The Issue Should the Respondent's license as a real estate salesperson in the State of Florida be revoked, suspended or otherwise disciplined?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The Department is a state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular, Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, Chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. At all times material to this proceeding, the Respondent was licensed as a real estate salesperson in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0605704. The last license was issued as a voluntary inactive salesperson with an address of 820 Manatee Avenue, Ellenton, Florida 34222. By application dated September 3, 1993, and received by the Department on September 10, 1993, Respondent applied to become a real estate salesperson in the State of Florida. Question 9 on the Application provides as follows: Have you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld? The question applies to any viola- tion of the laws of any municipality, county, state or nation, including traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection, or traffic signal violations), without regard to whether you were placed on probation, had adjudication with- held, paroled, or pardoned. If you intend to answer "NO" because you believe those records have been expunged or sealed by court order pursuant to Section 943.058, Florida Statutes, you are responsible for verifying the expungment or sealing prior to answering "NO". If you answered "YES", attach the details including dates and outcome, including any sentence and conditions imposed, in full on a separate sheet of paper. Your answer to this question will be checked against local, state, and federal records. Failure to answer this question accurately could cause denial of licensure. If you do not fully understand this question, consult with an attorney or the Division of Real Estate. Respondent answered "YES" to question 9 and provided information about one arrest for reckless driving in September 1984. A criminal background check performed as part of application process indicated that Respondent had also been convicted in June 1987 of reckless driving and had pled nolo contendere (no contest) to a felony charge of obtaining property by worthless check. Adjudication was withheld and Respondent received credit for time served. The Respondent did not have a criminal background check performed. Therefore, he failed to report the reckless driving conviction in June 1987 because he had forgotten about the conviction. As to the worthless check charge, the Respondent did not consider it part of his record since the charge against him for issuing worthless check was a mistake, and reimbursement was made on the check. The mistake was that Respondent's brother, Bret Gardner had signed a check for Respondent to purchase materials. However, in the process of using the check to purchase the materials the Respondent identified himself with his driver's license and his driver's license's number was placed on the check.. Since their names are similar and they are close to the same age (difference of two years), the Respondent was charged with issuing the worthless check rather than Bret Gardner. There was one other occasion in the past where Respondent was mistaken for Bret Gardner in a court proceeding. Apparently, the no contest plea was the easiest way for the court to clear up the matter. Respondent attended a real estate school operated by his mother, Claudia Gardner, and before filing his application the Respondent discussed Question 9 with his mother. Since the Respondent had been charged with other traffic violations (speeding tickets, etc.) it was his mother's opinion that by listing the one conviction - and if others should have been reported - then it would show that the Respondent was not attempting to conceal any convictions. Hindsight is 100 percent better than foresight. Respondent's mother's advice surely proves this out. The failure to furnish all the information concerning his criminal record was not intentional on the part of the Respondent. However, this does not relieve him of the responsibility to have made an effort to check his record, particularly since he was advised of its importance by the last paragraph in question 9 which was emphasized by being in bold print. Furthermore, having questioned his mother concerning the necessity to report his record - even assuming that time was of the essence in making his application - there was no reason why the Respondent could not have checked with the Division of Real Estate to determine if he should follow through on a check of his record so as to advise the Division of Real Estate of any changes to be made prior to the issuance of the license. The Department presented no evidence that had the Florida Real Estate Commission (Commission) been presented Respondent's complete record it would have denied him licensure.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and after having reviewed considered Rule 61J2-24.001, Florida Administrative Code, concerning disciplinary guidelines and the recommended range of penalties for a violation of Section 475.25(1), Florida Statutes, and considering mitigating circumstances as provided for in Rule 61J2-24.001(4), Florida Administrative Code, it is recommended that the Commission enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of having violated Section 475.25(1)(m), Florida Statutes. It is further recommended that the Respondent be assessed an administrative fine in the amount of $300.00, and his license be suspended for a period of six months, the suspension be stayed and the Respondent's license be placed on probation for a period of six months under terms and conditions deemed appropriate by the Commission. That upon the probation being successfully completed, the suspension of the Respondent's license would be lifted subject to any further terms and conditions the Commission may deem appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-4165 The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Petitioner, Department's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1. Proposed findings of fact 1 through 8 are adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 through 11 in the Recommended Order. Respondent Gardner's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1. The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are intermingled with argument and other matters not considered findings of fact, and are not in numbered paragraphs nor do the lend themselves to numbering. However, I have responded to what I consider proposed findings of fact and have adopted them in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 through 11 in the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel Villazon, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Bart Claude Gardner 820 Manatee Avenue Ellenton, Florida 34222 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Respondent should be terminated from employment with the school district.
