Findings Of Fact On November 4, 1982, the Petitioner, Enterprise Outdoor Advertising, Inc., submitted applications for permits for two signs facing Interstate No. 4 (hereafter I-4) near the intersection of I-4 and 50th Street in Tampa, Florida. The specific location of the proposed signs is described as: Sec. 205 E/B .02 F/W Interstate I-4 50th Street and I-4 Sec. 205 E/B .02 F/E Interstate I-4 50th Streetand I-4 Both applications were disapproved by the Department of Transportation on November 9, 1982. The two signs for which Petitioner sought permits were to be located on a piece of property owned by Mr. E. B. Rood (hereafter referred to as Rood property). The Rood property is located adjacent to I-4, east of 50th Street, which runs north and south. The west facing sign application (see Respondent's Exhibit 11) was denied by the Department of Transportation because of a conflicting existing sign, Permit No. 7716-12, held by Foster and Kleiser, Intervenor. Permit No. 7716-12 was for a westerly facing sign physically located on the Rood property, pursuant to a lease between Intervenor and E. B. Rood. (See Respondent's Exhibit 4.) On November 3, 1982, Mr. E. B. Rood provided written notice to Foster and Kleiser that he was cancelling the lease. By the terms of the lease, the Foster and Kleiser sign then had to be removed within 30 days. On November 9, 1982, when the Petitioner's application was denied, the sign erected pursuant to Permit No. 7716-12 was still physically standing on the Rood property. Sometime prior to December 3, 1982, the sign was removed by Foster and Kleiser and the Department of Transportation was notified that the sign had been dismantled. (See Respondent's Exhibit 9.) Subsequent to dismantling its west facing sign, the Intervenor, Foster and Kleiser, applied for and received a permit for a westerly facing sign on a piece of property adjacent to I-4 just west of 50th Street and the Rood property. This second piece of property, located west of the Rood property, is referred to as the Bize property. At the time Foster and Kleiser applied for the westerly facing sign permit on the Bize property, there were no pending applications for a conflicting sign, and the previous conflicting sign on the Rood property had been dismantled. The application filed by Petitioner for a permit for an easterly facing sign on the Rood property was denied because of a conflicting permit, No. AG558- Permit AG558-12 was for a sign on the Bize property which would face east adjacent to I-4. At the time of Petitioner's application on November 4, 1982, no sign had actually been erected pursuant to Permit No. AG558-12. Permit No. AG558-12 had been issued to Foster and Kleiser in February, 1982, pursuant to an application accompanied by a written lease containing the purported signature of Mr. John T. Bize, the named lessor. (See Respondent's Exhibit 6.) Mr. John T. Bize died on January 1, 1977, and, therefore, was deceased on February 19, 1982, the date of the lease submitted by Foster and Kleiser with its application for Permit No. AG558-12. The only witness signature appearing on the lease was that of Thomas Marc O'Neill. Mr. O'Neill did not observe or witness the lessor sign the lease and felt, at the time he signed, that he was witnessing the signature of Ronald L. Westberry, who signed the lease on behalf of Foster and Kleiser. At the time he signed as a witness, Mr. O'Neill was and continues to be an employee of Foster and Kleiser. Subsequent to its disapproval of Petitioner's application for an easterly facing sign permit, the Department of Transportation was informed by Petitioner of the invalid lease on which Permit No. AG558-12 had been issued. By letter dated November 17, 1982, the Department notified Foster and Kleiser of the invalid lease and gave Foster and Kleiser 30 days within which to correct the problem. On November 22, 1982, the Department received a new lease for the Bize property and sign permit AG558-12. The new lease contained the following addendum: Effective date of lease shall be the of [sic] closing of purchase of said property or erection of signs, which- ever is first. There was no further evidence of the actual effective date of the lease. The Department of Transportation has a policy of requiring, with an application for a sign permit, a lease or other written evidence that the landowner has given permission to use his property for outdoor advertising purposes.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter a Final Order denying the Petitioner's two applications for outdoor advertising sign permits. DONE and ENTERED this 20 day of June, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARVIN E. CHAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael A. Houllis, Esquire 10525 Park Boulevard North Seminole, Florida 33542 Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Steven L. Selph, Esquire Post Office Drawer 1441 St. Petersburg, Florida 33731 Mr. Paul Pappas Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact On November 3, 1982, outdoor advertising sign permits AR946-06 and AK947-06 were issued by the Department of Transportation to Sandy Advertising Company. The permits were for a location on the west (north) side of U.S. Highway 90 approximately two miles east of its intersection with U.S. Highway 29 within the city limits of Pensacola, Florida. Sandy Advertising Company transferred those permits to Lamar Advertising Company of Pensacola, Inc. Annual renewal payments have been made each year in a timely manner by Lamar Advertising Company of Pensacola, Inc. No permit tags have been displayed at the Lamar sites and no sign has been built or maintained at the Lamar sites since issuance of the permits. Without having submitted an application for a permit to the Department of Transportation, Outdoor Media of Pensacola, Inc., obtained a building permit from the City of Pensacola for the erection of an outdoor advertising sign located in Escambia County approximately 3,790 feet east of State Road 296 on the north side of U.S. Highway 90. Pursuant to the building permit, Outdoor Media erected a sign at that location. The sign had an east and a west face and was less than 500 feet from the site for which permits AK946-06 and AK947-06 were issued. Each face of the sign required a separate permit from the Department of Transportation. Learning of the erection of Outdoor Media's sign, the Department notified Petitioner to remove it. Instead Outdoor Media applied for two sign permits for each face of the sign. On August 8, 1988, the Department of Transportation received Petitioner's applications for a state outdoor advertising permit. The applications were for each face of the sign located on U.S. 90 (Scenic Highway), a federal aid primary highway in Pensacola, Escambia County, Florida. The applications were denied on the ground that two other permits, permit AK946- 06 and permit AK947-06, had been issued to Lamar Advertising of Pensacola, Inc., for a location on the same side of the highway within one thousand feet of Petitioner's site. The spacing impediment caused by the earlier permits is the sole basis for denial of Petitioner's permit applications by the Department of Transportation. Petitioner meets all other permit requirements. In 1984, the legislature extensively revised Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. See Chapter 84-227, Laws of Florida. Of particular concern in this proceeding are the changes to Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, and whether those changes apply to permits AK946-06 and AK947-06. The revisions to this section introduced very specific tag display as well as sign erection and maintenance requirements for all permits. The revisions increased the fee schedules and provided that all permits expire annually on January 15. Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, as amended states in part: (5)(a) For each permit issued, the department shall furnish to the applicant a serially numbered permanent metal permit tag. The permittee is responsible for maintaining a valid permit tag on each permitted sign facing at all times. The tag shall be securely attached to the sign facing or, if there is no facing, on the pole nearest the highway; and it shall be attached in such a manner as to be plainly visible from the main-traveled way. The permit will become void unless the permit tag is properly and permanently displayed at the permitted site within 30 days after the date of permit issuance. If the permittee fails to erect a completed sign on the permitted site within 270 days after the date on which the permit was issued, the permit will be void, and the department may not issue a new permit to that permittee for the same location for 270 days after the date on which the permit became void. (b) If a permit tag is lost, stolen, or destroyed, the permittee to whom the tag was issued must apply to the department for a replacement tag. Upon receipt of the application accompanied by a service fee of $3, the department shall issue a replacement permit tag. A permit is valid only for the location specified in the permit. Valid permits may be transferred from one sign owner to another upon written acknowledgment from the current permittee and submittal of a transfer fee of $5 for each permit to be transferred. However, the maximum transfer fee for any multiple transfer between two outdoor advertisers in a single transaction is $100. A permittee shall at all times maintain the permission of the owner or other persons in lawful control of the sign site to have and maintain a sign at such site. (8)(a) All licenses and permits expire annually on January 15, and all license and permit renewal fees are required to be submitted to the department by no later than January 15. On or before November 1 of each year, the department shall send to each permittee a notice of fees due for all permits which were issued to him prior to September 30. Such notice shall list the permits and the permit fees due for each sign facing. The permittee shall, no later than January 1 of each year, advise the department of any additions, deletions, or errors contained in the notice. Permit tags which are not renewed shall be returned to the department shall be accounted for by the permittee in writing, which writing shall be submitted with the renewal fee payment. (b) If a permittee has not submitted his fee payment by January 15, the department shall, no later than February 1, send a notice of violation to the permittee, requiring the payment of the permit fee within 30 days after the date of the notice and payment of a delinquency fee equal to 10 percent of the original amount due or, in the alternative to these payments, requiring the filing of a request for an administrative hearing to show cause why his sign should not be subject to immediate removal due to expiration of his license or permit. If the permittee submits payment as required by the violation notice, his license or permit will be automatically reinstated and such reinstatement will be retroactive to January 15th. If the permittee does not respond to the notice of violation within the 30-day period, the department shall remove the sign without further notice and without incurring any liability as a result of such removal. (9)(a) A permit shall not be granted for any sign for which a permit had not been granted by the effective date of this act unless such sign is located at least: One thousand five hundred feet from any other permitted sign on the same side of the highway, if on an interstate highway. One thousand feet from any other permitted sign on the same side of the highway, if on a federal-aid primary highway. The minimum spacing provided in this paragraph does not preclude the permitting V-type, back-to-back, side- to-side, stacked, or double-faced signs at the permitted sign site. A permit shall not be granted for a sign pursuant to this chapter to locate such sign on any portion of the interstate or federal-aid primary highway system, which sign: Exceeds 50 feet in sign structure height above the crown of the main- traveled way, if outside an incorporated area; Exceeds 65 feet in sign structure height above the crown of the main- traveled way, if inside an incorporated area; or Exceeds 950 square feet of sign facing including all embellishments. