Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent, Cheryl A. Odom, was employed as a law enforcement officer by the City of Opa-Locka Police Department, and was duly certified by Petitioner, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Commission), having been issued certificate number 02-028628 on June 4, 1982. The collective bargaining agreement between the Opa-Locka Police Department and its uniformed officers provides for an annual physical examination and drug screen for the uniformed officers. On January 2, 1991, Respondent was told that her annual physical examination and drug screen would be on January 3, 1991. On January 3, 1991, Respondent, as part of her annual physical examination for the Opa-Locka Police Department, reported to Toxicology Testing Services (TTS) and provided a urine sample to be analyzed for the presence of controlled substances. On January 4, 1991, Respondent reported back to TTS to provide a second urine sample for analysis. Both urine samples provided by Respondent to TTS were collected, stored, handled, and tested pursuant to procedures and methods adopted by TTS. The procedures and methods employed by TTS were shown to provide reliable safeguards against contamination, a reliable chain-of-custody, and produce, through Gas Chromograph/Mass Spectrometry (GCMS), a reliable analysis of Respondent's urine samples. The instruments used by TTS to analyze the two urine samples involved in this proceeding were in proper working order at the times the samples were analyzed. GCMS is accepted, scientifically, and the results it produces are acknowledged to possess a 99.99 percent accuracy rate. The urine sample taken from Respondent on January 3, 1991, was screened twice by TTS using a machine that was calibrated to detect benzoylecgonine, a cocaine metabolite, at a level of 50 nanograms per milliliter. Dr. Hall testified that the City of Opa-Locka had instructed TTS to use a screening cutoff of 50 nanograms per milliliter. This is a relatively low screening cutoff. In comparison, the screening cutoff the Commission has adopted by Rule 11B-27.00225(3)(b), Florida Administrative Code, is 300 nanograms per milliliter. The first screening of the sample of January 3, 1991, detected a level of benzoylecgonine at a level of 113, while the second screening detected a level of 115. Because the screening for cocaine was positive, Respondent's urine sample was subjected to analysis using GCMS, which more accurately analyzed the urine sample than the screening device. Upon analysis by the staff of TTS using the GCMS, the sample taken from Respondent on January 3, 1991, proved positive for the presence of benzoylecgonine in a concentration of 166 nanograms per milliliter. Such finding is consistent with the ingestion of cocaine, as cocaine is the only drug commonly available that, when ingested into the human body, produces the cocaine metabolite, benzoylecgonine. The GCMS analysis of the urine sample taken January 3, 1991, GCMS is found to be an accurate measurement and establishes that Respondent, on January 3, 1991, had benzoylecgonine in her urine at a level of 166 nanograms per milliliter. On January 4, 1991, the Opa-Locka Police Department notified Respondent that "a trace of something" had been found in her urine sample and that she would have to be re-tested. Respondent was not notified at that time that the substance detected was the cocaine metabolite. Respondent freely and voluntarily accompanied Sergeant Edward Moore of the Opa-Locka Police Department to TTS on January 4, 1991, at approximately 6:00 p.m., and provided the second sample for analysis. The analysis of this second urine sample taken from Respondent on January 4, 1991, proved positive for the presence of the cocaine metabolite, benzoylecgonine, in a concentration of 90 nanograms per milliliter. The GCMS analysis of the urine sample taken January 4, 1991, GCMS is found to be an accurate measurement and establishes that Respondent, on January 4, 1991, had benzoylecgonine in her urine at a level of 90 nanograms per milliliter. The reduced concentration of the cocaine metabolite detected in the second urine sample is consistent with the concentration of 166 nanograms per milliliter disclosed by the first sample, assuming abstinence during the intervening period. The results of the TTS testing demonstrates the presence of cocaine metabolite in Respondent's system, and, consequently, establish that Respondent ingested cocaine. These results do not, however, establish that the ingestion was knowing and unlawful. Petitioner relies on an inference that it asserts should be drawn from the positive test results to establish its assertion that "[o]n or about January 3, 1991, Respondent, Cheryl A. Odom, did then unlawfully and knowingly be in actual or constructive possession of a controlled substance named or described in Section 893.03, Florida Statutes, to-wit: cocaine and did introduce said substance into her body." There is no evidence, other than the test results, to establish this assertion. Dr. Hall testified that the levels of the cocaine metabolite detected in Respondent's urine samples could have been the result of unknowing passive inhalation of cocaine or the result of unknowing ingestion of cocaine by food or drink. In a heavy user, cocaine can be detected for up to 40 days following ingestion. In the case of a light user, the metabolite can be detected for up to ten days following ingestion. 