by In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc. Paragraph 1(E) of the Summary Final Foreclosure Judgment provides that the Summary Final Foreclosure Judgment shall eliminate the interest of anyone that has acquired an interest since the filing of the Lis Pendens, including the Department's leasehold interest if it were to enter into a lease on the property. The property bid by In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., was subject to a second mortgage. The record does not reflect that the first mortgagee and the second mortgagee entered into any type of written agreement not to disturb the leasehold interest of the Department. By letter dated May 11, 1993, an attorney for the RTC responded to the Department's request for assurances. The May 11, 1993, letter included the following: Pursuant to your request of yesterday, I am writing to belatedly confirm the April 19, 1993 telephone conference had you, Robert Gellman of Real Estate Recovery, Inc., and I. This telephone conversation was had to provide the Department of Corrections (the "Department") with the assurances requested from the RTC in the Department's March 31, 1993 letter of intent to award the subject least [sic] to In Rel Acquisitions, Inc. During this discussion you expressed the concern of the Department that the RTC intended to take title to the property and would then utilize special powers and privileges to dispossess the Department. If that were to be the case, you indicated that the Department would want an assurance that it would receive 90-days' notice before it could be dispossessed. (You indicated that 90-days is how long it would take to complete the bid process that would have to precede the Department's move.) Robert Gellman indicated that he was pursing [sic] numerous resolutions to the pending litigation, some of which might involve the RTC's taking title to the property and others which might not. Mr. Gellman assured you, however, that the RTC perceived it to be in its own best interest, and in the interest of any subsequent landlord, that the Department be kept happy and its tenancy undisturbed. Mr. Gellman also explained that he could not agree to anything at the time, as the appropriate committee approval had to be secured, but that he anticipated no problem in obtaining the necessary approvals of any writing consistent with our discussions once those writings were prepared. (I believe at the time we contemplated a written lease and a written assurance letter from the appropriate RTC official.) You indicated that your concerns had been satisfied and that these assurances were sufficient to satisfy the Department. The three of us discussed that it would not make sense to begin drafting anything at that time as the issues regarding the property's zoning still had to be cleared up and our efforts might otherwise "be all for not." Accordingly, it was mutually decided that we would wait to see the outcome of the May 5, 1993 hearing on the zoning issue before proceeding further. In the interim you indicated that you would be providing us with a list of the specific items of tenant improvements that your local officials expected to have made to the property. (We received this list on May 3, 1993.) On May 5, 1993 the Plantation City Council approved In-Rel Acquisition Inc.'s, request for a rezoning of its property and for a "special use" condition by a 4-0 vote, thus effectively resolving the zoning issue. Yesterday you and I spoke on this issue and discussed the situation. I indicated that the RTC is now in a position to provide you with written assurance that it has no intention of dispossessing the Department or interfering with its lease tenancy (either under the old or the new lease), and that the Department's leasehold interest would not be affected by the RTC taking title to the property (if it ever does). I asked and you indicated that this would give you what you needed and everything would be fine. In addition, I indicated that once the lease by and between the Department and In Rel is finalized, the RTC, if it still owns the note and mortgage, would be able to approve same. In light of the foregoing your call to me this morning, indicating that the Department had decided to withdraw its award to In Rel Acquisitions, Inc. and make the award to "Viloci" (phonetic(?), the next ranked bidder. During this discussion you indicated that Viloci's legal counsel had stated that the RTC would never be able to provide the Department with the requisite assurances. It is unfair for you to make decisions based in whole or in part on any statements made by Viloci's counsel regarding what the RTC can and cannot do without giving us an opportunity to respond -- especially in light of your indications on April 19th and again yesterday that the Department was satisfied with the RTC. The record reflects that the "Notice of Sale" failed to contain language providing that the property would be sold subject to any leasehold interest, either previously or subsequently acquired.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued in this case dismissing the Petition of In-Rel Acquisitions, Inc., and awarding the subject lease to the Intervenor, Janc, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 17th day of September 1993. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of September 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-3438BID The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties. Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by Petitioner Paragraph 1: First three sentences accepted in substance. Fourth sentence rejected as constituting primarily irrelevant or subordinate details. Last sentence reject as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence to the extent it is intended to imply that the zoning change obtained was sufficient. Paragraph 2 and 3: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 4 and 5: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 6: The first two sentences are rejected as irrelevant or as subordinate and unnecessary details. Last sentence rejected as irrelevant and also as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and as suggesting implications not warranted by the evidence. Paragraph 7: Rejected because it goes further than the evidence and suggests inferences not warranted by the evidence. Messrs. Gellman and Guerra told Mr. Ferst that they did not expect that the Department would have any problems with RTC, but the statements of Messrs. Gellman and Guerra stopped short of making any guarantees or of binding the RTC. Paragraph 8: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 9: Accepted in substance, with the deletion of the words "in ignoring the foregoing." Paragraph 10: Rejected as constituting a summary of a party's argument or statement of position, rather than a proposed finding of fact. Paragraph 11: First sentence is accepted in substance. Second sentence is accepted as literally true, but as also substantially irrelevant because during most of the original five-year lease there was no issue about hours of operation because there was no effort at restriction of hours of operation. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Paragraph 12: The first two sentences are rejected as constituting a summary of a party's argument or statement of position, rather than a proposed finding of fact. The third and fourth sentences are rejected because they go further than the evidence and suggest inferences not warranted by the evidence. As noted above, Messrs. Gellman and Guerra told Mr. Ferst that they did not expect that the Department would have any problems with RTC, but the statements of Messrs. Gellman and Guerra stopped short of making any guarantees or of binding the RTC. Paragraph 13: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed conclusions of law, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 14: First two sentences accepted in substance. Last sentence rejected as constituting argument or proposed conclusions of law, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 15: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed conclusions of law, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 16: It is accepted that Messrs. Gellman and Guerra made statements as to what they expected the RTC's position to be, but, as noted several times above, the statements of Messrs. Gellman and Guerra stopped short of making any guarantees or of binding the RTC. Proposed findings submitted by Respondent Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9: Accepted. Paragraph 10: Rejected as constituting subordinate and unnecessary restatement of a party's position. Paragraphs 11, 12 and 13: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 14: Rejected as repetitious. Paragraphs 15, 16 and 17: Accepted. Paragraph 18: First sentence is accepted. The second sentence is rejected as constituting argument, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraphs 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 29: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 30: Accepted. Paragraph 31 and 32: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraphs 33 and 34: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 35 and 36: Rejected as irrelevant or as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 37: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraphs 38, 39, 40 and 41: Rejected as irrelevant or as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraphs 42, 43, 44 and 45: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraphs 46, 47, 48 and 49: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 50: Accepted. Paragraph 51: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 52: First sentence rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Second sentence rejected as repetitious. Paragraphs 53, 54 and 55: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 56: First sentence accepted in substance. Second sentence rejected as constituting argument, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 57: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 58: Rejected as irrelevant or as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraphs 59, 60, 61, 62, 63 and 64: Rejected as primarily constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Proposed findings submitted by Intervenor Although there are some differences in the numerical sequence, the vast majority of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Intervenor are identical to those submitted by the Respondent. It would serve no useful purpose to repeat the rulings on all of those findings. The following rulings address the few proposed findings submitted by the Intervenor that are different from the ones submitted by the Respondent. Paragraph 11: Rejected as constituting subordinate and unnecessary restatement of a party's position. Paragraph 30: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 37: Rejected as irrelevant or as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 44: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 54: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraphs 55, 56, 57, 58, 59 and 60: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 61: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. Paragraphs 62, 63 and 64: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 65, 66 and 67: Rejected as constituting argument or proposed legal conclusion, rather than proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael S. Riley, Esquire 200 East Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1400 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Steven S. Ferst, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Joseph J. Villacci, Esquire 315 Northeast Third Avenue, Suite 200 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Harry K. Singletary, Jr., Secretary Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Louis A. Vargas, General Counsel Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500