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed so as to cause a sign which is conforming on the effective date of this act to become nonconforming. The effective date(s) of the amendments to Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, is stated in Section 27 of Law 84-227. Section 27 specifically and explicitly made permits issued prior to June 30, 1984 subject to the new provisions of Law 84-227. Section 27 states: This act shall take effect October 1, 1984, except that the amendments to Section 479.07 F.S. shall take effect July 1, 1984; however, any permit or license which is valid and applicable as of June 30, 1984, shall remain valid and applicable until January 15, 1985, unless the license or permit earlier expires or is revoked. [Emphasis supplied]. In spite of the language of Section 27, it is DOT's interpretation that for permits issued prior to July 1, 1984, permittees are not required to display tags within thirty (30) days and erect signs within 270 days as provided in Section 479.07(5)(a), Florida Statutes, effective July 1, 1984. DOT nonetheless requires pre-1984 permits to comply with Sections 479.07(5)(b) and (8)(a), Florida Statutes. While DOT's interpretation is not in writing and has not been promulgated as a rule pursuant to Sections 120.54 or 120.55, Florida Statutes, it is applied statewide and has been held to be an invalid unpromulgated rule in Case NO. 5227R, Final Order issued December 29th, 1988. DOT relies upon the definition of "non-conforming" signs given in Section 479.01(12), Florida Statutes. Section 479.01(12), Florida Statutes, states in part: `Nonconforming sign' means a sign which was lawfully erected but which does not comply with the land use, setback, size, spacing, and lighting provisions of state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance passed at a later date or a sign which was lawfully erected but which later fails to comply with state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance due to changed conditions. [Emphasis supplied.] 1/ DOT does not rely upon the exceptions listed in Section 479.16, Florida Statutes, as amended by Chapter 84-227. The exceptions are numerous, but do not specifically enumerate "Pre-July 1, 1984 permits." It is DOT's view that permits issued before July 1, 1984, are valid with or without a sign being erected or tags maintained or displayed. These "secret signs" can only be discovered after the application is submitted and DOT checks its computer records. The effect of DOT's interpretation is that pre- 1984 outdoor advertising sign permits can exist into perpetuity without the holder thereof ever erecting a sign or posting a metal tag as long as the permittee renews its permit. This interpretation is directly opposed to the legislature's purpose in enacting the 1984 amendments, i.e., the prevention of advertisers stockpiling unused sites and permits. Moreover, this interpretation is contrary to the pre- or post-1984 statutory language and is not a reasonable interpretation of the statute. DOT bases it's interpretation on the ground that the constitution prohibits the retroactive application of the 1984 amendments to permits existing prior to the effective date of those amendments. DOT did not offer any evidence as to the accuracy of its view on the requirements of the constitution. Failing such evidentiary support, DOT has failed to carry its burden of proof when utilizing an unpromulgated rule on a case by case basis. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties to and subject matter of this cause. Section 120.57(1) Florida Statutes. Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, was amended by Chapter 84-227, Laws of Florida, to require that parties obtaining outdoor advertising permits post their permit tags within thirty (30) days and erect their signs within two hundred seventy (270) days or their permits would automatically become void. The amendment became effective July 1, 1984. The amendment also expressly and explicitly provided for treatment of pre-July 1, 1984 permits by stating" . . . any permit or license which is valid and applicable as of June 30, 1984, shall remain valid and applicable until January 15, 1985, unless the license or permit earlier expires or is revoked. [Emphasis supplied]. Section 479.01(12) only makes exceptions for nonconforming "signs lawfully erected." Section 479.07(9)(c) only provides that nothing in subsection (9), pertaining to spacing requirements or permitting of new signs after July 1, 1984, may be construed to cause a sign which is conforming on the effective date of the Act to become nonconforming. See the definition of "sign" contained in Section 479.01(14), Florida Statutes, and of "erect" contained in Section 479.01(4), Florida Statutes. However, in spite of the clear language of the statutes, DOT interprets the term "permitted signs" as including permits issued prior to July 1, 1984, but which have no sign erected on the site. DOT has placed an interpretation upon the statutes that is not apparent from their language. The plain language of Sections 479.01(12) and 479.07(9)(c) only applies to signs which have been constructed on the permit site. The sections do not apply where no sign has been constructed. Since no signs were ever erected on the sites covered by permit AK946-06 and AK947-06 neither Section 479.01(12) nor 479.07(9)(c) applies to Lamar's permits. Further, DOT interprets the amendment to Section 479.07, now codified as Section 479.07(5)(a), requiring permit display and sign erection within a specified time period, to be applicable only to permits initially issued after the effective date of July 1, 1984. The agency has not enforced that subsection against preexisting permits and renewals of such preexisting permits, irrespective of whether or not a sign has ever been erected on the permitted site. However, the agency has applied and enforced against preexisting permits all other portions of the amendments, including but not limited to the mandatory recurring uniform annual January 15 renewal date and increased renewal fee with regard to preexisting permits. The agency has taken this approach on the grounds that the constitution prohibited the amendment from being applied retroactively to such preexisting permits. In Administrative Case NO. 88-5227R, this interpretation was held to be an invalid unpromulgated rule. However, agencies have the choice of properly promulgating rules and applying them with the full force and effect of law or of fully explicating those policies by demonstrating the policies' reasonableness and factual accuracy on a case by case basis in Section 120.57 proceedings. McDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance, 346 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Amos v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 444 So.2d (Fla, 1st DCA 1983); Gulf Coast Home Health Services Of Florida, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 513 So.2d 704 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). As noted earlier, the sole reason for DOT's policy was that it was required by the constitution. Such a bare bones claim as "the constitution requires it" is tantamount to the claim that was asserted in Florida Cities Water Company v. Florida Public Service Commission, 384 So.2d 1280 (Fla. 1980) that a previous statutory interpretation was "wrong as a matter of law." In Florida Cities, no record foundation was made for the non-rule policy being followed in that case. The Florida Supreme Court held that such a rationale was not sustainable absent adequate record support for the application of non-rule agency policy. In this case, DOT has failed to affirmatively show the reasonableness and factual accuracy of the policy that sign permits which were issued prior to July 1, 1984, should not be subject to Section 479.07(5), Florida Statutes, enforcement and should be treated as if they constituted, erected and maintained signs for purposes of Section 479.07(9), Florida Statutes. It is doubtful that DOT could ever show the accuracy of its view of the constitution. The case law in the area clearly establishes that permits such as these are not property in the constitutional sense. Such permits do not confer any right, estate or vested interest, and are revocable at the will of the legislature. Such permits are also subject to new permit conditions. State ex rel First Presbyterian Church of Miami v. Fuller, 187 So. 148 (Fla. 1939); City of Miami Beach v. Deauville Operating Corp., 129 So.2d 185 ( Fla. 3d DCA 1961) and Kawasaki of Tampa, Inc. v. Calvin, 348 So.2d 897 ( Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Moreover, the 1984 amendments to Chapter 479 do not require retroactive application to be applied to permits AK946-06 and AK947-06. The new permit conditions were applicable only upon the expiration of the old permits on January 15. Thereafter, the new permit conditions applied to the renewal. Therefore, since Lamar did not build any signs on the sites covered by either permit AK946-06 or AK947-06 within 270 days of its first renewal after the effective date of the statutory revisions to Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, and has not posted the required tags at the sites, permits AK946-06 and AK947-06 are void and cannot be used as a basis for denying Petitioner's sign applications. As in Florida Cities, having failed to establish the reasonableness and accuracy of its policy, the foregoing policy cannot form the basis of the permit denials. This is especially true in light of the fact that DOT's policy ignores the clear language of the statutory amendments.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order voiding Permits AK946-06 and AK947-06, held by Respondent, Lamar Advertising Company, Inc., and granting the applications of Outdoor Media of Pensacola, Inc. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of May, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 1990.
