Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, the Respondent, Jack Folk, has held an active real estate brokers license. From February 9, 1978, till December 14, 1978, Mrs. Evelyn Wilhelm, the Complainant, worked for the Respondent as a real estate broker. Pursuant to an employment agreement signed by Mrs. Wilhelm and the Respondent, she was to receive 80 percent commission on sales subject to exceptions for sales made by the Bo-Jac Realty Office or Bo-Jac Realty Listings. Out of the 80 percent, Mrs. Wilhelm was expected to pay all of her expenses. Due to continuing disagreements between the Complainant and Mr. Folk, Mrs. Wilhelm listed her license with another broker on December 14, 1978, without informing the Respondent of such action within 30 days prior to such termination as required by their employment agreement. The broker that she listed her license with was not a member of the Multiple Listing Service and Mrs. Wilhelm continued to use the Respondent's Multiple Listing Service after she had severed their professional relationship. Between December 18, 1978 and January 11, 1979, the Complainant continued to take referral calls from Respondent's office. When the Respondent learned from Mr. Wilhelm, the complainant's husband, on January 11, 1979, that the Complainant was registered with another broker, he immediately notified the Florida Real Estate Commission of such dual registration. At the time Mrs. Wilhelm left the Bo-Jac office, there were five pending or completed real estate closings in which she was involved and was owed money by the Respondent. One of these was designated as "Hart-Esposito" by the parties and is referred to as "Hart" in the Administrative Complaint. The Respondent was reluctant to pay the commissions to the Complainant because of legal advice he had received from his attorney concerning Section 475.42(1)(d), Florida Statutes and a possible breach of the employment agreement. This information was forwarded to the Complainant on January 25, 1979, via letter from Mr. Robert Saylor, attorney fro the Respondent. Upon the advice of counsel, Mr. folk deposited the disputed commissions in an escrow account and through his attorney notified the parties of this occurrence. The Complainant retained counsel who filed suit on the commissions on March 2, 1979. The Respondent counter-claimed and presented affirmative defenses outlining his position concerning the alleged breach of the employment contract and the dispute over the percentage of commissions due. Counsel for both parties entered into settlement negotiations which led to a voluntary dismissal by the Complainant on January 15, 1980 of the pending civil action. Although the civil action was filed by the Complainant, the Respondent also contemplated filing suit over the commissions. The Complainant simply filed her action before the Respondent's counsel file his.
Recommendation Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED: That the complaint filed against the Respondent, is DISMISSED. DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of November, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of November, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire C. B. Stafford, Executive Director Staff Attorney Florida Real Estate Commission Department of Professional 400 W. Robinson Street Regulation Post Office Box 1900 2009 Apalachee Parkway Orlando, Florida 32801 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert L. Saylor, Esquire 618 U.S. Highway One Post Office Box 14667 North Palm Beach, Florida 33408
Findings Of Fact Respondent Nelly Dijkman is now and was during the year 1977 registered with the Florida Real Estate Commission as a broker/salesman employed by Cousins Associates, Inc., 5830 Southwest 73rd Street, South Miami, Florida. (Stipulation) On January 14, 1977, Brian M. Foley and his wife, Leslie W. Foley, executed a listing agreement with Cousins Associates, Inc., South Miami, Florida, for the sale of their residence located at 7740 Southwest 143rd Street, Miami, Florida. The exclusive listing agreement was executed by Respondent on behalf of Cousins Associates, Inc., and provided for a three month period in which that firm would have the exclusive right to sell the property for a price of $87,500.00 at a commission of 6 percent of the selling price. It also provided that the realtor would have the property placed in multiple listing with the Kendall-Perrine Real Estate Computer Service, Inc., and that any sales derived from co-brokerage would be subject to an equal division of the real estate commission. Respondent had shown rental property to the Foleys prior to their purchase of the property which was the subject of the listing agreement. She also showed them prospective properties for purchase for some time prior to January 1977 and continued to do so during succeeding months. The listing agreement was renewed on May 10, 1977, for another three months with a selling price of $84,500.00. On that date, the parties also executed an agreement to place the property in the multiple listing service of the Coral Gables Board of Realtors. (Testimony of B. Foley, Petitioner's Exhibit 2.) During the period January-June 1977, Respondent showed the Foleys approximately 20 houses that were for sale in the area. On June 26, 1977, they made a written offer on property located at 6450 SW 92nd Street, Miami, Florida, and placed $500.00 in escrow with Respondent as a deposit. On the same date, Rosalie Kotok, a broker with Sunniland Realty, and Howard Richards, made an offer to purchase the Foley property for $77,000.00. The selling price of the property had been lowered by the Foleys to $79,900.00 on June 19th. The offer was made on behalf of Kotok and Richards through an associate with Sunniland Realty, Ruth Hanrahan. Mr. Foley advised Respondent that he would not sell the house for less than $79,000.00 and asked her to transmit the counteroffer to the prospective purchasers. On June 27 Respondent transmitted Foley's counteroffer of $79,000.00 and Kotok increased the offer to $78,000.00. Respondent told Mr. Foley of this offer by telephone that afternoon and he declined to reduce his asking price of $79,000.00. Respondent then obtained authorization from her broker, Jane C. Cousins, to reduce their share of the real estate commission $1,000.00 in order to effect the sale, based on the Foleys' "cooperation to work with us to purchase another home." Mr. Foley accepted this arrangement for the sale of the house on June 27. The sales purchase agreement with Kotok and Richards reflected execution by the Foleys on June 28, 1977. They executed an agreement, dated June 29, 1977, to purchase the house on which they had made the June 26 offer. (Testimony of Respondent, Cousins, B. Foley, Petitioner's Exhibit 2, Respondent's Exhibits 2-4.) On the morning of June 27, John P. Marangos, a broker/salesman registered with South Dade Realty, Inc., called Respondent at her home and told her he had a "hot prospect" to show the Foley house. Respondent told him that there was a contract being negotiated at that time on the property, but that he could certainly show the house because of the property, but that he could certainly show the house because of the possibility that the pending deal might not materialize. She left the key to