The Issue Should discipline be imposed against Respondent's Florida real estate sales associate license?
Findings Of Fact Stipulated Facts: Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.165 and Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent is and was at all times material hereto a licensed Florida real estate sales associate, issued license number 3015177, in accordance with Chapter 475 of the Florida Statutes. The last license issued was as a sales associate with Diane Lynne Severino, P. O. Box 354491, Palm Coast, Florida 32135-4991. On or about August 6, 2004, Joaquin Torres and Marine Hopson (Torres) entered into a purchase and sale agreement for the real property located at 9 Rockwell Lane, Palm Coast, Florida. Respondent was the sales associate on the above transaction. The closing did not occur on the above transaction. Additional Facts: According to Petitioner's records, the following constitutes the history of Respondent's sales associate license: Francis Anthony Severino, Sr., Sales Associate, License #SL-3015177 From January 1, 2004 to October 4, 2004, he was a sales associate affiliated with Team Real Estate, Inc. doing business as Realty Executives Fun Coast Team license number CQ 1008966, a brokerage corporation located at 185 Cypress Point Parkway, suite 4, Palm Coast, Florida 32164; From October 4, 2004 to March 31, 2005 said licensee was invalid due to no employing broker or no filing of a request to remain a sales associate under another broker. From March 31, 2005 to the Present he is a sales associate affiliated with Diane Lynne Severino license number BK 666867, a brokerage sole proprietorship doing business as Severino Realty located at 170 North Beach Street, Daytona Beach, Florida 32114. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 1. In his testimony Respondent indicated that his affiliation with Team Real Estate, Inc. ended on September 13, 2004, when he became inactive with that firm. Respondent's Exhibit numbered 2 is a copy of a DBPR RE-2050-1 Request for Change of Status form intended to establish the separation from that business. Mark Vost the real estate broker for Team Real Estate, Inc. filled out, signed, and sent it in. It has a fax stamp of September 13, 2004. The request by Mark Vost to inactivate Respondent as a sales associate with Team Real Estate, Inc., through the form DBPR RE-2050, was dated September 13, 2004, and officially received by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation on October 4, 2004. More significantly, Respondent testified that he filled out a DBPR RE-2050-1 a Request for Change of Status to be affiliated with Severino Realty whose broker was Diane L. Severino. At that time, Ms. Severino was Respondent's wife. A copy of the Request for Change of Status is found as Respondent's Exhibit numbered 3. It is dated September 13, 2004. Unlike Respondent's Exhibit numbered 2, Respondent's Exhibit numbered 3 does not have a fax stamp showing the date of transmission. Respondent indicated that he personally went to the fax machine in the office of Severino Realty and transferred his license to Petitioner by fax machine. On September 13, 2004, the date reflected on the form, Petitioner did not confirm the fax receipt by Petitioner. Respondent's explanation is that the fax machine upon which the transfer to Severino Realty of his sales associate license "did not have a receipt that prints out." Respondent in his testimony stated " . . . When I dialed the phone I got the dial tone, it rang, it answered, it made that beeping noise, and it never came and said anything that it did not go through and that it was an error. So I just assumed that it was accepted, because normally when a fax machine answers you, that beeping sound and it means that it is acknowledged and if it does not answer it’s a busy signal and you try dialing again." According to Respondent, from that point forward he assumed that his sales associate license had been transferred from Team Real Estate, Inc. to Severino Realty. It had not. Petitioner had evidence of the change of status of Respondent's license to inactive with Team Real Estate, Inc. It did not have evidence of the activation of Respondent's sales associates license with Severino Realty, even should one accept Respondent's testimony that he tried to fax the DBPR RE-2050-1 form designating a change in his broker to Diane L. Severino of Severino Realty on September 13, 2004. Ultimately the portrayal of Respondent's license history established in Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 1 is accepted where Respondent is recognized as being affiliated with Severino Realty commencing March 31, 2005. Respondent was involved with the Torres in a number of real estate transactions. One involved a purchase of a residence at 98 Ulysses Trail in Palm Coast, Florida, through a contract between Joaquine Torres and Holiday Builders, Inc. On July 21, 2004, the parties signed the contract. The total purchase price was $180,190.00. Respondent was named in the Sales/Forms FHA-VA- Std. in the portion of the forms described as "Realtor Referral" and Realty Executive is written next to his name. This is understood to refer to Team Real Estate, Inc. where Respondent was employed as a sales associate. The real estate commission involved with the purchase was 6 percent. