The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the offense alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated March 9, 2001, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Commission is the state agency responsible for certifying and revoking the certification of law enforcement officers in Florida. See §§ 943.12(3) and 943.1395, Fla. Stat. (2004). Mr. Rendon is a Florida-certified law enforcement and corrections officer. Mr. Rendon's first contact with Sheila Smith and Kimberly Ann Sturtz, Mrs. Smith's daughter, was in November 1998, when Ms. Sturtz called the police after an argument with her mother. At all times material to this proceeding, Ms. Sturtz was a child under 16 years of age. In December 1998, Mr. Rendon was dispatched to the Smith residence when Mrs. Smith called the police as a result of a fight with her son, Travis Caley. Mr. Rendon arrested Travis on December 2, 1998, and Travis was subsequently placed in a foster home. Mr. Rendon developed an interest in Travis and the Smith family, and he periodically contacted a representative of the Florida Department of Children and Family Services to check on Travis's situation. Mr. Rendon also talked to Travis on the telephone. Mr. Rendon often telephoned Mrs. Smith or went to the Smith residence to give her news about Travis, and Mrs. Smith often telephoned Mr. Rendon. Mr. Rendon had Mrs. Smith's and Kimberly's cell phone and pager numbers, and he used a code when he paged them, so they would know to call him back. He frequently paged Kimberly during the day. Mr. Rendon visited the Smith residence several times when Mr. and Mrs. Smith were home. He also stopped at the Smith residence when Mr. and Mrs. Smith were not at home and Ms. Sturtz was at the residence alone or with a friend named Alicia Cox, who lived across the street from the Smith residence. During these visits, Ms. Sturtz and Mr. Rendon talked but generally stayed outside the house, on the porch or in the yard. Mr. Rendon's visits to the Smith residence were not as frequent between February and April 1999, during the time Mr. Rendon was assigned to patrol an area of Lake County that was a considerable distance from the Smith's residence. His visits increased after April 1999, when he was assigned to patrol an area that included the Smith's residence. During this time, he often visited Ms. Sturtz when her parents were not at home. On May 27, 1999, Mr. Rendon stopped at the Smith's residence at a time when Ms. Sturtz was alone. Mr. Rendon and Ms. Sturtz sat on the porch for a while, talking. During this conversation, Ms. Sturtz told Mr. Rendon that she had a "crush" on him. Ms. Sturtz and Mr. Rendon subsequently entered the house, where Mr. Rendon asked Ms. Sturtz what she would do if he kissed her; Ms. Sturtz told him that she would probably kiss him back. Ms. Sturtz's back was against the wall inside the door, and Mr. Rendon held Ms. Sturtz's hands over her head; he kissed her; asked her to stick out her tongue so that he could suck on it; ran his hands down the sides of her body, grazing the sides of her breasts; lifted her skirt; licked and kissed the area around her navel; and stuck his tongue in her navel. Ms. Sturtz became frightened and asked Mr. Rendon to stop, which Mr. Rendon did. Ms. Sturtz observed that Mr. Rendon appeared to be sexually aroused during the incident and had a wet spot on the front of his trousers. Ms. Sturtz was 14 years old at the time of this incident. Mr. Rendon was arrested on June 9, 1999, for lewd and lascivious conduct with a child under 16 years of age. On or about October 13, 2000, Mr. Rendon entered a plea of nolo contendere to two charges of misdemeanor battery, defined in Section 784.03, in the Circuit Court of the Fifth Circuit in Lake County, Florida. These charges were based on the incident involving Ms. Sturtz that took place at the Smith residence on May 27, 1999. A judgment was entered adjudicating Mr. Rendon guilty of these crimes. The evidence presented by the Commission is sufficient to establish that Mr. Rendon failed to maintain good moral character. He touched Ms. Sturtz in a lewd and lascivious manner on May 27, 1999, and his actions also constituted misdemeanor battery.2
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order finding that David Rendon failed to maintain good moral character, as required by Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (1999), and that his certification as a law enforcement officer should be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S PATRICIA M. HART Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2005.
