The Issue The issue to be determined in this proceeding is whether Respondents Wilson and Son Sales, Inc. (Wilson), and Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, as surety, are indebted to Petitioner for certain Florida-grown agricultural products.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a producer of several vegetable crops in Hardee County. Wilson is a dealer in agricultural products. More specifically, Wilson operates an agricultural broker business in Plant City. Wilson’s surety is Ohio Casualty Insurance Company. Although Wilson has written contracts with some producers, Wilson does not have written contracts with all producers. In the absence of a contract, the terms of Wilson’s broker services are almost always the same; that is, Wilson gets a commission of 10 percent on the sale of the produce and $.35 per box for palletizing and pre-cooling the produce, in return for which Wilson makes a reasonable and good faith effort to sell Petitioner’s produce for the best price. Petitioner contacted Wilson in January 2007, about bringing flat beans to Wilson to sell. Wilson expressed interest and informed Petitioner about Wilson’s standards terms as described above. These terms were agreeable to Petitioner and he brought the beans to Wilson later that month. Although Petitioner and Wilson had no written contract, the parties’ mutual understanding of the terms of their agreement created an enforceable oral contract. Wilson sold Petitioner’s beans and no dispute arose from this first transaction. The parties’ subsequent transactions for other produce were undertaken pursuant to the same oral contract terms. Because Wilson works on a commission basis, it is generally in Wilson’s self-interest to sell growers’ produce for the best price. Petitioner contacted Robert Wilson, Wilson’s owner, by telephone in February 2007, and informed Wilson of his plans to grow wax beans and “hard squash.” It was not stated in the record whether all three varieties of hard squash later grown by Petitioner, butternut squash, acorn squash, and spaghetti squash, were discussed by Petitioner and Robert Wilson during their February 2007 telephone conversation. A major dispute in the case was whether the parties’ February discussion about hard squash created some obligation on the part of Wilson beyond the oral contract terms described above. Petitioner claims that Wilson encouraged him to plant the squash and that Petitioner would not have planted the squash otherwise. Petitioner never made clear, however, what additional obligation was created by Robert Wilson’s encouragement beyond the obligation to accept delivery of and make good faith efforts to sell Petitioner’s squash at the best price. Petitioner did not use the word “guarantee,” but his claim seems to be that Wilson became obligated to guarantee that the squash would be sold for a price close to the price published in the Columbia (South Carolina) Market Report, a periodic publication of produce prices. Such an obligation on the part of a broker is contrary to the general practice in the trade. Petitioner’s evidence was insufficient to prove more than that Robert Wilson thought he could sell Petitioner’s squash and had a genuine interest in acting as broker for Petitioner’s squash. The evidence was insufficient to prove the existence of a contractual guarantee that Wilson would obtain a certain price for Petitioner’s hard squash or do more than was promised with regard to the beans that Wilson had sold for Petitioner; that is, to try to sell the produce for the best price. When Petitioner’s wax beans were picked in late April, he brought them to Wilson to sell. No dispute arose regarding the sale of the wax beans. Petitioner brought squash to Wilson in five deliveries between May 12 and May 29, 2007. Petitioner said that on one of these deliveries, he had to leave the boxed squash in the parking lot of Wilson’s facility because there was so much cantaloupe that had been delivered ahead of him. Petitioner says he was told by a Wilson employee that the squash would not be put in the cooler. Petitioner thinks Wilson was more interested in moving the cantaloupe than the hard squash. Petitioner thinks his squash was not put in the cooler or was put in too late. Wilson denies that Petitioner’s squash was not put into the cooler or was put in late. Robert Wilson claims that he made many calls in an effort to sell Petitioner’s squash, but he could not find interested buyers for all of the squash because (1) the demand for hard squash dried up, (2) some of Petitioner’s squash was of low quality, and (3) the squash began to spoil. Petitioner denied these allegations. Petitioner received invoices and other paperwork from Wilson showing that Wilson sold Petitioner’s first delivery of 490 boxes of acorn squash for $10.18 per box. It sold Petitioner’s second delivery of 519 boxes of acorn squash for $2.08 per box. For Petitioner’s third delivery of 110 boxes of acorn squash and 240 boxes of spaghetti squash, Wilson “dumped” the acorn squash by giving it to away for free to the Society of St. Andrews food bank, and sold the spaghetti squash for $5.15 per box. Wilson sold petitioner’s fourth delivery of 279 boxes of butternut squash for $.55 per box.1 Competent substantial evidence in the record established that it is a regular occurrence for agricultural products awaiting sale to decay and become unsellable, and for the broker to dump the products in a landfill or give the products to a charitable organization and then provide the grower a receipt for tax deduction purposes. It was undisputed that Wilson did not notify Petitioner before disposing of his squash. Petitioner claims he should have been notified by Wilson if the squash was beginning to spoil. However, Petitioner did not prove that prior notification was a term of their oral contract. Petitioner claims further that the federal Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act required Wilson to notify Petitioner before dumping the squash and to have the squash inspected to determine whether, in fact, it was spoiled. As discussed in the Conclusions of Law below, this federal law is not applicable. Competent substantial evidence in the record established that the market for agricultural products fluctuates and, at times, can fluctuate rapidly. For hard squash, which is normally prepared in an oven, the market demand can drop dramatically due to the onset of warm weather simply because people tend not to cook hard squash dishes in warm weather. Petitioner’s squash was being marketed in May, which means the beginning of warm weather for most areas of the United States. This fact supports Wilson’s claim that the demand for hard squash had been good, but fell rapidly just at the time Wilson was trying to sell Petitioner’s squash. The problem with the claims made by Petitioner in this case is simply one of insufficient proof. It is not enough for Petitioner to offer theories about what he thinks happened or to raise questions which are not fully answered. Petitioner had no proof that his squash was not put in Wilson’s cooler, that his squash did not begin to decay, that the demand for hard squash did not fall rapidly, that Wilson did not make reasonable efforts to sell the squash, that Wilson had willing buyers for Petitioner’s squash at a better price, or that Wilson sold squash from other growers at a better price. Petitioner’s evidence for his claims consisted primarily of market price reports that he contends show the approximate price Wilson should have gotten for the hard squash. Market price reports have some relevance to the issues in this case, but competent evidence was presented that the prices quoted in the publications are not always reliable to indicate the price a grower can expect to get on any given day, because there are factors that cause the published market price to be an inflated price (and applicable to the highest grade of produce) and because the market price can change rapidly with a change in demand for the product. The oral contract between Petitioner and Wilson required Wilson to try to get the best price for Petitioner’s squash, not some particular price appearing in a particular market price report. Petitioner did not show that Wilson got a better price for hard squash of equal quality, or that other brokers in the area got a better price for hard squash of equal quality at the times relevant to this case. Petitioner’s evidence was insufficient to prove that Wilson did not make a reasonable and good faith effort to sell Petitioner’s squash at the best price.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s amended claim. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of March, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of March, 2008.