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 2. The real estate commission due Realty Executives (Team Real Estate, Inc.) was $8,129.00 in Respondent's name. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 2. On September 24, 2004, when the purchase was settled at closing, the $8,1029.00 was paid, in relation to the property at 98 Ulysses Trail. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 3. On September 24, 2004, the Torres as seller, with Severino Realty being reflected as the broker signed an Exclusive Right of Sale Listing Agreement for the 98 Ulysses Trail property. The price reflected was $229,800.00 with a broker's commission of 5.5 percent. The listing agreement bore one signature, that of the seller. The form did not name the authorized listing associate or broker. It referred to the brokerage firm name as Severino Realty. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 4. Earlier, Mr. Torres entered into a "Showcase Home Purchase Completed Field Model Agreement" with Holiday Builders, Inc. for a residence at 9 Rockwell Lane, Palm Coast, Florida. On August 6, 2004, the parties signed the agreement. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5. On September 24, 2004, an Exclusive Rights of Sale Listing Agreement form was prepared between the Torres and Severino Realty on 9 Rockwell Lane, listing the sales price as $164,900.00. At the time, the Torres did not own the home. The brokerage commission was 5.5 percent. A seller's signature was attached. No other signature was provided. No one was listed as associate or broker. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 6. The Torres' contract on 9 Rockwell Lane never closed due to the inability of the Torres to provide sufficient funds to conclude the purchase. On October 7, 2004, the Torres executed a Promissory Note to pay Respondent $5,000.00 upon the first sale of homes at 98 Ulysses Trail, 9 Rockwell Lane and 14 Ethel Lane. The amount was to be paid in 180 days from the date of the note payable at PO Box 354491, Palm Coast, Florida 32135 or "at such other place as payee or holder may specify in writing or in person." Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 7. On October 7, 2004, Mark Vost, broker/manager for Realty Executives Fun Coast Team Real Estate, Inc., wrote the title company that would be handling the closing on the 9 Rockwell Lane Property to advise that $5,000.00 of commission should be credited to the buyer with the balance of $879.00 being paid to Realty Executives the Fun Coast Team. Respondent's Exhibit numbered 8. This coincides with the settlement charges in the settlement statement for the 9 Rockwell Lane property that did not close on the anticipated date. October 12, 2004, was the scheduled closing date. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 9. After the Torres purchase of 9 Rockwell Lane did not close, Respondent telephoned Ms. Torres and said that she would have to pay him $6,000 because of the percentage (commission) he was losing. He made more than one call. Respondent told Ms. Torres that the failure to close on the 9 Rockwell Lane property was not his problem. Respondent told Ms. Torres that she had to pay because she did not buy the property at 9 Rockwell Lane, that he lost his time and lost his commission and that it was her fault. Respondent told Ms. Torres to give him a check. Eventually, Respondent came to the Torres home to get money from the Torres that he said was due. Based upon the demand for money, Ms. Torres wrote a check payable to Frank Severino in the amount of $6,000.00. The face of the check stated the purpose for the check as "9 Rockwell Lane." The check was written on October 12, 2004, the date Respondent went to the Torres' home. The payment was not intended as any form of gift or gratuity to Respondent. Respondent deposited and cashed the check. A replica of the check and its execution is found as Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 10.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered finding Respondent in violation of Sections 455.227(1)(n) and 475.25(1)(b), (d) and (e), Florida Statutes (2004), and revoking Respondent's sales associate license.1/ DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of March, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 2007
