The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner timely filed a complaint of discrimination in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2009).
Findings Of Fact Prior to November 28, 2007, the Petitioner was employed by the Respondent. On November 26, 2008, the Petitioner sent a Technical Assistance Questionnaire (TAQ) to the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR). The TAQ was submitted via facsimile transmission and was not signed. The Petitioner believed she was complying with the directives of the FCHR website and that follow-up assistance (from the FCHR) would not be required. The Petitioner did not understand that a signature was required, notwithstanding the place for same (along with a date) on page 2 of the TAQ. The Petitioner maintains that the FCHR website instructions were unclear and that she erroneously relied on the directions that did not specify she was required to sign the TAQ. The Petitioner filed a signed Charge of Discrimination with the FCHR on January 14, 2009. On February 5, 2009, the Petitioner received a "Notice of Receipt of Complaint" from the FCHR. At the same time, a copy of the complaint was furnished to the Respondent, who was then, presumably, put on notice of the Petitioner's charge. The FCHR did not advise the Petitioner that the TAQ had to be signed. In the course of its review of the instant charge, the FCHR entered a determination of "untimely." Per the FCHR's assessment, the charge of discrimination was filed more than 365 days from the last incident or act of discrimination. Thereafter, the Petitioner elected to file a Petition for Relief to challenge the determination and to seek relief against the Respondent. The Commission then forwarded the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal proceedings.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's claim of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of September, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark Levitt, Esquire Allen, North & Blue 1477 West Fairbanks Avenue, Suite 100 Winter Park, Florida 32789 Marie C. Perez 517 29th Street West Palm Beach, Florida 33407 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her race, subjected Petitioner to a hostile work environment, or retaliated against Petitioner in violation of the Hillsborough County Human Rights Ordinance 00-37, Section 4(1)(a)(1).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an aggrieved person within the meaning of Hillsborough County Human Rights Ordinance 00-37, Section 16. Petitioner is an African-American female and filed a complaint with the Board alleging that Respondent engaged in race, color, and gender discrimination; retaliation; and the creation of a hostile work environment. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 16. Respondent operates a car dealership and is in the business of selling and servicing new and used automobiles and trucks in several states, including Florida. Respondent was not Petitioner's employer. Petitioner was a temporary worker during the relevant period, and her employment contract was with an employment agency. No written employment contract existed between the parties to this proceeding. The employment agency paid Petitioner, and Respondent paid the employment agency. The employment agency assigned Petitioner to Respondent from January 13 through January 23, 2004. Other than Petitioner’s uncorroborated testimony, there is no written or other evidence that Respondent intended Petitioner’s temporary assignment either to become a permanent position or to last for six weeks. The fact-finder finds the testimony of Petitioner to be less than credible and persuasive. From January 13 until January 21, 2004, Petitioner worked at Respondent's Tampa office at Lexus of Tampa Bay located on North Dale Mabry Avenue, Tampa, Florida. Respondent transferred Petitioner to its office at Lexus of Clearwater, Florida, on January 21, 2004, and terminated the assignment from the employment agency on January 23, 2004. The termination of assignment occurred in Pinellas County, rather than Hillsborough County, Florida. Petitioner began her assignment at Lexus of Tampa Bay on January 13, 2004, as a receptionist. Respondent paired Petitioner with Ms. Mary Ann Browne, a full-time receptionist and Caucasian female. Respondent charged Ms. Browne with training Petitioner in the responsibilities of a receptionist. Petitioner alleges that Ms. Browne engaged in unprofessional conduct during the 10 days she trained Petitioner. The unprofessional conduct, according to Petitioner's testimony included "racial undertones." For example, Ms. Browne asked Petitioner why, "Black people are all family, cousins, sisters, brothers." Petitioner responded, "Don't ask me. I wouldn't be that black." Ms. Browne allegedly stated aloud that two female employees who hugged in greeting each other were lesbians. Ms. Browne allegedly called another African-American employee a "pimp" and referred to an Hispanic employee as a "macdaddy." The fact-finder does not know the meaning of the term "macdaddy," or even how to spell the term, and the record does not provide an adequate definition or spelling. Ms. Browne allegedly referred to homosexual customers as "flamers." Finally, Ms. Browne allegedly engaged in threatening physical behavior by tossing items at Petitioner across the reception desk. No one but Petitioner heard the alleged racial and sexist comments by Ms. Browne or witnessed the physically aggressive behavior. The preponderance of evidence does not establish a prima facie showing of discrimination or retaliation. Nor does the preponderance of evidence show that Respondent subjected Petitioner to a hostile work environment. Finally, a preponderance of the evidence does not show that Respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice. The evidence of Ms. Browne's conduct consists of Petitioner's testimony and a diary that Petitioner created contemporaneously with the acts Petitioner attributes to Ms. Browne. No other employees at Lexus of Tampa Bay witnessed the events evidenced in Petitioner's