The Issue Whether Respondent, Dien Duong, violated the provisions of Subsections 458.331(1)(m) and 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes, as specifically alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what penalty would be appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received, and the entire record compiled herein, the following material and relevant facts are found: Petitioner, Department of Health, Board of Medicine, is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of physician's assistants pursuant to Chapters 455 and 458, Florida Statutes, and Section 20.43, Florida Statutes. Respondent is and has been at all times material hereto a licensed physician's assistant in the state of Florida, having been issued license number PA 0003211 in 1997. Respondent received a Bachelor's Degree in Biology from Hope College, Holland, Michigan, in 1989 and thereafter received her physician's assistant degree from Western Michigan University in 1991, and became certified in Family Practice and in Surgery in Michigan upon graduation. Respondent has maintained her certification in Family Practice and in Surgery by successfully passing an examination every six years since 1991, in addition to taking a minimum of 100 hours of Continuing Medical Education (CME) courses each year. In 1997 Respondent began working at South Florida Baptist Hospital Emergency Department and has maintained her employment in that department as a physician's assistant. During the course of her employment, Respondent has gained extensive experience in the practice of assessing lacerations and repairing lacerations of all types. Respondent is highly respected by her employing physician, Dr. Charles Eaves, and by her supervising physicians in the emergency department of the hospital. Respondent has never been the subject of discipline or corrective action regarding her professional job performance as a physician's assistant. A physician's assistant is a licensed health care professional who works under the supervision of a doctor. Typical protocol between the supervising doctor and the physician's assistant is for the physician's assistant to inspect and evaluate the patient, examine the injury, prepare the patient for treatment, consult with the supervising doctor, and thereafter administer treatment to the injury approved by the doctor, followed by after-care instructions to the patient. Based upon the testimony of the experts, the protocol between experienced physician's assistants and their supervising doctors is based upon the doctor's respect and confidence in the physician's assistant's abilities, competence, experience and work history. In these mutual trust and respect working relationships, protocol typically permits the physician's assistant to work relatively autonomously. Without involvement of the supervising doctor, the physician's assistant examines emergency room injuries; they often treat the injured patient, and thereafter present the patient's case treatment and the patient's medical record to the supervising doctor for approval and, when recommended, signature for prescribed medication. The protocol between Respondent and her supervising physician, Dr. Diaz, at South Florida Baptist Hospital on May 8, 1998, was that of mutual trust. Patient D.Z. was a 33 year-old male who had fallen from a ladder and, while attempting to break his fall with his right hand, suffered a blunt, T-shaped, tear-like laceration injury to his right hand. The injury was on the palmar aspect in the area of the fifth metacarpal of the hand-bone that extended to the small finger; a complex laceration, described by doctors as a "sort of bust or blunt type," as opposed to a clean knife cut type, approximately 3/4 centimeter in depth. On May 8, 1998, D.Z. presented himself to the South Florida Baptist Hospital (Hospital) emergency room for treatment of his right hand laceration that extended to the subcutaneous level with subcutaneous tissue exposure. The Hospital's triage nurse, after completing preliminary patient information, directed D.Z. to First Care, that part of the hospital's emergency department where Respondent was working. Respondent, following protocol, examined D.Z.'s injured right hand and ordered x-rays to be taken. An x-ray was taken of D.Z.'s right hand and was reviewed by Respondent's supervising physician, Dr. Diaz, prior to treatment of the injury by Respondent. Dr. Diaz concluded that D.Z.'s x-ray was negative, with no broken bones or tendon involved. The medical records noted that D.Z. had the full range of motion of his fingers without numbness or tingling at that time. Respondent's treatment of D.Z. consisted of laying D.Z. on his back with his arm out to his side and using local anesthesia to numb the injured area. After numbing the hand, she infiltrated the wound with one percent plain Lidocaine, irrigated the wound with normal saline, and cleaned the wound with Betadine. She then debrided the tissue. Using sterile techniques, Respondent proceeded to suture the T-shaped