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner Lee Ann Burgess was employed on March 17, 1975, as the Administrator of the Domestic Tourism Section, Division of Tourism, Department of Commerce. During her initial years of employment, Edward J. Trombetta was the Secretary of the DOC. He remained in that position from February of 1975 through December 31, 1977. The DOC then had several Divisions--one of which was the Division of Tourism--and these Divisions were broken down into Bureaus which were, in turn, composed of various Sections. Mr. Trombetta was of the opinion that only himself, his Assistant Secretary and his Division Directors were policy-makers within the DOC and that other employees simply implemented that policy. According to Mr. Trombetta, policy-making deals with personnel matters and implementation of the budget appropriated by the Legislature. Decision- making and policy-making emanated from the Secretary's office. While the Section heads or administrators might recommend ideas which would lead to "policy," they had no authority to "establish" the course of policy for their respective Divisions or Sections, according to Mr. Trombetta. The December, 1976 job description for the position of Administrator of the Domestic Tourism Section included, in part, the following duties and responsibilities: -- being a working supervisor over a majority of the promotional activities of the division -- creating, directing and supervising the approved promotional and selected advertising programs. "He must not only plan the programs, he must budget each one as well as the entire Domestic Development Section." -- recommending new markets and objectives to the Division Director and advising on all aspects of promotion, utilizing research statistical information to support such recommendations and advice -- directing a staff of promotion specialists -- maintaining a constant contact with the higher echelons of the Department of Commerce as well as other government agencies and the private sector of the travel industry -- handling personnel both within the confines of the office and those that are required to be at great distances from the office in following through on the projects -- working with publishers of travel oriented publications in creation of special sections and issues on facets of Florida tourism -- initiating and carrying through promotions with department stores, other chain stores, industry, common carriers, resort areas and many others -- recommending and coordinating publicity in conjunction with the other areas of the Department of Commerce -- representing the Division at conferences of national, regional travel organi- zations -- creating and implementing special events which insure Florida's continued growth as a site for major sports activities -- developing and recommending advertising programs which illuminate Florida's sports attractions -- preparing, editing and distributing publications on promotional tourism activities and information on sports activities and facilities within Florida. During petitioner's tenure as Administrator of the Domestic Tourism Section, she was directly responsible to her Bureau Chief, Ron Miller. At the beginning of each fiscal year, she submitted for Mr. Miller's approval a listing of appropriate functions and trade shows to attend for that year. She submitted a requested budget. On occasion, Mr. Miller would discuss with her which projects or functions would need to be rejected because of the availability of funding. All promotional functions and long-term commitments had to be approved by Bureau Chief Miller. Petitioner could not expend money without prior approval and did not feel that she had the authority to commit funds, resources or time without prior approval from her Bureau Chief. She perceived that her authority was limited to the implementation of preapproved promotional programs and functions. Once a program was approved, it was her responsibility to create a theme for that program. Her decision as to who should attend certain programs or promotions was occasionally overridden by her Bureau Chief. During petitioner's tenure, the Domestic Tourism Section was composed of an administrator, a secretary and two promotional specialists, and conducted approximately 19 to 21 promotions per year. The goal of the DOC's Division of Tourism is to increase the number of visitors and to create more trade in Florida on an annual basis. When Sidney Levin became the Secretary of the DOC in March of 1979, he contemplated a reorganization and expansion of the Division of Tourism. He anticipated that the Division would obtain a greatly increased staff and an accelerated program in the tourism sales department. It was Mr. Levin's concept that, the three section heads were, as known in the business world, "sales managers" and that an extensive marketing plan would be developed for the Division of Tourism. The three "sales managers or section heads were to be in the areas of domestic sales, international sales and convention sales. (Later, a Latin American sales section was created.) The persons occupying these positions were responsible for the management of those sections and were to be active in the creation of a marketing plan for the entire Division. The majority of the work accomplished on the marketing plan was to come from the various sections, and the section heads would have the responsibility for that function. The section heads were to generate the ideas for the overall plan, to determine what was possible and what was not possible and then to implement the plan once approved. During Secretary Levin's tenure with the DOC, the head of each Department was permitted to designate ten "policy-making" positions as exempt from the Career Service System subject to the approval of the Department of Administration. Section 110.205(2)(h), Florida Statutes (1979) (now Section 110.205(2)(i)). In accordance with his reorganization and expansion plans for the Division of Tourism, Secretary Levin, by letter dated December 12, 1979, requested approval from Secretary Nevin Smith. DOA, to exempt from the Career Service System the positions of Administrator of Tourism Development (position number 00063) and Administrator of International Tourism (position number 00067). Two other positions not relevant to the issues herein were also requested to be exempt as policy-making positions. By letter dated December 14, 1979, Secretary Smith informed Secretary Levin that the four requested positions had been exempt from the Career Service as policy-making positions. [The convention sales section of the Division of Tourism was not yet created. When that position was later created, a request for a similar Career Service exemption was granted.] At the time of the requested exemption of petitioner's position, the only written guideline in existence as to a "policy-making" position was contained in a memorandum dated July 1, 1974, to all Department heads from former DOA Secretary L. K. Ireland, Jr. That memorandum states that the DOA's Division of Personnel defined a policy-making position as one which sets a definite course of action for the unit for which the position is responsible (i.e., office, bureau, division, department) which is unit-wide in effect and will guide and determine present and future decisions of that unit measured in a time span of no less than six months. Although not contained in written form in December of 1979, it was also the DOA's policy to refuse to approve exemptions for positions which directly reported to or were responsible to a position occupied by a Career Service employee. The position formerly occupied by petitioner (position number 00063) is now entitled Administrator of Domestic Sales of the Division of Tourism. The present incumbent, Glenn Couvillon, reports to the Bureau Chief of Sales and Promotions who reports to the Director of the Division of Tourism. Mr. Couvillon was formerly a promotional specialist under the supervision of petitioner Burgess. His present duties include the preparation and submission of a marketing plan for his section to his Bureau Chief for approval and, after such approval, the implementation and staffing of different promotions in that plan. Other than the enlargement of the Domestic Sales Section, and the expansion of its budget and programs, Mr. Couvillon does not feel that the role of the section administrator has changed much since he assumed that position. The Domestic Sales Section now has a staff of eleven, including seven Development Representatives, and does approximately 54 promotions a year. The 1980 job description for position number 00063 does not differ in significant respect from the 1976 job description for that position. The differences are primarily in the usage of terminology, and not in the description of duties or responsibilities. According to Nevin Smith, the Secretary of DOA since July of 1979, the principal criteria for determining whether a position is "policy-making" has always been the same. That criteria is whether or not the position-holder plays a key advisory role to the Department head. An expert in the area of personnel management and administration, Lee Breyer, defines a "policy-maker" as "an individual who can, with a high degree of success, be able to influence the direction of a particular level of that organization." In February of 1981, the DOA promulgated a rule which defines the policies applicable to exemption of policy-making positions. Rule 22K-16.02, Florida Administrative Code, provides as follows: A position is policy-making if the incumbent's primary responsibility is the managing of a major function or the rendering of management advice to Senior Management level administrative authority. Such position can be established as policy-making only if located in the top managerial levels of a department, division, or bureau (or comparable level) and if it is typified by broad responsibility for policy implementation and extensive participation in the development of a department's goals.