The Issue Whether or not Respondent's real estate license should be disciplined, because, as alleged, Respondent is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises and pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence and breach of trust in a business transaction; failed to place a trust deposit with her employing broker and operated as a broker while licensed as a salesman in violation of Subsections 475.25(1)(b), and (k), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact During times material hereto, Respondent, Barbara B. Wise, was a licensed real estate salesman in Florida, having been issued license number 0484022. The last license issued Respondent was as a salesman, c/o Grover Goheen Realty, Inc., at 414 Twelfth Avenue, North, St. Petersburg, Florida. During October 1988, Respondent, while licensed and operating as a salesman in the employ of her broker, Goheen Realty, Inc., solicited and obtained a lease listing agreement from Michael Riggins. As a result of that listing, Marsha Tenny contacted Respondent and requested assistance in obtaining a seasonal lease for the period January 1989 through April 30, 1989. Ms. Tenny made Respondent aware of her needs respecting a lease property to include wheelchair access as her husband was wheelchair bound. As a result of visiting approximately three available units, Respondent secured a seasonal lease from Michael Riggins for Marsha Tenny. The lease agreement for the Tenny's was the first rental listing that Respondent had obtained and it suffices to say that she was a novice in the area of securing lease agreements. Likewise, her employing broker did very little volume in rentals as her broker was of the opinion that the net commissions were not sufficient to defray the time and effort involved for several reasons including the limited availability of rental properties. As a result, her broker was unable to provide guidance. Pursuant to the aforementioned lease agreement, Respondent named several options by which Marsha Tenny could secure the apartment to include sending a personal check to her and after negotiating it she would in turn pay the rental fees directly to the landlord. Other options included Ms. Tenny sending separate checks to the landlord for the apartment and a check for the commission fees to her employing broker or she could deal directly with the landlord and remit a separate check to her employing broker for fees. Ms. Tenny elected to send a money order in the amount of $1,500.00 to Respondent. After she negotiated the check she received from Marsha Tenny, Respondent retained her commissions and did not pay her broker the pro-rata share that the broker was entitled to. Respondent did not inform her broker of the Riggins/Tenny lease agreement when she received the deposit from the Tennys on or about October 23, 1988. Respondent negotiated the Tenny's deposit check by depositing same into her personal account and drew a check in the amount of $1,100.00 as the rental deposit and remitted it to Mr. Riggins on October 2.1, 1988. Respondent retained the $400.00 balance as her fee. Respondent tendered her employing broker its portion of the commission fees ($174.00) on February 24, 1989. During early February 1989, the Tennys expressed dissatisfaction with the apartment and demanded a refund from Respondent. Respondent wrote the Tennys a letter of apology and submitted a money order to Marsha Tenny in the amount of $50.00 on February 3, 1989. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4.) As stated, Respondent was inexperienced with the rental business in Pinellas County. She was at the time undergoing other family problems, including tending to a sister in Orange County, Florida, who was very ill. At the time, Respondent commuted from Pinellas County to Orange County several times per week to visit with and assist her sister. Additionally, Respondent's office was being relocated and the staff was having to relay messages to her through her husband and other salesman employed with her broker. In addition to sending the Tennys a money order in the amount of $50.00, Respondent agreed to repay the Tennys the entire remaining balance of the finders fee that she received from the Riggins/Tenny leasing agreement as soon as she was financially able to do so. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent be issued a written reprimand and placed on probation for a period of one (1) year. During the probationary period, Respondent shall enroll in an approved post-licensure course and shall satisfactorily complete the same prior to termination of probation. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of April, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April, 1990. Steven W. Johnson, Esquire DPR - Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Barbara B. Wise 1059 42nd Avenue, N.E. St. Petersburg, Florida 33703 Darlene F. Keller, Executive Director Kenneth E. Easley, Esq. Division of Real Estate Department of Prof. Reg. 400 West Robinson Street 1940 North Monroe Street Post Office Box 1900 Suite 60 Orlando, Florida 32802 Tallahassee, FL 32399