laceration of D.Z.'s right hand. Because of the shape and depth of the laceration and because of the exposure of jagged-edge tears to the subcutaneous tissues, Respondent placed four subcutaneous sutures with 4.0 vicryl, an absorbable suture, in order to bring and keep the jagged-edged tears of D.Z.'s laceration together. For the type of wound suffered by D.Z., described as "bust-type-ripping-flesh tear," it is not possible to close a three or four centimeter wound with only surface sutures. Subcutaneous sutures are required for those wounds of this type and depth. For these reasons and acting appropriately within the scope of the practice of an experienced physician's assistant, Respondent determined to use subcutaneous sutures on D.Z., who is right-hand dominate. The experts who testified, Dr. Eaves, Dr. Solomon, Dr. Maddalon and Ms. Vergara, agreed that the process of using subcutaneous sutures helps to control bleeding, reduce tension within the laceration, and minimize potential "air pockets" within the wound, thereby promoting the healing process, and preventing potential, after-surgery, complications. In accord with protocol established between Dr. Diaz and Respondent, it was at the conclusion of her treatment care of D.Z. that she advised Dr. Diaz of her subcutaneous suture treatment and follow-up care plan. Respondent presented D.Z.'s record for his review, approval and signature. Dr. Diaz approved Respondent's subcutaneous suture treatment, her follow- up care plan of keeping the wound clean, taking the prescribed medication and having the sutures removed within a few days during his follow up a doctor of his choice. Dr. Diaz signed both the Emergency Room report and Respondent's suggested prescription medications for D.Z. On May 11, 1998, four days after his treatment and without obtaining and taking his prescription medications as instructed, D.Z. presented himself to Dr. Maddalon's office for a follow-up examination and evaluation of his injury. On May 14, 1998, Dr. Maddalon, who employed D.Z.'s mother as his office manager and had employed D.Z. for six years to clean his office and who had operated and treated D.Z.'s right hand for carpal tunnel syndrome some years earlier, examined D.Z.'s right hand following an earlier examination by his physician's assistant. On May 15, 1998, during exploratory surgery, Dr. Maddalon reopened the laceration of D.Z.'s right hand and observed that a subcutaneous suture had passed through the ulnar nerve and tied the ulnar digital nerve to the adjoining soft tissue. He removed the subcutaneous suture and removed the damaged part of the ulnar nerve. He then re-attached the exposed ends of the ulnar nerve. D.Z. recovered satisfactorily from Dr. Maddalon's surgery with most but not all of the sensation returning to the little finger on his right hand. According to his deposition, and without a review of D.Z.'s medical records from South Florida Baptist Hospital emergency room prepared by Respondent, Dr. Maddalon opined that certain protocol should be followed in treating "blunt-tear" type hand injuries like that suffered by D.Z. Dr. Maddalon went on to stress, however, that in his opinion placing subcutaneous sutures in such an injury as D.Z.'s was not below the standard of care for a physician's assistant. Deborah Vergara, a physician's assistant at Town and Country Hospital, Tampa, Florida, qualified as an expert in physician's assistants' duties, responsibilities and protocol, and after reviewing D.Z.'s medical records, opined that the care provided D.Z. by Respondent during treatment on May 8, 1998, was appropriate for a patient with D.Z.'s type laceration and was not below the standard of care for a physician's assistant. Deborah Vergara further opined that a suture passing through the ulnar nerve, in and of itself, is not a breach of the standard of care, and she was not aware of any textbooks for physician's assistants that prohibited ever placing subcutaneous sutures in a laceration. Dr. Charles Eaves, D.O., an expert in emergency medicine and an expert in supervising physician's assistants and who also has been the supervising doctor of South Florida Baptist Hospital for the past three years, opined that Respondent's placing subcutaneous sutures in a palmar laceration was absolutely within the standard of care. Dr. Eaves further opined that Respondent's entries in D.Z.'s medical records were within the standard of care. Dr. Barry Solomon, Board Certified expert and employed by the Physician Health Care Alliance in Clearwater, Florida, after review of all of D.Z.'s medical records from South Florida Baptist Hospital, the Administrative Compliant filed in this case, Dr. Maddalon's deposition, and records from Brandon Regional Medical Center, gave his opinions in the following areas: Protocol of supervising physician and physician's assistants working in specific areas of medicine. According to Dr. Solomon, physician's assistants generally operate with relative autonomy, based upon the experience of the assistant and the