Findings Of Fact The Parties FRTC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Charter Medical Corporation (Charter) which proposes to construct and operate a freestanding, 60 bed, 24- hour-a-day, Intensive Residential Treatment Program for children between the ages of 6 and 18 in Palm Beach County within HRS District IX, pursuant to Rule 10-28.152(8), F.A.C. and Chapter 395, F.S. Although FRTC represents it will construct its proposed facility with or without CON licensure, which it is entitled to do, given the peculiarities of this type of health care entity, it is clear that a prime motivator in FRTC's CON application is that with CON licensure, FRTC potentially will have greater access to insurance reimbursement because it may then call itself a "hospital." FRTC will seek JCAH accreditation. HRS is the state agency with the authority and responsibility to consider CON applications, pursuant to Chapter 10-5.011, F.A.C. and Sections 381.701-381.715, F.S. (1987). HRS preliminarily approved FRTC's application, and supported it through formal hearing and post-hearing proposals. RTCPB is an existing 40 bed residential treatment center for adolescents between the ages of 12 and 18, located in Palm Beach County, on the campus of Lake Hospital of the Palm Beaches. It provides services similar or identical to those services proposed to be offered by FRTC. It is JCAH accredited through an extension of Lake Hospital's accreditation and is close to JCAH accreditation in its own right. RTCPB is a subsidiary of Psychiatric Hospitals, Inc. (PIA) . PIA operates two residential treatment centers in Florida. RTCPB is not CON licensed as an IRTP, under Chapters 381 and 395, F.S., but is licensed as a child care facility under Chapter 395, F.S., as a provider of services to HRS under Chapters 10M-9 and 10E-10, F.A.C. RTCPB accepts substance abusers in residency. RTCPB has also applied for CON licensure as an IRTP in a batching cycle subsequent to the present one. That application has been preliminarily denied by HRS and RTCPB is awaiting a Section 120.57(1), F.S., formal administrative hearing thereon. RTCPB now estimates its current patients' average length of stay (ALOS) as 106 days but projects a 315 day (10 1/2 months) ALOS in its subsequent CON application. RTCPB is charging $185 per day or HRS patients and $255 with $23-26 ancillaries [sic] per day for private pay patients. Like FRTC, it uses a "levels" system of behavior modification and patient control. Humana is a 250 bed JCAH accredited hospital located in Palm Beach County, Florida. Of Humana's 250 beds, 162 are traditional acute care beds and 88 are psychiatric beds. The 88 psychiatric beds are administratively divided into different units, one of which is a 27 bed adolescent psychiatric unit; this unit opened January 20, 1987, and has an average length of stay of nine months. Humana's existing CONs are for short-term adult psychiatric beds and do not authorize an adolescent unit with an average length of stay of over 30 days. Ninety days is the demarcation, by rule, between short- and long-term psychiatric beds. Humana recently applied for a CON for more psychiatric beds and also applied for an IRTP CON in a subsequent batch to the present one. Humana's present 27 bed adolescent psychiatric unit provides grossly similar services to those proposed to be offered by FRTC, but its emphasis is more medical-psychiatric than emotional-behavioral. Like FRTC, Humana does not accept in residency adolescents with a primary diagnosis of substance abuse. Like FRTC and RTCPB, Humana uses a "levels" system. Eighty percent of Humana's patient mix are commercial pay, and the unit is running at a 15 to 20 percent profit margin. Humana usually charges $325 per day on their adolescent unit plus ancillaries [sic] amounting to 10 percent of the patient's bill, but HRS contract patients pay only $225 per day. Humana has lost a number of adolescent unit referrals to RTCPB since RTCPB opened June 1, 1987, but the unit continues to be almost fully occupied. Humana's main referral asset, as well as the source of the confusion of referring entities, appears to be the reputation of its director, Dr. Kelly. Dr. Kelly previously directed a program at Lake Hospital which was identical to the program that he now directs at Humana. Lake Hospital currently has RTCPB operating under its auspices, but not Dr. Kelly. Nature of the FRTC Program FRTC's proposed program is designed to serve those persons in the designated age group who have psychiatric diagnoses of a severity requiring a long-term approach in a multidisciplinary structured living setting to facilitate recovery. It will not, however, treat adolescents with an active diagnosis of chemical dependency or substance abuse. It also only commits to 1.5 percent indigent care. The proposed FRTC program differs from an acute care setting in significant quantitative and qualitative ways, the most visible of which is that acute care psychiatric settings (either long- or short-term) are geared toward dealing with patients actively dangerous to property, themselves, or others, but patients whom it is reasonably assumed will respond primarily to physiologically-oriented physicians and registered nurses administering daily medication, treatment, and monitoring, as opposed to a long-term living arrangement emphasizing behaviorally-oriented group interaction as an alternative to parental care at home. FRTC will, however, accept patients with psychiatric diagnoses of effective disorders, depression, schizophrenia and impulse disorders and those who may be potentially harmful to themselves, others, or property for whom no other less intensive or less restrictive form of treatment would be predictably helpful. FRTC would fall on the continuum of care below an acute psychiatric facility such as Humana. Assessment of such a target group on a patient by patient basis is obviously subject to a wide variation of interpretation by qualified health care professionals, but FRTC anticipates both verifying referral diagnoses and assuring quality of care by insuring that each new patient is seen by a psychiatrist within 24 hours of admission, and by having each case reviewed by an independent utilization review committee. FRTC also plans to complete appropriate patient assessments and develop and update individual, integrated treatment programs. FRTC will provide, where appropriate, for continuity of care from previous acute care institutions through the FRTC program and out into more normal individual or family living arrangements. Parents will have to consent to their child's placement at FRTC. FRTC's program proposes an average length of stay of 365 days (one year) with a range of six months to two years. Based upon all the credible record evidence as a whole, including, but not limited to, the protestants' respective ALOS, this is a reasonable forecast despite contrary evidence as to Charter's experience at its "template" Virginia institution, Charter Colonial. FRTC's program components will include individual therapy, recreational therapy, occupational therapy, and general education. The general education component in FRTC's proposed program is more general and more open than that offered in acute care settings, such as Humana. FRTC's overall program will utilize a "levels" system of behavioral management based upon patients earning privileges, which levels system has a good patient rehabilitation and functional administrative track record in many different kinds of psychiatric health care facilities, including Humana and RTCPB. FRTC intends that each patient's program will be individualized according to age and program component directed to his/her diagnosis and each patient will receive individual, resident group, and family therapies. As to assessment, types of therapy, continuity of care, and general education provisions, FRTC's proposal is grossly consistent with that of its "template." To the extent there is evidence of inconsistencies between the two programs in the record, the FRTC proposal represents either improvements over, or refinements of, its template program which have been developed as Charter/FRTC has learned more about what actually "works" for the IRTP form of health care, or it represents changes to accommodate Florida's perception of what less restrictive but still intensive residential treatment should be, or it anticipates local community needs. Quality of Care The applicant's parent corporation is an experienced provider of many types of accredited psychiatric facilities. The type of quality assurance program proposed and the staff mix provide reasonable quality care assurances. Design, Construction, and Personnel Refinements to FRTC's original schematic take into consideration the influence that physical structure has on an Intensive Residential Treatment Program. Those refinements include modification of a multipurpose room into a half-court gymnasium, addition of a classroom, addition of a mechanical room, modification of the nursing station to decrease the amount of space, and the deletion of one seclusion room and addition of a four to six bed assessment unit. The modifications resulted in the addition of approximately 1,000 square feet to the original design. A minimum of four to six acres would be necessary to accommodate the modified design which totals approximately 32,000 square feet. Public areas, such as administration and support services, dining room, and housekeeping areas, are to the front; private areas, such as the nursing units, are to the back. The facility's middle area houses gym, classrooms, and occupational therapy areas. The location encourages residential community involvement. Each of three, 20-bed units is made up of a group of two consultation rooms, a galley, a laundry, a day room and core living space located directly across from the nursing station for maximum observation and efficiency. Each unit comprises a separate wing. Six handicapped accessible patient beds are contemplated; the building will be handicapped-accessible. The staffing projections have increased and the pattern has been minimally altered in the updates. The updated pro forma also modified the initial financial projections so as to increase salary expense and employee benefits based on this change in staffing. An increase in the total project cost impacted on depreciation, and interest expense changed with time. All these changes are reasonable and insubstantial. FRTC's design is adequate for providing a suitable environment for intensive residential treatment for children and adolescents even though it is not identical to Charter's "template" for residential treatment and even though