The Issue Whether Respondent's outdoor sign permit should be revoked because the original sign has been destroyed by an Act of God, as alleged by Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this sign permit dispute, Petitioner, Department of Transportation (DOT), seeks to revoke the permit for an off- premise outdoor advertising sign owned by Respondent, North Florida Pecan 1 & 2, Inc. (Respondent), on the grounds that the original sign was destroyed by a fire in June 1998, the newly rebuilt sign has lost its nonconforming status, and any rebuilt sign is now illegal. In response to these charges, Respondent contends that the fire that destroyed the sign was an act of criminal mischief or arson, rather than an Act of God, and thus the sign still qualifies for a nonconforming status. The sign in question is located 12.2 miles north of the Flagler County line on the west side of Interstate 95 (I-95) facing south, and is perhaps a mile or so south of the intersection of State Road 207 and I-95 (intersection) in St. Johns County, Florida. Respondent does not own the property where the sign is located, and it conducts no other business activities on that property. The property on which the sign is located is zoned Open Rural by St. Johns County (County), and it is not designated predominately for commercial or industrial uses by the County under the County's future land use map, comprehensive plan, or zoning ordinances. The sign is used to advertise Respondent's combination gas station and "open-area fruit market" located "just off" the intersection. The parties have stipulated that the sign was originally constructed more than 20 years ago before the current sign regulations became effective; under the present law, it would be a nonconforming sign and illegal. On May 27, 1998, a thunderstorm occurred in St. Johns County, resulting in between one-quarter and one-half inch of rainfall in the area. Due to a lightning strike on a tree, a 2-acre fire started approximately 1,000 feet southwest of the intersection in the vicinity of the sign. Although firefighters believed they had "knocked out" the fire within a day or two, the fire continued to smoulder under the dampened top layer of organic matter for several weeks until June 15, 1998, when it "worked its way back to the surface," broke out again, and cleared the containment line of the earlier fire. Aided by a light wind from the southeast and extremely dry conditions, the fire quickly spread eastward at the rate of 1,000 to 1,500 feet every 15 minutes and consumed several hundred acres, including the land on which Respondent's sign was located, before it was brought under control. That fire is commonly referred to as the Fort Peyton fire. In determining the cause of the Fort Peyton fire, forestry officials could not find any indicators of arson, and visual burn patterns clearly indicated that the new fire's origin was where the May 27 fire had begun. Therefore, it was officially classified as a "rekindle or breakout" of the May 27 fire, which was started by lightning. Put another way, the fire was the result of an Act of God, which is "the sudden manifestation and forces of nature." On either May 30 or June 5, 1998, depending on whether court or forestry records are accepted as being the most accurate, a fire began in Flagler Estates, which, "as the crow flies," lies approximately 12 to 15 miles southeast of the Fort Peyton fire. The Flagler Estates fire, however, was the result of an unattended illegal burn which was started by three individuals and went out of control. The fire was brought under control the same evening by firefighters, but only after some 450 surrounding acres were destroyed. The three individuals were later charged with arson. Respondent established that the prevailing winds during May and June 1998 were from the southeast and that "spoilers" or "floaters" (hot debris) from existing fires can sometimes float in the air and ignite new fires several miles away. Indeed, Respondent's investigator observed spoilers from inland fires floating through the air some 8 or 9 miles out in the Atlantic Ocean while he was fishing during that period of time. Accordingly, Respondent contends that it is just as likely that a spoiler floated northeastward from the Flagler Estates fire on May 30, 1998, and ignited the Fort Peyton blaze, some 12 to 15 miles away. If this theory is accepted, it would mean that the Fort Peyton fire would be attributable to arson, and not to an Act of God. The foregoing assumption has been rejected for several reasons. First, spoilers from the Flagler Estates fire did in fact ignite several spot fires in the area, but all of these spot fires occurred on the same day as the fire started and were within an eighth of an mile from the Flagler Estates perimeter. Second, it is highly unlikely that a spoiler would float up to 15 miles and then lie dormant for two weeks before igniting the Fort Peyton fire. Finally, the theory goes counter to the more persuasive evidence given by the supervising forester who investigated the Fort Peyton fire and concluded that it was an outbreak of the earlier fire that was started on May 27, 1998. After the sign was destroyed, Respondent rebuilt the sign at the same location using substantially the same materials that had composed the sign before it burned. However, the materials used to rebuild the sign were not part of the sign structure which was burned in the Fort Peyton fire. The new sign is the same size, shape, and height of the destroyed sign.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order confirming that the outdoor advertising sign maintained by North Florida Pecan 1 & 2, Inc., under sign permit number BR 252-55 is illegal and must be removed. The permit should also be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of March, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this day 17th of March, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Department of Transportation ATTN: James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 J. Stephen Alexander, Esquire 19 Old Mission Avenue St. Augustine, Florida 32084 Robert M. Burdick, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Pamela S. Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact The Department of Transportation cited National Advertising Company for the maintenance of eight (8) outdoor advertising signs without current permit tags in violation of spacing requirements. The subject signs are listed on Exhibit 1 attached hereto and are owned and maintained by Respondent. The subject signs are located along I-95 in the vicinity of Orlando, Florida. The subject signs had valid county tags for 1972. The subject signs had no tags for 1973, but by agreement between Respondent and Petitioner this lack of 1973 tags has been disregarded. In the fall of 1974 Petitioner issued Respondent county tags for the subject signs. When affixing these tags to the signs Respondent discovered that there was some confusion over whether the signs were in the county or were in the city limits of Orlando. Respondent went to the City offices and asked if the signs were in the city limits and was told that the City did not know. Respondent then went to the County offices and was told that the signs were in the city. Respondent them communicated this information to Mr. Kennedy, an employee of the Department of Transportation in the DeLand office who agreed that the tags would not be put on the subject signs unless it was determined at some later date that the signs were actually located in the county and not in the city. At the time of this agreement Respondent was in possession of the 1974 county tags and was prepared to affix then to the subject signs. Because of the agreement however, the tags were not affixed to the subject signs. Confusion persisted over the question of whether the signs were located inside or outside of the city limits. In the fall of 1975, Respondent submitted a permit application for annual renewal for the subject signs requesting city tags. Petitioner granted this application and in late 1975 issued city tags for the subject signs. These tags have since been affixed to the subject signs and remain there at the time of this hearing. Representatives of Petitioner visited the Orange County Zoning Department on February 11, 1976 in attempt to determine whether the subject signs were located in the county or in the city. Petitioner's representatives determined that the signs were located in the county. During 1974 and 1975 there was a great deal of confusion on the part of both Petitioner and Respondent concerning the question of whether the subject signs were in Orange County or in the City of Orlando. Respondent, in good faith, diligently attempted to resolve the confusion. It appears however, that Petitioner and Respondent were not able to resolve the confusion until early 1976 and shortly before this hearing. Respondent made no application for 1976 permits for the subject signs before May 13, 1976.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Gary Dotson, d/b/a Castaway Point, holds outdoor advertising sign permit number 6637-2 authorizing a sign on U.S. 1, 1.3 miles north of SR 516, facing west, in Brevard County, Florida. This location is inside the road right-of-way of the City of Palm Bay. At the time when the subject sign Permit was issued by the Department, the City of Palm Bay had given permission to erect a sign at this location. This permission was for a period beginning on February 15, 1979, and expiring in April of 1980. A sign had been erected at the site where the permit had been issued. This sign was erected by a previous owner, and when the Respondent bought Castaway Point the purchase included the sign. The sign which was authorized by the subject permit was removed by the City of Palm Bay after the City's permission for continued maintenance of this sign had expired. There is presently no authority from the City of Palm Bay for the Respondent to have a sign at the permitted site.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that permit number 6637-2 held by Gary Dotson, d/b/a Castaway Point, for a sign on US. 1, 1.3 miles north of SR 516, facing west, in Brevard County, Florida, be revoked. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER ENTERED this 6th day of March, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Haydon Burns Bldg., M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 Mr. Gary Dotson 3101 Bay Boulevard, N.E. Palm Bay, Florida 32905 Hon. Thomas E. Drawdy Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to an outdoor advertising sign permit to be located in an unzoned commercial/industrial area and whether the sign site qualified as an unzoned commercial/industrial area.
