The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner's foster parent application for adoption of the minor child, S. J., should be granted.
Findings Of Fact S.J. was abandoned at birth. Moses and Juanita Pitchford served as foster parents of the child from the age of two days until March 30, 1998, when the child was over two years old. S.J. was observed by several of Respondent's employees as not behaving like other children her age. She had a flat effect, not laughing, playing or verbalizing as other children who visited Respondent's offices did. Subsequent evaluations of the child established that S.J. was developmentally delayed in speech, physical, and cognitive skills. S.J. was then referred to Easter Seals for services to assist her in the speech, physical, and cognitive skills areas. The Pitchfords' care had never been criticized in any of the Respondent's home evaluation forms completed by Gwen Tennant, the home care counselor employed by Respondent. Only when Juanita Pitchford applied to adopt S.J. did Tennant assert that Juanita Pitchford was not providing adequate care for the child. Tennant's concern was based on the fact that S.J. was not receiving the maximum exposure to an Easter Seals program for which she had qualified. The Pitchfords were never formally informed of this or any other deficiency. The evidence establishes that the Pitchfords presented S.J. at the program four days per week out of the total five days for which she was eligible. Following Respondent's denial by letter dated April 13, 1998, of Petitioner's foster parent application for adoption, Respondent has continued to place foster children, including infants, in the Pitchford home. The rights of the child's biological parents were terminated by court order dated June 17, 1997, due to their abandonment of the child. The court noted in its order that: Testimony adduced revealed that the child can and has formed a significant relationship with the parental substitute as has been established in her current foster care placement. The foster parents are the only parents she has ever known. The court's order also stated: [T]he child is currently being given excellent care by foster parents who love and care for [S.J.], and consider [S.J.] to be their child. On March 30, 1998, S.J. was removed to the home of Betty Allen, another foster parent. Allen is not married, cares for six other foster children under the age of six years, and works at a full-time job outside the home. Consequently, S.J. is delivered to day care on a regular basis for five days each week. During four of those days, she is later taken to the Easter Seals program by day care personnel for four and one-half hours. Allen cares for the foster children in her home from approximately 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. in the evening. She drops the children at day care before 8:00 a.m. each day. In contrast, Petitioner is not employed outside the home, remains there throughout the day, and is able to provide intense daily interaction with S.J.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered approving the application of Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of September, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of September, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Roger L. D. Williams, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 2417 Jacksonville, Florida 32231-0083 James C. Cumbie, Esquire One Independent Drive, Suite 3204 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether the Respondent's license to operate a family foster home should be renewed.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating foster home licenses in the State of Florida. The Respondent, Geraldine H. Daniels, operated a licensed foster care home at 2625 Northwest Third Street, Pompano Beach, Florida, from November 1994 until September 1998. At all times during such period the Respondent held a valid foster care license that expired on or about November 7, 1998. The Respondent sought to renew the foster care license but was denied by the Petitioner. The denial was timely challenged and the matter was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal proceedings. Foster home parents receive a "board rate" for children placed in their homes. This rate is to provide financial assistance to the foster home parent so that the child's needs may be met. A minor child known in this record as W.S. was placed in the Respondent's care in January 1998. The Respondent was paid the board rate for W.S. for the months of January through June 1998. During the same period of time, the Respondent collected SSI benefits for the child W.S. from the Social Security Administration. Such payments totaled $2,964. A second minor, P.H., was placed in the Respondent's foster care home in January 1998. The Respondent was paid the Department board rate for P.H. for January through September 1998. The Respondent applied for and received SSI benefits for P.H. beginning in July 1998. Although the Department paid the Respondent the monthly board rate for the minor, she collected the additional sums from SSI through December 1998. In August 1998 the Department notified the Respondent that she was not allowed to collect SSI benefits for children in her care. Subsequent to the notice, the Respondent continued to accept SSI benefits for P.H. The Department serves as the legal custodian for the children within the foster care program. As such, it is entitled to the SSI benefits for children within the system. Foster parents are entitled to the board rate that is established by the Department's uniform rate for dependent children. The Respondent made reimbursements to the Department after her home was closed in September 1998 due to the alleged fraudulent activity and lack of interaction with the children placed in the home.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a Final Order denying the Respondent's request for renewal of the foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of May, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of May, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Deborah Guller, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 201 West Broward Boulevard, Suite 502 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Geraldine H. Daniels 2625 Northwest Third Street Pompano Beach, Florida 33069 Virginia Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact In August, 1980, the home of Jacob and Donna Vermeulen was licensed by Petitioner as a pre-school foster home. Under that licensure, the Vermeulens were able to care for children from birth to four years of age. The subject of this proceeding, hereinafter referred to as S.L., was born on May 26, 1976. When S.L. was four years old he and his younger sister were removed from the custody of his natural mother (after he witnessed the homicide by bludgeoning of his father by his mother) because S.L. and his sister had been physically abused by both natural parents. Petitioner placed S.L. and his sister into the Vermeu1en foster home. After S.L. and his sister had been living with the Vermeulens for approximately six months, Petitioner removed them from the Vermeulen home and returned them to the custody of their natural mother. After approximately six months, the two children were again removed from their natural mother since she again physically abused them. Petitioner requested the Vermeulens to again take custody of S.L. and his sister. The Vermeulens were reluctant to do so since both S.L, and his sister were now older than was allowed under the Vermeulens' license, and because S.L. had problems relating with the other foster children living in that home during his first stay there. However, Petitioner's social workers begged the Vermeulens to take the children back since Petitioner was unable to find any other placement for S.L. The Vermeulens agreed to make their home available to S.L. and his sister, and the two children thereafter lived in the Vermeulen home for approximately two and one-half years prior to April 16, 1984. S.L. is a difficult child to care for; he is very emotional, developmentally immature, fearful, and fidgety. He has difficulty sleeping or listening, has a very low self-esteem, and is unable to complete tasks since he becomes emotionally frustrated. Not only is S.L. a clumsy child (most probably due to medication), he also throws himself onto the floor and onto his toys, both as part of his aggressive play behavior and also in conjunction with throwing temper tantrums. S.L. initiates fights in school, on the school bus and at home with the other children in the Vermeulen home to such an extent that fighting somewhere would have been almost a daily occurrence. His excessive demands for attention were often accompanied by negative behavior, such as hitting other children and throwing temper tantrums. On December 21, 1983, S.L. was evaluated by psychiatrist Josephine Perez. Perez diagnosed S.L. as suffering from Attention Deficit Disorder with Hyperactivity. Perez determined that the high dosages of anti-psychoic medication that S.L. had been taking were inappropriate, and she prescribed different medication for him. Perez recalls that during S.L.'s initial evaluation in December she noticed that his legs and arms were filled with bruises. S.L. began treating weekly with Perez from January 16, 1984, until April 16, 1984. On each visit at least one of the Vermeulens was present, and each visit contained a seasion between Perez and the foster parent discussing the child's progress and training the foster parent in the use of behavioral modification techniques. During those several months S.L. appeared at Perez's office on one occasion with a black eye and on another occasion with a bruising above his eye. One injury resulted from a fall in the bath tub, and another resulted from a fall out of bed; both falls were probably attributable to changes Perez made in S.L.'s medication. The Vermeulens discussed both incidents with Perez since they were concerned that S.L,'s medication was still not in the proper dosage. The Vermeulens testified that sometimes when S.L.'s medication was changed, he was unable to control even his arms and was unable to sit still long enough to eat. In January, 1984, when S.L. began treating with Dr. Perez there were six children living in the Vermeulen home: four foster children, one adopted child, and one natural child. The Vermeulens and Dr. Perez discussed the number of children living in the Vermeulen home, which prohibited giving S.L. the excessive amount of time required by him to satisfy his need for attention. Perez told the Vermeulens that in her professional opinion S.L. should be in a home with no more than one other child. In turn, the Vermeulens told Perez that they had been requesting Petitioner to remove S.L. from their home out of their concern (1) for S.L. since he needed so much more attention than was available to him and (2) for the other children not only because S.L. would kick and hit them but also because the Vermeulens had discovered S.L. in his sister's bedroom standing over her with a knife in his hand on two occasions. Although Perez agreed that S.L. should be placed a different foster setting, she did nothing to assist in obtaining a different placement and did not discuss with any employee of the Petitioner ("HRS") her recommendation and the Vermeulens' desire that S.L. be placed in a setting, preferably, where he was the only child. The Vermeulens, however, continued to request of HRS employees, including the visiting social workers and medical personnel, that S.L. be removed from their home, with visitation rights being given to the Vermeulens if possible. During this time period the Vermeulens determined that they wished to adopt Michelle, a foster child in their care. On Friday, April 13, 1984, an HRS employee went to the Vermeulen home to discuss that petition for adoption and to advise the Vermeulens that HRS would not allow them to adopt Michelle. Mr. and Mrs. Vermeulen S.L., and the rest of the children living in the home were present during that discussion. The Vermeulens were advised that they would not be permitted to adopt Michelle so long as S.L. was living in their home since he is a "therapeutic foster child" and