Charter's extensive experience with acute care facilities has focused these changes in its residential treatment concepts. The parties stipulated to the adequacy of FRTC's proposed equipment list and costs. Total construction cost was demonstrated to be reasonably estimated at $2,078,000. The square footage costs of $64.86 per square foot represet an increase from the square footage costs contained in the original CON application. The original budget was updated based upon a three percent inflation factor and the addition of the approximately 1,000 square feet. The additional space is not a significant construction change. The total project costs of $4,728,000 are reasonable. The testimony of HRS Deputy Assistant Secretary for Regulation and Health Facilities, John Griffin, who testified by deposition, (RTCPB's Exhibit 8, pp. 21-22) revealed no firm policy on what the agency, within its expertise, views as substantial and impermissible amendments to a CON application; HRS did not move at hearing to remand for further review; and the undersigned concludes that the changes in facility design, costs, and staffing do not represent significant changes which would be excludable as evidence and that they do represent permissible minor modifications and refinements of the original FRTC application. Site Availability No party contended that FRTC's application was a "site specific" application, that a residential treatment program is otherwise required to be "site specific," or that an IRTP CON is governed by a "site specific" rule or by "site specific" statutory criteria. Therefore, it was only necessary for FRTC in this noncomparative proceeding to establish that several suitable sites were available within the required geographic parameters at the financial amount allotted in FRTC's projections. FRTC did establish financially and geographically available and suitable sites through the testimony of Robert H. Ellzey, a qualified expert in commercial real estate values. The Non-Rule Need Policy There are no hospital licensed Intensive Residential Treatment Programs in Palm Beach County or in District IX. IRTPs are in a separate licensure category by law from psychiatric beds, acute care beds, and rehabilitation beds. There is a separate need methodology for long-term psychiatric beds and there are no CON licensed long-term psychiatric programs for children and adolescents in District IX, unless one considers Humana which is treating adolescents well beyond 30 or 90 days residency. HRS has no promulgated rule predicting need for IRTPs seeking specialty hospital licensure under Chapter 395, F.S. Subsequent to advice of its counsel that a CON must be obtained as a condition of IRTP licensure pursuant to Chapter 395, F.S., HRS elected to evaluate all IRTP CON applications in the context of the statutory criteria of Chapter 381, F.S., and in the context of HRS' non-rule policy establishing a rebuttable presumption of need for one "reasonably sized" IRTP in each HRS planning district. The May 5, 1988 Final Order in Florida Psychiatric Centers v. HRS, et al., DOAH Case No. 88- 0008R, held this non-rule policy invalid as a rule due to HRS' failure to promulgate it pursuant to Section 120.54, F.S., but that order also held the policy not to be invalid as contrary to Chapter 381, F.S. That Final Order intervened between the close of final hearing in the instant case and entry of the instant Recommended Order, however, it does not alter the need for the agency to explicate and demonstrate the reasonableness of its non-rule policy on a case by case basis. HRS was unable to do so in the formal hearing in the instant case. Notwithstanding the oral testimony of Robert May and Elizabeth Dudek, and the deposition testimony of John Griffin, it appears that the non- rule policy is not based upon generally recognized health planning considerations, but solely on the agency's statutory interpretation of recent amendments to Chapter 395 and some vague perception, after internal agency discussions, that the policy is consistent with certain promulgated need rules and with certain other non-rule policies for other types of health care entities, which other non-rule policies were never fully enunciated or proved up in this formal hearing. The HRS non-rule policy was also not affirmatively demonstrated to be rational because it does not take into account the reasonableness of a proposed facility's average length of stay, referral sources, geographic access, or other factors common to duly promulgated CON rules. Numerical Need and Conformity to Applicable Health Plans FRTC sought to support HRS' non-rule policy on numerical need for, and definition of, a "reasonably sized" IRTP through the testimony of Dr. Ronald Luke, who was qualified as an expert in health planning, development of need methodologies, health economies, survey research, and development of mental health programs. In the absence of a finding of a rational non-rule policy on numerical need, Dr. Luke's evidence forms the cornerstone of FRTC's demonstration of numerical need. Through the report and testimony of Dr. Luke, and despite contrary expert health planning testimony, FRTC established the numerical need for, and reasonableness of, its 60 licensed IRTP beds in District IX with projected 60 percent occupancy in the first year and 50 percent in the second year of operation using two bed need methodologies. Dr. Luke ultimately relied on a utilization methodology based upon 1991 population projections. Dr. Luke used a census rate per 100,000 population of 21.58. This is appropriately and reasonably derived from national data for residential treatment patients aged 0-17, regardless of the fact that the types of residential treatment considered by the NIMH data base employed by Dr. Luke greatly vary in concept and despite HRS having not yet clearly defined the nature of the programs and services it expects to be offered by a Florida specialty hospital licensed IRTP. Therefrom, Dr. Luke derived an average daily census of 52 in 1991. That figure yields a bed sizing of between 58 and 61 beds, depending on whether an 85 percent or 90 percent occupancy factor is plugged in. Either 58 or 61 beds is within the range of ratios calculated by Dr. Luke's other methodology for currently licensed Florida IRTPs in other districts. Assuming a target occupancy rate of 85 percent and an ALOS of one year, Dr. Luke considered the gross District IX IRTP bed need to be 60. In the absence of any like program to assess occupancy for and in the presence of similar programs such as Humana operating at nearly full occupancy now and RTCPB forecasting its occupancy at 88 percent in 1990 if it were IRTP-licensed, it is found that 60 beds are justified. Since there are no IRTP beds licensed as specialty hospitals in the current district bed inventory, no adjustment of this figure must be made to account for existing licensed IRTP beds. Simply stated, this is a CON application for an IRTP, nothing more and nothing less, and the subtrahend to be subtracted from gross district bed need is zero when there is a zero specialty hospital licensed IRTP bed inventory. Luke's calculated gross need of 60 bed is also his net need and is accepted. Fifty beds is generally the minimum size HRS will approve to be feasible for any free standing facility to be eonomically efficient and to be able to benefit from economies of scale. This 50 bed concept is within the wide range of bed ratios that HRS implicitly has found reasonable in, previously- licensed IRTP CON approvals. Conformity With Applicable Health Plans Section 38l.705(1)(a), F.S., requires HRS to consider CON applications against criteria contained in the applicable State and District Health Plans. In this regard, neither the applicable State Health Plan nor the applicable District IX Local Health Plan make any reference to a need for intensive residential treatment facilities. The District IX Health Plan addresses the need for psychiatric and substance abuse services to be available to all individuals in District IX. FRTC's project addresses this goal only in part. The District Health Plan states that priority should be given to CON applicants who make a commitment to providing indigent care. FRTC proposes only 1.5 percent indigent care which works out to only 1/2 of the ALOS of one patient at the proposed facility and is hardly optimum, but in a noncomparative hearing, it stands alone as advancing the given accessibility goal within the plan. Objective 1.3 of the State Health Plan provides: Through 1987, additional long-term inpatient psychiatric beds should not normally be approved unless the average annual occupancy for all existing and approved long-term hospital psychiatric beds in the HRS District is at least 80 percent. FRTC's project is neutral as to this goal. The District Plan also contains a goal for a complete range of health care services for the population of the district. FRTC advances this goal. The State Health Plan further provides: Goal 10: DEVELOP A COMPLETE RANGE OF ESSENTIAL PUBLIC MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES IN EACH HRS DISTRICT OBJECTIVE 10.1: Develop a range of essential mental health services in each HRS district by 1989. OBJECTIVE 10.3: Develop a network of residential treatment settings for Florida's severely emotionally disturbed children by 1990. RECOMMENDED ACTION: 1.03A: Develop residential placements within Florida for all SED children currently receiving ing treatment in out-of-state facilities by 1990. The FRTC project advances these goals in part. To the extent SED patients placed outside the state for residential treatment services are HRS patients whom FRTC as yet has not contracted to treat, the FRTC project does not advance this goal. However, increased insurance reimbursement will advance accessibility for those SED children and adolescents in need of this type of care whose families have insurance coverage. The State Plan also emphasizes a goal for a continuum of care. The FRTC plan advances this goal. Financial Feasibility William S. Love, Senior Director of Hospital Operations for Charter, was accepted as an expert in health care finance. Mr. Love prepared the pro forma financial statement contained in the original CON application and the update of the pro forma in response to HRS' completeness questions. Mr. Love also had input into the updated financial information which increased salary and benefit expense. (See FOF No. 11). The revised pro forma utilized an assumption of gross patient revenues of $300 per day and a 365 day ALOS, both of which are reasonable and both of which support the rest of FRTC's assumptions (See FOF No. 9). Routine revenues