Findings Of Fact Lamar is in the business of erecting, operating and maintaining outdoor advertising signs in Northwest Florida. The proposed sign’s location was in Walton County along US Highway 331, .1 mile south of Bay Grove Road, a collector road. U.S. Highway 331 is a federal aid primary highway and therefore, a state permit is required for signs placed along its path. According to a Walton County zoning plan, the proposed sign’s location was in an area zoned Rural Village on both the Future Land Use Map and Land Development Regulations. The June 2006 version of the Walton County Land Development Code provides: F. Rural Village (RV): This district is a mixed use district which permits predominately residential development up to a maximum of two units per acre. Residential uses shall account for approximately 95 percent of the total land area within any area designated on the FLUM for this District. The remaining area may be utilized for related and compatible commercial uses. Commercial uses may occupy up to five percent of the total land area designated on the FLUM for this District. Commercial land uses shall be limited to collector and arterial road intersections, intersections of subdivision collectors and arterial or collector road, and areas that are specifically designated Commercial on the FLUM. Not more than 15 percent of the total frontage on both sides of a collector or arterial road shall be occupied by commercial uses within this district. The Walton County Land Development Code also defined general commercial activity as including inventory storage. The proposed sign’s location met the requirements for commercial use under the RV designation. Walton County certified to the Department that the designated parcel for the proposed outdoor advertising sign was Rural Village and that the primary use of the area under the current comprehensive plan was agriculture, general agriculture, residential, civic uses, and residential subdivision. Walton County also confirmed that the proposed outdoor advertising sign would be in compliance with all duly adopted local ordinances and would be issued the necessary County permit for such sign. The Walton County Property Appraiser’s website listed the usage of the proposed outdoor advertising sign location as a “service station.” The service station building was still on the property, but had not been used as such for a number of years. Billy Wayne Strickland, the state outdoor advertising administrator of the Department, processed the outdoor advertising permit applications submitted by Lamar. Mr. Strickland determined after a review of Lamar’s applications that the site, being designated as Rural Village with mixed uses allowed, met the need for evaluation under the use test for unzoned commercial or industrial areas contained in Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. The use test is set forth in Florida Statutes 479.02. Under the test, the Department examines a proposed sign’s location under the applicable current land use designation and future land use designation to determine if the outdoor advertising site meets the use criteria set forth in the statute for unzoned commercial and industrial areas. The use criteria for such unzoned property require that three commercial or industrial activities be located within 1600 feet of each other, with one of those activities located on the same side of the road and within 800 feet of the proposed sign’s location. Distances are measured from building to building. Additionally, the commercial or industrial activity must be visible from the highway. Mr. Strickland visited the property in order to determine if the proposed sign location met the requirements of the use test. He observed that the proposed sign’s site holds an abandoned-looking gas station and a house with a large fenced in area. Leaking fuel tanks made it unlikely the service station would be restored. There were several small, boarded-up, “fishing style cabins” associated with the fenced property. The fenced area had a sign posted for North Florida Development, Inc., a construction company. There was a number for the company listed on the sign. On a tree to the right of the fence was a sign that read “Private Road Keep Out.” In general, the area behind the fence appeared to be used for storage of building materials and equipment such as trucks and trailers. Except for the area behind the fence, the North Florida Development property was clearly visible from the highway. Mr. Strickland called the phone number on the sign and was informed that North Florida Development, Inc., that he was calling, was in Miramar Beach, Florida, and that North Florida Development was storing equipment and trucks at the U.S. Highway 331 location for a job they were doing in Destin. There was no one present at the house or the adjacent buildings. The North Florida Development buildings and fenced area were within 800 feet of the proposed sign’s location and were on the same side of the road as the proposed sign’s location. Because of the lack of activity, Mr. Strickland concluded that the North Florida Development property was not a commercial activity which was visible from the highway. On the opposite side of the Highway, Mr. Strickland observed two businesses within a 1600-foot zone that met the criteria of the use test. Additionally, while at the site, Mr. Strickland issued a Notice of Violation for the on-premises sign of North Florida Development. The Notice required the sign to be removed. Later, after the hearing in this matter, this action was dismissed by the Department. On November 29, 2006, the Department issued a written denial of the outdoor advertising sign site permit applications for the following reasons: (1) the sign site was not permitted under the local land use designation of site per Section 479.111(2), Florida Statutes, and (2) the sign site did not qualify as an unzoned commercial/industrial area per Section 479.01(23), Florida Statutes. On the morning of April 5, 2007, Mr. Strickland, again visited the proposed sign’s site. He observed essentially the same things he observed during his first visit to the location, except the large North Florida Development sign that had been on the entrance to the fenced area had been removed. Andrew White, a regional inspector with the Department, inspected the North Florida Development site on May 17, 2007, and photographed the area. The sign for North Florida Development had been removed, but the keep-out signs were still in place. Photographs taken from the street revealed a partial view of a storage trailer through the open fence. On the morning of June 6, 2007, just prior to the hearing, Mr. Strickland again visited the proposed sign’s location and observed no activity at the location. He could only see a trailer partially visible beyond the privacy fence. Larry Wayne Adkinson, vice president of North Florida Development and a general contractor licensed in Mississippi, lives and works on the property of the proposed sign’s location. Mr. Adkinson testified that the property totaled five and a-half or six acres and consisted of his home, his office, the service station and five fishing cabins. He and his business have been at this location for at least 12 years. Work has been delayed on repairing the service station based, in part, upon the fact that the state was seeking to condemn a portion of the property where the service station was located for the expansion of U.S. Highway 331. Mr. Adkinson uses the property as an inventory site, storing construction materials, heavy equipment, landscaping materials, and other bulk material related to his business. The site contained three semi-tractor trailers that were utilized to store construction materials, including doors, windows, and heavy equipment and equipment and materials for a landscape business owned by Mr. Adkinson. The landscape business stored tractor-trailers, small-equipment trailers, plants, brick pavers, scaffolding and rock molds. The site’s storage of inventory and business activity was very visible to people who lived in the neighborhood around the North Florida Development property. The visibility was such that, in 2006, the neighbors complained about the view to the County. The County, in turn, asked Mr. Adkinson to place a fence around the area to block the view of people passing through the area. Mr. Adkinson complied with the County’s request and built the privacy fence that Mr. Strickland observed. Mr. Adkinson also placed the company’s business sign on the fence to identify the property as North Florida Development’s business property. Most of the loading and unloading of material and equipment occurs in the early morning and evening hours. At those times, there is considerable activity at the site with trucks and equipment entering and leaving the property. Mr. Adkinson’s testimony was confirmed by the testimony of Chad Pickens, who routinely drives by the site during those hours. Mr. Strickland never visited the property during those busy hours, and therefore, did not observe the business activity associated with the site. Mr. Adkinson uses two of the fishing cabins as machine shops for his company’s equipment and tools. The shops contain drill presses, welding and repair equipment. Entry is gained through the rear doors of the cabins. He left the front of the cabins boarded up to prevent theft and storm damage. Mr. Adkinson also receives business mail at the U.S. Highway 331 location and has employees and job applicants report to that location. Clearly, the North Florida Development property is a viable and on-going business that conducts one of its business activities on the property on which the proposed sign is to be located. The activity is visible from the highway, although such activity ebbs and flows through the day. The property, therefore, meets the land use test requirements of Florida Statutes, and the Petitioner’s applications should be granted.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Department of Transportation enter a Final Order granting the applications for outdoor advertising sign permits filed by Lamar Advertising of Fort Walton Beach. