Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, Respondent held a Class "C" Private Investigator's License Number C90-00727 and a Class "G" Statewide Firearms License, Number G90-02226. In April 1991 Respondent taught a Saturday morning class, the third or fourth week of that month, in which Beatrice Price and Ryan Martin were trainees. At the conclusion of the lecture Respondent took the two trainees on a "real" investigation. The subject of the investigation was a dentist, Dr. Kathleen Gerreaux, under surveillance on either a worker's compensation claim or a liability claim (conflict in the testimony and the type of surveillance is not relevant). Respondent placed a microphone under the blouse of Beatrice Price a/k/a Beatrix Herrera and had her go to the office of Dr. Gerreaux to try and learn in what activities she was engaging. The conversation was recorded in Respondent's van parked some distance away. When Herrera returned to the van the tape was replayed in her presence and the words of the investigator and Dr. Gerreaux could be clearly understood. Shortly thereafter Dr. Gerreaux left her office and returned to her home. Respondent took the van to the vicinity of the residence, parked several houses away and rigged Ryan Martin with a microphone under his shirt and had him go to Dr. Gerreaux's home to attempt to get her to go jogging or perform some other exercise which could be videotaped. Herrera overheard the conversation between Martin and Dr. Gerreaux while waiting in the van. This incident was not reported to Petitioner until several months later after Herrera had contacted plaintiff's investigator to complain about an incident which she was told she had been taped without her knowledge or consent. When told that her evidence was insufficient to support her claim Herrera told the investigator about the taping of the conversation with Dr. Gerreaux. This initiated the investigation which led to the Administrative Complaint filed herein. After talking to Herrera and Martin the investigator also interviewed Respondent regarding the taping incident. Respondent admitted to the investigator that he had used Herrera and Martin to intercept the conversations with Dr. Gerreaux, but said the tapes were unintelligible. Respondent's version of this incident was similar to the testimony given at the hearing by Herrera except for the clarity of the taped conversation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered finding David J. Berry guilty of violating section 493.6118(1)(f), F.S. and that an Administrative fine of $1000 be imposed. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of November, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Henri C. Cawthon Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, Mail Station #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Ronald L. Jones, Esquire 1020 East Lafayette Street, Suite 108 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent, Carswell Investigations, Dexter B. Carswell, owner, committed the violations alleged in the administrative complaint dated September 20, 1995; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations of this case, Respondent held a class "A" private investigative agency license, number A94-00095; a class "C" private investigator license, number C93-00488; and a class "G" statewide firearm license, number G94-02105. Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating such licenses. On August 22, 1994, Respondent, Dexter B. Carswell, was in Bibb County, Georgia. On that date, Respondent was riding in an automobile which went onto the school grounds of the Northeast High School, a Bibb County school property where Richard Harned was employed as a campus police officer. Posted conspicuously on those grounds were signs which notified the public that persons, vehicles, and personal belongings on school property were subject to search and that state law prohibited the possession of a deadly weapon on school property. While on school property on that date, Respondent was in possession of a handgun which is described as a 40 caliber Glock. On August 22, 1994, in Bibb County, Georgia, Respondent did not have a license to carry a concealed weapon in Georgia. Respondent knew a license was needed to carry a concealed weapon in Georgia. On August 22, 1994, in Bibb County, Georgia, Respondent did not have a license to conduct private investigations in Georgia. Respondent knew a license was required to conduct private investigations in Georgia. On August 22, 1994, in Bibb County, Georgia, Respondent carried a badge with the words "Investigator Detective" at the top, and "State of Florida, Broward County, FLA" along with an official-looking outline of the state of Florida. This badge did not denote Respondent was a licensed private investigator but could easily be misread as an official police badge. On or about January 5, 1995, by the grand jury for the December, 1994 term of the Bibb Superior Court, Respondent was indicted for the offenses of possession of a weapon on school property and carrying a concealed weapon in violation of Georgia law. As a result, Respondent pled guilty to the charges and, as a first time offender, adjudication was withheld, and he received time served (seven days), paid fines, and was placed on three years