are based on the types of routine services patients normally receive on a daily basis. Ancillary revenues are support revenues such as pharmacy charges, X-rays, lab charges, and other charges not generally utilized on a routine basis. The only charges to patients at the proposed FRTC facility are the routine and ancillary charges. The assumptions with regard to contractual adjustments are that there will be no Medicare utilization since the facility is projected for children and adolescents and no Medicaid since freestanding facilities in Florida are not eligible for Medicaid. Two percent of gross patient revenues are estimated to be contractual adjustments which relate to HMOs and PPOs. FRTC addresses indigent care by 1.5 percent of gross revenues which will be dedicated to Charter Care which is free care. The assumptions with regard to bad debt are that 8 percent of gross revenue will be the allowance for bad debt. An assumption of 20 percent of salaries was used for employee benefits which include the FICA tax, health insurance, dental insurance, retirement plans, and other benefits. Supplies and expenses were calculated as a function of patient day with a $90 per day estimate. Included in supplies and expenses are supplies utilized in the delivery of health care services as well as medical professional fees such as the half-time medical director and purchased services such as laundry, linen, speech and hearing services, utilities, telephone, malpractice insurance, repairs and maintenance. The depreciation assumptions are that the building would be depreciated over 40 years, fixed equipment over 20 years and major movable equipment over 10 years. Pre-opening expenses for the first 45 days of operation have been capitalized over 60 months with low amortization costs over 15 years. There is no income tax assumed in the first year but the assumption in subsequent years is that the tax rate will be 38 percent. The failure to assume a hospital tax is inconsequential. The assumptions for the second fiscal year are basically the same. Although staffing remained the same, the FTEs per occupied bed increased, and a 7 percent inflation factor was added. The project will be financially feasible even though the facility is pessimistically projecting a loss of $102,000 for the first year because a facility can suffer a loss in its first year of operation and remain financially feasible. The facility projects a $286,000 profit in its second year of operation. With regard to utilization by class of pay, FRTC has assumed that the insurance category represents 65.5 percent of total revenues projected and includes such things as commercial insurance, Blue Cross and any third party carrier other than Medicare and Medicaid. Assumptions with regard to the private pay are that 25 percent of the total revenues will be generated by private pay patients and would include the self pay portions of an insurance payor's bill, such as deductible and co-insurance. Bad debt was assumed to be 8 percent, and Charter Care or free care, 1.5 percent. FRTC's projected utilization by class of pay is reasonable and is supported by the protestants' current experience with commercial insurance utilization and reimbursement and the predicted recoveries if RTCPB were IRTP-licensed. In the second year of operation, the assumptions with regard to utilization by class of pay demonstrated an increase in the insurance category from 65.5 to 66.5 percent with everything else remaining the same except for a decrease in bad debt to 7 percent. The assumption with regard to a decrease in bad debt is based upon the establishment of referral patterns from acute psychiatric facilities, outpatient programs, mental health therapists, and miscellaneous programs. The assumption is that 65 percent of the patients would be covered by insurance, not that 65 percent of each bill would be paid by insurance. Charter's experience has been that a good portion of the deductible and co-insurance payments are collectible. FRTC did not assume payment from any governmental contracts or HRS reimbursement. FRTC's projected self pay percentages assumption reasonably contemplates the percentage of households in the district which can afford its projections for self pay. For purposes of evaluating the financial feasibility of this proposal, a management fee was not included because in looking at the financial feasibility of a facility the expenses of a corporate home office are incurred whether or not the facility is built. It was not appropriate to allocate a management fee to the hospital because it showed a loss in its first year of operation and a profit in its second. When the facility becomes profitable, FRTC anticipates passing the profit through to the corporation to help reduce the corporate overhead. If a management fee had been allocated to this facility, allocations would have had to have been made to the other Charter facilities to show where their management expense had decreased and their profitability increased. It would have been inappropriate to take these fixed expenses and allocate a portion of them to the proposed FRTC facility. In addition to the fact that the failure to include a management fee in the pro forma should not affect the feasibility of the project, Charter has good cause not to apply a $44 per patient day management fee in its IRTP. FRTC's categories of payor class are generally reasonable based in part on the results of a survey performed in Florida. FRTC's assumptions and calculations are reasonable, based upon the testimony of William S. Love and Dr. Ronald Luke, notwithstanding the testimony of Dan Sullivan, Donald Wilson, and Christopher Knepper, also qualified as experts. Specifically, it is found that Dr. Luke's assessment that the designation of a facility as a licensed specialty hospital has a beneficial effect on its ability to obtain insurance reimbursement for services, that reimbursement impacts to increase ALOS, and that the breakdown of sources of payment that FRTC has used is reasonable, is a credible assessment, supported elsewhere in the record. It is also found that Mr. Knepper's assessment for bad debt is inadequately supported and inconsistent with other evidence, and therefore not credible. Mr. Sullivan's testimony is not persuasive. Staffing and Recruitment Dr. Brett, a Charter regional director for hospital operations, was accepted as an expert in staffing psychiatric facilities including residential treatment centers. His distinctions between the acute care and residential types of facilities are corroborated and explained by other witnesses and evidence. Mr. Joyner was accepted as Charter's expert recruiter. Although the depth of Mr. Joyner's hands-on involvement in active recruitment is not extensive, the Charter network of manpower referrals and "head hunting" will obviously support this project. Upon the combined testimony of Dr. Brett, Mr. Joyner, and Paul Bodner, Charter's senior director of physician relations, there is sufficient evidence that FRTC can recruit a suitable staffing pattern to ensure quality of care (see FOF Nos. 9 and 10) in its proposed program, even if it has to hire from out of state and pay somewhat higher salaries due to some qualified manpower shortages in certain categories in Palm Beach County. In making this finding, the undersigned has considered the testimony of Donald Wilson concerning certain institution-specific recruiting problems of his principal, RTCPB, and the "step down" status of residential treatment as testified by Mary Certo, of Humana. Impact on Costs and Competition The FRTC project can reasonably be expected to attract patients with insurance coverage who would otherwise go to existing facilities for care, however, in light of the relatively consistent occupancy rates at Humana and RTCPB despite both their geographical proximity and the unique confusion of referrals arising over the relocation of Dr. Kelly, this impact is not altogether clear. Dr. Kelly's reputation will not be impacted by granting of a CON to FRTC. It is also not possible upon the basis of the record created in this hearing to factor out reimbursement differences inherent in Humana's current CON classification and RTCPB's circumstance as an unlicensed intensive residential treatment center. In any case, the negative impact upon Humana must be measured against the health planning goals expressed by several witnesses that it is desirable to substitute more suitable, less restrictive facilities for institutionalization of the severely emotionally disturbed child and adolescent whenever possible and that it is also desirable to encourage residential treatment upon a continuum of care basis after acute psychiatric care. The FRTC project will obviously increase the accessibility to this type of treatment for young people who have the appropriate insurance coverage. These goals are in conformity with the applicable health plans. The FRTC project can reasonably be expected to initially increase some costs of health services throughout the district because it will inflate some salary costs due to competition, but the negative impact will probably be short term.