testimony and diary. Ms. Browne left her employment with Respondent in the fall of 2004 and did not testify. Ms. Toni Davis, now Ms. Toni Scotland, was a receptionist during part of the relevant time but was not present during the entire time because she was being promoted to a position in accounting. Ms. Scotland did not recall any improper behavior by Ms. Browne in 2004. The Investigative Report based its recommendation of a finding of cause on statements attributed in the Report to then Ms. Davis and the documentation of the disciplinary action taken by Respondent against Ms. Browne. However, Ms. Scotland testified that she did not recall being contacted by an investigator for the Board and denied making any statements to the investigator. The investigation took approximately 3.5 years to complete because the investigator is the only investigator for the Board and because the investigator suffered a heart attack during the investigation. At the hearing, the testimony of the investigator concerning statements he attributed to Ms. Scotland, also Ms. Davis, was vague and sparse and is less than credible and persuasive. A preponderance of the evidence does not show that Respondent is responsible for the acts Petitioner attributes to Ms. Browne. Petitioner complained to her employment agency about the conduct of Ms. Browne. The employment agency notified Respondent, and Ms. Helene Ott, the supervisor at the time, interviewed both Petitioner and Ms. Browne on January 19, 2004. The only complaint made by Petitioner to Ms. Ott on January 19, 2004, was that Ms. Browne went to the break room to bring back a drink in separate disposable drink cups for Ms. Browne and Petitioner. Upon returning with the drinks, Ms. Browne told Petitioner that Ms. Browne had spit in Petitioner's cup. Petitioner did not tell Ms. Ott that Petitioner witnessed Ms. Browne spit in the cup. Petitioner's version of events changed at the hearing. Petitioner testified that she saw Ms. Browne spit in Petitioner's cup. Petitioner testified that Ms. Browne offered to refill the cup Petitioner already had on the receptionist desk, grabbed the cup, stood, drew up a large volume of spit from deep in Ms. Browne's throat, and let the long volume of liquid drop into Petitioner's cup in full view of Petitioner. Petitioner further testified in tears that she stated repeatedly to Ms. Browne, "Give me back my cup!" The foregoing testimony of Petitioner is less than credible and persuasive. The fact-finder is not persuaded that any reasonable person would have wanted Ms. Browne to return the cup. The cup was a disposable cup from the vending area which was of no value to Petitioner. Petitioner did not relate this version of the events to Ms. Ott when Ms. Ott investigated Petitioner's complaints on January 19, 2004. The version of events that Petitioner related to Ms. Ott on January 19, 2004, is consistent with the contemporaneous account by Mr. Browne. When Ms. Ott interviewed Ms. Browne on January 19, 2004, Ms. Browne admitted that she told Petitioner she had spit in Petitioner's cup when Ms. Browne returned from the vending area to the reception desk with Petitioner's drink. Ms. Browne also admitted to engaging in offensive language, offensive commentary about customers, and unprofessional conduct. A preponderance of evidence does not show that Respondent created or fostered a work environment that was hostile toward Petitioner. On January 19, 2004, Ms. Ott issued a written counseling/final warning to Ms. Browne for her use of “offensive language, offensive commentary about customers, and unprofessional conduct.” The disciplinary action advised Ms. Browne that any further misconduct would result in the termination of her employment. On January 20, 2004, Ms. Ott interviewed Petitioner again concerning additional complaints from the employment agency. Petitioner told Ms. Ott that Ms. Browne used vulgar and unprofessional language, but Petitioner did not state to Ms. Ott that Ms. Browne made racial or sexist comments. On January 21, 2004, Ms. Ott needed to fill another temporary vacancy at Lexus of Clearwater. Ms. Ott asked Petitioner to go to Clearwater, and Petitioner went to the Clearwater office voluntarily. Respondent ended the employment agency assignment on January 23, 2004. Ms. Ott described Petitioner’s performance as “very good." On January 23, 2004, Ms. Ott offered to write a letter of reference for Petitioner. Ms. Ott told Petitioner that Ms. Ott would consider Petitioner for a position at Lexus of Tampa Bay or Lexus of Clearwater if the need arose.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the final order issued in this proceeding should find that Respondent is not guilty of the allegations made by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of August, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Leslie P. Stokes 4714 Pleasant Avenue Palm Harbor, Florida 34683 Gail P. Williams Hillsborough County Post Office Box 1110 Tampa, Florida 33601-1110 Andrew Froman, Esquire Alva L. Cross, Esquire Fisher & Phillips LLP 401 East Jackson Street, Suite 2525 Tampa, Florida 33602
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a Class "D" Security Officer should be denied on the grounds set forth in the Department of State, Division of Licensing's (Department's) March 26, 1992, letter to Petitioner?