probation. Respondent is currently serving that probation. When Respondent filed his application for the class "A" investigative agency license he represented himself as the sole proprietor of Carswell Investigations. This application (Petitioner's exhibit 8) was submitted on March 18, 1994. Respondent subsequently incorporated Carswell Investigations and filed articles of incorporation with the office of the Secretary of State. Those articles represent that the corporate officers of the company are: Dexter Carswell, President; Jimmy Carswell, Vice President; Ethel Carswell, Secretary; and Alvaro Valdez, Treasurer. Respondent remained the sole owner of the corporation. Despite the incorporation of the business, Respondent did not update the licensing information with the Division of Licensing. Alvaro Valdez, who is also known as Alvara Valdel or Alvara Valdez, is a convicted felon. On August 22, 1994, Alvaro Valdez had in his possession a business card in the name of Carswell Investigations, Inc. No. A-94-00095, which certified Mr. Valdez as an employee of the company.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of State, Division of Licensing, enter a final order imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $1,350.00; suspending Respondent's class "C" license for a period of time to coincide with his probation from the Georgia criminal proceeding; and revoking Respondent's class "G" license. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of September, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of September, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 96-0324 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: Paragraphs 1, and 3 through 12 are accepted. Paragraph 2 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: 1. None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: Sandra B. Mortham, Secretary Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Don Bell, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Michele Guy, Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, Mail Station Number 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Dexter B. Carswell Carswell Investigations 3101 Northwest 47 Terrace, Number 119 Lauderdale Lakes, Florida 33319
The Issue The issues in the case are whether the Respondent’s application for a Class G Firearms license should be approved and whether his existing Concealed Weapons license should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the agency charged with regulating the licensure and sale of weapons in the State of Florida. By letter dated November 5, 1998, the Department of State, Division of Licensing, notified Kenneth Dunning that his application for a Class “G” license had been denied. The grounds for the proposed denial are as follows: Failure to qualify under Section 493.6118(4), Florida Statutes, in that you were convicted of a felony and your civil rights, including the specific right to possess firearms, have not been restored by the State of Michigan. For information, please contact the state (sic) of Michigan. In 1960, Mr. Dunning was convicted of attempted armed robbery, a felony, in the State of Michigan. On December 23, 1998, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint against Mr. Dunning, seeking to revoke his Concealed Weapons license, number W98-00504. As grounds for the proposed revocation, the Complaint states as follows: On or about June 17, 1960, in the State of Michigan, Respondent was convicted of attempted armed robbery, a felony, and has not had the right to own or possess firearms restored in the State of Michigan. Respondent is ineligible for licensure pursuant to Sections 790.06(2)(d) and 790,23, Florida Statutes. There is no evidence that Mr. Dunning’s civil rights were lost as a result of his 1960 conviction. The evidence, including Mr. Dunning’s uncontradicted testimony and available documents, establishes that Mr. Dunning’s civil rights, if impacted at all by his 1960 conviction, have been restored without reservation. By Order dated May 23, 1997, from the Office of Executive Clemency, Mr. Dunning was granted a restoration of civil rights “except the specific authority to possess or own a firearm” by the Governor of the State of Florida with the concurrence of the requisite members of the State Cabinet. The Certificate of Restoration indicates it is valid “in the State of Florida for any and all felony convictions in the state other than Florida, or in any United States court or military court. . . .” By Executive Order dated September 10, 1998, and signed by the Governor of the State of Florida, Mr. Dunning was granted “the right to own, possess or use firearms.” Department Exhibit numbered 1 is a letter dated September 28, 1998, from “Anthony P. Gledhill” who is identified as “Division Counsel, Detroit” for the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms to John P. Booth, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE). The letter is a legal analysis of case law related to restoration of an individual’s civil rights after conviction. The exhibit does not establish that Mr. Dunning’s conviction resulted in a loss of his civil rights. The letter does not establish that his civil rights, if impacted by the conviction, were not completely restored. Department Exhibit numbered 2 is a letter dated September 24, 1998, to Mr. Dunhill from Mr. Booth. The letter identifies as the reason for FDLE’s nonapproval of Mr. Dunning's attempt to purchase a firearm under Section 790.065, Florida Statutes, “the determination by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms that your civil rights have not been fully restored by Michigan. . . .” The exhibit does not establish that Mr. Dunning’s conviction resulted in a loss of his civil rights. The letter does not establish that his civil rights, if impacted by the conviction, were not completely restored.