Findings Of Fact On September 16, 1981, the Circuit Court, Fourth Judicial Circuit, In And For Duval County, Florida, upon a Petition For Modification of the Final Judgment of Paternity, entered a Consent Order For Support requiring the Petitioner in this cause to pay Fifteen and No/100 Dollars ($15.00) per week as and for child support and assigning said support payments to the Respondent in this cause until such time as the child involved in the paternity suit no longer received assistance from the State of Florida. At the time Respondent caused Petitioner's Federal Income Tax Refund to be intercepted, the Petitioner was in arrears in the sum of Two Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety and 17/100 Dollars ($2,790.17) on child support payments assigned to the Respondent under the order referred to in paragraph 1 above. Petitioner's Federal Income Tax Refund in the amount of Eight Hundred Twenty Eight and No/100 Dollars ($828.00) has been intercepted and is in the possession of the Respondent.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, enter a Final Order providing for the Petitioner's income tax refund in the amount of Eight Hundred Twenty Eight and No/100 Dollars ($828.00) be applied against his debt to the State of Florida for past due child support. Respectfully submitted and entered this 22nd day of April, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory Alan Mitchell 439 Woodbine Street Jacksonville, Florida 32206 R. Craig Hemphill, P.A. 331 East Union Street, Suite 1 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Frederick J. Simpson, Esquire Dept. of HRS Post Office Box 2417 Jacksonville, Florida 32231 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact In 1972 Petitioner received $743,982 of income from state and municipal bonds. On its federal income tax return the Petitioner allocated $471,229 of this amount to the policyholders' share as required by law and $272,753 to the company's share (Phase I). The Phase II figures were $359,669 and $384,313 respectively. Respondent has added back the entire $743,982 for purposes of computing Petitioner's Florida taxable income. Petitioner added back the $272,753 (Phase I) and $384,313 (Phase II). For 1972 Petitioner accrued $350,000 of Florida taxes on its federal income tax return. In computing its deductions on its federal income tax return 36.6612 percent of this amount was deducted in the Phase I computation and 51.6564 percent in the Phase II computation. Respondent has added back all of the Florida tax accrued in computing the Florida income tax owed by Petitioner. Petitioner's position is that only the company's percentages were deductible and only these amounts should be added back. The amount of additional Florida income tax assessment proposed for 1972 by the Respondent over that paid by Petitioner is $21,234. In 1973 Petitioner received $552,408 of income from state and municipal bonds. On its federal income tax return Petitioner allocated $335,662 of this amount to policyholders' share as required by law and $216,786 to the company's share (Phase I). The Phase II figures were $248,789 and $303,619 respectively. Respondent has added back the entire $552,408 for purposes of computing Petitioner's taxable income. Petitioner added back the $216,786 (Phase I) and $303,619 (Phase II). For 1973 Petitioner accrued $475,000 of Florida taxes on its federal income tax return. In computing its deductions on its federal income tax return 39.2438 percent of this amount was deductible in Phase I and 54.9628 percent in Phase II. Respondent has added back all of the Florida tax accrued. Petitioner's position is that only the company's percentages were deductible and only these amounts should be added back. The amount of additional Florida income tax assessment proposed for 1973 by Respondent was $20,184. It was further stipulated that the sole issues here involved are: The computation of the amount of tax exempt interest which is excludable from taxable income under section 103(a) Internal Revenue Code for purposes of the Florida corporate income tax; and The computation of the amount of Florida income tax accrued which is deductible for purposes of federal income tax and added back for purposes of computing the Florida income tax.
Findings Of Fact On or about August 18, 1977, Respondent, Charles Leon Winkleman (Winkleman), filed an application with Petitioner, Office of the Comptroller, Department of Banking and Finance (Department) for registration as an associated person with Tax Favored Securities, Inc., now known as Global Investors Securities, Inc. Winkleman's application was granted November 1, 1977. On April 11, 1984, Winkleman pled guilty to an information filed in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida (District Court) , Case No. 84-6043-Cr-JLK, which charged that he: did wilfully and knowingly aid assist in, and counsel, procure, and advise the preparation and presentation to the Internal Revenue Service of a United States Individual Income Tax Return (Form 1040) of William I. and Amy Steele Donner for the calendar year 1978 which was false and fraudulent as to a material matter, in that it represented that said William I. Donner was entitled under the provisions of the Internal Revenue laws to claim deductions in the sum of $83,313.00 representing an ordinary loss of income, as a result of being owner of a sole proprietorship managed by Charles L. Winkleman, whereas, as . Winkleman . . . then and there well knew and believed William I. Donner was not entitled to said deductions all in violation of Title 26 United States Code, Section 7206(2). 1/ On April 18, 1984, Winkleman filed an amended Form U-4 with the Central Registration Depository, and thereby advised interested parties that he had pled guilty to the information filed in the District Court. A copy of the amended Form U-4 was, contemporaneously, filed with the Department. 2/ On June 6, 1984, the District Court entered a judgment of guilt on Winkleman's plea. Winkleman was sentenced to six months imprisonment and fined $3,000.00. Winkleman failed, however, to notify the Department of such conviction until April 10, 1987, and offered no explanation at hearing for such failure. Following Winkleman's plea of guilty in the District Court, the Department of Commerce and Economic Development, Division of Banking, Securities and Corporations (Department of Commerce) in Juneau, Alaska, issued a notice of intent to revoke Winkleman's registration. This notice, dated June 4, 1984, sought revocation based primarily on Winkleman's plea of guilty to the charges filed in the District Court. Winkleman failed to notify the Department of the pendency of the Alaska proceeding until April 10, 1987, and offered no explanation at hearing for such failure. On March 10, 1987, the Department of Commerce entered an order revoking Winkleman's registration in Alaska based on his conviction in the District Court. By amended Form U-4, filed April 10, 1987, Winkleman advised the Department of his conviction in the District Court and the revocation of his registration by the State of Alaska. 3/ The order of the Department of Commerce, revoking Winkleman's registration, is currently on appeal. Winkleman seeks reversal of such order predicated on his assertion that the Department of Commerce breached an agreement to allow him to withdraw his registration in lieu of revocation. On July 20, 1987, the court, which is reviewing the Department of Commerce proceedings, entered an order staying the order of revocation pending the disposition of Winkleman's appeal. On April 1, 1987, a hearing was held before the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD), to consider whether Winkleman, because of his conviction, should be disqualified as a registered representative with Global Investors Securities, Inc. On August 13, 1986, NASD entered a "Notice Pursuant to Rule 19h-1 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934" whereby it proposed that Winkleman not be disqualified. On January 8, 1987, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rendered its decision that it would not invoke Section 15A(g)(2) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to direct NASD to disqualify Winkleman.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the registration of Respondent, Charles Leon Winkleman, as an associated person under the Florida Securities and Investor Protection Act be REVOKED. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of October, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of October, 1987.