Petitioner's rules would prohibit the adoption while a "therapeutic child" was in the home. Mrs. Vermeulen was unable to understand Petitioner's position: its refusal to remove S.L. from her home after repeated requests and its refusal to allow her to adopt Michelle for the reason that S.L. was in her home. Mrs. Vermeulen became upset, and S.L. told her and Petitioner's employee to put him in a foster home indicating he would rather be sent away than prevent Michelle from being adopted by the Vermeulens. Since the HRS employee was having a difficult time discussing HRS's position, she left the Vermeulen home. On Friday, April 13, 1984, or on Monday, April 16, 1984, S.L. became involved in a fight on the school bus on the way home from school. The bus driver told Mrs. Vermeulen about the fight. On Monday April 16, 1984, Mrs. Vermeulen took S.L. to his weekly therapy session with Dr. Perez. During that session, S.L. indicated to Perez that he had been bad and had been "paddled" on the legs. He would give her no details, but Perez believed it was Donna Vermeulen who paddled S.L. Rather than discuss it with Mrs. Vermeulen, Perez acted as though nothing had been said. Further, although a medical doctor, she did not examine S.L. Instead, Perez discussed with Mrs. Vermeulen behavioral modification techniques to be utilized with S.L. and sent them home. She then telephoned HRS, and a child abuse report was completed. On April 18, 1984, an HRS employee went to S.L.'s school, removed the child from his class, and took the child to be examined by the Child Protection Team. S.L. was first examined by the nurse. When S.L. was unable to explain to the nurse from where each mark on his body originated (or refused to), she interrogated him with questions such as "Did your mommy hit you?" The nurse made notations on a chart indicating numerous marks or bruises on S.L.'s body. However, an HRS employee saw S.L. disrobed when he was being examined by the doctor on the team and saw only two marks on his lower back. Other HRS employees went to the Vermeulen home and removed all the children. No one discussed the incident or accusation with either Mr. or Mrs. Vermeulen until the following day. Until he was removed from her class on April 18, 1984, S.L. was taught by Debbie Froug an Exceptional Education teacher for emotionally disturbed children. Although Froug describes S.L. as a basically honest child, she testified that he sometimes gets very confused. A careful review of the videotaped testimony of S.L. and of the conflicting testimony of the witnesses in this case indicates that Froug's latter description is probably an understatement. No witness in this case heard the same explanation (or accusation) as any other witness. S.L's videotaped testimony illustrates why: there is no statement made by S.L. that is not contradicted by him a few seconds later. For example the videotaped deposition contains on page 27 the following: O. Did you ever have a black eye? A. No. O. Didn't you talk to Dr. Perez about having a black eye once? A. Yes, but I didn't. How did you get the black eye? One of the kids on the bus. Things stated in the affirmative by S.L. in his deposition are also stated in the negative in that same deposition. Further, it is sometimes impossible to ascertain if S.L. is describing being hit by his real father, by his real mother, or by his foster mother. Although no accusation appears to ever have been made, including in the Administrative Complaint, that Jacob Vermeulen ever struck S.L., by the time of S.L.'s deposition eight months after the alleged incident when S.L. was asked if Jacob ever hit him, that question was answered in the affirmative. In short, the evidence is clear that S.L. had some bruises or marks on his body on April 18, 1984; that those bruises or marks were both received accidentally and intentionally inflicted, and that the bruises or marks on S.L.'s body were received as a result of S.L. falling from being uncoordinated or overmedicated, from S.L. flinging himself onto the floor or onto or against objects, and from being hit or kicked by other children with whom S.L. engaged in almost-daily physical combat. Donna and Jacob Vermeulen used only approved behavior modification techniques with S.L. and did not hit S.L. with or without any object, spank S.L., or otherwise inflict physical abuse upon him. Although the Vermeulens' license as a foster home was in effect at all times material hereto, it has lapsed. A foster home license is not automatically renewed but rather requires an annual licensing study. Other than "the incident" charged herein the Vermeulens have received no prior complaints from HRS.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is REC0MENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing with prejudice the Administrative Complaint filed herein and directing that any licensure study performed regarding the renewal or extension of Respondents' license be made omitting therefrom consideration of any of the matters set forth herein. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 19th day of July, 1985 at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July,1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Leonard Helfand, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 401 N.W. 2nd Avenue, Suite 1070 Miami, Florida 33128 Thomas J. Walsh, Esquire 590 English Avenue Homestead, Florida 33030 David Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue presented is whether the Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed in this case and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent, Kathy Bergerson, held a family foster home license for her residence issued by the Children, Youth and Family Program Office of Petitioner, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. As it relates to the license at issue, Respondent was first licensed by Petitioner in April 1987. In her home, Respondent was responsible for several developmentally disabled children and a developmentally disabled adult. Respondent's mother lives in an apartment adjoining the home and has access to the residence. Respondent's mother is a registered nurse. During the period since the licensure, the several incidents described in the following paragraphs occurred. Because the incidents involved Respondent or her home and the incidents were unexplained, Petitioner became concerned for the safety of the children in Respondent's care. The incidents at issue are as follows: Sometime during 1987 while one of the children was hospitalized, the child was discovered in what appeared to be a drug-induced sleep during a visit by Respondent. No harm to the child was demonstrated from the incident, and Respondent relayed the incident to Petitioner during her relicensure interview in 1988. Also, sometime in 1987, a housekeeper, provided by Metro-Dade County, allegedly assaulted Respondent's mother while attempting to steal toys and bed sheets from the home. No harm to the children was shown from the incident, and Respondent reported the incident to Petitioner during her relicensure interview in 1988. Then, early in 1988, Respondent received a delivery of medication which did not contain full amounts of the prescribed contents. The medication was delivered by a representative sent by Petitioner. No harm to the children was proven from the incident, and Respondent reported the incident to Petitioner. In July 1988, a report of the sexual abuse of the developmentally disabled adult living with Respondent was filed with Petitioner. The final disposition of the incident was not shown; however, neither Respondent nor Respondent's mother were classified as perpetrators of the alleged abuse. In September 1988, a child under Respondent's care, and custody was hospitalized after she became, untypically, lethargic and unresponsive when Respondent gave the child a dose of Panadol for her fever. Fearing that the child was allergic to the medicine, Respondent brought the bottle from which she had administered the medicine with them to the hospital, and reported her fear to the medical personnel at the hospital and to Petitioner. Although Petitioner asserted that the bottle of medicine was tested for its contents, the proof failed to demonstrate that a test was performed or the results of any such test. Respondent kept the medication for the children in a locked cabinet in her kitchen. Included in the drugs in the cabinet were Panadol, Valium and Benedryl. In addition to Respondent, Respondent's mother and nurses provided by Petitioner, on occasion, had access to the cabinet. While Petitioner contended that the Panadol given to the child was adulterated with Valium and Benedryl, the proof failed to indicate that the Panadol was altered, or that the child suffered from the ingestion of the medication. Petitioner asserted that it was unusual for a foster parent, such as Respondent, to have as many unexplained events reported within an almost two- year period. Therefore, based on the above incidents and what Petitioner perceived to be a pattern of unexplained incidents involving Respondent and her home, and after ordering a psychological evaluation of Respondent and her mother, Petitioner issued its notice of intent to revoke Respondent's family foster home license on February 14, 1989. Petitioner alleged that Respondent was not capable of handling the stresses associated with maintaining a family foster home. At the hearing Respondent demonstrated a tendency to become overly excited; however, the proof failed to demonstrate that she is unable to handle the stresses of her life. Respondent is a caring person who has an obvious interest and concern for the children in her charge. She expressed deep concern over each of the incidents recited above and, in fact, reported the majority of the incidents to Petitioner. Although the incidents described above generate concern, was not shown that the safety of the clients was endangered by the incidents.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: Recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services issue a Final Order withdrawing its intent to revoke Respondent's family foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 15th day of December 1989. JANE C. HAYMAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Park way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December 1989.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent should revoke Petitioner's license to operate a foster care home.