the Foley house in her mail box for Marangos to pick up. About twenty minutes later, Marangos came back and was not responsive when Respondent asked him how his clients had liked the house. Respondent then told him that she had several other properties that they might be interested in and he said that he would consider showing them on another day. (Testimony of Respondent.) About a week after he had sold his home, Mr. Foley received a telephone call from an unknown person from South Dade Realty, Inc., who told him that Marangos had wanted to buy his house and had made an offer of purchase. Foley called Marangos who allegedly told him that he had informed Respondent that he had a written contract for $78,900.00 on the Foley house, but that Respondent had told him that the house was sold. Foley testified that he then asked Respondent about the offer and she told him that it was not her duty to inform him of any other contract. He further testified that about a week after his initial conversation with her, Respondent told him that she did, in fact, have an offer from Marangos but did not want to present it because he had a very bad reputation for making offers on houses and not following through. He also testified that in his conversations with Respondent, she told him that she was aware of the amount of the offer made by John Marangos but that she did not pay any attention to it because he had a bad reputation. In contrast to Foley's testimony, Marangos testified that he and his wife had looked at the Foley house on June 27 after obtaining the key from Respondent. They decided to make the purchase in their own behalf and he therefore returned to his office, wrote a contract by hand, plus a check for $5,000.00 as a deposit on his bank account. He then called Respondent to tell her that he would like to present a contract on the house and she told him that a contract was being negotiated on the property at the time. She also allegedly told him that the sellers had until six o'clock that evening to respond to the pending offer and that she did not want to confuse the issue by having all kinds of contracts coming in. He testified that he called her that evening and she told him that the house was sold. Although Marangos' testimony confirmed Foley's version that his offer was for $78,900.00, he denied telling Respondent the amount of his offer or that it was in his own behalf. He further testified that one-half of the real estate commission would go to his firm if his offer had been accepted. He denied talking to Respondent when he returned the Foley key and said that he had merely put it in her mail box. Marangos testified that after Respondent told him the house had been sold, he threw away the contract and check. Although he was not sure whether there was $5,000.00 in his checking account on June 27, he testified that the check would have been good because he had often transferred money from his savings account to cover the amount of the check. He did not enter the $5,000.00 on his check stubs because he customarily carried several checks around while his wife retained the check book for entry therein at a later time. Respondent, on the other hand, testified that after she heard from Foley as to the Marangos offer, she talked to Marangos and told him that she understood he had presented a contract on the house to Mr. Foley. Marangos responded that Foley had been calling him. Respondent then asked him how he was doing with his hot prospect and he said, "Well, Nelly, those hot prospects were myself and my wife." In view of the contradictory nature of the foregoing testimony and the lack of documentary evidence, it is found that Petitioner failed to establish the fact that an offer to purchase the Foley property was communicated to Respondent by Marangos on June 27, 1975, or at any other time. (Testimony of Respondent, Foley, Deposition of Marangos, Petitioner's Exhibit 1.)
Recommendation That the Administrative Complaint against Respondent Nelly Dijkman be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of December 1978 in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of December 1978. COPIES FURNISHED: Salvatore Carpino, Esquire Staff Attorney Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Richard M. White, Sr., Esquire Suite 100 7100 North Kendall Drive Miami, Florida 33156
Findings Of Fact The Respondent Thomas P. Hoolihan is a licensed real estate broker. His last known address is 3440 N.W. Marinatown Lane, North Fort Myers, Florida 33903. Hoolihan is also president of Seago Group, Inc., a publicly held land development and rental corporation, of which Marinatown Realty, Inc., is a wholly owned subsidiary. In late 1977, Hoolihan met L. E. Hutchinson, the complainant in this case, through another broker for whom Hutchinson at the time was employed. In December 1977, Hoolihan and Hutchinson discussed the marketing of two condominium projects being developed by Hoolihan and reached an oral agreement whereby Hutchinson would be paid $18,000 in salary with a 1.5 percent commission on all sales. when the condominium units were completed and mostly sold, the parties' employment agreement was revised in late December 1979. Under the new agreement, Hutchinson was to receive $30,000 a year salary, commission on the remaining condominium units that had not yet closed and any commissions on outside property listings neither owned nor controlled by Seago. In return for the $30,000 guarantee, Hutchinson was to forego commissions on future properties owned or controlled by Seago Group, Inc. During the period from 1977-1978 when Hutchinson was receiving $18,000 plus a 1.5 percent commission, sales were handled through Lee Hutchinson Realty, Inc., which held license number 0182945. In early 1979, Marinatown Realty was incorporated to market Seago's real estate inventory, to identify and list outside properties and to act as a management agent for purposes of renting condominium units previously sold in recent projects. When Marinatown Realty was formed, the complainant became its active broker. While employed as the broker for Marinatown and receiving $30,000 a year as a salaried employee, Hutchinson held two other broker's licenses, one as L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc., and another as L. E. Hutchinson. In January 1980, Hoolihan agreed to pay a $15,000 bonus to Hutchinson in lieu of a salary increase. Since at that time sales were minimal, Hoolihan decided to pay the bonus in installments as sales occurred. Because Hutchinson left in May 1980, he received only $10,000 of the bonus which represented monies previously paid. On April 23, 1980, Hutchinson and Chuck Bundschu, a licensed real estate broker, negotiated and obtained a sales contract between Hancock Harbor Properties, Ltd., a wholly owned subsidiary of Seago Group, Inc., seller, and Frank Hoffer, buyer and licensed real estate broker, in which Hoffer offered to purchase approximately 3.16 acres of unimproved acreage for $500,000. Thomas P. Hoolihan, general partner of Hancock Harbor, executed the contract on behalf of the partnership. Prior to presenting the contract to Hoolihan, Bundschu, Hoffer and Hutchins on decided on a 30 percent, 40 percent, 30 percent, respective co- brokerage split on the $50,000 commission due on the sale of the