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners' Motions for Attorney's Fees should be granted, and if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulation of counsel, the papers filed herein, and the underlying record made a part of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are determined: Background In this attorney's fees dispute, Petitioners, Anderson Columbia Company, Inc. (Anderson Columbia) (Case No. 00-0754F), Panhandle Land & Timber Company, Inc. (Panhandle Land) (Case No. 00-0755F), Support Terminals Operating Partnership, L.P. (Support Terminals) (Case No. 00-0756F), Commodores Point Terminal Corporation (Commodores Point) (Case No. 00-0757F), and Olan B. Ward, Sr., Martha P. Ward, Anthony Taranto, Antoinette Taranto, J.V. Gander Distributors, Inc., J.V. Gander, Jr., and Three Rivers Properties, Inc. (the Ward group) (Case No. 00-0828F), have requested the award of attorney's fees and costs incurred in successfully challenging proposed Rule 18-21.019(1), Florida Administrative Code, a rule administered by Respondent, Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (Board). In general terms, the proposed rule essentially authorized the Board, through the use of a qualified disclaimer, to reclaim sovereign submerged lands which had previously been conveyed to the upland owners by virtue of their having filled in, bulkheaded, or permanently improved the submerged lands. The underlying actions were assigned Case Nos. 98- 1764RP, 98-1866RP, 98-2045RP, and 98-2046RP, and an evidentiary hearing on the rule challenge was held on May 21, 1998. That proceeding culminated in the issuance of a Final Order in Support Terminals Operating Partnership, L.P. et al. v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 21 F.A.L.R. 3844 (Div. Admin. Hrngs., Aug. 8, 1998), which determined that, except for one challenged provision, the proposed rule was valid. Thereafter, in the case of Anderson Columbia Company, Inc. et al. v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 748 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), the court reversed the order below and determined that the rule was an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Petitioners then filed their motions. Fees and Costs There are eleven Petitioners seeking reimbursement of fees and costs. In its motion, Anderson Columbia seeks reimbursement of attorney's fees "up to the $15,000 cap allowed by statute" while Panhandle Land seeks identical relief. In their similarly worded motions, Support Terminals and Commodores Point each seek fees "up to the $15,000 cap allowed by statute." Finally, the Ward group collectively seeks $9,117.00 in attorney's fees and $139.77 in costs. In the Joint Stipulations of Fact filed by the parties, the Board has agreed that the rate and hours for all Petitioners "were reasonable." As to all Petitioners except the Ward group, the Board has further agreed that each of their costs to challenge the rule exceeded $15,000.00. It has also agreed that even though they were not contained in the motions, requests for costs by Support Terminals, Commodores Point, Anderson Columbia, and Panhandle Land in the amounts of $1,143.22, $1,143.22, $1,933.07, and $1,933.07, respectively, were "reasonable." Finally, the Board has agreed that the request for costs by the Ward group in the amount of $139.77 is "reasonable." Despite the stipulation, and in the event it does not prevail on the merits of these cases, the Board contends that the four claimants in Case Nos. 00-754F, 00-755F, 00-0756F, and 00- 757F should be reimbursed only on a per case basis, and not per client, or $7,500.00 apiece, on the theory that they were sharing counsel, and the discrepancy between the amount of fees requested by the Ward group (made up of seven Petitioners) and the higher fees requested by the other Petitioners "is difficult to understand and justify." If this theory is accepted, it would mean that Support Terminals and Commodores Point would share a single $15,000.00 fee, while Anderson Columbia and Panhandle Land would do the same. Support Terminals and Commodores Point were unrelated clients who happened to choose the same counsel; they were not a "shared venture." Each brought a different perspective to the case since Commodores Point had already received a disclaimer with no reversionary interest while Support Terminals received one with a reversionary interest on June 26, 1997. The latter event ultimately precipitated this matter and led to the proposed rulemaking. Likewise, in the case of Anderson Columbia and Panhandle Land, one was a landowner while the other was a tenant, and they also happened to choose the same attorney to represent them. For the sake of convenience and economy, the underlying cases were consolidated and the matters joined for hearing. Substantial Justification From a factual basis, the Board contends several factors should be taken into account in determining whether it was substantially justified in proposing the challenged rule. First, the Board points out that its members are mainly lay persons, and they relied in good faith on the legal advice of the Board's staff and remarks made by the Attorney General during the course of the meeting at which the Board issued a disclaimer to Support Terminals. Therefore, the Board argues that it should be insulated from liability since it was relying on the advice of counsel. If this were true, though, an agency that relied on legal advice could never be held responsible for a decision which lacked substantial justification. The Board also relies upon the fact that it has a constitutional duty to protect the sovereign lands held in the public trust for the use and benefit of the public. Because lands may be disclaimed