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of December, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of December, 2007. COMPLETE COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Schwartz, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 James E. Moore, Esquire Post Office Box 1622 Crestview, Florida 32536 David M. Littlejohn, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 James C. Meyers Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Stephanie Kopelousos, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 57 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Alexis M. Yarbrough, General Counsel Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue Whether Petitioner's outdoor advertising sign permit applications should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, the parties' Prehearing Stipulation (which contains a "Statement of Admitted Facts"),1 and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner's Signs On or after July 21, 1998, Petitioner filed outdoor advertising sign permit applications for two signs2 (Petitioner's Signs) located on property it owns on the west side of Interstate 95 (I-95) within 660 feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way of I-95, one-half mile south of Northlake Boulevard, and north of Blue Heron Boulevard, in Palm Beach County, Florida. This area of I-95 has been a part of the interstate highway system since at least August of 1967. Palm Beach County is the local governmental entity with authority to adopt a comprehensive land use designation for the property on which Petitioner's Signs are located (Property). From the time the Signs were erected in 1987, through the present, the Property (on which Petitioner conducts no business activities) has been zoned or designated for residential, not predominantly commercial or industrial, use. Petitioner's Signs, each of which exceeds eight square feet in area, contain advertising messages for Petitioner. The messages can be read without visual aid by motorists of normal acuity traveling on I-95. Previously, the Signs indicated the Property was for sale, but they have not been used for such purpose since December 14, 1994. The Department denied Petitioner's permit applications because the Signs are located in an "unpermittable land use designation" inasmuch as the Property is designated for residential, not predominately commercial or industrial, use. Other Signs Subsequent to December 8, 1971, the effective date of Chapter 71-971, Laws of Florida,3 the Department has issued and/or renewed outdoor advertising sign permits for other signs located within 660 feet of the nearest edge of the interstate or federal-aid primary highway system, notwithstanding these signs' location in areas not designated primarily for commercial or industrial use. Signs Assigned Permit Numbers AZ346-35, AZ347-35, AY935-35, AY936-35, AY937-35, and AY938-35. Among these signs are six signs (three sign structures with two facings each) that, like Petitioner's Signs, are located on the west side of I-95, south of Northlake Boulevard and north of Blue Heron Boulevard, in an area designated for residential, not predominantly commercial or industrial, use. The Department has annually renewed the sign permits for these signs since at least 1973. The 1974 annual permit renewals are the earliest records the Department has for these signs. (The Department has neither an original, nor a copy of, the initial applications or the initial permits, for these signs.) The signs currently have the following permit numbers: AZ346-35, AZ347-35, AY935-35, AY936-35, AY937-35, and AY938-35. According to Palm Beach County Building records, these signs were all constructed before January 27, 1972, and four of the signs were constructed in the late 1960's (in or sometime after July of 1968). These signs are in the same location as when originally permitted, and that location has been zoned or designated for residential use since before the time the signs were constructed and permitted. Signs Assigned Permit Numbers AN661-35 and BG910-35 Two signs (one sign structure with two facings) located within 660 feet of the westerly right-of-way of I-95, south of Forest Hill Boulevard and north or Seventeenth Avenue North, in Palm Beach County, Florida, were permitted by the Department in August of 1984. This area of I-95 has been a part of the interstate highway system since at least April of 1976. The two signs were erected after August of 1984. They currently are assigned permit numbers AN661-35 and BG910-35. The initial outdoor advertising sign permit applications that were filed with the Department for these signs (in August of 1984), unlike the applications submitted by Petitioner in the instant case, indicated that the signs were to be located in an area that was "commercial or industrial zoned." On each application, the applicant "certif[ied] that the statements made and the information given in this application [were] true and correct." In accordance with the Department's standard operating procedure, a review of these applications was conducted by Department staff and the information contained therein, including that relating to the zoning of the area in which the signs were to be located, was determined to be accurate. Accordingly, the permits were issued. Based upon the evidence adduced at the final hearing in this case, it appears that, contrary to the determination made by the Department, the zoning information provided by the applicant was inaccurate inasmuch as the area in which the signs were to be located was actually (and still is) an unzoned residential area. Signs Assigned Permit Numbers AX549 and AX550 State Road 80 in Section 35, Township 43 South, Range 40 East, in Palm Beach County, Florida, has been part of the federal-aid primary system since at least January of 1973. There are two signs (one sign structure with two facings) that are located within 660 feet of the right-of-way of State Road 80 in Section 35, Township 43 South, Range 40 East, in Palm Beach County, Florida, in an area not designated for predominately commercial or industrial use (State Road 80 Signs). These signs currently are assigned permit numbers AX549 and AX550. The Department issued sign permits for the predecessors of the State Road 80 Signs (Predecessor Signs) on April 15, 1979. An examination of the initial outdoor advertising sign permit applications filed with the Department (in April of 1979) for the Predecessor Signs reveals that each application has the entry "8/67" in the space for showing the "date [the sign is] to be erected,"4 and has the handwritten notation, "grandfathered," on that portion of the application to be filled out by the Department. The Department uses the term "grandfathered" to refer to signs which existed legally prior to a change in the law rendering them nonconforming, but which, notwithstanding such change, are still treated as lawful (albeit nonconforming) signs. The Department has a policy of permitting or "grandfathering" signs that existed (in compliance with the then- existing law) prior to the effective date of the aforementioned January 27, 1972, agreement between the State of Florida and the United States Department of Transportation (which is referenced in Section 479.111(2), Florida Statutes), provided no changes are made to the signs. The State Road 80 Signs are in the same general location (but not the identical location) where the Predecessor Signs were located, and all of the property in that general location is now, and has been since before the Predecessor Signs were permitted, zoned or designated for some use other than commercial or industrial. In 1986, the property on which the Predecessor Signs were located was acquired (for $42,000.00, excluding attorney's fees and costs) by the Department as a result of a settlement reached by the Department and the property owner in an eminent domain proceeding. In recommending (in writing) that the Department settle the matter, the Department's trial attorney stated the following with respect to the Predecessor Signs: The settlement figure of $42,000.00 dollars is a reasonable Award in light of the real estate and severance damages. Due to the specific difficulties involved in this matter, for instance the importance of a particular type of advertising sign combined with the fact that this advertising sign was grandfathered in and since the sign has been put up, restrictions had occurred in Palm Beach County which would have prevented a similar sign from being put up. Accordingly all parties had to work within the constraints of the original sign location with slight adjustment and renovation in order to make effectively a new sign into a renovated sign for purposes of seeking whatever variance. As the trial attorney had suggested in his written recommendation, the Predecessor Signs, with the Department's approval, had been removed from their original location and reconstructed (in or about June of 1986) on a part of the property that was not subject to the eminent domain proceeding. Signs Along the Florida Turnpike State Road 91 (the Florida Turnpike) in Palm Beach County, Florida, was designated as a part of the National Highway System by the United States Congress on November 28, 1995. It thereupon was deemed by the Department to be a part of the federal-aid primary highway system in the state. Before November 28, 1995, starting at least as early as 1973, the Department had issued at least 95 sign permits for signs located in Palm Beach County, which were within 660 feet of the Florida Turnpike right-of-way and not located in areas zoned or designated for commercial or industrial use at the time the permits were issued. Many, or all, of these signs are still in areas not zoned or designated for commercial or industrial use. With the concurrence of the Federal Highway Administration, the Department did not require signs along the Florida Turnpike to meet the requirements applicable to signs located along federal-aid primary highway system roadways, provided a permit application for these signs was received by the Department prior to July 1, 1996. A sign located within 660 feet of the edge of the westerly right-of-way of the Florida Turnpike, south of Forest Hill Boulevard and north of Lake Worth Road (State Road 802), in Palm Beach County, Florida, was issued outdoor advertising sign permit number BM818 by the Department on May 28, 1996. The application for this permit had been received by the Department on May 8, 1996. At the time of the issuance of the permit, the sign was located in an area not zoned or designated for commercial or industrial use. The sign is presently in the same location, which continues to be not zoned or designated for commercial or industrial use.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order denying Petitioner's applications for outdoor advertising sign permits for his Signs. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May, 1999.
The Issue There are two separate issues in this case: (1) Whether Petitioner breached its contract with Respondent by not making payments for a sign lease, thereby resulting in the sign permit becoming invalid; and (2) Whether Petitioner constructed a roadside sign illegally, i.e., without a permit.