Findings Of Fact Having listened to the testimony and considered the evidence presented in this cause, it is found as follows: Petitioner is a domestic corporation. Petitioner provided medicare services to patients in the 1969-70 fiscal year. An on-site audit by the medicare auditing team was concluded in December of 1971, and petitioner received $56,131.00 of medicare reimbursements in January of 1972, for the services provided in the 1969-70 fiscal year. The petitioner did not file an amended federal income tax return for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1979. The adjusted federal income reported on petitioner's federal income tax return for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1972, included the $56,131.00 of medicare reimbursements received by petitioner in January of 1972. On petitioner's Florida income tax return for its fiscal year ending September 30, 1972, petitioner did not include the $56,131.00 figure in its adjusted federal income. On March 31, 1975, the respondent notified petitioner of a proposed deficiency in the amount of $2,100.99 arising from the petitioner's omission of the medicare reimbursements from its adjusted federal income as shown on its Florida corporate income tax return for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1972. Further correspondence ensued between the petitioner and the Corporate Income Tax Bureau of the respondent and the petitioner filed the present petition requesting a hearing on the issue. The respondent requested the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct the hearing.
Recommendation Based upon the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is my recommendation that there is no legal basis for affording the petitioner any relief from the proposed deficiency and that said deficiency in the amount of $2,100.00 be sustained. Respectfully submitted and entered this 17th day of September, 1975, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: E. Wilson Crump, II, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Tax Division, Northwood Mall Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Homer E. Ward, N.H.A. Administrator/President University Park Convalescent Center 1818 E. Fletcher Avenue Tampa, Florida 33612
Findings Of Fact The Tax-Credit Allocation Program Section 42(h)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, provides for federal income tax credits for the development of low income housing. The tax credits are allocated among the states based on state population. Respondent allocates the low income housing federal income tax credits available in Florida. The present case involves the 1992 tax credit- allocation cycle, which was unusual in one respect. The relevant provisions of Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code are due to expire on June 30, 1992. Respondent expedited the application and evaluation process for the 1992 cycle because of uncertainty concerning whether credits not allocated by June 30 can be allocated after the expiration of Section 42. As in past cycles, applicants in the 1992 cycle sought more tax credits than Respondent had to allocate. In some categories, the sum of tax credits sought by applicants is four times greater than the total available tax credits. Since 1990, as a result of changes in the Internal Revenue Code, Respondent has implemented a competitive process to determine which applicants should be awarded tax credits. In general, the selection process consists of an application and evaluation process followed by an underwriting process involving only those applicants and projects that were determined to be in the funding range after completion of the application and evaluation process. The objective of both stages is to identify proposed projects that offer the best opportunities for the development of affordable housing in Florida. This case involves only the first stage in which Respondent evaluates the application. The Subject Applications General Each Petitioner is a limited partnership formed to develop a low income rental housing project in Osceola County. The Ravenwood project is in the unincorporated county, and the Oakcrest project is in St. Cloud. Ronnie C. Davis is the general partner of both partnerships and controls the activities of these entities. His accountant, Steven Scott, has worked closely with Mr. Davis in connection with these and numerous other similar projects. As it had done successfully in past cycles, Petitioners applied to obtain federal income tax credits and sell the limited partnership interests (with tax credits) to a third party. The third party would combine Petitioners' projects with others like them and syndicate limited partnership interests to individual investors seeking, among other things, the available tax credits in order to lower their federal income tax liability. This indirect federal subsidy of development costs is intended to encourage the development of affordable housing. The application completed by Petitioners and other applicants in the 1992 cycle consists of numerous questions divided into 16 Forms. Each applicant receives a maximum of 1285 points based on the answers to the questions. Varying amounts of points are available for 12 of the 16 Forms. (Four Forms seek background information or constitute request forms.) The Ravenwood Application Form 1 of the Ravenwood application, which is dated January 30, 1992, consists of summarized information, which, where important, is requested elsewhere in the application. Due to its background nature, Form 1 involves no points. Form 1 of the Ravenwood application describes the proposed project as consisting of 181 units with eight units each in 23 different buildings. (Three units are reserved for on- site workers.) The project is situated on 11 acres and is projected to cost $9,537,049. Petitioner Ravenwood seeks $858,334 in federal income tax credits. Form 1 states that there is federal, state, or local financing "committed or to be committed to this Project." The financing is SAIL financing in the amount of $1.3 million representing 13.6% of the total project cost. Form 1 also states that the present owner acquired the property by gift on November 18, 1991. Form 4 addresses project feasibility and ability to proceed. Form 4 offers a maximum of 225 points. With Form 5, which concerns project funding, Form 4 is worth the most points of all the Forms. Form 4 of the Ravenwood application states, among other things, that the developer controls the site by County deed, which is intended to serve the purpose of a warranty deed. Attached as an exhibit to Form 4 is a letter dated November 20, 1991, from the Osceola County Administrator to Mr. Davis accompanying the delivery of a deed to the property from Osceola County to Ravenwood of Kissimmee, Ltd. The deed, which is dated November 18, 1991, recites as consideration "general benefit of the public." The deed conveys title to 11 acres "conditioned upon the grantee being awarded a state apartment incentive loan and tax credits no later than December 31, 1992. If this condition is not met by December 31, 1992, the property described herein shall revert to the grantor." The manner by which the limited partnership acquired the property is also covered in Form 6, which addresses local government contributions and planning efforts. Form 6 is worth 155 points, which is more than any other Form except Forms 4 and 5. The first part of Form 6 is directed to local government contributions. The first portion of the first part states: Attach evidence of any contribution or recommendation. Maximum points shall be awarded only when evidence of a contribution includes a signed statement from a chief elected official or his designee detailing the contribution from the appropriate local government. The value of the contribution must be stated in terms of a percentage of cost savings to the project. . . . Form 6 of the Ravenwood application answers affirmatively the question, "Has this project received any contributions from a local government?" In response to the request, "Describe the type of contribution," the application states: "Land as well as other government