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner was licensed as a therapeutic foster parent. Respondent issued this license to Petitioner through the Devereux Foundation, which operates and maintains a network of foster homes to serve dependent children in Respondent's custody. Respondent places children in therapeutic foster when they have been exposed to a severe degree of physical, emotional, and/or sexual abuse, as well as extreme neglect and/or abandonment. Such children require special care and cannot be disciplined like children in a stable nuclear family. Therapeutic foster parents should never spank or use other physical methods of punishment or behavior management on these children. Many therapeutic foster children have acute and unresolved issues with control and authority. In such cases, attempts by authority figures to assert rigid control over the children will likely provoke emotionally charged oppositional reactions by the children. This is especially true when the children have not developed a relationship with the authority figures. The likelihood that such oppositional reactions will occur is much greater when authority figures attempt to impose their will on the children with the use of physical force. Children in foster care experience great difficulty in learning to trust others. The inability to trust others is reinforced when a near-stranger makes demands on therapeutic foster children, then uses physical force to compel submission. Children from dysfunctional families often experience violence in the homes of their natural parents. The children learn at an early age to respond with violence to stressful situations. The use of physical force on foster children thus generates a real and severe risk of physical injury to the foster children, the foster parents, and innocent bystanders. One purpose of therapeutic foster care is to help children learn that violent behavior is not acceptable. When foster parents use physical force to compel obedience, they reinforce the lessons learned in the homes of their natural parents at the expense of the lessons the foster care program attempts to teach. Therapeutic foster parents undergo special training before they become licensed. The Model Approach to Parenting and Partnership (MAPP) training that all foster parents receive places special emphasis on the emotional fragility of children in foster care and the consequent need to avoid confrontation with foster children. In other words, MAPP training teaches foster parents not to engage in power struggles with their charges. MAPP training emphasizes the use of positive discipline for the inevitable situations in which foster children test the boundaries set by the foster parents. These methods include reinforcing acceptable behavior, verbal disapproval, loss of privileges, and redirection. Any form of verbal abuse or physical force is strictly prohibited. Petitioner received all of the training described above. In March 2001, a sibling group of two sisters (S.M.1 and S.M.2) and a brother (D.M.) were living in a therapeutic foster home operated by Brad and Sharon Carraway through the Devereux Foundation. Mr. and Mrs. Carraway were licensed therapeutic foster parents. Respondent and the Devereux Foundation have a policy that allows for substitute foster care when therapeutic foster parents need some time away from their foster children. In that case, Devereux arranges for another licensed therapeutic foster home in its network to care for the foster children for a period of time, usually a weekend. This arrangement is known as respite foster care. During March 2001, the Carraways needed a weekend away from their foster children to take care of some family business. At that time, Loretta Kelly was the foster care program manager for Devereux in the North Florida area. Ms. Kelly made arrangements for Petitioner and his wife to take the children during the weekend of March 23-25, 2001. The children arrived in Petitioner's home late in the afternoon of Friday, March 23, 2001. As S.M.1 and S.M.2 settled into their room, Petitioner advised them that supper would be served in five minutes. S.M.1 then announced that she was not hungry and would not be going to supper. Petitioner replied that S.M.1 could either go to the table for supper or he would be back in five minutes and make her go to the table. Five minutes later, Petitioner returned to the bedroom. He told S.M.1, who was sitting on the bed, to come in to supper. When S.M.1 refused again, Petitioner grabbed S.M.1 by the wrists and tried to drag her into the dining room. A struggle ensued with S.M.1 yelling for Petitioner to let go. During the struggle, S.M.1's wrist watch broke, leaving scratches on her arm. S.M.2 was in the hall. Hearing her sister call for help, S.M.2 ran in to help S.M.1. S.M.2 pushed Petitioner away from her sister. Petitioner then grabbed S.M.2 by the wrists and struggled with her for over a minute. During the struggle, S.M.2 slid down to a sitting position with her back against the wall. S.M.2 then used her feet in an attempt to break free from Petitioner. The struggle left S.M.2 with a scar from a scratch she received on her arm. Petitioner finally gave up and called the girls' therapist, Lori Farkas, to complain about the situation. S.M.2 heard Petitioner state that he wanted the girls out of his home. The incident was reported to Respondent. Subsequently, Respondent commenced a child protective investigation into the allegations; the investigation was still open on April 20, 2001. Petitioner became angry when he learned what the children told Respondent's investigators. He telephoned Ms. Kelly on the afternoon of April 20, 2001. He accused the children of lying and asserted that they should be punished. He threatened to file battery charges against the children and have them arrested if they did not change their story and "tell the truth." Next, Petitioner telephoned Ms. Carraway. He told Ms. Carraway that she ought to be teaching the girls morals and honesty. He accused the girls of lying. Petitioner informed Ms. Carraway that he was going to consult an attorney and have the girls arrested at school for assault and battery. Petitioner told Ms. Carraway that he would be more believable in light of the children's background. S.M.1 was with Ms. Carraway during Petitioner's telephone call. Ms. Carraway and S.M.1 wrote notes to each other regarding Petitioner's comments during the telephone call. Both girls were apprehensive for some time after this telephone call about the possibility of being arrested. Ms. Carraway called Ms. Kelly immediately after talking to Petitioner. Ms. Kelly then called Petitioner to instruct him not to make any further calls to the Carraway home.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order revoking Petitioner's therapeutic foster license. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of April, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: David L. Motes 2023 Duneagle Lane Tallahassee, Florida 32311 John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 2639 North Monroe Street, Suite 252A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 Peggy Sanford, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issues in these consolidated cases are whether Respondents' foster home license should be revoked as stated in an Amended Administrative Complaint dated October 6, 1999, and whether Mrs. Sampson's request to adopt a child, A.H., should be denied as explained in a letter dated October 6, 1999.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Children and Family Services is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating foster homes. It also is responsible for receiving and approving applications for adoptions. John Henry and Annette Sampson live in Plant City, Florida. They have been married approximately 24 years. They have adult children and three adopted children, one of whom is their biological grandson. The other two children, both boys, were foster children whom they raised from infancy (R.S., age 10; and D.S., age 9). Mrs. Sampson, a licensed practical nurse (LPN), met R.S. when she cared for him in the hospital following his birth. He had many medical problems and his biological mother was unable to care for him. Mrs. Sampson bonded with the child and sought and received a special foster home license so she and her husband could take him home. R.S. thrived in the care of the Sampsons despite his poor prognosis. The Sampsons were thus licensed as a foster home in 1990, and over an 8-year period cared for 14 foster children, most of whom had complex medical problems. A.H. was placed with the Sampsons when he was approximately one-month old in 1993. He had been exposed to drugs during gestation and had complicated medical problems at birth. He also thrived in the Sampson's home despite poor prognosis for survival. He bonded with the family and considers the Sampsons his parents and the three other adopted children as his brothers. By November 1997, when the children were removed from the Sampson home, Mrs. Sampson had already requested permission to adopt A.H. and was working with the agency on the details of a subsidy for the child. Also living with the Sampsons in November 1997 were two female foster children: A., who was 7 years old and was profoundly mentally handicapped; and M., who was 6 years old, partially paralyzed, and mentally handicapped. The two girls were placed with the Sampsons in February and May 1997; both had been previously subjected to horrific abuse and both began to respond positively, physically and mentally, to the loving care of the Sampsons. The events which led to removal of children from the Sampson home commenced in September 1997. Because of her mental condition M. was considered a danger to herself. She had poor impulse control and ate or chewed clothing, bedding, feces, and anything she could get in her mouth. A Childrens Medical Services (CMS) physician had prescribed restraints for her and Mrs. Sampson used then sparingly. Generally she would restrain M. when she put her to bed at night and would remove the restraints when the child fell asleep. One evening in September 1997, Mrs. Sampson put M. to bed with her restraints. Shortly later Mrs. Sampson went to work on her part-time nursing shift and forgot to tell Mr. Sampson to remove the restraints. The next morning when she returned home Mrs. Sampson found the child still restrained by her wrist, with some swelling. When she took M. to school Mrs. Sampson pointed out the swelling to the school nurse and explained what happened. Because of their routine practice to notify a caseworker of any marks on a foster child, the nurse or M's teacher called the agency. Neither the nurse nor the teacher was concerned about abuse in this case. As a result of the report an abuse investigation commenced and Jim Cunningham, a Child Protection Investigator, took M. to the Child Protection Team (CPT) physician for an examination. Dr. Laleh Bahar-Posey was the CPT medical director. In her medical examination Dr. Posey noted circular marks on the child's left forearm and both ankles, consistent with ligature and consistent with her being tied to the bed. In her testimony at hearing Dr. Posey clarified that she had confirmed during the medical examination that the leg marks were caused by M.'s braces and that Mrs. Sampson had only restrained one wrist. Because the report remained unchanged, however, the agency persisted until the hearing in its assertion that M. had been bound by her arms and legs overnight. Dr. Posey also noted in her examination of M. that the child had a mark on her left forearm that appeared to be an iron burn. Because of the position of the point of the burn, facing the outside of the arm, and because of the child's partially immobile right hand and arm, Dr. Posey and the CPT social worker surmised that the burn was not accidental nor self-inflicted. Mrs. Sampson's explaination of the burn was that her daughter-in-law had been ironing in another room of the home and briefly left the iron unattended. Mrs. Sampson was summoned by a yell from M. Mrs. Sampson immediately saw the child's burn and treated it with salve and a bandage. The next day Ms. Sampson told the school nurse about the burn and asked whether she should take M. to the doctor. The nurse examined the burn and determined that it was minor, was not even blistered, and was barely visible. She did not recommend that Mrs. Sampson take M. to the doctor and the nurse understood that M. could have accidentally caused the burn herself. Although she cannot use her right hand and arm, M. swings the arm as she walks. She is very clumsy and her gait is unsteady. The burn mark according to the weight of credible testimony is wholly consistent with M.'s knocking the iron against her left forearm while flaying her right arm around the ironing board. The pink mark in the healing stage was much more evident on M.'s dark skin than it would have been on a Caucasian child. The final incident leading to removal of the children from the Sampson home was a report to the agency on or about November 17, 1997, that M. had broken her arm about 3 weeks earlier. The Child Protective Investigator obtained the medical records from South Florida Baptist Hospital in Plant City and concluded that because the break was identified as a spinal fracture, requiring a twisting motion, the injury was an "inflicted injury." The agency immediately made plans to remove all children from the Sampson home and took the records to Dr. Posey for review. Dr. Posey's notes after her review of the medical records conclude that the injury was not consistent with Mrs. Sampson's alleged history that the child fell while briefly unattended in the bathroom. Dr. Posey's notes state her "grave concerns" about the safety of this child and other children in the home. Agency staff, including the Child Protection Investigator, a supervisor, and foster care and adoption counsellors convened at the Sampson home on the evening of November 17, 1987. Mrs. Sampson was not home, and Mr. Sampson was home with the three adopted children