Findings Of Fact On December 20, 1985, Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission and issued certificate no. 14-84-502-04. Respondent's work in law enforcement in Florida has been as a correctional officer. On the night of December 27, 1986, Respondent left his home to go to the American Legion in Lake City, Florida. On his way he met his friend Eddie Goodbread, Jr. Goodbread asked the Respondent if he could go with him to the American Legion Club. The Respondent agreed to have Goodbread come with him. Once at the American Legion the two men socialized. When they got ready to leave the club the Respondent left with his girlfriend. Goodbread took the Respondent's car and parked it on Myrtle Street. Goodbread then went with the Respondent and the Respondent's girlfriend and another person, which the Respondent describes as a girl, to the house of a friend other than Goodbread. At that point the Respondent and Goodbread split up again. Respondent was then with his girlfriend and Goodbread had the keys to Respondent's car. The Respondent came back later and met with Goodbread. Prior to the rendezvous, while Respondent had been with his girlfriend in her car, he had placed a .25 caliber automatic pistol in the glove box of that car. He had a license to carry this weapon issued by local authorities. The weapon was not contemplated as being a necessary item for his work as a correctional officer. When the Respondent got out of his girlfriend's car and approached Goodbread, the Respondent had the pistol in his coat pocket. Respondent told Goodbread that he was ready to go home because he had to go to work the next morning. Goodbread said, in kidding with the Respondent, that he did not have the car keys and that he had locked them in the car. Respondent recognized that he was joking with him. Nonetheless, Respondent looked in the car and saw that the keys were not there. Respondent returned to Goodbread and told Goodbread to give him his keys. Goodbread again told Respondent that the keys were locked in the car. Respondent told Goodbread that he was starting to go home. Goodbread's reaction to this remark was to get in the car and say "let's go." Goodbread then jumped out of the car and said that he was not ready to go. Respondent told him to come on and give him his keys. Respondent told Goodbread "come on man. Let's go." Goodbread told Respondent that he wasn't ready to go that he wanted to talk to some girl. Respondent said "come on let's go." Respondent took the gun out and said "you are going to make me put this on you. Come on let's go." Goodbread grabbed the gun unexpectedly and the gun discharged and killed Goodbread. Respondent never intended to injure Goodbread in his display of the pistol. Eight or ten witnesses saw the incident. It was investigated by the Lake City Police Department and Respondent cooperated in that endeavor to include turning over the pistol to the police and giving a voluntary statement about the incident. Respondent was charged through the Grand Jury of Columbia County, Florida, with the exhibition of the handgun in a rude, careless, angry, or threatening manner, not in necessary self defense and contrary to Section 790.10, Florida Statutes. A copy of that indictment may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. As set forth in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, Respondent plead guilty to the offense and was fined $176. The firearm was forfeited to the state, he received 11 days in jail and a condition was placed upon him not to possess a firearm for one year. Respondent claims that as a consequence of the incident with his friend Goodbread he began to drink more than he had before. There being no frame of reference to compare his drinking habits before and after the incident, this comment has little utility in understanding his motivation to drink and drive. It has been established that on September 13, 1987, in the early morning hours of that day, specifically around 1:30 a.m., the Respondent was observed by Deputy Sheriff Charles R. Tate of the Columbia County, Florida Sheriff's office, driving in a reckless manner. In this incident the Respondent pulled out of Church Street onto Bay Avenue in Lake City, Florida, in a reckless manner. The officer speeded up in his attempt to stop the Respondent and engaged the emergency equipment in the officer's car. Respondent went west bound on Bay and turned south on Marion Street which is U.S. 41. In the course of this pursuit Respondent accelerated to speeds up to 65 miles per hour. Respondent finally pulled over around the intersection of Marion Street and Grandview Avenue. Respondent cooperated with Officer Tate in the investigation of the driving offense. This included the officer noting that the Respondent had the smell of alcohol about his person. As a consequence, the Respondent was asked to perform certain activities associated with a field sobriety test to ascertain if Respondent was capable of operating his motor vehicle. When the Respondent tried to perform the finger to nose test which is given with each hand, he was unable to do that with either hand. In trying to perform the walking test Respondent staggered and when he made the return trip in the walking test he nearly fell over and had to