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that position number 00063 is a policy-making position eligible for exemption from the Career Service System in accordance with Section 110.205(2)(i), Florida Statutes. Respectfully submitted and entered this 16th day of September, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of September, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward S. Jaffry, Esquire HORNE, REODES, JAFFRY, HORNE & CARROUTH Post Office Drawer 1140 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Don W. Davis, Esquire Department of Commerce 510H Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David V Kerns and Daniel C. Brown, General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Stuart Edgerly Secretary Department of Commerce 510C Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Nevin G. Smith Secretary Department of Administration Room 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Petitioner's complaint and Petition for relief allege that she was discriminated against due to her handicap of multiple sclerosis when she was terminated by Respondents on March 9, 1990. The issue for disposition is whether that violation of Section 760.10, F.S., occurred, and if so, what relief is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Leah Swenson-Davis was employed by Respondent, Orlando Partners, as a national sales manager from August 1989, until her termination on March 9, 1990. As sales manager she searched out new business for the hotel, maintained files and obtained repeat business from corporations and other customers. Her salary was $28,000.00 a year. Louis Evans was director of sales, and her supervisor. He hired Ms. Swenson-Davis to book conventions and also hired Barbara Hydechuk and Beth Darkshani as other sales staff. In his opinion Ms. Swenson-Davis was a "pro"; she generated substantial revenue for the hotel and her sales bookings were "much superior" to the other staff. At one point, the three women were promised new office chairs if they could generate 500 room/nights by Friday of the same week. They made their goal, with Ms. Swenson-Davis bringing in 437 out of the total, and the other women bringing in the remainder. In addition to booking hotel rooms, Ms. Swenson-Davis also was effective in selling other hotel services. She generated business from groups who had previously used the hotel but had not been reworked. Her booking packages were very detailed and thorough and she had few cancellations. In February 1990, Barbara Hydechuk was promoted to director of sales, and she took over the responsibility of national sales. Leah Swenson-Davis was hospitalized in February 1990, for what was originally thought to be a stroke. She was then diagnosed as having multiple sclerosis, a disease affecting functions in the nervous system. Hers is not a severe form of the disease and her physician released her to return to work half-time. At the hearing, no signs of illness were evident; that is, she moved and spoke in a perfectly normal manner. When she returned to work, however, Ms. Swenson-Davis was treated "like a leper". Bill Flynn and Barbara Hydechuk made her feel like she would infect them. She was kept at a physical distance. During her absence, Barbara Hydechuk had been promoted. When Ms. Swenson-Davis asked Bill Flynn why she was not informed of the promotion opportunity, he replied that he had worked with Barbara. The work atmosphere, and employees' attitudes toward Ms. Swenson-Davis were very different after her return to work. On March 9, 1990, the Friday before Ms. Swenson-Davis was to pick up her doctor's release to return to work full-time, she was informed by Barbara Hydechuk that she was "terminated immediately" due to lack of productivity in the sales department. Since her termination, Ms. Swenson-Davis has submitted approximately 300 applications with other hotels, and in other sales and marketing areas. She has been given interviews, but has not been hired as of the date of the hearing, although she is capable of working full-time. She received unemployment compensation from March until September 1990. She has accrued medical expenses in the amount of $12,602.00, in 1992, for herself and her son, which expenses would have been covered by her former employer's benefit package. She was insured through COBRA until December 1990, when the premiums went over $500.00 and she could no longer afford them.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter its final order requiring 1) Reinstatement of Petitioner in the same or equivalent position, 2) damages of back pay computed at the rate of $28,000.00 per year from the time of discharge until reinstatement or rejection of an offer of equivalent employment, less payments received for unemployment compensation; 3) damages in the amount of $12,602.00, representing medical benefits lost; and 4) reasonable costs and attorneys fees. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 14th day of January, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of January, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-3920 The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact submitted by Petitioner: 1. Adopted in paragraph 1. 2.-3. Adopted in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4. 4. Rejected as irrelevant. 5.-6. Adopted in paragraph 6. 7. Adopted in paragraphs 2, 5, and 7. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. Petitioner asked why she was not told of the promotion opportunity. Adopted in paragraph 7. Adopted in paragraph 5. 11.-12. Adopted in paragraph 8. Rejected in part. The complaint in this case relates to wrongful termination, not failure to promote. Moreover, no competent evidence supports a finding that Petitioner would have applied for promotion or was denied promotion on account of her handicap. The other employee was promoted prior to Petitioner's return to work. Adopted in paragraph 9. Rejected as unsupported by the evidence. Basis for the computation is not apparent. Rejected as immaterial. Adopted in substance in paragraph 9, although the $200.00 expense incurred in 2/90 is rejected, as petitioner was still employed at that time. Rejected as unsupported by competent evidence. Rejected as unnecessary, although the recommendation for reinstatement is adopted. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Kirkland Kirkland Management, Inc. 946 North Mills Avenue Orlando, Florida 32802 Percy Bell K. F. International Host, Inc. 1600 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32790 Raymond Rotella Kosto & Rotella, P.A. Post Ofice Box 113 Orlando, Florida 32802 Orlando Partners, Inc. d/b/a Quality Hotel Orlando Airport 3835 McCoy Road Orlando, Florida 32812-4199 Tobe Lev, Esquire Post Office Box 2231 Orlando, Florida 32802 Betsy Kushner, Claim Representative Cigna Property and Casualty Companies Post Office Box 30389 Tampa, Florida 33630-3389 Margaret Jones, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4113 Dana Baird, General Counsel Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4113