under the Butler Act only if they fully meet the requirements of the grant, and these questions involve complex policy considerations, the Board argues that the complexity and difficulty of this task militate against an award of fees. While its mission is indisputably important, however, the Board is no different than other state agencies who likewise are charged with the protection of the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens. The Board further relies on the fact that the rule was never intended to affect title to Petitioners' lands, and all Petitioners had legal recourse to file a suit to quiet title in circuit court. As the appellate court noted, however, the effect of the rule was direct and immediate, and through the issuance of a disclaimer with the objectionable language, it created a reversionary interest in the State and made private lands subject to public use. During the final hearing in the underlying proceedings, the then Director of State Lands vigorously supported the proposed rule as being in the best interests of the State and consistent with the "inalienable" Public Trust. However, he was unaware of any Florida court decision which supported the Board's views, and he could cite no specific statutory guidance for the Board's actions. The Director also acknowledged that the statutory authority for the rule (Section 253.129, Florida Statutes) simply directed the Board to issue disclaimers, and it made no mention of the right of the Board to reclaim submerged lands through the issuance of a qualified disclaimer. In short, while the Board could articulate a theory for its rule, it had very little, if any, basis in Florida statutory or common law or judicial precedent to support that theory. Although Board counsel has ably argued that the law on the Butler Act was archaic, confusing, and conflicting in many respects, the rule challenge case ultimately turned on a single issue, that is, whether the Riparian Rights Act of 1856 and the Butler Act of 1921 granted to upland or riparian owners fee simple title to the adjacent submerged lands which were filled in, bulkheaded, or permanently improved. In other words, the ultimate issue was whether the Board's position was "inconsistent with the . . . the concept of fee simple title." Anderson Columbia at 1066. On this issue, the court held that the State could not through rulemaking "seek to reserve ownership interests by issuing less than an unqualified or unconditional disclaimer to riparian lands which meet the statutory requirements." Id. at 1067. Thus, with no supporting case law or precedent to support its view on that point, there was little room for confusion or doubt on the part of the Board. E. Special Circumstances In terms of special circumstances that would make an award of fees unjust, the Board first contends that the proposed rule was never intended to "harm anyone," and that none of Petitioners were actually harmed. But the substantial interests of each Petitioner were clearly affected by the proposed rules, and the appellate court concluded that the rule would result in an unconstitutional forfeiture of property. The Board also contends that because it must make proprietary decisions affecting the public trust, it should be given wide latitude in rulemaking. It further points out that the Board must engage in the difficult task of balancing the interests of the public with private rights, and that when it infringes on the private rights of others, as it did here, it should not be penalized for erring on the side of the public. As previously noted, however, all state agencies have worthy governmental responsibilities, but this in itself does not insulate an agency from sanctions. As an additional special circumstance, the Board points out that many of the provisions within the proposed rule were not challenged and were therefore valid. In this case, several subsections were admittedly unchallenged, but the offending provisions which form the crux of the rule were invalidated. Finally, the Board reasons that any moneys paid in fees and costs will diminish the amount of money to be spent on public lands. It is unlikely, however, that any state agency has funds set aside for the payment of attorney's fees and costs under Section 120.595(2), Florida Statutes (1999).
The Issue Whether or not the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, is entitled to relocate its employee, Perry Kirkland, from an assignment in Jacksonville, Florida, to an assignment in West Palm Beach, Florida.
