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STEPHANIE RICHARDSON vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 12-000540 (2012)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lake Butler, Florida Feb. 10, 2012 Number: 12-000540 Latest Update: Feb. 06, 2013

The Issue The issue is whether the Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice under section 760.10, Florida Statutes, (2010), by discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of sex through the creation of a hostile work environment or through constructive discharge, and if so, what remedy should be ordered.

Findings Of Fact Respondent Department of Corrections (Department) is an agency of the State of Florida responsible for the custody of inmates in state prisons. It operates the Reception and Medical Center in Union County, Florida, to process newly committed inmates into the state prison system and provide primary medical care to inmates. The Department employs over 15 employees. The Department has a policy, Procedure #208.052, which instructs all employees regarding the proper filing and processing of discrimination complaints. The Department has a Sexual Harassment Rule, Procedure or Policy, COER-1, which instructs all employees regarding their responsibility in reporting and filing discrimination complaints. The Department has a policy, Procedure #602.008, which instructs all employees on how to take appropriate action to report inappropriate inmate behavior. Ms. Stephanie Neff,1/ Petitioner in this case, is a woman who first began working for the Department as a Certified Nursing Assistant in March of 2008. On July 15, 2008, she submitted a letter of resignation because she was planning to leave her husband and return to South Florida due to marital problems. However, she and her husband sought marriage counseling and on July 24, 2008, she rescinded her resignation. She stayed on for over a year until she resigned in August of 2009. She was subsequently re-employed on March 19, 2010, as a clerk specialist for the period of employment at issue here, until she again quit her job on or about July 1, 2010. When Ms. Neff began her employment on March 19, 2010, she received an anti-discrimination information sheet, referencing the Department's Sexual Harassment Brochure, COER-1, and advising that complaints could be filed with the Senior Personnel Manager of Employee Relations at the appropriate service center or with the Supervisor of the Employee Relations and Program Section of the Bureau of Personnel, which she signed. When Ms. Neff began her employment on March 19, 2010, she also received and signed an Equal Opportunity and Anti- Harassment Statement advising that complaints could be filed with the Senior Personnel Manager of Employee Relations at the appropriate service center or with the assistant chief of the Employee Relations and Program Section of the Bureau of Personnel in Central Office, and advising her that complaints could also be filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. When Ms. Neff began her employment on March 19, 2010, she received Department policies which detailed her responsibilities regarding sexual harassment in the workplace and signed a receipt for those policies. Through Ms. Neff's receipt of the Sexual Harassment Brochure, COER-1, she became aware of her reporting responsibilities in relation to acts of sexual harassment in the workplace. When Ms. Neff commenced her employment on March 19, 2010, she received Department policies which detailed her responsibilities regarding Non-Security Staff Instructions for Reporting Inappropriate Inmate Behavior and signed a receipt for those policies. As an employee of the Respondent, Ms. Neff had access to the Department's forms, rules, and procedures through the Department's computer system. Ms. Judith Nader was Ms. Neff's supervisor and next in her chain of command. Ms. Nader, retired from the Department at the time of the hearing, worked for the Department for over 18 years. When Ms. Nader commenced her employment with the Department she received Department policies detailing her responsibilities regarding sexual harassment in the workplace and signed a receipt for those policies. No responsibility is placed on supervisors to report harassment, but "management" is given such a responsibility. Ms. Nader received Department policies which detailed her responsibilities regarding Non-Security Staff Instructions for Reporting Inappropriate Inmate Behavior and signed a receipt for those policies. As an employee of the Department, Ms. Nader had access to the Department's forms, rules, and procedures through the Department's computer system. Ms. Shea Dicks was Ms. Nader's supervisor and next in her chain of command. Ms. Dicks received Department policies which detailed her responsibilities regarding Non-Security Staff Instructions for Reporting Inappropriate Inmate Behavior and signed a receipt for those policies. As an employee of the Department, Ms. Dicks had access to the Department's forms, rules, and procedures through the Department's computer system. In addition to these formal notifications of Department policies on sexual harassment, employees had meetings at which the topics of sexual harassment and reporting procedures were discussed. The Department's sexual harassment policies have not been adopted by rule, are slightly inconsistent, and are not well understood or followed by the Department's employees. On March 26, 2010, Sgt. Patrick Pierce, a Corrections Officer employed by the Department, made comments to Ms. Neff which she has identified as inappropriate. On that day, about a week after Ms. Neff had begun her employment, she had gone outside with another person to smoke a cigarette. They did not have a lighter, so they went to "J-Dorm" (the infirmary) to borrow a lighter from one of the nurses. None of the nurses had one. As they were leaving, Sgt. Pierce asked them what they were looking for, and they replied that they were looking for a lighter. He did not have one, but got one for them from back in the inmate area. After using the lighter, they returned it and Ms. Neff went back to her office located in the portion of the hospital known as "Two West." Only a couple of minutes after Ms. Neff returned to her desk, the phone rang. She answered the phone, "Two West, Neff." The male voice on the telephone said, "Just who I was looking for." She said, "Who is this? How can I help you?" He replied, "You know who this is." She said, "No I don't. I'm really busy, how can I help you?" He said, "You need to bring that view back out here more often. You livened up the scenery." She said, "What are you talking about?" He said, "You need to bring that view back out here more often and if you'll back that ass up, I'll touch it. But you have to back it up because that's the only way I can touch it without getting in trouble." Ms. Neff replied, "The only person I back my ass up to is my husband. Have a nice day." She then hung up the phone. The comment to Ms. Neff on the telephone was sexual in nature and was inappropriate and unwelcome. Ms. Neff then called the J-Dorm nurses station to see if she could identify the caller. The nurse on duty told Ms. Neff that Sgt. Pierce was the only male on duty at the time. Ms. Neff testified at hearing that she immediately reported this incident to Ms. Nader and asked what she should do about it. She testified that Ms. Nader told her that that depended on how badly she wanted her job, telling her, "If you don't rile security they won't mess with you." Sgt. Pierce made one additional comment to Ms. Neff which she identified as inappropriate. Ms. Neff was sent back to J-Dorm to make some photocopies a couple of weeks later. Sgt. Pierce came in and went to the back desk to make a phone call. After the phone call, he closed the door, propped himself against the front desk and said, "So are you going to back that ass up to me now? I can smack it now. No one can see us, we are all alone." Ms. Neff now felt sure that Sgt. Pierce had made the earlier comments, because they were so similar. Ms. Neff testified that she said, "I forgot something" or offered some other excuse to leave the room, and went to the nurses' station. A nurse that was not busy accompanied Ms. Neff back to the room while she finished the copying. When they returned to the room, Sgt. Pierce left without saying anything. Sgt. Pierce's comments to Ms. Neff in the J-Dorm were sexual in nature and were inappropriate and unwelcome. Ms. Neff told Ms. Nader about the incident and asked Ms. Nader what she should do. Ms. Nader again advised Ms. Neff that if she wanted to keep her job, she should keep her mouth shut. She said, "Don't jack with security and they won't jack with you." Ms. Nader said she just would not send Ms. Neff back to J-Dorm anymore. Ms. Neff was the only source of income for her family; she needed her paycheck and decided not to report the incident. Ms. Nader did not report the incident to her superiors either. Ms. Nader's testimony at hearing was somewhat confused. She believed there was only one incident involving Ms. Neff and Sgt. Pierce, rather than two. She testified that at the time Ms. Neff told her about Sgt. Pierce's comment, she did not think that it constituted sexual harassment. She said that Ms. Neff did not seem that upset and that it appeared that Ms. Neff had appropriately handled the situation. Ms. Nader testified that she told Ms. Neff not to say anything because she was trying to protect Ms. Neff. She admitted advising Ms. Neff not to make an accusation against a Security Officer under the circumstances and further testified: Q: Is there an understanding at the DOC that you're not supposed to mess with security? A: There is in my book. There is – the way I look at it, if you don't mess with security . . . now, that's my understanding. Whether or not everybody else understands that, I don't know. But that is the way that I look at it. I can't tell you what other people think or don't think, but I would never mess with them. But, you know, I can't speak for the whole place. Ms. Nader went on to testify that had Ms. Neff stated that she had been sexually harassed, that then, whether Ms. Nader thought it was sexual harassment or not, "we would have sat down and pulled out the policies and procedures" and figured out what to do next. Ms. Neff was never physically touched by Sgt. Pierce and never witnessed him physically touch anyone else. Ms. Neff's total interaction with Sgt. Pierce involved two incidents: one on the telephone and one while she was making copies in J-Dorm. Petitioner was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment. Petitioner was the object of harassment because of her gender. A couple of weeks later Ms. Tammy Jo Laney, a temporary Health Support Aide at the Reception and Medical Center, called Ms. Neff from the parking lot. Ms. Laney told Ms. Neff that she did not want to go to work because she was scheduled to work in J-Dorm and the security officer that worked there was making comments to her that made her feel very uncomfortable. Ms. Neff advised Ms. Laney to go to work and say nothing. Ms. Neff told her it would not do any good to say anything, because they would just tell her that if she wanted to keep her job, she should keep her mouth shut. Ms. Laney did not follow Ms. Neff's advice. On April 23, 2010, Ms. Laney made a complaint of sexual harassment against Sgt. Pierce. The complaint was made to Ms. Dicks. Ms. Laney explained to Ms. Dicks that she wanted to talk about sexual harassment and then began to cry. Ms. Dicks immediately left the office and returned with a Health Services Administrator and Lieutenant Driggers to continue the meeting. Ms. Laney advised Ms. Dicks that Sgt. Pierce had told her she had pretty eyes and that that had made her uncomfortable. Ms. Laney told Ms. Dicks that a couple of days earlier when she had told Sgt. Pierce that she was going to the doctor, Sgt. Pierce had replied, "You are too sexy to be going to the doctor." Ms. Laney named numerous other women who had told Ms. Laney that Sgt. Pierce had made inappropriate sexual remarks or innuendos to them. Ms. Dicks called Ms. Emmelhainz, the Senior Personnel Manager, and put her on the phone with Ms. Laney, and then left the room so that Ms. Laney could have some privacy when talking with Ms. Emmelhainz. Ms. Laney then went to the Personnel Office to file a complaint with Ms. Emmelhainz. When Ms. Emmelhainz receives a sexual harassment complaint, she sends it to the Central Office Employee Relations Section, which turns it over to the Inspector General's Office for an investigation. The report then goes to the Warden. If discipline is warranted, the Warden then coordinates with Ms. Emmelhainz in the Personnel Office and with the legal office. Between April 23 and April 26, 2010, the Department moved Sgt. Pierce from the RMC Main Unit to the RMC West Unit. Following Sgt. Pierce's move from the Main Unit to the West Unit, Ms. Neff did not have to work with or see him again while working for the Department. After Sgt. Pierce had been moved to the West Unit, Ms. Nader again assigned Ms. Neff some clerking duties at J-Dorm in the evenings. On Monday, April 27, 2010, Ms. Neff was sent to J-Dorm to work. While she was there, Nurse Kristina Imler, LPN, told her about a conversation that Nurse Imler had had with a paraplegic inmate, Ernest Horton. As relayed by Nurse Imler, inmate Horton had asked Nurse Imler who Ms. Neff was. When Nurse Imler said, "That's Neff," inmate Horton replied, "Oh, my boy Pierce told me that she was the one who had turned him in." Nurse Imler further relayed to Ms. Neff that everyone was talking about her. There was some discrepancy between Ms. Neff's hand- written incident report of April 30, 2010, the audio recording she made on June 14, 2010, and her later testimony at hearing on June 1, 2012, as to exactly what she was told by Nurse Imler. Her two accounts from 2010 are more consistent with Nurse Imler's hearing testimony and with Nurse Imler's 2010 written statement. Ms. Neff's earlier accounts have been credited over Ms. Neff's testimony at hearing. Ms. Neff was concerned that inmate Horton believed she was the person who had reported Sgt. Pierce's conduct. She considered inmate Horton's remark as threatening, and advised Ms. Nader what she had been told. Ms. Neff testified that Ms. Nader told her that she would report it to Ms. Dicks. Ms. Nader did not recall talking with Ms. Neff about inmate Horton, but did remember telling someone that Ms. Neff did not have anything to do with turning in Sgt. Pierce, that it was somebody else, and that Horton "had his story wrong." Ms. Neff has never spoken directly to inmate Horton nor heard him make any reference to Sgt. Pierce. When Ms. Neff heard the statements allegedly made about her by inmate Horton she did not complete a Disciplinary Report. Meanwhile, after her meeting with Ms. Laney, Ms. Dicks had begun to contact the women that Ms. Laney had named who were also Ms. Dick's subordinates to ask them if they had also been subjected to inappropriate sexual comments from Sgt. Pierce. She contacted Ms. Neff and asked to talk with her. On April 28, 2010, Ms. Neff met with Ms. Dicks in her office and Ms. Neff told her about the telephone incident, the copier incident, and the more recent remark attributed to inmate Horton. Ms. Dicks told Ms. Neff that the advice Ms. Nader had earlier given her to stay silent to keep her job was not acceptable. Ms. Dicks told Ms. Neff to complete an Incident Report but to return it to Ms. Dicks rather than send it up the security chain. Ms. Dicks also advised Ms. Neff to call Ms. Emmelhainz because in addition to the comment from inmate Horton there was possible sexual harassment. Ms. Dicks did not advise Ms. Neff to fill out an actual Complaint for sexual harassment. When Ms. Nader next came on shift, Ms. Dicks talked to her about Ms. Nader's response when Ms. Neff had reported Sgt. Pierce's comments. Ms. Nader admitted telling Ms. Neff to just forget it and do her job. Ms. Dicks told Ms. Nader that Ms. Nader could not do that and told her that even if Ms. Neff did not want to come forward, that Ms. Nader, as her supervisor, had a duty to report such incidents. It was Ms. Dick's understanding that before inmate Horton became a paraplegic, he had been very violent. Ms. Dicks went to Nurse Imler and asked her to file an incident report regarding her conversation with inmate Horton. Ms. Dicks also talked with Major Willie Smith about the incident involving inmate Horton, and Major Smith told her that he would handle it. On or about April 29, 2010, Ms. Imler completed an incident report concerning statements made by inmate Horton. On or about April 29, 2010, an investigation was initiated into allegations that Sgt. Pierce sexually harassed the Department's employees, identified as Case No. 10-2-5291. Prior to April 29, 2010, and the initiation of the investigation into allegations that Sgt. Pierce sexually harassed the Department's employees, Ms. Neff did not do any of the following in accordance with Department Procedure 208.052: File a complaint of discrimination by contacting the Assistant Chief of Employee Relations and Programs Section in the Bureau of Personnel; File a complaint of discrimination by contacting the Florida Commission on Human Relations; File a complaint of discrimination by contacting the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; File a complaint of discrimination through the Department's internal formal procedure; File a complaint of discrimination through the Department's internal informal procedure. On April 30, 2010, Ms. Neff filed an Incident Report alleging Sgt. Pierce sexually harassed her. Ms. Neff completed her Incident Report and brought it directly to Ms. Dicks, as she had been instructed. Ms. Dicks immediately delivered the Incident Report directly to the Warden's office. Warden Riedl did not sign off on the Incident Report at the bottom as he customarily does. Warden Riedl testified that he believed the Incident Report had been dropped off at his office, but that due to its confidential nature it had then been immediately faxed to Personnel and the Inspector General's office. Warden Riedl identified a FAX number printed on the top of the incident report as the FAX number from his office. Under Department Policies, as testified to by Warden Riedl, sexual harassment should not be reported using an incident report filed through chain of command channels, but rather should be filed as a discrimination Complaint with an "intake officer" through Personnel, and sent from there to the Inspector General to conduct an investigation. Ms. Neff testified that subsequently she overheard Corrections Officers talking about her. They would say things such as, "Oh, that's Neff. You have to watch out for her." She testified that officers would not go into stairwells with her or get into the elevator with her. She testified that she was being treated as if she were the one who had done something wrong. She testified that these comments upset her. She noted that she depended on Corrections Officers for security and that she was worried that they might not protect her if she needed their help. Petitioner stated that she did not want to go to work, that a job that she had once enjoyed became a job she hated. It became "just a way to earn a paycheck." On May 6, 2010, Ms. Dicks sent a memo requesting discipline of Ms. Laney for having 17 unscheduled callouts, 3 tardies, and for leaving early on 3 occasions from February through April. Ms. Dicks testified that she submitted documentation on each of the unscheduled call-outs along with her request for discipline. This information was supplied by Ms. Nader and others on the shift. Ms. Emmelhainz received the recommendation for discipline against Ms. Laney. Ms. Emmelhainz testified that the attached documentation had been made by various individuals at the time of the unscheduled call out or early departure, but had been forwarded to Ms. Dicks at later dates. All were signed by Ms. Dicks on dates after the complaint of sexual harassment had been filed. Ms. Emmelhainz testified that it was not unusual for a supervisor to accumulate notes and memos and send them up only when they were seeking discipline. Ms. Emmelhainz testified that 17 incidents over a 90 day period was "a lot." At the time she received the request for discipline on Ms. Laney, she remembered that Ms. Laney had filed a sexual harassment claim earlier. Ms. Emmelhainz remembered discussing with corrections officials whether or not Ms. Laney should be disciplined in light of the recent complaint: And I said if we would normally discipline the person, we should not let the sexual harassment complaint interfere with it. We're not going to treat anybody any different, but if we would – anybody else, if we would treat them and do discipline, then we need to do discipline on her. The sexual harassment complaints should not interfere with that. Ms. Emmelhainz testified that termination was appropriate for a temporary OPS employee with attendance problems such as those reflected in the documentation on Ms. Laney. On May 27, 2010, Ms. Laney received a Letter of Termination of her employment from the Florida Department of Corrections signed by Warden Riedl. In the Inspector General's Report of the investigation, it is recorded that Ms. Neff stated she "knows why Nurse Laney got fired but it was convenient that it happened like it did." Ms. Laney testified that she did not have 17 unexcused absences. She stated there were two occasions when she called in to say she was sick and could not come to work. Ms. Laney testified that she believed she was fired because she filed a Complaint about sexual harassment. On or about June 8, 2010, Inspector Marrell Sercy of the Inspector General's Office initiated his investigation into Ms. Laney's complaint of sexual harassment. He interviewed Ms. Laney on June 9, Ms. Dicks on June 10, Nurse Johns and Nurse Holmes on June 11, Ms. Neff and Nurse Imler on June 14th, Ms. McKee and Officer Prevatt on June 15, Sgt. Pierce on June 18, Warden Riedl on June 29, Officer Owens on July 19, and Nurse O'Neal and Sgt. Pierce again on July 21, 2010. Meanwhile, on July 6, 2010, Ms. Nader left a message for Ms. Neff on her cell phone because on July 1, 2010, Ms. Neff had left work early on a family emergency and had not been back since. Ms. Neff called back about 5:00 pm to say that due to her family situation and for her personal safety it was necessary for her to leave the state and that she would not be coming back to work. Ms. Neff said that she was sorry it had to be that way but that it was necessary. Ms. Nader then transferred the call to Ms. Dicks. Ms. Nader documented this phone conversation on a form DC2-610. Ms. Neff told Ms. Dicks that she had talked with a staff person on July 2, 2010, and told them she would not be in to work that day. She went on to say that due to a personal matter she was going to move out of state and that she was resigning from her job. Ms. Dicks documented this phone conversation on a form DC2-610. The investigation into Ms. Laney's complaint of sexual harassment was completed on or about July 22, 2010. As was usual in complaints of employment discrimination, no recommendation was made, but records of the interviews and information were compiled. Based upon information contained in the Inspector General's Office investigation into Ms. Laney's allegations of sexual harassment, Inspector Stacy Fish of the Inspector General's Office opened an investigation into whether or not Ms. Nader failed to report allegations of sexual harassment that had been made to her. Inspector Fish listened to the interview of Ms. Neff, but was unable to interview her again because she had resigned and no one had any information on how to contact her. On October 22, 2010, Inspector Fish interviewed Ms. Nader, who stated that she did not remember Ms. Neff ever reporting to Ms. Nader that she had been sexually harassed by Sgt. Pierce. Almost four months after Ms. Neff quit her job, and while Sgt. Pierce was still working in the West Unit, there was another incident involving Sgt. Pierce. On October 29, 2010, Sgt. Gillian Scott, a female Corrections Officer, filed a Department of Corrections Discrimination Complaint, form DC2-881, accusing Sgt. Pierce of sexual harassment. Sgt. Scott alleged that Sgt. Pierce had exposed himself to her and crudely asked her to perform sexual acts. On October 29, 2010, through letter signed by Warden Riedl, Sgt. Pierce was placed on administrative leave "pending investigation of charges which could result in your dismissal." Another Inspector General investigation, Case No. 10- 2-10464, was commenced against Sgt. Pierce based upon Sgt. Scott's allegations. Sgt. Pierce was issued a Permanent Status Career Service Extraordinary Dismissal Letter dated February 2, 2011. The Extraordinary Dismissal Letter to Sgt. Pierce stated that the investigation into complaint #10-2-5291 filed by Ms. Laney had determined that Sgt. Pierce made unwanted sexual comments and sexual innuendos to Tammy Laney, Stephanie Neff, Charity Johns, Elizabeth Holmes, Kristina Imler, and Barbara McKee. It further stated that investigation into complaint #10- 2-10464, filed by Sgt. Scott, had determined that Sgt. Pierce had exposed himself and crudely solicited Gillian Scott to masturbate him and engage in oral sex with him. The Extraordinary Dismissal Letter was signed by Warden Riedl. Ms. Neff filed a complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations on June 16, 2011. The complaint was in letter form, signed by the complainant and verified, and was sufficiently precise to identify the parties and to describe generally the action or practice complained of. The FCHR Charge Form was signed by Ms. Neff on July 26, 2011. The Commission issued a Determination of No Cause on January 13, 2012, and Ms. Neff filed her Petition for Relief alleging an unlawful employment practice on February 8, 2012. On February 10, 2012, the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for assignment of an administrative law judge. The hearing was held on June 1, 2012. In her testimony at hearing, Ms. Neff attempted to connect her references to "family situation" and "personal matter" that she gave as the reasons for her resignation in July 2010, to her subsequent complaint of sexual harassment. She stated, I no longer trusted the people I was supposed to trust to protect me. It was causing problems at home. The hang-up phone calls. The stress. The yelling at my kids because they were five minutes late walking from the bus stop. My husband told me it was either quit my job with the Department or our marriage was going to end. I quit my job with the Department. However, Ms. Neff's explanation at hearing that she had actually been referring to the sexual harassment at work when she explained why she was leaving was not credible, and Ms. Neff did not demonstrate that she resigned because work conditions were intolerable. The comments of Correctional Officers made in Ms. Neff's presence that "we need to watch out for her" or words to that effect were hurtful, but were not directly threatening. Under all of the circumstances, an objective person would not conclude that the Corrections Officers making them would not protect her if an inmate attempted to hurt her in some way. There was no evidence that any Corrections Officer other than Sgt. Pierce ever sexually harassed Ms. Neff or any other person at the reception and Medical Center. It is not reasonable to assume they were all guilty of such conduct and were therefore afraid of Ms. Neff also turning them in. An objective person would instead conclude that being unaware of the true facts about Sgt. Pierce's behavior, security personnel were concerned that they not be wrongly accused by Ms. Neff. Ms. Neff's belief that these security personnel were unhappy that Ms. Neff (as they erroneously thought) had turned in Sgt. Pierce for sexual harassment was reasonable under the circumstances; her further conclusion that they would therefore want her to be hurt and so would not do their duty to protect her against physical injury from an inmate was not warranted. At hearing Ms. Neff testified that she did not leave work early before the end of her shift on July 1, 2010. She testified that she did not leave for a family emergency. Ms. Neff testified that she left the State and went to Alabama with her daughter but without her husband. She stated, "He stayed in Florida and took care of our stepson and his pregnant girlfriend. She could not leave the state due to prenatal care. I had just met my biological father a year and a half before. My daughter and I went to vacation with him for the summer so I could get to know him." Petitioner is a member of a protected class. Sgt. Pierce's statements, the remark by inmate Horton, and the comments by Corrections Officers were constituent parts of one broader working environment. The sexual harassment Of Ms. Neff was not so severe or pervasive that it altered the interpersonal climate of the workplace or created an objectively abusive and hostile atmosphere. The facts do not support the conclusion that the Department of Corrections discriminated against Ms. Neff on the basis of sex.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's complaints. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 2012