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, SG Outdoor, is a company engaged in the business of outdoor advertising in Florida. Respondent is the State of Florida ("State") agency responsible for monitoring compliance with State and Federal laws relating to outdoor advertising. According to those laws, signs within 660 feet of primary or interstate roadways visible from those roadways are subject to advertising regulations. There is currently a 1,500-foot spacing requirement (up from 1,000 feet in 1984) between signs. Further, signs must be located on land zoned for commercial and industrial use. Petitioner owns two signs which are at issue in this proceeding. One of the signs is a single facing sign of wood construction with a seven-foot height above ground level. The sign is assigned Tag No. AU557. The sign is situated just off Interstate 4, .871 miles east of State Road 33 in Polk County, Florida. This sign will be referred to herein as the "Original Sign." The Original Sign was built in 1971 and was located, at all times relevant hereto, on land owned by Mrs. Ona Grimes until that land was purchased by the State in October 2002. Petitioner also constructed another sign at approximately the same location. This sign, referred to herein as the "New Sign," has a double-faced, single-metal pole and is considerably higher in height than the Original Sign. Both the Original Sign and the New Sign are located on property which DOT contends is zoned as "Pasture, with residence." However, Polk County did away with its zoning ordinance in March 2000 and replaced it with Land Use Districts. The current Land Use District designation for the site is Business Park Center (within the Green Swamp Area of Critical State Concern). There was no competent testimony at final hearing as to whether that designation constitutes commercial or industrial zoning for purposes of roadside signs. The Original Sign was purchased by Petitioner in 1991 and was located on the Grimes property. Petitioner entered into a Ground Lease with Grimes that had a term of 30 years at a payment of $1,500 per year. In 2002, DOT entered into negotiations with Grimes to purchase the property. When DOT purchases property on which a roadside sign already exists, DOT may take the sign by way of condemnation through eminent domain (sometimes referred to by DOT as a "Take"). In such cases, the State must reasonably compensate the sign owner for the taking of its sign. In the alternative, the State may assume the sign lease and become a lessor to the sign owner. In that case, the sign owner must make its lease payments directly to the State. On May 22, 2002, DOT sent a letter to Petitioner explaining that DOT was in the process of acquiring the right of way on which the Original Sign was located. DOT offered to purchase (or Take) the sign from Petitioner for $17,300. While that offer to Petitioner was pending, DOT went forward with the purchase of the Grimes property. The purchase agreement for the property was signed by Grimes on July 11, 2002. Four days later, a letter from DOT to Petitioner was issued which said: Subsequent to receiving agreement and signed ODA [out door advertising] disclaimer from the property owner, an offer has been made to SG Outdoor, Inc. for the purchase of the ODA structure. Negotiations are ongoing. However, the purchase of Grimes property did not occur immediately. Meanwhile, in August 2002, Grimes entered into an illegal lease with Lamar Advertising, giving Lamar the same rights it had already contracted away to Petitioner. Petitioner was unaware of the lease with Lamar at that time. Such a lease would have been in violation of the already-existing lease between Grimes and Petitioner. At almost the same time, a DOT memorandum indicated that DOT was still "involved in ongoing negotiations" with Petitioner concerning the sign. The Grimes property purchase (by DOT) finally closed on October 1, 2002, at which time DOT became the owner of the Grimes property. Because of this fact, Petitioner was supposed to make its annual lease payments to the State of Florida ("State") as the new owner. Stated differently, the State became Petitioner's new lessor. On October 14, 2002, Lamar Advertising filed a Sign Permit Application with the Polk County Building Division. The application was for approval of its sign on the Grimes property. The application included a copy of Lamar's lease with Grimes; the lease had a 10-year period and a payment of $4,000 per year.1 On July 8, 2003 (ten months after DOT purchased the property), Petitioner filed a permit application with Polk County for the New Sign. Petitioner did not, at that time, have permission from DOT to erect a new sign, but believed it could obtain that permission after the fact. Petitioner then went forward with the construction of the New Sign. Meanwhile, Petitioner sent Grimes a check in October 2003, for its lease payment for the period June 1, 2003, through May 30, 2004. By that time, the State already owned the Grimes property. A member of the Grimes family sent Petitioner's check back to Petitioner in January 2004, explaining that all payments should be made directly to the State. There is no evidence in the record as to whether Petitioner attempted to make a lease payment to the Department at that time or at any other time. In November 2003, DOT issued a certified letter to Petitioner addressing Sign Permit No. AU557 that said: On October 2, 2002, the above referenced parcel was purchased by the Florida Department of Transportation. Although the Department will honor an existing lease, it will not engage in any new lease agreements nor grant permission for the referenced sign to remain. Since any potential oral agreement with the previous owner has expired, the Department requests that the [Original] sign be removed. Clearly DOT was mistaken. Petitioner had a written, not oral, lease with the prior owner. In response, Petitioner sent DOT a copy of its Ground Lease with Grimes. At that time, Petitioner also asked for a meeting with DOT's acquisition director to continue negotiating a fair price for the Original Sign. Several months later (on July 9, 2004), DOT issued its Notice of Violation regarding the Original Sign. The notice said "that the outdoor advertising sign referenced above has been acquired by the Department" (rather than saying the Department had purchased the land). The notice directed Petitioner to immediately remove the sign from the premises. The notice was partially in error; DOT had actually acquired the land, not the sign. Petitioner was in breach of its lease with the State by failing to make lease payments as required by the lease which DOT had assumed. However, it is unclear as to whether, upon notice of receipt of the written lease, DOT had ever advised Petitioner to send its lease payments directly to the Department. The Notice of Administrative Hearing Rights attached to the DOT Notice of Violation indicates a deadline of 30 days from receipt of the Notice for filing such a request, i.e., on or about August 10, 2005. Petitioner responded to the Notice with another letter (dated July 14, 2009) explaining again that it had a valid lease with Grimes for the sign location. Petitioner's letter asked DOT to abate its violation notice and reinstate Petitioner's permit. It also stated that "[i]f the State decides not to acknowledge the Judicial process [the ongoing probate dispute with the Grimes family concerning the lease with Lamar] and still proceeds with the Notice of Violation, then upon receiving your next correspondence, we will exercise our privilege to request an administrative hearing." Petitioner contends that the quoted statement constituted its request for an administrative hearing. However, the plain reading of the statement indicates that it is a statement of future intent based upon future actions by DOT. DOT then issued a letter dated August 10, 2004, to Petitioner explaining that the permit for the Original Sign had been revoked. The letter directed Petitioner to remove the sign. The letter stated that if Petitioner does not do so, then DOT would have the right to remove the sign. (As of the date of the final hearing in this matter, the sign was still in place.) The August 10 letter, in response to Petitioner's July 14 letter, appears to be the "next correspondence" Petitioner had requested. The exercise of its right to an administrative hearing would, therefore, be due on or about September 11, 2004. On September 8, 2004, Petitioner sent a letter to Holschuh declining DOT's offer to purchase the Original Sign for $17,000. That offer had been made in May 2002.2 This letter suggests a counter-offer of $82,500 as the purchase price. The letter did not invoke Petitioner's right to an administrative hearing. Holschuh responded that she was not involved in acquisitions, and Petitioner should contact the district office (with whom Petitioner had previously negotiated). Instead of heeding Holschuh's directions, Petitioner then sent her another letter asking her to send the correspondence on to someone in the acquisition division. The new letter also repeats the counter-offer of $82,500. This letter did not invoke Petitioner's right to a formal hearing, either. About one year later, on October 6, 2005, DOT issued another Notice of Violation, this one addressing Sign Permit No. AU557a (which Holschuh at final hearing said referred to the Original Sign, although there was no "a" nomenclature on the July 9, 2004, Notice of Violation). Also, on October 6, 2005, DOT issued a Notice of Violation addressing Sign Permit No. AU557a#2, which Holschuh said referred to Petitioner's New Sign, even though no permit for the New Sign had ever been issued by DOT. The New Sign by this time had been completed and was being used for outdoor advertising. Petitioner understands the need for a permit to construct a new outdoor sign on the State road right-of-ways, but opined that it believed it could do so after the fact. Petitioner has only obtained approval from Polk County for erecting the sign, an event necessary for construction purposes, but irrelevant to DOT requirements. In the letter to DOT from Petitioner dated October 26, 2005 (and presumably accepted by DOT as Petitioner's request for a formal hearing), reference is made to Sign Permit No. AU557a#2, i.e., the New Sign. However, the letter addresses the Original Sign and its perceived value by Petitioner. It is patently unclear as to which sign is actually being addressed, but facts surrounding both signs were presented at final hearing and both have been addressed herein. Nonetheless, Petitioner's October 26, 2005, letter was submitted within 30 days of the latest Notice of Violation and was presumably intended to invoke Petitioner's right to a formal administrative hearing. This letter was then forwarded to DOAH by DOT in March 2009, for the purpose of conducting the hearing. (No evidence was presented as to why the DOT's cover letter and Petitioner's request for hearing were not submitted to DOAH until three-and-a-half years after the letter was written.)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Respondent, Department of Transportation, reversing the revocation of Sign Permit No. AU557 and providing Petitioner, SG Outdoor, just compensation for that sign. Further, the final order should deem the newly constructed sign on the same site to be unauthorized and order its removal. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 2009.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner’s Outdoor Advertising Permit Applications should be denied due to application deficiencies, and because the signs are located adjacent to a designated scenic highway.