and the three foster children (A.H., A., and M.). The staff removed the children from the home and placed them in other foster homes or shelter homes. Several things concerned the staff when they were in the process of removing the children. Lesa Simms, the adoption supervisor, saw A.'s braids tied to her bed and Mr. Sampson quickly loosened them. When asked where the girls' clothes and medicine were stored Mr. Sampson said that he took care of the boys and did not know much about the girls. Several staff noticed that prescription bottles and loose pills were left in the kitchen, some on the counter, others in a cabinet within reach of some of the children. One of the staff had to call the pharmacy to find out which medications went with each child. After the children were removed from the Sampson home Ms. Sampson's application to adopt A.H. was reviewed by the agency's Adoption Review Committee which recommended the application be denied. Although the committee members were aware of Mrs. Sampson's prior glowing record as an adoptive and foster parent, the series of three injuries to M. was too serious to ignore. The agency also initiated revocation of the Sampson's foster home license. The Amended Administrative Complaint in Case No. 98- 1928 states these bases for the intended revocation: A foster child in your care was bound by her arms and legs overnight resulting in ligature marks on the child. The foster mother, Ms. Sampson, stated she forgot to remove the restraints. Section 409.175(8)(b)(1), Florida Statutes. A foster child in your care received a spiral fracture on her arm when she was in the bathtub. Medical authority states the injury inflicted was inconsistent with the explanation given by you during the Child Protection Investigation. Section 409.175(8)(b)1, Florida Statutes. A foster child in your care received an iron burn on her arm. The child was seen by a physician who stated the injury was not consistent with the account given by you. Her conclusion was that the iron burn appeared to be consistent with an inflicted injury. Section 409.175(8)(b)1, Florida Statutes. During a visit to your home by department staff, medicine bottles with their safety lids removed were not stored in an appropriate place out of the reach of the children. The bottles were filled with various drugs, such as anti-psychotics, amphetamines, and other drugs that were within reach of most of the foster children in the home. There were loose pills in the cabinet above the counter, along with hot pepper flakes also within reach of most of the foster children in the home. You were out of town according to your husband, who stated he did not know anything about the girl's issues, Section 409.1275(8)(b)2, Florida Statutes, and 65C-13.010(1)(b)7.d, Florida Administrative Code. A staff individual observed Mr. Sampson untying a child's hair from the crib, Section 409.175(8)(b)(2), Florida Statutes and Rule 65C-010(1)(b)5.e, Florida Administrative Code. The October 6, 1999, letter informing Mrs. Sampson of the adoption request denial states: The Administrative Rule 65C-16 currently in effect provides that "if allegations of abuse/neglect or abandonment have been verified, the application must be rejected and referral to the Adoption Applicant Review Committee is not required." Despite this provision, the Adoptive Applicant Review Committee and the district administrator reviewed your application. It was decided that your application would be rejected based upon the facts involved in the Florida Protective Services System reports #97-103474 and #1997-126233, not just the disposition decision of these two reports. Abuse report 1997-103474 had a finding of "some indicators" of burns/scalds with regard to the burn on M.'s left arm. Abuse report 1997-126233 was "verified" for bone fracture/neglect and inadequate supervision and conditions hazardous to a child. The evidence in this protracted consolidated proceeding does not support the agency's intended actions. There is no evidence that Mrs. Sampson abused M. or any other child in her care. The ligature marks, the burn, and the broken arm were each explained by competent experts as accidents which would not be unusual in any normal family and which were entirely consistent with the history offered by Mrs. Sampson. The injuries were certainly consistent with M.'s complex mental and physical condition. In a child under twelve months of age and not walking, a spiral fracture would be an immediate cause for concern. But in an older child such as M., a spiral fracture would occur in a fall when the limb is immobilized on impact and the body twists around it. A deliberate twisting by Mrs. Sampson or someone else would have left such marks on the child's arm that the physicians who saw her in the emergency room immediately after the accident would have been alerted. Instead, no physician who treated M. ever suspected abuse. Dr. Posey did not see her, but instead only viewed the X-rays and the conclusion by Dr. Del Toro, the emergency room radiologist, that the fracture was a "spiral fracture." There is no evidence of false or "inconsistent" histories of the injury reported by Mrs. Sampson. She did not see the child fall; she was bathing M. and left the bathroom briefly; when she returned, the child was on the floor. This account is still consistent with her account to the psychologist, Dr. Whyte, that when she attempted to pick up the child they both fell. In hearing, and in her interview with Dr. Whyte, Dr. Posey receded from her former opinion that the fracture had to be non-accidental. Only one agency staff person observed Mr. Sampson's "untying" A.'s braids from her bed although approximately six individuals, including a law enforcement officer, were at the Sampsons' home gathering the children. The action as described by Ms. Simms was very quick. It might have been as benign as untangling the child's hair which was caught in the bed. Mr. Sampson unequivocaly denies that the child's hair was tied; other agency witnesses testified that they followed Ms. Simms and saw M. sitting or standing in her crib, not lying down with her hair tied. The medications were improperly stored but were inaccessible to most of the children. According to agency witnesses this violation would not have been a basis for denial of an adoption or license revocation. No one, including agency workers who had visited the home many times, announced or unannounced, had ever had a problem with storage of medications at the Sampson home. In fact, no one, not the psychologist, not adoption workers, teachers, co-workers, licensing staff nor physicians who had observed the Sampson children in the home, at school, or in the community, ever saw anything other than loving, caring, conscientious parenting by the Sampsons. Mrs. Sampson could be aggressive and demanding, but always as an advocate for the children. She made requests for special equipment, like a Geri-chair, that would help the children become more self-reliant. She minimized the use of physical restraints and she consulted with the physicians on reducing medications that she felt were keeping M. over-sedated. She bought lovely clothes and cooked special foods for the children and by all reported observations the children, adopted and foster children, thrived and were happy. The dependency proceeding was resolved with a directed verdict against the agency and the Sampsons' adopted children were returned to their home. A.H. now needs to be returned home as well and Mrs. Sampson's adoption request approved. The allegations which were the basis for the Adoption Application Review Committee's recommendation and the District Administrator's acceptance were not proven and there is a preponderance of affirmative proof that the adoption request should be granted in A.H.'s best interests. A.H. bonded with the Sampsons and their children and the passage of time since his removal from the home has not broken that bond. He still begs to go home to them. The psychologist, Dr. Whyte, who evaluated the Sampsons at the agency's referral, and the adoptions caseworker for A.H. both urge that it is in his best interests to be adopted by Mrs. Sampson. A.H.'s current foster mother, who is herself willing to adopt A.H., testified that A.H. should be adopted by the Sampsons as he loves them and considers them his parents. As established with testimony of the agency's own witnesses, evidence of the accidental, not deliberate, injuries to M., coupled with the one-time improper storage of medications, would not support a decision to revoke the foster home license. Instead, in these circumstances foster parents would be asked to sign a letter of compliance. The foster home license expired in 1998, after the children were removed from the home. In April 1998 Dr. Whyte recommended that the girls, with their complex medical problems and extraordinary care-taking demands, be placed in a therapeutic home where 24-hour care could be provided without the conflicting demands of other obligations. Circumstances in the Sampson household have changed since 1997 and 1998 when Mr. Sampson moved out, and the record does not clearly reflect whether he currently resides in the home. The adopted children have grown older and one child may be leaving to go to college. The Sampsons have also grown older. They should be permitted to reapply for a license based on the prior expiration of their license and not based on a revocation action which is not supported in this proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing it is RECOMMENDED that the agency enter its final order: returning A.H. immediately to Mrs. Sampson; approving her application to adopt A.H.; and granting the Sampsons leave to apply for foster home license without any prejudice of the allegations stated in the agency's October 6, 1999, revocation letter. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of August, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 2000.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent should deny Petitioners' application for a license to provide foster home care for dependent children pursuant to Section 409.175, Florida Statutes (1999). (All statutory references are to Florida Statutes (1999) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating foster care in the state. Petitioners were foster care parents until October 5, 2000, when Petitioners voluntarily surrendered their foster care license for medical reasons. Prior to October 5, 2000, Mrs. Williams suffered from high blood pressure and dizziness. She was physically unable to care for foster children and asked that Respondent remove all foster children from her home. Before her medical problems began, Mrs. Williams complained to Respondent that she could not provide foster care for children with behavior problems. Mrs. Williams asked Respondent to remove certain children from her home because they presented behavioral problems with which she could not cope. In March of 2001, Petitioners applied for a new license to provide foster care. Petitioners did not provide any medical evidence, during the hearing or the application process, that Mrs. Williams has recovered from her medical problems. Her medical problems have a long medical history and come and go each year. Mrs. Williams is 62 years old. On the family profile sheet filed with Respondent, Mrs. Williams lists her occupation as "disabled."
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioners' application for a license to provide foster care to dependent children. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Wilbert and Estella Williams 412 Pine Avenue Sanford, Florida 32771 Craig A. McCarthy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services, District 7 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioners have been guilty of violation of pertinent statutes and rules governing qualification and capability to hold a foster home license and to operate a foster home, in this case a "therapeutic foster home" and, if so, whether their application for renewal of licensure should be denied.