support and assistance." Form 6 states that the value of the contribution is $1,089,000. In response to a question as to how the value was calculated, the application reports that the value was calculated by a "local realtor." The application notes that the total project cost is $9,537,049. Form 6 contains a scoring sheet that awards points based on the ratio of the value of the local government contribution to the total project cost. If the local government contribution amounts to at least 10% of the total project cost, then the maximum of 75 points are earned for the first part of Form 6. Lower percentages earn fewer points, as follows: 9%-- 67.5 points, 8% 60 points, 7%--52.5 points, 6%--45 points, 5%-- 37.5 points, 4%--30 points, 3%-- 22.5 points, 2%--15 points, and 1%--7.5 points. As support for the information provided in the first part of Form 6, the application contains various attachments in the back of Form 6. One attachment is a letter dated November 18, 1991, from Barney Veal, Broker/President of ERA--Osceola Brokerage Co., Realtor. The Veal letter, which is addressed to Mr. Davis, states in its entirety: Per your request, and after careful consideration, I have reviewed the value of the land donated to you by the Osceola County Board of County Commissioners. Weighted consideration was given for the following: *Development Improvements to the municipal water system *Development Improvements to the municipal sewer system *Development Improvements to the transportation system *Superior site use through off-site drainage *Ease of access via the John Young Parkway Extension to the "high tech" corridor of neighboring Orange County *Property aesthetics This property contains 11 acres, and has a current density of 18 units per acre, thus allowing construction of 198 multi-family units. Therefore, the estimated valuation is approximately $5500 per residential unit, which equals a total amount of 1,089,000 [sic]. Another attachment to Form 6 is a letter from Ron Howse, P.A., an engineering and land planning firm. Mr. Howse, whose office is in St. Cloud, incorporates Mr. Veal's letter and provides the above-described responses to the questions contained in the first part of Form 6. The remaining attachments to Form 6 address the second part, which involves local government planning efforts with respect to affordable housing. This part of Form 6 is not relevant to the subject case. The Oakcrest Application The Oakcrest application, which is also dated January 30, 1992, is similar to the Ravenwood application. Form 1 of the Oakcrest application describes the proposed project as consisting of 189 units with eight units each in 24 different buildings. (Three units are reserved for on-site workers.) The project is situated on 19.4 acres and is projected to cost $10,164,207. Petitioner Oakcrest seeks $914,778 in federal income tax credits. Form 1 states that there is federal, state, or local financing "committed or to be committed to this Project." The financing is SAIL financing in the amount of $1.4 million representing 13.8% of the total project cost. Form 1 also states that the present owner acquired the property by gift on November 21, 1991. Form 4 of the Oakcrest application states, among other things, that the developer controls the site by warranty deed. Attached as an exhibit to Form 4 is a letter dated November 21, 1991, from Larry F. Hopper, Executive Director of the St. Cloud Area Chamber of Commerce. The letter is to Mr. Davis and accompanies the delivery of a deed to the property from the St. Cloud Housing & Revitalization Agency, Inc. to Oakcrest of St. Cloud, Ltd. The deed, which is dated November 21, 1991, conveys title to 19.4 acres conditioned upon the grantee being awarded a state apartment incentive loan and tax credits to construct no less than 193 units, with construction thereon to commence no later than December 31, 1992. If the above cited incentive loan and tax credits are not received and construction not begun by December 31, 1992, the property described herein shall revert to the grantor. Form 6 of the Oakcrest application answers affirmatively the question, "Has this project received any contributions from a local government?" In response to the request, "Describe the type of contribution," the application states: "Land Contribution, as well as other government support and assistance." Form 6 states that the value of the contribution is $1,018,000. In response to a question as to how the value was calculated, the application reports that the value was calculated by a "local realtor." The application notes that the total project cost is $10,164,207. As support for the information provided in the first part of Form 6, the application contains various attachments in the back of Form 6. One attachment is a letter dated November 18, 1991, from Barney Veal, Broker/President of ERA--Osceola Brokerage Co., Realtor. The Veal letter, which is addressed to Mr. Davis, states in its entirety: Per your request, and after careful consideration, I have reviewed the value of the land donated to you by the St. Cloud Housing and Revitalization Agency, Inc. Weighted consideration was given for the following: *Development Improvements to the municipal water system *Development Improvements to the municipal sewer system *Development Improvements to the transportation system *Location Proximity to a new growth area *Property Aesthetics This property contains 19.4 acres, and has a current density of 10 units per acre, thus allowing construction of 194 multi-family units. Therefore, the estimated valuation is approximately $5250 per residential unit, which equals a total amount of $1,018,500. Another attachment to Form 6 is a letter from Ron Howse, P.A., an engineering and land planning firm. Mr. Howse, whose office is in St. Cloud, incorporates Mr. Veal's letter and provides the above-described responses to the questions contained in the first part of Form 6. Another attachment to Form 6 of the Oakcrest application is a copy of the first two pages of the Articles of Incorporation of the St. Cloud Housing & Revitalization Agency, Inc., a not-for-profit corporation. According to the articles, the not-for-profit corporation was incorporated by the St. Cloud Area Chamber of Commerce, Inc. Relevant Practices of Respondent The head of Respondent is its Board of Directors. Each review cycle, the Board appoints a Review Committee, which normally consists of five or six persons. Different employees of Respondent serve on the Review Committee each year. The Review Committee assigns scores for each Form of each application. These determinations are then submitted to the Board of Directors for further action. Certain practices have evolved in connection with the scoring of applications. To the extent that any of these practices may constitute nonrule policy, Respondent has amply explicated the practices, which appear to be necessary and proper to the discharge of its responsibilities in the allocation of low income housing federal tax credits. First, the Review Committee generally limits its review of an application to the material contained within the four corners of the application. The reason for this practice is that the Review Committee is typically operating under time pressures. However, there are two circumstances in which the Review Committee may refer to information not contained within the application. The first and more frequent exception to the general rule is if something is unclear in the application. In this case, a member of the Review Committee or staff of Respondent may contact the applicant to obtain a clarification. Sometimes, the contact may be with a third party, such as a third-party lender to whom questions concerning the scope of a commitment letter may be directed. By limiting these inquiries to clarifications, Respondent avoids the possibility of the eliciting information that constitutes post-deadline amendments of material aspects of the application. The second exception to the general rule is when a third party informs the Review Committee that certain information contained in an application is inaccurate. To a great extent, the accuracy of the contents