support himself. From the observations of the Respondent Officer Tate believed that the Respondent was driving under the influence when the stop was made. He arrested the Respondent for that offense and took him to the Florida Highway Patrol station where Robert Bellamy, a trained breathalyzer operator, administered a breathalyzer test to the Respondent. The results show that the Respondent was registering at .16 at 2:25 a.m., and registering at .15 at 2:27 a.m. with .10 being the legal presumption for impairment. Respondent was then taken to the Columbia County Jail. While at the jail correctional officer Jacklyn Yvonne Jones- Holland attempted to fingerprint his right hand. Ms. Holland knew of the Respondent before this evening but had had no opportunity before to speak to the Respondent. In the course of the fingerprinting Respondent took his left hand and rubbed it on the side of the officer's leg in the area of her groin. The first time he did this she stepped back on the chance that the Respondent was unaware of what he was doing at the time. However, when she moved the Respondent again put his hand on her leg in the area of her groin. Based upon the facts of this case in which Officer Tate describes the quality of the Respondent's impairment on a scale of 1 to 10, as being a 5 and Ms. Holland describes this impairment to be 6 or 7 on a scale of 1 to 10, Respondent is not found to be so under the influence that he did not realize what he was doing when inappropriately touching Ms. Holland in two instances. When he touched her the second time Ms. Holland went to another part of the building and made out a complaint against the Respondent for his assault and he was arrested for that offense. An Officer Myers read the Respondent his rights related to the assault during which conversation Respondent said, "I'm drunk. Oh yeah, that's what I'm here for. I'm drunk." There was no verbal exchange between the Respondent and Ms. Holland during the inappropriate touching. Ms. Holland had not invited those actions by the Respondent. The Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 3 constitutes the Florida Uniform Traffic Citation for the offense of driving under the influence and the disposition of that case in which the Respondent was fined $411, had his license suspended for six months, and attended school for persons who have driven under the influence. He also attended Alcoholics Anonymous and received other counseling contemplated for persons who may have drinking problems. Respondent says that he does not drink at present and no evidence was offered which would refute that claim. Respondent was charged under information with the unlawful, intentional and knowing touching or striking of Jacklyn Yvonne Jones-Holland and plead guilty to battery. He received a period of probation of one year for that offense. Certified copies of the information and order withholding adjudication of guilt and placing the defendant on probation can be found as exhibit numbers 5 and 4 respectively. The reckless display of the firearm leading to the death of his friend, and the battery committed on Ms. Holland are all indications of a lack of good moral character and are events for which the Respondent has no acceptable explanation or excuse. Driving under the influence is reprehensible but does not show a lack of good moral character.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered suspending the certificate of the Respondent for a period of six months. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of December, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-3816 The facts as presented by the Respondent are commented on as follows: Paragraphs 1-5 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 6 is not accepted to the extent that it argues that the incident involving the death of Mr. Goodbread is directly responsible for the fact that the Respondent was driving under the influence on the night in question and committed the battery on Ms. Holland. Furthermore, the suggestion that the Respondent was too under the influence to understand the fact of his battery against Ms. Holland is rejected. His testimony that he does not have a recollection of touching Ms. Holland runs contrary to the impression of the facts, that impression being that the act of the Respondent was volitional. The idea of his cooperation with Trooper Bellamy in the administration of the breathalyzer examination and the efforts to comply with what was expected of him in responding to the circumstance of the driving under influence offense is recognized as mitigation, but does not explain away the offense. The suggestion in Paragraph 7 that the death of the friend and the driving under the influence are interrelated is not accepted. Respondent did indicate that he was emotionally upset over the death of his friend, this would be expected but it is not clear to what extent his drinking increased following the death of the friend as compared to his drinking habits before that time. Respondent's suggestion that he is free from the effects of alcohol problems at present was not refuted. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that he presently has any problem with alcohol abuse. Reference to other traffic violations and his service record as a correctional officer leaves a neutral impression of the Respondent which is neither to his advantage or that of the Petitioner. Consequently, the facts of those prior events have not been reported in the fact-finding set forth in the Recommended Order. Paragraph 8 is contrary to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Stephen A. Smith, Esquire Post Office Drawer 1792 Lake City, Florida 32056-1792 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Moore, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 =================================================================
The Issue Whether the unit described in the petition is appropriate. Whether the Petitioner is an Employee Organization within the definition of Ch. 447, F. S.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent misused her position as an Orlando city commissioner by attempting, on May 6, 2006, to influence how the Orlando Police Department (the police department) handled a routine traffic stop involving her son in violation of Subsection 112.313(6), Florida Statutes (2005).1
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating compliance with the Code of Ethics applicable to public officers and employees pursuant to Chapter 112, Part III. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent has been a public officer, a commissioner of the City of Orlando, Florida. Respondent is African-American, as are her two sons Mr. Sean Lynum and Mr. Juan Lynum. At 12:50 a.m., on May 6, 2006, Officer Matthew Ochiuzzo was on duty for the police department patrolling the Paramore neighborhood in Orlando less than a mile from Rock Lake Drive. Officer Ochiuzzo stopped Mr. Juan Lynum because of an inoperable headlight on the vehicle Mr. Lynum was driving.2 Mr. Lynum was driving Respondent’s vehicle home from a fraternity party to Respondent’s residence on Rock Lake Drive in Orlando, Florida. Mr. Lynum shared the residence with Respondent at the time. Neither Respondent nor Mr. Lynum were aware that a headlight on the vehicle was not working. Mr. Lynum telephoned Respondent from his cellular telephone. He informed Respondent that he was being stopped by a Caucasian police officer and expressed his concern that he was the victim of racial profiling. Respondent telephoned then Chief Michael McCoy of the police department at his home and expressed her concern that Mr. Lynum was the victim of racial profiling. Chief McCoy said he would telephone the watch commander on duty and have him deal with the allegation of racial profiling. Respondent then telephoned Officer Roderick Johnson, the police liaison officer assigned to Respondent and an officer first class in the police department. Officer Johnson was engaged in approved off-duty employment to provide security at a local night club. Respondent had time to disclose the general location of the traffic stop and her concern that her son was being racially profiled when she terminated the conversation to take a return telephone call from Chief McCoy. Respondent clearly intended to influence how the police department handled the traffic stop. Respondent did not expressly request intervention in the traffic stop by Chief McCoy or Officer Johnson, but Respondent admits that the purpose of her action was to alert both men to possible racial profiling and to monitor the traffic stop. Respondent used her official position to influence the traffic stop of her son. Both Chief McCoy and Officer Johnson interpreted a telephone call from a city commissioner at approximately 1:00 a.m. in the morning to be a request for action in her official duty as a commissioner.3 The testimony of Chief McCoy is illustrative. Q. Chief, when you received that call from Commissioner Lynum, did you feel you needed to act based on the phone call? A. She’s a Commissioner, yes. Act then, yes. . . . Q. . . . When you answered that she was a Commissioner, what did you mean by that? How did that impact you? A. I used to make the analogy that our Commissioners were our board of directors, because I spent some time in the private sector, and you know, they drive the direction of the city, police department being part of that. So they’re a Commissioner. They’re elected by the people, so, yeah, pay attention to a Commissioner call, as I would a Mayor call. Q. So when you responded to her, were you responding as a friend or as a commissioner? A. As a commissioner. Transcript (TR) at 258-259 and 277. Officer Johnson took it upon himself to call Officer Ochiuzzo, by radio and then by cell phone, during the traffic stop. A call from a city commissioner at approximately 1:00 