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.57120.68509.092760.01760.10760.1190.404
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DOUGLAS FOREMAN, JR. vs DAYTONA IHOP, INC., 09-004807 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Daytona Beach, Florida Sep. 04, 2009 Number: 09-004807 Latest Update: Mar. 18, 2010

The Issue The issues are whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on his race, and if so, what relief should be granted.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is a Florida corporation with its principal business location in Ormond Beach, Florida. Respondent operates a restaurant in Daytona Beach, Florida, known as IHOP 35. At all times material here, IHOP 35 had a racially-diverse workforce. Scott Studner is Respondent's President. Mr. Studner has direct supervisory authority over Respondent's management employees and ultimate supervisory authority over the non- management employees at IHOP 35. Mr. Studner is responsible for making all decisions relating to promotions and terminations of employees. Petitioner is a single African-American male with a minor son. Respondent hired him as a line cook in January 2007. At that time, Petitioner did not have any management experience. Petitioner worked as a cook on the day shift for approximately 15 months before Respondent terminated his employment. Petitioner began working 40-hour weeks for $9.00 per hour. He received at least five raises over a 12-month period, increasing his hourly wage to $10.00. Petitioner and all of the staff had to work some overtime during busy periods like "Race Week." Shortly after Petitioner began working, Mr. Studner asked Petitioner if he had any interest in a future management position. Mr. Studner routinely asks this question of all newly hired cooks. Mr. Studner told Petitioner about Chester Taylor, an African-American male, who began working for Mr. Studner as a dish washer and now owns and operates two IHOP restaurants of his own. Mr. Studner never made any representation or promise regarding Petitioner's potential advancement into a management position at IHOP 35. Shortly after he was hired, Petitioner began to demonstrate poor performance traits. He frequently arrived late to work. Occasionally Petitioner called to say that he could not work due to personal reasons. While working for Respondent, Petitioner reported several specific instances of racial hostility in the workplace to the general manager, Kathy, who tried to correct each problem as it arose. On one occasion, Petitioner discussed one incident with Mr. Studner, months after it occurred. In February 2007, Petitioner reported to Kathy that a white server named Sharon Blyler had made an inappropriate comment. Specifically, Petitioner accused Ms. Blyler of stating that she would get her orders out faster if she was black like a server named Angela. Kathy wrote Ms. Blyler up on a disciplinary form, advising her that comments about someone's race or color would not be tolerated. Mr. Studner was never informed about this incident. In April 2007, a white co-worker named Kevin called Petitioner a "monkey" several times. The name calling initially arose as a result of someone in the kitchen requesting a "monkey dish," which is a term commonly used in restaurants to describe a small round bowl for side items such as fruit. Petitioner reported Kevin's inappropriate comments to Kathy, who wrote Kevin up on a disciplinary form and suspended him for a week. Apparently, Kevin continued to work in one of Mr. Studner's restaurants but did not return to work at IHOP 35. Three or four months after Kevin was suspended, Mr. Studner asked Petitioner if Kevin could return to work at IHOP 35. When Petitioner objected, Mr. Studner said he would put Kevin on the night shift. During the conversation, Mr. Studner told Petitioner that he should have punched Kevin in the face for calling him a monkey. In the summer of 2007, there was an ordering mix-up involving a Caucasian server named Tiffany. When Tiffany became upset, Petitioner told her to calm down. Tiffany then called Petitioner a "fucking nigger." Kathy immediately had a talk with Tiffany, who then quit her job. Mr. Studner was never informed that Tiffany used a racial slur in reference to Petitioner. In August 2007, Petitioner received a formal verbal warning that was memorialized on a disciplinary form. The warning related to Petitioner's tardiness for work and for not maintaining his work area. When Kathy left her job as general manager of IHOP 35 in October 2007, there was no one person in charge of the kitchen. Petitioner and the other cooks continued to do their previously assigned jobs. On one occasion, Petitioner and another African- American male cook got into an argument. Someone at the restaurant called the police to intervene. Petitioner denies that he picked up a knife during the confrontation. At some point, Mr. Studner began working in the kitchen with Petitioner. Mr. Studner worked there for approximately five straight weeks. While Mr. Studner was working in the kitchen, he never saw any signs of racial hostility. However, Mr. Studner was aware that Petitioner could not get along with the rest of the staff. Mr. Studner realized that the staff resented Petitioner's habit of talking on his cell phone and leaving the line to take breaks during peak times. Respondent had an established and disseminated work policy that employees are not allowed to take or make cell phone or other telephone calls during work hours except in emergencies. Compliance with the policy is necessary because telephone calls to or from employees during paid working time disrupt the kitchen operation. Petitioner does not dispute that he made and received frequent calls on company time for personal reasons. Sometimes Mr. Studner would enter the restaurant and see Petitioner talking on the phone. Mr. Studner would reprimand Petitioner, reminding him that phone calls on company time were restricted to emergency calls only. Mr. Studner had video surveillance of the kitchen at IHOP 35 in his corporate office in Ormond Beach, Florida. Mr. Studner and his bookkeeper, Steven Skipper, observed Petitioner talking on his cell phone when Mr. Studner was not in the restaurant. Eventually, Mr. Studner decided to transfer Petitioner to another one of his restaurants to alleviate the tension caused by Petitioner at IHOP 35. After one day at the other restaurant, Mr. Studner reassigned Petitioner to IHOP 35 because he realized that Petitioner was unable to get along with the staff at the new location. Respondent never gave Petitioner any managerial responsibilities. Petitioner did not approach Mr. Studner or otherwise apply for the position of Kitchen Manager or any position other than cook. Respondent never denied Petitioner a promotion. In December or January 2007, Respondent hired Larry Delucia as the Kitchen Manger at IHOP 35. Mr. Delucia had not previously worked with Respondent, but he had extensive management experience at three different restaurants. When Mr. Delucia began working at IHOP 35, Petitioner and the other cooks were asked to help familiarize him with the menu and the set-up of the kitchen and coolers. They were not asked to train Mr. Delucia, whose job included scheduling and working on the computer, as well as supervising the kitchen. In February 2008, Petitioner told a white busboy named John to bring him some plates. John then told Petitioner that he was not John's boss and called Petitioner a "fucking nigger." The front-end manager, Pam Maxwell, immediately suspended John for a week but allowed him to return to work after two days. Mr. Studner was not aware of the incident involving John. Petitioner then asked Mr. Delucia and Ms. Maxwell for the telephone number of Bob Burns, the district manager for the International House of Pancakes, Inc. Mr. Studner was not aware of Petitioner's request for Mr. Burns' telephone number. Days later, Mr. Studner instructed Mr. Delucia to terminate Petitioner's employment. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Mr. Studner decided to terminate Petitioner solely because of his continued cell phone usage on company time as observed in person and on surveillance tapes. At first, Petitioner did not realize he had been permanently terminated. During the hearing, Petitioner testified that he tried to return to work by talking to Mr. Delucia, who told him to call Mr. Studner. Mr. Studner did not return Petitioner's calls. For years, Mr. Studner has employed African-Americans to work as servers, cooks, hostesses, kitchen managers, front- end managers, and general managers. Mr. Studner owns five other restaurants, including two other IHOPs. Over the last two years, Mr. Studner has hired three African-American general managers.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Complaint and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of December, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this <day> day of <month>, <year>. COPIES FURNISHED: Sebrina L. Wiggins, Esquire Landis, Graham French 145 East Rich Avenue, Suite C Deland, Florida 32721 Paul J. Scheck, Esquire Shutts & Bowen, LLP 300 South Orange Avenue, Suite 1000 Post Office Box 4956 Orlando, Florida 32802 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (4) 120.569760.01760.10760.11
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JOANNE E. WINSTON vs CITY OF EDGEWATER, 13-003604 (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Daytona Beach, Florida Sep. 17, 2013 Number: 13-003604 Latest Update: Apr. 15, 2015

The Issue The issues are whether Respondent, City of Edgewater (the City), committed unlawful employment practices contrary to section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2013),1/ by discriminating against Petitioner based on her age, gender, and/or disability by the manner in which the City terminated Petitioner’s employment. Also at issue is whether Petitioner’s termination was in retaliation for Petitioner’s complaints regarding discriminatory conduct by her immediate superior.