confidence of the supervising physician. Physician's assistants see low acuity patients, leaving the physician to see high acuity patients. Physician's assistants do check with the physician on duty as they proceed through treating a patient, checking to make sure what they are going to do is appropriate and have the physician review and sign the chart as the patient is being made ready for discharge. Protocol for physician's assistants suturing palmar lacerations. Dr. Solomon opined that Respondent's conduct when presented with a patient with a palmar laceration in a subcutaneous area with an abnormal, complex laceration, and after assessment for nerve damage, tendon damage, bone injury, and after obtaining an x-ray which was reviewed by the emergency room physician at the time, and then proceeding to place a two- layer closure consisting of four subcutaneous sutures and eleven external sutures to close the wound, was within the standard of care of physician's assistant, in this case, the Respondent. Dr. Solomon further opined that there is nothing wrong with placing subcutaneous sutures in a hand laceration and there is always a risk, with a deep wound that nerves, blood vessels, arteries and veins could potentially be hit or sutured. This risk is a recognized complication when one places subcutaneous sutures in that (hand) part of the body. He concludes that Respondent practiced within the physician assistant's standard of care in her subcutaneous suture treatment of Patient D.Z.'s right hand. Petitioner has failed to provide the opinion of an expert that establishes a standard of care for an experienced physician's assistant; has failed to provide evidence of standard of care for maintaining medical records; and has failed to provide an expert opinion in support of the allegation that Respondent's treatment of D.Z.'s right hand laceration fell below a physician's assistant standard of care for treatment of hand lacerations. The testimony of Dr. Charles Eaves, Dr. Barry Solomon and Deborah Vergara is credible in establishing that Respondent, Dien Duong, actions were not violations of Subsection 548.331(1)(m) and 488.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order finding Respondent not guilty of violating Subsections 458.331(1)(m) and (t), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of May, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of May, 2002.
Recommendation The recommendations contained in the joint stipulation of the parties are hereby adopted verbatim as follows: Respondent agrees to the terms and conditions for probationary limitations of his licenses under the provisions of Chapter 483, Florida Statutes, in lieu of the revocation of that license. Respondent shall retain his Clinical Laboratory Technologists License in serology, clinical chemistry and hematology. (There was no agreement as to paragraph 3) Respondent shall actively participate in a drug rehabilitation program approved by the Department for a period to be determined by the program selected. Respondent shall ensure that the program submits quarterly reports from the drug program to the Department for the period Respondent is enrolled in the rehabilitation program. The Petitioner shall provide that the reports will be reviewed by the Department and clinical laboratory advisory council. Respondent shall report to the Department representative, in person, for an annual interview for the first two years of the probationary period. The Petitioner may require and request unannounced urine specimens of Respondent during the probationary period for the purpose of drug screening. Respondent or Petitioner shall notify Respondent's current employer, if a clinical laboratory, of the nature of his problem and offense and shall require an annual report of his performance in the laboratory for the duration of the five years probation. Respondent shall advise the Department of any change in employment or address or any additional laboratory employment within 30 days during the five year probationary period. Respondent agrees that non-compliance with the terms of probation will be cause for immediate revocation of his Clinical Laboratory Personnel License. Respondent further agrees that any renewal or reissuance of license will. be taken subject to the terms herein until such terms have been fully satisfied. That the Secretary of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services shall enter a final order requiring the probationary limitation of Respondent's Clinical Laboratory Personnel License, incorporating this Joint Stipulation and the Recommended Order entered in this cause." In addition to the recommendations contained in the. Joint Stipulation it is further recommended that Respondent be required to work under direct supervision only in the area of immunohematology (blood banking) until such time as he presents evidence, satisfactory to the Administrator of Laboratory Personnel Licensure, Office of Licensure and Certification, DHRS, that he has successfully completed his present