a.m. motivated Officer Johnson to take action. Officer Ochiuzzo terminated the traffic stop after discussing the matter with Officer Johnson and never spoke to the watch commander on duty during the traffic stop. Officer Ochiuzzo had intended to issue a traffic summons to Mr. Lynum for an inoperable headlight, no registration, and no proof of car insurance. The benefit sought by Respondent in her attempt to influence how the police department handled the traffic stop involving her son was not to prevent her son from receiving a traffic citation. When Mr. Lynum arrived at Respondent’s home after the traffic stop, Respondent discovered that the headlight on her vehicle was inoperable. She telephoned Officer Johnson and asked him to ensure that a traffic citation was forwarded to her. The benefit sought by Respondent was to prevent racial profiling during an ongoing traffic stop by complaining directly to the chief. That was a special benefit or privilege available to Respondent that was not available to a member of the public through the police department’s bias free policing policy. The police department’s bias free policing policy was drafted by legal counsel for the department and was adopted in June 15, 2004. The policy required a member of the public who alleged racial profiling to file a written complaint on a form provided by the department and required the department to investigate the alleged profiling. Respondent was personally familiar with the police department’s bias free policing policy. Respondent was very active in the community, supported the bias free policing policy, and assisted her constituents in processing profiling complaints. Mr. Lynum later filed a complaint of racial profiling pursuant to the bias free policing policy. The police department investigation exonerated Officer Ochiuzzo. Exoneration means the department found Officer Ochiuzzo to be innocent of the charges in the complaint. Exoneration differs from “not sustained” in that the latter means only that the proof is insufficient to support a finding of guilt. When Respondent telephoned Chief McCoy and her liaison officer at approximately 1:00 a.m. on the morning of May 6, 2006, Respondent acted with wrongful intent for the purpose of benefiting another person from an act or omission during an active traffic stop. Respondent acted in a manner that was inconsistent with her public duties. Respondent testified that she called Chief McCoy and Officer Johnson, not in her capacity as commissioner, but as a mother fearful for the safety of her son. Mr. Lynum testified that he sought his mother’s help out concern for his safety at the hands of a Caucasian police officer. The fact-finder finds the testimony of both witnesses to be less than credible and persuasive. Mr. Lynum was on his cell phone when Officer Ochiuzzo approached the vehicle driven by Mr. Lynum. Mr. Lynum virtually ignored Officer Ochiuzzo. The actions of Mr. Lynum in ignoring an investigating officer risked antagonizing the officer and are inconsistent with a person in fear of physical harm. The testimony of Officer Ochiuzzo is illustrative. Q. So what did you do next? A. I exited my patrol vehicle and I approached Mr. Lynum’s car. . . . Q. Okay. What happened next? A. He was on his cell phone when I approached the window and the window was up, and I told him I was conducting a traffic stop and that I needed his license and registration, proof of insurance, and he didn’t respond. Q. So at the initial approach of the vehicle, did you make any other gestures to get the driver’s attention or did you solely use voice commands? A. Voice commands combined with my patrol car lights and chirping of the siren. Q. So when you made these initial voice commands, did the driver respond? A. No. Q. So what did you do next to get his attention? A. . . . I took my flashlight and I tapped the window to get the driver’s attention and instructed him again that I was conducting a traffic stop and I needed a license, registration, proof of insurance. Q. And at that point did Mr. Lynum engage in the traffic stop? A. No. Q. What did he do? A. He ignored it once again. He was on the cell phone. And so I pulled the door open and I told him that I was conducting a traffic stop. I needed his license, registration, proof of insurance. TR at 35-36. Officer Ochiuzzo returned to his patrol vehicle and began writing a uniform traffic citation when he was interrupted by the radio inquiry, which concluded by cell phone, from the liaison officer for Respondent. Officer Johnson informed Officer Ochiuzzo that Officer Johnson was Commissioner Lynum’s liaison officer and that Officer Ochiuzzo had stopped the commissioner’s son. After the conversation, Officer Ochiuzzo terminated the traffic stop. When Officer Ochiuzzo pointed patrol vehicle lights into the rearview mirror of the vehicle of Mr. Lynum, shined a flashlight beam into the vehicle, and kept his free hand on top of his holstered