Findings Of Fact The City is an employer as that term is defined in section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner is a white female who was over the age of 40 during the events relevant to this proceeding. Petitioner was hired by the City as a part-time animal control officer on June 9, 1993. At the time Petitioner was hired, animal control was part of the City’s police department. On October 15, 1993, Petitioner was transferred to a full-time position as records clerk/telecommunicator in the police department. Petitioner maintained the department’s records and answered all police calls, including 911 calls. She dispatched officers and emergency personnel. Petitioner testified that this was a desk job with no real physical requirements beyond walking to a window to deal with members of the public. She received excellent evaluations and stayed in this position until early 1999. While working this job, Petitioner obtained police training at Daytona State College. Upon graduation, Petitioner applied for a job as a police officer with the City. On February 19, 1999, the City hired Petitioner as a police officer. Petitioner was promoted to sergeant on May 7, 2006, and served in that position until her demotion following an altercation with a female detainee in the City’s holding facility on June 16, 2011. Petitioner was continuously employed by the City for 18 years and eight months. During her employment, she received regular pay increases and numerous commendations. Over the years, she received three written warnings and one demotion, from sergeant to officer after the incident on June 16, 2011. Chief of Police David Arcieri characterized her disciplinary record as good in light of Petitioner’s length of service. During the course of her employment, Petitioner had multiple health problems. In 2001, during work-related mountain bike training, Petitioner suffered a fall that badly injured her shoulder.3/ Petitioner had surgery and recalled that she missed at least four months of work. When she came back to work, Petitioner was unable to perform the normal duties of a police officer. She was allowed to return in a light-duty desk position, working with the City’s chief of grants. She worked in this position for approximately six months before returning to regular duty as a police officer. In 2004, Petitioner was diagnosed with lupus and rheumatoid arthritis (“RA”). Petitioner testified that she freely discussed her condition with her co-workers because of the problems she had establishing a medication regime that did not cause allergic reactions. Until late 2011, she was forced to give herself painful injections in the stomach. She now has a port implanted that allows her to take the medications via infusion. Chief Arcieri confirmed that it was common knowledge in the City’s police force that Petitioner had lupus. Petitioner testified that she missed very little work because of the lupus and RA. She requested no accommodations in the workplace for these conditions. Sometime in 2009, Petitioner underwent neck surgery to repair a disc “that was almost gone.” Petitioner recalled discussing her condition with then-Sergeant Arcieri4/ prior to the surgery. They talked about the fact that her doctors were unsure whether the neck condition had been brought on by her RA. Petitioner testified that she was out of work for two or three months due to this surgery, but did not require a light-duty assignment when she reported back to her position. On September 22, 2009, Petitioner was at work conducting a witness interview when her nose began bleeding uncontrollably. A fellow officer drove her to the emergency room. Another city employee came to the emergency room to make sure Petitioner got home safely. At the hospital, Petitioner was diagnosed with hypertension. She missed several days of work and was placed on medications to control her blood pressure. City Manager Tracey Barlow testified that he was contemporaneously aware of Petitioner’s hypertension. Petitioner requested no workplace accommodations for her hypertension. In early 2010, Petitioner was out of work for a time with uncontrolled vomiting and diarrhea. Petitioner’s physician, Dr. Beatrice Bratu, diagnosed her condition as stress-induced colitis. Petitioner testified that her treatments for the colitis lasted about three months but that she was back at work within a few weeks. On March 15, 2010, Personnel Director Donna Looney addressed the following email to Petitioner: We are very pleased to see you back and doing well! I am in receipt of a note from Dr. Bratu which indicated you may return to work. I want to stress that we understand the necessity for you to follow your doctor’s instructions. No restrictions are noted; therefore you are allowed to continue your regular duties. Please be advised that you have a continuing obligation not to work when you are feeling impaired (fatigue, weakness, pain, etc.). It is City policy that if you expect to have any adverse side effect while taking medication, you must inform your supervisor, and you are never to drive a City vehicle when you are feeling impaired. If I can be of any further assistance, please feel free to contact me. Petitioner requested no workplace accommodation related to her colitis. On June 16, 2011, Petitioner was involved in an altercation with a 28-year-old female detainee at the City police station. Several officers submitted witness statements about the incident and police station video cameras captured the essentials of the acts that occurred. The video recording did not include sound. The detainee, J.G., had been arrested for battery and was by all accounts heavily intoxicated and belligerent. J.G. asked to go to the bathroom. Petitioner let her out of the cell and escorted her to the bathroom. The video shows Petitioner standing in the open doorway of the bathroom, waiting for J.G. to finish. Petitioner told the police department’s internal affairs investigator that J.G. asked for tampons. Petitioner responded that the police department did not keep such items and that she would have to clean up as best she could with the materials available in the bathroom. J.G. replied that she could not put back on the shorts she had been wearing. She stated they were not her shorts and they were bloody. Petitioner told her that she had to put the shorts back on. At this point, the video shows the shorts flying out of the bathroom and landing behind Petitioner, who kicked them back into the bathroom and stepped into the doorway. J.G., stepping into camera range, picked up the shorts and threw them at Petitioner. The shorts hit Petitioner along her beltline. Petitioner took a step forward and struck J.G. in the face with her open right hand. J.G. pushed forward momentarily, but retreated into the bathroom as Petitioner continued to advance. At this point, Officer Eric Selvaggio entered the picture to assist. For a period of roughly forty seconds, all three people were inside the bathroom, invisible to the camera. The doors then opened, and the three emerged. The two police officers guided the handcuffed J.G. toward a point outside the range of the camera. J.G. wore only a shirt and underwear. The video next cut to an empty holding cell. Petitioner and Officer Selvaggio entered the picture, guiding the handcuffed J.G. toward the cell. J.G. continued to struggle with the officers. She dropped to the ground. The officers pulled her to her feet and pushed her into the cell. J.G. kicked at Petitioner. The camera angle made it impossible to see whether there was contact, but Petitioner stated at the time, and has consistently maintained since the incident, that J.G. kicked her in the stomach. Immediately after the kick, Petitioner attempted to push her way past Officer Selvaggio toward J.G. Petitioner drew back her right fist but Officer Selvaggio’s left arm blocked her from throwing a punch. He pushed Petitioner away and then secured J.G. in the holding cell. Though there is no sound on the video, it is clear that Petitioner and J.G. continued an animated conversation after J.G. was locked in the cell. Multiple police witnesses recalled Petitioner calling J.G. a “fucking bitch.” Petitioner and the other officers on duty went out the back door to discuss the situation. The video appears to show Petitioner performing a joking reenactment of her attempted punch at J.G. Officer Selvaggio stated to the investigator that Petitioner told him she might not charge J.G. for the incident, but he replied that under the circumstances it would be best if she did follow through with charges. Petitioner filled out a charging affidavit against J.G., charging her with battery on a law enforcement officer, in violation of section 784.07(2)(b), Florida Statutes. In her charging affidavit, Petitioner wrote as follows, in relevant part, verbatim: On June 16, 2011 at approximately 12:45 a.m., the defendant, [J.G.] was in police custody at the Edgewater Police Department on a battery charge from a previous police call. The defendant requested to use the bathroom and was escorted to the bathroom by me. The defendant was upset over being arrested, while sitting on the toilet, she kicked off her shorts and threw them out of the restroom stating that she was not putting them back on as they were not hers and were soiled from her menstrual cycle. I pushed the shorts back into the restroom with my foot and advised her she needed to put them back on, she screamed she was not going to. When the defendant rose from the toilet, she picked up the shorts and threw them directly into my face, striking me with the shorts. The defendant then pushed herself up against the sink and began calling me a bitch and telling me again she was not putting the shorts back on and she was leaving. I entered and attempted to get her out of the bathroom, she began to punch at me. Myself and Officer Selvaggio, who was standing nearby, grabbed hold of the defendant in an effort to get her out of the bathroom. The defendant struggled against us, before we got her to the floor and secured her. As we were getting her back into the cell, the defendant threw herself onto the bench and kicked out striking me in the stomach with her right foot. The defendant was left in the cell with no shorts on and in handcuffs . . . . It should be noted that Petitioner’s charging affidavit states that J.G. hit her in the face with the bloody shorts, when in fact the shorts hit Petitioner in the waist area. Petitioner failed to mention that she slapped J.G. in the bathroom or that Petitioner attempted to punch J.G. in the holding cell. Chief Arcieri testified that when he came in later that morning, he reviewed all of the reports filed since the previous day. Petitioner’s report caught his eye because it involved battery on a law enforcement officer inside the station house. He instructed his assistant to pull the video of the incident and make one copy for him and one for Petitioner. When he saw the video, Chief Arcieri notified the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (“FDLE”) and requested an investigation. Chief Arcieri testified that he went to FDLE because he thought criminal charges could ensue in the case and that he does not like to investigate criminal matters internally. He also ordered an internal affairs investigation, but placed it on hold pending the outcome of the FDLE investigation. On June 21, 2011, Petitioner was placed on paid administrative leave for the duration of the investigations. J.G. refused to cooperate with the FDLE investigators. Without a victim willing to go forward, no criminal charges could be brought against Petitioner. The FDLE investigation was dropped. The internal affairs investigation was completed on August 15, 2011. The investigator’s written report concluded as follows: Sgt. Winston did commit the act of perjury on an official felony charging affidavit. Sgt. Winston did in fact using her hand strike a prisoner in the face which caused her to fall back onto the sink. Sgt. Winston did reach her right arm over the shoulder of Officer Selvaggio in an attempt to strike a handcuffed prisoner which Officer Selvaggio was attempting to secure inside the holding cell. Sgt. Winston did violate Edgewater Police [sic] & Procedure by removing a prisoner, removing the prisoner’s handcuffs without another officer present and allowed the prisoner to use the restroom. Sgt. Winston violated Edgewater Policy & Procedure by entering the cell/booking area wearing both her issued side arm as well as her issued taser. Sgt. Winston violated Edgewater Police [sic] & Procedure by openly criticizing the policy of securing any and all weapons prior to entering the booking/cell area when prisoners are present. This was done openly in the presence of fellow officers. Sgt. Winston violated City Policy and Procedure 12.02 Inappropriate/Unacceptable Behavior. Sgt. Winston did violate Edgewater Police Department Policy & Procedure Excessive force not resulting in injury. Petitioner was represented by counsel for the Fraternal Order of Police (“FOP”) in defending herself against the allegations that resulted from the internal affairs investigation. Negotiations ensued between the City and Petitioner to resolve the matter short of litigation. A settlement agreement was reached and executed on August 24, 2011. Petitioner agreed to findings that some of the allegations were sustained.5/ Petitioner agreed to a demotion from sergeant to officer, effective August 19, 2011, with a resulting salary cut, and she agreed to attend anger management courses. On August 24, 2011, Chief Arcieri ordered Petitioner to report for duty at 6:00 a.m. the following morning. Petitioner called in sick and did not report for work on August 25, 2011. Ms. Looney, the personnel director, contacted Petitioner to find out why she was not reporting for work. Petitioner told Ms. Looney that she had sustained a back injury during the altercation with J.G. on June 16, 2011. Ms. Looney testified that this was the first she knew of Petitioner’s back injury. In a letter dated August 24, 2011, and received by Chief Arcieri on August 25, 2011, Petitioner’s personal workers’ compensation attorney wrote as follows, in relevant part: As you know, Ms. Winston is an 18 year employee with our [sic] agency who was recently in an altercation with a belligerent, drunken female on June 16, 2011. Ms. Winston was injured during the arrest but was placed on Administrative leave pending an internal investigation and the matter has not been reported as an injury as of yet. Ms. Winston was not aware that she had injured her low back immediately due to circumstances surrounding the altercation and the typical adrenaline response resulting from such an altercation. She thought she was just sore from being beat up a bit but as the weeks went by her condition worsened. A recent MRI has revealed two herniated discs in the lower back and Ms. Winston does require medical treatment for this work related injury. I am requesting at this time that the Agency immediately file a First Report of injury on behalf of Ms. Winston. This should be considered notice under Chapter 440 of the work related injury. In addition to the back injury, Ms. Winston now suffers from uncontrolled high blood pressure which is also disabling. Ms. Winston will be receiving a letter from her doctor indicating that she is unable to work due to her uncontrolled blood pressure at this juncture. That is also a work related claim under F.S. 112.18, more popularly known as the “Heart/Lung Bill.” This claim should also be processed and medical care should be provided as soon as possible. Please see that a First Report of Injury is completed with regard to this claim . . . . In a related claim, Ms. Winston also has a September 22, 2009 uncontrolled hypertension incident which resulted in hospitalization. As you know, the 2009 accident occurred while Ms. Winston was interviewing a sex crime victim. She was experiencing a severe headache and then had an uncontrollable nose bleed during the interview. The blood pressure reading at the time revealed her blood pressure was severely elevated and she was taken to the hospital. This incident should have triggered the immediate filing of a First Report of Injury under F.S. 112.18 as referenced above. For whatever reason, no First Report of Injury was filed but I am requesting that you file such a First Report of Injury immediately on Ms. Winston’s behalf and that you provide appropriate medical care for this condition . . . . Finally, Ms. Winston advises me that she has been under an internal investigation since the June, 2011 incident. This internal investigation appears to be entirely inappropriate given the circumstances surrounding this event and would appear to be part of an intimidation practice on the part of your Agency, which is in clear violation of F.S. 440.205. As I am sure you know, 440.205 prohibits the harassment, intimidation, retaliation, or termination of an employee by virtue of a workers’ compensation claim. Needless to say, Ms. Winston has numerous ongoing workers’ compensation claims and it appears that all of the harassment which she has been subjected to since the time the internal investigation was opened in this matter appears to be directly attributable to her ongoing workers’ compensation issues. It should also be noted that Ms. Winston is suffering from post traumatic stress disorder as a result of this recent altercation and all of the fallout related to same. As I am sure you are well aware, post traumatic stress disorder of this nature is also covered for First Responders under the auspices of F.S. 112.1815. I am requesting again that a First Report of Injury be filed relative to this issue and that appropriate medical care be provided. Ms. Winston is entitled to full pay as she was injured during an altercation with a violent individual. Full pay is appropriate pursuant to the provisions of F.S. 440.15(11). This means that she should be receiving a regular paycheck without deduction of sick or vacation bank time. Please see that the appropriate adjustment is made relative to payment of benefits and feel free to contact me with any question . . . . On August 30, 2011, Petitioner submitted three “Incident/Accident Information Forms” to the City in regard to her workers’ compensation claims. The first states that Petitioner suffered an injury to her lower back on June 16, 2011, when “an intoxicated combative prisoner . . . kicked me in my stomach just above my gun belt.” The second describes “stress” as the injury, dated June 28, 2011, caused by “constant harassment & belittled by Dave Arcieri.” The third form states that the date of injury was September 22, 2009, the injury was “blood pressure caused bleeding of the nose,” and describes the incident in terms similar to those used in the attorney’s letter of June 24, 2011. Petitioner testified that she still sees a psychiatrist once a month and goes to counseling every two weeks, but that she first sought mental health counseling in June 2011 because of problems with Chief Arcieri that dated from long before he became chief. She testified that “he would cuss me out, call me names, have people that were subordinates watching me and reporting back to him to make sure I didn’t breathe the wrong way.” Petitioner testified that Chief Arcieri’s animus toward her dated from her handling of a situation as a sergeant that led to the firing of an officer. A member of Petitioner’s squad reported to her that an officer in another squad stole property from a civilian during a traffic stop and then gave him the stolen item. Petitioner told the officer to file a report and drop the item into evidence and that she would meet with the other officer’s sergeant. The other officer’s sergeant required him to write a report. The officer lied in the report. Petitioner and the other sergeant brought the matter to the attention of their superiors. After an investigation, the department had no choice but to fire the officer. At a sergeants’ meeting a little while later, then- Administrative Sergeant Arcieri said that Petitioner was incompetent. If she had handled the situation differently, Sergeant Arcieri would not have had to fire a good officer. Petitioner asked how the department could tolerate a lying thief in its midst. Sergeant Arcieri told her that the officer could have been reprimanded in some other way. Petitioner testified that she was afraid of Chief Arcieri because of threats he made to her. He made it clear to her and to any other officer who thought about reporting something to Ms. Looney or Mr. Barlow that these officials would let him know and the snitch would pay a price. On September 27, 2011, Petitioner sent an email to Michelle Grenham, Chief Arcieri’s secretary, stating that she would be unable to attend the anger management class required by the settlement agreement because she was undergoing major surgery on September 28 at Halifax Hospital in Daytona Beach. Ms. Grenham forwarded the email to Chief Arcieri and Ms. Looney. Petitioner underwent surgery on September 28, 2011, to repair the herniated discs in her back. Petitioner testified that prior to the surgery, she had difficulty walking, standing, bending at the waist, reaching, and climbing stairs due to the pain in her back. She was able to drive a car but only for short distances. She did not have full control of her bladder and bowels. She could only sleep by putting herself in a fetal position then bracing herself with pillows to keep her in that position. Petitioner described the surgery as less than a complete success. She had numbness in her right leg, was unable to bend, squat, kneel or stretch, and could not sit for very long. She eventually required spinal injections and the surgical insertion of a morphine pump in her stomach for pain in her spine. The morphine pump was still in place at the time of the hearing. Physicians also implanted a spinal cord stimulator in her back. She regained control of her excretory functions but was unable to walk without the use of a walker for several months and a cane thereafter. She wore a back brace most of the time. On November 29, 2011, Petitioner and her husband met with Mr. Barlow and Ms. Looney to discuss Petitioner’s medical situation and when she might return to work. The meeting was held at Petitioner’s request. Petitioner testified that she came into the meeting wearing a back brace and using a walker. Her husband had to drive her to the meeting. Petitioner testified that she asked for the meeting to find out if she could get an extended leave until her physician cleared her to go back to work. She also wanted to discuss Chief Arcieri’s harassment and belittling of her. At the meeting, Petitioner told Mr. Barlow that she didn’t know how long the healing process would take or whether she would need additional surgeries. Petitioner testified that Mr. Barlow told her it might be in her best interest to retire, in light of her age and her many health problems, including RA, lupus, hypertension, and now the back injury. Mr. Barlow stated that it seemed to him that Petitioner didn’t have anything that was going to go away, and that anyone with a back injury would have issues with it for life. Mr. Barlow asked whether Petitioner really thought she could ever come back as a police officer. Petitioner could only say that she didn’t know. Petitioner testified that she told Mr. Barlow that she hoped to reach retirement as a police officer but that she was willing to take another position with the City if her physical limitations kept her from returning to her former position. Petitioner testified that she told Mr. Barlow that she had a doctor’s appointment on May 3, 2012, and that Mr. Barlow promised to give her a leave of absence until that appointment. Petitioner’s husband, Ricky Winston, testified that at the meeting, his wife explained her injuries to Mr. Barlow and complained about Chief Arcieri’s constant ridicule and badgering. Mr. Winston stated that Mr. Barlow had a calendar and some paper and a calculator that he was using to diligently figure out something. It turned out that Mr. Barlow was calculating the date of Petitioner’s full retirement, with the idea of carrying her on the City’s employment roster until then. Mr. Winston testified that he left the meeting with the understanding that Mr. Barlow had agreed to grant Petitioner unpaid leave until she reached retirement. Mr. Winston recalled that Mr. Barlow listed all of Petitioner’s physical problems and asked why she didn’t just quit. Mr. Winston testified that this question was devastating to his wife because she never had any intention of leaving the job she loved. Ms. Looney testified that she did not recall Mr. Barlow mentioning any of Petitioner’s physical infirmities aside from her back injury. She did not recall Mr. Barlow using a calculator or calendar during the meeting or stating a date for Petitioner’s retirement. Ms. Looney stated that the goal was for Petitioner to return from her next doctor’s appointment with a physician’s statement as to when she could return to work, whether at full or light duty. Ms. Looney’s assumption, based on Petitioner’s condition, was that Petitioner would return to light duty at first. Mr. Barlow explicitly stated that the City wanted Petitioner to return to work, either full or light duty. Ms. Looney testified that she believed everyone at the meeting understood that Petitioner wanted to return to light duty and that the police department would try to find light duty restricted work for Petitioner when