Findings Of Fact On January 4, 1994, Respondent completed an applicant security check form for employment with the Petitioner. The form specified a series of questions related to past or pending criminal charges to which Respondent was to check either a "yes" box or a "no" box. On each occasion, Respondent checked the "no" box. At the conclusion of the form is a certification as follows: I certify that the above responses are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and are made in good faith. I understand that any incompleteness or false information on this form may be just cause for a rejection of my application for employment or dismissal in the event I am employed by the School Board of Palm Beach County. Respondent did not disclose that in 1987 she was charged with aggravated assault and possession of a weapon. As a result of the charges, Respondent was sentenced to one year probation, required to pay a fine and court costs, and fifty hours of community service. When Mr. Lachance learned of the results of the background search (which differed from Respondent's application), he met with Respondent who admitted the criminal charges but who alleged that she had believed them to be resolved. The recommendation was then made to the Board to terminate Respondent's employment as a bus driver.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That School Board of Palm Beach County, Florida enter a final order dismissing the Respondent from her employment with the school district in accordance with the Board action of April 7, 1995. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-2884 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: 1. Paragraphs 1 through 5 are accepted. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: 1. None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: Lee M. Rosenberg, Esq. School District of Palm Beach County Office of the General Counsel 3318 Forest Hill Boulevard Suite C-302 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 Ms. Tina King 5030 Elcharo North West Palm Beach, Florida 33415 Dr. Bernard Shulman Superintendent Palm Beach County School Board 3340 Forest Hill Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-5869 Frank T. Brogan Commissioner of Education Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
Findings Of Fact Respondent Starla K. Rose, was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0046404. On February 25, 1985, an Information was filed in the Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Broward County, Florida, charging Respondent with one count of grand theft, Sections 512.014(1)a and b and 512.014(2)b, Florida Statutes, two counts of insurance fraud by false or fraudulent claims Section 517.234(1)(a)1, Florida Statutes; and, one count of false report of the commission of a crime, Section 817.49, Florida Statutes. Respondent pled not guilty to the Information. On June 6, 1985, a verdict was rendered which found Respondent guilty of one count of grand theft, one count of insurance fraud by false or fraudulent claims and one count of false report of the commission of a crime. The court adjudged Respondent guilty of issuing a false report of the commission of a crime, withheld adjudication of guilt on the remaining counts, placed Respondent on probation for 3 years, and ordered her to pay costs. Respondent filed a timely motion for new trial following rendition of the verdict. At the time of final hearing in this case, no disposition had been made of Respondent's motion for new trial.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to section 57.111, Florida Statutes (2011).1/
Findings Of Fact By a three-count Administrative Complaint dated June 7, 2011, the Respondent charged the Petitioner with alleged violations of law related to the sale of certain products. The allegations of the Administrative Complaint were prosecuted in the disciplinary case. A final hearing in the disciplinary case was conducted on January 24 and 25, 2012. On April 18, 2012, the ALJ issued a Recommended Order determining that the products referenced in the Administrative Complaint were unregistered securities and that the Petitioner "violated section 626.611(16) [Florida Statutes,] by selling an unregistered security that was required to be registered pursuant to chapter 517." The Administrative Complaint also charged the Petitioner with additional violations of statute including a "[d]emonstrated lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance," in violation of section 626.611(7). As set forth in the Recommended Order, the ALJ determined that the evidence failed to establish the additional violations. Based on violation of section 626.611(16), the ALJ recommended that the Petitioner's license be suspended for a total of six months, two months for each product sale alleged in the three separate counts of the Administrative Complaint. On July 6, 2012, the Respondent issued a Final Order determining that in addition to the violation of section 626.611(16) found by the ALJ, the Petitioner had also violated section 626.611(7). Despite finding the additional violation, the Respondent adopted the penalty recommended by the ALJ. The Petitioner took an appeal of the Final Order to the District Court of Appeal for the Fifth District. The Court determined that the products sold by the Petitioner were not securities that required registration at the time they were sold by the Petitioner, and, on June 21, 2013, issued an order reversing the Final Order issued by the Respondent. The parties have stipulated that the Petitioner was the prevailing party in the disciplinary case and is a "small business party" as defined by section 57.111(3)(d).
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent attempted to obtain his license to practice medicine by fraudulent representations, in violation of Section 458.331(1)(a), Florida Statutes, or if Respondent misrepresented or concealed a material fact during any phase of a licensing or disciplinary process, in violation of Section 458.331(1)(gg), Florida Statutes. If so, an additional issue is what penalty the Board of Medicine should impose.
