The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in a discriminatory housing practice, within the meaning of and in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2005), by requiring Petitioners to submit a second application for the approval of a condominium purchase.
Findings Of Fact It is undisputed that Petitioner, Allan Kangas, has no handicap and is not a disabled person. At the conclusion of Petitioners' case-in-chief, Mr. Kangas testified that he has no handicap. The undersigned, sua sponte, entered an ore tenus order on the record dismissing the case brought by Mr. Kangas. Petitioner, Anna Kangas, is an elderly female and the mother of Mr. Allan Kangas and Mr. Sheldon Kangas, the latter being the representative in this proceeding for the named Petitioners. It is undisputed that Mr. Sheldon Kangas is not handicapped, but that Mrs. Kangas is handicapped, within the meaning of Section 760.22(7), Florida Statutes (2005), because of Alzheimer's disease. Respondent is a condominium association lawfully incorporated as a Florida corporation (Association). Respondent must operate in accordance with the Articles of Incorporation, By-Laws, and Declaration of Condominium (condominium documents). The condominium documents require the Association to approve each purchase of a condominium. On December 8, 2005, Mr. Sheldon Kangas and Mrs. Anna Kangas contracted with Ms. Mary Cox to purchase condominium unit 15, located at 23 Hatchett Creek Road. Ms. Cox is a real estate agent and a co-owner of unit 15. Ms. Cox notified Ms. Pat Williamson, Association Secretary, of the prospective purchase. For the reasons stated herein, Respondent did not discriminate against the prospective purchasers, but approved the purchase of condominium unit 18 in a timely manner after the purchasers changed their purchase contract from unit 15 to unit 18. The prospective purchasers completed an application for approval of the purchase of unit 15 sometime between December 8 and 10, 2005. The Association conducted a meeting to approve the proposed purchase on December 10, 2005. During the meeting on December 10, 2005, the purchasers informed the Association that they wished to purchase unit 18, located at 29 Hatchett Creek Road, rather than unit 15. Unit 18 was owned by Mr. Brian Isaac. Ms. Cox did not object to releasing the purchasers from the contract for the purchase of unit 15. The Association informed the purchasers that a new application for unit 18 would be required. The purchasers completed a new application under protest. At a meeting conducted on January 3, 2006, the Association approved the application for the purchase of unit 18. The purchase of unit 18 closed on January 25, 2006. The purchasers seek reimbursement of living expenses incurred for hotel rooms and meals during the delay caused by the requirement for a second application. The purchasers are not entitled to reimbursement. The purchase of unit 18 was the first time the Association had required a second application. However, it was also the first time a purchaser had changed his or her choice of units after submitting an application. The Association did not discriminate against Mrs. Kangas because of her handicap. The record evidence contains no justifiable issue of law or fact to support the alleged discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of January 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of January 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David G. Muller, Esquire Becker & Poliakoff, P.A. 630 South Orange Avenue, Third Floor Sarasota, Florida 34236 Shelden Kangas Allan Kangas 4578 Manor Drive Sarasota, Florida 34233
The Issue Whether Petitioners were subject to discrimination in the rental of a dwelling, or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of rental of a dwelling, based on their race or familial status, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners, Rolstan and Leticia Hodge, are African- American and currently reside in Virginia Beach, Virginia. Petitioners have six children. Respondent, Watson Realty Corp.,1/ is a real estate and property management company with offices throughout the state of Florida and an office in Georgia. Wendell Davis is the company’s Executive Vice President in charge of Watson Realty Management Division, including its Jacksonville office located at 4456 Sunbeam Road, Jacksonville, Florida 32257. On June 3, 2013, Petitioners completed applications to rent a property from Respondent located at 2314 Creekfront Drive in Green Cove Springs, Florida (the Property). Petitioners’ applications were taken by Gayle Aljets, Secretary at Respondent’s Westside office. Ms. Aljets sent, via facsimile transmission, Petitioners’ applications, along with copies of their photo identification, social security cards, and proof of income, to Anne Fletchall, Application Specialist in Respondent’s Sunbeam office.2/ Ms. Fletchall entered pertinent information from Petitioners’ applications, including personal identification and income information, into a system run by LexisNexis, a company with which Respondent contracted to conduct background, criminal, and financial screening of applicants.3/ LexisNexis screens applicants based on criteria selected by Respondent. For example, Respondent requires applicants to establish income of three times the rental amount, applies the combined income of multiple applicants for the same property (roommates), and requires criminal background checks on applicants 18 years of age and older. On debt issues, Respondent screens applicants for legal debts (e.g., judgments) of $1,000 or more within the most recent 48 months; as well as tax liens, landlord debt, and utility debt within the most recent 24 months. The screening system allows for exceptions, or “overrides,” on negative results for specified criteria. For example, if an applicant has a legal debt of $1,000 or more in the most recent 48 months, or a tax lien, landlord debt, or utility debt within the most recent 24 months, the system will return an override code of “800,” allowing approval of the applicant with a co-signor, or guarantor. The override determinations were made by Respondent at the time Respondent contracted with LexisNexis. Ms. Fletchall entered Petitioners’ information separately as two roommates applying for the Property. LexisNexis reported to Ms. Fletchall that Mr. Hodge had a legal debt of $1,000 or more within the last 48 months, thus failing one of the screening criteria. However, the program assigned an override code of “800,” meaning the application could be approved if Mr. Hodge obtained a guarantor. Mrs. Hodge passed all the LexisNexis screening criteria. LexisNexis further reported Petitioners’ rent-to- income ratio as 24.73 percent, based on a monthly rent of $1,195.00 and a combined income of $5,055.00. According to the criteria established by Respondent when setting up the screening process, a guarantor must establish an income of three and one-half times the amount of the monthly rent. Mrs. Hodge’s individual verified income was approximately $1,400.00, less than three and one-half times the monthly rental amount. Ms. Fletchall sent an email to Heather Cornett, property manager in the Westside office, informing her that Mr. Hodge was approved conditioned upon obtaining a guarantor. Ms. Cornett informed Mr. Hodge by phone that he would need a guarantor in order to qualify to rent the Property. Mr. Hodge asked why a guarantor would be required, but Ms. Cornett was unable to explain. Ms. Cornett informed Mr. Hodge that he would receive a letter from the third-party screening company that explained the details. During that telephone conversation, Mr. Hodge requested a telephone number for LexisNexis. Ms. Cornett did not have the LexisNexis telephone number and informed Mr. Hodge she would have to call him back with the number. Ms. Cornett obtained the number and made a return call to Mr. Hodge with the telephone number the same day. Through contact with LexisNexis, Mr. Hodge learned that a judgment against him by Freedom Furniture and Electronics had caused him to fail the applicable screening criteria, thus triggering the need for a guarantor. Mr. Hodge contacted Ms. Cornett and informed her that the debt had been satisfied. Ms. Cornett asked Mr. Hodge to obtain a letter from the debtor on the debtor’s letterhead verifying the debt had been satisfied. Mr. Hodge subsequently met with Ms. Cornett in her office and presented a letter from Freedom Furniture and Electronics. The letter represented that Mr. Hodge had entered into a payment agreement to satisfy the debt and that, thus far, payments had been made on time. Ms. Cornett faxed the letter to Ms. Fletchall to submit to LexisNexis as additional information. Ms. Fletchall called Ms. Cornett and told her the letter was only proof that payments were being made on the debt, not that the debt had been satisfied. Ms. Cornett called Mr. Hodge and informed him that the letter did not change the status of his application, and a guarantor was still required. Mr. Hodge requested Ms. Cornett submit the matter to a manager for review. Ms. Cornett took the Hodge’s applications, the letter, and the LexisNexis report to Terri Brown, Respondent’s Regional Manager. Ms. Cornett spoke to Ms. Brown via telephone, who confirmed that a guarantor would still be required for approval. Ms. Cornett again called Mr. Hodge with this information. Mr. Hodge did not obtain a guarantor and did not make another application, or otherwise arrange with Respondent to rent the Property. On June 10, 2013, Respondent received an application from a different set of applicants to rent the Property. The applicants were white and listed on their application that they had three children.4/ Ms. Fletchall processed two separate applications for the applicants as roommates, just as she did with Petitioners’ applications. The LexisNexis report showed that the male applicant failed three of the screening criteria, while the female applicant passed all the criteria. The system assigned an override code of “800” for the male applicant’s prior landlord debt, triggering the requirement for a guarantor. The system also assigned an override code of “920” based on the male applicant’s prior issue with a personal check, triggering a requirement that the male applicant pay monthly rent by certified funds. On June 21, 2013, the new applicants entered into a lease for the Property. The tenants obtained a guarantor who signed a lease guarantee which was incorporated into the lease.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2014H0082. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of September, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Suzanne Van Wyk Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSotoBuilding 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 2014.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was subjected to housing discrimination by Respondent based on Petitioner's race, African-American, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Miguel Johnson is an African-American male and, therefore, belongs to a class of persons protected from discrimination under the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2009). He filed a complaint for housing discrimination against Riviera Towers at 6896 Abbott Avenue in Miami Beach. Respondent Riviera Terrace Apartments (Riviera Terrace) was apparently erroneously named Riviera Towers in the complaint and in the style of this case. Notice of that error was given by the owner, Arie Markowitz, and in the absence of any indication that Riviera Terrace is a corporate entity, Mr. Markowitz is also added as a Respondent. The style has been corrected to reflect these corrections. Riviera Terrace, 