Recommendation Upon a balanced consideration of all relevant criteria it is RECOMMENDED that HRS enter a Final Order approving FRTC's CON application for an IRTP, as updated, for licensure as a specialty hospital. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of June, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 87-2037 & 87-2050 The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), F.S., with regard to the parties' respective Proposed Findings of Fact. Proposed Findings of Fact (PFOF) of FRTC: Covered in "issue" and FOF 1. Covered in FOF 1 and 2. 3-7. Except as subordinate or unnecessary, accepted in "procedural and evidentiary matters" and FOF 11. 8. Accepted in FOF 12. 9-12. Except as subordinate, unnecessary, or cumulative, accepted in FOF 7-9. 13. Accepted in FOF 10. 14-17. Accepted in part and rejected in part in FOF 7-11, 30. Although portions of the underlying data referred to in proposal 16 and by Mr. Joyner in his testimony was excluded from evidence, he was qualified as a recruitment expert and for the reasons set forth in FOF 30, his opinion is accepted. 18-19. Accepted in FOF 21. Accepted in FOF 22, 26, 29. Accepted in FOF 23. Accepted in FOF 24. Accepted in FOF 25 and 29. Accepted in FOF 26 and 29. Except as subordinate or unnecessary, covered in FOF 27. Except as mere argument or statement of position, accepted in FOF 26-27, and 29. 27-29. Accepted in part and rejected in part as unnecessary and cumulative to the facts as found; in part rejected as mere argument or recital of testimony, not distinguishing opinion from fact. To the degree adopted or accepted upon the record as a whole, see FOF 26-29. 30-31. Accepted in FOF 28. 32-40. Accepted in part and rejected in part as unnecessary and cumulative to the facts as found; in part rejected as mere argument or recital of testimony, not distinguishing opinion from fact. To the degree adopted or accepted upon the record as a whole, see FOF 9, 11, 21, 26-29. 41-44. Accepted in part and rejected in part as unnecessary and cumulative to the facts as found in FOF 29-32. 45-47. Rejected, as recital or summation of testimony and as part of preliminary agency review not relevant to this de novo proceeding. 48. Covered in FOF 7, 18-20, 22, and 26. 49-52. dejected as set out in "organic law and legislative background," "procedural and evidentiary matters," FOF 13-15. See also COL. 53. Accepted in FOF 16. 54-58. Rejected in part and accepted in part as set out in FOF 14-15. Rejected where not supported in full by the record as a whole, where subordinate, unnecessary or cumulative to the facts as found and where mere recital of testimony. 59. Accepted in principle and modified to conform to the record in FOF 18-20, 31. 60-61. Accepted in part and rejected in part as stated in "procedural and evidentiary matters" and in FOF 14-16 and the COL. Accepted in FOF 15 and COL. Accepted in FOF 18-20, 31. 64-68. Rejected as unnecessary to the facts as found in FOF 1, 7, 13-15 and 29, also in part as not supported by the record as a whole, and as primarily legal argument and recitation of testimony. Accepted in FOF 3-4 and 30. Accepted in part and rejected in part in FOF 3-4, 7, 26, and 29. 71-74. Except as subordinate or unnecessary, accepted in FOF 5-9 and 30-32. HRS' Proposed Findings of Fact (PFOF): 1-3. Accepted in "organic law and legislative background." 4. (Two paragraphs) Accepted FOF 3-4. Accepted in "issue" and FOF 3-4. Accepted, FOF 29-32. Rejected as unnecessary. Accepted, FOF 1. 10-18 & 20. Except as subordinate or unnecessary, accepted in FOF 5, 6, 15, 26, 31. 19. Rejected as irrelevant. 21-28. Accepted in part as modified to conform to the record as a whole in FOF 6-9, 30-31. The irrelevant, unnecessary or subordinate material has also been rejected. 29-31. Accepted in FOF 4, 9, 21, 26, 29-31. 32-35. Accepted in FOF 7-9. 36-41. Accepted in FOF 7-9 as modified to conform to the record as a whole, to eliminate subordinate and irrelevant matters and to comport with the rulings on the insubstantiality of updates to the CON application, in "procedural and evidentiary matters" and FOF 11. 42-45. Accepted as modified to conform to the record as a whole, to eliminate subordinate and irrelevant matters and to comport with the rulings on the insubstantiality of updates to the CON application in "procedural and evidentiary matters" and FOF 9-11, 21, 23, 30 and 32. Accepted in FOF 22, 26, 29. Accepted in FOF 7, 20, 22, 26. 49-52. Accepted in FOF 3, 4, 21-29. Assuming, based on the transcript reference, that this proposal refers to FRTC's pro forma, this proposal is accepted but unnecessary for the reasons set forth in rulings on HRS' PFOF 36-45. See FOF 11 and 21-29. Accepted in FOF 13-15. 55-58. Rejected as unnecessary. 59. Accepted but not dispositive of any material issue at bar. See FOF 13-15. 60-62. Accepted in part and rejected in part in FOF 13-14, as mere recital of testimony and statements of position. 63. Accepted in FOF 29. 64-65. Accepted in FOF 5-9. Accepted in FOF 7-9. Accepted that HRS made this assumption but it fails to explicate the non-rule policy. See FOF 13-14. Accepted in FOF 16. Rejected as a statement of position or COL. Peripherally, see COL. Accepted in FOF 13-14 but not dispositive of any material issue at bar. Rejected in FOF 13-14. 72-74. Rejected as preliminary agency action, irrelevant to this de novo proceeding. 75-76. Accepted in FOF 17-20. This is a subordinate definition and not a FOF. See FOF 30-31 and COL. Rejected in part and accepted in part in FOF 17-20, 31. Accepted in FOF 10. Accepted in FOF 13-15. Accepted as stated in the "procedural and evidentiary matters," FOF 13-15 and in the COL. 82-85. Covered in FOF 3-6, 13-15. 86. Rejected as preliminary agency action, irrelevant to this de novo proceeding. 87-88. Rejected as subordinate or unnecessary. 89. Accepted in FOF 29. 90-96. Accepted as modified to conform to the record evidence as a whole and FOF 15-16 and to reject subordinate and unnecessary material. Accepted without any connotations of the word "therefore" in FOF 4, 7-9, 21 and 29. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Accepted in "organic and legislative background" and FOF 13-15. Rejected as not established upon the record as a whole; unnecessary. Rejected as a statement of position only. Joint Proposed Findings of Fact of RTCPB and Humana 1-2 Accepted in FOF 1. 3-4. Accepted in FOF 2. 5-6. Accepted in "issue" and FOF 3-4. 7. Accepted in "issue" and FOF 5-6. 8-13. Accepted in part and rejected in part as set out under "procedural and evidentiary matters," FOF 3-6, 13-15, and the COL. 14-18. Except as subordinate or unnecessary, accepted in FOF 1, 7-9, 11, 21-29. 19-27. Rejected as irrelevant preliminary action to this de novo proceeding. 28-36. Rejected in part and accepted in part upon the compelling competent, substantial evidence in the record as a whole as set forth in FOF 13-14. Also as to 33 see FOF 15. 37-52. Accepted in part and rejected in part in FOF 13-16 upon the greater weight of the credible evidence of record as a whole. Irrelevant, unnecessary and subordinate material has been rejected, as has mere argument of counsel. Accepted in FOF 17. Rejected in FOF 20, 31. Accepted as modified in FOF 20, 31. Excepting the mere rhetoric, accepted in FOF 18, 31. Accepted as modified in FOF 7, 18-20, 26, 31. 58-59. Accepted in part and rejected in part in FOF 17-20, 26, Rejected as subordinate. Rejected as recital of testimony and argument 62-63. Rejected as unnecessary. 64-67. Accepted in FOF 3-4, 6-9. The first sentence is rejected as cumulative to the facts as found in FOF 3-4, 6-9. The second sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence as a whole. Rejected in FOF 4, 21. Accepted in FOF 4 and 21, 29. Rejected as unnecessary Accepted in FOF 26. Rejected in FOF 15-20, 31. Rejected as unnecessary in a noncomparitive hearing. 75-87. Except as irrelevant, unnecessary, or subordinate, accepted in FOF 5-9, 30, 31. Rejected in part as unnecessary and in part as not comporting with the greater weight of the evidence in FOF 7-10 and 30. Accepted in FOF 1, 5-9. 90-92. Accepted in FOF 5-9. Rejected in FOF 5-6. Rejected as subordinate. 95-98. Accepted in FOF 5-9. 99-102. Rejected as unnecessary. 103. Except as subordinate or unnecessary, accepted in FOF 5-9. 104-118. Except as unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative to the facts as found, these proposals are covered in FOF 5-9, 30-31. Except as Subordinate, covered in FOF 6 and 31. Accepted in part in FOF 5-9, 21-29, otherwise rejected as misleading. Except as subordinate, accepted in FOF 6. Rejected as unnecessary. Accepted in FOF 21. Accepted in FOF 21-29. Rejected in part and accepted in part in FOF 21-29. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary in part and not supported by the greater weight of the credible evidence in 21-29. 127-128. These proposals primarily recite testimony by Mr. Grono, an administrator of a psychiatric hospital for very severely disturbed persons (Grant Center). This evidence by itself is not persuasive in light of Dr. Luke's study and other admissions of the parties referenced in FOF 21-29. Upon the greater weight of contrary evidence, it is rejected. 129. Rejected as subordinate except partly accepted in FOF 29. 130-133. Rejected upon the greater weight of the evidence in FOF 9, 11 and 21-29. 134, 139. Rejected as legal argument without citation. 135-138. Rejected in FOF 21-29. 140-144. Rejected as stated as not supported by the greater weight of the credible evidence and as partly mere legal argument. See FOF 9, 21-29. 145. The first sentence is rejected upon the reference to PFOF 140-144 for the same reasons given above and the remainder is rejected as subordinate. 146. Rejected in FOF 21-29. 147. Rejected as mere legal argument without citation. 148-149. Rejected in FOF 21-29, particularly 27 upon the greater weight of the credible evidence. The mere legal argument is also rejected. 150-157. Rejected as set out in FOF 28 upon the greater weight of the credible evidence. Uncited argument and statements of position have likewise bean rejected. 158, 160. Rejected as mere argument without citation. 159. Rejected as subordinate and not dispositive of any material issue at bar in FOF 23. 161. Rejected as mere argument. 162-167. Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the credible evidence in FOF 30-32. Also 167 is rejected as mere argument without citation. 168. Accepted in part and rejected in part in FOF 30-32. 169. Accepted but subordinate. 170. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative to the facts as found in FOF 31. 171-180. Covered in FOF 30-32. 181-185. Rejected as contrary to the evidence in part and in part unnecessary and cumulative to the ruling in "procedural and evidentiary matters" and FOF 7, 10-11, 21, 23, 30-32. 186-188. Rejected in FOF 7, 10 and 30 upon the greater weight of the credible evidence. 189. Rejected as unnecessary 190. Rejected in FOF 30. 191-392. Accepted but not dispositive of any material issue at bar. See FOF 30-32. 193. Rejected in FOF 30-32. 194-195. Except as subordinate or unnecessary, rejected in the several references to future establishment of referral networks. See FOF 21, 27. 196-197 & 199. Rejected as unnecessary 198. Rejected as irrelevant in part and immaterial in part upon the rulings in "procedural and evidentiary matters" and FOF 11. 200. Rejected as unnecessary 201-202. Accepted in FOF 7, 20, 26-27 and 31, but cumulative. 203. Covered in the COL. Rejected in FOF 21-22. 204. Rejected as mere argument without citation. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Glazer, Esquire AUSLEY, McMULLEN, McGEHEE, CAROTHERS & PROCTOR 227 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 John T. Brennan, Jr., Esquire BONNER & O'CONNEL 900 17th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 James C. Hauser, Esquire Joy Heath Thomas, Esquire MESSER, VICKERS, CAPARELLO, FRENCH & MADSEN 215 South Monroe Street Post Office Box 1876 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Fred W Baggett, Esquire Stephen A. Ecenia, Esquire ROBERTS, BAGGETT, LaFACE & RICHARD 101 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lesley Mendelson, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner, Basedeo Ramassar, is eligible for exemption from disqualification from working in a registered or licensed family day care center under Subsection 402.302(3), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Under Sections 402.301-319, Florida Statutes, the Department of Children and Family Services is the agency responsible for establishing licensing standards for child care facilities and child care personnel. Petitioner, Basedeo Ramassar, is married to Cathy Ramassar; they both reside at 2707 West Airport Boulevard, Sanford, Florida. Cathy Ramassar applied to Respondent to renew her license as a family day care facility at her home at 2707 West Airport Boulevard, Sanford, Florida. As a result of her application, Respondent conducted a Level 2 background screening. As a result of the screening, it was determined that, on March 20, 2000, Basedeo Ramassar had pled nolo contendere to the charge of assignation to commit prostitution, a violation of Section 796.07, Florida Statutes. When Cathy Ramassar was advised that her license would not be renewed because of her husband's violation of Section 796.07, Florida Statutes, she requested an administrative hearing and, shortly thereafter, Mr. Ramassar requested an exemption pursuant to Section 435.07, Florida Statutes. Michael Ingram, District 7 Screening Coordinator, convened a three-person Exemption Review Committee which considered the circumstances surrounding the disqualifying criminal incident, nature of harm to victim, amount of time since the last criminal incident, and the applicant's general history. The Exemption Review Committee relies on the applicant to provide information on rehabilitation. The Exemption Review Committee denied Mr. Ramassar's exemption request based, in part, on the fact that not enough time had elapsed since the 1999 offense and the March 20, 2000, nolo contendere plea and a 1990 domestic battery arrest which occurred prior to his current marriage. This denial was a proper exercise of the authority vested in the Exemption Review Committee. Mr. Ramassar testified that during the afternoon hours of November 26, 1999, he approached an undercover female police officer and "offered her $20 for straight sex." This resulted in his arrest and ultimately, his nolo contendere plea to assignation to commit prostitution. With the help of a supportive wife and members of their church, which he regularly attends, Mr. Ramassar has made a good start on a rehabilitation program. Apparently, he has a good marriage which has withstood the humiliation of public knowledge of his infidelity and criminal involvement; each witness testified to awareness of his criminal involvement. As a part of the exemption process, Subsection 435.07(3), Florida Statutes, requires an assessment of "the nature of the harm caused to the victim"; the only "victim" in this case is Mr. Ramassar's wife, who has not only suffered the public humiliation of her husband's infidelity, but has been denied a license renewal for her day care facility. Mr. Ramassar is regularly employed as a mason and, as a result, except on rare occasions, is away from the day care facility during its normal working hours. Witnesses who had children enrolled in Mr. Ramassar's wife's day care facility expressed little concern with the knowledge that Mr. Ramassar had pled nolo contendere to assignation to commit prostitution.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order granting Petitioner, Basedeo Ramassar, an exemption from disqualification from employment as a caretaker for children and granting Cathy Ramassar a renewal of her license. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of September, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Craig A. McCarthy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 400 West Robinson Street Suite S-1106 Orlando, Florida 32801-1782 George B. Wallace, Esquire George B. Wallace, Esq., PA 700 West First Street Sanford, Florida 32771 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services was the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing of family child day care centers in this state. Respondent, Elizabeth Horton, has, since before January 31, 1992, operated the Little Darling Horton-Cotton Family Day Care at 3710 11th Street East in Bradenton, Florida. The location is Mrs. Horton's home, and she resides there with Alfrader L. Cotton, her companion, Craig E. Horton and Sheldon G. Horton, her sons, and Tangela D. Horton, her daughter. In January, 1992, Mrs. Horton submitted an application for a license to operate a family day care center at the stated location and listed the others noted above as residents. Thereafter, on July 9, 1992, June 28, 1993, July 11, 1994, July 18, 1994 and December 21, 1995, Mrs. Horton submitted application forms for renewal of her license. On each of the renewal application forms, those same individuals were listed as residents of the home. Mrs. Horton's brother, L. H., was not listed as a resident or in any capacity on any of the application forms. On or about December 3, 1993, a report of abuse of a minor female, A. M., born on February 12, 1984, was received in the Department. The substance of the allegation was that A. M., along with her little brother, born on March 6, 1985, were placed by their mother at the Respondent's home from about 5:00 PM until early the next morning each week night, while their mother was at work. The report further alleged that Mrs. Horton's brother, L. H., had molested A. M. while she was staying in the Horton home. He was alleged to have awakened her in the middle of the night while she was asleep in the Horton daughter's bedroom on the pretext of taking her to the bathroom, but fondled her breasts and vaginal area. This report was investigated by personnel of the Department and was classified as verified. A report of neglect was entered against Mrs. Horton arising out of her failure to supervise the children and a Hearing Officer from the Division of Administrative Hearings, after a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, entered a Recommended Order recommending that the Department enter a Final Order amending the proposed confirmed report to a classification of unfounded and expunging Mrs. Horton's name from the case record and all Department records. The Hearing Officer found, however, that L. H. had committed the abuse, and this determination was subsequently affirmed by the Secretary of the Department in the Final Order entered in this case. In 1989, L. H. was found guilty in the Circuit Court in Manatee County of lewd and lascivious acts in the presence of a child eleven years of age or younger, in violation of Section 800.04, Florida Statutes, a felony, and was sentenced, among other things, to community control for two years followed by seven years probation. After his arrest for the assault on A. M., on June 28, 1995, his prior sentence was increased to seven years in prison. He was also tried in Circuit Court for Manatee County for sexual battery, and was, on that same date, sentenced for the second offense to life imprisonment, with the provision he serve no less than twenty-five years. Whenever an individual is issued a license to operate a family day care center, that person is provided with a copy of a handbook containing the rules of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services relating to the licensing and operation of those facilities. Included within that pamphlet is a copy of Department rule 10M-10.002, dealing with personnel, which requires that all persons who are members of the operator's family or who reside in the day care home must be screened as must be persons providing substitute care in the absence of the operator. The evidence regarding the status of L. H. is contradictory. A. M. indicates that L. H. would be at the center from about 10:00 PM at night, after Mrs. Horton picked him up at work; would be there when she, A. M., went to bed at some time after 9:00 PM and before 11:00 PM; and, most of the time, would also be there then next morning, having spent the night in the bedroom of Mrs. Horton's son, Craig. A. M. cannot recall if L. H. ate his meals at the Horton home or took his showers there, but she recalls that he did cook there several times. She never saw him change or wash his clothes there and she never saw any of his clothes in the closet. Though she contends she was never left alone with L. H. by Mrs. Horton, she claims she was touched on her private parts by him on several occasions in the early hours of the morning, while the others in the house were sleeping. A. M.'s mother does not know if L. H. lived at the Horton child care center or not. He was there sometimes at night when she dropped the children off, and he was always there when she picked them up the next morning. To the best of her knowledge, the children were never left alone with him. Mrs. Horton, on the other hand, while admitting she knew that her brother had been convicted of a felony regarding a sexual offense against a minor child, categorically denies that L. H. lived at her home. She admits that he visited there from time to time and admitted to Ms. Winfrey, the child care supervisor from the Department, that he spent the night there from time to time as well. According to Mrs. Horton, L. H. lived with their parents in a home in the next block east on 11th Street East. Respondent admitted at hearing to picking him up from work around 9:00 PM at times, but not regularly. She contended at hearing he would come to the house to watch TV and to play games with her son, but rarely did he stay and never did he spend the night. The probation officers who visited L. H. would sometimes come to her house to see him but would never come in. None of the probation officers ever said anything to her about L. H.'s being at her home with children being present. At no time until the report of abuse was filed did she have any idea that L. H. was behaving improperly with any children in her charge. When she found out what he had done, she told him not to come back to that house. Mrs. Horton's daughter, age 17, claims that L. H. did not live at the care center at any time. He did not wash his clothes there or do anything which indicated he lived there. Since she was older, she stayed up later than A. M., going to bed around 10:00 PM or so. As she recalls, L. H. would usually leave the house about 10 or 11:00 PM and she would see him leave often. She did not often go to bed while he was still there. Taken together, the evidence establishes that while L. H. may not have resided at the house on a permanent basis, he was there frequently enough to be considered a member of the family as defined in the Department rules.