of the application is checked in the underwriting stage of the allocation process. But, if time permits, the Review Committee or other representatives of Respondent may, if they so choose, undertake a necessarily limited investigation of statements in an application. In the couple of years that the allocation process has been competitive, the only application rejected as "untrue," aside from Ravenwood and Oakcrest, was an application for a project known as Woodside. Ironically, this application appears to have been challenged by Mr. Davis and Mr. Ginsburg, 1/ who alerted Respondent to the fact that, contrary to representations contained in the application, the Resolution Trust Corporation, not the developer, owned the site. 2/ It appears that, due to timing, the Board itself rejected the Woodside application because the true facts were uncovered during the underwriting stage, rather than the application and evaluation stage. It appears that, also during underwriting, another application was rejected due to ineligibility, if not actual untruthfulness. In that case, an application for a project known as Golden Acres was rejected when representatives of the Board checked the project site and confirmed that the buildings had already been placed in service and thus would not be eligible for any or a full tax credit. Except for one case in which the wrong application form was used, the record does not disclose if other applications have been summarily rejected for reasons other than satisfying a scoring threshold described in the application form and irrelevant to this case. Rather than reject an application, at least prior to the underwriting process, the Review Committee and Board will often rescore an application. Not infrequently, a developer submits an application containing information that may be described, in the words of one witness, as optimistic in nature. If the application contains sufficient material for the Review Committee or Board to rescore a Form, possibly with the assistance of a clarification from the applicant or a third party, the application will be rescored so that a lower score results. It is not always easy to describe what renders an application "untrue." One example of an untrue application would be if an applicant fabricated a loan commitment letter when no such commitment had been made. On the other hand, if the applicant claimed more points than the letter, on its face, justified due to its numerous contingencies and conditions, the application would clearly be rescored. Although it may contain inaccuracies, a true application must disclose all material facts so that each Form may be scored reasonably accurately. The materiality of an omitted fact depends largely on the importance and purpose of the requested information. The decisions as to what information is important, material, or untrue and when to reject and when to rescore an application must be based on a balancing of at least two considerations. The first is that the purpose of the application and evaluation and underwriting processes is to ensure that the available tax credits go to the best projects, in terms of meeting the critical needs of low income persons for affordable housing. Superior applications should not be rejected too readily. The second is that the integrity of the evaluation process would be compromised if the "untrue application" language is interpreted so that all instances of applicant untruthfulness are reduced to over-optimism, thus meaning that untrue applications would be always rescored and never rejected. Without the potential penalty of rejection, the process by which applications are evaluated and projects underwritten would become increasingly burdened by the chore of detecting growing numbers of misrepresentations. At some point, the resources of Respondent would become overtaxed, misrepresentations would probably escape detection, and the overall objective of the entire program--facilitating the availability of affordable housing--would eventually be defeated. V. Preliminary Scoring of the Applications in the 1992 Cycle In the present case, on or about February 27, 1992, the Review Committee tentatively scored all of the applications. For medium counties, 3/ eight applications fell within the funding range, one application fell partly in the funding range, 16 applications meeting the scoring threshold fell outside the funding range, and one application failed to meet the scoring threshold. The tentative scoring assigned Ravenwood 1190 points and Oakcrest 1153.87 points for the two highest scores among the nine projects tentatively allocated, in whole or in part, the tax credits requested. On March 6, 1992, the Board of Directors reviewed the tentative scoring determined by the Review Committee. By this time, representatives of Respondent had determined that the contribution of the land from the local governments, as asserted in both applications, was not as represented. The Board decided to reject both applications. If the Ravenwood and Oakcrest applications had been merely rescored so as to lose all 75 points for the first part of Form 6, they would have remained in the funding range. In fact, Ravenwood would have remained first, and Oakcrest would have been third, tied with another project. Respondent has implemented an appeal process by which scores set by the Board, following review of the tentative scoring of the Review Committee, may be re-evaluated by the Board. In the 1992 cycle, 36 applicants took advantage of this process. The appeals hearing, which took place on May 1, 1992, resulted in the issuance of the final scoring tabulation, which is Petitioner Exhibit 14. However, no material changes took place with respect to medium counties, and the Ravenwood and Oakcrest applications remained rejected. Facts Not Disclosed on Applications Ravenwood The basic problem with the Ravenwood application is that it states that the local government, Osceola County, contributed the raw land to the applicant. In substance, the County has conveyed nothing to the Ravenwood limited partnership. Through a series of step transactions, Mr. Davis, using an agent, obtained title to the land from a genuine third party, conveyed the land to the County, and caused the County to convey the land to the Ravenwood limited partnership. The few details of the transactions that are relevant begin with the fact that, by contract dated April 9, 1991, Mr. Davis agreed to pay the original owners $300,000 for 12.5 acres. On October 30, 1991, Mr. Davis assigned the contract to his accountant's brother, Jimmy Alan Scott. By quitclaim deed acknowledged November 9, 1991, Mr. Scott quitclaimed any interest he had in the land to Osceola County. On November 18, 1991, Mr. Davis, Mr. Scott, and Osceola County entered into a trilateral agreement. The parties agreed that Mr. Scott would convey the property to the County, which would convey the property to the Ravenwood limited partnership. Also, the County agreed that if the property reverted to it under the condition to be contained in its deed to the partnership, then it would reconvey the property to Mr. Scott. Another significant aspect of the trilateral agreement is that the deeds from Mr. Scott to the County and the County to the Ravenwood limited partnership are to be "held in escrow pending the County's negotiations with [other parties including the original owners of the subject land] to acquire additional property for the recreational complex." By letter dated March 2, 1991, the attorney for the Ravenwood limited partnership discloses that the escrow had not been broken, inferentially because escrow conditions remained unsatisfied, and the deeds had not been recorded. On November 16, 1991, Mr. Davis lent Mr. Scott the funds necessary to purchase the land from the original owners. A note for the amount was to be forgiven if Mr. Scott donated the land to Osceola County. By warranty deed dated January 6, 1992, the original owners conveyed the land to Mr. Scott, who, on the same date, conveyed the land to the County. The two deeds were identical except that deed into the County contains a reverter clause covering all but a small part of the