Hancock Harbor Property. The co-brokerage fee split was typed on the bottom of the contract submitted to Hoolihan and was signed by the three brokers. The commission due to Hutchinson was made payable to L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc. On April 25, 1980, the contract with the original co-brokerage split was presented to Hoolihan who refused to agree to its co-brokerage split provision. In the presence of Hutchinson, Hoolihan informed Bundschu and Hoffer that he would not pay a commission to Hutchinson because he was a salaried employee of the Seago Group and not entitled to a commission on the sale of this property. Accordingly, the co-brokerage fee provision of the executed contract was never signed by the seller, Thomas P. Hoolihan. Instead, on April 25, 1980, Bundschu, Hoffer and Hoolihan agreed to a split of $20,000 to Hoffer and $15,000 to Bundschu in lieu of the split specified in the original contract. At the closing on July 18, 1980, which was held at Coastland Title Company, a closing statement was prepared which shows that real estate commissions were disbursed to Chuck Bundschu Realty, Inc. ($15,000), Marinatown Realty, Inc., ($15,000) and Hoffer's firm, Landco, Inc., ($20,000). The checks were written and disbursed following a conversation between an official of Coastland Title Company and Hoolihan in which Hoolihan informed the official that Hutchinson was a Seago employee and he would not agree to pay a $15,000 commission to him under such circumstances. On July 18, 1980, a check for $15,000 was issued by Coastland Title Company to Marinatown Realty, Inc. The $15,000 represented Hutchinson's share of the co-brokerage agreement. when received on July 18, 1980, by Billie Robinette, the broker for Marinatown Realty, the check was signed over by her to Seago Group, Inc., since in her opinion it did not represent commissions earned by Marinatown Realty. The oral agreement between Hutchinson and Hoolihan was to terminate at the end of April 1980, or approximately five days after the Hoffer contract was presented. Hoolihan offered to renew the contract without a provision for a guaranteed salary because Marinatown Realty had been consistently losing money since its incorporation. On May 6, 1980, Hoolihan received a letter of resignation from Hutchinson and concluded that his offer had been rejected In early May 1980, Hoolihan received a call from Ms. Robinette, who had been employed as Hutchinson's secretary, regarding filling the open brokerage position at Marinatown Realty, Inc. Hoolihan discovered from Ms. Robinette that Hutchinson had paid himself 50 percent of the commissions due Marinatown Realty, Inc., for the management of condominium rentals. After examining the check stubs from Marinatown's bank account, Hoolihan took personal possession of all the books and records of the company and had the office locks changed. When he examined the books and records of the realty company, Hoolihan realized that his assumption that Hutchinson Realty, Inc., became inactive when Marinatown Realty, Inc. was formed in January 1979, was erroneous and that Hutchinson had operated his own realty company, L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc., while employed by Marinatown Realty, Inc. The Administrative Complaint in this case was filed on July 22, 1981. The preliminary investigative report compiled by Robert Corno, DPR Investigator, was filed on September 24, 1981 and the final investigative report was filed on September 30, 1981. The following is a synopsis of the investigator's findings and recommendation: That the COMPLAINANT [Hutchinson] worked for the SUBJECT [Hoolihan] and their contractual agreement was verbal. COMPLAINANT was paid on a salary/commission basis by companies of which SUBJECT is Chief Officer. That the COMPLAINANT filed civil action suit against SUBJECT in this case and it was dismissed with prejudice. That prior investigation by the DPR recommended that no action be taken against the SUBJECT in this case. That two weeks after this investiga- tion was undertaken, an Administrative Complaint was being filed by the DPR against the SUBJECT. That the existing BROKER for MARINATOWN REALTY, INC, was not involved in this case, and that since the time of the above referenced transaction, the SUB- JECT has acquired his BROKER'S license number 020462 which had no effect in this case. That conflicting statements by inter- viewers, namely former and present employees and other agents involved in this case revealed that there is a reasonable doubt for probable cause against the SUBJECT. (Respondent's Exhibit 1) As noted by Investigator Corno, this was the second time Marinatown Realty had been investigated in relation to this case. In both instances, a recommendation that no action be taken was apparently made. At the final hearing on December 1, 1981, counsel for the Department saw the complete investigative report, including the investigator's recommendation of a lack of probable cause, for the first time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint filed against Thomas P. Hoolihan be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of December, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Xavier J. Fernandez, Esquire NUCKOLLS JOHNSON & FERNANDEZ Suite 10, 2710 Cleveland Avenue Fort Myers, Florida 33901 James A. Neel, Esquire 1315 Chalon Lane, S.W. Fort Myers, Florida 33903 William M. Furlow, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation - Legal Section 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 C. B. Stafford, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether respondents' real estate licenses should be revoked, suspended, or otherwise disciplined on charges of false promises, misrepresentation, culpable negligence, and breach of trust in a business transaction.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Terry L. Baker is now and was at all times material to the charges a licensed real estate broker holding license no. 204679. (P-1) He also was president, secretary, and treasurer of respondent Terry L. Baker and Associates, Inc., a licensed real estate brokerage corporation (lic. no. 213974) located at 1418 West Edgewood Avenue, Jacksonville, Florida. There are no other officers, directors, or members of this brokerage corporation; respondent owns 100 percent of the capital stock. (P-1) Respondent was, and continues to be, the active broker for this real estate brokerage corporation. (P-1) On July 21, 1982, respondent assisted in the negotiation and closing of a real estate sales transaction between Dolores B. Hawkins, as seller, and James W. and Patricia L. Dobson, as purchasers. The real estate involved was a residential lot and dwelling unit located at 7065 Bishop Hatcher Drive East, Jacksonville, Florida, and was, at the time, the subject of a mortgage foreclosure proceeding. (Testimony of Hawkins, Baker; P-2, P-6) The real estate sales contract was signed by the seller and buyers on July 21, 1982. At that time, respondent submitted a written estimate of the seller's closing costs. This estimate, signed by both respondent and the seller, showed that the seller would net $1,598.25 from the transaction. It was specifically noted that this net figure did not include an Atlantic Bank payment. This payment was a recognized