1/ In response to the testing which revealed the presence of the cocaine metabolite in her urine, Respondent denied the knowing use of cocaine at any time. In determining whether this denial is credible, the undersigned has considered the testimony from the persons who have known Respondent for an extended period of time and the letters of commendation that were presented by Respondent without objection. From this evidence, it is found that Respondent is a person of good moral character who has respect for the law. Respondent has the ability to differentiate between right and wrong and the character to observe the difference. The evidence established that Respondent has a disdain for drugs that has been evident in her personal and professional life. There was other evidence that was considered in determining the credbility of Respondent's denial of knowing drug use. From the time of her certification through January 1991, Respondent submitted to periodic drug screens. All prior drug screenings during the course of her career were negative. Respondent had reason to believe that her annual physical examination, which included the drug screening, would be in January 1991 because the physical examination and drug screen for the years 1989 and 1990 were in January. It is doubtful that Respondent would have knowingly ingested cocaine if she had reason to believe that she would soon be subject to a drug screening. There was no evidence that Respondent used drugs, other than the test results, despite an internal investigation by the Opa-Locka Police Department following the positive testing in January 1991. From Respondent's initial employment as a police officer through her current employment, but for the incident in question, Respondent has consistently been recognized as a professional, loyal and dedicated police officer. During this service, she was frequently commended for her performance. Respondent could not explain how or when the cocaine may have gotten into her system. This inability to explain does not compel the conclusion that her denial of knowing and voluntary ingestion is to be discredited in light of Dr. Hall's testimony that the ingestion could have occurred days before the testing and been unknown to Respondent. It is concluded, based on the totality of the evidence, that Respondent's denial that she has ever knowingly taken drugs is credible. To sustain its burden of proof in this proceeding, Petitioner must establish that Respondent's cocaine use was knowing and unlawful. The fact that Respondent tested positive for cocaine ingestion, without the inference that the ingestion was knowing and unlawful, does not establish that Respondent lacks good moral character. Based on the evidence presented, including the Respondent's credible denial and Dr. Hall's testimony, the undersigned declines to draw the inference that Petitioner requires to sustain its burden of proof in this proceeding. 2/ Because the evidence in this proceeding failed to establish that Respondent unlawfully and knowingly ingested cocaine, the Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent lacks good moral character.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered dismissing the administrative complaint filed against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of August 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of August 1995.
The Issue Whether Respondent, a non-instructional employee of Alachua County School Board (School Board), should be dismissed for the reasons stated in the notification letter of November 5, 1998.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the governing body of the School District of Alachua County, Florida. It operates 43 public schools and centers in Alachua County and employs approximately 4,000 persons. At all times material, Respondent was employed by Petitioner in the position of maintenance helper. He is a member of Petitioner's career service bargaining unit. Petitioner has a "drug free workplace policy" which is part of the collective bargaining agreement with a non- instructional bargaining unit. The policy was implemented in June 1993. Before that time, Petitioner gave notice to its employees of the drug-free workplace policy. Petitioner's drug-free workplace policy requires that, as a condition of continued employment, employees submit to drug screening when there is reasonable suspicion of substance abuse. Following a positive drug screening, the employee is given an opportunity to participate in a treatment program. The policy also provides that, after completion of the treatment program, the employee may return to work, but if there is a second positive drug test, the employee may be disciplined up to and including termination of employment. Petitioner's Human Resources Division has attempted to be consistent in administering the drug-free workplace policy. Any employee having a second positive drug test has been recommended for termination. Pertinent to this case, Petitioner's