pistol, it was not a threat to Mr. Lynum. It was standard procedure for traffic stops at that hour. When Officer Ochiuzzo was yelling at Mr. Lynum, it was because Mr. Lynum had ignored the officer’s earlier attempts to redirect Mr. Lynum from the cell phone conversation and had failed to lower the window so the officer would not have been required to yell to be heard. Mr. Lynum is an attorney who is familiar with police procedures during traffic stops through instructions from his father who was a law enforcement officer from 1969 through 1987 and ended his career as the chief of the Wildwood Police Department in Wildwood, Florida. Sean Lynum, Mr. Lynum’s brother, is a former officer in the same police department as Officer Ochiuzzo. Respondent is very active in the community and familiar with police procedure. A common safety precaution for a person who suspects he or she is a victim of racial profiling during a traffic stop is to ensure the site of the stop is well lighted and that the person is in contact by cell phone with a person who can be a witness. Mr. Lynum followed both precautions. He stopped in a well-lit area, and he was on his cell phone. Complaints of racial profiling in the area had declined from 23 the year before Chief McCoy became the chief of the department to a consistent annual range of six to eight. Racial profiling was not an issue in the area until after Mr. Lynum made his complaint. The testimony of Chief McCoy is illustrative. This, after the fact, became quite a community event or issue, which sparked a lot of accusations of racial profiling. Our policy had been in effect as long as it’s been in effect. The year before I was Chief, there was like 23 total racial profiling complaints made. The year I became Chief that dropped to like six or eight and that was-–that number was pretty consistent. Even after we had this community event issue, they still never got over 10, total. The key is that if you have a complaint, you need to follow up on it. If people feel like they were stopped simply because they were-–of their race, then you need to do the form and do it right and the officers know that-–or knew that. Q. So, really, it did not become a community issue until after Commissioner Lynum’s son was stopped, racial profiling? A. That would definitely be my perspective . . . . it was not an issue. TR at 278-279.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order and public report finding that Respondent violated Subsection 112.313(6) and publicly censuring and reprimanding Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd of February, 2009.
Findings Of Fact The PBA originally filed a petition with PERC requesting recognition as the exclusive representative for collective bargaining purposes of the same, or a similar unit of employees as are involved in this case during the spring of 1975. The Alachua County Sheriff's Department was named as the public employer in that petition. The petition was given PERC No. 8H-RA-756-2024 and was dismissed by PERC. On August 5, 1975, the PBA filed the instant petition. (See: Hearing Officer's Exhibit 1). On February 16, 1976, the PBA, through its attorney prepared a PERC withdrawal request, asking that withdrawal of the instant petition be approved by PERC. The request was forwarded to PERC on February 16, and was accompanied by a recognition certification petition reflecting that the Sheriff's Department had recognized the PBA as the exclusive bargaining agent for units of employees substantially similar to those involved in the instant petition. (See: Hearing's Officer's Exhibit 5). The final hearing was scheduled to be conducted on February 19, 1976. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 2). The PBA is an employee organization within the meaning of Florida Statutes 447.002(10). (Stipulation, Transcript Page 18, 19). 1/ The PBA has requested recognition as the bargaining agent for the employees set out in the petition in this case. (Stipulation, TR 19, 20). There is no contractural bar to holding an election in this case. (Stipulation, TR 20). PERC has previously determined that the PBA is a duly registered employee organization. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 3). This finding was made a matter of stipulation at the hearing. (TR 20, 21). PERC has previously determined that the PBA has filed the requesting showing of interest with its petition. (Hearing Officer's Exhibit 4). This finding was made a matter of stipulation at the hearing. (TR 21, 22). Alachua County is a political subdivision of the State of Florida which is governed by a Board of County Commissioners. Florida Constitution, Article VIII, Section 1(a), (d). The Board of County Commissioners have the powers and exercise the duties enumerated in Florida Statute Chapter 125, Part I. Alachua County has adopted by ordinance the County Administration Law of 1974 (Florida Statutes Chapter 125.70 et seq.) The Sheriff of