property. The condition is that the majority of the land reverts to Mr. Scott if construction of no less than 184 units of affordable housing does not begin by December 31, 1991. The only deed from the County to the Ravenwood limited partnership is dated November 14, 1991. Copies of the deed were produced at the hearing and attached to the Ravenwood application in Form 4. In the instrument, the County "has granted, bargained and sold" the subject land to the Ravenwood limited partnership conditioned upon the partnership "being awarded a state apartment incentive loan and tax credits no later than December 31, 1992. If this condition is not met by December 31, 1992, the property described herein shall revert to the grantor." There are no warranties, such as a warranty of title, contained in this deed. The underlying problem with the Ravenwood application is as basic as the problem in the Woodside application, where Mr. Davis objected that the RTC, not the applicant, owned the land, contrary to the assertions contained in the application. The County has not contributed anything to the Ravenwood limited partnership because the partnership does not own the land. First, unspecified escrow conditions have left uncompleted the conveyances to the County and the Ravenwood limited partnership. Tied up in escrow, the deeds have not been delivered, which is as basic an aspect to the conveyance of property as is their execution. Second, the application shows that the limited partnership owns the land as a result of a deed from Osceola County. The deed predates the date on which the original owners conveyed the land to Mr. Scott and he purportedly, using an escrow arrangement, conveyed the land to Osceola County. In a deed without any warranties, it is questionable whether the doctrine of after- acquired interest or estoppel by deed would operate here. In light of the problems identified in the preceding two paragraphs, the overstatement problem is less substantial. Although the County has contributed something in the way of services, there is no evidence that the contribution of such services anywhere approaches the claimed amount of $1,089,000, which is more than three times the value of the land as of April, 1991. However, in view of the failure of the Ravenwood limited partnership to obtain any title to the land, the value of the contribution is not $1,089,000, but zero. Oakcrest The basic problem with the Oakcrest application also involves the contribution of raw land to the partnership. The land has not yet been conveyed to the partnership. The relevant details of the Oakcrest transactions are similar to those of the Ravenwood transactions. On November 18, 1991, Mr. Scott and a genuine third party entered into an agreement for deed for 19.4 acres for payment of $300,000. The condition of a closing, which is set for no later than January 5, 1993, is that the Oakcrest limited partnership be awarded tax credits no later than December 31, 1992. Notwithstanding its title as an agreement for deed, the subject instrument operates like a purchase and sales contract, in part because Mr. Scott has not placed any money unconditionally at risk and a closing is set at a point in the future once certain contingencies have been satisfied. On November 19, 1991, Mr. Scott conveyed by warranty deed to the St. Cloud Housing and Revitalization Agency, Inc. the same 19.4 acres subject to the condition that the "grantee [i.e., the Agency] being awarded a state apartment incentive loan and tax credits to construct no less than 193 units with construction thereon to commence no later than December 31, 1992." If the condition is unsatisfied, it provides for the property to revert to Mr. Scott. On November 21, 1991, the St. Cloud Housing and Revitalization Agency, Inc. conveyed by warranty deed to the Oakcrest limited partnership the same 19.4 acres subject to the same condition concerning 193 units. The Oakcrest transfers are ineffective and leave the Oakcrest limited partnership with no interest in the land and thus in receipt of no contribution from a local government. The application, which adequately discloses the nature of the St. Cloud Housing and Revitalization Agency, Inc. as other than a local governmental entity, contains only the warranty deed from the Agency to the Oakcrest limited partnership. The omission of the sales contract (i.e., Agreement for Deed) leaves the incorrect impression that the Agency had an interest to convey to the Oakcrest limited partnership. The Agency had no such interest because Mr. Scott had no such interest. 4/ But the valuation problem is greater in the Oakcrest case. Unlike the Ravenwood case, in which months passed between the contract and the date on which the applicant asserted the value of the land, the Oakcrest sales contract calling for a $300,000 purchase price was signed just three days before the deed purportedly conveying the land from the Agency to the Oakcrest limited partnership. Unlike the Ravenwood case, the Agency was making no other contributions to the partnership. Even assuming an effective conveyance, the application thus grossly overstates the value of the contribution at $1,018,500, when the original sellers only three days earlier agreed to sell the property, under substantial conditions favorable to the buyer, for only $300,000. Whether the Applications are Untrue For the reasons set forth above, the Ravenwood and Oakcrest applications were untrue at the time that they were submitted and were properly rejected by Respondent. The materiality of the omissions is indisputable. Contrary to the assertions in both applications, the applicant in each case not only had not received a contribution of the land from a local government, but the applicant had not even obtained an interest in the land.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby recommended that the Florida Housing Finance Agency enter a final order rejecting the Ravenwood and Oakcrest applications as untrue. RECOMMENDED this 9th day of June, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of June, 1992.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner's application for licensure as a nonresident life, health and variable annuities insurance agent should be denied on the basis of his having pled guilty and been convicted of a felony. Embodied within that general issue are the issues of whether the felony involved is one of moral turpitude and whether the conviction, and the circumstances surrounding it, demonstrate that the Petitioner lacks fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Preston Hursey, Jr., filed an application for qualification in Florida as a nonresident life, health and variable annuities agent. The application was filed on November 13, 1989. On April 9, 1990, the Department of Insurance issued a letter of denial with regard to that application based upon a felony conviction of the Petitioner in the past. The Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged, in pertinent part, with enforcing the licensure, admission and continuing practice standards for insurance agents of all types, embodied in Chapter 626, Florida Statutes, and with regulating the admission of persons to licensure as insurance agents in the State of Florida. On August 12, 1988, an Information was filed with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, charging the Petitioner with three felony counts involving "aiding or assisting presentation of false income tax return". That is a felony violation of Title 26 U.S.C., Sections 7206(2). On November 15, 1989, the Petitioner was found guilty of three counts of aiding or assisting presentation of false income tax return in violation of that statutory section. The actual conduct for which he was convicted occurred prior to the charges. Prior to 1984, the Petitioner worked for some years as a medical examiner for insurance companies, taking medical histories, blood pressures, pulses and the like, for purposes of establishing insurance coverage for clients of the companies. Some time in early 1984, the Petitioner approached American Dynamics Corporation, as a client, with the intent of availing himself of the financial