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Transportation regulates outdoor advertising signs located in proximity to the state highway system, interstate highway system, and federal-aid primary highway system. U.S. Highway 1 is a federal-aid primary highway that runs in a generally north/south direction along the east coast of Florida. In April l995, the Department issued outdoor advertising sign permit tag number BK459 to Town & Country Realty for an outdoor advertising sign (the “original sign”). The original sign was constructed adjacent to and on the west side of U.S. Highway 1 in Sebastian, Florida (the “property”). Records maintained by the Department during the period of the original sign’s existence, i.e., the Department’s outdoor advertising database from July 31, 2002, indicate that the original sign was located at U.S. Highway 1 milepost 18.496. That evidence, created contemporaneously with the sign’s existence, and before any controversy regarding the sign arose, is accepted as the most persuasive evidence of the precise location of the original sign. Mr. Pye testified that outdoor advertising sign permits are issued for a specific location, rather than for any location on a parcel of property. Given the precise spacing requirements for signs (see, e.g., section 479.07(9) and section 479.11), and the permitting of signs to the thousandths of a mile, Mr. Pye’s testimony is accepted. The original sign was located against a backdrop of vegetation. The original sign was single-sided with a north- facing sign face. As such, the original sign could normally be seen only from vehicles traveling southbound on U.S. Highway 1. On June 13, 2000, U.S. Highway 1, from milepost 14.267 to milepost 22.269 was designated as the Indian River Lagoon State Scenic Highway. The scenic highway designation included the stretch of U.S. Highway 1 on which the property fronts. On March 18, 2004, Henry Fischer & Sons, Inc./Town & Country Realty sold the property and the original sign to Petitioner. Daniel Taylor, a licensed real estate broker, worked on the transaction that led to Petitioner’s ownership of the property. He indicated that the property was desirable because it was clean, cleared, and demucked, and because it had the permitted original sign as an attractive asset, since the sign provided an income stream that could be used to pay property taxes. Eric Fischer, who was a director of Town & Country Realty, testified that, when the property was sold to Petitioner, the original sign was intended “to go with the property.” Upon the sale of the property and the original sign, Petitioner believed that Town & Country Realty would notify the state of the sale of the sign, and that he would thereafter be contacted by the state. Mr. Taylor testified that he and Petitioner called the Department and determined that Petitioner “could just step into the Fischer's shoes.” Based on the testimony of Petitioner and Mr. Taylor, Petitioner knew, or should have known, that the Department had regulatory oversight over the sign. An Outdoor Advertising Permit Transfer Request form is required to be submitted to the Department in order to transfer a sign permit from one person to another. No Outdoor Advertising Permit Transfer Request form was submitted for permit tag number BK459. Petitioner was never contacted by the state regarding the sale of the sign. Nonetheless, Petitioner continued to lease the sign and, as detailed herein, to replace and move the sign after the hurricanes of 2004. In September and October 2004, Hurricanes Frances and Jeanne struck Sebastian, Florida, very badly damaging the original sign. The wooden supports were flattened and no longer usable, and the sign was “pretty demolished.” Petitioner testified that he was told by an official of Indian River County to relocate the original sign to keep it from proximity of trees that could, in the event of a recurrence of the 2004 storms, topple and destroy the sign. The testimony, which was intended to prove the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that Petitioner was directed by a governmental representative to relocate the sign, was uncorroborated by evidence that would be admissible over objection in a civil trial. Petitioner hired a person to rebuild a sign on the property. When the sign was rebuilt, it was not replaced at its original location at milepost 18.496. Rather, the “rebuilt sign”1/ was moved to the cleared center of the property at milepost 18.535. Instead of a single-faced sign normally visible to northbound traffic, the rebuilt sign was a double-faced sign, with sides facing north and south. As such, the rebuilt sign could be seen by vehicles traveling U.S. Highway 1 in either direction. The original sign had four equally-spaced square support posts. The rebuilt sign has three equally-spaced round, and more substantial, support poles. The rebuilt sign has 11 horizontal stringers on each face, with each stringer secured to the three support posts. The stringers are uniform in appearance. The photographs of the rebuilt sign clearly show all of the stringers on one side, and some of the stringers on the other. The stringers show no evidence of having undergone storm damage, or of having been secured to support posts at different points along the stringers. The preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that the stringers were -- as were the posts -- new, stronger, intact materials when the rebuilt sign was constructed, and were not materials salvaged from the remains of the original sign. The original plywood facing on the original sign was replaced with vinyl facings on the rebuilt sign. As a result of the foregoing, a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the rebuilt sign was a new sign erected of entirely new materials, and was not established as a result of maintenance or repair of the original sign. After the March 18, 2004, sale of the property and the post-hurricane erection of the rebuilt sign, Town & Country Realty continued to receive renewal billing from the Department for the original sign, along with several other signs owned by Town & Country Realty. Town & Country Realty, having sold the property on which the original sign was located and having no apparent interest in maintaining its other signs, did not pay the renewal bills. On January 31, 2005, the Department issued a Notice of Violation and Order to Show Cause Non-Payment (“NOV”) to Town & Country Realty. The NOV provided a grace period of 30 days within which the license and permits could be renewed, subject to a penalty. Town & Country Realty did not renew the license or permits. On March 7, 2005, the Department issued a Final Notice of Sign Removal, noting that Town & Country Realty had not made payment for renewal or request an administrative hearing to contest the NOV. As a result, Town & Country Realty was given the option of either petitioning for reinstatement of the license and permits, or removing the signs, including the sign bearing permit tag number BK459. Failure to exercise one of the options within 90 days was to result in the removal and disposal of the sign by the Department. On March 22, 2005, as a result of the continued requests for payment, Town & Country Realty submitted an Outdoor Advertising Permit Cancellation Certification form (“Cancellation Certification”) to the Department for permit tag number BK459. The Cancellation Certification was received by the Department on March 24, 2005. The Cancellation Certification was signed by Carl Fischer, president of the permit holder, Town & Country Realty. Mr. Fischer indicated that it was the permit holder’s intent “that the above-referenced Permit(s) be cancelled,” and that “all entities with a right to advertise on the referenced sign have been notified of the permit cancellation.” In the “Date Sign Removed” field of the form, Mr. Fisher wrote “see below.” In the bottom margin of the form, Mr. Fischer noted that the sign had been destroyed by one of the 2004 hurricanes, and that “new owner rebuilt sign and I removed BK459 tag and enclosed it.” The Cancellation Certification did not provide any information regarding the rebuilt sign or whether it was a sign that required a permit from the Department,2/ nor did it provide the name, address, or other identifying information regarding the “new owner.” It was not clear when Mr. Fischer removed permit tag number BK459, but it was nonetheless removed and returned to the Department with the Cancellation Certification. The Cancellation Certification was not intended by Mr. Fischer to affect Petitioner’s rights or interest in the rebuilt sign, but was a means of stopping renewal bills from being sent to Town & Country Realty. A Cancellation Certification may be conditioned upon issuance of a new sign permit, provided the Cancellation Certification is submitted along with an outdoor advertising permit application. The Cancellation Certification gave no indication that permit tag number BK459 was being conditionally canceled as a requirement for issuance of a new permit, and was not accompanied by an outdoor advertising permit application. On March 24, 2005, permit tag number BK459 was cancelled. From 2005 until June 2014, the rebuilt sign remained in place without inquiry from the Department, during which time Petitioner continued to lease and receive income from the sign. No transfer of or application for a sign permit for the rebuilt sign was filed, and no payment of annual fees was made. No explanation was provided as to why the March 7, 2005, Final Notice of Sign Removal was not enforced, or why the rebuilt sign, which has at all times been clearly visible from U.S. Highway 1, was allowed to remain in place for nearly a decade despite having no affixed permit tag. On or about May 28, 2014, Mr. Johnson, who was on patrol in the area, noticed that the advertising on the rebuilt sign had been changed. The change caught his attention, so he reviewed the Department’s outdoor advertising sign database to determine whether the sign was permitted. He confirmed that the rebuilt sign was not permitted. On June 5, 2014, Mr. Johnson affixed a “30-day green notice” to the rebuilt sign, which provided notice of the Department’s determination that the sign was illegal, and was to be removed within 30 days. Failure to remove the sign was to result in the removal of the sign by the Department. On June 9, 2014, the Department issued a Notice of Violation - Illegally Erected Sign (NOV) to Petitioner for the rebuilt sign. Petitioner did not submit a hearing request regarding the NOV. Rather, Petitioner called the telephone number that was listed on the NOV. He spoke with someone at the Department, though he could not remember who he spoke with. Petitioner was advised to file an application for the sign, a remedy that is described in the NOV. On December 1, 2014, Petitioner submitted Outdoor Advertising Permit Application Nos. 61203 and 61204 for the northward and southward faces of the Current Sign at milepost 18.535. Petitioner subsequently submitted additional information, including local government approval, in support of the application. On December 18, 2014, the Department issued a Notice of Denied Outdoor Advertising Permit Application for application Nos. 61203 and 61204 (“notice of denial”) to Petitioner. The bases for the notice of denial were that the property’s tax identification numbers submitted in various parts of the application did not match, thus constituting “incorrect information” in the application, and that the rebuilt sign is located on a designated scenic highway, thus prohibiting issuance of the permit. In the Pre-hearing Stipulation filed by the parties, the Department, though referencing “incorrect information” as a basis for the December 18, 2014, notice of denial, concluded its statement of position by stating that “[i]n sum, the Department properly denied [Petitioner’s application] as the sign is located on a scenic highway.” That focus on the scenic highway issue in the Pre-hearing Stipulation could, of