treatment at the Broward Methodone Maintenance Rehabilitation and Research Facility and the Christian Mental Health Clinic or in the al alternative, during the period that he is enrolled in the drug treatment program selected by DHRS, whichever occurs first. DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of February, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven Rowitt 5966 N.W. 28th Street Sunrise, Florida 33313 Harold L. Braynon, Esquire District X Legal Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 201 West Broward Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 David Pingree Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Steve Huss, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent Adopted in Findings of Fact 6 and 7.I Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 12 and 21. Matters not contained therein are rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as subordinate and not supported by competent substantial evidence. Partially adopted in Findings of Fact 6 and 7. The third sentence is rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Findings of Fact 14. The first sentence is rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. The last two sentences are rejected as subordinate. Partially accepted in Finding of Fact 10. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate. Rejected as argumentative. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. Rejected as legal argument. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 22. Matters not contained therein are rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner in violation of Section 760.10 et. seq., Florida Statutes, as set forth in Petitioner's Petition for Relief filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a female African-American who has completed medical school. On March 19, 1997, Petitioner completed an "Application for Residency," seeking to participate in Respondent's clinical anesthesiology residency program. That program is operated in conjunction with the Public Health Trust. Applicants selected to participate in the residency program become employees of Respondent. The terms and conditions of employment are subject to the policies of both Respondent and the Public Health Trust. Petitioner's application to participate in the residency program related that she had completed an internship at University of Maryland/Harbor Hospital (Harbor) and two years of anesthesiology residency at King/Drew University, Los Angles (King). Petitioner signed the application on March 19, 1997. On April 30, 1997, Petitioner submitted an "Application for Graduate Medical Education at the Jackson Memorial Medical Center" that required her to "list chronologically your activities from time of graduation from Medical School to present. Specify type of post graduate training if any." Petitioner listed the internship at Harbor and the residency at King. She signed the application under the declaration: "I hereby declare that I have examined this application; and to the best of my knowledge and belief, it is true, correct, and complete." Petitioner was accepted into Respondent's clinical anesthesiology residency program based, in part, on the information reflected in the foregoing applications. That acceptance created an employee/employer relationship between Petitioner and Respondent. On July 17, 1997, Petitioner submitted a completed "Personnel Form" to Respondent. The Personnel Form required her to disclose all her activities since her completion of medical school. On that form Petitioner listed her previous internship at Harbor and her previous residency training at King. She verified it was correct to the best of her knowledge and signed the form. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Dr. Brian Craythorne was a Professor of Medicine at the University of Miami and the Chairman of Respondent's Department of Anesthesiology. Dr. Craythorne had supervisory responsibility for Petitioner and was instrumental in selecting her to participate in the residency program. In April 1998, Dr. Craythorne received routine information from the American Board of Anesthesiology (ABA) setting forth the number of hours of training from other anesthesiology residency programs for which each resident participating in Respondent's residency program had received credit. The information from the ABA also set forth the number of hours of training for which each resident had received no credit. From that information, Dr. Craythorne learned that Petitioner had a total of 39 hours of residency training in anesthesiology from other programs for which she had received no credit. Three of the 39 hours of training for which she had no training were at King, which was reflected on her application and related paperwork. The training at King is not an issue in this proceeding. The additional 36 hours of residency training for which she received no credit was from Howard Hospital. 