planning services of that company with the intent of saving on income taxes. The company was apparently counseling clients as to tax shelters in which they could invest or which they could claim, as a means of' avoidance of federal income tax. The Petitioner became very interested in that tax saving procedure and sometime in 1984 became involved with the firm as one of its financial counselor employees. The firm trained him in the service they offered to taxpayers, which involved financial planning by using trusts to defer taxes, as well as other means of sheltering income from tax liability. The company and the Petitioner counseled numerous clients and assisted them in taking advantage of alleged tax shelters, including the final act of preparing their tax returns. During the course of going to hearings with his clients, when their tax returns came under question by the Internal Revenue Service, the Petitioner became aware that apparently the service would not accept the tax shelter devices being used by his company and him as a legitimate means of avoiding taxes. He then sought legal advice from a tax attorney and received an opinion from him that the tax avoidance counseling methods, devices and tax return preparation the Petitioner and his employer were engaging in were not legal, and that the Petitioner should advise anyone he knew involved in such schemes to terminate their relationship. The Petitioner acted on that advice, terminated his relationship with the company and recommended to his clients that they terminate their relationship with the company and the tax avoidance devices being used. Through hindsight and learning more about relevant tax law in the last four to five years since the conduct occurred, the Petitioner realizes that the tax shelter schemes marketed by his employer at that time and, by himself, did not make financial or legal sense. The Petitioner at that time had very little training in financial counseling or advising and very little training in the Federal income tax laws arid regulations. In retrospect, after receiving much more such training as an agent of New York Life Insurance Company since that time, he realized the significance of the error he and his former employer committed. When the tax returns were prepared by the Petitioner and others employed with the firm involved, the tax return accurately reflected the gross income of he taxpayer, the "W2 forms", and all appropriate documentation. Then, the gross income of the taxpayer was shown as reduced by the amount of funds affected by the tax shelter system marketed by the Petitioner's former employer and the Petitioner. There was a statement on the tax return itself explaining the disparity in taxable income so that basically the Internal Revenue Service had the facts and circumstances of such situations disclosed to it. It, however, deemed anyone marketing such tax shelters as engaged in marketing "abusive tax shelters", in effect, in violation of the Internal Revenue Code. Ultimately, the Petitioner was prosecuted along with others involved in the transactions and suffered a felony conviction of three counts of violation of the statute referenced above. The Petitioner has steadfastly maintained both before and after his conviction that he had no intent to violate the tax laws of the United States, but rather believed, until he sought a legal opinion from a qualified attorney, that the service he was marketing was a legal one. After he came under prosecution by the Justice Department for the violation, the Petitioner cooperated fully with the Internal Revenue Service and the Justice Department. The felony violation of which he was convicted, by guilty plea, carried a sentence of three years imprisonment, one year for each tax return involved. That sentence was reduced by the court; however, in consideration of the circumstances of the Petitioner's offense and his cooperation with the prosecuting authorities, to one month of "work release", which he served by working during the day for senior citizens organizations and returning to a confinement facility in the evening. He also was required to render 200 hours of community service, which he has completed, and three years probation. Because of his excellent attitude and behavior and his demonstrated activities designed to further his education in the insurance and securities field, his successful pursuit of the insurance and securities marketing profession in other states and his obviously-positive motivation, his probation officer has recommended that his probation be terminated early, after only two years of it would have been completed in November, 1990. The sentence was reduced because of the Petitioner's positive record in his community, the fact that he had no prior criminal history and because of widespread support by responsible members of the community and by the probation officers who reviewed his case and situation. The judge, upon sentencing, also noted that he was impressed by the fact that the Petitioner wanted to continue to work in the insurance and securities field and was the sole support of a young son whom he was supporting and caring for as an active parent. He continues to do that. The record establishes that the Petitioner's conviction was the result of a guilty plea. That plea resulted from a negotiated "plea bargain" settlement with the prosecuting authorities. The Petitioner established with unrefuted testimony, that he never had any willful intent to commit a crime or defraud the Federal government and the Internal Revenue Service. While he had a general intent to offer the tax advice involved to clients and assist them in engaging in tax shelter arrangements and in preparing the related tax returns, he had no specific intent to commit acts which he knew to be illegal when he committed them, nor which he believed amounted to fraud or deceit of the Internal Revenue Service. Although he pled guilty to a crime involving, by the language of the above--cited statute, the element of falsity, which bespeaks of deceit or fraud, the evidence shows that the Petitioner harbored no such fraudulent or deceitful intent. This is corroborated by the fact that the Petitioner and his clients disclosed all income on the tax return and simply disclosed that a portion of it was sheltered, which procedure was determined by the Internal Revenue Service to be illegal. There was no evidence of record to indicate that the Petitioner sought to conceal income or otherwise commit a false or fraudulent act in the course of his financial and tax advice to these clients, nor in the preparation of their tax returns for submittal. While the statute he is convicted of violating appears to involve the element of moral turpitude because it refers to false or fraudulent tax returns, it is a very general type of charge which can cover many types of activities or conduct. Consequently, one should consider the specific conduct involved in a given instance, such as this one, to determine whether the crime committed factually involved moral turpitude. Based upon the unrefuted evidence of record culminating in the findings of fact made above, it is clear that the Petitioner committed no conduct involving moral turpitude at the time the activity in question was engaged in for the above reasons. The Petitioner has been in no legal altercation, criminal or otherwise, before or since the instance which occurred in 1984. He has become licensed in Washington DC, Maryland and Virginia as an insurance agent and as a broker agent. He represents numerous insurance companies, including, for approximately five years, the New York Life Insurance Company and other reputable companies. He has pursued his continuing education requirements and has earned more requirements than he needs for licensure in Florida and Maryland. He is actively seeking to improve his professional standing and competence in the insurance and securities field and is highly motivated to continue doing so. A great deal of his motivation comes from the fact that he is the sole support of his young 11-year-old son. He enjoys the insurance profession because it gives him time to participate in his