Findings Of Fact Perry Kirkland, the Respondent, is employed as a beverage sergeant with the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. He has been employed with that division for sixteen years. Within that employment period, he has worked for one year in Orlando, two years in Miami, a period of time in Daytona Beach and then was assigned to Jacksonville, Florida, where he has remained as an employee with the exception of a period of time of 28 days beginning on September 19, 1977, when he was working for the same division in West Palm Beach, Florida. His service in the present type of classification began in 1968 when he was made an enforcement supervisor. His category was later changed to beverage sergeant in 1975. He is a permanent status employee. The underlying nature of the dispute between the Petitioner and Respondent concerns the Petitioner's effort to have the Respondent moved from Jacksonville, Florida, to West Palm Beach, Florida, on a permanent basis, as a condition of the Respondent's employment. The propriety or impropriety of such a requirement may be best understood by discussing the background facts which led to his proposed relocation. In the late fall or early winter of 1976, the Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Charles A. Nuzum, in conjunction with his subordinates, determined that it was necessary to transfer certain personnel from the Marianna office to the Panama City office. The purpose of such transfer was to promote more comprehensive enforcement in the Panama City area which was thought to be necessary, and had as its correlative purpose the removal of employees from the Marianna office, where the workload was not as substantial as that in Panama City. In essence, it has been decided that a full-fledged office would he opened in Panama City, in contrast to a sort of impromptu office that was in existence at the time. To make this change in personnel, it was necessary for the Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco to get the approval of the Department of Administration, Division of Budget. Mr. Nuzum and his chief of law enforcement met with representatives of the Department of Administration, Division of Budget, to include Elton Revell, a senior budget analyst. The purpose of this meeting was to present the request for changes in the Marianna and Panama City Offices. Revell advised the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco that the Division of Budget could not go along with the "piecemeal" resolution of the problem of a disparity in the efforts of fulfilling the mission of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. It was Revell's position that it would be necessary to consider the entire state in evaluating such realignment, before any approval could be granted. As an example of his position, Revell specifically mentioned that he thought that Live Oak and Jacksonville were offices that were overstaffed. At the insistence of the Division of Budget, and in keeping with his own analysis of the needs of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Mr. Nuzum undertook the task of analyzing the assignment status of the manpower of the division statewide, in an effort to achieve the mandate of his division's function more uniformly. The director had the benefit of certain weekly and monthly reports filed by the field agents in the categories of the division's overall mission. He also had the benefit of an overview of the conditions in the district offices, having made personal visits to the offices around the state. However, it was determined that a more specific study was necessary to get a true picture of the conditions in the district and sub-district offices for purposes of presenting the proposed realignment of personnel to the Department of Administration, Division of Budget. The principal task of doing the study was assigned to John Berry, an auditor with the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. Berry performed a workload study for a period in 1976, which was designed to determine the time that the agents within the district offices were spending in the primary agency functions, which are licensing and enforcement. The result of this study may he found in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence. Berry in compiling his study, examined the various functions being performed in the Jacksonville District Office and the West Palm Peach District Office, which are Districts III and X respectively. It was determined, per his workload study, that although Jacksonville and West Palm Beach had a comparable number of licenses in their district, the number of manhours being spent in the performance of the licensing and enforcement functions of the division were significantly disproportionate. This is borne out by an examination of the Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, which shows 2,067 licenses in Jacksonville and 2,015 licenses in West Palm Beach, for the various counties in the districts. Although this number is relatively close, manhours in the licensing function in Jacksonville was some 9,907 hours and the licensing manhours in West Palm Beach were 6,683. Likewise, the enforcement manhours in Jacksonville were 10,250, an even greater gap existed for enforcement in West Palm Beach in comparison to Jacksonville, in that the total manhours spent for that function in West Palm Beach was 3,355. These statistics were derived from an examination of the weekly and monthly reports from the personnel within the Jacksonville and Palm Beach offices. The statistics were also borne out by the testimony of the lieutenant in charge of the West Palm Beach office, who indicated that due to a shortage of manpower, the enforcement function in the