drug-free workplace policy provides: It is the intent of the Board to provide a drug-free Workplace. Drug-Free Workplace Guidelines The purpose of these guidelines is to comply with the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988, 34 CFR Part 85, Subpart F, which requires grantees to certify that they will maintain a drug-free workplace. When a reasonable suspicion exists, the Director of Employee Relations shall be contacted. The employee, if a member of a bargaining unit, shall be afforded the opportunity to have ACEA representation. The employee will be provided an opportunity to explain his/her condition. The employee will be provided with information regarding available drug counseling, rehabilitation, assistance program, and leave options. A rehabilitation contract including drug testing may be agreed upon. Failure to participate in a treatment program following a positive drug screening will result in disciplinary action, up to and including termination. Due process will be followed. * * * 12. Employees who return to work after completion of a rehabilitation program shall be subject to follow-up drug testing with twenty-four (24) hour notification. Any employee who refuses the drug test or subsequently tests positive may be disciplined up to and including termination. (Emphasis supplied) Respondent's drug test reported on September 2, 1998, was positive for cannabinoids-THS and cocaine metabolites. Respondent entered into a rehabilitation contract with Petitioner on September 3, 1998. Respondent's entry into a rehabilitation program was not "voluntary," in that Respondent was required to enter a rehabilitation program in order to retain his public employment. The contract Respondent signed provided, in pertinent part, as follows. 2. Following release from the rehabilitation clinic/counselor and for a period of one year from that release, the employee agrees to random breath analysis or blood alcohol test upon notification and/or urine analysis within 24 hours of notification from the Director of Employee Relations. Positive results indicating alcohol and/or illegal mind-altering substances, following the initiation of this contract, is prima facie evidence of violation of this contract. I understand that failure to comply with the terms of this contract may result in termination of my employment with the School Board of Alachua County. (Emphasis supplied) In order to enter the agreed residential drug treatment program, Respondent twice applied for leave, which Petitioner granted. The last date that his leave would run out was October 30, 1998. Ms. Pamela Love-Knerr conducted an initial evaluation/screening of Respondent in September 1998, in preparation for his admission to the residential treatment program at Bridge House, a residential treatment program operated by Meridian Behavioral Health Care, Inc. She was a counselor at Bridge House until November 1998. However, she did not conduct group sessions at Bridge House after January 1998, when, due to her health problems, she was assigned to the night shift. In August 1998, she was assigned to the evening shift. Respondent entered the Sid Martin Bridge House on October 2, 1998, and was discharged or transferred from the residential program on Friday, October 23, 1998. Also on Friday October 23, 1998, Respondent telephoned the office of Catherine L. Birdsong, Petitioner's personnel supervisor, and her secretary made him an appointment to see Ms. Birdsong the following Monday about returning to work. On October 23, 1998, Respondent's Bridge House counselor of record was Larry Faulkner, not Ms. Love-Knerr. However, since the time of her initial evaluation/screening of Respondent, Ms. Love-Knerr had been the only counselor at Bridge House who maintained regular contact with Ms. Birdsong. On October 23, 1998, Ms. Birdsong believed that Ms. Love-Knerr was the counselor assigned to Respondent. While at Bridge House, Respondent had attended therapy meetings every day, and his urine tests had been drug-free. On October 18, 1998, Respondent and his counselor, Larry Faulkner, had agreed upon an "after care" program, to begin on November 1, 1998, consisting of a schedule of meetings of a men's group, an anger management group, Narcotics Anonymous, and Alcoholics Anonymous. It was planned that Respondent would not return to work until a week or two had passed, so that he could "get [himself] together." The period from October 23, 1998, to November 1, 1998, was intended by Respondent and his counselor, Larry Faulkner, as an interim between residential treatment and "after care." Normally, a client of Bridge House would participate in an "after care" program even after he returned to work. On October 23, 1998, after learning that Respondent wanted to return to work, Ms. Birdsong telephoned Bridge House and spoke to Pamela Love-Knerr. Ms. Love-Knerr told Ms. Birdsong that Respondent had completed the Bridge House residential program; that she was recommending an "after care" program for him; and that she was releasing him for work. Mr. Faulkner may not have been aware that Ms. Love- Knerr and Ms. Birdsong had spoken by telephone on October 23, 1998. Ms. Love-Knerr shared office space with Mr. Faulkner at that