itself, constitute a waiver and elimination of other issues, including that of incorrect information. See Palm Beach Polo Holdings, Inc. v. Broward Marine, Inc., 174 So. 3d 1037 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). However, looking beyond the Pre-hearing Stipulation, the issue of incorrect information was not the subject of testimony at the final hearing, finds no substantial support in the documentary evidence, and made no appearance in the Department’s Proposed Recommended Order. The record in this proceeding does not support a finding that Petitioner provided “incorrect information” in his application, or that such “incorrect information” supports a denial of the application. On February 12, 2015, Petitioner filed a request for an informal administrative hearing with the Department to contest the notice of denial. The request for hearing included affidavits from Petitioner and Henry A. Fischer, a vice-president of Town & Country Realty, each of which provided that Town & Country Realty “submitted to the governmental authorities included but not limited to the Florida Department of Transportation notice of the transfer of the property and the sign permit to Mr. Daddano as well as his correct mailing address of 15 Lakeside Lane, N. Barrington, IL 60010.” It is not known whether the N. Barrington, Illinois, address was that of Mr. Fischer or that of Petitioner. Regardless, no such notice of transfer, or any other document bearing the referenced address, was introduced in evidence or discussed at the final hearing. The preponderance of the evidence indicates that the March 22, 2005, Outdoor Advertising Permit Cancellation Certification, with the notation described in paragraph 30 above, was the only notice provided to the Department regarding the disposition of permit tag number BK459. By June 4, 2015, the advertising copy that caught Mr. Johnson’s attention had been removed and replaced with a “This Sign For Rent” covering. By no later than November 17, 2015, well after the Department issued the notice of denial, and without any other form of approval or authorization from the Department, Petitioner had the rebuilt sign “pivoted” in roughly its existing location, so that it is now parallel to U.S. Highway 1. As such, only the side of the sign facing U.S. Highway 1 is visible from the highway, making it a “one-way reader” as opposed to a two-sided sign. Nonetheless, unlike the original one-sided sign, which was perpendicular to the highway against a backdrop of vegetation, the pivoted rebuilt sign can be seen by traffic traveling in either direction on U.S. Highway 1.3/
Recommendation Upon consideration of the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Transportation enter a final order denying Outdoor Advertising Permit Application Nos. 61203 and 61204. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of April, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 2016.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner’s applications for a State sign permit should be granted.
Findings Of Fact No dispute exists that DOT is the State agency responsible for regulating outdoor advertising signs located within 660 feet of the State Highway system, interstate, or federal-aid primary system in accordance with Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. Mr. Monsalve wishes to place two advertising signs within 660 feet of Interstate 95 and visible to Interstate 95. The advertising signs require a permit. On or about June 16, 2008, Mr. Monsalve filed two applications, completing DOT’s forms titled “Application for Outdoor Advertising Permit” (Application), with DOT for outdoor advertising signs. The two applications indicated the same location for the outdoor advertising but with different height, width, and total square feet: one was a height of 4 feet, width of 60 feet, and 240 total square feet, and the other was a height of 12 feet, width of 12 feet, and 144 total square feet. The two Applications were assigned Application numbers 57196 and 57197, respectively. The location for the proposed outdoor advertising signs is 299 Southwest 17 Road in Miami, Florida, near Interstate 95, North of Southwest 3rd Avenue. Mr. Monsalve owns the property on which the advertising signs are to be located. The Application contained a section titled “Local Government Permission.” The section provided that it was to be completed by the appropriate local government official or that a “written statement indicating that the sign complies with all local government requirements” may be submitted or, “for a proposed sign location, a copy of the building permit issued by the local government may be submitted.” The section was neither completed by the local government official nor was a written statement submitted indicating that the signs comply with all local government requirements. However, Mr. Monsalve submitted a 1999 building permit from the local government. The local government was the City of Miami. The 1999 building permit was issued by the City of Miami on July 13, 1999, to Hampton Inn for a commercial painted wall sign, located at 299 Southwest 17 Road. The building permit was issued Permit Number SG 99-5011166. The Folio Number, i.e., Property ID Number, on the 1999 building permit is No. 01-4138-002-0020. Mr. Monsalve owns the property for which the 1999 building permit was issued for the advertising sign. The property is the same property identified on his Application, assigned Application number 57197. DOT requires that, in order for a building permit to constitute “local government permission,” the permit must have been issued within six months of the date of an application for an outdoor advertising sign. The 1999 building permit submitted by Mr. Monsalve was beyond the six-month time period of the date of Application number 57197. Furthermore, by letter dated June 25, 2008, the City of Miami notified DOT that the 1999 building permit no longer had legal status due to the City of Miami changing its laws regarding billboards and that Mr. Monsalve did not have local government permission.3 The evidence demonstrates that the 1999 building permit did not constitute local government permission. The evidence failed to demonstrate that Mr. Monsalve had obtained local government permission. In March 2004, DOT issued a permit to the Hampton Inn for an outdoor advertising sign on Mr. Monsalve’s property. The permit was issued Tag Number CA179, and the sign was built on August 19, 2004. The permit information provides, among other information, that the location of the outdoor advertising sign was located 0.040 miles North of Southwest 3rd Avenue and that the sign was 144 square feet. Hampton Inn and Mr. Monsalve entered into an agreement/contract for Hampton Inn to lease outdoor advertising space from Mr. Monsalve at 299 Southwest 17 Road, Miami, Florida. A Second Lease Agreement between Mr. Monsalve and the Hampton Inn indicates in provision numbered one that the lease agreement was extended until March 31, 2007. The evidence demonstrates that, subsequent to March 31, 2007, the lease of the space by the Hampton Inn continued on a month-to-month basis and that the last time that Mr. Monsalve received payment for the monthly lease was in March 2008. The location for the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179 is the same location of Mr. Monsalve’s proposed outdoor advertising sign in Application number 57197. In June 2008, the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, was transferred from Hampton Inn to Outlook Media using DOT’s form titled “Outdoor Advertising Permit Transfer Request.” The permit is considered by DOT to be currently active. The location for Mr. Monsalve’s Application number 57197 is currently permitted to Outlook Media due to the transfer of outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179 to Outlook Media. The distance between the proposed sign in Mr. Monsalve’s Application number 57196 and the space in the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, is less than 1500 feet. The evidence demonstrates that the sign in Mr. Monsalve’s Application number 57197 conflicts with the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, in that the two are the same location. Mr. Monsalve believed that he, as the property owner, owned the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, as well. He did not agree for the permit to be transferred. Mr. Monsalve was not aware that the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, had been transferred by Hampton Inn to Outlook Media. The evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that he owned or did not own the permit or that his permission was required for the permit to be transferred. Mr. Monsalve did not agree to lease the space for the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, to Outlook Media. Mr. Monsalve notified DOT that a problem existed between him and the City of Miami regarding obtaining local government permission and requested DOT to put his Application on “Hold” in order to provide him with time to resolve the problem. He also notified DOT regarding his dispute with the transfer of the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, to Outlook Media. DOT is unable to place applications on hold but is required to act on applications within 30 days. Also, Mr. Monsalve notified the City of Miami, among other things, of his dispute with the transfer of the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, to Outlook Media, and that he did not give Outlook Media permission to erect a sign on his property for which the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, was issued. By Notice of Denial issued on July 3, 2008, DOT notified Mr. Monsalve that his Applications were denied for the following reason: Other: No statement from the appropriate local governmental official indicating that the agency or unit of local government will issue a permit to the applicant upon approval of the state permit application by the Department (Section 479.07(3)(b), Florida Statutes). On July 15, 2008, DOT issued an amended Notice of Denial, notifying Mr. Monsalve that his Applications were denied for the following reasons: Sign does not meet spacing requirements (1500’ for interstates . . .) s.479.07(9)(a)1.&2., FS In conflict with permitted sign(s), tag #(s) CA 179 held by Outlook Media of South Florida, LLC . . . Sign/location does not comply with all local government requirements . . . s.479.07(3)(b), FS Other: The building permit submitted with the application is not in compliance with local governmental requirements. No evidence was presented to demonstrate that a determination had been made as to what Mr. Monsalve’s legal rights are as the owner of the property regarding his lease agreement/contract with the Hampton Inn and the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179; and regarding the transfer of the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order denying Andres Monsalve’s application for an outdoor advertising sign permit. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of December 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 2008.