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is 56 years of age. He has had numerous brushes with the law, many of them alcohol-related, dating back to 1956, but he has never been convicted of a felony. In June of 1956, Petitioner attempted to purchase a beer in Sacramento, California. He was 19 years old at the time and, although in the military, under the legal drinking age. Petitioner was arrested and charged with a misdemeanor violation of California's alcoholic beverage control law. He received a ten-day suspended sentence. In November of 1956, when Petitioner was stationed on a military base in Amarillo, Texas, he and friend, without authorization, went into a room on the base where weapons were stored. They took possession of a .38 calibre firearm and started "playing with it." Petitioner was arrested and charged with the misdemeanor offenses of unlawful entry and wrongful appropriation. He received a bad conduct discharge, which was suspended. After attending a rehabilitation training program, he returned to active military service. In May of 1962, Petitioner was arrested for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, a misdemeanor. He was subsequently convicted of the offense. His license was suspended for ten days and he was ordered to pay $25 in court costs. In the early part of 1964, Petitioner, along with several others, charged $700 worth of merchandise in a department store in Indianapolis, Indiana using credit card slips they had forged. Petitioner was arrested and charged with the felony offense of uttering a forged instrument. Adjudication of guilt on this charge was withheld and Petitioner was placed on three years probation. In October of 1968, while in Anderson Indiana, Petitioner was arrested and charged with theft by deception for having written checks in amounts that exceeded the balance of his checking account. The checks were actually written by Petitioner's estranged wife without his knowledge. The charge against Petitioner was dropped after restitution was made. In January of 1969, Petitioner was again arrested in Anderson, Indiana and charged with theft by deception for having written bad checks. These checks were written by Petitioner, but he did not realize at the time he wrote them that, because of his wife's check writing, he had insufficient funds in his account. Adjudication of guilt on this charge was withheld and Petitioner was placed on probation for a year. In February of 1970, Petitioner stayed in a Naples, Florida hotel for approximately three or four days. When he checked out, he did not have enough money to pay his bill. Petitioner was arrested and charged with the misdemeanor offense of defrauding an innkeeper. Less than a week later, Petitioner made restitution and the charge against him was dropped. The following month, while in Miami Beach, Florida, Petitioner was again unable to pay a hotel bill and, as a result, arrested and charged with defrauding an innkeeper. This charge was also dropped after Petitioner made restitution. In May of 1970, Petitioner was arrested and charged with breaking and entering a Naples, Florida restaurant with intent to commit grand larceny. The charge was unfounded and it was subsequently dropped. In January of 1971, Petitioner was driving a motor vehicle in Fort Myers, Florida that had an expired inspection sticker affixed to it. He was stopped by the police and a firearm belonging to a passenger was discovered in the vehicle. Petitioner was arrested and charged with unlawful possession of a firearm and driving a vehicle with an expired inspection sticker. The former charge was dropped. With respect to the latter charge, Petitioner was fined $30 or $35. In October of 1971, Petitioner was arrested in Naples, Florida and charged with writing a worthless check. The check was in the amount of $20 or $25. At the time he wrote the check, Petitioner was unaware that he did not have enough money in his account to cover the check. Petitioner subsequently made restitution and the charge was dropped. In February of 1976, in Lauderhill, Florida, Petitioner was arrested and again charged with writing a worthless check. The amount of this check was less than $50. Petitioner pled guilty to this misdemeanor offense and was fined $10. In addition to paying the fine, Petitioner made restitution. That same month, Petitioner was arrested in Sunrise, Florida and charged with battery on his wife. The charge was unfounded and it was subsequently dropped. In July of 1976, in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, Petitioner was arrested and charged with aggravated assault, assault and battery and petty larceny. All of these charges were unfounded; however, as a matter of convenience and pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner pled no contest to the assault and battery charge. Adjudication of guilt on this charge was withheld. Petitioner received a 90-day suspended sentence and a $352 fine, which was also suspended. The remaining charges against Petitioner were dropped. In December of 1977, Petitioner was again arrested in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. On this occasion, he was charged with two counts of writing worthless checks under $50. Petitioner subsequently made restitution and the charges were dropped. In February of 1980, in Jasper, Florida, Petitioner was arrested and charged with driving while intoxicated, speeding, driving without a valid drivers license and refusing to sign a summons. The latter charge was dropped. Petitioner pled guilty to the remaining charges and was adjudicated guilty on these charges by the trial court. For speeding and driving without a valid drivers license, he was fined. For driving while intoxicated, he was also fined and, in addition, his drivers license was suspended and he was ordered to attend DWI school. In May of 1985, in West Palm Beach, Florida, Petitioner was arrested on a Dade County, Florida warrant that had been issued in 1980, when he had been charged with two felony counts of writing worthless checks. The checks had actually been written by Petitioner's daughter. After his arrest, Petitioner made restitution and the charges against him were dropped. In November of 1985, Petitioner was arrested in West Palm Beach, Florida and charged with driving while intoxicated. He pled guilty to this misdemeanor charge. The trial court adjudicated Petitioner guilty and suspended his license for six months and ordered him to attend DWI school. Petitioner has not been in trouble with the law since. He is now a law-abiding citizen, who is better able to control is intake of alcohol. In filling out Section 5 of his application for licensure, which addressed the subject of criminal history, Petitioner did not intentionally make any misrepresentations or omit any required information. It was his understanding that he was required to disclose information relating only to felony convictions in this section of the application.