The Issue Whether the Respondent's real estate broker's license should be disciplined based upon the allegations that Respondent was guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device, culpable negligence or breach of trust in a business transaction in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b) Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.165, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent David William Tricker is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0270690 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued to the Respondent was as a broker in care of Florida Country Clubs International, Inc., 555 Estates Place, Longwood, Florida, 32779, a Florida corporation. Respondent became the broker for Henro, Inc. (hereinafter Henro) and Henro Realty, Inc. early in 1993 and served until approximately October 21, 1993, when Respondent submitted his letter of resignation to the Florida Real Estate Commission ("FREC"). The Henro companies were owned by a British couple, David and Marion Moth, who also did business in the United Kingdom as Henro Land Leisure Limited. On or about July 8, 1993, Henro negotiated a verbal contract with Gilman Pool Services to maintain and provide pool cleaning services at homes managed by Henro on behalf of its owners. The contract was followed up with a letter dated the same date from Henro and signed by Marion Moth, as vice president. The fee for the service was $65.00 per month for each pool cleaned. Payment terms were to be on 30-day invoice. Heather and Peter Shimmin operated the pool service, and relied upon Henro to pay them for their services. There was no clear and convincing evidence that the Shimmins relied upon Respondent to pay them for their services, or that Respondent was aware of this contract between Gilman Pool Services and Henro. The July 1993 bill to Henro was $5,227.40. On September 1, 1993, Henro issued check #2123 in the amount of $5,227.40 to Gilman Pool Services. This check did not clear and was later made good by Henro by payment in cash to Gilman Pool Service. The August 1993 bill was in the amount of $6,352.36 was not paid. The September, 1993 bill, which amounted to $5,887.00 and the October, 1993 partial bill in the amount of $1,595.00 remains due, owing and unpaid. On October 31, 1993, Henro went out of business. At the time Henro closed, Henro owed Gilman Pool Services $13,061.76, in unpaid maintenance and pool cleaning services. Gilman Pool Services made no demand upon Respondent for past due invoices. The testimony of the witness, Hal Klein, was not credible.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission issue and file a Final Order finding the Respondent not guilty of violating Subsections 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and DISMISSING the Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 1st day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of December, 1994. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1, 2, 3(in part), 4(in part), 5(in part), 6, 7, 8, 9, 10(in part). Rejected as against the greater weight of credible evidence: paragraphs 3(in part), 4(in part), 5(in part),10(in part), 11, 12. Respondent's proposed findings of fact. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1, 2, 3(in part), 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12(in part). Rejected as against the greater weight of evidence: paragraph 3(in part). Rejected as argument: paragraph 12. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack McRay, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Senior Attorney Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Legal Section - Suite N 308 Hurston Building North Tower 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 David W. Tricker (pro se) 555 Estates Place Longwood, Florida Stephen T. Ball, Esquire Maguire, Voorhis & Wells, P.A. Two South Orange Plaza Post Office Box 633 Orlando, Florida 32802-0633
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Scott William Katz (Katz), applied to Respondent, Florida Real Estate commission (Commission), for licensure as a real estate salesman. By letter of June 5, 1987, the Commission advised Katz that his application was denied because he had been disbarred from the Florida Bar Association and the Oklahoma Bar Association. Katz filed a timely request for formal hearing to contest the Commission's action. The proof established that by order of the Supreme Court of the State of Florida in The Florida Bar v. Katz, 491 So.2d 1101 (Fla. 1986), Katz was disbarred from the practice of law. The Court's opinion reads, in pertinent part: In Count I, the Bar charged respondent with violating several disciplinary rules pertaining to conflicts of interest and secrets of clients. Initially, respondent represented a wife in a dissolution of marriage action. He obtained a final judgment on her behalf which provided for child support as well as other relief. Respondent continued to represent the wife, filing a motion to modify the final judgment and a motion for contempt wherein various arrearages in child support were alleged. Approximately two years later, respondent commenced proceedings against his former client on behalf of her ex-husband, seeking a reduction in child support payments. These payments were part of the very relief sought and obtained by respondent on behalf of the wife in the original dissolution proceedings. Respondent's former client did not consent to respondent's representation of her former husband and indicated that such consent would not have been given if sought by respondent. In Count II, the Bar charged that respondent coerced an agreement from a former client to pay damages on a claim which had no legal basis.... * * * In Count III, the Bar charged that respondent misrepresented material facts in a sworn pleading in order to obtain the relief sought. Cadet Joseph K. Barbara had retained respondent when he was dismissed from West Point. Respondent filed a sworn motion before a federal court requesting the issuance of a temporary order restraining West Point from dismissing the cadet. The pleading contained the representation that West Point had no objection to the issuance of such an order. The federal judge entered the order