her doctor cleared her to return. Petitioner would remain on unpaid leave until her next doctor’s appointment in January 2012, at which time the City would need to know whether she could return to work. Petitioner had given Ms. Looney light duty notes from physicians in the past, which led Ms. Looney to assume that Petitioner understood what she needed to provide to the City. Ms. Looney stated that Mr. Barlow did not promise to keep Petitioner’s job open until May 2012. Mr. Barlow recalled almost nothing about the November 29, 2011, meeting with Petitioner. The only relevant specific testimony he provided on the subject was a denial that he told Petitioner that she could have a leave of absence until May 2012. However, given his lack of recall as to anything else that transpired in the meeting, Mr. Barlow’s testimony on this single point is not credited. The testimony of Petitioner and her husband regarding the statements made at the November 29, 2011, meeting is credited as to Mr. Barlow’s discussing Petitioner’s retirement and as to the fact that a discussion of Chief Arcieri’s behavior toward Petitioner occurred. On these points, Petitioner and Mr. Winston were credible, consistent witnesses. Ms. Looney’s testimony on these points was confused and equivocal. Mr. Barlow’s testimony was of little use at all as he claimed to remember virtually nothing about the meeting. However, the testimony of Petitioner and her husband cannot be credited as to the matter of Mr. Barlow’s promise to give Petitioner a leave of absence until May 3, 2012. Even disregarding Mr. Barlow’s convenient memory on this point, Petitioner’s testimony and that of her husband diverged on the ground for the leave of absence. Petitioner testified that Mr. Barlow gave her until May 3, 2012, because that was the date of her next doctor’s appointment. Mr. Winston vaguely recalled that a date was mentioned, either March or May, and that this date was based on Mr. Barlow’s calculation of Petitioner’s retirement date. Petitioner’s claim that Mr. Barlow gave her until May 2012 is further undercut by documentary evidence. On January 26, 2012, Petitioner sent Ms. Looney an email that stated as follows, in relevant part: Call me when you get the chance, I have prescriptions to pick up and get fitted for another brace, but I am going to need to take a leave of absence for a bit. Dr. Vinas [Petitioner’s surgeon] is not releasing me for duty at this time . . ., I will be going into a new brace and will be going to pain management for epidural injections in my spine. I have attached the letter from Dr. Vinas, as well as a copy of the medications I will be taking. My next appointment with him will be May 03/2012 unless the Dr. at the pain management center feels I need further surgery. I have no idea what to do about taking a leave, is there paperwork I need to file or just send you a letter? I would rather speak to you so if you are not busy please call me . . . . If the November 29, 2011, meeting had settled the question regarding Petitioner’s leave of absence until her doctor’s appointment on May 3, 2012, there would have been no need for Petitioner to write to Ms. Looney on January 26, 2012, to request a leave of absence and to inform Ms. Looney that her next doctor’s appointment would be on May 3. This email is consistent with the assertion made in the City’s February 21, 2012, letter terminating Petitioner’s employment that Mr. Barlow agreed to maintain the status quo until January 23, 2012, the date of Petitioner’s next scheduled doctor’s appointment.6/ In an email to Ms. Looney dated February 9, 2012, Petitioner stated, “[A]t this stage nothing surprises me anymore, I mean after all, I was supposed to be back on my feet and rarin to go by January, well that, as you know did not happen.” Petitioner closed a separate February 9, 2012, email to Ms. Looney with the following: “I forwarded this to [Mr. Barlow] also, but if he does not get it please let him know and tell him I said to keep his chin up as he always does and thank him for allowing me to take a leave of absence. Hopefully it won’t be much longer.” These emails cast further doubt on Petitioner’s claim that she had obtained a leave of absence until May 3, 2012, from Mr. Barlow at the November 29, 2011, meeting. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Petitioner was granted an unpaid leave of absence at the November 29 meeting, but only until her physician cleared her to return to work in some capacity, which Petitioner at the time anticipated would occur in January 2012. The evidence presented at the hearing showed that Petitioner had used her twelve weeks of leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) as of November 16, 2011. She had exhausted all of her accrued leave as of December 9, 2011, when she formally began the unpaid leave of absence. On January 1, 2012, Petitioner began receiving the City’s long-term disability benefits. Ms. Looney signed a letter to Dr. Federico Vinas, dated January 25, 2012, that stated as follows: Ms. Winston has informed us she is a patient of yours. She has a follow-up appointment January 26, 2012 in association with surgery perform [sic] by you. First, and foremost, enclosed you will find the Authorization to Disclose Medical Information form executed by Ms. Winston along with her job description (Police Officer) setting out the physical requirement. JoAnne is a valued City employee and it would be greatly appreciated if you verify her ability to perform any or all of these duties. Please provide us with specific restrictions or requirements necessary not to aggravate her condition and advise as to exactly when she can be cleared for full police officer’s duties. Your expertise is [sic] this matter is greatly appreciated. Please contact me for any further information you may need. The City’s job description for “Police Officer” reads as follows, in relevant part: PRIMARY DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES: (all duties may not be performed by all incumbents) Patrols designated area of the City to preserve the peace, to prevent and discover criminal acts, and to enforce traffic regulations. Answers calls and complaints involving drunkenness, domestic disputes, assaults and batteries, missing persons, fires, thefts, accidents and other felonies and misdemeanors. Is responsible for being knowledgeable of the crime problem in assigned work area and developing strategies to combat the problem. Develop contacts and provide intelligence reports to detectives and administration. Makes preliminary investigations at crime scenes or incidents, protects and collects physical evidence, locates witnesses, interviews witnesses, makes arrests, assists paramedics with basic and advance [sic] life support. Interviews complaints [sic] and witnesses to obtain information about crimes; assists in investigative work. Prepares evidence for issuance of complaints and testifies as a witness in both civil and criminal court, transports prisoners. Patrols school zones and high activity areas when assigned. Assists motorists, directs traffic, investigates accidents, recovers stolen automobiles, prepares detailed reports, advise of and interpret laws and ordinances and provides general information to the public. Cooperates and coordinates with other law enforcement agencies and other components of the Criminal Justice System. * * * Environmental Conditions: Outdoor environment with exposure to discomforting and dangerous working conditions Office environment with exposure to computer operations Physical exertion in lifting/moving items weighing up to 50 pounds Routine travel is required along daily assigned routes Occasional overnight travel is required Other physical/mental requirements may apply * * * DISCLAIMER STATEMENT This job description is not intended as complete listing of job duties. The incumbent is responsible for the performance of other related duties as assigned/required. The physical demands described herein are representative of those that must be met to successfully perform the essential functions of this job. Reasonable accommodations may be made to enable qualified individuals with disabilities to perform the essential functions. On January 26, 2012, Dr. Vinas forwarded to Ms. Looney a “Work Status” form regarding Petitioner that provided as follows: The above captioned patient is being treated in this office. The patient’s current work status is as follows: ( ) This patient was seen for treatment in our office today, please excuse any absence from work or school. (X) Based on the job description provided by the patient, it is in this patient’s best interest to be excused from all work duties at this time. Restrictions The patient may return to or continue to work with the following restrictions: ( ) No lifting over pounds. ( ) No excessive/repetitive bending or twisting. ( ) No prolonged sitting/standing or stooping. ( ) No excessive/repetitive pulling or pushing. ( ) No excessive activity with arms above shoulder level/overhead activity. ( ) ALL OF THE ABOVE ( ) Specific instructions ( ) This patient does not work at this time, but has been instructed to limit household/daily activities so as to remain within the above noted restrictions. ( ) This patient’s most recent evaluation supports a return to normal, routine work activities. The effective date of this Work Status is from the date noted above until further notice. If the patient’s current position of employment can be modified or other position found that conforms to the above restrictions, then the patient may return to work. If these restrictions cannot be maintained, I would recommend that the patient be excused from work until further notice. The patient’s work status will be evaluated on a visit-to-visit basis. Ms. Looney testified that based on Dr. Vinas’ Work Status form and her own conversations with Petitioner, she concluded that Petitioner was unable to return to work in any capacity, full or light duty, as of January 26, 2012. At the hearing, Petitioner conceded that she could not have returned to work as a police officer on January 26, 2012. As set forth in Finding of Fact 54, supra, Petitioner notified Ms. Looney via email on January 26 that her next appointment with Dr. Vinas would be on May 3, 2012. In the same email, Petitioner asked for guidance on how to request a further leave of absence. The record of this proceeding includes a “Request for Leave of Absence” form in which Petitioner asked for a leave of absence commencing on January 26, 2012, with an “anticipated return date” of May 3, 2012. At the hearing, Petitioner could not recall filling out this form. In her testimony, Ms. Looney indicated that she filled out the form for Petitioner. In the space in which the applicant is to set forth reasons for the leave of absence, Ms. Looney wrote, “See attached e-mail,” which was Petitioner’s January 26 email to Ms. Looney. Mr. Barlow denied the request for a further leave of absence by signature on the request form. The form does not indicate when Ms. Looney filled it out or when Mr. Barlow denied the request. The record is also unclear as to when Petitioner was notified that the City was denying her a further leave of absence. As late as February 9, 2012, Petitioner was still sending chatty emails to Ms. Looney regarding her medical condition and treatment, even asking Ms. Looney and Mr. Barlow to stop by her house for a visit if they are ever in the neighborhood. The first clear notice of the denial was in the termination letter set forth in the next paragraph. On February 21, 2012, Ms. Looney wrote the following letter to Petitioner: On November 29, 2011 Tracey Barlow, City Manager, and myself met with you to discuss your medical situation. You informed us your next doctor’s appointment was January 23, 2012, at which time you were hoping to be taken out of your brace. We agreed your continued employment with the City would depend on your returning to full duty and I would send Dr. Vinas a letter requesting exactly when you would be cleared to return to full duty as a police officer. Following your exam on January 26, 2012, you emailed me Dr. Vinas’ work status form which states “based on the job description provided by the patient, it is in this patient’s best interest to be excused from all work duties at this time.” You also stated your next appointment is May 3, 2012 and asked about taking a leave of absence. JoAnne, as you are aware your FMLA was met as of November 16, 2011; all your workers compensation claims have been denied;7/ you exhausted all of your accruals as of December 9, 2011 and have been granted unpaid leave of absence for the previous 74 days, and as of January 1, 2012 you began receiving the city’s long term disability benefit. Therefore, due to all the facts stated too [sic] include uncertain ability to return to work date, the City Manager has denied your request for leave of absence exceeding 30 days. As a result, consider this formal notification that your employment with the City of Edgewater ends effective February 24, 2012. It is very important that you contact the Personnel Department to make the necessary arrangements for your continued insurance coverage and any outstanding benefits/obligations you have with the City. Petitioner testified that at the time the City terminated her employment, she was still using a cane at home and a walker when she went out. There is no question that Petitioner was unable to return to full duty as a police officer on February 24, 2012. It was Petitioner’s contention that she could have come back to work for the police department in some form of light duty, as she had been allowed to do in the past, or in one of several jobs that the City advertised as open during her convalescence. Petitioner further contended that Ms. Looney should have sent Dr. Vinas the job descriptions of all open City jobs rather than just the job description of a police officer. As to the last point, Ms. Looney testified that it was standard practice for the City to send the physician an employee’s current job description for an assessment of the employee’s ability to return to work. Petitioner was treated no differently than any other City employee in this regard. Petitioner testified that she asked the City to bring her back in another position, but could offer no documentary evidence to support that testimony. She claimed that part of the discussion at the November 29 meeting with Mr. Barlow and Ms. Looney was her hope to retire as a police officer, but her desire to remain a city employee in whatever capacity she could. Ms. Looney testified that Petitioner never asked to work in any position other than that of police officer. Petitioner sent an email to Ms. Looney on December 26, 2011, asking whether Ms. Looney had “heard from my Dr. as to when I might be able to come back light duty or anything else?” Petitioner claims that the “anything else” portion of the email indicated her desire to be placed in any available job. Ms. Looney read the email as merely asking whether she had heard from Petitioner’s doctor, not as a job request. Ms. Looney’s reading is not unreasonable given that this was the only document Petitioner produced that even arguably contained a statement asking to be placed in a position other than police officer. In any event, whether Petitioner asked to be placed in another position is not decisive because of the blanket statement in Dr. Vinas’ work status form. Ms. Looney testified that she was unable to place Petitioner in any position because Petitioner’s physician had clearly stated that it was in her best interest to be excused from all work duties. It was always the City’s understanding that Petitioner would return to work in a light duty function at first, but in fact Petitioner was not cleared to work at all. Ms. Looney might have followed up with Dr. Vinas and inquired whether Petitioner was capable of doing clerical work or some other form of indoor, deskbound job, but Petitioner has pointed to nothing that required Ms. Looney to do so in light of Petitioner’s failure to request that accommodation. Ms. Looney testified that it was the City’s practice to hold off on discussing positions outside of an employee’s department until the employee has actually been cleared for light duty. No evidence was presented that the City treated Petitioner any differently than it treated other employees in a similar position. Similarly, Mr. Barlow might have agreed to extend Petitioner’s unpaid leave of absence to May 3, 2012, but he was not required to do so. At the time of her termination, Petitioner had used twelve weeks of FMLA leave and had been granted an additional 74 days of unpaid leave at Mr. Barlow’s discretion. Petitioner had been out on some form of medical leave for approximately six months. The City did not seize on some early opportunity to dismiss Petitioner; rather, the City had anticipated that Petitioner would return to work as a police officer and waited until Petitioner had exhausted all avenues of leave except a second discretionary unpaid leave of absence before deciding to terminate her employment. Petitioner offered no credible evidence that her termination was based on her age, gender, disability or perceived disability or that she was treated differently than other employees due to her age, gender, or disability. The lone indication of possible bias was Mr. Barlow’s statement at the November 29, 2011, meeting that Petitioner should consider retirement in light of her age and poor health. This statement may be easily read as a kindly (if poorly phrased) expression of concern for Petitioner. By her own testimony, Petitioner was on good terms with Mr. Barlow and Ms. Looney right up to the time of her termination. Petitioner sent solicitous emails to them as late as February 9, 2012. Petitioner’s feelings were hurt by the statement, but no other ill effect followed. She was granted the requested unpaid leave of absence and remained employed by the City for three more months. Petitioner testified that she never considered herself disabled and prided herself on not calling in sick or requesting accommodations for her conditions. Ms. Looney, Mr. Barlow, and Chief Arcieri all testified that they did not perceive Petitioner as having a disability that required accommodation in the workplace, though they were all aware of at least some of her chronic conditions such as lupus, RA, and hypertension. Petitioner claimed that Chief Arcieri carried on something of a vendetta against her. Chief Arcieri testified that prior to the demotion his relationship with Petitioner was friendly. When Petitioner’s house was flooded, Chief Arcieri took off work to help Mr. Winston solder a broken shower valve. After Petitioner was demoted, the relationship was less friendly but always professional. Chief Arcieri testified that he has never yelled at Petitioner or any other employee. He never called her names. The harassment and belittling that Petitioner alleged never happened. Chief Arcieri denied any sort of gender bias, pointing to the successful efforts his department has made to recruit and hire female officers. He denied ever making a comment about Petitioner’s age. He testified that he never considered Petitioner disabled while she was on active duty, despite her lupus. Petitioner never requested an accommodation and Chief Arcieri never saw the need for an accommodation. Chief Arcieri testified that at the close of the internal affairs investigation of the June 16, 2011, incident, he declined to sustain some of the allegations in order to protect Petitioner from a referral to the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (“Commission”) for further discipline. Chief Arcieri assented to a request by the FOP that he submit a letter to the Commission stating that he believed the demotion was sufficient and asking the Commission not to take further action against Petitioner. Petitioner’s testimony against Chief Arcieri consisted of general statements that he harassed and belittled her. The only specific incident Petitioner recounted as to the source of any possible animus the chief bore toward her involved the firing of the officer who stole something during a traffic stop. Even if Petitioner’s version of events is accepted, Chief Arcieri’s anger toward Petitioner had nothing to do with her age, gender, or disability. He called her “incompetent.” He was upset about the manner in which Petitioner performed her job, which he believed led to the needless dismissal of a good officer. Whether Chief Arcieri was right or wrong to be angry at Petitioner, he did not engage in an act of discrimination. Even if the factfinder were to accept Petitioner’s description of Chief Arcieri as a bully on the job, there is no evidence aside from Petitioner’s general comments to indicate that she was singled out due to her age, gender or disability. It is telling that in testifying about her fear of reporting the bullying, Petitioner stated, “I was afraid. I was very afraid. David Arcieri made it not only clear to me, but to any other officer who even thought about going to report to Donna Looney or to Tracey Barlow, ‘Don’t worry, they’ll let me know and you will pay the price.’” This statement might be evidence that Chief Arcieri is a bully, a poor leader of his department, or a bad administrator. However, the statement does not establish that Chief Arcieri discriminated against Petitioner in a manner prohibited by section 760.10, Florida Statutes. If anything, the statement indicates that Petitioner found herself in the same boat as the other officers in her department.8/ Petitioner was aware of and understood the City’s nondiscrimination and no-harassment policy, the operative language of which states: The nature of some discrimination and harassment makes it virtually impossible to detect unless someone reports the discrimination or harassment. THUS, IF ANY EMPLOYEE BELIEVES THAT HE OR SHE OR ANY OTHER EMPLOYEE IS BEING SUBJECTED TO ANY OF THESE FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION OR HARRASSMENT, HE OR SHE MUST REPORT THIS TO THE PERSONNEL DIRECTOR (386-424-2408) AND/OR CITY MANAGER (386-424-2404). If you are encountering a problem, please do not assume that the City is aware of it. The City is committed to ensuring that you have a pleasant working environment, and your assistance in bringing your complaints and concerns to our attention is a necessary first step. (Emphasis in original). The policy was included in the City’s personnel manual. Petitioner was provided with copies of the policy and amendments thereto several times during her tenure with the City. Petitioner conceded that, notwithstanding the policy, she did not report any incidents of harassment or discrimination to either Ms. Looney or Mr. Barlow while she was actively working for the City. The allegations of intimidation and harassment made by Petitioner’s attorney in his August 24, 2011, letter and Petitioner’s allegation of “constant harassment and belittlement by Dave Arcieri” in her workers’ compensation incident report were made only after Petitioner had been off the job for eight weeks. Further, the specific allegations made by Petitioner’s attorney claimed that the City was in violation of section 440.205, Florida Statutes, not that Chief Arcieri or any other City employee was discriminating against or harassing Petitioner because of her age, gender, disability, or perceived disability. The evidence produced at the hearing established that Petitioner sustained an injury to her back, most likely due to an altercation with a detainee on June 16, 2011, that necessitated surgery and a rehabilitation process that was not complete even at the time of the hearing in May 2014. The City carried Petitioner as an employee until all of her available leave had been used and then for another 74 days on an unpaid leave of absence. The City had no legal obligation to grant Petitioner an unpaid leave of absence but did so in the hope that Petitioner would be able to return to work in January 2012. As of the termination date of February 24, 2012, Petitioner had been away from her job for more than six months, had not been cleared by a physician to do work of any kind, and would not receive a physician’s clearance to work any sooner than May 3, 2012. The City could have consented to carry Petitioner even longer on an unpaid leave of absence, but it was not discriminatory for the City to make the business decision to terminate Petitioner’s employment. Petitioner offered insufficient credible evidence to refute the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason given by the City for the termination of her employment. Petitioner offered insufficient credible evidence that the City's stated reason for the termination of her employment was a pretext for discrimination based on her age, gender, disability, or perceived disability. Petitioner offered insufficient credible evidence that the City discriminated against her because of her age, gender, disability, or perceived disability in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes. Petitioner offered insufficient credible evidence that her dismissal from employment was in retaliation for any complaint of discriminatory employment practices that she made while an employee of the City.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that the City of Edgewater did not commit any unlawful employment practices and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of January, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of January, 2015.