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding that Petitioner should not be denied licensure as a Class "D" Security Officer on the grounds cited in the Department's March 26, 1992, denial letter. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 18th day of August, 1992. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1992.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant and material to this proceeding, the Respondent, Willie Marion Ware (Licensee), held license number 74-00564, series 2-COP, authorizing him to sell alcoholic beverages on the premises doing business as Silver Shadow, located at 918 S. Adelle, Deland, Volusia County, Florida (the premises). Between the dates of July 1, 1989, and October 30, 1991, the Licensee's brother, Earl M. Ware (a/k/a Joe or Little Joe), was a convicted felon. The Licensee's brother, Earl M. Ware, was convicted less than five years ago for selling cocaine inside the licensed premises. The Licensee fully knew that his brother, Earl M. Ware, was and is a convicted felon who is prohibited from being employed as person in charge, bartender, or manager. Contrary to agreements made by Licensee in a previous case with this same charge and despite notice by Deputy Bowman, Licensee has continued to employ his brother, Earl M. Ware, as a person in charge, bartender or manager. At various times relevant to this proceeding, the Licensee's brother, Earl M. Ware, possessed keys to enter the premises and open the locked door to the premises and he opened the premises to the public without any supervision by Licensee or by any other employees. Earl M. Ware worked inside the premises when there were no other employees or the Licensee present inside the premises. In fact, Earl M. Ware was the only person in charge for extended periods of time, particularly on Sundays. The Licensee's brother, Earl M. Ware, worked behind the bar, asked clients what they wanted to drink, retrieved the alcoholic beverage orders, served those alcoholic beverages to clients, charged clients for those alcoholic beverages, and took money from clients for those alcoholic beverages. Between July 1, 1989, and October 30, 1991, the licensed premises were a continuing nuisance. Complaints regarding or involving the premises and its parking lot owned by Licensee were more than double those of the other two licensed premises located within 5 blocks of Licensee's premises. The complaints ranged from possession of drug paraphernalia and sale of narcotics, to armed robbery and attempted murders of law enforcement officers. Deputy Brown, in particular, testified that he purchased crack cocaine right at the front door of the premises. Deputy Brown also observed numerous narcotics transactions taking place inside the premises, while Licensee was inside the premises. Deputy Brown also made several purchases of cocaine in the parking lot of the Silver Shadow when the dealer advised that he was not holding the drugs and he then went inside the Silver Shadow to retrieve the drugs to be sold. Deputy Boltz removed two males under age 21 from the bathroom of the Silver Shadow, one of whom had a gun in his pocket. Deputy Bowman followed up on a complaint by a man who said he was beaten and robbed in the Silver Shadow. Deputy Bowman was advised by "Joe" that a fight occurred and that he had broken it up. The shoe missing from the complainant's foot was found by Bowman in the back corner of the bathroom. Deputy Bowman notified Licensee several times between the dates of July 1, 1989, and October 30, 1991, that the premises was fostering illegal activity, particularly narcotics activity. Every deputy who testified identified multiple occasions when he found containers of cocaine, bags with drug residual, and drug paraphernalia on the premises. They also each smelled marijuana and crack cocaine being smoked on the premises. Licensee was made aware of the incidents and told the law enforcement officers that he couldn't check or control the use of drugs on the premises. The Licensee never contacted the Sheriff's Office and never asked any of the deputy sheriff's specifically assigned to work the area to come inside his premises to enforce any criminal laws. Licensee did not contact the police when he knew that a criminal was hiding the gun used in an attempted murder of a police officer inside the premises. The Licensee denied ever speaking with Deputy Bowman regarding the continued illegal activity inside the premises. According to the Licensee, there is no illegal activity taking place inside the premises. This testimony is simply not worthy of belief. While the Licensee did attend community meetings and did place no trespassing signs in the adjoining parking lot, he had never asked any law enforcement officer to remove anyone from his premises. The Licensee acknowledged that he did not feel it was his duty to police his premises and identify persons who are engaging in illegal activity to the law enforcement authorities. According to the Licensee, that was the job of the police, and not his responsibility. In DABT Case No. AY74870121, Licensee's license was suspended and fined for multiple instances of the sale of crack cocaine on the premises by Earl M. Ware and for keeping an establishment used by persons using controlled substances and thereby deemed a public nuisance. The Final Order in that case was entered on May 25, 1989. In that proceeding, Licensee made various assurances regarding the exclusion of Earl M. Ware from the premises and the implementation of various devices meant to discourage and prevent any sale and use of drugs on the premises. Despite that Final Order and the terms thereof, the proof in this case shows that these same violations continued from July 1, 1989, to November 1, 1991, without cease.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco enter a Final Order and therein: Find that the Licensee, Willie Marion Ware, is guilty of the first count of employing a convicted felon. Find that the Licensee is guilty of the second count of maintaining a nuisance. Find that the previous conviction history of this Licensee for similar offenses is a sufficient aggravating factor to exceed the penalty guidelines Revoke license No. 74-00564, Series 2-COP, issued to Willie Marion Ware d/b/a Silver Shadow. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of September, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 1992. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-3333 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, DABT 1. Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1-6(1-6); 7-10(6-9); 11-16(9-14); 17(18); and 18-22(21-24). COPIES FURNISHED: Richard W. Scully, Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1000 Donald D. Conn, General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1000 Monica Atkins White Assistant General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1007 Reginald Moore Attorney at Law Post Office Box 1848 Daytona Beach, FL 32115-1848
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this case, Rajenor Bajrangi held a valid Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (hereinafter Division), license for the premises known as the Quick Stop Center (hereinafter licensed premises), license number 6k9-305, series 2-APS, located at 1201 Airport Boulevard, Sanford, Seminole County, Florida. Underage operative Robert Scott assists the Sanford Police Department in determining whether or not licensed premises will sell alcoholic beverages to persons under the age of 21 years of age. Mr. Scott was born on April 17, 1969, and on Monday, May 23, 1988, he was nineteen years old. On May 23, 1988, Robert Scott entered the licensed premise, walked to the back of the store, removed a 12 oz. can of Miller beer from the cooler, and proceeded to the check-out counter. He presented the beer to a man that he identified at the hearing as being Rajenor Bajrangi. Mr. Bajrangi, without requesting any identification, rang up the beer on the cash register and received from Mr. Scott the requested price for the beer. Mr. Scott departed the premise with the beer and met Officer Collison outside where Mr. Scott gave Officer Collison the Miller beer. At no time during this transaction did Mr. Bajrangi inquire as to Mr. Scott's age. Officer Chris A. Collison of the Sanford, Florida, Police Department has been a police officer for over eight years. On May 23, 1988, about 10:00 p.m., he went in an unmarked car with another officer and Robert Scott to the licensed premises. He was able to observe Mr. Scott enter the licensed premises purchase the aforementioned beer and then depart the premises. The funds that Mr. Scott used to purchase the beer were provided by Mr. Collison. Mr. Collison received the Miller beer purchased by Mr. Scott from the hands of Mr. Scott. He identified the beer that was offered as Petitioner's Exhibit 2 as being the beer that was given to him by Robert Scott. David E. Ramey is a law enforcement investigator for the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco and he has been so employed for over eleven years. He inspected the can of Miller beer that was entered into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 2 and knows that the evidence was labeled as beer, that it was contained in an unopened can, that it had lithographed on the lid of the can the word "Florida," and that it bore the manufacturer's trademark. Investigator Ramey had the opinion that the substance in Petitioner's Exhibit 2 is beer. The usual penalty for a licensee selling to an underage person is a $1,000.00 civil penalty accompanied by a 20-day license suspension. Mr. Rajenor Bajrangi testified that, on May 23, 1988, when Mr. Scott purchased the beer, there was a large group of rowdy people loitering in the vicinity of the licensed premise and that the police officers should have arrested these rowdy persons instead of trying to make an underage case against him. Neither the testimony of Officer Collison or that of Mr. Scott served to bolster Mr. Bajrangi's claim that he was diverted by the so-called rowdy persons and Officer Collison specifically stated that there were no distractions occurring in the vicinity of the licensed premise at the time the beverage was purchased. Considering the evidence as a whole, there was no credible evidence that Respondent was distracted at the time the beverage was purchased.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding the licensee guilty of a violation of Section 561.29(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and Section 562.11(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and imposing a civil penalty of $1,000.00 and a three (3) day license suspension. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of July, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of July, 1988. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Recommended Order Paragraph 1-6. Accepted Respondent's letter dated July 4, 1989. Did not dispute Petitioner's finding of fact but was in the nature of mitigation. COPIES FURNISHED: Harry Hooper, Esquire Deputy General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Rajenor Bajrangi c/o Quick Stop Center 1201 Airport Boulevard Sanford, Florida 32771 Leonard Ivey Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco The Johns Building 725 S. Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Stephen R. McNamara Secretary Department of Business Regulation The Johns Building 725 S. Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Joseph A. Sole General Counsel Department of Business Regulation The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000
Findings Of Fact 13. The factual allegations contained in the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment issued on February 11, 2009, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on March 5, 2009, the 2"4 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on March 11, 2009 and the 3 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on October 30, 2009, which are fully incorporated herein by reference, are hereby adopted as the Department’s Findings of Fact in this case.