The Issue Whether Redland Brokers Exchange, Inc., is owed $2,602.60 for agricultural products ordered by and delivered to Mo-Bo Enterprises, Inc.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Redland Brokers is an agent for producers of Florida-grown agricultural products. Mo-Bo is a dealer in such products in the normal course of its business and is bonded by Armor. During the period from October 28, 1994, until November 11, 1994, Mo-Bo ordered various agricultural products from Redland Brokers. In accordance with the usual practice of Redland Brokers when doing business with Mo-Bo, the orders were accepted by telephone and the items were loaded onto trucks sent by Mo-Bo to Redland Brokers's warehouse. Redland Brokers sent the following invoices to Mo-Bo for agricultural products order by and delivered to Mo-Bo: November19, 1994 Invoice Number 275 $180.00 November5, 1994 Invoice Number 290 756.00 November11, 1994 Invoice Number 319 793.00 November19, 1994 Invoice Number 334 353.60 November19, 1994 Invoice Number 338 520.00 TOTAL $2,602.60 Payment was due twenty-one days from the date each invoice was mailed. Despite repeated demands, Mo-Bo has not paid any of the amounts reflected in these invoices. As of September 6, 1995, the date of the formal hearing, $2,602.60 remained due and owing to Redland Brokers.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order ordering Mo-Bo Enterprises, Inc., to pay $2,602.60 to Redland Brokers Exchange, Inc., and, if Mo-Bo Enterprises, Inc., does not pay this amount, ordering Armor Insurance Company to pay this amount, up to its maximum liability under its bond. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of October 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of October 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Frank T. Basso, Jr., Owner Amy L. Glasow, Owner Redland Brokers Exchange, Inc. 401 North Redland Road Homestead, Florida 33030 Paul Boris Mo-Bo Enterprises, Inc. Post Office Box 1899 Pompano Beach, Florida 33061 Mark J. Albrechta, Esquire Armor Insurance Company Legal Department Post Office Box 15250 Tampa, Florida 33684-5250 The Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, Esquire General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Earl R. Tyler, was born on October 9, 1915. Petitioner was employed by the Respondent as a storekeeper from approximately March of 1977 until April of 1978, at which time he voluntarily terminated his employment with Respondent in order to become a real estate salesman. Prior to his leaving the hospital, Petitioner had received no reprimands or complaints from his supervisors at the hospital regarding his work as a storekeeper. In September of 1978, Petitioner filed an application for employment in a clerical position at the hospital. On or about October 15, 1978, Petitioner received a letter from the hospital advising him that there was an opening in the clerical field and requesting him to contact the personnel office regarding that position. Although Petitioner was not employed at the time, he believed the open position to be on the night shift and, accordingly, he never contacted the hospital regarding that position. Dale J. Learn, the Materials Manager at Lehigh Acres General Hospital, had become good friends with Petitioner during the time that Petitioner worked at the hospital, and he also knew Petitioner's wife, who was working at the hospital. In February, 1979, Learn told Petitioner's wife to have Petitioner come to the hospital to talk to Learn about an expected vacancy in the storekeeper position. Petitioner complied, and he and Learn met in the hospital cafeteria and discussed the expected vacancy and the potential for Petitioner being rehired in that position. The storekeeper position was within the department of which Learn was the head, and Learn was currently restructuring both his department and the storekeeper position. At the time that he met with Petitioner in the hospital cafeteria, the storekeeper position was not yet available and had not been publicized. Petitioner expressed his interest in being rehired as the storekeeper, and Learn advised Petitioner that the position as envisioned would require no heavy lifting by the Petitioner since Learn also intended to hire a younger man to do the heavy lifting. Petitioner made no response to Learn's statements regarding the necessity or desirability of Petitioner engaging in heavy lifting. Several weeks after the meeting between Petitioner and Learn in the hospital cafeteria, Petitioner saw an advertisement in a Fort Myers newspaper wherein the hospital was advertising for the position of storekeeper/medical supplies. Since Petitioner had heard nothing from Learn subsequent to their meeting, Petitioner telephoned Joseph Feith to express his interest in the position. Feith advised Petitioner that the department managers had authority to make decisions regarding hiring of personnel, subject to the approval of Feith, who was the Executive Director of the hospital. Feith, accordingly, advised Petitioner to contact Learn. Petitioner telephoned Learn but was unable to reach Learn at that time. After several days, Learn returned Petitioner's telephone call. During that conversation, Learn suggested that Petitioner should be relaxing and enjoying life and playing golf, but that he would do all he could to assist Petitioner in obtaining a clerical position at the hospital. Petitioner made no response to Learn's comments regarding taking life easy and made no further contact with anyone at the hospital regarding employment as a storekeeper. Learn hired a man in his early thirties for the storekeeper's position. The decision to hire that applicant and to not hire Petitioner was made solely by Learn. Learn's decision was based upon the successful applicant's better qualifications, more recent work experience, and Learn's hope that that applicant would be more likely to remain in the position for a long term. The reorganization of his department by Learn had caused a large expansion in the inventory for which the storekeeper was responsible. Additionally, between the time that Petitioner left his employment with the hospital as its storekeeper and the time of the hearing in this cause, the position of storekeeper was held by three people instead of one, also indicating a substantial change in procedures regarding the position in question. At the time of the hearing, the storekeeper position was occupied by two men and one woman ranging in ages from the late thirties through the mid-fifties. Petitioner has no knowledge of any instances wherein Lehigh Acres General Hospital has discriminated against persons because of their age. The hospital does have a policy of nondiscrimination. During the times in question, the hospital employed approximately fifteen to twenty persons the approximate same age as the Petitioner. Further, at the time of the hearing in this cause, Feith, the Executive Director of the hospital, was fifty-eight years old, and Learn, the department manager, was fifty-four years old.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations declaring that Earl R. Tyler was not discriminated against on the basis of his age and dismissing his Petition for Relief with prejudice. RECOMMENDED this 22 day of July, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Department of Administration 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: William E. Adams, Jr., Esquire Florida Rural Legal Services 1617 Hendry Street, Third Floor Fort Myers, Florida 33901 R. J. Castellanos, Esquire Kushner & Castellanos Post Office Box 1999 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 Mr. Norman A. Jackson Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto J. Ladd Howell, Respondent, was registered with the Board of Real Estate as a broker and the The Howell Companies, Inc., was registered as corporate real estate broker. Respondent was leasing agent at the Texaco Building where he had his offices and the offices of The Howell Companies, Inc., when space was leased to the firm of Blackman, Kallick and Company, a CPA firm, in 1977. During the latter part of 1979 Arnold G. Simon And Harvey Muskat, two of the principals in the Blackman firm, mentioned to Respondent that they were interested in buying a building to move their firm into and asked him to keep a lookout for a building for them. They made this request to Respondent as a real estate broker. These conversations were sporadic and usually occurred at chance meetings in the corridors of the Texaco Building or the restaurant in that building. No written agreement was entered into and no specific requirements as to size or price were established by Simon or Muskat. No discussion regarding any fee for such services as Respondent would perform was ever held. During the latter part of 1979 Respondent, who also invested in real property, learned that a two-story building at 136 Madeira, Coral Gables, containing approximately 5,000 square feet was on the market, and on October 5, 1979, submitted an offer to purchase this property for $175,000. This offer was rejected. Intermediate offers were made; Respondent learned others were also interested in this property; and, on December 14, 1979, Respondent made an offer to purchase this property for $213,000. This offer was accepted by the seller in February 1980 and the sale closed in June 1980. Respondent testified that he advised Simon and Muskat of buildings for sale located at 811 Ponce De Leon Boulevard, 264 Alhambra Circle, and 116 Giralda (all in Coral Gables) but