6890 Abbott Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida, 33141, is a 20-unit apartment complex. Mr. Johnson thought that the complex has 22 units, but there is no evidence to support his thinking. Contrary to his request, the undersigned has no independent investigative powers and must accept the evidence in the record. According to his records, Mr. Johnson, on March 17, 2009, telephoned a number he saw on a "For Rent" sign at Riviera Terrace. A woman identified as Diana Miteff answered the telephone. Mr. Johnson said Ms. Miteff identified herself as the manager of the complex. The telephone records indicate that the conversation lasted one minute. Mr. Johnson testified that Ms. Miteff told him to call back later. Mr. Johnson telephoned Ms. Miteff again on March 21, 2009, and his records indicate that they talked for 8 minutes. Mr. Johnson testified that Ms. Miteff told him about the security deposit, that the rent for a one bedroom apartment was $900 a month, and that she had some vacant efficiencies. Mr. Johnson testified that a friend of his, Pedro Valdes, lives in the same complex and that together they met with Ms. Miteff the day after Mr. Johnson talked to her on the telephone, and saw a vacant efficiency apartment. According to Mr. Johnson, Ms. Miteff told him, after seeing him, that there were no vacancies. Ayesha Azara, Mr. Johnson's wife, testified that she made another unsuccessful attempt to rent a unit in Riviera Terrace in May 2009. She had no information in March 2008, except to say tht Ms. Miteff claimed to be the manager and told her the building was for elderly people. Pedro Valdes testified that he lives in Riviera Towers and gave his address as 6896 Abbott Avenue. He said that the "For Rent" sign for Riviera Terrace is not always posted in front of the complex. Mr. Markowitz is the owner of Riviera Terrace at 6890 Abbott Avenue. He testified that he is also the manager and that Ms. Miteff is a tenant. He uses her telephone number on the "For Rent" sign because he does not speak Spanish. The apartments are government-subsidized Section 8 housing. The only vacant efficiency in March 2008 was a unit for which he already had a written lease, but the tenant could not move in until after a government-required inspection. He also testified that his tenants are not all Caucasians and not all elderly. Ms. Miteff confirmed that she has been a resident of Riviera Terrace for 20 years. She concedes that she told Mr. Johnson's wife that the people in the complex are very quiet and mostly old people. Mr. Johnson's claim of discrimination based on race is not supported by the evidence, which is contradictory with regard to the name and address of the property, and because there were no vacant apartments at Riviera Terrace in March 2008.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Petition for Relief be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of October, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Louis A. Supraski, Esquire Louis A. Supraski, P.A. 2450 Northeast Miami Gardens Drive 2nd Floor North Miami Beach, Florida 33180 Miguel Johnson 916 West 42nd Street, Apt. 9 Miami Beach, Florida 33140 Miguel Johnson C/O Robert Fox 1172 South Dixie Highway Coral Gables, Florida 33146 Diana Mittles Riviera Terrace Apartments 6896 Abott Avenue Miami Beach, Florida 33141
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of unlawful discrimination in the provision of services or facilities in connection with her dwelling based on her race or handicap, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 51-year-old black female who relocated to Leesburg, Florida, from Port Chester, New York, in February 2012. Respondent, Richman Property Services, Inc., is the corporate owner/manager of Laurel Oaks Apartments (Laurel Oaks) located at 131 Bayou Circle in Leesburg, Florida. Amy Lewis is the Community Manager of Laurel Oaks. Petitioner rented a two-bedroom apartment unit from Respondent from February 24, 2012, until she moved to Orlando, Florida, on December 3, 2012. Petitioner?s daughter, Sushon Dillard, occupied the apartment with Petitioner during her tenancy at Laurel Oaks. Petitioner spoke with Ms. Lewis via telephone to inquire regarding the availability of a unit at Laurel Oaks while Petitioner was still residing out of state. Petitioner applied for tenancy at Laurel Oaks by faxing her application to Ms. Lewis. Petitioner?s application was accompanied by a copy of her award letter documenting Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) payments as proof of income. On February 24, 2012, Petitioner signed a lease for Laurel Oaks unit #103, paid a security deposit, and moved into the unit. Petitioner has a current clinical diagnosis of “schizophrenia, paranoid.” She also claims to be diagnosed bi- polar with Tourrete?s Syndrome. While Petitioner presented no documentation of the additional diagnosis, her testimony on this issue is credible and is accepted by the undersigned. Petitioner was first hospitalized for treatment of an unspecified mental illness at Bellevue Hospital in New York in 1982. She apparently lived without significant incident for the next 26 years. Petitioner had a “breakdown” in 2008, while living in Arizona, and another “breakdown” that same year in New York, for which she was hospitalized at Greenwich Hospital in Connecticut, and later transferred to Stamford Hospital in Connecticut. Petitioner reports that since April 2008, she has “spent time in numerous mental institutions in Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Maryland and New York.” Petitioner?s most recent incident occurred in August 2012, while she was living at Laurel Oaks. She was taken by police to a local facility named “Life Stream” where she was treated for a number of days, then returned home to her apartment at Laurel Oaks with her daughter. Petitioner appeared calm