on the basis of respondent's misrepresentation of the position of the West Point authorities. Upon finding respondent guilty of all charges, the referee recommended disbarment, stating: The cumulative guilt of the three different transgressions indicated a gross callousness and indifference to the entire Code of Professional Responsibility. In Count I, he must be presumed to have divulged secrets of his client's to the client's adversary. In Count II, he outrageously and successfully pressured his client to wrongfully agree to pay him money when his client had no legal obligation to do so. Certainly moral extortion if nothing else. He deliberately lied under oath to a Federal Judge who relied upon such falsehood in issuing the order. Certainly a lawyer can do little more culpable and destructive to the court system. The example set by Respondent must be dealt with harshly to prevent those considering such conduct in the future. Accordingly, the Court concluded: We approve the referee's findings of guilt on Count I of the Bar's complaint and find that respondent violated disciplinary Rule 1- 102(A)(5)(a lawyer shall not engage in conduct contrary to the administration of justice); Disciplinary Rule 4-101(A) and (B) (a lawyer shall not knowingly use a client's confidence or secret to the advantage of another without full disclosure), Disciplinary Rule 5-105(A) and (B)(a lawyer shall decline proffered employment if a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected), and Disciplinary Rule 9-101 (a lawyer shall avoid even the appearance of impropriety). We approve the referee's findings of guilt on Count II and find that respondent violated Florida Bar Integration Rule, article XI, Rule 11.02(3)(a) prohibiting conduct contrary to honesty, justice, or good morals. We approve the referee's findings of guilt on Count III, finding that respondent violated Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(1)(a lawyer shall not violate a discipline rule); Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(3)(a lawyer shall not engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude); Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4)(a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); Disciplinary Rule l- 102 (A)(5)(a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice); Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(6)(a lawyer shall not engage in any conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law); Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(5)(a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of law or fact in representing a client); and Florida Bar Integration Rules 11.02(3)(a) and (b)(a lawyer shall not commit acts contrary to honesty, justice, good morals, or commit a crime). Predicated on his disbarment from the Florida Bar Association Katz was, effective February 19, 1987, disbarred from the Oklahoma Bar Association. At hearing, Katz offered no proof of subsequent good conduct and reputation, or any other reason sufficient to demonstrate that the interests of the public and investors would not likely be endangered by the granting of registration.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Petitioner, Scott William Katz, for licensure as a real estate salesman be DENIED. DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of July, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Scott William Katz 361 Midpines Road Palm Springs, Florida 33461 Lawrence S. Gendzier, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Joseph A. Sole, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
Findings Of Fact Based on the admissions of the Respondent, on the testimony of the witnesses, and on the exhibits received in evidence, I make the following findings of fact: Respondent Larry L. Toney is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0089521 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued was as a broker, t/a Larry L. Toney Realty, Inc., 4629 Moncrief Road West, Jacksonville, Florida 32209. At the time of the events described below, Ernest W. Mabrey was the owner of a house located at 3926 Perry Street, Jacksonville, Florida. On or about March 3, 1986, the Respondent met with Josephine Watkins, who is the daughter of Ernest W. Mabrey, at her home in Lake Butler, Florida, and advised her and Mr. Mabrey that the property described above, then owned by Mr. Mabrey, was in foreclosure. Ernestine Byrd, another daughter of Mr. Mabrey, was also present. An action to foreclose the mortgage on the subject property had in fact been filed at the time the Respondent met with Ernest W. Mabrey and members of his family. The Respondent requested that Ernest W. Mabrey sign a warranty deed to evidence the fact that he, Ernest W. Mabrey, had no interest in saving the subject property from the then pending mortgage foreclosure action. Josephine Watkins and Ernestine Byrd discussed the proposed transaction before any papers were signed. Ernest W. Mabrey did not object to transferring the subject property. On or about March 3, 1986, Ernest W. Mabrey, as grantor, signed a warranty deed which conveyed the subject property to Emory Robinson, Jr. Mr. Mabrey willingly signed his name to the warranty deed with the understanding that he was releasing his interest in the subject property because he was sick and neither he nor his daughters had the funds necessary to redeem the property. Josephine Watkins helped her father, Mr. Mabrey, write his name on the warranty deed and Ernestine Byrd signed the warranty deed as a witness to her father's signature. At the time the warranty deed was signed, no payments had been made on the mortgage for approximately five years. The Respondent did not promise to pay any money to Mr. Mabrey or his daughters in connection with the transfer of the subject property, nor did they expect to receive any money. The Respondent did not forge any signatures on the warranty deed described above. All of the signatures on that warranty deed are genuine. The grantee in the subject transaction, Emory Robinson, Jr., paid the holder of the first mortgage the sum of $6,787.11 in order to bring the payments to a current status and he assumed the mortgage. The mortgage foreclosure action was then voluntarily dismissed.