1/ The program at Howard, which was equivalent to a three-year program, was not reflected on any application or related document Petitioner submitted to Respondent before April 1998. Petitioner's failure to disclose her participation in the residency program at Howard was intentional. Petitioner's failure to disclose her participation in the residency program at Howard violated the clear policies of both Respondent and the Public Health Trust that require applications and related documents to be truthful, correct, and complete. Dr. Craythorne confronted Petitioner about the foregoing omissions in her applications and associated paperwork. In response, Petitioner submitted a letter dated May 27, 1998, in which she tried to explain why she did not obtain credit at Howard and why she had not divulged that information to Respondent. Petitioner asserted that she had sued Howard and had subsequently settled the litigation with instructions from her attorney that she could not discuss the litigation. 2/ Petitioner's letter of May 27, 1998, was not satisfactory to Dr. Craythorne. On June 3, 1998, Dr. Craythorne issued to Petitioner a "Disciplinary Action Report" (DAR) advising he was recommending that Petitioner be dismissed from the residency program (thereby terminating her employment with Respondent). The grounds for the action were her violation of Respondent's policies by making a false statement or statements on her application for employment and related documents and her violation of Public Health Trust Policy #305 pertaining to falsifying records or any other record of the Trust. Referencing Respondent's Department of Anesthesiology, the DAR also contained the following: Our department's recruiting and hiring practices . . . includes a policy/practice not to accept residents [sic] who have had more than one prior anesthesia residency experience for the clinical anesthesia years 1 through 3. [3/]] On June 29, 1998, Dr. Craythorne wrote a letter to Petitioner terminating her employment on the grounds set forth in the DAR. The termination letter advised Petitioner that she could request the Senior Vice President for Medical Affairs (Dr. Gerard A. Kaiser) to review the decision to terminate her participation. The letter also advised Petitioner that "[u]nless the Senior Vice President rescinds the proposed action, it will become effective following his review and decision." On July 21, 1998, Dr. Kaiser advised Petitioner that he had reviewed the facts surrounding her termination and agreed with the termination decision. Consistent with her rights pursuant to the applicable collective bargaining agreement, Petitioner requested and received a hearing before the Peer Review Committee, which was composed of other participants in the anesthesiology residency program. On December 1, 1998, the Peer Review Committee issued its report upholding Petitioner's termination for the reasons cited by Dr. Craythorne. On December 23, 1998, Ira C. Clark, president of the Public Health Trust, advised Petitioner that he had upheld her dismissal based on his review of the Peer Review Committee's findings and recommendation. Petitioner thereafter filed a grievance pursuant to her collective bargaining rights. On October 21, 1999, an evidentiary hearing was conducted before an arbitrator. On November 1, 1999, the arbitrator entered his Opinion and Award upholding Petitioner's termination of employment. Petitioner thereafter filed a complaint of discrimination with the FCHR on or about March 27, 2000. The gravamen of the complaint was that Respondent fired her in retaliation for her complaint to Dr. Craythorne that another resident had made a derogatory racial comment towards her. On December 10, 2001, the FCHR entered a determination of "no cause," determining that there was no cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice had occurred. On January 14, 2002, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from an unlawful employment practice with the FCHR. The Petition alleged the following facts in support of her claim of discrimination: On April 1, 1998, a racial remark was made to me by Dr. Kirsten O'Neal, which was, "we know how lazy you Blacks are." I reported it (the statement) to Dr. Craythorne and Dr. Brindle, as well as in writing (copies are in my file). Dr. Craythorne asked me if I had any witnesses, I said yes. The following month they decided to investigate my application, and terminated me on July 1998 (sic). The Petition described the disputed issues of fact as follows: I was terminated because I did not put on my application that I had worked for Howard Hospital in Washington, D. C. They stated the reason I was terminated is because the ABA (American Board of Anesthesiology) requires that you only attend two programs if you have received credit. I did not receive any credit. Please see the enclosed pamphlet from the ABA at page 9. The Petition set forth the following ultimate facts entitling Petitioner to relief: When JMH terminated me, it was because I made a claim of racial discrimination, which I reported prior to investigation of my application. Had I not complained of racial remarks that was made to me by the above Dr. Kirsten O'Neal, it would not have come up about my application. The evidence established that Petitioner complained to Dr. Craythorne that Dr. O'Neal had made the derogatory, racial remark set forth in the Petition. 