obligation of the seller and was required to obtain the release of a record judgment lien held by the bank. Ms. Hawkins, the seller, understood that this payment was her obligation and was not included in the $1,598.25 figure. The written estimate also included seller's cost of approximately $2,000 for attorney's fees and back mortgage payments. The attorney's fees were related to the legal costs associated with the mortgage foreclosure proceeding. An existing mortgage balance, to be assumed by the buyers, was listed as approximately $19,000. (Testimony of Hawkins, Baker; P-3) On two separate occasions prior to closing, respondent told seller Hawkins that there had been an increase in the charge for attorney's fees associated with the mortgage foreclosure. (Testimony of Hawkins, respondent) Prior to closing, respondent loaned seller Hawkins $220 to help her pay her apartment rent. They agreed that the loan would be repaid out of the proceeds from the sale of her property. (Testimony of Hawkins, Baker; P-4) At closing on August 17, 1982, respondent presented the seller with a Seller's Closing Statement listing various charges to the seller, including the loan repayment of $220, the payment to Atlantic Bank (for release of lien) of $425, attorney's fees of $638.50, and an assumed mortgage of $19,847.51. The net amount due the seller was $675.82. The buyers paid the balance due at closing and the seller delivered the warranty deed to respondent for recording. A couple of days later, respondent, in turn, wrote a check for $675.82 and delivered it to the seller as net proceeds from the sale. Payment of respondent's commission was shared by the seller and buyers at closing. Respondent received the warranty deed at closing and the parties to the transaction expected him to have it recorded. He accepted this duty and undertook to perform it. However, he did not record the warranty deed on the public records until October 4, 1982--almost three months later--after repeated requests by the mortgage service company for a copy of the recorded deed. The delay was caused by respondent's waiting to receive a release of the Atlantic Bank lien so that he could record the two instruments at the same time. But after repeated requests for a copy of the recorded deed, he finally recorded it even though he had not yet received the release of lien. (Testimony of Baker, Hawkins, Dobson) Contrary to the Department's contention, respondent's delay in recording the deed does not constitute culpable negligence, false promises, misrepresentation, or breach of trust in a business transaction. His lack of diligence in recording the deed is, instead, an act of simple negligence. His carelessness exposed the buyers to unnecessary risk. During this delay of almost three months, the seller, while record titleholder, could have reconveyed the property or subjected it to additional encumbrances. Respondent, in delaying recordation almost three months, failed to exercise that degree of care which a reasonable man, in the same situation and with similar experience, would not have omitted. His failure to exercise due care does not, however, demonstrate willful, wanton, or reckless disregard for the rights of others. The Department also charges that respondent did not have--at time of closing--the lien of Atlantic Bank satisfied. Prior to closing, the respondent- -on behalf of the seller--negotiated the outstanding debt with attorneys for Atlantic Bank: He was told that the bank would accept fifty cents on the dollar, or $425. Thereafter, respondent collected this amount as a charge to the seller at closing. (Testimony of respondent) Respondent, however, did not have an executed release of lien form, or the judgment lien satisfied, at closing. He asserts--without contradiction-- that the bank's attorney at first offered to prepare the release, but later asked respondent to do so. By the time of closing, respondent had been either unable to obtain the release from the attorney, or he had been unable to obtain and complete the form on his own. When asked why he proceeded to close the transaction although the release had not been obtained, he states that both buyers and seller consented to the closing because the property was facing foreclosure. Respondent's assertion that the parties consented to closing, in the absence of a release of lien, is unrefuted and accepted as fact. No evidence was presented that, in light of the parties' consent, closing of the transaction was improper.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the administrative complaint, and all charges contained therein, be dismissed for failure of proof. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of September, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 1983.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, Respondent, Jack W. Miller, was a licensed real estate broker having been issued license number 0060257 by the Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation. Respondent, Robert D. Stewart, was a licensed real estate broker-salesman having been issued license number 0085004 by Petitioner. Miller was the broker for Jack Miller Realty, 319 Park Lake Circle, Orlando, Florida, and Stewart was employed as & broker- salesman by Systems Four, Inc., 1561 Lee Road, Winter Park, Florida (Petitioner's Exhibits 4 and 5). Belair Woods Subdivision is located west of Orlando, Florida, within the corporate limits of Ocoee, Florida. Miller began selling homes exclusively for Belair in 1971 and continued doing so until December, 1975. In late 1973, Miller sold a home in Belair Woods to Carlton and Willie Mae Hall, husband and wife. Miller left Belair in December, 1975 to open his own real estate firm, Jack Miller Realty, in Orlando. In January, 1977, Carlton Hall called Miller and advised him he wished to sell his home. Hall then signed an exclusive right of sale contract with Miller on January 19, 1977, to expire six months thereafter (Respondents' Exhibit 4). The contract provided for a $53,900 selling price and a 7 percent sales commission to Miller. The contract also noted that a second mortgage on the horse for a swimming pool was "net assumable" and "have (sic) to be approved". The $53,900 price was arrived at by comparing the selling prices of other new homes in the subdivision ($42,050), taking into consideration the "extras" that Hall had added to his home since its purchase, and an allowance for a 7 percent sales commission. During the six month period that the contract remained in effect, little interest was shown in the property by prospective buyers. In fact, only one person actually expressed an interest in purchasing it, but because of financing difficulties was unable to make an offer. The contract was subsequently renewed for an additional 3 months to and including October 19, 1977 (Respondents' Exhibit 6). 