Recommendation For all of the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission issue a final order in this case dismissing all charges against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of May, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of May, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following are my specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Findings Proposed by Petitioner: Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3: Accepted. Paragraph 4: First two lines accepted. Last line rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Paragraph 5: First sentence is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Second sentence is rejected as constituting subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 6: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 7: Accepted in substance, with additional findings for clarity and completeness. Paragraph 8: It is accepted that the house was conveyed to Mr. Robinson. The remainder of this paragraph is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence or as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Findings Proposed by Respondent: All of the findings proposed by the Respondent have been accepted in whole or in substance, except as specifically set forth below. In making my findings of fact, I have omitted a number of unnecessary details proposed by the Respondent. Paragraph 8: Rejected as constituting subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 18: Rejected as constituting subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 19: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details and as legal argument. COPIES FURNISHED: JAMES H. GILLIS, ESQUIRE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE POST OFFICE BOX 1900 ORLANDO, FLORIDA 32802 HENRY E. DAVIS, ESQUIRE ROBERTS & DAVIS 816 BROAD STREET JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA 32202 DARLENE F. KELLER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE POST OFFICE BOX 1900 ORLANDO, FLORIDA 32802 WILLIAM O'NEIL, ESQUIRE GENERAL COUNSEL DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750
The Issue Whether petitioners have standing to challenge the validity of respondent's proposed rules, 38F-5.30 through 38F-5.70, Florida Administrative Code I.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner achieved a passing grade on the September 28, 1993, mortgage broker examination.
Findings Of Fact On September 28, 1993, Petitioner took the mortgage broker examination. To pass the examination, a candidate must receive a minimum score of 75. Petitioner was advised that she had achieved a score of only 74. Petitioner was afforded an opportunity to review the examination questions and her answers thereto, and she did so on October 15, 1993. She questioned her failure to receive credit for ten of her answers on that examination and provided written explanation for why she believed her answers to those questions were correct. Petitioner's written challenges and explanations regarding her answers to those ten questions were reviewed by a subject matter expert and by a psychometrician employed by National Assessment Institute, the company responsible for creating and administering the Florida mortgage broker examination. Both experts determined that Petitioner's answers to those ten questions were incorrect and that her explanations therefor were without merit. Petitioner was advised that she was entitled to no extra credit for her answers on that examination, and this proceeding ensued. At the final hearing in this cause, Petitioner admitted and agreed that the answers which she had chosen for questions numbered 2, 20, and 23 of the examination were incorrect. Petitioner, accordingly, withdrew her challenge to the grading of her answers to those three questions and proceeded forward regarding her answers to seven questions only. Petitioner chose answer "D" to question numbered one. The correct answer was "A". Petitioner was not able to correctly answer that question because she was unfamiliar with a term used in the question. That term is found in the "Fannie Mae" guidelines. Petitioner's answer is not correct. Petitioner chose answer "A" to question numbered 19, but the correct answer is "C". Petitioner's suggestion that both answers are correct is not persuasive. Petitioner chose only part of the correct answer, and multiple choice "C" contained all of the information necessary for a correct answer. Partial credit is not given for partial answers on the mortgage broker examination; rather, to receive credit for an answer, a candidate must choose the answer which completely responds to the question. Since Petitioner's chosen answer was an incomplete answer, her answer was not correct. Petitioner thought that "C" was the correct answer to question numbered 33, but only answer "A" was correct. That basic question regarding title insurance and the correct answer were taken from the Handbook of the Florida Association of Mortgage Brokers, one of the required reference materials. Petitioner chose answer "D" for question numbered 35, but only answer "C" was correct. As with question numbered 33, Petitioner based her answer on her experience as a real estate broker in New York. The question and answer, however, can be found in the "Fannie Mae" guidelines. As her answer to question numbered 36, Petitioner chose answer "A". However, the only correct answer was answer "C". Petitioner's answer involved a different type of insurance than the kind involved in the question. Petitioner believed that choice "B" was the correct answer to question numbered 59. However, the correct answer was choice "D". The question tested Petitioner's understanding of the definitions found in Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. Petitioner's choice of a more generic term was incorrect. As her answer to question numbered 98, Petitioner chose "C", but only "B" was a correct answer. This question used the same term found in question numbered one. Since Petitioner did not understand that term, which is found in the "Fannie Mae" guidelines, she did not know the correct answer to either question numbered one or question numbered 98. Petitioner is not entitled to extra credit for her answers to any of the questions challenged in this proceeding. Petitioner failed to achieve a passing grade on the September 28, 1993, mortgage broker examination.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Petitioner failed to achieve a passing score on the September 28, 1993, mortgage broker examination and denying Petitioner's application for licensure as a mortgage broker. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of March, 1995, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-4a have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 9, 11, 16, 17, 20, 23, 26, 29, 32, 35, 38, and 39 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 6, 8, 10, 12-15, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30, 31, 33, 34, 36, 37, 40, and 41 have been rejected as being subordinate to the issues herein. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 7 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Helena Weisfeld Chirico c/o Robert Weisfeld 2739 Parkview Drive Hallandale, Florida 33009 Helena Weisfeld Chirico Post Office Box 800 Hunter, New York 12442 John D. O'Neill, Esquire Assistant General Counsel The Comptroller's Office 111 Georgia Avenue, Suite 211 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Honorable Robert F. Milligan Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Harry Hooper, General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance Room 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