none of these buildings was acceptable. In their depositions Simon and Muskat did not recall being referred to the buildings by Respondent. During his negotiations for the building at 136 Madeira, Respondent told Simon and Muskat he was negotiating for a building they might be interested in but would neither show them the building nor discuss the terms being negotiated. The building at 136 Madeira contained stores on the ground floor and three apartments on the second floor. Respondent obtained plans of the building and had plans drawn to change the upper floor to office space. Respondent left a copy of these plans at the office of Simon and Muskat, but the latter, in their depositions, do not recall such plans. In late January Respondent was advised that his offer had been accepted by the sellers and the acceptance was in the mail. He then told Simon and Muskat that the negotiations had been completed and he could show them the building. Simon and Muskat were shown the building in February 1980 and indicated interest in acquiring the building with Respondent. At the Texaco Building they occupied about 1,200 square feet of office space but they needed additional space for expansion. After receiving the accepted contract from the sellers, Respondent called Simon and Muskat to set up an appointment to meet with them to discuss their purchase of part of the building at 136 Madeira. At the meeting Respondent advised Simon and Musket that they could purchase one-half of the building for $161,500 consisting of $80,000 cash and half of the $163,000 mortgage. No discussions occurred regarding the renovations the building required to convert the second floor to offices and refurbish the ground floor before Respondent showed Simon and Muskat his contract to purchase the building for $213,000. At this time they became quite incensed with the idea that Respondent was being grossly unethical and unfair in attempting to make such a profit on the transaction and terminated the meeting. At a subsequent meeting between Respondent and Muskat, the latter inquired if Respondent had reconsidered his offer to sell them part of the building and, when Respondent replied that he thought $161,500 for half the building was a good deal for the CPA firm, Muskat denounced Respondent as being unethical and asked him to leave the office. Simon and Muskat subsequently filed a complaint with Petitioner and filed a civil suit against Respondent.
Findings Of Fact At all times here involved Theodore R. Johnson was a registered real estate salesman and managed the UFA office at DeLand, Florida. He has been a registered real estate salesman for more than 30 years. He was authorized to sign checks on the escrow account of UFA in DeLand. At all times here involved Roy Edwin Schaefer was a registered real estate salesman and an associate of Johnson at DeLand. At all times here involved Richard W. Goddard was a registered real estate broker and officer and Active Firm Member in UFA with offices in Orlando, Florida. He was the broker under whom Johnson and Schaefer worked. He supervises some 20 UFA branch offices in Florida north of Orlando. He visits the branch offices at frequent intervals (once or twice a week) and exercises general supervision over these offices headed by a salesman. At all times here involved United Farm Agency, Inc. was a corporate registered real estate broker and maintained a district office in Orlando, Florida. The practice of UFA, which was in existence in 1971 to allow salesmen who head branch offices to disburse funds from their escrow account, has been changed. Now the signature of the broker is also required before funds can be disbursed from the escrow account. On August 15, 1970 Schaefer obtained a listing agreement for UFA on property owned by Prentice L. and Vivian Glasgow in Pierson, Florida. This listing agreement provided, inter alia, that in the event there is a forfeiture of funds deposited, 1/3 of such forfeited funds would go to the seller and the balance paid to UFA as commission. By Deposit Receipt and Agreement for Sale dated July 9, 1971 (Exhibit 7) one Margaret C. Lord offered to buy the Glasgow property at the asking price and Glasgow accepted. Schaefer procured the buyer and the contract was drawn up in the UFA branch office in DeLand, apparently by Johnson and/or his secretary of some 30 years. During Schaefer's discussion with Mrs. Lord at her motel immediately prior to the drafting of the contract he observed some $4000 in cash she was carrying in her purse. At the time Lord signed the contract she put up $1500 by check and stated she would have an additional $6000 transferred to her account by her broker and would present the additional $6000 within two or three days. No one who participated in the preparation of the sales agreement doubted her intention and ability to produce the additional earnest money deposit. The contract and the $1500 deposit check was held by Johnson for several days and when the additional deposit promised by the buyer was not forthcoming Johnson deposited the $1500 in the UFA escrow account and forwarded a report of sale to UFA (Exhibit 14). By acknowledgment of sale letter dated July 20, 1971, UFA acknowledged Johnson's report of sale and a $7500 deposit. The contract provided buyer could take possession of the property July 17, 1971 and closing was set for October 11, 1971. Neither Johnson nor Schaefer were able to again contact Mrs. Lord. Shortly after the contract was executed the Glasgows were advised that only $1500 had been deposited. After Johnson had been unable to contact Mrs. Lord he advised Goddard that only $1500 had been deposited, and by memo dated October 18, 1971 (Exhibit 19) Goddard advised UFA's home office. The Glasgows were in the process of getting a divorce and Glasgow was anxious to consummate the sale. After checking several times with Johnson about the closing, Glasgow advised Johnson he needed money to move off the property (Glasgow's testimony) or that he needed money in connection with his divorce (Johnson's testimony). Early in the morning on August 25, 1971 Glasgow made an urgent request to Johnson for funds and Johnson wrote Glasgow a check for $500 on the escrow account because he, Johnson, did not have a personal check available at the time. The same morning Johnson obtained $500 from his wife and deposited this money in the escrow account. The escrow account was credited with $500 on August 25, 1971 and debited with $500 on August 31, 1971 when the check issued to Glasgow cleared. Johnson's testimony that he considered the $500 a personal loan to Glasgow was unrebutted and is supported by his deposit of a like sum in the escrow account as soon as the bank opened. Shortly after the contract was executed, but before the $1500 check was deposited, Schaefer, without Johnson's knowledge, delivered a copy of the contract to Glasgow. The contract provided, inter alia, that if either the seller or the buyer fails to perform his part of the agreement he will forthwith pay as liquidated damages to the other party a sum equal to 10 percent of the agreed price of sale. When Johnson's efforts to locate Mrs. Lord were unsuccessful and no response received to letters of August 28 and October 4, 1971, Johnson disbursed the balance of the funds in the escrow account on October 18, 1971. One check in the amount of $250 he paid to himself as reimbursement for his expenses in attempting to locate Mrs. Lord. The remaining $750 ($500 of the $1500 had already been given to Glasgow, but how the cash deposit of $500 made August 15 was withdrawn from the escrow account was not explained) was split between Johnson and UFA. After the transaction fell through Glasgow moved back on his property. By letter dated October 20, 1972 (Exhibit 8) Glasgow filed a complaint with the Florida Real Estate Commission in which he referred to the liquidated damages provision of the contract (10 percent of purchase price) and the $7500 down payment which he alleged UFA had in escrow and had not paid to him. The investigation followed which led to the complaint filed herein.