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a final order granting the application of Kenneth Dunning for a Class “G” firearms license and dismissing the Administrative Complaint addressed herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of April, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Steve Bensko, Esquire Division of Licensing Department of State The Capitol, Mail Station 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Kenneth Dunning 806 Walker Drive Tampa, Florida 33613 Honorable Katherine Harris Secretary of State Department of State The Capitol, Plaza Lever 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Deborah K. Kearney, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, Lower Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaint and the penalties, if any, that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact On June 11, 1991, Respondent filed an employment application with Florida Patrol and Security Guard Service, Inc., d/b/a Sunstate Security Patrol. Respondent submitted to Maria Vilma Gonzalez, the secretary for Sunstate Security Patrol, photocopies of two documents. Respondent represented that one photocopy was of his Class D Security Officer License and that the other was a photocopy of his Class G Statewide Firearms Permit. The photocopy of the Class D license depicted a valid license with an expiration date of April 1, 1992. The photocopy of the Class G license depicted a valid license with an expiration date of March 4, 1992. Respondent began working for Sunstate Security Patrol as an armed guard on June 11, 1991, and continued that work for approximately six weeks. He left that employ to take employment with Ventura Security Services. Respondent submitted the same documents to Ventura Security Services to show his licensure that he had submitted to Sunstate Security Patrol. Respondent did not hold a valid Class D license or a Class G license on June 11, 1991, when he applied for employment with Sunstate Security Patrol, at any other time while he was employed by Sunstate Security Patrol, or when he applied for employment with Ventura Security Services. Respondent had been issued a Class D license that expired March 4, 1988. Respondent had been issued a Class G license that expired April 1, 1988. The document that Respondent gave to Sunstate Security Patrol and to Ventura Security Services with his employment application purporting to depict a photocopy of a valid Class D license had been altered to reflect an erroneous expiration date. There was no competent evidence submitted at the formal hearing as to who altered the document, but it is clear that Respondent misrepresented his licensure status by submitting this altered document. The document that Respondent gave to Sunstate Security Patrol and to Ventura Security Services with his employment application purporting to depict a photocopy of a valid Class G license had been altered to reflect an erroneous expiration date. There was no competent evidence submitted at the formal hearing as to who altered the document, but it is clear that Respondent misrepresented his licensure status by submitting this altered document. 1/ At the time of the formal hearing, Respondent held a "D" license and a "G" license. The "D" license has an issuance date of October 1, 1991, and an expiration date of July 31, 1993. The "G" license has an issuance date of October 1, 1991, and an expiration date of October 1, 1993.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which adopts the findings of fact contained herein and which revokes all licenses issued by Petitioner to Respondent. DONE AND ORDERED this 18th day of August, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1992.
Findings Of Fact In March, 1955 the Petitioner was convicted in Federal Court in the Southern District of Florida of the felony Interstate Transportation of Forged Checks. He was placed on probation. Shortly thereafter the Petitioner was again arrested for probation violation and he served a three-years sentence. He was released from prison in 1958. It does not appear that the Petitioner's civil rights have been restored to him. The Petitioner is in all other respects entitled to be issued a license as an employee guard.