2/ The extension of the agreement contained the same terms and conditions as the original exclusive right of sale contract, including the selling price and a 7 percent sales commission. There were no offers made by prospective buyers during the following 3 months, and the listing expired in October. Miller advised Hall at that time that because of the lack of interest, "he better rest on it for awhile." On or about April 8, 1978, the Halls visited Miller's house and again requested Miller's services in selling their home. Because of a pending job transfer to another city in the state, Hall was anxious to sell his property. Miller and the Halls agreed upon a $53,900 selling price and a $500 sales commission for Miller. This agreement was embodied in an exclusive right of sale contract signed by the parties on April 8, 1978, to be effective for 6 months (Petitioner's Exhibit 1). Miller agreed to charge a $500 commission because Hall was a friend and he wished only to recoup the advertising expenses previously incurred under the prior listings. They also agreed that Miller would not have to advertise the property; however, he did place a sign in front of the house as well as list the property in the Multiple Listing Service. Miller advised Hall that if another realtor presented an acceptable offer, Hall would be liable for a sales commission which typically was 7 percent of the total sales price. Sometime thereafter, but still in the month of April, 1978, Respondent Stewart noticed the Halls' listing in the Multiple Listing Service and called Miller to inquire if the property was still on the market. Stewart also advised that he had prospective buyers (Steven and Linda Day) for the property. Miller replied that it was for sale, but that he (Miller) had agreed to charge only a $500 commission, and in order for another realtor to sell it, the selling price would have to be increased to compensate the Halls for a normal sales commission. Miller then called Carlton Hall, advised him of the situation, and told him that although the commission would be greater, the sales price would also be increased. Hall told Miller to have Stewart bring out the prospective purchasers to look at the house. An appointment was then made for Stewart to show the prospective buyers the horse within the next few day. After the Days were shown the home, they decided to present an offer which was executed on April 29, 1978 (Petitioner's Exhibit 2). The contract for purchase offered $59,100 conditioned upon the Days obtaining a $55,000 VA loan. The remainder was to be paid by cash at the closing. The offer was to expire at midnight on the same date. In arriving at a $59,100 sales price, Stewart increased the original asking price of $53,900 in order to cover a 7 percent sales commission and to compensate Hall for VA points that he would be required to pay. On the evening of April 29, 1978, Respondents visited the Halls to present the offer. At that time they discussed the estimated sales expense involved in the sale (Petitioner's Exhibit 3). Stewart told Hall he would receive "approximately the same as if they were selling it for fifty-three nine and paying a five hundred dollar commission." He did not tell them they would net the same amount. Miller also told Hall he would receive an amount "fairly close" to that which he would have received under the original asking price. Hall declined to sign the contract and instead requested an extension of time in which to review the offer until the next morning. This was agreed upon, and Hall retained the estimated sales expense overnight to study the figures. At 7:00 a.m. the next morning, Stewart returned to the Halls' home with the contract. The Halls modified the contract by increasing the sales price to $59,600; they also agreed to pay a 7 percent sales commission out of the proceeds. However, after reviewing the counter-offer, the Days rejected it that same morning. On May 18, 1978, while the listing agreement was still in effect, and unknown to the Respondents, the Halls sold their home to the Days for $55,900 (Respondents' Exhibit 7). Under the terms of their agreement, the buyer agreed to pay all closing costs while the seller agreed to pay a "real estate fee" of $500. Hall sent a $500 check to Miller, which Miller refused to accept. Miller and Systems Four, Inc. then filed suit in circuit court against the Halls seeking reimbursement for the 7 percent sales commission. They ultimately recovered $3,253.33 and certain costs (Respondents' Exhibit 1). The judgment of the circuit court was affirmed by the District Court of Appeals. Hall v. Systems Four, Inc., 383 So.2d 1220 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). The Halls then filed a complaint with Petitioner that gave rise to this proceeding. During his dealings with the Days, Stewart and the Days discussed several alternatives for buying the Halls' home but only formalized one offer in writing. This offer was presented to the Halls on April 29, 1978. The second mortgage on the Halls' home was a home improvement loan from Winter Park Federal for a swimming pool. In order to assume that mortgage, a buyer would have to requalify with the lending institution by presenting a satisfactory financial statement. As a general rule, home improvement loans are not assumable and the representation by Stewart that the loan was not assumable was correct.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the charges against Respondents, Jack W. Miller and Robert D. Stewart, be DISMISSED. RECOMMENDED this 14th day of August, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of August, 1981.
The Issue This is a case in which the Petitioner seeks to suspend or revoke the Respondents' licenses, or take other disciplinary action against the Respondents, for reasons which are alleged in a five-count Administrative Complaint. All of the allegations of the Administrative Complaint arise from two transactions; a rental agreement involving property owned by Mr. and Mrs. Capraro and another rental agreement involving property owned by Ms. Supino. The Administrative Complaint alleges that as a result of the Respondents' actions in connection with these two transactions the Respondents have violated Section 475.25(1)(b), (d), and (k) Florida Statutes. The Respondents dispute some of the factual allegations and deny that there was any violation.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations of the parties, on the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing, and on the exhibits received in evidence, I make the following findings of fact: 2/ At all times relevant and material, Robert H. Karn has been licensed as a real estate broker, having been issued license number 0122138. At all times relevant and material, Robert H. Karn, Inc., has been a corporation licensed as a real estate broker, having been issued license number 0214562. The street address of both Respondents is 5211 Southwest 91 Terrace, Cooper City, Florida 33328. (Tr. 6-7) Findings regarding the transaction involving the Capraro property During May of 1983, Robert H. Karn was the listing broker for the rental of a residence owned by Joseph A. Capraro and Vita M. Capraro. (T. 51, 156) Letitia Daugherty was interested in renting a residence and another broker, Lois Rutkin, showed the Capraro property to Daugherty. Negotiations followed and thereafter, on May 13, 1983, Letitia Daugherty, as prospective tenant, and Joseph A. Capraro and Vita M. Capraro, as landlords, signed a document titled Agreement To Enter Into A Lease. The Agreement required that Daugherty pay the amount of $950.00 "as an earnest money deposit and as a part of the rental price on account of offer to rent the property . . . ." The Agreement provided that