and controlled at the final hearing. She testified that she is taking her medications and doing very well. Petitioner claims that when she moved into the unit at Laurel Oaks, it was not cleaned, was “infested with dead roaches,” and the washing machine was filthy. Petitioner?s daughter testified there were dead roaches even in the dishwasher. Petitioner also bases her allegation of discrimination on Respondent?s accusation in April 2012, that Petitioner had not paid a $300 security deposit prior to occupying her apartment. When Petitioner paid her April rent, Trifonia Bradley, an employee in the office at Laurel Oaks, informed Petitioner she still owed a $300 security deposit. Petitioner responded that she had paid the deposit on February 24, 2012. Although the evidence was not clear as to the specific date, Petitioner later met with Ms. Bradley and brought in her receipt showing the $300 had been paid in February. After that meeting, Petitioner received a phone call from Ms. Lewis apologizing for the error and stating something to the effect of “we are all good.” Petitioner believes Respondent was attempting to take advantage of her disability and trick her into paying the deposit again. At final hearing, Petitioner and her daughter presented evidence and testimony regarding additional alleged discriminatory acts by Respondent. Petitioner alleged that someone employed by, or otherwise acting on behalf of Respondent, sabotaged her automobile; harassed her by requesting her daughter fill out a separate rental application in order to live with her; harassed Petitioner about her request for accommodation based on her disability and claimed she had not demonstrated that she was disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act; threatened to tow away her car because it was inoperable; and stole money from her apartment. Each of these additional alleged acts occurred after September 21, 2012, the date on which FCHR issued its determination of no cause, and was not investigated by FCHR. Petitioner is intelligent and articulate. Her exhibits were well-organized and contained copious documentation of the alleged discriminatory acts occurring after September 21, 2012. Her documentation included correspondence with Laurel Oaks? management, notices which were posted on the apartment door, copies of numerous forms and applications, and a police report. In contrast, Petitioner offered no tangible evidence regarding the condition of the property upon occupancy other than her testimony, which was not persuasive. She introduced no photographs, no written complaint, and no correspondence with the manager or other employees of Laurel Oaks regarding the condition of the apartment. In fact, she offered no evidence that she brought the condition of the unit to the attention of Laurel Oaks? management. Given the totality of the evidence, including the demeanor of the Petitioner and Ms. Dillard, the undersigned finds that either the unit was not unclean or Petitioner did not bring the condition of the unit to the attention of Laurel Oaks upon occupying the unit. Further, the undersigned finds that Laurel Oaks erroneously requested the security deposit in April 2012, and corrected the error after reviewing Petitioner?s documentation. The mistake was not an act of discrimination based either on race or disability.2/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2012H0289. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of December, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Suzanne Van Wyk Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of December, 2012.
The Issue Whether Respondents discriminated against Petitioner in the provision of housing, or services in connection therewith, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act (“the Act”).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Pedro Tamayo, suffers from anxiety, depression, memory loss, and complex regional pain syndrome (“RPD”). Respondent, Avtec, is a residential construction contractor, doing business in Palm Bay, Florida. On November 10, 2018, Petitioner executed a Contract for Sale and Purchase (“Contract”) with Avtec to construct a residential structure on property owned by Petitioner on Raleigh Road Southeast in Palm Bay, Florida. The specific floor plan chosen by Petitioner was the Citation 4 Plus. Avtec executed the Contract on November 12, 2018. The Contract covers clearing of property for construction, materials and color selections by the buyer, and the buyer’s right to reverse the floor plan, among other terms. When Petitioner entered into the Contract, he simultaneously chose many of the options available to customize the Citation 4 Plus, such as impact windows, an exterior pedestrian door in the garage, and a front septic system. Among the options Petitioner chose was 36-inch (36”) doors for the master bedroom entrance, closet, and master bathroom entrance. Petitioner has no obvious physical disability and does not require use of a wheelchair or walker. Construction Setback The Contract does not address the construction setbacks from the property lines. Setbacks are governed by local government codes and Avtec is required to follow those codes. On November 30, 2018, Petitioner met with his sales agent, Sean McCarry, at the Avtec showroom, to discuss some of the options he had chosen for his new home. They specifically discussed plumbing issues for the master bathroom, 36” wide doors in the master bedroom, placement of the septic tank, the concrete culverts for the driveway, and a 45-foot (45’) setback of the home from the property line. While the standard setback for a home with a front septic tank is 38’ to 40’, Petitioner indicated he wanted to build an aluminum carport, which required additional setback footage. Respondent Amicucci stepped into the meeting with Petitioner and Mr. McCarry to address Petitioner’s