son's many school-related and extracurricular activities, such as football. The Petitioner's testimony, and the proven circumstances of the situation, establish without question that he is an honest, forthright person who has candidly admitted a past mistake and who has worked actively, in the approximate six years which have elapsed since the conduct was committed, to rectify that blemish on his record. His efforts to rehabilitate himself personally and professionally involved his active participation as a parent for his son in his son's school life and otherwise, and participation in church and community activities. During the time period which has elapsed since the conduct in question occurred, he has sufficiently rehabilitated himself both personally and professionally so as to justify the finding that he has demonstrated trustworthiness and fitness to engage in the business of insurance. Indeed, three other states, after having the circumstances of his conviction fully disclosed to them, have licensed him or retained him as a licensee insurance agent. The Petitioner is a navy veteran of Vietnam, having served three tours in the Vietnam war, for which service he was decorated. He had a number of security clearances, including a top secret security clearance based upon his work in the field of communications and cryptology during that war. This honorable service, the efforts he has made to improve himself personally and professionally before and since the subject conduct occurred, the fact that it was an isolated incident on his record, the fact that it did not involve any established intent to defraud or deceive on his part, the fact that he is an active, positive parental role model, community member and church member, and his general demeanor at hearing of honesty and forthrightness convinces the Hearing Officer that the isolated incident of misconduct he committed did not involve a demonstrated lack of fitness and trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance. Quite positively, the Petitioner has demonstrated his fitness and trustworthiness to engage in that business.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's application for licensure as a nonresident life, health and variable annuities insurance agent should be granted. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 90-3069 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-4. Accepted. 5. Rejected, as not clearly established by the evidence of record. 6-14. Accepted. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-4. Accepted. 5. Rejected, as not clearly established by the evidence of record. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, Esq. General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Preston Hursey, Jr., pro se Post Office Box 43643 Washington, DC 20010 Willis F. Melvin, Jr., Esq. Andrew Levine, Esq. Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
The Issue At issue herein is whether or not the Respondent's certificate to practice as a certified public accountant in the State of Florida should be revoked based on conduct which will be set forth hereinafter in detail for alleged violations of Chapter 473, Florida Statutes, and the rules and regulations promulgated and adopted thereunder in Chapter 21A, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony of witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence introduced at the hearing, and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. Mark Finkel, Respondent, is the holder of certificate No. 2327 as a certified public accountant in the State of Florida. As such, the Respondent is subject to the provisions of Chapter 473, Florida Statutes, and the rules and regulations promulgated in Chapter 21A, Florida Administrative Code. The Respondent has been so registered as a certified public accountant since 1968. During early 1973, Respondent was engaged by David E. Wells, M.D., P.A., to prepare and file individual and corporate tax returns for the entity, David E. Wells, M.D., P.A., for the three years ending June 30, 1975. Respondent's engagement stamped from a referral of Dr. Wells' former C.P.A., Tom Williams, who relocated from Florida during late 1972. At the outset of his engagement by Dr. Wells, Respondent was briefed on the nuances of Dr. Wells' cardiology practice by Tom Williams. Respondent, according to Dr. Wells, was told that his duties would include those of filing corporate and individual tax returns and proper accounting for the administration and payment of pension plan taxes. During 1973, Respondent made quarterly visits to Dr. Wells' office to review records and billing information. The record reveals that Respondent filed quarterly payroll tax returns through September of 1976 and individual income tax returns for the years ending 1973 and 1974. Respondent failed to file individual income tax returns for the year ending December, 1975, or corporate returns for the years ending June 30, 1973, through 1976, and pension tax returns for the years ending 1973 through 1976. However, Respondent represented to Dr. Wells that all necessary returns were filed with the Internal Revenue Service and the other governmental agencies charged with the collection of taxes. For the years 1973 through 1976, Dr. Wells received inquiries from the Internal Revenue Service requesting information as to why corporate tax returns had not been filed for his corporation for the three years ending June 30, 1975. Based on the correspondence received from the Internal Revenue Service, Dr. Wells attempted to communicate with Respondent to either get the necessary forms filed or to request a return of Respondent's working papers which would assist another C.P.A. in preparing and filing the pertinent returns, to no avail. In this regard, after repeated calls, Dr. Wells obtained what records Respondent had which were of little use to his newly retained accountant, Myron Kahn, a certified public accountant who, since 1959, has been licensed in Florida and North Carolina. Messr. Kahn was retained by Dr. Wells in December of 1976 and established that the Respondent had only filed an individual income tax return for Dr. Wells for the calendar year 1973, plus quarterly payroll tax returns filed which were current. (See Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 2.) Based on the available records, Messr. Kahn reconstructed the necessary accounting data based on cash receivables and disbursement vouchers for the prior four-year period. Messr. Kahn, after diligent search, found no control sheets, financial summaries, analyses, etc., which would have been kept if the pertinent income tax returns had been filed as required. Because Messr. Kahn had to reconstruct the necessary accounting data, he spent an inordinate amount of time compiling the returns he needed to file. Evidence reveals that due to Dr. Wells' late filing of tax returns for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, he incurred an additional penalty of $12,600, plus approximately $2,700 in interest and for his state corporate return, a penalty of $1,700 was assessed, plus $325 for interest. For the year ending June 30, 1975, Dr. Wells paid a Federal penalty of $5,618, plus $878 in interest, and a state penalty of $1,052, plus $132 in interest. Douglas H. Thompson, Jr., the Board's Executive Director, has been a certified public accountant since April, 1968. Director Thompson is the Board's chief administrative officer and custodian of records. On approximately December 16, 1976, Director Thompson received a complaint from David E. Wells, M.D., based on Respondent's "failure to file requested corporate returns and to return certain documents."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and in the absence of any effort on Respondent's part to refute or otherwise mitigate the evidence presented, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent's license to practice as a certified public accountant (certificate No. 2327) be REVOKED. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of August, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner owes money to Respondent due to an overpayment of compensation.