USC (3) 42 U.S.C 1210142 U.S.C 1210242 U.S.C 12111 Florida Laws (11) 112.18112.1815120.569120.57120.68440.15440.205760.02760.10760.11784.07
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FELICIA A. ALEXANDER vs DYNAIR SERVICES, INC., 00-001217 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sanford, Florida Mar. 22, 2000 Number: 00-001217 Latest Update: Jun. 30, 2004

The Issue In her charge of discrimination Ms. Alexander alleges that her employer created a hostile work environment and unfair conditions of employment when it singled her out as a thief of a stolen purse, denied her overtime, disciplined her for the size of her earrings, and made insulting statements about African Americans. The issues in this proceeding are whether that discrimination occurred, and if so, what relief is appropriate.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter its final order dismissing the complaint by Felicia A. Alexander against Dynair. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of August, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Felicia A. Alexander Post Office Box 549 Sanford, Florida 32772-0549 Gabriel G. Marrero, Administrator Dynair Services, Inc. Two Red Cleveland Boulevard, Suite 205 Orlando-Sanford International Airport Sanford, Florida 32773 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57760.10
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ALLISON M. HUTH vs NATIONAL ADMARK CORPORATION, 00-004633 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Nov. 14, 2000 Number: 00-004633 Latest Update: Sep. 26, 2001

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice and, if so, determination of the relief to which the Petitioner is entitled.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Allison M. Huth, is an adult female person. At all times material to this proceeding the Petitioner has been a resident of the State of Florida. The Respondent, National Admark Corporation, is an advertising agency and publishing company. At all times material to this proceeding, the Respondent was doing business from offices located in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. On the morning of June 12, 1998, a Mr. William Rufrano, who was at that time a boyfriend of the Petitioner, took the Petitioner with him to the Fort Lauderdale offices of the Respondent. At that time, Mr. Rufrano had some type of arrangement with the Respondent pursuant to which he worked in the field making sales calls in an effort to sell the Respondent's products.1 The Petitioner's reason for going with her boyfriend to the Respondent's offices on June 12, 1998, was to find out more about the company in order to decide whether she wanted to work for the company. Upon arriving at the Respondent's offices on June 12, 1998, Mr. Rufrano introduced the Petitioner to his "boss" and to several of the other people who worked in the Respondent's offices. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Rufrano left the Respondent's offices and spent most of the rest of the day meeting prospective customers and making sales presentations outside of the Respondent's offices. The Petitioner remained at the Respondent's offices for most of the day. The Petitioner spent the day making calls to prospective customers. She attempted to have each of the prospective customers make an appointment for a salesperson to visit and make a sales presentation for the Respondent's products.2 The Petitioner never signed any paper work with the Respondent regarding any business relationship between herself and the Respondent. Specifically, she did not sign or submit an application for employment with the Respondent, she did not sign or enter into an employment contract with the Respondent, and she did not sign or enter into an independent contractor agreement with the Respondent. The Petitioner did not have an understanding with the Respondent as to what her hours of work would be or as to how many hours she would work each day, each week, or each month. The Petitioner did not have an understanding with the Respondent as to what her compensation would be for making telephone calls.3 In sum: The Petitioner and the Respondent never entered into any agreement by means of which the Petitioner became either an employee or an independent contractor of the Respondent. During the course of her day at the Respondent's offices, the Petitioner had occasion to seek assistance from Mr. Anthony Tundo, who was the Respondent's Sales Manager, and was the person the Petitioner had been told to contact if she had any questions. Following the Petitioner's request for assistance, Mr. Tundo engaged in a number of inappropriate, unwanted, and ungentlemanly acts that caused the Petitioner to become very upset and uncomfortable. The worst of Mr. Tundo's acts that day are described as follows in the Petitioner's Exhibit 8, a letter signed by the Petitioner and her boyfriend a few days after the events on June 12, 1998: Mr. Tundo began stroking Allison's [Petitioner's] head very softly and used the excuse that he was trying to pick something out of her hair. Mr. Tundo trapped Allison against the coffee counter in the hallway. He then pressed himself, including his erection [,] against her body which was against the counter. He then proceeded to kiss her on her forehead and cheeks. When Allison was in Mr. Tundo's office, he told her to take a look at something he was doing. Not wanting to go behind the desk, Allison leaned over the front of the desk to look. As she did so, Mr. Tundo stared directly down Allison's blouse and commented[,] "what a nice pair of tits you have." Allison quickly stood up, and proceeded to walk around behind Mr. Tundo's desk figuring he couldn't look down her blouse. As she was leaning on his desk watching what he was doing, he began to stroke her fingers and hands. He then told her to turn around. Allison did so thinking there was a flaw or something wrong with her outfit. He then grabbed her firmly by the backs of her arms and positioned her[,] which made her feel extremely uncomfortable. After doing so, he uttered the word[,] "there." He then told Allison[,] "You have very, very nice legs," and "You have a very beautiful ass[,]" and proceeded to pat Allison on her rear end. When Allison was sitting on the couch in Mr. Tundo's office, she got up to go to the ladies' room. Mr. Tundo told her to sit back down. Presuming Mr. Tundo wanted to tell her some more things related to business, she sat back down. Mr. Tundo told her to "do that again." When Allison questioned what he meant, Mr. Tundo told her that he wanted her to uncross her legs (like she would have to do in order to stand up) again so he could see what it looks like inside her legs and up her skirt. Mr. Tundo was also moving his hands in an outward motion as he was telling her these things. After Allison left Mr. Tundo's office, he continued to follow her around the office building. As he was following her, he continually told her that she has "such a sexy walk," and "such a nice ass." He followed her into the conference room next to the coffee maker. He then proceeded to rub her shoulders, moaning softly and breathing heavy as he did so. He then told her that she seemed "tense." There is no competent substantial evidence that Mr. Tundo had ever previously engaged in conduct such as that to which he subjected the Petitioner. There is no competent substantial evidence that Mr. Tundo had ever previously engaged in any type of conduct that would create a sexually hostile or abusive work environment. There is no competent substantial evidence that the Respondent's management had ever been advised that Mr. Tundo had previously engaged in any conduct that would create a sexually hostile or abusive work environment. There is no competent substantial evidence that the Respondent's management had ever received any prior complaints that Mr. Tundo had engaged in conduct such as that to which he subjected the Petitioner, or that he had engaged in any other type of conduct that would create a sexually hostile or abusive work environment.

Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a Final Order in this case dismissing the Petition for Relief and denying all relief sought by the Petitioner. DONE AND ORDERED this 30th day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of May, 2001.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10
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CATHERINE M. LECAS vs FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 15-007003 (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lakeland, Florida Dec. 10, 2015 Number: 15-007003 Latest Update: Nov. 10, 2016

The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged by Petitioner in her Employment Charge of Discrimination.

Findings Of Fact During all times material to this case, Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a park ranger at Alafia River State Park in Lithia, Florida. On January 1, 2010, Petitioner became a full- time park ranger, and from this date through June 5, 2014, Petitioner was supervised by Coy Helms, the manager for Alafia River State Park. Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment for “poor performance and conduct unbecoming a public employee.” The events that led to Petitioner’s termination from employment with Respondent occurred on March 28, 2014. Petitioner is a 40-plus-year-old Christian female, who identifies as being of Greek and Native American origin. Petitioner describes her skin color as “olive.” Background Information On November 18, 2013, Petitioner received a written reprimand from Coy Helms, who at the time served as park manager at Alafia State Park and Petitioner’s immediate supervisor. Petitioner was reprimanded for insubordination and conduct unbecoming a public employee. According to the reprimand, Petitioner had interactions with certain park volunteers that resulted in complaints being filed with Mr. Helms. The written reprimand advised that “THIS IS AN OFFICIAL WRITTEN REPRIMAND [and that] FUTURE VIOLATIONS MAY RESULT IN FURTHER OR MORE SEVERE DISCIPLINARY ACTION, UP TO AND INCLUDING DISMISSAL.” Petitioner refused to sign the reprimand when the same was presented to her by Mr. Helms. In early December 2013, a few weeks after receiving the written reprimand, Petitioner verbally reported to Valinda Subic that during the summer of 2011, Petitioner was inappropriately touched on the ear by her co-worker, Ronald Stevens. Ms. Subic advised Rae Kelly, from Respondent’s bureau of human resource management, of Petitioner’s complaint, and on December 6, 2013, Ms. Subic and Ms. Kelly contacted Petitioner to get a statement from her about the incident. Petitioner advised that she did not wish to make a statement about the incident but would provide follow-up documentation in support of her harassment allegations at a later time. After several unsuccessful attempts to secure from Petitioner information supporting her harassment allegations, Ms. Kelly informed Petitioner that if the information that Petitioner promised was not received by March 12, 2014, the harassment allegation investigation would be closed. There is no evidence of record indicating that Petitioner ever provided additional information to Respondent in support of her allegation of harassment by Mr. Stevens. Termination of Employment On March 28, 2014, at approximately 7:30 a.m., Petitioner met with Mr. Helms to discuss work plans for the day. It was understood that Petitioner would be doing yard maintenance work at the park’s north gate. In addition to the yard maintenance work, Mr. Helms assigned Petitioner an additional work-related task of placing an out-of-order sign on the restroom facility near the north gate. In order to perform her work-related tasks, Respondent assigned Petitioner a DEP-owned Ford Ranger pick-up truck. Mr. Helms, within a few hours of assigning tasks to Petitioner, went to the north gate area to verify that Petitioner had completed her assignments. When Mr. Helms arrived at the north gate, he did not see Petitioner. Mr. Helms noted that the out-of-order sign had been placed on the restroom as directed, but that Petitioner had failed to perform the yard maintenance work. Seeing that Petitioner had not completed her work assignment, Mr. Helms then searched for Petitioner throughout the park but was unable to locate her. Mr. Helms then exited the park and went to a nearby Circle K convenience store in a further attempt to locate Petitioner. After waiting for some period of time at the Circle K, Mr. Helms observed Petitioner, while driving her assigned Ford Ranger pick-up truck, enter the convenience store parking lot. Petitioner parked the truck, exited the vehicle, walked towards the store, and then returned to the vehicle without entering the store. Upon reentering the vehicle, Petitioner drove back to the state park. Respondent’s email records show that on April 3, 2014, Mr. Helms submitted a written narrative to Ms. Subic wherein he outlined what he observed on March 28, 2014, with respect to Petitioner, her whereabouts, and her use of DEP’s vehicle. On April 7, 2014, Ms. Subic directed Mr. Helms to speak with Petitioner about what he observed on March 28, 2014. On April 10, 2014, Mr. Helms met with Petitioner to discuss her actions of March 28, 2014. Petitioner testified that during this meeting with Mr. Helms, she explained that on the morning of March 28, 2014, after placing the out-of-order sign on the restroom near the north gate, she left the park in her assigned DEP vehicle to go to the Mobil station to get gas for the vehicle. Petitioner also testified that although she did drive to the Mobil station, she did not purchase gas for the vehicle, but instead went to the Sweetbay market located next to the Mobil station where she filled a personal prescription and purchased a sympathy card for the family of a deceased friend. Petitioner further testified that after leaving Sweetbay, she went to Ace Hardware. Petitioner has no specific recollection of why she stopped at Ace Hardware and did not present any evidence indicating that the visit to the store was for work-related reasons. Finally, after leaving Ace Hardware, Petitioner then drove to the home of the bereaved to deliver the sympathy card that she purchased from Sweetbay. In explaining her actions on March 28, 2014, Petitioner claims that Mr. Helms allowed employees to conduct personal business if the personal business did not cause the employees to deviate from their authorized travel route related to DEP official business. Petitioner’s statement regarding Mr. Helms may generally be true; however, under the facts of the present case there is no credible evidence that Petitioner left the park on March 28, 2014, for anything other than reasons related to the handling of her personal affairs. Succinctly stated, Petitioner put 50 miles on DEP’s vehicle on March 28, 2014, and none of these miles were related to the operation of Alafia River State Park. By correspondence dated April 28, 2014, Scott Robinson, on behalf of Respondent, informed Petitioner that it was the intent of Respondent to terminate her employment with the agency for reasons related to her actions of March 28, 2014. Following Petitioner’s predetermination conference, Mr. Robinson, by correspondence dated June 5, 2014, informed Petitioner that her employment was being terminated due to her actions of March 28, 2014. Mr. Robinson also informed Petitioner that the written reprimand she received on November 18, 2013, was a factor in Respondent’s decision to terminate her employment. Petitioner did not offer any evidence, direct or circumstantial, that in any way establishes that she was subjected to discriminatory animus, or that Respondent’s decision to terminate her employment was motivated by reasons related to her allegation of sexual harassment by Mr. Stevens.1/ Respondent had legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for terminating Petitioner’s employment.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that Respondent, Florida Department of Environmental Protection, did not commit unlawful employment practices as alleged by Petitioner, Catherine M. Lecas, and denying Petitioner's Employment Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of August, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of August, 2016.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.68760.10760.11
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GREGORY R. LULKOSKI vs ST. JOHNS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 17-005192 (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Augustine, Florida Sep. 20, 2017 Number: 17-005192 Latest Update: Sep. 12, 2019