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order denying Elizabeth Horton renewal of her license to operate a family day care center. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Raymond R. Deckert, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative services, Room 500 400 West Dr. M. L. King, Jr. Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33614 Elizabeth Horton 3710 11th Street East Bradenton, Florida 34208 Alfrader Cotton Qualified Representative 3710 11th Street East Bradenton, Florida 34208 Gregory D. Venz Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Building Number Two, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard Doran General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Building Number Two, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Conclusions Having reviewed the Amended Notice of Intent to Deny and Settlement Agreement, and all other matters of record, the Agency for Health Care Administration finds and concludes as follows: 1, The Agency has jurisdiction over the above-named Petitioner pursuant to Chapter 408, Part II, Florida Statutes, and the applicable authorizing statutes and administrative code provisions. 2. The Agency issued the attached Amended Notice of Intent to Deny and Election of Rights form to the Petitioner. (Ex. 1) The Election of Rights form advised of the right to an administrative hearing. 3. The parties have since entered into the attached Settlement Agreement. (Ex. 2) Based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED: 4. The Settlement Agreement is adopted and incorporated by reference into this Final Order. The parties shall comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 5. The Petitioner’s license renewal application for assisted living facility licensure is withdrawn. 6. The Agency’s Amended Notice of Intent to Deny is moot and thus is withdrawn. 7. The Petitioner is responsible for any refunds that may be due to any clients. 8. The Petitioner shall remain responsible for retaining and appropriately distributing client records as prescribed by Florida law. The Petitioner is advised of Section 408.810, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner should also consult the applicable authorizing statutes and administrative code provisions as well as any other statute that may apply to health care practitioners regarding client records. Filed December 6, 2012 3:03 PM Division of Administrative Hearings 9. The Petitioner is given notice of Florida law regarding unlicensed activity. The Petitioner is advised of Section 408.804 and Section 408.812, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner should also consult the applicable authorizing statutes and administrative code provisions. The Petitioner is notified that the cancellation of an Agency license may have ramifications potentially affecting accrediting, third party billing including but not limited to the Florida Medicaid program, and private contracts. ORDERED at Tallahassee, Florida, on this @ day of ; 2012. Elizabeth Didek, Secretary Agency for Hgalth Care Administration
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review, which shall be instituted by filing one copy of a notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk of AHCA, and a second copy, along with filing fee as prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal in the appellate district where the Agency maintains its headquarters or where a party resides. Review of proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the Florida appellate rules. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I CERTIFY that a true and correct_cgpy of this Final Order was served on the below-named persons by the method designated on this £ tay of , 2012. Richard Shoop, Agency Cte Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg. #3, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Telephone: (850) 412-3630 Jan Mills Shaddrick Haston, Unit Manager Facilities Intake Unit Assisted Living Unit (Electronic Mail) Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) Finance & Accounting Revenue Management Unit (Electronic Mail) Katrina Derico-Harris Medicaid Accounts Receivable Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) Patricia Caufman, Field Office Manager Areas 5 and 6 Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) David Selby, Esq. Assistant General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) Shawn McCauley Medicaid Contract Management Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) R. Bruce McKibben Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings (Electronic Mail) Amelia Cowles, Co-owner 80" Place 5551 80" Place Pinellas Park, FL 33781 (U.S. Mail) Christina Mesa, Esq. Mesa Law, PA PO Box 10207 Tampa, FL 33679 (U.S. Mail) NOTICE OF FLORIDA LAW 408.804 License required; display.-- (1) It is unlawful to provide services that require licensure, or operate or maintain a provider that offers or provides services that require licensure, without first obtaining from the agency a license authorizing the provision of such services or the operation or maintenance of such provider. (2) A license must be displayed in a conspicuous place readily visible to clients who enter at the address that appears on the license and is valid only in the hands of the licensee to whom it is issued and may not be sold, assigned, or otherwise transferred, voluntarily or involuntarily. The license is valid only for the licensee, provider, and location for which the license is issued. 408.812 Unlicensed activity.-- (1) A person or entity may not offer or advertise services that require licensure as defined by this part, authorizing statutes, or applicable rules to the public without obtaining a valid license from the agency. A licenseholder may not advertise or hold out to the public that he or she holds a license for other than that for which he or she actually holds the license. (2) The operation or maintenance of an unlicensed provider or the performance of any services that require licensure without proper licensure is a violation of this part and authorizing statutes. Unlicensed activity constitutes harm that materially affects the health, safety, and welfare of clients. The agency or any state attorney may, in addition to other remedies provided in this part, bring an action for an injunction to restrain such violation, or to enjoin the future operation or maintenance of the unlicensed provider or the performance of any services in violation of this part and authorizing statutes, until compliance with this part, authorizing statutes, and agency rules has been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the agency. 3 (3) It is unlawful for any person or entity to own, operate, or maintain an unlicensed provider. If after receiving notification from the agency, such person or entity fails to cease operation and apply for a license under this part and authorizing statutes, the person or entity shall be subject to penalties as prescribed by authorizing statutes and applicable rules. Each day of continued operation is a separate offense. (4) Any person or entity that fails to cease operation after agency notification may be fined $1,000 for each day of noncompliance. (5) When a controlling interest or licensee has an interest in more than one provider and fails to license a provider rendering services that require licensure, the agency may revoke all licenses and impose actions under s. 408.814 and a fine of $1,000 per day, unless otherwise specified by authorizing statutes, against each licensee until such time as the appropriate license is obtained for the unlicensed operation. (6) In addition to granting injunctive relief pursuant to subsection (2), if the agency determines that a person or entity is operating or maintaining a provider without obtaining a license and determines that a condition exists that poses a threat to the health, safety, or welfare of a client of the provider, the person or entity is subject to the same actions and fines imposed against a licensee as specified in this part, authorizing statutes, and agency rules. (7) Any person aware of the operation of an unlicensed provider must report that provider to the agency. ae re RICK SCOTT RORDR ASENG! FORFEAIT CARE ADMINS HATS ELIZABETH DUDEK GOVERNOR Better Health Care for all Floridians INTERIM SECRETARY August 29, 2012 Administrator Gene Cowles so" Place P.O, Box 1778 Safety Harbor, FL 34689 RE: DOAH Case # 121-2641 AHCA Case # 2012007214 AMENDED “NOTICE OF INTENT TO DENY” Dear Administrator: It is the decision of the Agency for Health Care Administration (the “Agency”) that your renewal application for an Assisted Living Facility and initial Limited Mental Health specialty license to operate 80° Place be DENIED. This denial is based on the following: Your Standard license was due to expire on 20 May, 2012, and you had applied to renew it plus add a Limited Mental Health specialty license. On 14 February, 2012, the Agency, as required by law, attempted to conduct a biennial survey pursuant to re- licensure. No administrators, staff nor residents were present on that date when the surveyor arrived. , The Agency is required by law to inspect ALFs biennially for licensure renewal. Furthermore, these inspections are required by law to be unannounced. Finally, the Agency is required by law if unable to conduct the inspection to deny the renewal application. : Therefore, the following listed laws, but not limited thereto, require denial of your renewal application: F.S. 408, Part II, to include 408.806 (7) (a), (c)&(d) (re license application process) 408.811 (1) (a)&(b) (re right of inspection) 408.815 (1) (b)& (c) (re denial) * — Headquarters Area Office 2727 Mahan Drive 525 Mirror Lake Or. No., Tallahassee, FL 32308 Suite 330D AHCA.MyFlorida.com St. Petersburg, FL 33701 EXHIBIT 1 F.S. 429, to include 429.14 (1) (h)&(k) (re administrative penalties) 429.17(2) ;429.28(3) (a) (re renewal) , 429.28(3) (a)&(b) (re residents’ rights) 429.34 (re right of entry & inspection) Rule 58A-5.015,F.A.C. (re renewal) * The 3 July, 2012, Notice of Intent to Deny, mistakenly cited F.S. 408.15 (1) (b)&(c); the correct cite (408.815(1) (b)&(c))is listed above. EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS Pursuant to Section 120.569, Florida Statutes (F.S.), you have the right to request an administrative hearing. In order to obtain a formal proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearing under Section 120.57(1), F.S., your request for an administrative Hearing must conform to the requirement in Section 