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent hereto, Respondent held a valid Class "W" Concealed Weapon or Firearm License issued by the Petitioner. Petitioner alleges that Respondent was convicted of Assault with Intent to Murder on June 8, 1960 in the State of Georgia and his civil rights have not been restored. A person by the name of John P. Piner was sentenced by the Superior Court of Richmond County, Georgia, on June 8, 1960, to serve a term of imprisonment at hard labor for a period of not less than three (3) years and not more that four (4) years for the crime of Assault with Intent to Murder. The sentence was suspended and the Defendant was placed on probation and fined. Respondent, John P. Piner, during all relevant times was on active duty with the United States Army and remained so until his honorable separation from the service on June 23, 1969, after more than twenty years of service. The evidence failed to show that the person named in the Sentencing document found in the records of Richmond County, Georgia was the same person as the Respondent named in the Administrative Complaint. The evidence failed to show that the Respondent, John P. Piner, was adjudicated guilty of the felony of Assault with Intent to Murder in the State of Georgia by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent be DISMISSED and that Petitioner's application for renewal of his concealed weapon or firearm license be GRANTED. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of November, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1994. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1 Rejected as against the greater weight of evidence: paragraphs 2, 3, 4. Proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent. Accepted in substance: Section 1. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard R. Whidden, Jr. Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS-4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Donald R. Henderson, Esquire Mateer Harbert & Bates Post Office Box 2854 Orlando, Florida 32802-2854 Honorable Jim Smith, Secretary of State Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater, General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue Whether on or about November 28, 1993, Petitioner committed an act of violence or used force on another person which was not for the lawful protection of himself or another and was sufficient grounds for denial of Petitioner's application for a Class "D" Security Officer and Class "G" Statewide Firearm Licenses, pursuant to Sections 493.6118(1)(j) and (2), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact By application dated February 10, 1994, Petitioner applied to Respondent for a Class "D" Security Officer license and a Class "G" Statewide Firearm license. The applications prepared by Petitioner were complete, and included the required photos and copy of a certificate evidencing successful completion of security officer training as required by statute. On November 28, 1993, the Petitioner met his estranged spouse in the Lakeland police station lobby to exchange custody of their baby daughter. This transfer of custody was videotaped, allegedly by the Petitioner's mother-in-law. As the transfer was ending, the Petitioner became agitated at the person holding the camera. Petitioner picked up the baby car seat and moved towards the camera. The Petitioner swung the baby car seat, while the baby was in it, in the direction of the camera. No competent evidence was produced which proved that the car seat, while being swung by Petitioner, struck another person or an object held by another person.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered approving Petitioner's application for a Class "D" Security Officers license and a Class "G" Statewide Firearm license as provided for in Section 493.6118, Florida Statutes (1993). DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of January, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of January, 1995. APPENDIX Petitioner is eligible for licensure under either stand Petitioner did not submit proposed findings of fact. Respondent proposed finding of fact: Accepted in substance: paragraph 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 (in part). Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of competent (non-hearsay) evidence: paragraphs 6 (in part), 7. COPIES FURNISHED: Angel E. Figueroa 5331 David Street Lakeland, Florida 33813 Richard R. Whidden, Jr., Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS-4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater, Esquire General Counsel The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent's Class "D" Security Officer License and/or Class "G" Statewide Firearm License should be revoked or otherwise disciplined based upon the alleged violations of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, set forth in the Third Amended Administrative Complaint filed by Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence introduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: On or about June 7, 1989, Respondent filed an application for a Class "D" Security Officer License with the Department. The application form asked the applicant whether he had ever been arrested and to list any and all arrests. The application specifically provided that "falsification of this question may be grounds for denial of your license." Respondent answered affirmatively that he had been arrested. The only specific incident listed on the application was an arrest in 1979 for a charge of "asault [sic] with a deadly weapon intemp [sic] to kill Fay N.C. [sic]." The Application also required the applicant to set forth the outcome of all arrests. Respondent replied that the "charges was [sic] drop [sic]." On or about July 17, 1990, Respondent