Conclusions THIS PROCEEDING came on for final agency action and Alex Sink, Chief F inancial Officer of the State of Florida, or her designee, having considered the record in this case, including the Stop- Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment and the Amended Orders of Penalty Assessment served in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 09-036-D1, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, hereby finds that: 1. On February 11, 2009, the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (hereinafter “Department”) issued a Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 09-036-D1 to BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. 2. On February 11, 2009, the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment was served by personal service on BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. A copy of the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit A” and incorporated herein by reference. 3. On March 5, 2009, the Department issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in Case No. 09-036-D1 to BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $196,980.30 against BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. 4. On March 16, 2009, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was served by certified mail on BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. A copy of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit B” and incorporated herein by reference. 5. On March 11, 2009, the Department issued a 2°4 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in Case No. 09-036-D1 to BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. The an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $50,968.94 against BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. . 6. On March 26, 2009, the 2°4 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was served by certified mail on BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. A copy of the 2"! Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit C” and incorporated herein by reference. 7. The Employer requested a formal hearing on April 6, 2009. A copy of the Request for Hearing is attached hereto as “Exhibit D” and incorporated herein by reference. 8. On April 21, 2009, the request for formal hearing was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for assignment of an Administrative Law Judge. The matter was assigned to Administrative Law Judge Barbara Staros and given case number 09-2138. 9. On October 30, 2009, the Department issued a 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in Case No. 09-036-D1 to BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. The 3rd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $10,179.61 against BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. 10. On October 30, 2009, the 3™ Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was served on legal counsel for BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. A copy of the 3" Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit E” and incorporated herein by reference. 11. On November 9, 2009, BEST WELDING AND FABRICATION, INC. filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal. A copy of the Notice of Voluntary Dismissal is attached hereto as “Exhibit F” and incorporated herein by reference. 12. On November 12, 2009, an Order Closing File was entered. The Order Closing File relinquished jurisdiction to the Department. A copy of the Order Closing File is attached hereto as “Exhibit G” and incorporated herein by reference.
Findings Of Fact During the month of April in 1988, and perhaps also in March of that year, the Petitioner, Sam Anthony Ciotti, conspired with others to purchase 200 pounds of marijuana in Broward County, Florida, for $110,000.00 The conspirators intended to transport the 200 pounds of marijuana to Ohio, where they expected to sell the marijuana to others. Unbeknownst to the conspirators, the persons from whom they arranged to purchase the marijuana were detectives of the City of Fort Lauderdale Police Department. The negotiations for the sale were primarily between the detectives and a conspirator named Klenner. The basic terms of the agreement were that the detectives would deliver 200 pounds of marijuana to Klenner or to someone designated by Klenner, Klenner would then transport the marijuana to Ohio and sell it, and once he received the money for selling the marijuana, Klenner would pay $110,000.00 to one of the detectives. To secure the deal, Klenner agreed that he and the Petitioner, Ciotti, would sign a promissory note for $110,000.00 secured by a boat co-owned by Klenner and Ciotti. On April 14, 1988, one of the detectives met with the Petitioner, Ciotti, at the boat yard where the boat was. docked. During that meeting the detective confirmed with Ciotti that a promissory note would be signed for 200 pounds of marijuana and that the boat would be collateral for the promissory note. On April 15, 1988, the two detectives met with Klenner and Ciotti, at which time Klenner delivered to one of the detectives a promissory note in the amount of $110,000.00 signed by both Klenner and Ciotti. On April 19, 1988, one of the detectives spoke to Klenner and arrangements were made for the marijuana to be delivered to a third conspirator named Bradford. Later that day the two detectives met Bradford at a prearranged location. One of the detectives took possession of Bradford's motor vehicle, loaded it with 200 pounds of marijuana, and returned the motor vehicle and its cargo of marijuana to Bradford. The trunk was opened and Bradford examined the marijuana cargo. Bradford then took possession of his motor vehicle and attempted to drive away with the 200 pounds of marijuana. At that point, he was arrested. Later that same day, the detectives went to the boat yard where the boat owned by Klenner and Ciotti was docked, where they arrested Ciotti and seized the boat owned by Klenner and Ciotti. On June 8, 1989, the Department of Revenue issued a document titled Notice Of Assessment And Jeopardy Findings which assessed tax, penalties, and interest in the amount of $52,534.42 against the Petitioner, Ciotti, pursuant to Section 212.0505, Florida Statutes (1987). The factual basis for the assessment was the Petitioner's involvement in the marijuana transaction described in the foregoing findings of fact. Following other unsuccessful efforts to resolve the matter, the Petitioner ultimately filed a timely petition seeking a formal hearing. At the formal hearing in this case on September 28, 1990, the Department of Revenue delivered to the Petitioner a document dated September 27, 1990, titled Revised Notice Of Assessment And Jeopardy Findings. The significant difference between the original assessment and the "revised" assessment is that in the latter document the Department seeks to recover less than in the original assessment. Specifically, the "revised" assessment contains a lower estimated retail price than on the original assessment and eliminates a fifty percent penalty that was included on the original assessment. These changes are consistent with the Department's current policies regarding the assessment of taxes, penalties, and interest. The net difference between the two assessment documents is a reduction of $18,809.39 in the amount sought by the Department. The specific amounts assessed in the "revised" assessment are as follows: Tax, $22,000.00; Penalty, $5,500,00; and Interest, $6,225.03; for a total of $33,725.03. Interest continues to accrue at the rate of $7.23 per day. The factual predicate for the "revised" assessment is the same as that of the original assessment.
Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue issue a final order in this case concluding that the Petitioner, Sam Anthony Ciotti, is liable for taxes, penalties, and interest pursuant to Section 212.0505, Florida Statutes (1987), and assessing the amount of such liability at $33,725.03, plus interest at the rate of $7.23 per day since September 28, 1990. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 1st day of February 1991. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February 1991.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent violated the provisions of chapter 440, Florida Statutes,1/ by failing to secure the payment of workers’ compensation, as alleged in the Stop-Work Order and Third Amended Order of Penalty Assessment.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement that employers secure workers’ compensation coverage for the benefit of their employees. Respondent is a corporation with its principal office 3981 North W Street, Unit 36, Pensacola, Florida 32505. At all relevant time periods, Respondent has been engaged in business as a contractor in the construction industry. On March 28, 2012, after receiving a public referral regarding alleged uninsured construction activity at 2544 North D Street in Pensacola, Florida (the Site), Department Compliance Investigator Angelia Brown visited the Site. Upon Ms. Brown's arrival, there were plumbers and a siding company at the Site. According to Ms. Brown, she also saw an individual attaching u- shaped metal clips between the inside beams and the roof and soffits of the house that was being constructed at the Site. The plumbers had a workers' compensation policy and the siding workers had exemptions from workers' compensation requirements. Ms. Brown spoke to the man who appeared to be attaching the metal clips. Based upon that conversation, Ms. Brown concluded that the man was a subcontractor and Respondent's employee. The evidence, however, does not support that conclusion. The man, whose name is apparently Robert Madron, was not called as a witness at the final hearing. According to Ms. Brown, Mr. Madron told her he had his own company. Ms. Brown, however, was unable to obtain information verifying that assertion. Further, while Mr. Howard had paid Mr. Madron prior to Ms. Brown's visit for unsolicited work Mr. Madron had performed for Mr. Howard, consisting of picking up trash and repairing some equipment owned by Mr. Howard, Mr. Howard denied that Respondent ever employed Mr. Madron. Rather than showing that Mr. Madron was a subcontractor with his own business or an employee of Respondent, the evidence adduced at the final hearing indicated that Mr. Madron, who was known as "Gomer" by Mr. Howard, was an unemployed, homeless person, living in nearby woods. Mr. Madron would often come to the Site and surrounding neighborhood looking for work and food. Mr. Howard was surprised that Ms. Brown had taken Mr. Madron seriously, because Mr. Howard believes that Mr. Madron's facial expressions and unbalanced, awkward gait are obvious indicators that Mr. Madron is unstable and has mental problems. Ms. Brown issued a Stop-Work Order to Mr. Madron the day of her first visit at the Site, March 28, 2012. The evidence presented at the final hearing, however, failed to show that Mr. Madron was ever employed by Respondent. The next day, March 29, 2012, Ms. Brown returned and observed four other individuals working at the Site. The individuals included Robert Jones, Charles Lyons, Martin Shaughnessy, and Allen Weeden. While Ms. Brown concluded that these individuals were Respondent's employees on March 29, 2012, the evidence shows that they were paid for the work that day by Pacesetter Personnel, an employee-leasing company. Aside from alleging that Respondent employed Mr. Madron, the Third Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is based upon Respondent's alleged employment and failure to provide workers' compensation coverage for Mr. Jones, Mr. Lyons, Mr. Shaughnessy, and Mr. Weeden. In addition, the Third Amended Order of Penalty Assessment alleges that Respondent employed its officer, Mr. Howard, during a lapse in Mr. Howard's exemption from workers' compensation. There was no testimony from Robert Jones, Charles Lyons, Martin Shaughnessy, or Allen Weeden offered at the final hearing and the evidence is otherwise insufficient to show that those individuals were employed by Respondent on March 29, 2012. The Department's investigator, Ms. Brown, further concluded that Pacesetter Personnel had not provided worker's compensation coverage for those four men on March 29, 2012. Her conclusion, however, was based on a conversation she said she had with Pacesetter Personnel. The Department did not offer the testimony from anyone at Pacesetter, nor did it offer any non- hearsay evidence to support Ms. Brown's conclusion that Pacesetter Personnel was not providing workers' compensation to those four individuals. Further, the only evidence that the Department offered to prove that Messrs. Jones, Lyons, Shaughnessy, and Weeden were ever employed by Respondent, or to support the Third Amended Penalty Assessment, consists of Mr. Howard's cancelled checks to those individuals. The Third Amended Penalty Assessment seeks an assessment for Robert Jones from January 1 to March 28, 2012. At the final hearing, Mr. Howard testified that Mr. Jones is a relative, and the payment to Mr. Jones was a loan to help Mr. Jones with moving expenses. There is no contrary evidence. The Third Amended Penalty Assessment provides an assessment for Charles Lyons for the periods from July 1, 2010 to December 31, 2010, and from January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2011. The assessment is based upon one check to Mr. Lyons in the amount to $480. Mr. Howard testified that Mr. Lyons had an exemption from workers' compensation. The Department presented no contradictory evidence. The Third Amended Penalty Assessment seeks an assessment for Martin Shaughnessy for several time periods based upon several checks from Mr. Howard. Mr. Howard testified that Mr. Shaughnessy had an exemption and the Department