request for mitered ends on the culvert pipe. Mr. Amicucci was not present when Petitioner requested a 45’ setback. Mr. McCarry verbally agreed to “take care of” the setback requested by Petitioner. Petitioner’s selection of 36” doorways for the master bedroom, and a front septic system were reduced to writing and included in the Contract, signed by both parties, as an Option to Sales Agreement. Petitioner executed five addenda to the Contract between November 30, 2018, and May 1, 2019, including optional upgrades and a modification to the design of the sidewalk. On July 23, 2019, Petitioner and Avtec executed a change order to include the mitered ends of the culvert pipe. No part of the Contract, any addenda thereto, or any change order, addresses Petitioner’s request for a 45’ setback. Section 28 of the Contract provides that “NO OTHER AGREEMENTS exist between the BUYER and SELLER except as set forth in this Agreement. This Agreement shall not be modified except by an instrument in writing executed by both BUYER and SELLER.” Section 29 of the Contract contains the following statement in red underlined text: No representative of Seller has authority to make any verbal statements that modify or change the terms or conditions of this contract. Buyer represents that buyer has read and understands this entire contract. Buyer also represents that buyer is not relying on any verbal statement, promise, or condition not specifically set forth in this contract. It is acknowledged that builder is relying on these representations and would not enter into this contract without this understanding. Section 20 of the Contract specifically provides, “Once the rough plumbing is installed, absolutely NO CHANGES will be allowed.” Petitioner’s new home was built 40’ from the property line, rather than 45’ as Petitioner requested. Sometime after the rough plumbing was installed and the foundation was poured, Petitioner complained to Avtec that his home was not built with a 45’ setback as promised by Mr. McCarry. On August 22, 2019, Avtec, through its Director of Corporate Development, responded in writing to Petitioner’s complaint. Avtec apologized that the home was not built to the setback he had communicated to Mr. McCarry, and referred to the Contract terms that exclude any verbal agreements. Avtec offered to release Petitioner from his contract, refund his deposit of $6,250, and give Petitioner $30,000 for the property after selling it to another buyer. On November 13, 2019, Petitioner signed a “Final Acceptance of Completion” of the construction of his home. Fill Dirt On March 8, 2019, Petitioner drove by the construction site and noted that the fill dirt being used was “contaminated” with tree branches and other material. He drove to the model home to discuss the issue with Mr. McCarry. Mr. McCarry contacted Mr. Amicucci, who agreed to meet Petitioner at the property to inspect the fill and address Petitioner’s concerns. Petitioner and Mr. Amicucci testified to two very different versions of the events at the construction site that day. Petitioner testified that, when Mr. Amicucci arrived, he got out of his vehicle, visibly upset, and raised his voice and cursed at Petitioner regarding his lack of knowledge of proper fill material. Petitioner testified, specifically that: I feared that [Mr. Amicucci] would physically attack me by his aggressive demeanor and I immediately froze. I could not comprehend how a paying customer could be treated this way by raising concerns for the foundation of my home. I am not a builder. [Mr. Amicucci] simply needed to explain the common practice of standard fill. Since March 8th, 2019, my quality of life has not been the same. I have severe anxiety due to the memories of that day and suffer constant nightmares. I feel as [sic] my life can be in danger and, therefore, live in a state of high alert. My daily life has been disrupted. Simply having to drive by Avtec showroom due to my normal routine routes triggers flashbacks of that day. Mr. Amicucci testified that when he arrived at the property, Petitioner was upset and aggressive toward him, demanding that the fill be removed from his property. Mr. Amicucci reassured Petitioner that the fill was all good soil and that it would be root-raked before it was spread for the foundation. Mr. Amicucci explained the root-raking process and the equipment used therefor. Nevertheless, Petitioner insisted that Mr. Amicucci go with him to another construction site to show him the type of fill he wanted used on his property. Mr. Amicucci accompanied Petitioner to the specific construction site, which was not an Avtec project, and Mr. Amicucci identified the fill being used there as a hard white shell material. Mr. Amicucci assured Petitioner that the brown sandy soil imported to his property would be better for the sod and plants Petitioner would be using to landscape the property. Mr. Amicucci testified that, at the end of the meeting, Petitioner extended his hand and said, “[l]ook, that all sounds good. I just want to start back over. Are we good?” Mr. Amicucci shook Petitioner’s hand and assured him that they “were good.” Mr. Amicucci’s testimony regarding the events that occurred on March 8, 2019, is accepted as more credible and reliable than Petitioner’s. Knowledge of Petitioner’s Disability Mr. Amicucci testified that he was not aware that Petitioner had any kind of disability until the Complaint was filed against him and Avtec. Petitioner testified that his disability was revealed to Mr. Amicucci on November 30, 2018, during a meeting at the Avtec showroom to discuss the various options selected by Petitioner when he signed the contract. Petitioner testified that Mr. Amicucci asked him what he did for a living and Petitioner told him that he was retired and disabled from the City of Hialeah. He testified that Mr. Amicucci was further on notice because Petitioner