West Palm Beach area was woefully inadequate. This discussion of the Jacksonville and West Palm Beach district offices leads to further consideration of the efforts made by the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco to have their personnel realigned. After Director Nuzum had received the workload study, he had a further discussion of the authenticity of that study, with members of the staff, to include the district supervisors. His communication with the district supervisors had been by sending them a copy of the workload study to solicit their remarks. This study was forwarded to the district supervisors some time in March, 1977. After this discussion, the study was accepted. On June 7, 1977, the director forwarded the reorganization proposal to Mr. J. Jackson Walter, the Executive Director of the Department of Business Regulation, of which the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco is a part. This reorganization proposal was forwarded in conjunction with a request made by Mr. Walter. Again, the contents of this proposal are found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, which includes the workload study and a specific indication of how many persons would be reassigned to the various offices. It also includes a copy of the then present manning chart and a copy of the proposed manning chart after the changes. At that point in time, the exact persons who would be moved had not been determined. Moreover, the criteria for moving individuals from one location to another was still under discussion. Finally, it was determined that the basis for movement would be on the grounds of seniority, should there be two possible candidates for relocation and a decision become necessary for selecting one of those two persons. Sergeant Kirkland was in that category, because within the Jacksonville district there were two beverage sergeants and the other beverage sergeant was a more senior member of the division. Therefore, Kirkland was chosen to be relocated from Jacksonville to West Palm Beach. The purpose of this relocation was primarily to promote a more consistent enforcement pattern in terms of hours spent in that function statewide and between Jacksonville and West Palm Beach. A related reason was to allow some assistance to the lieutenant in charge of the West Palm Beach office, in terms of supervision of the field beverage officers of basic rank. A letter was forwarded to the district supervisors and district auditors from Mr. Nuzum, indicating that the realignment of personnel assignments would be on the basis of seniority. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2 submitted into evidence is a copy of that notification. After determining that seniority would be the criterion for the relocation of personnel involved, the Division Director submitted his proposals through the Department of Business Regulation for transmittal to the Department of Administration for their approval. The Department of Administration approved the reorganization and J. Revell of the Department of Administration informed Floyd L. Dorn of the Department of Business Regulation's personnel office, that this approval had been granted. This approval came about in August, 1977. After receiving the notification of approval, Director Nuzum then began to advise the personnel who were affected by the reorganization in terms of any relocation. As stated before, Sergeant Kirkland was a person involved in the relocation question. Assistant Chief of Enforcement, Ken Ball, on the basis of the seniority standard, determined that Sergeant Kirkland should be transferred from Jacksonville to West Palm Beach. This was approved by Director Nuzum and this particular change was indicated on the reorganization position chart, which was Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 submitted into evidence. His position number is 00092. The Respondent had filled the 00092 position while working in Jacksonville. His primary function was as supervisor of the enforcement section of the district, with the exception of the period of time in which he was acting in the dual capacity of enforcement supervisor and acting district supervisor. His duties during that latter period are described in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4 admitted into evidence. This duty description was made by Sergeant Kirkland. When the present district supervisor, Captain Oganowski, took over the permanent job of district supervisor in Jacksonville, Sergeant Kirkland went back to filling the duties of enforcement supervisor. This function entailed the supervision of the enforcement division, as opposed to enforcement and licensing or licensing. Sergeant Kirkland continued to hold this position except for a short period of time in 1975 when he changed positions with the licensing supervisor. This is reflected in Respondent's Exhibit No. 5 admitted into evidence. Respondent's Exhibit No. 6 shows the reassignment of Kirkland back to the job 00092, (enforcement supervisor) in Jacksonville. During his tenure with the division, Sergeant Kirkland has maintained a high standard of performance