presented no contrary evidence. The Third Amended Penalty assessment also seeks an assessment for James Howard, individually, from July 17 to August 11, 2011, during which time there was a lapse in his certificate of exemption from workers' compensation. The evidence showed that, other than that 26-day lapse, Mr. Howard has maintained his exemption since 2003. The Department presented no evidence that Mr. Howard provided services to, or was paid by, Respondent during the time that his exemption had lapsed. The only evidence presented was a check from Respondent's checking account showing a payment to Mr. Howard's mother during the lapse period. Mr. Howard testified that the check was to reimburse his mother for the use of her American Express card to purchase materials and supplies. The Department presented no countervailing evidence. In sum, the evidence presented at the final hearing was insufficient to support the Stop Work Order or Third Amended Penalty Assessment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Workers’ Compensation enter a final order dismissing the Stop-Work Order and Third Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of June, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 2013.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Clarence Goosby, suffered racial discrimination when he was terminated from employment for fighting.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner, Clarence Goosby, is an African-American, who was employed by Respondent from October 13, 1999, until he was terminated on February 17, 2000. Respondent, Florida Extruders International, Inc., a manufacturing company located in Sanford, Florida, employs approximately 500 employees and is an "employer" as defined in Subsection 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Some of the manufacturing activities at Respondent's plant are dangerous. One of these activities, melting aluminum scrap, takes place in the Cast House, which is noted as a "restricted area." Workers in the Cast House wear fire- protective clothing. On February 17, 2000, an African-American employee, Broderick Demps ("Demps"), was noticed in the Cast House where he had gone to use the restroom. A Caucasian supervisor, William Wilson ("Wilson"), questioned Demps regarding his presence in a restricted area and was advised by Demps that his supervisor had given him permission to use the restroom. Demps exited the Cast House and was followed by Wilson to another building, the Warehouse, Demps' workstation. Wilson met another supervisor, Frank Witherspoon ("Witherspoon"), as he entered the Warehouse. Wilson and Witherspoon located Demps' supervisor, Warren Lawrence ("Lawrence"), who advised that he had not given Demps permission to enter the Cast House. At this point, Demps began yelling at Wilson; his language was obscene and racial. The other supervisors tried, without success, to control Demps. Petitioner, hearing the altercation, left his work area in the same building, and recognized Demps (who he referred to as his "God-brother"), who continued yelling obscenities at Wilson. Petitioner's supervisor, Kenneth McKinney ("McKinney"), told Petitioner to return to his work area. Petitioner ignored McKinney's directive. Petitioner approached Wilson and the other supervisors and began yelling obscenities and racial slurs at Wilson. While standing in close proximity to Wilson and shouting at him, Petitioner made a quick move with his hand and arm. Wilson, believing that Petitioner was attempting to strike him, responded by striking Petitioner. Demps then struck Wilson in the head, knocking him to the floor. Both Petitioner and Demps jumped onto Wilson, striking and kicking him. Witherspoon, McKinney, and Lawrence physically pulled Petitioner and Demps off Wilson. Petitioner and Demps continued yelling obscenities and racial slurs at Wilson as they were being removed from the Warehouse. Petitioner officiously injected himself into a volatile situation involving Demps and his supervisors. By his confrontational conduct, Petitioner precipitated a physical altercation among himself, Wilson, and Demps. Witherspoon contacted Dana Lehman ("Lehman"), operations manager and highest-level executive at Respondent's plant, by radio and advised him of the altercation. Lehman immediately went to the Warehouse, where a crowd of employees had gathered in addition to the individuals mentioned hereinabove. Lehman inquired of several employees regarding the altercation but no one reported having seen it. Lehman attempted to speak to Petitioner and Demps about the incident. Petitioner and Demps were confrontational; Lehman obtained no relevant information from them. Lehman questioned McKinney, Lawrence, and Witherspoon and received their reports regarding the incident, which are detailed hereinabove. Wilson confirmed the descriptions and observations of the three supervisors/witnesses. McKinney, Petitioner's supervisor, recommended to Lehman that Petitioner be terminated for unauthorized leaving of his work area and instigating a fight with a supervisor. Respondent had in the past terminated several employees of different ethnicities for fighting. Respondent's employees' handbook (Policies and Procedures Handbook) reads, in pertinent part, as follows: Conduct Meriting Immediate Discharge Certain actions are such serious breaches of responsibilities to the company that no prior warnings or probation notices are required and may result in immediate discharge. For example: * * * Fighting or hitting another employee, or similar disorderly conduct, during work hours or on company premises. Willful disobedience (insubordination) Petitioner was aware of Respondent's prohibition against fighting and insubordination. Lehman discharged Petitioner on the day of the incident for fighting and insubordination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David Glasser, Esquire Glasser and Handel Suite 100, Box N 150 South Palmetto Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 James W. Seegers, Esquire Valencia Percy Flakes, Esquire Akerman Senterfitt 255 South Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