Findings Of Fact The above-named Petitioners were licensed as operators of a therapeutic foster home and as therapeutic foster parents. Due to an alleged abuse report, they became involved in a revocation proceeding with the Department concerning their previously-held license. Upon advice by personnel with Camelot, Inc. (Camelot), a private provider which provides services to the Department for therapeutic foster care, by contract, they voluntarily relinquished their previous license on February 6, 2006, in the belief that they would still be entitled to a formal proceeding to contest that the alleged abuse occurred, and their licensure entitlement. The Department declined to afford them a hearing on the issue, and they appealed to the District Court of Appeal for the First District. The Department was upheld. They then applied for a renewal of their therapeutic foster care license on August 10, 2006, for Lake County, Florida. An evaluation of the application was launched by the Department and ultimately the Department issued a denial of the license application. A timely request for an administrative proceeding to contest denial of that license was filed by the Giegers. The license denial was based initially upon the Department's determination that the Giegers had allegedly inappropriately punished children in their home and that they had some sort of business interest or income interest in being licensed foster parents, purportedly a violation of foster parenting rules. Sometime thereafter a supplemental basis for denial was served upon them by the Department wherein the Department alleged that the Petitioners had also violated Section 409.175(4) and (12)(a), Florida Statutes (2006), because they had a child placed in their home through a guardianship agreement that had not been approved by a court and were therefore acting as an unlicensed foster home. A response to that supplemental denial notice was made by the Petitioners. Therapeutic foster parents are trained to provide for children with difficult behavioral problems. The Giegers received this training and remained in compliance with the training updates and continued education necessary in order to continue their licensure in good standing. In addition to this, Mrs. Geiger is a trained mental health specialist, with a master's degree, who works for Lifestreams, a mental health provider, providing services to disturbed children. The Giegers were previously affiliated, as therapeutic foster parents, with the private provider, Camelot, which provides services to the Department for therapeutic foster care. They were licensed as therapeutic foster parents at that time, and accepted a number of severely disturbed children into their home over the years while they were affiliated with Camelot. When a foster parent has a child placed in their home, Camelot has a therapeutic system whereby a therapist is assigned to that child and is available for consultation at any time of day. If the primary therapist is unavailable, the supervisor of that therapist is available for consultation. Camelot's therapeutic personnel and various mental health professionals have been frequently in the Giegers' home to consult, monitor, and assist with the care and therapy of foster children placed there. A number of those therapeutic personnel testified. They established that the Giegers are excellent parents who have provided exemplary care to the foster children placed in their home. These people have training in mental health and related fields. Some hold master's degrees and have been trained to recognize abuse or evidence of it. Some are psychologists, specifically assigned as the mental health professional working with particular children placed in the Giegers' home. In 2005, a child, J.D., was placed in the Giegers' home by the Department. In addition to J.D., there were other children in the home, including Tyler, a non-foster care child placed privately by Camelot with the Giegers, as well as the Giegers' own adopted son. All of the children in the home had been abused prior to their placement with the Giegers. J.D.'s previous situation before coming to the Giegers' home was particularly egregious. He had been starved, locked in a closet, had his fingernails removed by his parents and otherwise was the victim of severe parental abuse before coming into foster care. His was a case of high public notoriety and appears to have been thus treated with a heightened level of attention by the Department, as compared to the case of other children. When J.D. arrived at the Giegers' home after his initial rescue from his earlier situation, he purportedly weighed 58 pounds and was only 4 feet 8 inches tall, at the age of 17 years. During the time he resided with the Giegers, he grew several inches and gained almost 80 pounds due to the care given him by the Giegers. He was placed on special vitamins and formula, in addition to his regular meals, in order to restore him to appropriate physical condition. Because of his physical condition, extra efforts were made by the Petitioners to assure his safety. They even placed him in a private school because they felt he would be at risk attending a large public high school, which he would otherwise have been required to attend. J.D. did well at the Giegers' home initially and it was planned for him to remain in their home after he reached 18 years of age, if he continued to adjust favorably to being a member of their family. He began "acting out" more severely, however, with problematic behaviors. Ultimately it was determined by both the Giegers and Camelot that he should not remain in their home after he turned 18 because of the adverse impact he was having on other children residing in the home. Before the determination was made that J.D. would not remain in the Giegers' home after he reached 18 years of age, the Department had praised the Petitioners' care of J.D. After that decision was made, an attorney for the Department suggested to Mrs. Gieger that she be hired by the Department to provide special services to J.D. Apparently there was a funding problem with regard to continuing J.D. in private school, and this was suggested as a means of funding the private school. Mrs. Gieger, however, did not feel this funding was appropriate because she was already being paid by Camelot for these services, and expressed this to the attorney, she therefore declined that offer. In December 2005 the Department decided to have J.D. re-evaluated by his original evaluator, a psychologist, Dr. Dykel. During his meeting with Dr. Dykel, J.D. apparently told Dr. Dykel that the Giegers had cursed in his presence and in the presence of other children, used racially derogatory language concerning Black children in the foster childrens' presence and that Mrs. Gieger had sat on him as a means of restraint or punishment. He also stated that he was being deprived of food. This meeting occurred on a Friday afternoon. After the meeting J.D. returned to the Giegers' home and made statements about what he had said to Dr. Dykel. Initially the Petitioners thought nothing about the statements, but on the following Tuesday an abuse report was called in indicating that the Giegers had inappropriately punished J.D. in the manner he had related to Dr. Dykel. The child Tyler, who had been placed in the Giegers' home was a child who suffered from severe mental health issues. He had been placed privately with Camelot by his father. He had set his father's and step-mother's bed on fire the previous Christmas because he did not receive a toy, a "PS2," that he asked to be given him for Christmas. There was testimony that he was told by J.D. that if he would make a statement against the Giegers to the Department that he would get the PS2 toy that he wanted. He was taken by Erica Summerfield, an investigator assigned by the Department to the case concerning the abuse report, to the "Child Advocacy Center," for a statement. He apparently made such a statement, of the above import, but then recanted it. Nonetheless, based only on the statement made by J.D. and by Tyler, Erica Summerfield made a determination that the abuse report should be determined to be "founded." As a result of her report (and apparently a past history of abuse reports concerning the Giegers' foster care facility, none of which had been proven to be "founded"), Camelot apparently suggested to the Giegers that they voluntarily relinquish their license, purportedly telling them that they would still have the ability to challenge the abuse report through a Chapter 120 hearing. They sought to obtain a Chapter 120 hearing and the Department denied their request. An appeal ensued and the denial by the Department was affirmed by the District Court of Appeal. During the pendency of that appeal, the Giegers filed an application to renew their license, which was denied. This proceeding ensued after that denial, when the Giegers requested a formal proceeding. The Department offered the testimony of Erica Summerfield who was a child protective investigator assigned to the investigation. She was the supervisor of the person who interviewed J.D. and Tyler, apparently the only sources of investigative information leading to her finding that abuse had occurred. Ms. Summerfield testified that her concerns about the Giegers led her to make a report finding that abuse had occurred because alarms had been placed on the bedroom doors of childrens' bedrooms in the Giegers home; that the Giegers had used excessive restraint against J.D. (allegedly held him on the floor and lay on him or sat on him); and that J.D. had been mentally injured by the Giegers and not provided with sufficient food. She also opined that Mrs. Gieger had made inappropriate statements to J.D. None of these purported findings are supported by credible evidence. Initially it is found that J.D.'s and Tyler statements to the interviewer, who then apparently related them to Ms. Summerfield, constitute, at best, "second-hand" hearsay. Neither the interviewer nor J.D., nor Tyler testified at the hearing, and Tyler later recanted his statements made to the interviewer. The Respondent's exhibits two, three, and four, the interview reports, were offered into evidence and were only admitted regarding a basis for the Department's course of conduct in the matter, but not for the truth of any facts depicted on the face of those exhibits. Concerning the alleged complaint, related to the interviewer, regarding lack of food, the credible persuasive evidence shows that J.D. actually grew several inches after being placed with the Giegers, even though doctors had opined that he would not grow much, if at all, because of the starvation that had occurred early in his life. He also gained substantial weight while being cared for by the Giegers, so that he essentially looked like a normal child by the time he left their care. He had been emaciated when he came to the Giegers' care and had been described as looking like a "concentration camp victim." He was described as being far smaller than a child of his age when he came to the Giegers' care, but seven months later appeared to be essentially a normal child in physical appearance. The evidence, in fact, clearly supports the determination that the Giegers did provide J.D. with appropriate nutrition during their care of him. The basis for the alleged abuse regarding his not being properly fed is simply not credible. The Giegers had also been accused by J.D. or Tyler, or both, with using inappropriate language, racial slurs and cursing in J.D.'s presence, purportedly causing him mental harm. However, mental health experts present in the Giegers' home on a weekly and almost daily basis had never heard any inappropriate language, including any inappropriate racial language or inappropriate cursing in the childrens' presence during their visits to the Giegers' home. Many of these visits were unannounced. Two of the counselors or mental health professionals often present in the home were African-American. They found no evidence of racial tension or racially derogatory language being used by the Giegers or in the Giegers' home. It was their belief that the Giegers did not exhibit any behavior which suggested racism. Further, there were no Black children placed in the Giegers' home during the time that J.D. was there. There is simply no credible evidence to support any finding that inappropriate language was used by Mr. or Mrs. Gieger in J.D.'s or other childrens' presence, of a racially derogatory nature or otherwise. Part of the basis