submitted an application with the Department for a Class "G" Statewide Firearms License. The application form for this license included an identical request regarding prior arrests. In response, Respondent checked the box indicating he had never been arrested and wrote "N/A" where he was supposed to indicate the date, charge and outcome of the arrests. Respondent has not provided any explanation for why his Class "D" Application disclosed an arrest in 1979, but his Class "G" Application did not reference this arrest. This discrepancy is not alleged in the Third Amended Administrative Complaint. Petitioner has submitted a certificate from the Cumberland County, North Carolina Superior Court which indicates that a criminal summons was issued for "Angelo Louis Lugo" on or about May 5, 1987, for a charge of "M Assault By Pointing A Gun." It is not clear whether this summons is directed at Respondent nor is it clear whether the Summons was ever served and/or the subject was arrested. The ultimate disposition of this criminal case is not clear. Respondent denies ever being served with the summons referenced in this court record. The evidence was insufficient to establish that Respondent was ever arrested in connection with this matter. Petitioner has submitted a second certified record from the Cumberland County, North Carolina Superior Court, which indicates that Respondent was issued a "Citation" on March 10, 1986, for the charge of "M Shoplifting Concealment Goods." No other evidence or explanation of this record has been provided. Respondent admits that he was issued a Notice to Appear in court after he was caught by store security personnel taking aspirin from a bottle. He testified that he did not list this matter on his applications because he was not "arrested." Instead, he claims that he was merely issued a citation to appear in court. The evidence presented in this case did not refute Respondent's version of the events surrounding this court record. In sum, the evidence was not clear and convincing that Respondent was ever formally "arrested" for this incident. The ultimate disposition of this criminal charge is not clear from the record in this proceeding. Counts III and IV of the Third Amended Administrative Complaint are based upon an incident that occurred on February 9, 1993 between Respondent and Jorge Ruiz. There is a good deal of conflicting evidence regarding this incident. Both Respondent and Ruiz have testified and/or given statements on several occasions about the incident including statements to the police, testimony in a related criminal proceeding against Respondent and depositions taken in connection with a civil lawsuit filed by Ruiz against Respondent, Respondent's employer and the Bank where Respondent worked. It is impossible and unnecessary to resolve all of the conflicts in the differing accounts of the incident as described by Respondent and Ruiz at various times. After considering all of the evidence presented, including the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, the findings in this Recommended Order are based upon the clear and convincing evidence presented. On February 9, 1993, Respondent was working as an armed security guard at a Barnett Bank in Plantation, Florida. At approximately 1:30 p.m., Respondent was working outside the bank in the vicinity of the drive-thru lanes. He was there to direct traffic and monitor the area. Around this time, Jorge Ruiz pulled into the paved area in front of the drive-thru booths. Ruiz had been to the Bank on numerous occasions in the past and he had often used the drive-thru windows. Ruiz has a very powerful radio in his pick-up truck and he admits that he tends to play music at a loud volume. On at least one prior occasion, Ruiz had proceeded to the drive-thru station with his radio blasting. The tellers had complained about the noise coming through the intercom system. During the week or so prior to February 9, 1993, Ruiz and Respondent had at least one minor confrontation. During this prior instance, Respondent advised Ruiz that he had to turn his radio down before he reached the drive-thru booth because the intercom system picked up the background noise and it interfered with the tellers' ability to communicate with the customers. Ruiz replied that he would turn down the radio when he got to the window. When Ruiz entered the Bank's parking lot on February 9, 1993, his radio was playing loudly. Respondent approached the driver's side window of Ruiz' vehicle and asked Ruiz to turn his radio down. Ruiz responded with a number of obscenities. Respondent told Ruiz that unless he turned his radio down, he could not use the drive-thru facility. Ruiz refused to comply. Respondent stood in front of Ruiz' vehicle and directed him away from the drive-thru lane. Ruiz' vehicle moved forward and bumped into Respondent. Respondent drew his gun and shouted at Ruiz to stop the car and get out. Respondent claims that he intended to hold Ruiz while he called the police. The parties exchanged words and Ruiz' truck again moved forward striking Respondent. Respondent was not knocked down or otherwise injured, however, his gun discharged. The bullet penetrated the windshield of Ruiz' truck and hit the steering wheel. A fragment from the steering wheel struck Ruiz in the neck or chest