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the bid specifications, together with other applicable authority, require that a bid, in order to be responsive, contain any written list of subcontractors.
Findings Of Fact On September 26, 1989, Respondent issued a document entitled, Specifications for Replacement of Air Conditioning, West Orange High School, Winter Garden, Florida, Engineers Project No. 89-016. As amended by three addenda, the above-described specifications shall be referred to as the "ITB." Respondent duly advertised for bids ore September 26, October 3, and October 10, 1989. The advertisement did not state that Respondent reserved the right to waive minor irregularities. In response to the ITB, Florida Mechanical, Inc. ("FMI") and B & I Contractors, Inc. ("B & I") timely submitted bids. For the base work and alternate 1, which Respondent ultimately decided to select, FMI bid $1,439,000, B & I bid $1,438,000, and a third bidder, S. I. Goldman, Company bid $1,621,000. These bids are recorded on a Bid Tabulation Sheet prepared by the engineer retained by Respondent for the project. The Bid Tabulation Sheet contains eight columns. Four columns record bid amounts for the base work and various alternates. The remaining columns are entitled, "Bidder," "Bid Bond," "Addenda," and "Subs." Each of the three bidders were named in one of the rows beneath the "Bidder," column. Each bidder had one "X" in its "Bid Bond" column and three "X"s in its "Addenda" column. However, only FMI and S. I. Goldman Company had "X"'s in their "Subs" columns. By resolution adopted on November 29, 1989, Respondent directed that all bids were rejected and that the Superintendent would correct any ambiguities and uncertainties in the ITB and solicit new bids. The resolution noted that Respondents staff had recommended that, if any bid were accepted, it should be that of B & I. However, [FMI] submitted with its bid a list of Major Sub-contractors of the form displayed in the [ITB], and B & I did not submit wish its aid a list of Major Sub-contractors[.] The resolution concluded that Respondent based on advice of staff and counsel, found that the [ITB is) ambiguous and/or uncertain as to whether or not a bidder must submit along with his bid a list of Major Sub-contractors, (b) that because of such ambiguity and/or uncertainty, it would be unfair and/or improper for [Respondent] to accept either of the bids received by it, and (c) that as a result thereof [Respondent] should reject all bids received by it for ,the Project and should solicit new bids for the Project as soon as is reasonably feasible after correction by [Respondents] staff of any ambiguity and uncertainty as aforesaid in the [ITB]. FMI and B & I each timely filed a notice of intent to protest and formal written protest of Respondent's decision to reject each company's respective bid. S. I. Goldman did not protest the decision and is not a party to the subject case. At a meeting on December 12, 1989, Respondent elected to refer the bid protests to the Division of Administrative Hearings for a formal hearing., At the beginning of the hearing, the parties filed a written stipulation, which stated that the only issue for determination was which Petitioner should be awarded the contract and not whether Respondent should seek further bids or award the contract to another bidder. The stipulation also stated that the Petitioners and Respondent agreed to abide by the recommendation of the hearing officer. At the hearing, the parties further stipulated that the sole issue for determination is whether the ITB, together with other applicable authority, required that the responsive bid contain any written list of subcontractors. In addition, the parties stipulated that both Petitioners had standing and the protests were timely and sufficient. The ITB requires that each bidder familiarize itself with all federal, state, and "Local Laws, ordinances, rules, and regulations that in any manner affect the work." Under the section entitled, "Preparation and Submission of Bids," the ITB states: "Each bidder shall use the Bid Form that is inserted herein, and may copy or reproduce the form on this own letterhead." Among other requirements, the ITB requires two bonds. The first is a "bid guarantee" of at, least five percent of the amount of the bid. The form of this guarantee may be cash or a Bid Bond." The other bond described in the ITB a 100% public construction bond. The surety on this bond must have been admitted to do business in Florida, must have been in business and have a record of successful continuous operation for at least five years, and must have at least a Bests Financial Rating of "Class VI" and a Bests Policyholder Ration of "A." The Bid Form contained in the ITB is two pages. Among other things, the Bid Form requires that the bidder receiving written notice of acceptance of its bid must provide the prescribed payment and performance bond and execute the contract within ten days after notification. The next document in the ITB is a single page entitled, "Form of Bid Bond." The provisions on this page identify the A.I.A. document to use and state that the Bid Bond "shall be submitted with the Bid Proposal Form." The next document in the ITB is a single page entitled, "List of Major Subcontractors." The List of Major Subcontractors states: Bidders shall list all major subcontractors that will be used if a contract is awarded. Additionally, bidders shall identify in the appropriate box whether or not that trade specialty is minority owned. Another paragraph defines minority ownership. The remainder of the form consists of ten rows for the "bidder" and nine major subcontractors, such as concrete, electrical, HVAC, and controls, and blanks where the bidder can indicate which of these entities are minority owned. The next document in the ITB