for the abuse finding (and the reason for license denial) was excess restraint or "sitting on" J.D. as punishment. This position was based on the statements of the two children, J.D. and Tyler. One of them, Tyler, tearfully recanted his story shortly after he made the statement. Erica Summerfield testifying for the Department, admitted in her testimony that she was aware of his recantation. She also admitted that Tyler's parents had asked her more than once to allow him to be placed back in the Giegers' home. They also had disclosed to her that he had a habit of making inappropriate statements and lying. There is evidence that J.D. had told him that he would receive a toy he wanted very much if he would make a statement to the Department that J.D. had been abused by the Giegers. Most importantly, J.D. had identified the point in time when Ms. Gieger was supposed to have sat on him as during an occasion when he broke a window at the house. Other mental health providers who were in the home around that time reported never seeing any bruise marks or other evidence of injury to J.D. or at any other time. They also reported that Mrs. Gieger was especially careful of his safety because of the seriously debilitated condition of his body. Most importantly, however, during the time that the window was broken by J.D. and he was severely acting out, Mrs. Gieger was on the phone with a professional from Camelot who was helping her to calm or "de-escalate" J.D. and who remained on the phone with Mrs. Gieger during the entire incident. That expert heard nothing which indicated that Mrs. Gieger had sat on the child or in anyway inappropriately restrained him. Mrs. Gieger denied using physical restraints on the foster children at the hearing. The Department maintains, however, that in two prior reports discussed in Camelot's letter, report 1999-127436 and 2002-007021, the Giegers had admitted restraining foster children. In the 1999 incident the child purportedly sustained rug burns on the face while being restrained on the floor by Mr. Gieger. These reports are at best second-hand hearsay. Moreover, they are not reasons of which the Petitioners were provided notice, as part of the basis for the denial of their licensure application which triggered this proceeding. Moreover, both of those incidents were immediately reported by the Giegers themselves to the Department and, ironically, the Department did not see fit to make any determination at the time, or since, that those incidents amounted to abuse. No finding was made that those alleged incidents were "founded" abuse episodes. Moreover, the Department relies upon an incident where Mrs. Gieger purportedly stated that she used force against J.D. when he tried to grab her neck. She purportedly told Ms. Summerfield in an interview that she gave J.D. a "therapeutic bear hug" by grabbing his arm and turning him around. He fell to the floor as a result. Parenthetically, not even the Department claims that she forced him to the floor. Mrs. Gieger's testimony at hearing concerning this event was to the effect that she grabbed J.D.'s wrist in order to prevent him from striking her or grabbing her neck and that he just collapsed to the floor. The Department then maintains that foster parents are not permitted to use such "force" on foster children, such as grabbing J.D.'s wrist, because it equates this to the use of corporal punishment and that grabbing a child's arm or wrist could "traumatize" an already vulnerable foster child. Mrs. Gieger's testimony, however, indicates that the use of "therapeutic bear hug," even if it occurred, is part of an approved method of training which she had, which is designed to safely manage children who are acting out in a potentially dangerous way, until they can calm down. She testified that Camelot, the Department's contracting agent, had approved this training for her. Moreover, when a foster parent is in danger of attack by a 17-year-old, even a somewhat debilitated child, who threatened striking or grabbing the foster parent by neck or throat, to grab his arm or wrist to prevent such conduct is reasonable and does not constitute unreasonable restraint. Assuming this event occurred, to characterize the grabbing of a child's wrist, to prevent injury or potential injury to a foster parent or another, as excessive force or "corporal punishment" is nonsensical. There is no credible, persuasive evidence that either Mr. or Mrs. Gieger engaged in any excessive force or restraint amounting to abuse. A concern was raised by Dr. Dykle, the psychologist, who was fearful of the fact that alarms had been placed on childrens' rooms in the foster home. Ms. Summerfield based her finding that abuse had occurred, in part, on the report that the alarms had been placed on the doors of some of the childrens' rooms. Ms. Summerfield, however, admitted in her testimony that alarms are often and routinely placed on childrens' rooms in therapeutic foster care homes. The mental health experts who testified clearly established that in every therapeutic foster home such alarms must be placed on bedroom doors because of a safety concern for other children. Children who are placed in this type of home are often serious safety risks for themselves or for other children. They have often been found themselves to be perpetrators of inappropriate or violent conduct. Many times they are children who have been sexually abused and have themselves become sexual perpetrators. In fact, there was a child in the Giegers' home at the time J.D. was there who had set his parents' bed on fire because he did not get a desired toy for Christmas. Dr. Dykle's apparent grave concern about alarms being placed on the childrens' bedroom doors is surprising since it appears to be completely contrary to generally accepted, safe practice for therapeutic foster homes, something that he should have been aware of if he is indeed an expert in child abuse issues. Ms. Summerfield admitted that she was aware that this was a virtually universal safety practice in therapeutic foster homes and yet, paradoxically, used it as a factor in support of her finding that abuse had occurred, as a basis of denial of re-licensure. Ms. Summerfield also admitted that she had spoken with Camelot professionals who assured her that the Giegers had been exemplary foster care parents. She acknowledged that J.D. had made untrue statements in the past about other foster placements. She admitted that the only evidence of improper restraint, or any kind of abuse or neglect in the home, was essentially predicated on the statements of the two children who did not testify in this proceeding. She conceded that one of them had recanted and she knew of this well before the hearing. Mental health experts from Camelot who testified, established that it is a very frequent event for foster children placed in therapeutic foster homes to act out and to make false statements and accusations concerning their care-givers. They also indicated that J.D. had made such false allegations in the past against other caregivers. This was all information that a thorough investigation would have made known to the Department, at the time it was making the determination that there was a basis for a finding of abuse. The only witness other than Ms. Summerfield, presented by the Department, was Amy Hammett, the licensing official who actually signed the letter denying the license application. She testified that she did not review all of the documents that made up the Giegers' license application. Some other department employee had been assigned to the case and it had been later transferred to Ms. Hammett before the final decision was made. She had reviewed five relevant forms, but nothing else. She had no evidence to support the Department's position that the Giegers had relied upon the foster care services they provided for income to support their own family, other than the fact that they had taken a legal position in the appeal from the previous attempt at a Chapter 120 proceeding, to the effect that they had something in the nature of a property interest in their foster care license. This may have been a necessary position to take in an attempt to establish jurisdiction or standing in that proceeding, but other than that, and one statement attributable to Mr. Gieger that there was an adverse financial effect on the Giegers related to that proceeding, it was not established that the Giegers were relying on the income from foster care services to support their family. Rather, in the context of that statement and the Giegers legal position during the course of their appeal, the reference was most likely made in the context that the hiring of an attorney, with related expense, in prosecuting the first case, including an appellate proceeding, caused an adverse financial effect, which is understandable. That does not constitute credible, persuasive evidence that the Giegers were relying upon foster care services as income to support their own family and themselves in violation of any Department rule. Mrs. Gieger, indeed, testified under oath that they did not rely upon foster care income to support their family. Her testimony and that of others showing that they have successfully operated a well- managed, licensed home for a substantial period of time, shows that the Petitioners are financially capable of operating safely and successfully under a new license. There is no persuasive evidence to the contrary. The greater weight of the credible evidence is persuasive in establishing that the Giegers provide quality therapeutic foster care and have not engaged in the abuse with which they are charged. Even J.D. expressed the desire to come back and live with the Giegers and, after he reached 18 years of age, he did so. This certainly does not support the existence of abuse. Moreover, Earnest Thomas, J.D.'s guardian ad litem established that the Giegers provided J.D. with excellent care. He was a frequent visitor in their home and paid close attention to J.D.'s well-being during times pertinent to this case. Further, the caseworker, Sheila Donato, was the person who took J.D. from the Giegers' home when he was removed by the Department. On this occasion she stated that he was tearful and crying when he left the Giegers' home and asked if he would be able to come back to their home for Christmas. There were no bruises or other evidence that he had been harmed in any way. She established that the fact that he returned to the Giegers home after he turned 18 years of age is evidence that he had never been abused while there. After the Giegers' foster care license had been relinquished voluntarily by them under the above-referenced circumstances, Tyler's parents executed "guardianship papers" placing Tyler in the custody or guardianship of the Giegers and they continue to allow Tyler to reside in their home. The Department maintains that this was an illegal placement because the Giegers were not a licensed foster care facility at that time and had not secured a court order allowing Tyler to be in their guardianship. The circumstances were, however, that Ms. Giegers' mother was the attorney who prepared the guardianship papers for the Giegers and for Tyler's parents to execute. She rendered an opinion to them that that was sufficient to justify allowing Tyler to remain in the Giegers' home. Ms. Gieger testified that she knew of other teachers and other individuals who had used similar documents to establish a basis to take custody of a child in their home. She believed that what she was doing was legal. There was no intent by her, or Mr. Gieger, to engage in any kind illegal custody, guardianship or circumvention of the foster care licensure requirements, or any other illegal act. There is no evidence that Tyler had been adjudicated dependent and subject to the custody of the Department.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Children and Family Services granting a foster home license to the Petitioners, authorizing their operation as a therapeutic foster home. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of August, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerri A. Blair, Esquire Lockett & Blair Post Office Box 130 Tavares, Florida 32778 Ralph J. McMurphy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 1601 West Gulf Atlantic Highway Wildwood, Florida 34785 Gregory Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John J. Copelan, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Robert A. Butterworth, Secretary Department of Children and Family Services Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue for consideration in this matter is whether Petitioner should be granted an exemption from disqualification to serve as a foster parent because of the matters alleged in the Department's letter of denial dated June 7, 1996.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to the issues herein, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services was the state agency responsible for the licensing of, inter alia, foster homes and foster parents in Florida, and for the granting of expemptions from disqualification for licensing for persons who otherwise would net be eligible for licesning due to prior misconduct. Petitioner, Robert Mallan, was convicted in Circuit Court in Hillsborough County of kidnapping and grand theft - 3rd degree, on November 12, 1991. The kidnapping related to the ten year old son of the boyfriend of a female friend of the Petitioner, Ms. Lilly. While admitting his participation and liability for the incident, Petitioner contends that the boy was taken by the young lady in an effort to exact revenge against her lover, the boy's father, for abusing her and to scare him so he would not touch her aqain. Petitioner's part, he asserts, was to rent the motel room where the child was taken for the woman and her accomplice sister, and when the plot began to fall apart, the two women implicated him. Ms. Lilly's testimony in a deposition given in August, 1991, prior to the criminal trial, paint a far more sinister participation by the Petitioner. Regardless of the motive for the act, Petitioner was found guilty of the offenses alleged, including the grand theft charge, and because some members of the jury hearing his case recommended clemency, he was sentenced as a youthful offender and was incarcerated for approximately eighteen months as a result thereof. Petitioner's wife, Jennifer Mallan, met and developed a relationship with two children in February, 1992. These children, the two S. boys, were the natural children of Johnnie Marie Roye, whose parental rights have been terminated. Desiring to take care of the children, Ms. Mallan undertook training as a foster parent through the Family Enrichment Center in Hillsborough County which trains, educates and assesses potential operators of foster homes for licensure. Ms. Mallan's home was subsequently licensed as a foster home in October 1994, prior to her marriage to the Petitioner, and became the foster home to the two S. boys. Petitioner met the children in August 1992, well before he and Jennifer were married, and he developed a good relationship with them. Once Ms. Mallan married the Petitioner, it becamae necessary for him to receive the foster parent training as well in order for the two S. boys to remain in the Mallan home. Therefore, as a part of the paper work incidental to his licensure, which, according to Ms. Wiliams, the Executive Director of the FEC, consisted of approximately twenty separate documents, Mr. Mallan filled out the form to initiate a background check. This check when completed in December 1994, revealed no record of any conviction. For some reason, however, a second background check, to include fingerprints, was required in the latter part of 1995. Incidental to that check, Petitioner filled out an Affidavit of Good Moral Character in September 5, 1995 on which, under penalty of perjury, he attested that he had not been found guilty of any of the criminal violations listed thereon, including kidnapping under Section 784.01, Florida Statutes. This affidavit is generally prepared by the trainee, under the supervision of the trainer, Ms. Davis, in conjunction with a training session. In this case, because Mr. Mallan had indicated he would not be available to attend training sessions on Thursdays, (one half the course), Ms. Williams cannot be sure whether he receive the standard verbal instructions given to applicants that they shyould not try to hide anything in their backgrounds. However, both Ms. Williams and Ms. Davis gave all the trainees their home phone numbers and offered to help in the prepartion of the documents after hours. Neither lady was contacted by Respondent with questions about any of the documents. Petitioner signed the affidavit at the spot provided therefore on the back of the form where someone had placed an "X". The form is self-explanatory and easy to read. Alicia Miller, the licensing worker at the Family Enrichment Center,who helped Ms. Mallan obtain her foster care license, and who was also helping Petitioner to obtain his, claims she explained the contents of the affidavit to him during the one and a hours she spent at his place of employment going over the forms with him, and he did not request an explanation of the affidavit form. Others who took the FEC's foster parent training, including Steven Link and Noel Perez, filled out the same affidavit and neither had any trouble comprehending the language on the form. Mr. Link indicates they were given many forms to fill out, some of which were read by the teacher. Others were self-explanatory. Not all the forms were given out on the same night. The results of the second background investigation revealed Petitioner had a conviction for kidnapping. This information was discovered by James Thomas, the background screening unit coordinator for the Department, who in turn informed Alicia Miller of the fact and that that conviction disqualified Petitioner from obtaining clearance as a caretaker for children. Ms. Miller passed this information on to Mr. Mallan who requested an exemption. All foster parents must be screened for violations of the law, some of which may disqualify a person from serving as a caretaker of children or from obtaining a foster caer license. When a person is disqualified because of a particular violation, that individual must seek an exemption from the agency before he or she can be licensed. A hearing was held on this request on May 10, 1996, In addition to his oral presentation, Mr. Mallan also provided the agency with numerous reference letters from people in the community who have known his through his church involvement. The informal exepmtion hearing of May 10, 1996 was attended by Mr. Thomas, Don McNair, the operations management consultant who specializes in the licensing of shelter and foster homes, Mr. and Mrs. Mallan, Alicia Miller, Randy White and Mark katherin Moers. As a result of this hearing, on May 20, 1996 the agency advised Mr. Mallan by letter that his request for exemption had been denied. The reason given for the denial was that Mr. Mallan did not show adequate remorse for his actions in kidnapping the child taken nor was he sufficiently forthright in explaining his involvement in the crime. Before recommending denial of Petitioner's request for exemption, Mr. Thomas reviewed the court records relating to the kidn apping charge and concluded that Mr. Mallan's version of the crime at the exemption hearing was not consistent with what was shown in the records. Mr. Mallan's story tended to indicate his involvement in the actual kidnapping was minimal, but an investigator from the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office, who participated in the investigation of the crime, indicated that was not so. After the committee which heard Petitioner's request for examption met and recommended denial of the exemption, Mr. Mallan requested a second exemption hearing at which he could present his reasons for granting the exemption. Though such a hearing is not normally granted, at the direction of the District Administrator, Mr. Taylor, Mr. Mallan was granted a second exemption hearing at which he could discuss the progress he has made since his imprisonment. At this second hearing, held on May 31, 1996, Petitioner was heard by Harriet Scott, a district program manager; Mr. Thomas; and Mr. McBride, an agency licensing supervisor. The District Administrator, Mr. Taylor, also sat in for a part of the hearing but did not ask any questions of Mr. Mallan. During this second hearing, Petitioner claimed he was "railroaded" at his criminal trial by the prosecution and his two co-defendants, Ms. Lilly and Ms. Parmenter. When asked why he had a gun in his possession at the time of the kidnapping, Mr. Mallan explained he was going to use the gun to committ suicide and denied he used it during the commission of the kidnapping. However, when he was arrested by a Leon County Deputy Sheriff in a Tallahassee motel, he made several inconsistent statements regarding the location of the weapon. At the time of his arrest, he was dressed in a tuxedo and waiting for his girlfriend, now his wife, to pick him up to atten a formal sorority function. The decision to deny Petitioner's request for edxemption from disqualification was a difficult one for the committee to make. The evidence indicates that the two S. boys have been doing well in the care of Mr. and Mrs. mallan and want to return to their home. However, the initial decision to deny the request was made by Mr. Taylor, the District Administrator. Both members of the first committee appointed to review the case recommended denial of the request, and Mr. Taylor agreed only after reading all materials furnished to him by the committee. Several days after the denial letter was sent out, Mrs. Mallan called Mr. Taylor and before he could respond, Mr. Mallan also called to express his concern over the denial, indicating he did not feel he had been given a chance to present his full story. Based on this, and on the fact that Mr. Taylor had some additional questions to ask of the Petitioner, the second hearing was granted. Mr. Taylor classifies this case as one of the 4 or 5 most difficult decisions and the most difficult exemption decision he has had to make during his tenure as District Administrator. His concerns, which ultimately culminated in his decision to deny exemption, were: He did not feel Petitioner was entirely truthful at his first hearing and was evasive and misleading in the information given to the FEC. Petitioner did not express any remorse for his actions. During the period Mr. Taylor sat in during the second exemption hearing, Petitioner appeared almost arrogant and defiant in his approach to the committee. Taylor did not feel Petitioner accepted responmsibility for his actions. Throughout the hearing, Petitioner denied, minimalized and trivialized what he had done and consistently tried to place the blame on others. Many of the concerns expressed by Mr. Taylor were also felt by other committe members such as Ms. Scott. She, too, had the feeling that Petitioner was dissembling and not telling the whole truth. She concluded that the five years which had passed since the conviction was not enough time for Petitioner to be rehabilitated. Once the second hearing was over, Mr. Taylor had no doubts as to those factors cited in the paragraph next above, but he had great concern for the two children involved. He had to weigh these concerns. Before making his final decision, Mr. Taylor read and accepted as sincere all the letters sent in by Petitioner's friends and supporters. Mr. Taylor has no doubt that Petitioner is recognized as having done considerable good in the community, but all this has a hollow core, and without sincere remorse, the rest does not ring true for him. To Mr. Taylor the issue was not whether the two children in issue had a good home or whether Petitioner has done good, but whether Petitioner has been sufficiently rehabilitated, and based on what he has observed, Mr. Taylor concluded Petitioner has not. None of the staff of the Family Enrichment Center, including Olga Williams, the Director, Delores Davis, a training coordinator and teacher of the the Model Approach to parenting and Pertnership (MAPP) classes, or Alicia Miller, all of whom knew the Mallans through contact at the FEC, were ever informed prior to the marriage that Jennifer was going to marry Petitioner, nor were they informed by either that Petitioner had been convicted of kidnapping. Mr. Mallan is currently employed by the South Tampa