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner was retaliated against in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA), chapter 760, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses and other evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner worked for FCTC for several years in several different positions, including as a career pathways supervisor, and most recently as a grant writer. FCTC was, for all times relevant to Petitioner’s allegations, a conversion charter technical center in St. Johns County, Florida, operating pursuant to a charter contract with the District by a privately organized 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation, the First Coast Technical Institute (FCTI). On July 1, 2016, the District began operating the educational programs at FCTC, due to the dire financial situation which had developed at the college. In taking over the programs at FCTC, the District immediately recognized that the administrative staff at FCTC was bloated and needed to be streamlined. Further, because FCTC would now be operated by the District, the District endeavored to evaluate FCTC’s structure to determine how it could operate more like a District school, including with respect to personnel structure. The District set out to reorganize and restructure FCTC to align it with the District and address administrative redundancy and financial issues. To facilitate this transition and evaluation, the District placed all administrative employees at FCTC on temporary contracts, effective July 1, 2016. This decision was made sometime in June 2016. On the morning of July 1, 2016, all employees of FCTC were called to a meeting held by Dr. Joseph Joyner, the District Superintendent. At that meeting, Dr. Joyner introduced Cathy Mittelstadt as the interim principal. At the conclusion of the meeting, all administrative personnel, including Petitioner, were offered temporary employment contracts, for a term of approximately six months. The contracts could be terminated by either party with two weeks’ notice. No administrative employee was placed on a longer temporary contract. The temporary employment contracts, including Petitioner’s, began on July 1, 2016, and terminated on December 21, 2016. Petitioner’s temporary employment contract expressly incorporates District Board Rule 6.10(3). Board Rule 6.10(3) concerns temporary employment with the District, and provides that temporary employees work for a limited amount of time. The rule does not state that temporary employees enjoy an expectation of employment beyond the contract term. As the interim principal, Ms. Middelstadt was tasked by the District with evaluating the structure of FCTC to determine how it could be streamlined to address budget and financial issues and also bring it in line with how other District schools operated. The elimination of positions at FCTC was contemplated as part of this evaluation. Every administrative position at FCTC was evaluated for potential elimination. Ultimately, Ms. Mittelstadt was responsible for recommending to the District’s Executive Cabinet (Executive Cabinet) how FCTC should be restructured. As part of this process, Ms. Mittelstadt was also responsible for recommending to the Executive Cabinet those positions that would be eliminated as part of the restructuring process. The Executive Cabinet did not reject any of Ms. Mittelstadt’s recommendations, but rather, accepted them without change. The Executive Cabinet would not have taken any action with respect to any employee working at FCTC without a recommendation from Ms. Mittelstadt. Ms. Weber had limited involvement in the restructuring process. She provided ministerial assistance to Ms. Mittelstadt during this process, but she was not responsible for, or involved in, the decision as to how the school would be restructured, or for any recommendations regarding the same. FCTC employees were kept informed as to the status of restructuring during the process. Ms. Mittelstadt and Ms. Weber did not tell any administrative employee at FCTC, including Petitioner, that they could expect their contract would be renewed or that they would retain their positions past the term of their temporary employment contract. Petitioner understood that he was being appointed to a temporary employment contract not to extend past December 21, 2016. Ms. Mittelstadt made the determination as part of the restructuring process that Petitioner’s position should be eliminated, and that his temporary employment contract would be allowed to expire pursuant to its terms. Ms. Mittelstadt recommended this course of action to the Executive Cabinet, which approved it. Through Ms. Mittelstadt’s evaluation and assessment of the needs of FCTC, she determined that a full-time grant writer was not necessary for FCTC. Certain tasks related to grants obtained by the School District, including accounting related tasks, are handled in the District’s main office, and the remaining tasks related to grants are handled at particular schools by a different position, career specialists. Indeed, no other District school employs a full-time grant writer. In furtherance of the District’s decision to streamline administration at FCTC and realign it with how other District schools operated, Ms. Mittelstadt determined that the grant writer position occupied by Petitioner, as well as another type of position at FCTC, the program manager position, should be eliminated, and the duties performed within those positions subsumed within the career specialist position, as in other District schools. The District distributed a vacancy announcement for the Career Specialist position to all FCTC employees, including Petitioner. The announcement included a job description for the position. The job description and vacancy announcement were used to fill the position. The job description provides that grant writing and management, encompassing Petitioner’s duties as a grant writer, are part of the duties, among others, of a career specialist. Petitioner did not apply for this position. Petitioner was informed at a meeting on November 18, 2016, that his contract would be allowed to expire effective December 21, 2016, and not renewed. Present at this meeting, in addition to Petitioner, were Ms. Mittelstadt, Ms. Weber, and Brennan Asplen, the District’s Deputy Superintendent for Academic & Student Services. At the meeting, Petitioner was provided a notice indicating that his temporary employment contract was expiring pursuant to its terms. Petitioner was permitted to work through the remainder of his contract term with no diminution in benefits or pay. Petitioner requested to be placed in another position at FCTC at this time, but was informed there were no vacancies posted for him to be moved to, that the District was not placing non-renewed employees into positions, and that he could apply to any position he liked when it was posted. One position, a Case Manager in the Career Pathways program, was funded from a grant, and that position was technically vacant under the grant. However, FCTC was in a hiring freeze at the time, as Ms. Mittelstadt made the decision to not fill the Case Manager position given, and during, the extensive realignment and assessment of FCTC whose budget was being scrutinized at a deep level. The District did not place any other non-renewed employees into positions. The Case Manager position was eventually advertised in April 2017. Petitioner did not apply for the position despite being informed of it and having nothing restricting him from doing so. Petitioner’s work performance played no role in the decision to eliminate his position. Ms. Mittelstadt and Ms. Weber both indicated that they did not retaliate against Petitioner for any reason. In fact, Petitioner was not the only person whose position was eliminated. Ms. Mittelstadt also recommended that six or seven other positions also be eliminated. Furthermore, approximately 12 to 15 FCTC employees resigned, and their positions were eliminated. Had those employees not resigned, their positions still would have been eliminated and those employees’ contracts would have been allowed to expire. Petitioner filed the complaint or charge, at issue in this proceeding, with the FCHR on December 22, 2016 (December 22nd Complaint). In it, Petitioner alleges that he was retaliated against in violation of the FCRA. While Petitioner was not represented by counsel at the time that he filed the December 22nd Complaint, he obtained representation from a lawyer thereafter, and during the FCHR’s investigation of this complaint. This was not Petitioner’s first complaint filed with FCHR concerning his work at FCTC. Just before the District began operating the programs at FCTC, and specifically on June 27, 2016, Petitioner filed a complaint (June 27th Complaint) with the FCHR also alleging retaliation. The June 27th Complaint was received by the FCHR on June 28, 2016. Petitioner introduced no evidence showing that at the time the decision was made to place individuals on temporary employment contracts, that the District was aware of his June 27th Complaint. Petitioner alleges in the December 22nd Complaint that the District terminated his employment because he engaged in protected activity under the FCRA. Petitioner does not allege in the complaint that he was subjected to a hostile work environment or harassment due to any retaliatory animus on the part of the District. Rather, Petitioner only alleges that he believes he frustrated his supervisor at various times, not that he was subjected to a hostile work environment. On August 17, 2017, the FCHR issued a no-cause determination. On September 20, 2017, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from Unlawful Employment Practice, initiating the instant proceeding. In the Petition, Petitioner largely alleges that he believes the District submitted false information to the FCHR and that the District was guilty of various acts of fraud and abuses. Specifically, Petitioner alleged: Not only did the SJCSD lie about its relationship with FCTC, the SJCSD deliberately lied about my position working collaboratively with other SJCSD personnel assigned to grants administration and my unique ability to assist the SJCSD in avoiding mistakes that they were driven to make, mistakes that rose to the point that they became criminal. The SJCSD committed to a path of making such criminal errors with federal funds and falsifying their account of why they fired me. I have assembled sufficient evidence to show that the SJCSD is guilty of violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and that they fired me as a whistle blower having abundant evidence of their crimes committed against the public interest for the personal benefit of key administrators. In his Petition, Petitioner did not identify reasons why he believes the FCHR’s “No Reasonable Cause” finding was without merit. And other than his alleged retaliatory firing, Petitioner does not identify any other adverse effects that he suffered as a result of the SJCSD “criminal” activities, or allege that he was subjected to a hostile work environment. Petitioner alleged for the first time at hearing that the District subjected him to a hostile work environment in retaliation for engaging in protected activity. He alleged this hostile work environment centered on three actions. First, that the District did not provide him a copy of a harassment complaint filed by another employee concerning him in a timely manner, and did not set up the meetings he requested to address that complaint the way he wished. Second, that District personnel did not provide him access to “SunGard” software. And, third, that District officials asked him to sign a form related to grants that he did not wish to sign. Regarding the first allegation, sometime prior to July 1, 2016, Renee Staufaccher filed a complaint with Stephanie Thomas regarding Petitioner’s conduct. This complaint was lodged while the District was not operating the programs at FCTC. District officials told Petitioner that complaints lodged during this time period should be referred to FCTI. Once the District began operating the programs at FCTC, Petitioner reached out to Ms. Weber for a copy of Ms. Staufaccher’s complaint. Ms. Weber took steps to obtain that complaint, and it was provided to Petitioner within roughly two weeks of his request, despite Ms. Weber being out of the office one of those weeks. Petitioner requested to meet with Ms. Staufaccher and Ms. Thomas regarding the nature of the complaint and his concerns about whether the complaint was authentic. Ms. Staufaccher was no longer employed at FCTC within a matter of days of this request. Petitioner also requested to meet with Ms. Thomas only a matter of days before she ceased working at FCTC. Petitioner was not afforded the meeting or other items requested because the matter concerned old, not ongoing events occurring prior to the time the District began operating FCTC. Petitioner did not interact with, or report to, Ms. Staufaccher or Ms. Thomas during this time, and neither supervised him. Petitioner never disclosed to the District that he was suffering continued harassment at the hands of Ms. Staufaccher or Ms. Thomas subsequent to July 1, 2016. Petitioner offered no evidence that his request was handled differently from any other District employee, and Ms. Weber credibly testified he was treated the same as any other District employee in this regard. Regarding the second allegation, Petitioner alleged at the hearing that the District did not provide him access to SunGard, a computer program that had some relation to the performance of his job duties. At hearing, Petitioner represented that he was never provided access to this program. However, he later conceded that he did have access to this program during his employment. Specifically, prior to being given direct access to this program, Petitioner was provided access to the information in the program through the assistance of another District employee. This provided Petitioner with access to the information he needed to perform his job, including generating reports. Accordingly, it was not necessary for Petitioner to have direct access to SunGard to perform his job duties. The District was not authorizing extensive access to SunGard during this time because it was in the process of creating new systems and processes to bring FCTC in line with the District’s standards. In short, Petitioner was still able to perform his job, despite his complaint that he was not given direct access to SunGard. As to Petitioner’s third complaint, on or about October 2016, Jena Young, formerly employed in the District’s accounting office, asked Petitioner to sign a form related to grant accounting. Ms. Young was not Petitioner’s supervisor. Petitioner stated that he did not want to sign the form because he believed there was incorrect information on the form. Petitioner was not forced to sign the form, and was not told he must sign the form or face adverse consequences. Ultimately, he did not sign the form. The District maintains a rule governing harassment in the workplace. The rule provides a complaint procedure for employees to complain of harassment. The rule provides multiple avenues for employees to report harassment, and provides that complaints will be investigated and discipline meted out for employees impermissibly harassing others in violation of the rule. The rule prohibits retaliation against an employee who files a complaint. Notably, Petitioner never filed a harassment complaint about conduct occurring subsequent to July 1, 2016, despite his being aware of the rule. Petitioner’s protected activity at issue in this case concerns his June 27th Complaint and varied grievances that he filed while he was an employee at FCTC prior to July 1, 2016. Petitioner only offered three grievances into evidence--his first grievance, his ninth grievance and his tenth grievance-- all lodged prior to July 1, 2016, and all concerning the conduct of administrators at FCTC while it was still operated by FCTI and not the District. Petitioner’s first grievance was filed on May 21, 2015, alleging that FCTC’s then-president, Sandra Fortner, engaged in nepotism by hiring her friends and family, and that he experienced a hostile work environment because a co-worker, William Waterman, was rude to him in meetings and in e-mails. Petitioner does not allege in this grievance that he was being discriminated against on the basis of a protected class or that he believed anyone else was being discriminated against or adversely affected because of their protected class. Petitioner’s ninth and tenth grievances, both filed on June 13, 2016, allege that Ms. Fortner engaged in nepotism by hiring her associates, and that Stephanie Thomas, FCTC’s Human Resources Director, and Ms. Stauffacher, were complicit in that nepotism. Indeed, Petitioner testified that the thrust of these grievances was that members of potential protected classes did not get to interview for jobs at FCTC, not because of those protected classes, but because they were not Ms. Fortner’s friends or family. Ms. Mittelstadt had not seen the grievances that Petitioner filed, and had no knowledge of the June 27th Complaint when she determined that his contract be allowed to expire pursuant to its terms and his position eliminated. Petitioner introduced no evidence that Ms. Mittelstadt ever saw any of his grievances or the June 27th Complaint at the time she made the decision to eliminate his position. Ms. Mittelstadt credibly testified that none of Petitioner’s grievances, requests for grievances, e-mails related to grievances, or his June 27th Complaint played any role in her recommendation that his position be eliminated.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Gregory R. Lulkoski in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of June, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 2019. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Gregory Ryan Lulkoski 212 River Island Circle St. Augustine, Florida 32095 (eServed) Michael P. Spellman, Esquire Sniffen & Spellman, P.A. 123 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Jeffrey Douglas Slanker, Esquire Sniffen & Spellman, P.A. 123 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Robert J. Sniffen, Esquire Sniffen & Spellman, P.A. 123 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57120.686.10760.10760.11 DOAH Case (2) 17-238517-5192
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PAUL INACIO vs GULF POWER COMPANY/CRIST ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, 90-002709 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida May 02, 1990 Number: 90-002709 Latest Update: May 14, 1991

Findings Of Fact Born in Rio de Janeiro, petitioner Paul Sergio Inacio emigrated to the United States from Brazil in 1961, when he was still a teenager. He first worked for respondent for a brief time in 1976. On June 6, 1980, he returned to respondent's employ as a journeyman welder mechanic at Crist Electric Generating Plant, a position he still held at the time of hearing. A "mile square with seven generating units" (T.187), the plant is in Florida, as are respondent's headquarters. Several hundred people work for respondent at Crist Electric Generating Plant alone. In "late June, 1980" (T.235) somebody began calling Mr. Inacio "Julio," nicknaming him after a Hispanic character in a television series (Sanford & Son). The actor portraying Julio "used to drag a goat through the living room . . . and acted . . . stupid." T.236; T.64. Despite (or perhaps because of) petitioner's telling people he did not like being called "Julio," the sobriquet caught on. Even during his initial eight-month probationary period, he made his objections known. T.115, 180. He felt freer to press the point, once the probationary period ended, although at least one friend advised him to do so might be counterproductive T.235-6. Mr. Inacio never referred to himself as Julio. T.28, 99-100, 115, 146-7, 180, 194, 198. Once "he almost got in a fight with [a co-worker] because the guy called him my little Puerto Rican buddy Julio." T.28. Before he retired from his employment as a supervisor with respondent, on July 30, 1987, Murdock P. Walley repeatedly addressed, or referred to petitioner in his presence, as "Julio," "wop," "spic," and "greaser." Mr. Walley's last day at work was "in April or along about then." T.472. Behind petitioner's back, Mr. Carnley heard Mr. Walley refer to petitioner as "wetback," "wop" or "the greaser." T. 27. Co-workers have called him "spic," "wetback," and "greaser" to his face, (T.30) as well as behind his back. Mr. Peakman, another maintenance supervisor, testified that he was guilty of a single lapse: I didn't see him and I asked, "Where's Julio?" And then I caught myself, I said, "Excuse me, where's Mr. Inacio?" I corrected myself right then. T.455. In or about January of 1989, (T.271), Jimmy Lavon Sherouse, maintenance superintendent since May of 1987, referred to petitioner as "Julio" at least once, in the break room. Willard A. Douglas, a supervisor of maintenance at the plant since December of 1981, referred to petitioner as "Julio" frequently. Described as abrasive, Mr. Douglas, also known as "Bubba," has "single[d] Paul out." T.46. But it appeared at hearing at least as likely that Mr. Douglas singled petitioner out because of a run-in which had nothing to do with Mr. Inacio's background, as that he discriminated against him on account of national origin. Prior to June of 1989, continuously since 1981 (T.29), Howard Keels, Calvin Harris, Mike Taylor, Ronnie Yates, and Bill Sabata, Control Center supervisors, C. B. Hartley, supervisor over the coal docks, John Spence and David Hansford, both maintenance supervisors at the time, Mike Snuggs, Joe Patterson, Ed Lepley, Tommy Stanley and Dennis Cowan, supervisors of the laboratory department, Dennis Berg and Joe Kight, schedulers, Tom Talty, the assistant plant manager, Joe Lalas and Larry Swindell, both operations supervisors, all called petitioner "Julio" "[t]o his face in [the] presence" (T.27) of Ricky Carnley, a fellow welder mechanic who testified at hearing. T.21-26. Others also heard supervisors call petitioner "Julio." T.79-80, 110, 144-6, 178-9, 195-6, 237-9, 537-8. Not without reason, petitioner came to feel that "(a)nything associated with Hispanic heritage that could come up, I was called at some point or other by practically anybody." T.267. Angelo Grellia, a fellow mechanic who testified "I'm a wop, you know" (T.79) (emphasis added) remembered co-workers calling petitioner a "wop." A newspaper cartoon posted on a bulletin board in the employee break room (not the bulletin board reserved exclusively for management's use) depicted a man using a two-by-four. Petitioner "is known for using two-by-fours a lot to move stuff, pry stuff for leverage." T.34. The cartoon was labelled "Julio." Another time somebody posted a newspaper clipping, a report of a parricide, complete with picture; the killer's name had been lined through and Mr. Inacio's had been substituted. T.112, 158, 179. After two days, a fellow employee took it down (T.158), apparently without Mr. Inacio's ever seeing it. Still another time somebody posted "a National Geographic picture" (T.181) that resembled petitioner "and the caption said, can you guess who this is." T.181. Somebody had guessed and written in "Julio." T.243. According to uncontroverted testimony, white Anglo-Saxon men "were not selected to be the butt of these sorts of jokes." T.159. Over the plant's public address system, in Mr. Talty's presence, Charles Brown referred to petitioner as "Paul Inasshole," a play on his surname. T.25. No other employee was ridiculed in such a fashion, as far as the evidence showed, (T.49) but broadcasts in a similarly offensive vein ("An asshole" "A nasty hole") took place repeatedly over respondent's public address system. T. 24-25, 48-49, 71, 144-146, 163, 240. At all pertinent times, respondent had widely disseminated written equal opportunity and affirmative action policies with the stated "intent . . . to provide all employees with a wholesome work environment." Respondent's Exhibit No. 2. "Company policy prohibits intimidation or harassment of its employees by any employee or supervisor." Id. But, as Barbara Louise Mallory, an "Equal Employment Opportunity representative" (T.477) in respondent's employ, conceded, the "conduct that went on was against [Gulf Power's] policies and against the law." T.484. Respondent's Exhibit No. 2 stated that employees "subjected to conduct which violates this policy should report such incidences to their immediate supervisor, a higher level of supervision, or the Company's Equal Employment Opportunity Representative in the Corporate Office." Id. In the present case, both respondent's immediate supervisors and "a higher level of supervision," were well aware of the harassment to which petitioner was subjected, before he officially reported it. Supervisors were themselves guilty of harassment. On February 8, 1988, Mr. Sherouse, the maintenance superintendent, addressed "a routine shift meeting with employees [and] discussed with them the need to refrain from destruction of employees' or company property." Respondent's Exhibit No. 8. Mr. Sherouse "essentially said . . . some employees . . . were being singled out . . . . " T.295. He told employees at the meeting that "such an incident . . . could result in an action up to termination." Id. At the same meeting he "also discussed cartoons and calendars that could be considered . . . racial or sexual harassment . . . [directing that] they must be removed now." Respondent's Exhibit No. 8. These matters were also discussed at an employee information meeting in January of 1989. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. But harassment of petitioner continued. "[Q]uite frequently . . . thick heavy grease would get smeared on his toolbox, underneath the drawers of his toolbox." T.34. The lock on his locker was glued or "zip-gripped" shut several times, and had to be cut to open the locker. Respondent's Exhibit No. He is the only employee (T.39) who had to change clothes because some sort of itching powder was put in his clothes. Somebody put "Persian Blue," a particularly persistent dye, in his glove. At respondent's counsel's behest a list was prepared of "employees who have experienced problems with someone tampering with their tools or person[a]l lockers," Respondent's Exhibit No. 10, during the two years next preceding the list's preparation on August 4, 1989. Of the nine employees listed, seven were white Caucasians whose tools or books had been lost or stolen. 1/ Unlike the native-born men on the list, petitioner and Debbie Mitchell, the only other person listed, were subjected to repeated instances of vandalism and other harassment, including unflattering references in cartoons posted on the bulletin board in the break room. Although petitioner did not request it, management assigned him a new locker, something they did for no other employee. According to a co-worker, petitioner, who once taught welding at Pensacola Junior College, "likes to do a good, clean, responsible job" (T.185) of welding. But, on October 22 and 23, 1988, when petitioner and Millard Hilburn worked on "the #7 bottom ash discharge piping," Respondent's Exhibit No. 21, at Willard Douglas' behest, they failed to stop seepage from the pressurized pipe (which was in use while they worked) by welding, and resorted to epoxy which, in Mr. Douglas' "opinion[,] . . . [was] bad judgement and very poor workmanship." Id. Of 30 or 40 welders respondent employed at Crist, only one or two "still have a clean record. Eventually somebody is going to get a leak." T.202. Petitioner's work record is basically a very good one, although not perfect. Nevertheless Mr. Sherouse, after putting petitioner's name on a list of three "employees who for different reasons are not performing their jobs," Respondent's Exhibit No. 7, summoned petitioner to a conference about his job performance, on January 20, 1989. The other two employees were Scott Allen, whose problem was "attitude . . . distrust, dislike . . . just unbelievable" (T.443; 420) and Ed Lathan who "hadn't been there since June of '87" (T.420) except sporadically "working light duty." T.420. Mr. Sherouse also prepared various memoranda concerning petitioner; and caused other managers to prepare still other memoranda. Only after the January conference was petitioner involved in the repair of a boiler tube that failed. (He welded one end of a replacement piece that may have been improperly sized and had already been welded in place by others.) In contrast to petitioner's involvement in two incidents (only one of which occurred before the filing of the complaint), at least one other welder mechanic working for respondent had made five welds that failed in short order. On April 11, 1989, petitioner was assigned the job of cleaning plugged nozzles on intake screens for units four and five (although ordinarily operators themselves did such routine maintenance.) He first went to the control room for units four and five and asked directions to the intake screens, which are part of the cooling system. Misunderstanding directions, he went to the wrong cooling system intakes, those for units six and seven, instead of those for four and five, and started work without finding a red tag (used to indicate that somebody from operations had "isolated" the equipment) and without placing his own tag on an electrical switch that equipment operators use. He did, however, place tags on valves that had to be opened in order for the system to operate. When Mr. Sherouse heard what had happened he sent Mr. Inacio home from work. Although Mr. Sherouse did not at that time "announce termination or non- termination, pay or no pay" (T.436), petitioner was eventually paid for the time off, which lasted two days during the purported pendency of an investigation, which consisted of "going back and looking at his files." T.437. Without credible contradiction, several people testified that mistaking one piece of equipment for another occurred not infrequently (T.85) at the Crist plant. The evidence showed that much more serious safety lapses had, in general, elicited much milder responses from management. Petitioner was criticized more harshly than non-minority employees for the same or comparable performance. T.31-33, 73-74, 112-120, 130-131, 148-9, 150-4, 186-7, 197, 257- 263. Petitioner's safety record was "better than most." T.424. An Indian who works at the Crist steam plant, Ron Taylor is known as "Indian" or "Chief." T.52. Supervisors referred to Nicholas Peterson as "a damned Greek" (T.111) when he worked at respondent's Crist plant. "From January 1982 until March 1990," just about every supervisor at Crist "refer[red] to some . . . blacks as being niggers." T.135. Objection was sustained to admission of colored Beetle Bailey comic strips crudely altered to depict cartoon characters engaged in oral sex. But Ms. Mitchell testified without objection to other "extremely vulgar cartoons" (T.157) she saw posted on the bulletin boards including one with her name on it. T.159. (When she complained to Mr. Sherouse, he eventually reported back to her that the reference was to a different Debbie.) At Crist Electric "they use the good ole boy theory . . . [i]f you fit into their select group, you're taken in, you're trained . . . you get better selection of jobs. If you're not, you're an outcast." T.136. Petitioner "definitely" got more than his share of "dirty jobs," specifically precipitator work and condenser work. T.183; 85-86, 147-8. Petitioner's "pride was hurt." T.265. He felt humiliated. Unfair criticism affected his morale. T.36. At least one co-worker "could sense . . . that he felt like he was not wanted there." T.37. He considered leaving his employment and even told at least one Gulf Power official that he was doing so. See Respondent's Exhibit No. 3. Discriminatory treatment affected his ability to concentrate, and so his job performance. T.36, 37.

Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the FCHR order respondent to refrain from harassing or otherwise discriminating against petitioner on account of his national origin. That the FCHR award petitioner reasonable attorney's fees and costs. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of May, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of May, 1991.

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000e Florida Laws (3) 760.01760.02760.10
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JERZY JOZEFIK vs H & S SWANSON`S TOOL COMPANY, 02-004728 (2002)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Largo, Florida Dec. 05, 2002 Number: 02-004728 Latest Update: Aug. 31, 2004

The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Petitioner was harassed on the basis of national origin or discriminated against on the basis of a disability.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner began employment with the Respondent in the summer of 1994 and was terminated from his employment on July 28, 1999. The Respondent operates a machine shop where different types of large metal parts are fabricated according to customer order. The Petitioner was employed as a "mill operator" in the "caterpillar" department. As a mill operator, the Petitioner was required to load metal parts into machines for further processing, check the quality of his work, and return the parts to a container of finished parts. At all times material to this case, the Respondent had a policy prohibiting employee harassment on the basis of numerous grounds including "national origin." The policy provided that any employee who believed that such harassment was occurring should report it immediately to a supervisor or to another company official. The non-harassment policy was included in the employee handbook. The Petitioner received the handbook when the Respondent employed him and was aware of the policy. The Petitioner, of Polish origin, asserted that at various times he was harassed on the basis of national origin; specifically, he was sometimes addressed as "pollock" by some co-workers. Although the evidence establishes that employees, perhaps including the Petitioner, occasionally referred to each other by ethnic slurs (i.e., "pollock," "speedy Gonzalez," and "buddha") the testimony regarding such incidents was anecdotal, and the times and dates of such references are uncertain. The evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner was subjected to a hostile work environment or was harassed on the basis of national origin. Other than as set forth herein, the evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner or any other employee ever advised a supervisor or a manager that co-workers were making ethnic references or that any employee felt harassed by the behavior. In March 1998, a note was taped to the men's restroom door reading "Polish Department – Jerry's [sic] Office." The Petitioner reported the note to his supervisor. A meeting was held with the Petitioner's co-workers on March 16, 1998, where the Respondent's managers advised the employees that such behavior was not acceptable and that similar events in the future would result in disciplinary action against the perpetrators. The Petitioner also asserts that he was discriminated against on the basis of an alleged disability. In December 1998, the Petitioner had a total replacement of his right hip. He was medically cleared to return to work on March 1, 1999, with restrictions of not working more than 10 hours per day for two weeks and not lifting more than 20 pounds. The Petitioner reported for work on March 4, 1999, but was sent home by his supervisor because there was no work that met his restrictions, particularly the weight restriction. Generally the metal parts involved in the Respondent's manufacturing process weighed in excess of 20 pounds. By March 18, 1999, the restrictions were lifted and the Petitioner returned to work without incident until July 1999. On July 6, 1999, the Petitioner received a written warning from a plant supervisor who determined that the Petitioner was not properly inspecting parts being produced in the Petitioner's machine. An excessive number of parts were not within acceptable fabrication tolerances and had to be "re- worked." The warning specifically provided that failure to improve the quality and inspection of parts would result in termination of employment. On July 27, 1999, the Petitioner reported hip pain to his physician and was again placed on a restricted workload that included no lifting of weight in excess of 20 pounds and no "twisting" until the physician determined that the pain had been resolved. Based on the medical restrictions and his experience, the Respondent was unable to locate work suitable for the Petitioner. The Petitioner's employment was terminated because there were no jobs available that complied with the Petitioner's medical restrictions. Review of the Petitioner's performance evaluations establishes that he was generally an average worker who was sometimes warned about becoming too involved in other employees' activities. His evaluations of August 1996 and September 1998 contained references to such involvement and indicated that he should "spend less time worrying" about other employees. The 1996, 1997, and 1998 performance evaluations suggested that the Petitioner obtain additional training in order to advance his career. The Respondent offered a program to fund such training, and notices regarding the training were posted on a bulletin board accessible to employees, but the Petitioner did not take advantage of the program. At the time of the July 1999 medical restrictions, the Petitioner's skill set did not qualify him to perform tasks other than as a mill operator using the machine for which he was originally employed.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Jerzy Josefik in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of May, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of May, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jerzy Jozefik 9605 Southwest 27th Avenue Ocala, Florida 34476 Grant D. Petersen, Esquire Ignacio J. Garcia, Esquire Haynsworth Baldwin Johnson & Greaves LLC 600 North Westshore Boulevard, Suite 200 Tampa, Florida 33609-1117 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 12102 Florida Laws (2) 120.569120.57
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VIRGINIA HOWELL vs COLLEGE OF CENTRAL FLORIDA, 19-000029 (2019)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Ocala, Florida Jan. 03, 2019 Number: 19-000029 Latest Update: Sep. 12, 2019

The Issue The issues for determination are: (1) did the College of Central Florida (“CCF”) commit an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of age and/or sex; and (2) did CCF unlawfully retaliate against Petitioner by firing her.

Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: Ms. Howell began working in CCF’s lawn maintenance department on August 17, 2015. She worked 25 hours a week performing activities such as removing weeds, picking up debris, and maintaining the flower beds around CCF’s campus. CCF’s lawn maintenance department consisted of approximately 20 people, but Ms. Howell was the only female. At the time of the final hearing, Ms. Howell was 67 years old. Tommy Morelock, CCF’s director of facilities, made the decision to hire Ms. Howell. Ms. Howell claims that her co-workers mistreated her. For example, she asserts that there were at least three occasions when co-workers intentionally drove a four-wheel drive vehicle or a pickup truck into a golf cart driven by her. Another alleged incident involved a co-worker running a finger down her neck. In addition, Thomas Smith supposedly “flipped her off” on numerous occasions throughout her tenure at CCF and referred to her as a “f***ing c*nt.” In approximately August of 2016, after a co-worker allegedly used a vehicle to strike a golf cart driven by Ms. Howell, her fiancée, Newell Melton, called CCF in order to lodge a complaint with Mr. Morelock. Mr. Melton ultimately spoke with Katherine Hunt, one of Mr. Morelock’s subordinates and CCF’s manager of facility operations and construction projects. Ms. Hunt met with Ms. Howell soon afterward about these alleged incidents. Ms. Howell also described how her male co- workers would grab themselves between the legs. However, Ms. Howell did not indicate that those actions were directed toward her. Ms. Howell did not mention any improper conduct by Thomas Smith during her meeting with Ms. Hunt. In late 2016 or early 2017, Ms. Howell also met with Mark Sakowski, another of Mr. Morelock’s subordinates and CCF’s manager of plant safety and facility operations, about one of the vehicle incidents. Mr. Sakowski told Ms. Howell that he would talk to the co-worker in question and asked her to bring any future issues to his attention. Ms. Howell did not mention anything to Mr. Sakowski about Thomas Smith directing obscene gestures toward her. After the meeting, Mr. Sakowski spoke to employees within the lawn maintenance department about professionalism, safety, and having respect for others. Ms. Howell never filed a formal complaint with CCF about her co-workers’ alleged misconduct. At Mr. Morelock’s request, Ms. Howell met with him and Caroline Smith, CCF’s equity officer, on June 7, 2017, to discuss her complaints. During this meeting, Ms. Howell described: (a) how her co-workers would drive vehicles into golf carts she was occupying; (b) the incident in which a co-worker ran a finger down her neck; and (c) a rumor among her co-workers that she was planning to file a sexual harassment complaint. As CCF’s equity officer, Ms. Smith is responsible for investigating student and employee claims of discrimination or harassment. After hearing Ms. Smith’s description of the alleged incidents, she concluded that the allegations involved inappropriate “horseplay” rather than age and/or gender-based discrimination. She then explained CCF’s employee complaint procedure to Ms. Howell, but Ms. Howell declined to initiate a formal complaint. Ms. Howell did not mention Mr. Smith’s alleged misconduct during her meeting with Mr. Morelock and Ms. Smith. In a memorandum dated June 7, 2017, and addressed to Ms. Howell, Mr. Morelock wrote the following: As discussed in our 11:00 AM meeting today with the College Equity Officer, Mrs. Smith, to address your complaints regarding horseplay in the workplace, rumors, and possible harassment, I have met with the 3 employees in your complaint and have addressed these issues. Please let me know immediately if there are any further incidents or if you have any additional concerns. Mr. Morelock noted in the memorandum that Ms. Hunt, Mr. Sakowski, and Ms. Smith received copies. Ms. Howell received a copy of Mr. Morelock’s memorandum shortly after their meeting. At approximately 12:30 p.m. on July 19, 2017, Ms. Howell was nearing the end of her workday and driving a golf cart. She crossed paths with a vehicle driven by Mr. Smith and noticed in her rearview mirror that Mr. Smith was directing an obscene gesture toward her.2/ Ms. Howell proceeded on her way to leaving the CCF campus. However, she reversed course and, with the assistance of another co-worker, spent approximately ten minutes driving around the CCF campus looking for Mr. Smith. Upon finding Mr. Smith at the back of the CCF campus planting junipers, Ms. Howell exited the golf cart and angrily told Mr. Smith to stop directing obscene gestures toward her. According to Mr. Smith, Ms. Howell went into a “tirade.” After confronting Mr. Smith, Ms. Howell left the campus without reporting this new incident to any supervisors. As far as she knew, none of the pertinent supervisors were available. Mr. Smith felt threatened and immediately sought out Mr. Sakowski. Mr. Smith reported that Ms. Howell demanded that he stop spreading rumors about her, and Ms. Howell supposedly stated that CCF, Mr. Smith, and Mr. Smith’s wife “would be sorry.”3/ Rather than obtaining Ms. Howell’s version of the confrontation, Mr. Sakowski and Ms. Hunt spoke to Mr. Morelock, who was on vacation at the time. Mr. Morelock recommended that they confer with CCF’s director of Human Resources and authorized them to resolve the matter as they saw fit. Mr. Sakowski and Ms. Smith called Ms. Howell on July 21, 2017, and notified her that she had been fired. The only explanation given to Ms. Howell was that she did not work well with supervisors and co-workers. Mr. Sakowski explained that he was concerned about his staff’s safety and that of CCF’s students: We take safety very seriously on the campus. And in this day and age with mass-casualty and active-shooter scenarios, we practice these drills on campus on an annual basis. And it did scare me that -- I did not want it [to] make national news. Mr. Sakowski was also concerned by the fact that Ms. Howell confronted Mr. Smith rather than reporting his obscene gesture to a supervisor: Instead of coming back onto campus after leaving her shift, she should have come into the building and either got myself or Ms. Hunt at that time and explained what had just happened instead of taking matters into her own hands. Because Mr. Morelock’s memorandum to Ms. Howell directed her to “[p]lease let me know immediately if there are any further incidents or if you have any additional concerns,” Ms. Hunt considered Ms. Howell to be insubordinate when she confronted Mr. Smith on July 19, 2017.4/ This was the first disciplinary action that CCF had taken against Ms. Howell. Since being fired by CCF, Ms. Howell has unsuccessfully applied for two positions, a greeter at a hospital and a landscaping technician at a local cemetery. While she considers herself to be retired, Ms. Howell is still looking for employment. Ultimate Findings Ms. Howell persuasively testified that Mr. Smith directed an obscene gesture toward her on July 19, 2017. However, the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that CCF did not know nor should have known that Mr. Smith directed obscene gestures and/or language toward Ms. Howell. While Ms. Howell consistently testified that she did not discuss Mr. Smith’s conduct with Mr. Sakowski or Ms. Hunt, she gave conflicting testimony as to whether she reported Mr. Smith’s conduct to Mr. Morelock during their meeting on June 7, 2017. In contrast, Carol Smith, CCF’s equity officer, persuasively testified that Mr. Smith’s conduct was not discussed during that meeting.5/

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of June, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 2019.

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000e Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57120.68509.092760.01760.10760.11 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60Y-4.016 DOAH Case (1) 19-0029
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