is the Owner-Contractor Agreement, which is followed by tie Form of Construction Bond, General Conditions, and Supplementary General Conditions. Section 7.11 of the Supplementary General Conditions establishes certain requirements to be performed after the submission of bids. This section provides: Pre-Award Submittals: Before the Contract is awarded the apparent low bidder shall provide the following information to the owner. A copy of the Contractors current State of Florida General Contractor's or Mechanical Contractors License. Pre-Construction Meeting. After the Notice to Proceed and within eight (8) business days of the Owner [sic], the Contractor shall meet with the Owner, Engineer and Subcontractors that the Owner may designate... The Contractor shall provide the following to the Owner. * * * 2. A written list of all Subcontractors, material men and suppliers with such information as requested by the Owner or Engineer. * * * The remaining documents in the ITB are the technical specifications for the job. The three addenda supply additional technical information not relevant to this case. Respondent has promulgated rules with respect to the bidding process ("Rules"). The ITB does not refer to the Rules, which define and use many terms that are found in the ITB. For instance, Rule 1.1.25 defines the phrases, "Performance and Payment Bond," which is the same phrase used in the Bid Form in the ITB. The Rules define several other capitalized terms that are also used in the ITB, such as Bid Bond, Bid Guarantee, Bidder, and Contractor. Rule 4.1 similarly states that the bidder is familiar with federal, state, and "Local Laws, Ordinances, Rules and Regulations that in any manner affect the Work." Rule 6.1 describes the process by which a bidder is to prepare and submit bids and the Bid Guarantee in language similar to that contained in the ITB. Rule 6.2 discusses the listing of subcontractors. Rules 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 state: General Contractor shall include as an integral part of his bid a List of Subcontractors he proposes to use. The Bidder shall enclose this list in a 4" x 9" envelope, sealed and marked "List of Subcontractors" and identified ... The Bidder shall enclose said envelope with his bid proposal in the mailing envelope. The List of Subcontractors enclosed with tee Proposal of each Bidder will be examined by the ... Engineer before the Proposal is opened and read. In the event that the form is not properly executed and signed, the Proposal of that Bidder will be returned to him unopened... Rule 6.3 requires a Statement of Surety as another "integral part" of each bid. Rule 6.3.3 states: The Statement of Surety will be opened examined by the ... Engineer prior to the opening of the Proposal.... Although similar to Rule 6.2, Rule 6.3 lacks the warming that if the Statement of Surety is not "properly executed and signed, the Proposal of that Bidder will be returned to him unopened." Rule 19.1 sets forth the requirements, for the surety. These requirements are different than those set forth in the ITB. Rules 19.1.1 and 19.1.2 require, as does the ITB, that the surety be admitted to do business in the State of Florida and shall have been in business and have a record of successful continuous operations for at least five years. However, Rule 19.1.1 requires that the surety be represented by a reputable and responsible surety bond agency licensed to do, business in the State of Florida and have a local representative in the Orlando area. Rule 19.1.3 requires minimum Bests ratings of "A" in "management," and, as to "strength and surplus," "AAA+" in financial rating and $12,500,000 minimum surplus. Rule 19.1.3.3 also requires that the surety be listed on the U.S. Treasury Departments Circular 570. The bids of FMI and S. I. Goldman Company contained a completed List of Major Subcontractors. The bid of B & I did not. No bidder included a Statement of Surety with its bid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the School Board of Orange County enter a Final Order awarding the subject contract to Florida Mechanical, Inc. ENTERED this 15th day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 1990. APPENDIX Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of FMI All of FMI's proposed findings have been adopted or adopted in substance. Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of B & I 1-4: adopted or adopted in substance. 5: adopted, except that the staff recommended that, if the bid was to be awarded, that it be awarded to B & I. 6: adopted in substance. 7: rejected as conclusion of law and, to the extent fact, subordinate. 8-12: rejected as subordinate. 13-16: adopted or adopted in substance. 17: rejected as subordinate. 18: rejected as unsupported by the greater height of the evidence. 19-21: rejected as subordinate. 22: rejected as beyond the scope of the issues and irrelevant in view of the stipulation. In the stipulation, the parties agreed that the issue to be addressed would not be whether the intended agency action of Respondent was lawful (i.e., not arbitrary, fraudulent, dishonest, or otherwise improper), but rather whether the ITB, together with other applicable authority, required that the responsive bid contain any written list of subcontractors. COPIES FURNISHED: James L. Schott, Superintendent The School Board of Orange County, Florida P.O. Box 271 Orlando, FL 32802 Charles Robinson Fawsett, P. A. Shutts & Bowen 20 North Orange Avenue Suite 1000 Orlando, FL 32801 James F. Butler, III Smith, Currie & Hancock 2600 Peachtree Center Harris Tower 233 Peachtree Street, N.E. Atlanta, GA 30043-6601 William M. Rowland, Jr., Esq. Rowland, Thomas & Jacobs, P.A. 1786 North Mills Avenue P.O. Box 305 Orlando, FL 32803