Christian Center, (STCC), where he and his wife are members. He has been involved in community volunteer work since his release from prison. He is an active participant in a church program called "Conquering Force" in which he speaks to inner city children to convince them that the decisions they make today will affect their future. Though in these talks he has admitted to a prior conviction and incarceration, he has never discussed in detail with any audience the nature of his offense and the circumstances surrounding it. In addition to his work at STCC, Mr. Mallan has volunteered and worked at other community organizations which serve children's needs. It appears from Mrs. Mallan's recounting of the relationship amongst herself, Petitioner and the two S. boys has been quite good. When she and Petitioner decided to marry, and she realized both she and he would have to be liecensed as foster parents, she claims she advised the Department of Petitioner's conviction and also advised her MAPP teacher, asking if it would be worthwhile to continue with the trainin in light thereof. She claims to also have told Ms. Miller who, she relates, also told her the conviction would not be a problem so long as Petitioner has been clean since his release from prison. Once they were married, she contends, they both advised the relevant agency authorities of his conviction. Ms. Mallan contends that Petitioner should receive an exemption b ecause since he got out of prison he has lived rehabilitation for himself and others. He works with children to help and assist in decision making. He has never shown anything contrary to rehabilitation ahd wants to have a positive influence on youth. To her knowledge, parents of the children with whom he comes into contact are grateful for the time and efforts he has expended in Florida, nationally and internationally. Mr. Mallan became a Christian two weeks after he went to prison. He immediately worked in the chapel and has never backslid, but has been consistent and committed since he gave his life to the Lord. Mrs. Mallan disagrees with the Department's conclusion that Petitioner is not remorseful over what he did. She has heard him publicly speak about it and he has contacted the victim's father to see that the boy is all right. Petitioner's good wirk is noted by Henry Blanton who served on a committe for a crime forum for the Boy Scouts which was made up of judges, police officials and others related to law enforcement and at which Petitioner was involved. Mr. Blanton had known Petitioner for several years and saw what he was doing for youth, and asked him to get involved. Mr. Blanton's son has been involved with the petitioner through church activities and feels he knows Petitioner quite well. Mr. Blanton is aware of Petitioner's record from Petitioner's public recounting of it as a part of his ministry, and is shocked by the Department's position that Petitioner has not been rehabilitated. Blanton is unequivocally convinced that Petitioner has been rehabilitated and has done much for young people in the community. In Blanton's words, Petitioner "should be commended for what he has done - not castigated and raked over the coals." Tough he his aware of Petitioner's conviction for kidnapping, Mr. Blanton is not aware of the details. As he recalls, Petitioner has referred to the kidnapping as a "prank." Mr. Blanton knows nothing bad about the Petitioner other than his conviction and is not aware of any drug or grand theft charges. He also was not aware that Petitioner was not honest on his affidavit of good moral character, and feels that lying is not evidence of good moral character. Several other responsible individuals were convinced of Petitioner's worth, having heard of his incarceration through their relationship with him. None was advised of the reason for his imprisonment, however. Nevertheless, all, including a marital counselor and a school community specialist, believe Petitioner is committed to a Christian lifestyle and to God. Mrs. Mallam's uncle, a Hillsborough County Circuit Judge, has known Petitioner for about five years, before the trial and incarceration. He cannot say whether Petitioner has changed because he did not know Petitioner well before his imprisonment. In the Judge's opinion, it is hard to measure rehabilitation, but he seems to have seen a change in the Petitioner's life style which makes him moere committed to the improvement of youth. Petitioner never denied his crime to this Judge nor did he try to minimize them, but he also never brought the subject up and the Judge never questioned Petitioner about it. All of the responsible individuals such as teachers and school administrtors who have been in contact with the two S. boys attest that they have done well living with the Petitioner and his wife. Pastor Randy White of STCC first met the Petitioner right after Mr. Mallan was released from prison. At that time, Petitioner was dating Ms. Mallan and wanted to attend his church. For over a year therafter, Petitioner did community service for the church as a part of his probation. He told the pastor he had b een convicted of kidnapping and grand theft and appeared to be remourseful, neither denying nor minimalizing his offenses. After he completed his period of community service, Petitioner came on staff at the church as outreach director. He performed well and was offeded the position of youth pastor in which capacity he is still employed. In the words of Pastor White, Petitioner has done a "tremendous" job. Churches from all over the country have contacted him seeking to hire him. Both pastor White and the church sponsored Petitioner in a one year "Master pastor" intern program which gave him thirty college credits. Petitioner successfully completed the program. Pastor White has no reservations about Petitioner's rehabilitation or that he is a productive member of society. Petitioner has now beenb ordained as a minister and has all the qualities of a minister. In Pastor White's opinion, Petitioner has a stable marriage to a woman who is involved in his ministry and woulod not turn to crime. Recognizing that truth is a part of rehabilitation, Pastor White believed also that an intentional misrepresentation is evidence of bad character. He is aware of Petitioner's reference to his misdeed as a "prank", but also contends that Petitioner told him he had told the Department's representatives of his criminal record. Pastor White has no reason to doubt Petitioner on any level. In that regard, Petitioner counselled with Paul Hollis, the Director of Counseling for STCC in the Fall of 1992. Petitioner wanted to make sure thee was nothing in his background to cause a problem for the church. In the course of the counselling, petitioner gave a full account of his criminal conviction and the details involved. He was very open and did not try to conceal anything. As a rsult of their sessions, Mr. Hollis felt that Petitioner was remorseful and anxious to insure that what happened in his past would never happen again. At that time, Mr. Hollis felt Petitioner was already rehabilitated and nothing has occurred since to cause him to have a question as to Petitioner's rehabilitation. In fact, Petitioner is now helping to rehabilitate others. Arlene Freed-Vest, Petitioner's probation officer for the fourteen months he was on probation after his release from approximately nine months in prison, supervised him closely during the period of community service he performed upon his release. Petitioner had initially been placed on three and a half years of probation, but she recommended early termination of probation based on her satisfaction he was rehabilitated. This determination was based on a review of his entire file from confinement on and she was satisfied he had received all the benefits he could from prob ation and would not benefit from it further. She concluded that Petitioner took responsibility for his actions and has shown continuing remorse. The fact that he has tried to get on with his life does not mean he is not owning up to his offense.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order granting Robert Mallan an exemption from disqualification from residing in a licensed foster home. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of February, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of February, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth M. Hapner, Esquire 101 South Franklin Street, Suite 100 Tampa, Florida 33602 Josefina M. Tomayo, Esquire Jennifer S. Lima, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services District 6 Legal Office 4000 West Dr. M. L. King, Jr. Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33614 Gergory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood boulevard Building 2, Room 204-X Tallahassee, Florida 32399-07600 Richard Doran General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Jeanette Dilligard, is licensed to operate the Dilligard Foster Home for children located at 1751 N.W. 76th Street in Miami, Florida. In the summer of 1985, W. T., age 11, L. I., age 9 and P. F., age 8, were placed in Ms. Dilligard's care by DHRS. While the children were in Ms. Dilligard's care, they were frequently and consistently given physical punishments and beatings. Each child would receive some form of physical punishment at least once a week. Ms. Dilligard used an electrical extension cord and a white belt when administering the beatings. The beatings would last about 5 minutes, sometimes leaving cuts and bruises on the children. The punishments were usually administered for fairly insignificant transgressions by the children. On one occasion, Ms. Dilligard had taken the children with her to a laundromat and L. I. accepted a piece of chewing gum from another person that was there. When Ms. Dilligard and the children returned home, L. I. was given a beating for "accepting food from a stranger." On another occasion, P. F. was eating sunflower seeds and left some of the empty shells on the floor. Ms. Dilligard administered a beating to P. F. for that offense. On yet another occasion, P. F. received a beating when she brought home a bad school report card. On November 19, 1985, W. T. lost a key to the house which he was given by Ms. Dilligard. Ms. Dilligard had previously told W. T. that if he lost the key, he could be given a beating. That evening, W. T. and his two sisters planned that they would run away from Ms. Dilligard's home the next day. On the morning of November 20, 1985, the three children ran away and went to their aunt's house. After the children left Ms. Dilligard's home, they were interviewed by the child protection team in Dade County and taken to Jackson Memorial Hospital for a medical examination. The physician's report indicated that both P. F. and L. I. had multiple bruises, scratches and abrasions on their legs and back which were non- accidental type injuries consistent with their allegations of physical beatings. Prior to receiving her license to operate a foster home, Ms. Dilligard was specifically advised, during a Foster Parent Training Program, of DHRS' policy that any form of physical punishment in the foster home setting was prohibited.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That Jeanette Dilligard's license to operate a family foster home be REVOKED. DONE AND ORDERED this 12th day of January, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-1907 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in substance in finding of fact 3. Adopted in substance in finding of fact 4. Adopted in substance in finding of fact 4. Rejected as subordinate. Adopted in substance in finding of fact 4. Adopted in substance in finding of fact 5. Rejected as subordinate. Rejected as argument. Rejected as argument. Rejected as argument. Rejected as subordinate. Rejected as a recitation of testimony. Adopted in substance in finding of fact 5. Rulings of Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent (None Submitted) COPIES FURNISHED: Leonard T. Helfand, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue, Suite 790 Miami, Florida 33128 Jeanette Dilligard 1751 Northwest 76th Street Miami, Florida 33147 William Page, Jr., Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Steven W. Huss, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