Findings Of Fact By application dated and acknowledged on December 27, 1993, Respondent applied for a medical license by endorsement. Respondent filed the application with the Board of Medicine on January 12, 1994. Question 6 on the application asks: Have you ever been convicted of a felony? Yes No ; a misdemeanor? Yes No . Have any judgments ever been entered against you? Yes No . Have you ever been sued for malpractice? Yes No . In response, Respondent typed X’s in the “No” boxes for the first two questions in Question 6. Immediately above the signature of Respondent and acknowledgement of the notary public, on the last page of the application, is the statement: I have carefully read the questions in the foregoing application and have answered them completely, without reservations of any kind, and I declare under penalty of perjury that my answers and all statements made by me are true and correct. Should I furnish any false information in this application, I hereby agree that such act shall constitute cause for denial, suspension or revocation of my license to practice medicine/surgery in the State of Florida. In fact, on October 24, 1988, Respondent was found guilty, after a three-day jury trial, of 12 misdemeanor counts of failure to remit a total of over $47,000 in state sales taxes due from November 20, 1985, through December 20, 1986. On December 22, 1988, the court sentenced Respondent to pay a fine of $12,000 on all 12 counts and reasonable court costs, and serve six months’ probation on each of the 12 counts, with the periods of probation to run consecutively. Respondent’s explanation for the omission from the application is that he mistakenly believed that the only misdemeanors covered by the question were those involving the practice of medicine. Respondent’s explanation for the nondisclosure is unreasonable. Nothing in the language of Question 6 limits the scope of the inquiry to misdemeanors involving the practice of medicine. The preceding question in Question 6 asks about felonies without qualification or limitation, and it is absurd to interpret this question as not asking about any felony, such as bank robbery, even though the felony did not involve the practice of medicine. For the same reason, Respondent knew that he was to have disclosed any misdemeanor, even if it did not involve the practice of medicine. Respondent’s explanation for the commission of the crimes is more plausible. Briefly, Respondent testified that he had invested about $100,000 of the total of $250,000 in the acquisition of the Philadelphia franchise of long-distance telephone provider that had emerged immediately following the breakup of AT&T in the mid 1980s. Essentially reselling AT&T long-distance services, the new company paid AT&T at wholesale for the services that it marked up and sold at retail to end users. Respondent explained that he had been an absentee owner for much of the time. Also, the AT&T billing for this new arrangement was confused and irregular. Changes in ownership preceding and following Respondent’s investment in the company further complicated the situation. A Pennsylvania revenue auditor contacted Respondent over a year after he had sold his stock in the company in 1986, gotten married, and been traveling extensively out of state. At this time, Respondent learned of the company’s sales tax problems, which involved a complicated telecommunications excise tax. Respondent’s corporate purchaser was no longer operating the company, which had become bankrupt. Respondent paid the taxes due, but the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania nevertheless prosecuted him for his role in the failure of the company to pay its taxes. After sentencing, Respondent paid the fine and served his probation without incident. He disclosed the misdemeanor convictions to the Pennsylvania agency regulating the practice of medicine and was able to continue practicing medicine there. After consideration of Respondent’s application, the Florida Board of Medicine issued Respondent license number ME 0066606.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Tanya Willaims, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Bin C03 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Theodore M. Henderson, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Kim M. Kluck Carol Gregg Senior Attorneys Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 Christopher Grillo 1 East Broward Boulevard, Suite 700 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent willfully has failed or refused to file a CE Form 1, Statement of Financial Interests (Form 1), for 2015, in violation of section 112.3145(8)(c), Florida Statutes (2018).
Findings Of Fact Respondent is presently employed by Miami-Dade County as a Purchasing Specialist in the Water and Sewer Department. She has worked for Miami-Dade County continuously since 1997 when she was hired as a clerical worker in the Water and Sewer Department. She assumed procurement duties when she earned a promotion in 2006 to her present position. In 2011, changes in internal operations in the Water and Sewer Department resulted in the assignment to Respondent of spending authority of up to $25,000, and Respondent has filed Forms 1, evidently without litigation, for 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2016. In her job, Respondent routinely documents whether county vendors have performed their contractual obligations. When a vendor fails to perform, Respondent contacts the vendor in an attempt to secure performance. If the vendor's nonperformance persists, Respondent places the vendor on probation. Prior to her employment with Miami-Dade County, Respondent worked for 17 years as a clerical worker with AT&T. By May 15, 2016, the Commission transmitted to the Miami-Dade County Supervisor of Elections a list of persons, including Respondent, who were required to file a Form 1 for 2015 by the deadline of July 1, 2016. On February 26, March 25, and April 22, 2016, the Supervisor of Elections emailed Respondent reminders to file timely her 2015 Form 1, and Respondent received each of these email reminders. On May 27, 2016, the Supervisor of Elections mailed Respondent a detailed letter reminding her of the obligation to file a Form 1 by July 1, supplying the necessary form, and indicating how to file the completed form. Respondent received this letter. Respondent testified that, in the spring of 2016, she was under considerable stress from a marital separation that had commenced when