The Issue Whether Respondent Kenneth M. Mossell's real estate license should be disciplined because he allegedly engaged in dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence or breach of trust in a business transaction; collected money in connection with a real estate brokerage transaction except in the name of his employer and with the express consent thereof; registered as an officer of a corporation while licensed as a salesman; operated as a broker while licensed as a salesman; and failed to account and deliver any secret or illegal profit in violation of Subsections 475.25(1)(b) and (e); 475.42(1)(b) and (d), Florida Statutes; Rule Sections 21V-14.012(2) and (3), and 21V-5.016, Florida Administrative Code; and whether Respondent L. Jean Jones DuBrian's real estate license should be disciplined based upon the charge that she is guilty of dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device, culpable negligence or breach of trust in business transactions; operated as a broker under a trade name without causing said name to be noted in the Commission records and placed on her license; or operated as a member of a partnership or as a corporation or as an officer or manager thereof, without said partnership or corporation holding a valid current registration; failed to prepare and sign required written monthly escrow reconciliation statements, all in violation of Subsections 475.25(1)(b) and (e); 475.42(1)(k), Florida Statutes, and Rule Sections 21V-14.012(2) and (3), Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of Florida, specifically Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. Respondent DuBrian is now, and was at all times material hereto, a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0306696 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued was as a broker, c/o United Team, Inc. t/a ERA, 5844 Main Street, New Port Richey, Florida. Respondent Mossell is now, and was at all times material hereto, a licensed real estate salesperson in Florida, having been issued license number 0538751. The last license issued was as a non-active salesperson, 3432 Lori Lane, New Port Richey, Florida. Linda Sychowski, Frederick Reimer and Mary Patricia Mossell were officers of Majestic Realty and Leasing, Incorporated (Majestic), which was formed during May of 1989. Respondent Mossell was the primary financial investor. On or about April 16, 1990, Sychowski filed Majestic's annual report for 1990 with the Secretary of State listing Mary Patricia Mossell as Director/Treasurer, Sychowski as Director/President and Reimer as Director/Vice President. Respondent DuBrian was never an officer, director or shareholder of Majestic. During August 1989, pursuant to a verbal agreement, Respondent DuBrian became qualifying broker for Majestic. During August 1989, Sychowski notarized Respondent DuBrian's signature on a document titled "State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, Application and Request for Licensure of a Real Estate Brokerage Corporation or Partnership." Respondent DuBrian's name appears on the portion of the form listing all corporate officers and directors. During October 1989, Respondent Mossell opened an escrow account at Citizens and Southern Bank (C & S) on behalf of Majestic. Respondent Mossell and Sychowski were signatories on the C & S account and Respondent Mossell signed as Secretary of the corporation. On September 20, 1990, Sychowski notified the Department of Professional Regulation that Respondent DuBrian had been terminated as broker of record for Majestic. President Linda Sychowski denies that she had any understanding that Respondent DuBrian would operate an independent real estate company outside of Majestic or that DuBrian would receive commissions for real estate activities except through Majestic. Sychowski is not a real estate licensee and relied upon Respondent DuBrian's competency as a broker. During April 1990, Sychowski signed check numbers 119 and 120 drawn on Majestic's escrow account. Those checks were payable to Respondent Mossell's wife, Mary Patricia Mossell, as reimbursement for the return of a security deposit and cleaning services. Sychowski learned, subsequent to Respondent DuBrian's termination, that DuBrian operated a real estate brokerage company out of her home independent of her activities as a broker with Majestic. She learned of DuBrian's other brokerage activities during a deposition in conjunction with a civil suit filed by DuBrian against Majestic. During October 1989, Jonathan Rummey entered into a lease agreement to rent property at 5416 Aloha Boulevard. Rummey paid monthly rent pursuant to the agreement and vacated the property during October 1990. Initially Rummey paid rent to Majestic and later DuBrian notified him that she had moved to another real estate company and that the rent was to be paid directly to her. Rummey understood that DuBrian was acting as an agent for the landlord and, as such, was receiving a commission from the landlord. Respondent Mossell was aware that Respondent DuBrian was conducting a real estate rental business from her home. Mossell knew this when DuBrian was hired as the qualifying broker for Majestic. Mossell permitted DuBrian to continue operating her independent rental brokerage business. Mossell allowed this since he thought that it would not be financially prudent for DuBrian to leave her ongoing business and hire on with a new firm, Majestic, which had no rental accounts. During April 1989, Scott Spoerl entered a lease agreement with Respondent DuBrian for rental property he owned. The agreement provided that rental payments would be made to Respondent "L. Jean DuBrian, Registered Real Estate Broker." Respondent DuBrian received ten percent of the rents collected as her fee for providing rental services to Spoerl. Spoerl received checks for his portion of the rent from Respondent DuBrian's account entitled "L. Jean Jones DuBrian Escrow Account." During May 1990, DPR Investigator Marjorie May conducted an inspection and escrow account audit of Majestic. At the time, Respondent DuBrian was Majestic's qualifying broker. During that audit, Investigator May discovered that Respondent DuBrian was not preparing and signing monthly reconciliation reports. During October 1988 Walter Hankinson, Jr., and his wife entered into an agreement to rent property for $500 per month from DuBrian. The Hankinson's paid monthly rent to Respondent DuBrian personally. The Hankinsons vacated the property during January 1992. The bank account entitled "Kenneth Mossell or Jean DuBrian, Special Account Number One," account number 1519555601 maintained at Barnett Bank had statements dated October 11, 1989, and November 9, 1989. No other statements were issued for that account. Two checks were drawn on the above-referenced account, one payable to and endorsed by Kathy Renquist and one dated October 23, 1989, payable to cash. The latter check was endorsed and cashed by Respondent Mossell. The referenced account was a personal and not a business account. Escrow accounts are usually identified as such. Banks label escrow accounts as such because the account is not directly charged. When bank accounts are set up, the account is designated as the customer instructs. The customer signs the signature card after the account title is typed in. During July 1989, Arthur Wagenseil entered a lease agreement to rent property from Respondent DuBrian. Respondent DuBrian represented the landlord and the monthly lease payments were paid directly to her. In July 1989, James Irwin entered a one year lease agreement with Wagenseil. As part of the agreement, Irwin paid Respondent DuBrian a ten percent (10%) commission of rents received. Typically, Respondent DuBrian received the rent from the tenant, deducted the necessary expenses and her commission, and remitted the balance to the landlord (Irwin). Respondent DuBrian advised Irwin that she had arranged with Majestic to keep her clients and business the way she was doing it at the time. During July 1989, Edmund Lekowski entered a two year lease agreement to rent property, paying $390 per month in rent to Respondent DuBrian as agent for the landlord. In May 1989, Frederick Reimer participated in the formation of Majestic as a director and principal. The other officers of the corporation were Sychowski and Mary Patricia Mossell. Majestic was established to engage in the business of renting and leasing realty. Reimer is not licensed as a real estate salesperson or broker. Reimer met Respondent DuBrian when she applied for and was hired as the broker for Majestic. Respondent Mossell was a part owner of Majestic and, as noted, was the primary financial investor. The corporate escrow account was maintained at C & S Bank and Respondent DuBrian was not a signatory on the account. Respondent DuBrian was employed at Majestic to meet the requirement of having a broker on staff. Reimer relied on Respondent DuBrian's knowledge of real estate law. Reimer was unaware of Respondent's DuBrian's operation of a separate rental/leasing business from her home. Respondent DuBrian was not an officer of Majestic nor did she inform Reimer of the legal requirement that she be an officer of the corporation and a signatory on the escrow account. Leo Huddleston, an investigator with Petitioner, met with Respondents DuBrian and Mossell on March 19, 1991, at which time Respondent DuBrian acknowledged that she was not a signatory on the Majestic escrow account because she was not a stockholder or shareholder. During the March 19, 1991 interview, Respondent DuBrian advised Huddleston that she was conducting a rental business, as