the rent would be $475.00 per month, that the "pre- payments" would be $475.00 for the last month's rent, and that a security deposit in the amount of $475.00 would be paid as follows: $150.00 on June 14, 1983, $150.00 on July 14, 1983, and $175.00 on August 14, 1983. The agreement also provided that rent would be due on the 14th of each month. (Pet. Ex. #1; Tr. 21, 22, 24, 97-98) During the negotiations which led up to the agreement to enter into a lease, Daugherty was represented by Lois Rutkin, a real estate broker associated with Drew Realty, and the Capraros were represented by Robert H. Karn. All of the terms of the agreement to enter into a lease were agreed to by all parties prior to that document being signed. It was also specifically understood that the $950.00 paid by Daugherty represented the first and last month's rent. The cashier's check for the $950.00 was made payable to the order of Robert H. Karn because he specifically requested that it be made payable to him. (Tr. 21, 23- 26, 33, 49, 54, 57, 171) If a formal lease had been entered into pursuant to the terms of the Agreement To Enter Into A Lease, Daugherty's $950.00 deposit would have been applied as follows: $475.00 for the first month's rent from May 14 to June 13, 1983, and $475.00 for the last month's rent. Further, if such a lease had been entered into consistent with the Agreement, Daugherty would not have been obligated to pay any further amounts until June 14, 1983, at which time she would have been obligated to pay $475.00 for one month's rent from June 14 through August 13, 1983, plus a $150.00 payment towards the security deposit. (Pet. Ex. #1) Consistent with her obligation under the Agreement To Enter Into A Lease, and at the specific request of Robert H. Karn, Daugherty obtained a cashier's check in the amount of $950.00 payable to the order of Robert H. Karn and delivered the cashier's check to Robert H. Karn. The cashier's check was thereafter cashed by Robert H. Karn without being deposited in any trust or escrow account. (Pet. Ex. #2) Robert H. Karn prepared a formal written lease for the rental of the Capraro property by Daugherty. The lease prepared by Robert H. Karn contained several provisions which were materially different from the terms contained in the Agreement To Enter Into A Lease. Among the changes were a provision that the rent would be due on the first of each month, that the security deposit would be $950.00, that $285.00 of the money previously paid by Daugherty would be applied as rent from May 14 to May 31, 1983, that $665.00 of the money previously paid by Daugherty would be applied towards the security deposit, that additional payments of $142.50 each would be due towards the security deposit on July 1, 1983, and August 1, 1983, and that the next month's rent in the amount of $475.00 would be due on June 1, 1983. (Pet. Ex. #3, Tr. 55, 60) The written lease prepared by Robert H. Karn also contained the following provisions: Tentant (sic) will have first option to Buy said property at the end of this lease. Drew Realty will receive $142.50 on July 1, 983, for renting this property to the "Tentant (sic). Drew Realty will receive a 3 percent Real Estate Commission if Tentant (sic) buys the property. Robert H. Karn, Inc. will receive $142.50 on August 1, 1983 for the rental listing. Robert H. Karn, Inc. will receive a 3 percent Real Estate Commission if Tentant (sic) buys the property. The written lease which was prepared by Robert H. Karn was given to Daugherty on the evening of May 16, 1983. When Daugherty read the lease and saw that it contained provisions different from the provisions in the Agreement To Enter Into A Lease, she refused to sign it. That same evening she told Lois Rutkin, Dan Drew, and Robert H. Karn that she refused to sign the lease because it was different from what she had agreed to, and she demanded the return of her $950.00 deposit. The $950.00 deposit has never been returned to her. (Tr. 27- 30) On the evening of May 16, 1983, extensive discussions took place between Daugherty, Lois Rutkin, Dan Drew, and Robert H. Karn in an effort to resolve the problem. Robert H. Karn's excuse for changing the terms in the lease was that Daugherty had two dogs, but Robert H. Karn had known about the dogs before the parties signed the Agreement To Enter Into A Lease. During the discussions on the evening of May 16, 1983, Lois Rutkin told Robert H. Karn she wanted him to return the cashier's check he had received from Daugherty and Dan Drew told Robert H. Karn not to disburse the funds from that cashier's check, but to return the money to Daugherty. Robert H. Karn did not return the cashier's check nor did he otherwise make any reimbursement to Daugherty. (Tr. 40, 58-59, 85-86) By the time Lois Rutkin, Dan Drew, and Daugherty asked for the return of the $950.00 cashier's check, Robert H. Karn had already cashed the check and had spent the money. Most, if not all, of the money was spent on behalf of the Capraros to pay for such things as mortgage payments and painting on the Capraro's rental property. After Daugherty refused to sign the lease, Robert H. Karn told the Capraros to treat Daugherty's $950.00 deposit as "default money." Actually, the default was by the Capraros who, through their agent Robert H. Karn, tried to change the terms of the agreement. (Tr. 42, 84, 100, 105, 160- 161, 167, 170, 173-175) Subsequently, Daugherty sued Robert H. Karn in County Court in an attempt to collect her 950.00 deposit. On September 12, 1983, a Default And Final Judgment gas entered in Case No. 83-2532-SPH in County Court in Broward County against Robert H. Karn and in favor of Letitia Daugherty in the sum of $950.00, plus court costs in the amount of $42.00. After the judgment was entered against Robert H. Karn, Daugherty again demanded payment of the $950.00. Robert H. Karn has never paid anything to Daugherty. (Pet. Ex. #4, Tr. 30-31, 45, 47-48) Robert H. Karn never asked the Florida Real Estate Commission for an escrow disbursement order regarding the transaction involving the Capraro rental property. (Tr. 169-170) Findings regarding the transaction involving the Supino property In about the middle of July of 1983, Lucy Supino entered into an oral agreement with Robert H. Karn pursuant to which Robert H. Karn was to attempt to locate a tenant for one or more of Lucy Supino's rental units. During August of 1983 Robert H. Karn rented one of Lucy Supino's rental units to Marilyn McKelvey. Thereafter, Karn, Supino, and McKelvey had various disagreements about the transaction. (Tr. 113-116, 121, 138, 141-142) 3/
Recommendation For all the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a Final Order which would (a) find the Respondents guilty of the violations charged in Counts I, II, and III, of the Administrative Complaint, (b) dismiss counts IV and V of the Administrative Complaint, (c) fine the Respondents a total of $950.00, and (d) suspend the licenses of the Respondents for a period of ninety (90) days or until such time as the judgment in Case Number 83-2532, Broward County Court, has been satisfied, whichever is later; provided that in any event the period of suspension shall not exceed ten (10) years. DONE and ORDERED this 24th day of January, 1985 at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 1985.