her husband had moved out of the marital home in February 2015. Undoubtedly, Respondent was distraught over the prospect of the failure of a marriage of 35 years' duration, but she timely filed her 2014 Form 1 shortly after the separation had taken place. Three factors are important for determining whether Respondent's failure to file from July 2, 2016, through August 30, 2017, was willful. First, Respondent's employment history includes many years of clerical work and 12 years of managing contracts for the Water and Sewer Department. Clearly, Respondent understands the importance of paperwork, knows how to complete and file forms, and recognizes that there are consequences for failing to file completed forms timely. Second, Respondent had filed four Forms 1 for the four years preceding 2015, so she was well aware of her annual duty to file this financial disclosure and of the general timeframe for when the form was due. Third, the Commission and Respondent's Supervisor of Elections showered Respondent with notices to file the 2015 Form 1. In addition to the above-noted communications prior to July 1, on July 29, 2016, the Supervisor of Elections mailed Respondent, by certified mail, a detailed letter advising that she was delinquent in filing a Form 1, but could file within a grace period that ended on September 1, 2016. This letter warns that a fine of $25 per day, up to $1500, would begin to accrue if the form is not filed by September 1 and, if Respondent fails to file the form within 60 days after the expiration of the grace period on September 1, "you will also be subject to penalties provided in Florida Statute 112.317." Respondent received this delinquency notice. On August 17, 2016, the Commission issued a courtesy notice, in the form of a bright orange postcard, advising Respondent that the grace period for filing the 2015 Form 1 would expire on September 1, 2016, and warning that she would accrue a fine of $25 per day (Automatic Fine) until she filed the form or accrued a total of $1500 in fines (Maximum Automatic Fine). On September 7, 2016, the Commission sent a courtesy letter advising Respondent that the grace period had expired on September 1, and the Automatic Fine was accruing and would continue to accrue until it reached the Maximum Automatic Fine. Respondent received these courtesy communications. On March 2, 2017, the Commission issued to Respondent a Notice of Assessment of Automatic Fine, which is the Maximum Automatic Fine. The notice advises how to appeal the Maximum Automatic Fine and even identifies acceptable grounds for setting aside the fine. The notice concludes that, if Respondent failed to appeal or pay the Maximum Automatic Fine within 30 days, a default order would be issued that could refer the matter to a collection agency or her employer for withholding a portion of her salary until the fine was paid. The notice also warns that the Commission could impose "[a]n additional civil penalty . . . if . . . a complaint is filed against you pursuant to Section 112.324, Florida Statutes." Respondent received this notice. On May 23, 2017, the Commission issued a Final Notice of Assessment of Automatic Fine for Failure to Timely File Form 1, Statement of Financial Interests. This letter advises that Respondent had waived her right to appeal the Maximum Automatic Fine and restates the rights of the Commission to obtain payment of the fine. Respondent received this notice. On August 2, 2017, the Commission issued a Notification of Issuance of Default Final Order advising Respondent that, if she failed to pay the Maximum Automatic Fine by September 7, 2017, the Commission would refer the matter to a collection agency. This letter warns that a failure to pay or arrange to pay the fine by the deadline would result in a copy of the Default Final Order being sent to Respondent's agency head. Respondent received this notice. On August 31, 2017, Respondent filed her 2015 and 2016 Forms 1. Based on the above-cited facts, Respondent's failure to file the 2015 Form 1 from July 2, 2016, through August 30, 2017, was intentional and, thus, willful. Addressing solely the collection of the Maximum Automatic Fine, on September 7, 2017, the Commission sent Respondent a letter stating that a recent statutory change required the Commission to notify her agency head to implement withholding from her salary. On October 11, 2017, the Commission sent a letter to the Finance Manager of the Miami-Dade County Finance Department. The letter states that, "[t]o timely resolve this matter," which refers to the Maximum Automatic Fine, the Commission requested that the manager withhold a portion of Respondent's salary and remit it to the Commission. The Finance Manager implemented salary withholding, typically $174.11 per month, as of November 6, 2017, and the Commission received the final payment on March 6, 2018, for a total of $1500. None of Respondent's Forms 1 for the years 2011 through 2016 discloses financial interests above the disclosure thresholds. At this point, as she explained tearfully at the hearing, Respondent is merely trying to keep her job so she can work a few more years and retire with a pension on which she can live.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order dismissing the Order Finding Probable Cause and this section 112.3145(8)(c) proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of October, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 2018.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners, Judith C. Cleary and Charles B. Houck (Petitioners or Ms. Cleary and Mr. Houck), are entitled to an award of attorney's fees against Respondent, Department of Financial Services (Respondent or the Department), pursuant to section 57.111, Florida Statutes (2009).1/