a broker, separate and distinct from Majestic. During the March 19, 1991, meeting, Respondent DuBrian advised Investigator Huddleston that she was unaware that radon and agency disclosures and written monthly reconciliations were required. Also, during that meeting with Investigator Huddleston, Respondent Mossell advised that he was a signatory on the Majestic escrow account and that he withdrew $310 from that escrow account when a Mr. Schlatterman vacated some rental property that was leased from Majestic. Respondent Mossell's withdrawal was based on repayment and reimbursement to his wife for cleaning the Schlatterman's vacated apartment and a $250.00 cash refund of a security deposit that Mary Mossell had given to the tenant, Schlatterman. Respondent Mossell did not provide Investigator Huddleston with documentation for the claim on the Schlatterman's security deposit. In this regard, the Schlatterman's experienced an emergency and had to vacate on a weekend when the banks were closed. At the time of Investigator Huddleston's interview of Respondents during March 1991, Respondent DuBrian acknowledged that while she was employed as qualifying broker for Majestic, she was also operating an independent rental business. Investigator Huddleston's investigation of the Petitioner's records revealed that Respondent DuBrian was only registered as qualifying broker for Majestic and for no other company.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding that: Respondent L. Jean Jones DuBrian's real estate license be suspended for a period of six (6) months and that she be issued a written reprimand and ordered to complete 24 hours of post licensure education within the period of suspension or as soon thereafter as is practicable. Respondent Kenneth M. Mossell be reprimanded and ordered to complete 18 hours of post licensure education within one year of the issuance of the Final Order. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 5th day of October, 1992. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of October, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NOS. 92-1072 AND 92-1322 Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order: Paragraph 17, rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 19, rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Paragraph 37, rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 57, adopted as modified, Paragraph 40, Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Janine B. Myrick, Esquire Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 L. Jean Jones DuBrian 7326 Baltusrol Drive New Port Richey, Florida 34654 Kenneth Milton Mossell 3432 Lori Lane New Port Richey, Florida 34655 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue Has Respondent Fancy Farms Sales, Inc. (Fancy Farms) made proper accounting to Petitioner Wayne Sullivan in accordance with Section 604.22(1), Florida Statutes, for agriculture products delivered to Fancy Farms from November 8, 1994, through December 10, 1994, by Wayne Sullivan to be handled by Fancy Farms as agent for Wayne Sullivan on a net return basis as defined in Section 604.15(4), Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Wayne Sullivan was in the business of growing and selling "agricultural products" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(3), Florida Statutes, and was a "producer" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Fancy Farms was licensed as a "dealer in agricultural products" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes, as evidenced by license number 8453 issued by the Department, supported by bond number 57 92 20 in the amount of $75,000, written by Gulf Insurance Company with an inception date of September 1, 1994, and an expiration date of August 31, 1995. From November 8, 1994, through December 10, 1994 Wayne Sullivan delivered certain quantities of an agricultural product (zucchini) to Fancy Farms. It is the accounting for these zucchini (zukes) that is in dispute. It was stipulated by the parties that Fancy Farms was acting as agent in the sale of the zukes delivered to Fancy Farms for the account of Wayne Sullivan on a net return basis. There is no dispute as the quantity or size of the zukes delivered by Wayne Sullivan to Fancy Farms during the above period of time. Furthermore, there is no dispute as to the charges made by Fancy Farms for handling the zukes, including but not limited to the commission charged by Fancy Farms. The agreed upon commission was ten per cent (10 percent) of the price received by Fancy Farms from its customers. There is no evidence that Fancy Farms found any problem with the quality of the zukes delivered to Fancy Farms by Wayne Sullivan during the above period of time. Upon delivering the zukes to Fancy Farms, Sullivan was given a prenumbered delivery receipt ticket (delivery ticket) showing Wayne Sullivan as Grower number 116 and containing the following additional information: (a) date and time of delivery; (b) produce number, i.e., 37 indicating fancy zukes and 38 indicating medium zukes; (c) description of the produce, i.e., zukes, fancy; (d) a lot number containing number of delivery ticket, grower number and produce number, i.e. 2074-116-37 and; (e) the number of units of zukes received by Fancy Farm. The accounting for the zukes from the following delivery receipt ticket numbers is being contested in this proceeding: (a) 2127 dated November 8, 1994, lot nos. 2127-116-37 and 2127-116-38; (b) 22145 dated November 10, 1994, lot nos. 2145-116-37 and 2145-116-38; (c) 2181 dated November 15, 1994, lot nos. 2181-116-37 and 2181-116-38; (d) 2242 dated November 29, 1994, lot nos. 2242- 116-37 and 2242-116-38; (e) 2254 dated December 1, 1994, lot nos. 2254-116-37 and 2254-116-38; (f) 2289 dated December 7, 1994, lot nos. 2289-116-37 and 2289- 116-38 and; (g) 2313 dated December 10, 1994, lot nos. 2313-116-37 and 2313-116- 38. Once Fancy Farms found a customer for the zukes, Fancy Farms prepared a prenumbered billing invoice. Additionally, a bill of lading and load sheet was prepared and attached to the invoice. The bill of lading and load sheet would have the same number as the invoice. Basically, the invoice and bill of lading contained the customer's name and address, produce number, description of produce, number of units ordered, number of units shipped and the price per unit. The load sheet contains the customer's name, produce number, description of produce, units ordered, units shipped and the lot number for the units that made up the shipment. On numerous occasions Fancy Farms made adjustments to the selling price after the price had been quoted and accepted but before the invoice was prepared. Fancy Farms did not make any written notations in its records showing the adjustments to the price or the reasons for the adjustments to the price. Salvatore Toscano testified, and I find his testimony to be credible, that this usually occurred when there was a decrease in the market price after Fancy Farms made the original quote. Therefore, in order to keep the customer, Fancy Farms made an adjustment to the price. Sullivan was never made aware of these price adjustments. In accounting for the zukes delivered by Sullivan, Fancy Farms prepared a Grower Statement which included the delivery ticket number, the date of delivery, the lot number, grower number, produce number, description of the produce, quantity (number of units), price per unit and total due. Payment for the zukes was made to Wayne Sullivan from these statements by Fancy Farms. Sometimes payment may be for only one delivery ticket while at other times payment would be for several delivery tickets for different dates. A portion of Petitioner's composite exhibit 1 is the Florida Vegetable Report (Market Report), Volume XIV, Nos. 19, 21, 23, 31, 33, 37 and 40, dated October 28, 31, 1994, November 8, 10, 15, 29, 1994, and December 7, 12, 1994, respectively. The Market Report is a federal-state publication which reports the demand (moderate), market (steady), volume (units) sold and prices paid per unit for numerous vegetables, including zucchini, on a daily basis. The prices quoted for zucchini is for 1/2 and 5/9th bushel cartons and includes palletizing. The average cost for palletizing in the industry is 65 per carton. Fancy Farms receives and sells zukes in one-half (1/2) bushel cartons. Fancy Farms does not palletize the cartons for handling at its warehouse or for shipment. On November 8, 10, 15, 1994, Sullivan delivered a combined total of 130 units of fancy zukes and a combined total 206 units of medium zukes represented by delivery receipt ticket nos. 2127, 2145 and 218l, for a combined total of fancy and medium zukes of 336 units for which Fancy Farms paid Sullivan the sum of $1,171.00 as evidenced by the Grower Statement dated November 25, 1994. Forty eight units of fancy zukes represented