always wears a glove to improve circulation in his right hand and that he can hardly sign his name, which would have been apparent to Mr. Amicucci at the November 30, 2018 meeting. Finally, Petitioner alleges Mr. Amicucci should have been aware of his disability because he requested 36” ADA-compliant door widths for the master bedroom. Mr. Amicucci did not recall Petitioner telling him he was disabled or seeing Petitioner wearing a glove. He did recall seeing Petitioner wearing a sling of some sort and inquiring whether he had been injured. He recalled Petitioner telling him it was related to an old injury. Mr. Amicucci was not present for any discussion about the 36” doorways. Assuming, arguendo, that he was present for that discussion, a request for 36” doorways alone is not proof of a disability. Many buyers upgrade to larger doorways to accommodate larger furniture or in anticipation of needing a walker or wheelchair access in the future. Furthermore, requesting ADA-compliant doorways is irrelevant to Petitioner’s claim that he has emotional disabilities and chronic pain. The evidence does not support a finding that Mr. Amicucci knew of Petitioner’s disabilities of anxiety, depression, memory loss, and RPD. No other witness was offered on behalf of Avtec. There is no evidence to support a finding that Avtec had knowledge of Petitioner’s disability through any other employee.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petition for Relief from a Discriminatory Housing Practice No. 202022149. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Mike Amicucci Suite 3 590 Malabar Road Palm Bay, Florida 32909 Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Pedro Tamayo 987 Raleigh Road Southeast Palm Bay, Florida 32909 (eServed) Rebecca E. Rhoden, Esquire Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor & Reed, P.A. 215 North Eola Drive Orlando, Florida 32801 (eServed) Lawrence F. Sietsma Avtec Homes, Inc. et al 2860 North Riverside Drive Indialantic, Florida 32903 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue Whether the Florida Commission on Human Relations and the Division of Administrative Hearings have jurisdiction pursuant to Section 760.34, Florida Statutes, to consider Petitioner's Petition for Relief; and Whether Petitioner timely filed his Petition for Relief with the Florida Commission on Human Relations.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following Findings of Facts are made: Petitioner contracted to purchase a condominium, "unit 206 in Building 425 at Serravella at Spring Valley" from Respondent. For reasons not relevant to the issues presented for determination, closing was deferred; and on December 22, 2006, Petitioner signed and submitted an "Addendum to Contract" to Respondent that sought "to revise contract closing date to 2/28/2007." Sometime in late December 2006, a telephone conversation took place among Steve Myers, a realtor for Serra Villa, Petitioner, and Barefield. Barefield was in Alabama, and Myers and Petitioner were in Florida on a speakerphone. Barefield advised Petitioner that the addendum would not be accepted by Respondent. Barefield and Petitioner did not speak to each other after this December telephone conversation. All communication was accomplished through third parties. Subsequent to Respondent's refusal to accept Petitioner's addendum, there is lengthy correspondence and litigation involving the parties. For some time after Respondent rejected Petitioner's addendum, Petitioner desired to purchase the condominium and, apparently, indicated so in various offers communicated by his attorneys to Respondent. If an unlawful discriminatory act occurred, the determination of which is not an issue presented for determination, the act occurred in December 2006. Petitioner's Housing Discrimination Complaint dated September 17, 2008, and signed by Petitioner on September 22, 2008, was filed with United States Department of Housing and Urban Development more than one year after the alleged act of discrimination. On November 6, 2008, Petitioner sent a four-page fax transmission to Lisa Sutherland, a FCHR employee, which included a Petition for Relief. On November 13, 2008, Petitioner sent a second fax transmission of seven pages to Lisa Sutherland. Apparently, this second transmission included a Petition for Relief. On December 4, 2008, Petitioner sent a third fax transmission addressed to "Mrs. Crawford/Lisa Sutherland." While the fax transmission cover sheet is dated "11-13-08," the report of transmission shows that this 11-page transmission was sent on "12/04 15:24." The Petition for Relief forwarded by FCHR to DOAH was date-stamped "2008 DEC-4 PM 3:25."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that FCHR dismiss the Petition for Relief as being time-barred as a result of the late filing of Petitioner, Ricardo Vega's, Housing Discrimination Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of April, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard S. Taylor, Jr., Esquire 531 Dog Track Road Longwood, Florida 32750-6547 Barbara Billiot-Stage, Esquire Law Offices of Barbara Billiot-Stage, PA 5401 South Kirkman Road, Suite 310 Orlando, Florida 32819