in his various assignments. The current description of duties and responsibilities which the Respondent is expected to assume in the West Palm Beach office may be found as a part of Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4 admitted into evidence. This function includes the supervision of both enforcement and licensing personnel. When it was determined that Sergeant Kirkland would be sent to West Palm Beach, the Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco telephonically communicated the notice of this transfer. It was followed by a letter indicating the transfer, a copy of which is Respondent's Exhibit No. 1 admitted into evidence. The date of the written notification is August 25, 1977. The official report of personnel action setting the effective date of the relocation was dated September 15, 1977, and made the effective date September 19, 1977. A copy of this report of personnel action is Respondent's Exhibit No. 3 admitted into evidence. The type of action indicated on this form is original appointment, with the additional statement entered as "Continued." In fact, the relocation of Sergeant Kirkland is a reassignment within the meaning of Rule 22A-7.08, F.A.C. It is a reassignment because the appointment involved a move from one position in one class to a different position in the same class. The position move, is a move from the 00092 position in Jacksonville, which involves the supervision of enforcement personnel in Jacksonville, to the 00092 position in West Palm Beach, which involves the supervision of both enforcement and licensing personnel. Under the terms of Rule 22A-7.08, F.A.C., Kirkland may not appeal that reassignment. However, since it involves a geographic transfer of more than fifty miles the Respondent is entitled to appeal this decision to the Career Service Commission, in keeping with the authority of Rule 22A-7.09, F.A.C. The Respondent has challenged this relocation by his Career Service Appeal. That appeal has two principal contentions. The first contention concerns the assertion that the transfer does not fall within any of the types of enumerated appointments found in Rule 22A-7, F.A.C. As already shown, this position has been rejected, because the appointment has been determined to be a reassignment appointment. The second contention of the appeal is that any transfer from Jacksonville to West Palm Beach would cause irreparable financial harm and hardship on the Respondent and his wife. In connection with this assertion, Sergeant Kirkland produced evidence that the housing in the West Palm Beach area is more expensive than that in Jacksonville, and that, not withstanding the amount of equity which he might realize from the sale of his Jacksonville property, he still would incur approximately $15,000 additional cost for housing. This housing would not be comparable to his Jacksonville housing, due to the difference in the available amount of property and size of the home itself being smaller in West Palm Beach. The house that he is purchasing in Jacksonville is a four-bedroom, two-bath, two-carport home. The house being contemplated for purchase in West Palm Beach is a three-bedroom, two-bath home. Furthermore, the cost of the mortgage in Jacksonville is $165 and this cost would be exceeded in West Palm Beach even if the equity realized in the sale of Jacksonville home were put toward the down payment. It was also established that the restaurant cost in the West Palm Beach area is greater than that cost in Jacksonville. Sergeant Kirkland's wife testified that she is a hospital operating room nurse who has established a certain amount of seniority in her present employment. She is also only one year away from being able to retire with retirement benefits. If she is required to move, she would lose those benefits and also have to start at the bottom of the seniority list in any new employment in a hospital operating room in West Palm Beach. Finally, the Respondent demonstrated that to move from the Jacksonville community to West Palm Beach would cause him to lose church membership and other community activities in which he is involved. In spite of the degree of hardship which has been demonstrated by the Respondent in his presentation, a review of all the facts and circumstances would justify the Petitioner's action in its reassignment transfer of the Respondent. The action was not a punishment, it was a circumstance where the needs of the Petitioner in this instance, are more compelling than the hardship which will be caused Sergeant Kirkland and his family.