Findings Of Fact The following findings of fact are based upon the stipulation of the parties, as well as the evidence presented at hearing, including the demeanor of the witnesses: Polynesian Isles Developers, Ltd., was a developer of a time-share property, within the meaning of Section 721.05(9), Florida Statutes, in Osceola County in 1984. Bailey M. Weldon was a general partner of Polynesian Isles Developers, Ltd., and a developer of time-share property known as Polynesian Isles Resort Condominium I from November 23, 1982 to January 16, 1985. Polynesian Isles Developers, Ltd., submitted certain advertising to Petitioner for approval on January 9, 1984, and was noticed of deficiencies in its Polynesian Isles- Super Bowl advertising materials by notice issued by the Petitioner on January 17, 1984. These advertising materials were distributed in the January 18, 1984 Super Bowl Supplement to the St. Petersburg Times without correction of the noticed deficiencies. No time-share unit weeks were sold as a result of this ad. It was represented in the Polynesian Isles Developers, Ltd., public offering statement, and its sales contract with purchasers of time-share unit weeks, that purchasers would obtain fee title to purchased unit weeks free and clear of encumbrances. It was also represented in such sales contracts with purchasers of time-share unit weeks that Polynesian Isles Developments, Ltd., as Seller, would provide purchasers with an owner's title insurance policy upon closing Respondent agrees and stipulates that no owner's title insurance policy was issued for some of the unit weeks sold and closed in 1984. The evidence establishes that no title insurance policies were issued for 329 unit weeks. Respondent established an escrow account for the deposit and withdrawal of all funds received from, or on behalf of, time-share purchasers. Daniel Giannini served as escrow agent for Polynesian Isles Developers, Ltd., for the purpose of receiving and disbursing funds pursuant to Section 721.08 Florida Statutes. Respondent agrees and stipulates that some affidavits for release of escrow funds were delivered to Daniel Giannini as escrow agent when all conditions required by Section 721.08, Florida Statutes, had not occurred. The evidence establishes that these affidavits falsely stated that all conditions for closing had occurred when, in fact, closing had not properly occurred on 331 unit weeks in 1984 because title was not conveyed free and clear of all encumbrances. As a result, purchasers' funds in escrow were released to Respondent without the conveyance of free and clear title or the issuance of title insurance policies. Goldome Savings Association held the primary mortgage on the first phase of the Polynesian Isles Development. This mortgage encumbered unit weeks sold by the Development. Respondent failed to obtain partial releases from Goldome of the mortgages on 331 unit weeks which closed in 1984, and therefore the sale of these weeks closed without free and clear title. Deeds to the 331 unit weeks were recorded without disclosure of the underlying mortgage. Title insurance policies were not issued on 329 of these unit weeks as a result of the failure to obtain releases. Respondent Weldon was the general partner who was in charge of legal matters, closings and title insurance. He also supervised the general manager of Polynesian Isles with his other general partner, Richard Barcley. It was Weldon's general practice to sign escrow affidavits in blank and to rely on his employees to insure that they were used properly at closings. The general manager of the development during 1984 was Frank Cuyler. Respondent terminated Cuyler when he learned that Cuyler had agreed to an unfavorable change in the terms of Goldome's mortgage as an inducement to obtaining financing for phase II of the development, and had failed to report such change to Respondent, or obtain his approval. The effect of the change which was agreed to by Cuyler was to increase the amount the development had to pay to Goldome for a partial release on each unit-week from $1800 to approximately $3800. When it became apparent that it was not financially feasible for the development to pay this increased amount for releases, Cuyler simply proceeded to close on 331 unit-weeks without releases. Respondent was unaware of this practice, and when it came to his attention he immediately gave instructions that it be discontinued, and terminated Cuyler. In addition, he raised approximately $1.4 million, including $300,000 of his own money, to obtain the releases on these 331 unit-weeks, and to cure any mortgage default. However, the evidence does not establish that releases were ever obtained.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Petitioner enter a Final Order assessing an administrative penalty against Respondent Bailey M. Weldon in the amount of $10,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 1988. APPENDIX (DOAH Case No. 86-1003) Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1.(a)-(c) Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 1(d) Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 1(e) Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 1(f)-(g) Adopted in Finding of Fact 5 1(h)-(i) Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 2(a)-(b) Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 2(c)-(e) Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. 2(f) Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. 2(g)-(h) Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. 2(i)-(j) Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. 2(k) Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Rejected since this is a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 3A Rejected as irrelevant to the charges in this case. 3B Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 3C Adopted in Findings of Fact 3, 5. 3D Adopted in Finding of Fact 3, assuming typographical error of 229 which should be 329. 3E Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 3F(a) Rejected in Finding of Fact 7. 3F(b) Rejected as not based upon competent substantial evidence in the record. 3F(c) Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 6, 7 and 8. 3F(d) Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 4, 6. COPIES FURNISHED: Pamela S. Leslie, Esquire Eric H. Miller, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Charles Edwin Ray, Esquire 6534 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, Florida 33707 E. James Kearney Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Van B. Poole Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Joseph A. Sole General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is, and at all times material to this matter has been, registered with the Real Estate Commission as a real estate broker. The Respondent has been the broker in charge of Lynn Real Estate Company. From approximately January 6, 1976 until February 14, 1977, Jacqueline McNabb was associated as an independent contractor with Lynn Real Estate and with the Respondent. McNabb was at that time registered with the Real Estate Commission as a real estate salesman. She is now registered as a broker. McNabb's relationship with the Respondent is set out in a contract which was received in evidence at the hearing as Petitioner's Exhibit 1. Paragraph 6 of the contract provides: The fees usually and customarily charged by the broker shall be charged for any service performed hereunder, unless broker shall advise the salesman of any special contract relating to any particular transaction he undertakes to handle. When the salesman shall perform any service hereunder, whereby a fee is earned, said fee shall, when collected, be divided between the broker and the salesman, in which division the salesman shall receive sixty percent and the broker shall receive the balance. In the event that two or more salesmen participate in such a service, or claim to have done so, the amount of the fee over that accruing to the broker shall be divided between the participating salesmen according to agreement between them, or by arbitration. In no case shall the broker be liable to the salesman for any fee unless the same shall have been collected from the party for whom the service was per- formed. Paragraph 8 of the contract provides: This contract, and the association created hereby, may be terminated by either party hereto, at any time upon notice given to the other; but the rights of the parties to any fee, which accrued prior to said notice, shall not be divested by the termination of this contract. On February 14, 1977, the Respondent duly terminated the contract with Ms. McNabb, as the result of a conflict which is not relevant to this proceeding. The Respondent immediately wrote to the Real Estate Commission advising that McNabb was no longer associated with him. Ms. McNabb testified at the hearing that the contract was terminated on February 15, but it is clear from the evidence that she was mistaken. While she was under contract with the Respondent, McNabb obtained a listing for the Respondent for the sale of property owned by a Mr. Davidson. The property was listed on a Multiple Listing Service. No contract for the sale of the property had been obtained prior to the time that McNabb's contract with the Respondent was terminated. On February 16, 1977, Ms. Jean Krueger, a registered real estate salesman employed by Tamarac Realty obtained a contract for purchase of the property. The contract was written at approximately 4:45 P.M. on February 15, and she immediately called the Respondent's office so that they would wait for her to get there with the contract before the office was closed for the day. Ms. Krueger delivered the contract to the Respondent, Mr. Davidson accepted it, and the transaction ultimately closed. Ms. McNabb learned that a contract had been obtained on the Davidson property approximately 3 days after the contract was signed. She made both written and oral demand upon the Respondent for a share of the commission. The Respondent, after consulting representatives of the Real Estate Commission, representatives of the St. Petersburg Board of Realtors, and legal counsel, declined to give McNabb any share of the commission. The Respondent did not know at the time that he terminated his contract with McNabb that a contract would be obtained for sale of the Davidson property. Ms. Krueger, the salesman who obtained the contract had never met the Respondent prior to taking the contract for sale to him, the day after McNabb's contract was terminated. During the course of this proceeding the Respondent has been cooperative in providing copies of documents to Ms. McNabb. The Respondent has no history of complaints being made against him to the Florida Real Estate Commission, and it does not appear that he has in the past refused to pay any salesman a commission to which the salesman was entitled.