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Hardin Hammock Estates (hereinafter referred to as "Hardin"), discriminated against Petitioner, Ms. Celeste Washington (hereinafter referred to as Ms. Washington), on the basis of her race in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections through 760.37, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Celeste Washington is a black adult. Hardin is a housing rental complex with 200 single- family residences. Hardin is located in Miami-Dade County, Florida. Hardin provides "affordable housing" to lower-income individuals and, therefore, its residents are required to meet certain income requirements in order to be eligible for a residence at Hardin. At the times material to this proceeding, Hardin was managed by Reliance Management Incorporated (hereinafter referred to as "Reliance"). At the times material to this proceeding, Salah Youssif, an employee of Reliance, acted as the property manager at Hardin. Mr. Youssif is himself black, having been born in Sudan. Ms. Washington's Charge. On or about August 29, 2002, Ms. Washington filed a Complaint with the Commission. After investigation of the Complaint, the Commission issued a Determination of No Reasonable Cause, concluding that "reasonable cause does not exist to believe that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred" and dismissing the Complaint. On or about May 5, 2003, Ms. Washington filed a Petition with the Commission. Ms. Washington alleged in the Petition that Hardin had violated the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.36, Florida Statutes. In particular, Ms. Washington alleged that Hardin had "violated the Florida Fair Housing Act, as amended, in the manner described below": Washington was told that the waiting list at Hardin Hammock Estates was closed. She visited this development twice and was told the waiting [sic] was close [sic]. At that time she viewed the wating [sic] list and the majority of the names are [sic] Hispanic. Islanders do not consider themselves as Black Americans. The "ultimate facts alleged & entitlement to relief" asserted in the Petition are as follows: Hardin Hammocks has willful [sic] and [knowingly] practice [sic] discrimination in there [sic] selection practice and a strong possibility that the same incomes for Blacks & others [sic]. Black Americans rent is [sic] higher than others living in these [sic] developments. At hearing, Ms. Washington testified that Hardin had discriminated against her when an unidentified person refused to give her an application and that she believes the refusal was based upon her race. Management of Hardin; General Anti-Discrimination Policies. The residence selection policy established by Reliance specifically precludes discrimination based upon race. A human resource manual which describes the policy has been adopted by Reliance and all employees of Reliance working at Hardin have attended a workshop conducted by Reliances' human resource manager at which the anti-discrimination policy was addressed. An explanation of the Federal Fair Housing Law of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development is prominently displayed in the public area of Hardin's offices in both English and Spanish. As of July 1, 2002, approximately 52 of Hardin's 200 units were rented to African-American families. Hardin's Application Policy. When Mr. Youssif became the property manager at Hardin, there were no vacancies and he found a disorganized, outdated waiting list of questionable accuracy. Mr. Youssif undertook the task of updating the list and organizing it. He determined that there were approximately 70 to 80 individuals or families waiting for vacancies at Hardin. Due to the rate of families moving out of Hardin, approximately one to two families a month, Mr. Youssif realized that if he maintained a waiting list of 50 individuals it would still take approximately two years for a residence to become available for all 50 individuals on the list. Mr. Youssif also realized that, over a two-year or longer period, the individuals on a waiting list of 50 or more individuals could change drastically: their incomes could change; they could find other affordable housing before a residence became available at Hardin; or they could move out of the area. Mr. Youssif decided that it would be best for Hardin and for individuals interested in finding affordable housing that Hardin would maintain a waiting list of only 50 individuals and that applications would not be given to any person, regardless of their race, while there were 50 individuals on the waiting list. Mr. Youssif instituted the new waiting list policy and applied it regardless of the race of an applicant. If there were less than 50 names on the waiting list, applications were accepted regardless of an individual's race; and if there were 50 or more names on the waiting list, no application was accepted regardless of an individual's race. Lack of Evidence of Discrimination. The only evidence Ms. Washington presented concerning her allegations of discriminatory treatment is that she is black. Although Ms. Washington was refused an application for housing at Hardin,3 the evidence failed to prove that Ms. Washington's race played any part in the decision not to give her an application.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing Celeste Washington's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November, 2003.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Palm Frond Condominium Association, discriminated against Petitioner, Hugo M. Villagra, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Recommendation Based on Petitioner’s Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of September, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of September, 2015.