Findings Of Fact At all relevant times, Respondent has employed Petitioner. By Stipulation, the parties agree that Respondent overpaid Petitioner the sum of $6282.41 by check dated February 14, 2005. The dispute is whether Respondent is entitled to repayment of an additional $2332 in withheld federal income taxes associated with the agreed-upon overpayment. On the date of the overpayment in February 2005, Respondent credited Petitioner with the gross sum of $9328. The net payment to Petitioner was $6282.41. The difference between the gross and the net was $2332 in withheld federal income taxes and $713.59 in employee-paid FICA and Medicaid. Respondent is not seeking repayment of the employee-paid FICA and Medicaid. Respondent discovered the error on December 31, 2005, so it was unable to process the paperwork necessary correct the situation with the tax withholding in the same tax year of 2005. By failing to discover the error in time to process the paperwork in the same tax year, Respondent was unable to effectively reverse the withholding transaction with the Internal Revenue Service. Thus, when Petitioner filed his 2005 federal income tax return, his gross income included this overpayment, and the amount of tax already paid included the $2332 that was erroneously withheld in Respondent's overpayment in February 2005. It is thus clear that Respondent overpaid Petitioner $6282.41 in net pay plus $2332 in income taxes that it withheld from Petitioner and submitted, to Petitioner's credit, to the Internal Revenue Service. The total overpayment is therefore $8614.41.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Juvenile Justice enter a final order determining that, due to an overpayment in 2005, Petitioner shall repay $8614.41, upon such terms, if any, as the department shall determine. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of October, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of October, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Anthony J. Schembri, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Jennifer Parker, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300 Michael B. Golen Assistant General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Theodore E. Morakis 11904 Southwest 9th Manor Davie, Florida 33325
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner should be issued a sales tax exemption certificate either as a "church" or as a "religious organization."
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, In His Service, is a not-for-profit organization formed to give structure to a Bible study and prayer group Shirley B. Cole leads. Cole is the Petitioner's "pastor," but she is not ordained, does not officiate at weddings or funerals, and has no formal religious training other than participation in similar study groups in the past. The Petitioner is affiliated with an organization called the Federation of Independent Churches, which has an office on East Bird Street in Tampa, Florida. (In a post-hearing submission, Cole asserted that the Petitioner's "outreach is from Greater Ministries International, basically functioning as a satellite church, but there was no evidence regarding Greater Ministries International.) Portions of the Petitioner's by-laws were admitted in evidence at the final hearing. The by-laws make reference to three officers--president, vice-president, and secretary-treasurer--but Cole testified that she was the secretary and that someone else was the treasurer, and she did not seem to know anything about a president or vice-president. In addition, while the by-laws refer to a board of directors and meetings of the board of directors, Cole does not know anything about either. The Petitioner is small (not more than 15 members). It consists primarily of Cole and her friends and neighbors and some others who hear about the meetings. The group has met in various locations, including Cole's home at 5155 20th Avenue North, St. Petersburg, Florida, and the homes of other members of the group. In addition to Bible study and prayer, the group discusses health issues and other topics of interest and shares reading materials and tapes on topics of interest. From time to time, the group collects items of donated personal property for the use of members of the group and others in need who could use the items. In late June 1998, the Petitioner applied for a sales tax exemption certificate as a church. In response to a question from a representative of the Respondent DOR Cole stated that the Petitioner held services in her home every Thursday from 7:30 to 9:30 or 10 p.m. A DOR representative attempted to confirm Cole's representation by attending a meeting in Cole's home on Thursday, October 8, 1998, but no services were being held there, and no one was home. If there was a meeting on that day, it was held somewhere else. On or about December 28, 1998, DOR issued a Notice of Intent to Deny the Petitioner's application because the Petitioner did not have "an established physical place of worship at which nonprofit religious services and activities are regularly conducted and carried on." In January 1999, Cole requested an administrative proceeding on the Petitioner's application, representing that she was holding the Petitioner's meetings at her home every Monday from 7:30 p.m. On Monday, April 5, 1999, a DOR representative visited Cole's home at 7:30 or 7:35 p.m., but no one was home. At final hearing, Cole testified that she went to pick someone up to attend the meeting and was late returning. Cole had an April 1999 newsletter admitted in evidence. It indicates that she holds weekly Bible study meetings on Mondays at her home. It also indicates: "The week of April 19th will be our maintenance [health] meeting." It also indicates that the Monday, April 26, 1999, meeting would be a "covered dish dinner with prayer and praise fellowship afterward." Cole also had a book/tape loan check-out list admitted in evidence. The list indicates that two items were checked out on January 21, one on February 8, two on February 14, one on February 15, one on March 8, one on March 21, two on March 22, one on April 4, one on April 5, and four on April 12, 1999. (Two entries dated April 13 precede two on April 12, so it is assumed that all were on April 12, 1999). Cole owns her home, pays the taxes, and pays the utility bills. Cole also claims a homestead exemption. There are no signs, no physical attributes, or anything else that would identify Cole's house as a church. No part of the home is set aside for the Petitioner's exclusive use. The Petitioner pays no rent to Cole and does not reimburse Cole for any of her expenses (such as taxes and utility bills) of home ownership. Under local City of St. Petersburg zoning ordinances, Cole would have to obtain a special exception from the Environmental Development Commission to use her home as a church. Cole has not attempted to do so. Had she tried, the special exception would be denied because her home does not meet the ordinance's minimum lot and yard size criteria for such a special exception. (It is not clear whether Cole's home would meet the ordinance's parking, maximum floor area ratio, and maximum surface ratio criteria for a special exception for a church.) In light of past discrepancies between the Petitioner's representations and the facts, it was not clear from the evidence presented in this case that meetings have taken place, are taking place, or will take place in Cole's home on a regular basis.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the DOR enter a final order denying the Petitioner's application for a tax exemption certificate. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Shirley Cole, Pastor In His Service 5155 20th Avenue, North St. Petersburg, Florida 33710 Kevin ODonnell, Assistant General Counsel Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