Recommendation It is recommended that the proposed reassignment appointment transfer of the Respondent from Jacksonville to West Palm Beach in the position 00092 he approved and that the appeal by the Respondent challenging this action by the Petitioner be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 30 day of December, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph M. Glickstein, Jr., Esquire 1205 Universal Marion Building Post Office Box 1086 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 Francis Bailey, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32201 Dorothy Roberts Appeals Coordinator Division of Personnel and Retirement 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact On July 24, 1986, Key Sand Associates, Ltd., by and through its agent, Eduardo Avila, made an application for a variance to the height limitation under the Code to allow a 145 foot building for 26 residential units, as described in plans submitted as part of the application. A public hearing was set before the Development Code Adjustment Board (DCAB) for August 28, 1986. There was no evidence that notice was not published in the newspaper as provided by the Code or was not mailed to the owners of the adjacent properties within 200 feet of the subject parcel as shown by the latest ad valorem tax records. On August 28, 1986, a public hearing was held before the DCAB at the time and place set forth in the notice. At the time of the hearing, minutes were kept and a tape recording was made. The tape recording and minutes of the hearing reveal that the DCAB heard the testimony of: a planning official; Eduardo Avila, representing the applicant; Y. H. Lee, architect, representing the applicant; Mr. Carl G. Myers, President of the Sand Key Property Owners Association, an opponent; Sam Dervish, representing the adjacent property owner, Dervish Bros. Gallery Restaurant, an opponent; and, Ed Armstrong, an attorney representing the interests of the developer of the adjacent property of Crescent Beach Club I, an opponent. Two letters in opposition were read into the record. At the conclusion of the public hearing before the DCAB, the DCAB found that the requirements for the variance under Section 137.012 of the Code had been met and granted the variance, as requested, by a vote of 4-1. 1/ On September 10, 1986, the appellant, Walt Buchholz, filed a notice of appeal with the City Clerk under the procedure provided in Section 137.013 of the Code. The notice of appeal alleged that Buchholz is "a resident and owner of unit 16A, 1340 Gulf Blvd., Clearwater, Florida," adjacent to the subject parcel. It further stated that the bases of the appeal were: (1) that the present owners of the adjacent property were not notified although the developer was; (2) that the applicant had misrepresented the facts at the hearing related to a representation about a blank wall on the condominium building in which Buchholz owned property; and (3) the naviety of the DCAB related to a display of model buildings by the applicant at the hearing. A hearing on the appeal was set for January 23, 1987, and appropriate notice given. The appeal hearing was continued from December 29, 1986, to January 23, 1987, on Appellant's motion to enable Buchholz to be present at the hearing on the ground: "Appellant's presence at a hearing in this case is necessary for Appellant's testimony is essential to support his position." The conduct of the appeal hearing was in accordance with Section 137.013(e) of the Code. At the appeal hearing on January 23, 1987, the hearing officer accepted the record on appeal which had been transmitted by the City Clerk to the Department of Administrative Hearings on September 19, 1986, consisting of seven items, as required by Section 137.013(e)(2)a. of the Code. The appellant did not present any witnesses nor introduce any evidence in support of the issues raised in his notice of appeal during the presentation of his case. 2/ However, the appeal hearing reflected a concession by Key Sand that Buchholz owns a condominium unit in the Crescent Beach Club, less than 200 feet from the subject property, and did not receive notice because the City Clerk sent the notice to the owner according to the latest ad valorem tax roll, the developer of the Crescent Beach Club. Appellant's counsel argued that failure to provide notice to owners of adjacent property who became owners of the property after the publication of the last ad valorem tax roll was a procedural impropriety. Appellant's counsel argued that the applicant had not presented sufficient evidence to support any of the required standards for approval of a variance at the August 28, 1986, hearing as required by Section 137.012 of the Code. Key Sand argued that Appellant was not a party in interest as required under the Code, in that, (1) there was no showing that appellant was an adversely affected person with a definite interest exceeding the general interest shared by the rest of the community and (2) being a person who owns property within 200 foot of the subject property does not by itself prove an adverse interest to his property in granting the variance. Appellant did not present even any argument during his case related to the second and third items of appeal set forth in the notice of appeal filed in this matter. Appellant did not prove that the DCAB was deceived by the passing reference to a "blank wall" during the DCAB hearing or that the DCAB naively was deceived by the models displayed at the hearing. To the contrary, the record on appeal reflects that the DCAB was not deceived by the reference to a blank wall" and that the DCAB critically weighed the display models along with all the other evidence.