4/ There was no evidence to establish a link between the complaint made by Petitioner to Dr. Craythorne pertaining to Dr. O'Neal and the decision to terminate her participation in the residency program. Respondent established that Petitioner was terminated because she failed to adhere to Respondent's and the Public Health Trust's clear policies requiring applications and other employment documents to be truthful, correct, and complete.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of August, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of August, 2002.
The Issue The issue presented for decision herein is whether or not the Respondent, based on conduct set forth hereinafter in detail, is guilty of unprofessional conduct and of being convicted or found guilty of a crime which directly relates to the practice of nursing or the ability to practice nursing.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant findings of fact: At times material hereto, Respondent, Cecelia Faye Norwood, was licensed as a practical nurse by petitioner and has been issued license number 0533451 by the Florida Hoard of Nursing. (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit A) During times material herein, Respondent was employed as a licensed practical nurse at South Florida State Hospital, Hollywood, Florida and was assigned to a ward where she administered treatment to psychiatric patients. During the afternoon of October 21, 1983, while employed at South Florida State Hospital, Respondent administered an injection to a fifteen (15) year old patient. Thereafter, Respondent assisted other hospital employees in restraining the patient. The patient had been placed in a "four-point restraint" (with both arms and legs restrained) however she managed to pull her left arm from the restraint. While Respondent was attempting to restrain patient D'Antuono's left arm, the patient grabbed Respondent's hair, pulling her head towards the bed frame at which time Respondent struck the patient in the face. During the afternoon, Respondent was assisted by employees Patricia Calcagino, an LPN, and Mrs. Fico. Those two employees released the patient's fingers from Respondent's hair and while Ms. Calcagino was attempting to refasten the restraint straps to the bed frame, Respondent struck the patient in the face. (Tr. 19 and 37) This incident was reported to the hospital and an internal investigation was conducted by Ben Drazen, Director of Internal Affairs for South Florida State Hospital. Later, a joint investigation of the incident was conducted by South Florida State Hospital, the Office of Children, Youth and Family Services, and the Broward County Sheriff's Department. Respondent was criminally charged based on the investigation by the Broward County Sheriff's Department and, on October 17, 1984, entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of knowingly or by culpable negligence, permitting the physical or mental injury to a child by striking said child about her face with her hand, in violation of Section 827.04(2), Florida Statutes. The patient involved in the aforesaid incident was a stocky patient who had been diagnosed as psychotic and slightly retarded. The patient had a history of combative, assaultive behavior. Ms. Rotton, an RN who was called upon to offer her opinion as to whether or not Respondent's conduct was unprofessional, considered that such conduct was inappropriate or unprofessional. She understood that Respondent was provoked to the point where she struck the patient and "she could understand how such an incident might happen." The patient is a patient with a "very well-documented history of extremely assaultive behavior, very, very agitated. She has injured many employees in the past." (Testimony of Drazen, Tr. 34 and 35) Nurse Rotten also acknowledged that the patient involved had given the staff quite a few problems. The patient bit, kicked, scratched, clawed and spit in the face of other employees. (Testimony of Rotton, Tr. 28 and 29) Nurse Rotten had observed Respondent work with patients for a long time. Nurse Rotten has "seen [Respondent] deal with some pretty difficult patients. I've seen her, you know, assaulted, by patients; nothing like this has ever happened. . . ." (Tr. 30) Respondent has never been disciplined by either her then employer, South Florida State Hospital, 2/ or Petitioner, Board of Nursing. (Tr. 30)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby recommended that the Respondent, Cecelia Faye Norwood, be placed on probation for a period of one (1) year subject to appropriate terms of probation as deemed indicated by her conduct, found hereinabove, by Petitioner. 3/ RECOMMENDED this 21st day of March, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 1985.