by lot no. 2127-116-37 was billed out by Fancy Farms to P. H. Lucks, Inc. for $5.00 per unit. Without an explanation, Fancy Farms reduced the price to $2.50 per unit. However, Fancy Farms paid Sullivan $5.00 per unit for the 48 units of fancy zukes. Five units of medium zukes represented by lot no. 2145-116-38 were not accounted for by invoice. Thirty two units of fancy zukes represented by lot no. 2181-116-37 were not accounted for by invoice. Nineteen units of medium zukes represented by lot no. 2242-116-38 were not accounted for by invoice. Where there is no invoice the price quoted in the Market Report is used to calculate the amount due Sullivan. The amount due Sullivan from the Grower Statement dated November 25, 1994, is: Lot No. 2127-116-37: $5.00 per unit x 48 units (Invoice 3814) = $ 240.00 Lot No. 2127-116-38: $3.50 per unit x 45 units (Market Report) = $ 157.50 $3.50 per unit x 35 units (Invoice 3783) = $ 122.50 Lot No. 2145-116-37: $5.00 per unit x 12 units (Invoice 3818) = $ 60.00 $5.00 per unit x 38 units (Invoice 3822) = $ 190.00 Lot No. 2145-116-38: $3.00 per unit x 13 units (Invoice 3820) = $ 39.00 $3.00 per unit x 22 units (Invoice 3822) = $ 66.00 $3.00 per unit x 5 units (Market Report) = $ 15.00 Lot No. 2l81-116-37: $8.00 per unit x 32 units (Market Report) = $ 256.00 Lot No. 2181-116-38: $3.50 per unit x 86 units (Invoice 3778) = $ 301.00 Total owed to Sullivan = $1,447.00 Less: Amount paid Sullivan = $1,171.00 Ten per cent commission = 144.70 Net due Sullivan = 131.30 On November 29, 1994, Sullivan delivered 53 units of fancy zukes and 69 units of medium zukes as represented by delivery ticket no. 2242 for a combined total of 112 units for which Sullivan was paid $472.00 by Fancy Farms as represented by the Grower Statement dated December 7, 1994. The prices of $3.25 and $3.00 as indicated by invoice nos. 3941 and 3947, respectively are not indicative of the market for fancy zukes as established by the Market Report for December 1, 1994. The Market Report established an average price of $8.00 per unit for fancy zukes. Likewise, the price of $3.00 per unit for medium zukes as indicated by invoice no. 3927 is not indicative of the market for medium zukes as established by the Market Report for December 1, 1994. The Market Report established an average price of $6.00 per unit for medium zukes. The amount due Sullivan from the Grower Statement dated December 7, 1994, is: Lot no. 2242-116-37: $8.00 per unit x 53 units (Market Report) = $ 424.00 Lot no. 2242-116-38: $6.00 per unit x 69 units (Market Report) = $ 414.00 Total owed Sullivan = $ 838.00 Less: Amount paid Sullivan = $ 472.00 Ten Percent Commission = $ 83.80 Net due Sullivan = $ 282.20 On December 1, 7, 1994, Sullivan delivered a combined total of 51 units of fancy zukes and a combined total of 87 units of medium zukes for a combined total of 138 units of fancy and medium zukes represented by delivery ticket nos. 2254 and 2289 and was paid $516.00 for these zukes by Fancy Farms as represented by the Grower Statement dated December 15, 1994. There was no invoice for lot nos. 2254-116-37 or 2254-116-38. The Market Report established a market price of $8.00 and $6.00 per unit for fancy and medium zukes, respectively. The amount due Sullivan from the Growers Statement dated December 15, 1994, is: Lot No. 2254-116-37: $8.00 per unit x 39 units (Market Report) = $ 312.00 Lot No. 2254-116-38: $6.00 per unit x 20 units (Market Report) = $ 120.00 Lot No. 2289-116-37: $6.00 per unit x 12 units (Invoice 4049) = $ 72.00 Lot No. 2289-116-38: $3.50 per unit x 67 units (Invoice 3946) = $ 234.50 Total owed Sullivan = $ 738.50 Less: Amount paid Sullivan = $ 516.00 Ten Percent Commission = $ 73.85 Net due Sullivan = $ 148.65 On December 10, 1994, Sullivan delivered 27 units of fancy zukes and 18 units of medium zukes for a combined total of 45 units as represented by delivery ticket no. 2313 and was paid $211.50 for those zukes by Fancy Farms as represented by Growers Statement dated December 23, 1994. The 18 units of medium zukes represented by lot no. 2313-116-38 are not covered by an invoice. The Market Report established a unit price of $6.00 for the fancy zukes. Invoice no. 4075 billed the fancy zukes at zero without any explanation. Fancy Farms paid Sullivan $5.50 per unit for the fancy zukes. The Market Report established a per unit price of $8.00 for the fancy zukes which is more in line with the market than is the $5.50 per unit paid by Fancy Farms. The amount due Sullivan from the Grower Statement dated December 23, 1994, is: Lot No. 2313-116-38: $6.00 per unit x 18 units (Market Report) = $ 108.00 Lot No. 2313-116-37: $8.00 per unit x 27 units (Market Report) = $ 216.00 Total owed Sullivan = $ 324.00 Less: Ten percent commission = $ 32.40 Amount received by Sullivan = $ 211.50 Net due Sullivan = $ 80.10 The net amount owed to Sullivan by Fancy Farms: From Grower Statements dated: November 25, 1994 $ 131.30 December 7, 1994 $ 282.20 December 15, 1994 $ 148.65 December 23, 1994 $ 80.10 Total owed to Sullivan $ 642.25
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Respondent Fancy Farms Sales, Inc. be ordered to pay Petitioner Wayne Sullivan the sum of $642.25. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of November, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of November, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-3015A The parties elected not to file any proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 508 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Wayne Sullivan 49 Myrtle Bush Lane Venus, Florida 33960 James A. Crocker Qualified Representative Fancy Farms Sales, Inc. 1305 W. Dr. M. L. King, Jr., Blvd. Plant City, Florida 33564-9006 Gulf Insurance Company Legal Department 4600 Fuller Drive Irving, Texas 75038-6506
The Issue The issue is whether the termination of Respondent, Otis Paul Whatley, was in accordance with the personnel procedures established by the Emerald Coast Utilities Authority.
Findings Of Fact ECUA was created in 1981 pursuant to Chapter 81-376, Laws of Florida. By law, it provides utility services throughout Escambia County, Florida. Mr. Whatley was employed by ECUA. On October 31, 2001, Mr. Whatley signed an acknowledgement that he received the ECUA Employee Handbook. The ECUA Employee Handbook is a summary of benefits, policies, procedures, and rules, which are more fully set forth in ECUA's Human Resources Policy Manual. While on the ECUA Rotation Schedule Standby List on Sunday, July 26, 2009, Mr. Whatley, and his co-worker Jonathan Wheat, were required to be available to make repairs when summoned by ECUA customers. Mr. Whatley submitted a Daily Overtime Report dated July 26, 2009, which indicated that he worked on that day from 9:00 a.m. until 10:30 a.m. at 926 Lake Terrace, in Pensacola, Florida. The overtime report further stated that he worked from 10:30 a.m. until 11:00 a.m. at 1283 La Paz Street, in Pensacola. He further asserted that he worked at 402 West Lloyd Street, from 6:00 p.m. until 11:00 p.m. According to the Global Positioning System (GPS) installed on the ECUA truck assigned to Mr. Whatley, he did not depart his residence at the time he claimed to be working at 926 Lake Terrace or at 1283 La Paz Street. Moreover, the evidence provided by the GPS indicated that he was at the 402 West Lloyd Street for four hours rather than the five claimed as overtime. Mr. Whatley's co-worker, Jonathon Wheat, did work at 926 Lake Terrace and at 1283 La Paz Street, but he worked alone. Mr. Wheat joined in Mr. Whatley's prevarication with regard to the quantity of time expended at 402 West Lloyd Street. Mr. Wheat confessed to his prevarication when confronted. Mr. Whatley lied about his whereabouts when initially confronted, but eventually admitted that his timesheet contained false entries. It is found as a fact that Mr. Whatley, on his time sheet for July 26, 2009, claimed one hour and a half overtime for work at 926 Lake Terrace, one-half-hour overtime for work or at 1283 La Paz Street, and an hour more overtime than actually worked at 402 West Lloyd Street. None of the forgoing periods were worked by Mr. Whatley. Accordingly, these entries on his time sheet were false.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Executive Director of the Emerald Coast Utility Authority, based on the findings of fact found herein, impose such penalty on Otis Paul Whatley, as he or she determines to be appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of November, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Otis Whatley 8655 Ramblewood Place Pensacola, Florida 32514 John E. Griffin, Esquire Carson & Adkins 2930 Wellington Circle, North, Suite 201 Tallahassee, Florida 32309 Stephen E. Sorrell, Executive Director Emerald Coast Utilities Authority 9255 Sturdevant Street Post Office Box 15311 Pensacola, Florida 32514-0311