area, causing a minor wound. Respondent contends that he was justified in drawing his weapon and/or using deadly force "to prevent the escape from custody of a person who committed a felony in his presence." This contention is rejected because there is no evidence that Ruiz was attempting to escape. Furthermore, it is not clear that Ruiz in fact committed a felony, nor does it appear that the use of force was reasonably necessary under the circumstances of this case. Respondent also contends that he was justified in drawing his weapon in self-defense because he was being threatened by a deadly weapon, i.e. Ruiz' truck, and he had no reasonable means of escape. Respondent claims that he was boxed in by a vehicle in front of the truck and had no reasonable way to retreat from the "deadly force" that confronted him. Respondent's contention that he had no reasonable means of escape is rejected as not credible. Contrary to Respondent's claim, the evidence was clear that Respondent had reasonable means of escape. Moreover, there were alternate ways to handle the situation which would have diffused rather than exacerbated the tension and danger. Respondent claims that the gun discharged accidently when the truck hit him. No persuasive evidence was presented to refute this contention. Indeed, in some of his statements, Ruiz admitted that the gun may have gone off by accident when his truck struck Respondent. In sum, it is clear that Ruiz was belligerent and abusive and that his car bumped into Respondent twice. Nonetheless, Respondent's contention that he was justified in drawing his weapon and that he had no reasonable means of escape is rejected. While it can not be concluded from the evidence presented that Respondent deliberately shot at Ruiz, the evidence did establish that Respondent was guilty of negligence, misconduct and/or incompetency when he drew and pointed his loaded weapon at Ruiz. The circumstances did not justify Respondent pointing a loaded weapon at Ruiz. Without question, Respondent failed to demonstrate that level of discretion and caution that is expected of a person licensed to carry a firearm in the course of his employment. After the gun went off, Respondent immediately jumped into the truck and took Ruiz to a nearby hospital where Ruiz' minor injury was treated and he was released.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Department of State, Division of Licensing enter a Final Order dismissing Counts I, II, and III of the Third Amended Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent and finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained in Count IV of that Third Amended Administrative Complaint. As a penalty for the violation, Respondent should be fined $1,500.00, his Class "G" Firearms License should be revoked and his Class "D" Security Guard License should be placed on probation for three years. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of December, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2566 Petitioner has not submitted any proposed Findings of Fact. Respondent's proposed recommended order included a section entitled Findings of Fact. However, that section does not include any individually numbered proposed findings of fact and the paragraphs contained in this section of Respondent's proposal include a mixture factual assertions, argument and legal conclusions. The proposal has been fully reviewed and considered. However, because proposed findings of fact have not been separately identified, no rulings are made with respect to Respondent's proposal. COPIES FURNISHED: Henri C. Cawthon Assistant General Counsel Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS #4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 James S. Benjamin, Esquire Benjamin & Aaronson, P.A. 100 Northeast Third Avenue, Suite 850 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue Whether Respondent violated provisions of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, as more specifically alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated April 15, 1991.
Findings Of Fact On March 14, 1991, Respondent performed the services of a security guard at a Best Western Motel in Orange County, Florida, As such he was employed by the motel. While performing the services above noted Respondent carried a 9mm Berretta automatic pistol in a holster external to his clothes. While performing the above-noted services Respondent's firearm was unloaded and he had hollow point 9mm shells in his pocket. While performing the above-noted services Respondent held neither a Class D nor Class G license. Respondent was performing the services of security guard while substituting for a relative who was ill. Respondent was working solely for the motel and was not associated with any security guard agency. The motel manager had requested that Respondent carry a unloaded firearm because several crimes had been committed in the vicinity of the motel. Respondent believed that as an employee of the motel, as contrasted with being employed by a security guard agency, Respondent did not need a security guard license. Further, Respondent believed he had a Second Amendment U.S. Constitutional right to overtly carry the firearm in the holster outside his clothing. At the time of this hearing Respondent was unemployed.