28-106.201, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C.), and must state the material facts you dispute. SEE ATTACHED ELECTION OF RIGHTS FORM Sincerely, Shaddrick A. ton, Manager Assisted Living Unit Bureau of Long Term Care Services Copies to: : Jan Mills, General Counsel Office, Tallahassee ‘Christina Mesa, Esq.,P.0.Box 10207, Tampa, FL 33679-0207 Assisted Living Unit, Tallahassee Paul Brown, AHCA, Supervisor, Area 5, St. Petersburg David Selby, AHCA, Assistant General Counsel, St. Petersburg STATE OF FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 80" PLACE, Petitioner, : vs. DOAH CASE NO. 12-2641 AHCA NO. 2012007214 STATE OF FLORIDA, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, Respondent. / SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT Petitioner, 80" Place, and Respondent, State of Florida, Agency for Health Care Administration (hereinafter the “Agency”), through its duly authorized representatives, pursuant to Section 120.57(4), Florida Statutes, each individually, a “party,” collectively as “parties,” hereby enter into this Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”) and agree as follows: WHEREAS, Petitioner is an assisted living facility (“ALF”) licensed pursuant to Chapters 408, Part IT and 429, Part I, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 58A-5, Florida _ Administrative Code; and WHEREAS, the Agency has jurisdiction by virtue of being the regulatory and licensing authority over Petitioner, pursuant to Chapters 408, Part i and 429, Part I, Florida Statutes; and WHEREAS, the Agency served Petitioner with a “Notice of Intent to Deny” (“NOI”) received on or about 9 July, 2012, and an “Amended Notice of Intent to Deny” on 6 September, 2012, both notifying Petitioner of the Agency’s intent to deny Petitioner’s license renewal application, and WHEREAS, the parties have negotiated and agreed that the best interest of all the parties will be served by a settlement of this proceeding; and . NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and recitals herein, the parties intending to be legally bound, agree as follows: EXHIBIT 2 1. All recitals herein are true and correct and are expressly incorporated herein. 2. Both parties agree that the “whereas” clauses incorporated herein are binding findings of the parties. 3. Upon full execution of this Agreement, Petitioner agrees to waive any and all appeals and proceedings to which it may be entitled including, but not limited to, an informal proceeding under Subsection 120.57(2), Florida Statutes, a formal proceeding under Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, appeals under Section 120.68, Florida Statutes; and declaratory and all writs of relief in any court or quasi-court of competent jurisdiction; and agrees to waive _ compliance with the form of the Final Order (findings of fact and conclusions of law) to which it may be entitled, provided, however, that no agreement herein shall be deemed a waiver by either party of its right to judicial enforcement of this Agreement. 4 Upon full execution of this Agreement, the parties stipulate: a. Petitioner’s request for a hearing in this cause is deemed withdrawn; b. Petitioner’s application for licensure renewal is also deemed withdrawn, and c. This cause shall be deemed dismissed as moot. 5. Venue for any action brought to enforce the terms of this Agreement or the Final Order entered pursuant hereto shall lie in Circuit Court in Leon County, Florida. 6. By executing this Agreement, neither party admits or denies the allegations set forth in the Amended NOI, and the Agency asserts the validity of the allegations raised in the Amended NOI referenced herein. 7. The Agency is not precluded from using the subject events identified in the Amended NOI for any purpose within the jurisdiction of the Agency. Further, Petitioner acknowledges and agrees that this Agreement shall not preclude or estop any other federal, state, or local agency or office from pursuing any cause of action or taking any action, even if based on or arising from, in whole or in part, the facts raised in the Amended NOI. This Agreement does 2 not prohibit the Agency from taking action regarding Petitioner’s Medicaid provider status, ° conditions, requirements or contract. 8. Upon full execution of this Agreement, the Agency shall enter a Final Order adopting and incorporating the terms of this Agreement and closing the above-styled case. 9. Each party shall bear its own costs and attorney’s fees. 10. This Agreement shall become effective on the date upon which it is fully executed by all the parties. 11. Petitioner for itself and for its related or resulting organizations, its successors or transferees, attorneys, heirs, and executors or administrators, does hereby discharge the State of Florida, Agency for Health Care Administration, and its agents, representatives, and attorneys of and from all claims, demands, actions, causes of action, suits, damages, losses, and expenses, of any and every nature whatsoever, arising out of or in any way related to this matter and the Agency’s actions, including, but not limited to, any claims that were or may be asserted in any federal or state court or administrative forum, including any claims arising out of this . Agreement, by or on behalf of Petitioner or related facilities. 12 This Agreement is binding upon all parties herein and those identified in paragraph 1 of this Agreement. 13. In the event that Petitioner was a Medicaid provider at the subject time of the occurrence alleged in the Amended NOI, this Agreement does not prevent the Agency from seeking Medicaid overpayments related to the subject issues or from imposing any sanctions pursuant to Rule 59G-9.070, Florida Administrative Code. 14. The undersigned have read and understand this Agreement and have the authority to bind their respective principals to it. Petitioner has the capacity to execute this Agreement. 15. This Agreement contains and incorporates the entire understandings and agreements of the parties. ar eee a SF ee 16. This Agreement supersedes any prior oral or written agreements between the © parties. , 17, This Agreement may not be amended except in writing. Any attempted assignment of this Agreement shall be void. . 18. —_ All parties agree that faxed and scanned signatures suffice for original signatures, The following representatives hereby acknowledge that they are duly authorized to enter - into this Agreement, consisting of the preceding 18 para, , stina. Mesa, Esq. Florida Bar No, 932388 MESA LAW, PA 2727 Mahan Drive . - PO Box 10207 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Tampa, FL 33679-0207 Florida Bar no.; 932388 . For Petitioner . DATED: }2 [of L DATED: /0-(2-/2—- tuart F. Williams el Gene Cowles, Co-owner -or- General Counsel Amelia Cowles, Co-owner Agency for Health Cay9 Administration a ; bi ‘2727 Mahan Drive Ayilding #3 55 Place Tallahassee, Flog Pinellas Park, FL 33781 patep: / paren: 0-2-2 Wy A Edwin D. Selby, Assistant Florida Bar No. 262587 Agency for Health Care Administration $25 Mizror Lake Drive, Suite 330H St. Petersburg, FL 3870 DATED: _ /2L7 LO 02, eneral Counsel
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding is whether Petitioner, a family day care center owner/operator, committed violations of the Florida Statutes and the Florida Administrative Code, as alleged by Respondent, sufficient to justify Respondent's refusal to renew Petitioner's license.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Linda Stewart, on behalf of Stewart Family Day Care (Petitioner), received the business’ first license to operate a family day care center for no more than 10 children on December 20, 1996. Annual renewals of the license followed until January 2002, following Stewart Family Day Care’s renewal application filed the first of that month. On January 22, 2002, Petitioner was notified that the Department of Children and Family Services (Respondent) had declined to renew Stewart Family Day Care’s license to operate as a family day care. Denial was based on Petitioner’s September 24, 2000, arrest and subsequent conviction for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol (DUI). License denial was also based on a report made to Respondent of domestic violence (Report No. 2000-075894) in the home in which Petitioner operated the Stewart Family Day Care. An additional report, Report No. 2001-04761, which made allegations that Petitioner was intoxicated while caring for children was closed as unfounded. At the time of both occurrences for which Respondent had concerns, there were no children in the care of Petitioner Stewart with the exception of her son, who was at the time of the alleged domestic violence 16 years of age. As established by the evidence, Petitioner was not the first aggressor and did not initiate the altercation that occurred in her home when a guest, not a live-in as alleged in the report, with too much to drink became violent, hitting Petitioner. Petitioner’s son went next door at his mother’s request and called law enforcement. Following Respondent’s refusal to renew Petitioner’s license, Petitioner has become actively involved with Alcoholics Anonymous (AA). Petitioner’s sponsor in AA testified that Petitioner attends meetings and is sincere in her commitment to AA. Petitioner, it is specifically found, has effectively rebutted through clear and convincing evidence, the allegations of domestic violence upon which Respondent relied for denial of re-licensure. Additionally, the evidence convincingly establishes that the DUI offense committed by Petitioner, at night, was unrelated in any way to her day care business. Further, as established by testimony of parents at the final hearing, Petitioner enjoys their full confidence with regard to the care afforded their children. Licensure renewal has never been denied to Petitioner in the past. Additionally, she has attended, through the years, numerous seminars and short courses to compliment and increase her proficiency in the area of child care.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is Recommended that a final order be entered granting renewal of Petitioner’s license to operate a day care center. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of June, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Ralph J. McMurphy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 1601 West Gulf Atlantic Highway Wildwood, Florida 34785 R. Eric Rubio, Esquire 2407 East Bloomingdale Avenue Valrico, Florida 33594-6404 Paul Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Petitioner may be granted a family day care home registration/license.