The Issue Whether the Respondent is guilty on six counts of charging an advance fee for the listing of time-share estates for sale, in violation of Section 721.20(4), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a corporation organized under the laws of Arkansas and was authorized by the Florida Secretary of State to transact business in the State of Florida from November 1991 through December 1997. Respondent's main office is now located in Mountain Home, Arkansas. Respondent's credit card terminals are in Arkansas. Respondent has an escrow and operating account in Mountain Home, Arkansas. Respondent hired Jack McClure to open and operate its Florida office. Jack McClure held a Florida real estate broker's license. National Resort Mart conducted business from its Florida office in Kissimmee, Florida, until McClure's death in December 1997. Respondent opened and maintained escrow and operating accounts in Florida from 1992 through 1997 for its Florida business. The Florida office was limited to the activities of time-share real estate sales. The Respondent did not list time- shares, nor collect any advance fees for listing time-shares at its Kissimmee, Florida, branch office. Global Title Company of Naples, Florida, conducts the closings for Respondent for the majority of their Florida time- share sales. Respondent advertised its Florida office in its direct mail brochure, sent to Florida time-share owners, with the statement: "Our Orlando office is situated only seven miles from Disney World." Ms. Valnecia Williams of Madison, Florida, owns a time- share unit at Cypress Point Resorts in Central Florida. Williams received a mailed "brochure" from Respondent's home office which advised her that Respondent was in the business of buying and selling time-shares. Based on the Respondent's direct mail flyer, Williams called the Kissimmee, Florida, telephone number to find out information related to her listing. Apparently, the call was automatically switched to the home office. She received some initial information. Several weeks later she called the Respondent's Arkansas office and talked to a different salesperson. Williams agreed to list her time-share, Cypress Pointe Resort, Unit 5206, Week 37, with Respondent on March 5, 1997, at an asking price of $12,9000 in an open listing for a period of a year. Consideration was in the form of a seven percent of gross sale of the unit, or a $750 minimum commission, to be paid to Respondent at the closing of the sale. Respondent charged an advance fee of $439 from Ms. Williams of Madison, Florida, at the time she listed her Florida time-share period at Cypress Point Resort for sale with Respondent. Williams authorized Scott Fisher, Respondent's salesperson in Arkansas to charge the refundable advertising and marketing fee of $439 to Williams' USAA Federal Savings Bank charge card. Williams was not pleased with the service provided by Respondent and, on or about July 28, 1997, demanded a refund from the Respondent. Sometime within the next two months Respondent complied with the request and refunded the fee by crediting Williams' charge card with the same amount. Kim Collins of Faith, North Carolina, owns a time-share unit at Westgate Lakes, Orlando, Florida. Collins received brochures from Respondent's home office seeking a listing for her time-share unit in Florida, approximately one year later. Collins called Respondent at an "800" number which was automatically forwarded to Respondent's main office in Arkansas. Eventually, Collins decided to use Respondent's services and borrowed the money from her mother to pay the advance fee and sign the listing contract. Respondent collected an advance fee from Mr. and Mrs. Richard Collins of Faith, North Carolina, of $439 at the time they listed their Florida time-share period at Westgate Lakes, Orlando, for sale with Respondent, by mail and check to the Respondent's main office in Arkansas. Collins' time-share has been listed for sale with Respondent since July 1, 1996. Dan Coffey of Jacksonville, Florida, owns a time-share unit at Orange Lake in Central Florida. Coffey received a brochure from Respondent's home office and called for more information. Coffey agreed to list his unit for sale with Respondent on October 14, 1996, at a negotiable price of $12,900. Respondent collected an advance fee from Mr. and Mrs. Daniel Coffey of Jacksonville, Florida, of $439 at the time they listed their Florida time-share period of Orange Lake Resort, Orlando, Florida, for sale with Respondent. In like manner, Respondent collected an advance fee from Mr. and Mrs. Rick Rogers of Maumee, Ohio, at the time they listed their Florida time-share period with Respondent. Respondent also collected an advance fee from Mr. and Mrs. Donald Gordon of Pensacola, Florida, at the time they listed their Florida time-share period with Respondent. Respondent collected an advance fee from Mr. and Mrs. William Budai of Duquesne, Pennsylvania, of $539 at the time they listed their Florida time-share period at Westgate Villas, Kissimmee, Florida, for sale with Respondent. The contract signed by each complainant was titled "Listing Agreement." The Listing Agreement between the time- share owner of the Florida unit and Respondent was for the listing of their time-share for sale for a percent of gross sale of the unit to be paid at the closing, with an advance fee payable immediately. All transactions between the owners and Respondent were made through the Respondent's home office in Arkansas. No advance fee was collected within the boundaries of the State of Florida. Complainants Collins and Coffey did not receive refunds of the advance fees they paid to Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, enter a final order that: Finds Respondent guilty of six violations of Section 721.20(4), Florida Statutes. Respondent pay a penalty of $10,000 per violation for each of the six violations, to be paid within thirty (30) days of the entry of the final order. That Respondent refund $439 each to Kim Collins and Daniel Coffey, to be paid within thirty (30) days of the entry of the final order. That Respondent cease and desist from collecting advance fees for the listing of time-share periods for Florida residents and/or Florida time-share units. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Mary Denise O'Brien, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 James H. Gillis, Esquire James H. Gillis Associates, P.A. 8424 Pamlico Street Tallahassee, Florida 32817-1514 William Woodyard, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Philip Nowick, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condos, and Mobile Homes Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether the Petitioner qualifies for award of attorney's fees pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Professional Regulation, Florida Real Estate Commission, charged the Respondents (Petitioners in this case) with four counts of violating Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes in an administrative complaint. The Respondents asked for a formal hearing in a timely fashion. Case number 85-1825 went to formal hearing and a Recommended Order was entered on November 15, 1985. The Recommended Order found that the Respondents were guilty of one count of violating Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by forging a contract. The Recommended Order recommended suspension of the Respondents' license for six months, but that the suspension be suspended upon payment of a civil penalty of $1,000. The Board rejected the Respondents' (Petitioners in this case) exceptions and entered a Final Order on January 30, 1986 rejecting the Respondents' exceptions and adopting the Hearing Officer's findings, conclusions and penalty. No appeal was taken of the Final Order.