Alachua County is a constitutional officer. Florida Constitution, Article VIII, Section 1(d). Except as modified by special act, the sheriff has the powers and exercises the duties enumerated in Florida Statutes, Chapter 30. The relationship between the Sheriff and the County is further defined by Laws of Florida, Chapter 71-447 (1971). This act is a reenactment of Laws of Florida, Chapter 65-1192 (1965). This Special Act changes somewhat the relationship between the County and the Sheriff as it would exist solely under Florida Statutes, Chapter 30 in regard to fiscal matters. The adoption of the budget under the special Act is the same or substantially similar to the mechanism set out in Chapter 30. In Alachua County, however, appropriations are not given the Sheriff in lump sums. Custody and administration of funds is in the hands of the County. In order to make expenditures beyond $25, the Sheriff must obtain the approval of the Board of County Commissioners. The Sheriff submits requisitions to the County, and these are reduced to purchase orders and presented to the Board of County Commissioners. A copy of such a purchase order was received in evidence as Alachua County Exhibit 10. If the Board of County Commissioners approves the purchase order, then the sheriff can make the expenditure. If the Board does not approve the purchase order, then the Sheriff cannot make the expenditure unless he successfully appeals the decision in accordance with the provisions of the Special Act. A position classification and pay plan has been adopted by the Board of County Commissioners of Alachua County. The pay plan has the effect of setting the salaries for all persons employed by Alachua County, including employees of the Sheriff's Department. The salaries set out in the pay plan cannot be changed except by action of the Board of County Commissioners. Modifications to the plan could be adopted by the Board at any time, and proposals for changes could be made by the Sheriff. If the Board refused a changed proposed by the Sheriff, then the Sheriff would have the appeal mechanisms set out in Florida Statutes, Chapter 30, and Laws of Florida, Chapter 71-447. The Sheriff is solely responsible for the hiring, firing, suspension, discipline, and promotion of employees in the Sheriff's Department. The Sheriff is responsible for setting working hours and scheduling vacation time, holidays, and allowing compensatory leave. The Sheriff is totally responsible for the grievance procedure, and manages all training programs and internal investigations. The Communications Department in Alachua County is headed by the Sheriff. Not all of the functions of the Communications Department are directly related to law enforcement. The Communications Department handles communications functions relating to ambulance service and the County fire control program. Approximately 87 percent of the work of the Communications Department is law enforcement related. The Sheriff exercises the same control over employees of the Communications Department as he exercises over employees of the Sheriff's Department. The budgetary mechanism for the Communications Department is likewise the same as the budgetary mechanism for the Sheriff's Department. The PBA, Alachua County, and the Sheriff have engaged in the collective bargaining process since 1973. Collective bargaining agreements were reached among the parties for the 1973-74 and 1974-75 fiscal years. These agreements were received in evidence at the hearing as Alachua County Exhibits 1 and 2. Each of the agreements is signed by representatives of the County and the Sheriff. The County and the Sheriff participated in the negotiations as co- employers. The Sheriff signed the agreements exclusively as to some of the provisions, together with the County as to other provisions, and the County signed exclusively as to other provisions. The breakdown is set out on the signature pages of each agreement. (See: Alachua County Exhibit 1, p. 8; Alachua County Exhibit 2, p. 10). Generally the provisions signed by the Sheriff relate to working conditions other than those directly requiring the expenditure of money. The provisions signed by the County involve the expenditure of funds. Negotiations were initiated among the parties to reach a similar agreement for the 1975-76 fiscal year. In the early stage of these negotiations the Sheriff indicated that he considered himself the sole employer, but that he would negotiate as previously so as not to unduly delay the negotiations. No contract has been signed by all three parties. The PBA and the Sheriff have entered into two agreements. These agreements were received in evidence at the hearing as Sheriff's Exhibits 1 and 2. The agreements were apparently signed a few days prior to the hearing. The agreements cover both fiscal and non-fiscal considerations. ENTERED this 23rd day of April, 1976 in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675