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, The Pines at Warrington, LP, et al., and Pinnacle, and American Management Service Company (The Pines), discriminated against Petitioner, Susan M. Walters (Ms. Walters), because of her disability and gender in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20- 760.37, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Walters, during times pertinent, suffered from schizophrenia, chronic differentiated type alcohol abuse, and a personality disorder. The Pines is an apartment community consisting of 160 units. The community is managed by Pinnacle, a subsidiary of American Management Services, LLC. Approximately 90 percent of the residents at The Pines are women. Ms. Walters completed a detailed application for residency in The Pines with Joy John (Ms. John), the facility's leasing specialist. Ms. Walters signed the application on October 24, 2007. She entered into a lease for a term of one year on October 31, 2007. During the course of these events, Ms. Walters did not claim a disability or mention that she was disabled. No one in management at The Pines perceived Ms. Walters to be disabled. During the application and contract process, Ms. Walters was provided with copies of the rules and regulations governing residents of The Pines. The lease required Ms. Walters to provide management at The Pines 60 day's notice, if she wanted to vacate the premises. In or around February 2008, Ms. Walters acquired a dog. She informed management at The Pines, and in accordance with the lease agreement, began making payments toward the required pet deposit. During April 2008, Ms. John and Dawn Chapman, Property Manager, received complaints about Ms. Walters' dog. The dog's barking was disturbing residents of The Pines. Four to five complaints were received each week during April. Ms. John and Ms. Chapman advised Ms. Walters of the complaints and provided her with suggestions as to how to ameliorate the problem. Nevertheless, the barking continued. On May 13, 2008, Ms. Walters was provided a "Seven Day Notice of Noncompliance with Opportunity to Cure," addressing the dog issue. It informed Ms. Walters that she must prevent the dog from disturbing other tenants. It further informed her that if the problem continued, she might be evicted. Another week of barking precipitated a "Seven Day Notice of Noncompliance with Possible Lease Termination Following." This was dated May 21, 2008, and signed by Dawn Chapman. The notice again made clear to Ms. Walters that if the barking continued she might be evicted. These notices were often given to other residents of The Pines when their barking dogs annoyed other tenants. Many of the residents of The Pines were minorities. One of them, Rhonda Lavender, complained about Ms. Walters because she put up a sign in a stairwell that included the word "nigger." Another resident, a disabled man who lived in the unit above her, complained that she "lambasted him" because he dropped a boot and it made a loud noise. Others complained about her coming out of the door to her apartment and screaming. None of the residents, who complained about Ms. Walters' barking dog, or her other offensive actions, mentioned her gender or that she was disabled. At no time during the residency of Ms. Walters at The Pines did she provide Ms. John or Ms. Chapman information with regard to having a disability. The only evidence of a disability presented at the hearing was a form Ms. Walters referred to as "a doctor's release for medical records," signed by an unidentified "physician." It was also agreed that Ms. Walters received payments based on a disability from the U.S. Social Security Administration. However, no evidence was adduced that indicated Ms. Walters was limited in one or more major life activities. Ms. Walters' rent payment for June was due June 5, 2008, but was not paid. On June 6, 2008, a "Three Day Notice- Demand for Payment of Rent or Possession" was affixed to the door of her apartment. The notice demanded payment of the sum of $518.00 or delivery of possession of the premises. The notice informed Ms. Walters that eviction proceedings would ensue if she did not pay in three days. By June 6, 2008, however, Ms. Walters had determined that she was going to vacate the premises. She told Ms. Chapman that she would pay her June rent on June 20, 2008, but this was a prevarication because Ms. Walters had no intention of paying any more rent. On or about July 4, 2008, Petitioner vacated her apartment. She placed her keys in the drop box designated for rental payments. The rent for June was never paid. Ms. Walters testified under oath that during her occupancy of the dwelling her bank card went missing. She stated that on another occasion $20 went missing from her apartment and that subsequently $10 disappeared. She said the fire alarm rang once for two hours. She said she was disturbed by noisy neighbors and a loud maintenance man. She said that once after returning from her job she discovered a glass plate in her apartment that had been shattered. She did not reveal any of these allegations to management at The Pines when they occurred, if they did occur. Ms. Walters claimed that someone entered her apartment in May and sprayed a chemical that encouraged her dog to defecate inside the apartment. She said she could not check her mail because management at The Pines had locked her out of her mailbox. She said someone came in and scratched her Teflon frying pan and burned up her microwave oven. She did not make these allegations to management at The Pines when they occurred, if they did occur. Even if one believes that her property was violated, and evidence to that effect was thin, there is no indication at all that anyone involved in managing The Pines was involved. Moreover, no adverse action was taken toward Ms. Walters. Two notices about barking dogs and a written demand that she pay rent do not amount to an adverse action.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief of Susan M. Walters be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of October, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Dawn Chapman The Pines at Warrington 4101 West Navy Boulevard Pensacola, Florida 32507 Angela North Olgetree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C. 301 Congress Avenue, Suite 1150 Austin, Texas 78701 Susan M. Walters 1112 Bartow Avenue Pensacola, Florida 32507 Monica Jerelle Williams, Esquire Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak, and Stewart, P.C. 100 North Tampa Street, Suite 3600 Tampa, Florida 33602 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