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner operated a licensed family day care home from 1992 until June 2002, when she ceased to operate a home. In late 2002 or early 2003, Petitioner applied to DCF for a new license. Petitioner's new application was denied solely because of information found during the background screening, including information from her prior licensure file. Glenda McDonald was Petitioner's day care supervisor during Petitioner's prior licensure. In that capacity, Ms. McDonald conducted regular inspections of Petitioner's day care home. On August 25, 1992, Ms. McDonald's superior sent Petitioner a letter stating that Petitioner was operating a day care facility in excess of its licensed capacity and requiring Petitioner to come into compliance by August 28, 1992. Petitioner credibly denied that she received this letter. The letter was not sent to Petitioner's address of record and no proof of the allegations in the letter were presented. During Petitioner's prior licensure, DCF generated four abuse/neglect reports related to Petitioner's day care home. None of these reports were written by Ms. McDonald, who was never a child protection investigator (CPI). Copies of these reports were included in Petitioner's old licensure file.1/ Abuse/neglect Report 1998-050246 relates to a child who wandered away from Petitioner's day care home on May 1, 1998. The report was verified for "inadequate supervision: neglect" against Petitioner. As a result of the events giving rise to the May 1, 1998 abuse/neglect report, Ms. McDonald cited Petitioner's day care home on June 4, 1998, with one count of "Class II non- compliance: lack of direct supervision," pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rules 10M-12.020(5)(a) and 65C-22.001(5)(a). Since this exhibit was a carbon copy in Ms. McDonald's possession, it is inferred that Petitioner actually received a copy of this informal citation. Ms. McDonald also issued a warning letter to Petitioner on June 4, 1998, citing only Rule 10M-12.0202(5)(a), and saying that Petitioner could appeal after she received a subsequent fine letter for either $50.00 or $100.00. In connection with the May 1, 1998 incident, Ms. McDonald had interviewed Petitioner, who had made various admissions. After her investigation, Ms. McDonald was satisfied that a child entrusted to Petitioner's care had walked out of Petitioner's enclosed yard and further had walked beside a busy road, without Petitioner's knowledge, and that the child had been picked up by the police after nearly two hours' absence, near a busy intersection. In the course of Ms. McDonald's investigation, Petitioner had admitted her caretaker responsibility for the child but had denied that he was a paying day care client. At the hearing in the instant case, Petitioner maintained essentially the same position. Abuse/neglect Report 1999-105502 relates to allegations, arising on August 19, 1999, that Petitioner had locked day care children in a time-out room or "cubby" and that day care children had been beaten. No indicators were found by the CPI against Petitioner for corporal punishment. The report was eventually closed with "some indicators" against Petitioner as the caretaker responsible for confinement and bizarre punishment, constituting neglect. However, DCF did not classify or close this report at all until January 25, 2002. As a result, the report refers to "prior reports," but lists reports for both previous and subsequent years: 98-505246, 99-105502, 99-118736, 00-128236, and 02-006119. Because the classification of abuse/neglect report 99-105502 depended upon reports after its date of commencement, some of which cannot be assessed as to status,2/ and because no competent, credible evidence concerning the underlying August 19, 1999, event alleged in the report was presented in the instant hearing, report 1999-105502 is discounted in its entirety as evidence of any wrong-doing, abuse, or neglect by Petitioner.3/ Abuse/neglect Report 1999-118736 relates to allegations of bite marks found on a nine-month-old child in Petitioner's day care home on September 17, 1999. Petitioner was listed therein as a "significant other." The report was "closed with no on-going care needed." Abuse/neglect report 2000-128236 relates to bite marks found on one two-year-old child inflicted by another two-year old child, both of whom were in Petitioner's day care home on August 16, 2000. This report was classified only as "investigation complete," and further stated that Petitioner was the caretaker responsible. The report further noted that the CPI wanted DCF to consider "removing" Petitioner's license due to the number of abuse/neglect reports with "verified" allegations and some indicators. Yet as of the closure of this report, there appears to have been only the 1998 verified report. (See Findings of Fact 7 and 8). Due to all of the inconsistencies within the 1999 and 2000 reports, due to there being only one report (No. 98-050246) ever actually classified as "verified," and due to the legally indefinite nature of the classifications assigned by CPIs in 1999 and 2000, it is apparent that the CPIs who completed the 1999 and 2000 abuse/neglect reports had no clear understanding of the terms required by law for classifying them. Because of the vague classifications assigned to the 1999 and 2000 reports, it may be inferred that Petitioner was never provided a timely opportunity to contest them. (See also Finding of Fact 17.) Therefore, these reports cannot be called either "verified," "confirmed," "upheld," or "uncontested." (See Conclusion of Law 27). On November 24, 1999, Ms. McDonald wrote Petitioner to express DCF's concern, pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-22.001(5)(a), after the CPI's investigation and her own independent inspection arising from "the repeated abuse reports". Ms. McDonald's use of the plural for "abuse reports" is noted. However, her letter stated no "concern" other than the incident of September 17, 1999, on which investigation had been closed, naming Petitioner only as a "significant other." The letter was sent certified mail to inform Petitioner that the violation was being classified as a Class II violation with a $25.00 fine for each day of violation and she could appeal when she got a subsequent fine letter. No return of certified mail receipt was offered in evidence. Ms. McDonald testified in the instant case that she was contemporaneously aware of the bites on the nine-month-old who was in Petitioner's day care on September 17, 1999, and that she also was contemporaneously aware of another child who had been bitten while in Petitioner's day care. It is inferred from her testimony that Ms. McDonald was familiar, from her regular inspections, with the events surrounding the August 16, 2000, abuse/neglect report of a two-year-old child suffering bite marks from another two-year-old child, because Ms. McDonald further testified that it was upon the second biting incident that DCF began to seriously consider revoking Petitioner's first license. (See Findings of Fact 10-11). On or about December 11, 2000, a DCF attorney drafted an administrative complaint against Petitioner. The administrative complaint sought only to impose administrative fines for violations as follows: one 65C-20.009(3)(a) violation, Class I, inadequate supervision, with a fine of $100.00; one 65C-20.009(3)(a), Class II violation, inadequate supervision, with a fine of $50.00; and one 65C-20.009(3)(a) violation, Class II, inadequate supervision, with a fine of $50.00. The administrative complaint contained no prayer to revoke Petitioner's license. The charges contained therein apparently were solely the result of the abuse/neglect reports arising from incidents on May 1, 1998 (the wandering child incident); September 17, 1999, (the bites on the nine-month-old child); and August 16, 2000, (the bites on the two-year-old child). An administrative complaint is merely an allegation. Of itself, it proves none of the charges contained therein. Moreover, there is no clear evidence that Petitioner ever received the foregoing administrative complaint so as to have an opportunity to contest the charges. However, the administrative complaint suggests, contrary to some testimony, that Petitioner had not previously been fined for these dates. It also clearly demonstrates that, as of December 11, 2000, DCF did not view the wandering child or the two incidents of biting children biting each other as Code violations worthy of revoking Petitioner's license. Ms. McDonald testified that in 2002, as a result of the foregoing administrative complaint, she told Petitioner that DCF would not renew Petitioner's license when it came up for renewal, and that consequently, Petitioner agreed to retire and never reapply for a day care license, rather than suffer administrative prosecution. Petitioner credibly denied that such a scenario had ever occurred. Petitioner testified that she had never signed anything, did not know there were charges pending against her, and only "retired" in 2002 because she had been hospitalized and unable to work for a period of time. Her husband credibly corroborated her desire to retire after hospitalization. Because the 2000 administrative complaint was apparently never served on Petitioner; because of the greater weight of Petitioner's and her husband's combined testimony; because DCF seems to have repeatedly intended to assess different degrees of noncompliance and different amounts of fines for the same alleged events; because DCF introduced warnings and citations but no fine letters containing the opportunity to appeal/contest; and because it is not credible that someone licensed for 10 years would retire and guarantee never to reapply, only to avoid what, at worst, would be a $200 fine, Petitioner and her husband are found to be the more credible witnesses on why Petitioner surrendered her first license, and it is accordingly found that Petitioner surrendered her first license without coercion by DCF and without giving DCF any promise not to reapply. Petitioner is also found credible that she did not know there were any continuing problems as a result of any of the oral or written warnings she had received. Her testimony in this respect is understood to mean that she never received a notice permitting her to contest any of the four abuse/neglect reports discussed, supra., or any formal notices to pay fines.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Children and Family Services enter a Final Order granting Petitioner registration for licensing as a day care home, subject to her fulfilling all the other requirements for a new license applicant. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 2004.