Findings Of Fact The underlying proceedings were initiated by Respondent on February 22, 2010, by the issuance of substantively identical Administrative Complaints against Petitioners. Petitioners timely requested administrative hearings to contest the charges against them, and the cases were forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings where they were consolidated for hearing. Count 1 of each Administrative Complaint charged Petitioners with willfully misrepresenting and or omitting material information in order to induce Mr. and Mrs. Nagle to cash in another annuity they held in order to purchase an annuity sold by Petitioners. Included in the alleged misrepresentations or material omissions were: misrepresenting that there would be no surrender charges to withdraw the entire amount of the new annuity after one year, when in fact there would be a 15 percent surrender charge; falsely representing that the annuity would earn the Nagles ten to 20 percent returns; and (3) misrepresenting the suitability of the Nagles to purchase the annuity by misrepresenting the Nagles' net worth and by misrepresenting the Nagles' investment objective as long-term, in a form Petitioners submitted to the insurance company issuing the annuity. Count 2 of each Administrative Complaint charged Petitioners with similar conduct in order to induce the Nagles' son, Robert, to purchase an annuity. Included in the alleged misrepresentations or material omissions were: misrepresenting that there would be no surrender charges to withdraw the entire amount of the new annuity after one year, when, in fact, there would be a 15 percent surrender charge; and falsely representing that the annuity would earn Robert Nagle ten to 20 percent annual returns. Petitioners do not dispute that if the allegations charged in the Administrative Complaint had been proven by clear and convincing evidence, then Respondent would have established the statutory violations alleged as the predicate for taking disciplinary action against Petitioners' insurance agent licenses. Petitioners also acknowledge that Respondent initiated the disciplinary actions against them on the basis of two complaint letters received by Mrs. Phyllis Nagle, the attestation of Mrs. Nagle to the material allegations in an affidavit, and a corroborating complaint letter by Mrs. Nagle's son, Robert Nagle. After a full evidentiary hearing, a Recommended Order issued in the underlying disciplinary actions determined that the more credible evidence failed to establish the allegations in the Administrative Complaints. In particular, the undersigned weighed the credibility of testimony by Robert Nagle and by Petitioners at the final hearing, as well as deposition testimony by both Mr. and Mrs. Nagle. The question posed in this case, however, is not whether credibility judgments caused the Department to ultimately not prevail in its charges against Petitioners. Instead, the question here is whether Respondent had a reasonable basis, in law and in fact, at the time it initiated the underlying disciplinary actions. In this regard, Petitioners contend that the Department's investigation file contained documents from the insurance company issuing the annuities that contradict the allegations in the Administrative Complaints. Petitioners point to three documents in particular. The first document was a customer survey response submitted by Mrs. Nagle to the insurance company after she purchased the annuity from Petitioners. Her completion of the survey form indicated that she knew that "[s]urrender charges are imposed on premature full withdrawal"; that she considered the "annuity to be a long-term investment"; that she did "not intend to use these funds to meet current expenses"; and that Petitioners reviewed her "financial status . . . and other pertinent information to determine whether this annuity purchase" was suitable to her. The other document claimed to contradict the allegations in the Administrative Complaints was the Nagles' annual statement showing a yield of 5.66 percent, which was different than the 2.6 percent yield claimed by Mrs. Nagle in her complaint letters or affidavit. Finally, Petitioners point to statements of understanding signed by the Nagles, showing the surrender charges that would be imposed for early withdrawals. None of these documents conclusively refute the charges in the Administrative Complaint. For example, with respect to surrender charges, the Nagles' complaints assert that Petitioners represented that there would be no surrender charges for a withdrawal after one year. Mrs. Nagle's survey form only acknowledged that there would be surrender charges for "premature" withdrawal. It certainly would have been possible to reconcile these two concepts in that Mrs. Nagle may have been thinking that "premature" withdrawal, as used in the survey form, was a withdrawal in less than one year. The response in the survey form to the "surrender charge" question does not conclusively contradict Mrs. Nagle's complaint and affidavit, nor does it conclusively contradict the allegations in the Administrative Complaint. Similarly, the responses in the survey form about suitability do not conclusively contradict the allegations in the Administrative Complaint. The annual statement likewise does not conclusively contradict the allegations in the Administrative Complaint, even though the yield shown is somewhat different from the yield Mrs. Nagle referred to in her complaint. Whether the yield was actually 2.6 percent or 5.66 percent, the material allegations in the Administrative Complaint were that Petitioners misrepresented that the yield would be 10 to 20 percent per year. These allegations and the complaints on which they were based, were not so plainly lacking in credibility that no reasonable agency would have proceeded with charges. Finally, the signed statements of understanding showing that surrender charges would be imposed for early withdrawals do not contradict the Nagles' complaints or the allegations in the Administrative Complaint. Although the undersigned ultimately found against the credibility of the Nagles' complaints, those complaints were that Petitioners made oral representations assuring the Nagles that there would be no surrender charges after one year, even though the policy forms themselves said otherwise. The ultimate lack of credibility of the complaining witnesses' testimony was not so clear that no reasonable agency would have prosecuted the claims. In short, Respondent had a reasonable basis in law and in fact, following a reasonable investigation, to make the allegations and to charge the statutory violations it did in the Administrative Complaints. The documentation gathered in the investigation did not conclusively contradict the factual allegations, and the credibility of the complainants was not so obviously lacking that no reasonable agency would have made the allegations in the Administrative Complaints. And it is beyond dispute that if those factual allegations had been proven, the charged statutory violations would have been established. Thus, it cannot be said that Respondent's action in initiating the disciplinary proceedings against Petitioners was unreasonable governmental action.
The Issue Whether Respondent should take final action to deny Petitioner's application for a real estate sales associate license on the ground that Petitioner was found guilty, in the State of Georgia, of the crime of theft by taking.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: On June 12, 2006, Petitioner was working as a clerk at a UPS store in Cherokee County, Georgia, when he "gave in to temptation" (as he described it at hearing) and stole $500.00 in cash from an envelope given to him by a customer for shipment to the customer's former wife in Kansas. When the customer's former wife received an empty envelope, she notified the customer, who, in turn, called the police. On June 16, 2006, the police went to the UPS store to investigate the matter. When questioned by the police during their visit to the store, Respondent admitted to stealing the $500.00. He was thereupon placed under arrest and, thereafter, criminally charged. On October 16, 2007, in Cherokee County, Georgia, State Court, Petitioner was found guilty of the misdemeanor crime of theft by taking and sentenced to 12 months' probation. Among the conditions of his probation was that he provide "proof of repay[ment]" of the $500.00 he had stolen. Petitioner has not been arrested again, and he has returned to its rightful owner the $500.00 he had stolen and has otherwise completed his probation. The record evidence, however, does not reveal how long ago Petitioner's probation was completed; nor, more importantly, does it shed any light on what Respondent has done with his life (other than completing his probation and not getting arrested) since the theft which led to his being placed on probation, or what his present reputation is for honesty, trustworthiness, and fair dealing. The record evidence, therefore, is insufficient to establish that there is reason to believe that, notwithstanding his commission of the aforementioned theft, it is not likely he would act dishonestly or in any other manner endangering the public were he to be granted the real estate sales associate license he seeks.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission issue a Final Order denying Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate sales associate. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of December, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of December, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Kevin Vaughn, Jr. 931 Village Boulevard, Apartment 905-203 West Palm Beach, Florida 33409 Tom Barnhart, Esquire Special Counsel Office of the Attorney General Plaza Level 01, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Roger P. Enzor, Chair, Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street, N801 Orlando, Florida 32801 Layne Smith, General Counsel, Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint issued against him, as modified at hearing, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, including the parties' prehearing stipulation filed October 21, 2004, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been since October 17, 1988, licensed as an insurance representative in the State of Florida holding 02-16, 02-18, and 02-40 licenses. His licensure identification number is A268617. In 2001, criminal charges were filed against Respondent in Orange County Circuit Court Case No. CR-01-2309/B. On or about February 20, 2002, Respondent submitted, in Orange County Circuit Court Case No. CR-01-2309/B, a verified Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty, which read as follows: My name is Robert Trueblood and I acknowledge that I am the Defendant charged in the above-styled criminal case[]. I am represented by a lawyer, Arthur L. Wallace, III. I wish to withdraw my plea of not guilty and plead guilty to: Count 2 - Sale of Unregistered Security and Count 3 - Sale of Security by Unregistered Agent. I understand that each of these counts is a third degree felony and each is punishable by up to five (5) years in the Department of Corrections and a $5,000.00 fine. I have told my lawyer all the facts and circumstances about the charges against me. I believe that my lawyer is fully informed on all such matters. My lawyer has counseled and advised me on the nature of each charge; on any and all lesser included charges; on all possible defenses that I might have in this cause; and all the penalties that might be imposed if convicted.[1] I understand that I may plead not guilty to any offense charged against me. If I choose to plead not guilty, the Constitution guarantees me the right to maintain that plea and (a) the right to a speedy and public trial by jury; (b) the right to see, hear and face in open Court all witnesses called to testify against me and to cross- examine said witnesses; (c) the right to use the power and process of the Court to compel the production of any evidence, including the attendance of any witnesses in my favor; (d) the right to have the assistance of a lawyer at all stages of the proceedings and to have one appointed for me if necessary; and (e) also the right to take the witness stand at my sole option; and if I do not take the witness stand I understand the jury, at my request, will be told that this may not be held against me. I also understand that by pleading guilty and admitting the truth of the charges against me, I am waiving all of the rights referred to in the above paragraph and the Court may impose the same punishment as if I had ple[]d not guilty, stood trial and been convicted. I know that if I plead guilty there will be no further trial of any kind, which means that by pleading guilty I waive my right to trial. I understand that some of the charges filed against me in this case may have occurred in whole or in part in Florida Counties other than Orange. However, I wish to resolve, in Orange County, all the charges filed in case number CR 01-2309 and do affirmatively waive my right to venue in other counties where the crimes may have occurred. I am 55 years of age. I have gone to school up to and including 5 y[ea]rs [of] college. I am not under the influence of any alcoholic beverage, drug or medicine at the time I sign this plea agreement. My physical and mental health is presently satisfactory. No one has made any promise, assurance or guarantee to me that I would receive any consideration in exchange for pleading guilty other than as set out in this plea agreement. I declare that no one has subjected me to any force, duress, threats, intimidation or pressure to compel or induce me to enter a plea of guilty. I am entering this plea with the understanding that I may serve every day of the sentence I am agreeing to in this plea agreement. Although I may have received advice or opinions as to the potential for some type of early release, I hereby acknowledge under oath that I have not relied upon those opinions or that advice as an inducement to enter this plea. I believe that my lawyer has done all that a competent attorney could to counsel and assist me. He has answered all my questions about this case to my satisfaction and I AM SATISFIED WITH THE ADVICE AND HELP HE HAS GIVEN ME. I understand that if I am not a United States citizen, this criminal proceeding could cause me to be deported to the country of my origin. I understand that if I fail to pay any fines or costs as ordered by the Court, there will be a lien placed against me. I understand that I waive my right to appeal any rulings of the Court previously made in this case except as specifically stated herein. I understand that I have the right to appeal the judgment and sentence of the Court within thirty (30) days from the date of sentence. I understand that any appeal must be in writing. I understand that if I wish to take an appeal and cannot afford an attorney to help in my appeal, the Court will appoint an attorney to represent me for that purpose. I request the Court to accept my plea, knowing that upon it being accepted by the Court that nothing will remain to be done except for the Court to enter its judgment and sentence. I offer my plea freely and voluntarily and of my own accord and with full understanding of all matters set forth in the Information and in this Petition, the Certificate of my lawyer and Plea Agreement which are contained herein. Though I may have been assisted by my lawyer, I certify that the statement and representations herein above made are my own and have not been suggested directly or indirectly by him or anyone else, and that the decision to plead guilty was made by me. I further represent that my attorney has advised me of considerations bearing on the choice of which plea to enter and the pros and cons of such plea, the likely results thereof as well as any possible alternative which may be open to me. I represent to the Court that the plea bargain attached hereto was negotiated by my attorney with my full and complete consent thereto and that the decision to plead guilty was made by me. I fully concur in the efforts of my attorney and agree to the terms of the bargained plea. The Plea Agreement between Respondent and the prosecutor (which was referenced in Respondent's Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty) read as follows: The Defendant, and the State, pursuant to the provisions of Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.171, agree and stipulate to recommend to the Court the following resolution of the above- styled case: Defendant agrees to plead guilty as charged to Count 2 - Sale of Unregistered Security and Count 3 - Sale of Security by Unregistered Agent. The State will stand silent as to the issue of adjudication. The Defendant shall be sentenced to five (5) years of supervised probation with all standard conditions, as well as the following special conditions: The Defendant shall testify truthfully when requested by the State, without the necessity of subpoena, in reference to any and all matters related to the facts and circumstances surrounding the Defendant's charges in this case. The Defendant shall pay restitution in an amount to be determined. The Defendant agrees the amount of restitution owed is not limited to the transactions to which he is entering this plea. Defendant shall pay court costs as directed by the Court. Defendant shall be required to pay $3,5000.00 for costs of prosecution to the Office of Statewide Prosecution, Department of Legal Affairs for the State of Florida. The Defendant shall pay $500.00 to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and $500.00 to the Office of Comptroller, Department of Banking and Finance for costs of investigation involved in this case. The Defendant shall have no contact, directly or indirectly, with any of the witnesses in this case. [4]. If the Defendant violates any law while awaiting sentencing or if he fails to appear for sentencing as ordered by the Court, the State shall not be bound by this agreement and may recommend any lawful sentence and the Court may impose any sentence permissible under the law. The Defendant shall not be entitled to withdraw his plea of guilty in this case. [5]. The State agrees to nolle prosequi Count 4 - Sale of Unregistered Security, Count 5 - Sale of Security by Unregistered Agent, Count 6 - Sale of Unregistered Security, and Count 7 - Sale of Security by Unregistered Agent. [6]. If the sentence agreed upon in this plea agreement is a departure from the sentencing guidelines, both the State of Florida and the Defendant agree not to appeal this sentence. [7]. Should the Defendant violate his community control or probation, he affirmatively agrees that he shall be sentenced pursuant to the sentencing guidelines. [8]. The Defendant affirmatively agrees not to request that the Court impose a sentence lower than the sentence outlined above. [9]. Both the State and the Defendant understand that the trial judge has the ultimate responsibility for the sentence the defendant actually receives and that the recommendations made above are not binding on the trial judge unless adopted thereby. The Defendant shall not be entitled to withdraw his pleas of guilty in the event that the trial judge imposes a sentence different from that recommended above. On February 20, 2002, after Respondent entered his guilty pleas in Orange County Circuit Court Case No. CR-01- 2309/B to Count 2 (alleging the "Sale of Unregistered Security," in violation of Section 517.07, Florida Statutes) and Count 3 (alleging the "Sale of Security by Unregistered Agent," in violation of Section 517.12(1), Florida Statutes), the court accepted the pleas, withheld adjudication, and placed Respondent on two concurrent five-year terms of probation, with the special condition that he "serve 1 Day[] in the Orange County Jail, with 1 Day[]'s credit for time served." Other special conditions, including those described in the Plea Agreement set out above, were also imposed.2 Respondent failed to notify Petitioner in writing within 30 days after entering his guilty pleas in Orange County Circuit Court Case No. CR-01-2309/B that he had entered the pleas. Respondent has previously been disciplined by Petitioner's predecessor, the Department of Insurance (DOI). By Consent Order issued November 1, 2000, in DOI Case No. 31036-00-AG, Respondent was suspended for a period of three months. The Consent Order approved the parties' Settlement Stipulation for Consent Order, which provided, in pertinent part, as follows: * * * The Department has caused to be made an investigation of the Respondent and other individuals involved in the marketing and promotion of Legends Sports, Inc. As a result of that investigation, the Department alleges that the Respondent induced individuals to invest in Legends Sports, Inc. and represented that the investment was guaranteed by a surety insurer. However, the investment was not a good investment, the purported surety insurer did not exist or was not authorized to conduct business in this state, and the investment resulted in substantial losses to individual investors. The investigation resulted in a multi- count criminal information (hereinafter referred to as the "criminal actions") being filed against Respondent and other Legends Sports agents in the Seminole County Circuit Court in Sanford, Florida, Case No. 98- 4569CFW. Specifically, Respondent was charged with the following felonies: sale of unregistered securities, sale of securities by an unregistered dealer and unlawful transaction of insurance. Respondent has entered or will enter a plea of guilty to lesser included charges which are first degree misdemeanors. As a result of the plea, the Court in the criminal action, among other things, placed the Respondent on probation. As a condition of probation, the Court ordered the Respondent to pay restitution to the individuals who invested in Legends Sports through the Respondent and suffered financial losses as a direct consequence of such investments. The restitution amount represents the commissions received by the Respondent (hereinafter referred to as the "restitution order in the criminal action"). The Court in the criminal action also ordered that a criminal restitution judgment, that is not dischargeable in bankruptcy, be entered for the full amount of the promissory notes sold by the Respondent, unless a judgment has already been entered in that amount in favor of the Receiver for Legends Sports. Respondent denies knowingly misrepresenting the Legends Sports investment. * * * 13. This Settlement Stipulation for Consent Order is subject to the approval of the Insurance Commissioner. Upon his approval, and without further notice, the Insurance Commissioner may issue a Consent Order providing for the following: Incorporation by reference of the terms and conditions of this Settlement Stipulation For Consent Order. Respondent's licensure and eligibility for licensure as an insurance agent within the state are SUSPENDED for a period of three (3) months pursuant to section 626.641(1), Florida Statutes. The suspension shall take effect on 11/1/2000. * * * Approximately a year earlier, by Consent Order issued July 12, 1999, in DOI Case No. 99-CE58350, Respondent was fined $250.00 for failure to comply with continuing education requirements. Respondent's health has deteriorated in recent years. He has "been in the hospital several times with . . . heart [problems]."
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner issue a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of twice violating Section 626.621(8), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Counts I and II of the Amended Administrative Complaint, and of violating Section 626.621(11), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count III of the Amended Administrative Complaint, and suspending his licenses for nine months for having committed these violations. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2004.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent properly assessed a civil penalty against Petitioner, pursuant to Section 213.29, Florida Statutes (2007),1 after Respondent was adjudicated and sentenced in a criminal proceeding for the offense of theft of state funds.
Findings Of Fact Integrated Copy Systems failed to file sales tax returns or failed to remit sales tax, or both, to the Department during the periods July 2003 through April 2005. In an attempt to secure compliance, on May 12, 2005, the Department recorded a tax warrant with the clerk of court for Hillsborough County in the amount of $24,060.95. The amount of tax due listed on the warrant was $18,400.29, an amount which included, in part, an estimate of tax liability. This estimate was appropriate since Integrated Copy Systems had not filed sales tax returns for certain periods, and Respondent had no information as to the amount of taxable sales made for those periods. Petitioner was subsequently arrested and charged with the offense of theft of state funds, a third-degree felony, in State of Florida v. Michael Maynard, Case No. 05-22960, in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Hillsborough County, Florida. On December 13, 2007, Petitioner entered a plea to the criminal charge and was sentenced to probation, with conditions which included the payment of restitution,3 and adjudication was withheld. Petitioner testified that as part of an agreement in his criminal case, he paid the outstanding taxes and that "zero" taxes were due. Petitioner also testified that pursuant to an agreement with the prosecuting attorney, he was assessed and paid a civil fine $1,000.00. Petitioner made some payments to the Department for the sales taxes which he failed to remit for the periods of July 2003 through April 2005. However, Petitioner has not paid all the outstanding sales taxes owed for the subject time period, despite his belief to the contrary. The records generated and/or produced by Petitioner, which purport to reflect the payments made to the Department, do not take into account the accrual of interest and other penalties. The Department properly applied Petitioner's payments to the outstanding sales taxes owed by Integrated Copy Systems. To calculate the amount of sales and use tax owed by Integrated Copy Systems, the Department applied all payments made towards the tax liability of the company. The Department also removed the estimated amount of tax from the total amount of taxes due upon receipt of the company's sale tax returns for the missing periods. The Department accurately determined that as of December 21, 2007, Integrated Copy Systems still owed $7,075.48 in sales tax. On March 19, 2008, the Department issued a Notice of Final Assessment Sales or Use Tax, Penalty and Interest. The amount of the penalty assessed against Petitioner, in his capacity as corporate officer or responsible party, is $14,150.96, which is 200 percent of Integrated Copy Systems' tax liability.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Revenue, enter a final order sustaining the sales tax assessment of $7,075.48; and the penalty assessment of $14,150.96 45. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 2010.