time, and because Bridge House was under-staffed, Ms. Love- Knerr was assisting him in getting caught up on his paperwork. Ms. Birdsong considered the written continuing care contract for Respondent, together with her October 23, 1998, telephone conversation with Ms. Love-Knerr, and determined that Respondent had completed the residential part of his rehabilitation; that he was in or would be in a "after care" program; and that he would be able to return to work immediately. Petitioner's decision to return an employee to work is normally made by the Petitioner's District Drug Free Workplace Coordinator after discussing it with the returning employee's drug/alcohol counselor. On Monday, October 26, 1998, at approximately 9:00 a.m., Respondent met, in person, with Ms. Birdsong at her office. They discussed his impressions of the Bridge House program and his desire to return to work. Because his leave was only approved through the end of that work-week, October 30, 1998, it was arranged, through a speaker-phone conversation with Respondent's immediate supervisor, that Respondent would return to work on Monday, November 2, 1998. Ms. Birdsong then sent Respondent for a follow-up drug test for return to duty. Ms. Birdsong informed Respondent that he should report for a drug test by 10:00 a.m., that morning, October 26, 1998. It is Petitioner's normal practice to require employees who are returning from a rehabilitation program to take a drug test prior to returning to work. Respondent went to Doctor's Laboratory of Gainesville as instructed, and provided a urine specimen for drug testing at 10:00 a.m. on October 26, 1998. Respondent's specimen was transported by courier to Doctor's Laboratory in Valdosta, Georgia, where it was tested and confirmed positive for cocaine metabolites as benzozlecgonine. Doctor's Laboratory reported the test result to MRO Services, Inc., in Brunswick, Georgia. After a review of the test results and a telephone consultation with Respondent, the Medical Review Officer, Robert H. Miller, M.D., reported to Petitioner that Respondent's drug test was positive for cocaine metabolites.1 On November 2, 1998, Respondent met again with Ms. Birdsong. She explained to him that because of the positive result of his October 26, 1998, drug test, he might be recommended for termination. She gave him written notice to schedule a pre-termination conference within five days. On November 5, 1998, Respondent and his mother met with Synester P. Jones, Petitioner's Assistant Superintendent for Human Resources, in a pre-termination conference. Ms. Jones explained the procedure for drug testing. She also informed Respondent in writing that, based on his second positive drug test, she would recommend suspension and termination. At its regular meeting on November 17, 1998, Petitioner School Board suspended Respondent without pay, effective November 18, 1998, pending disposition of the instant proceeding.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Alachua County School Board enter a final order terminating Respondent for violating its drug-free workplace policy and his rehabilitation contract. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of August, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 1999.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of violating Petitioner's rule requiring that all employees Respondent's job classification submit to random drug testing.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Petitioner employed Respondent as a school bus driver. On January 12, 1995, Petitioner's representatives conducted a Drug Free Workplace Employee Training Session, which was attended by Respondent. This training session was one of many such sessions at which Petitioner's representatives explained to each covered employee the provisions of Petitioner's drug policies. These provisions include a provision that a refusal to take a random drug test is tantamount to failing a drug test and a basis for termination. The Employee Information on Drug and Alcohol Testing, which is the handbook distributed to Petitioner's school bus drivers, including Respondent, informs each driver that Petitioner will annually administer random drug tests to half of the driver positions and that, if selected for a random drug test, the driver must report immediately to the testing laboratory. The employee handbook informs drivers that a refusal to submit to a random drug test is prohibited. The employee handbook explains that engaging "in conduct that clearly obstructs the testing process" constitutes a refusal to submit to a random drug test. The employee handbook notes that conduct obstructing the testing process includes a "failure to immediately report to the testing facility after notification." Finally, the employee handbook warns that Petitioner may terminate drivers who have engaged in prohibited behavior. Article 32, Section 2, of the 1998-2000 Agreement Between the School Board of Pinellas County, Florida, and School Employees Union, Local 1221, Firemen & Oilers, An Affiliate of Service Employees International Union, AFL/CIO, CLC, contains the same requirements as those set forth above in the employee handbook. Section 3 warns that a violation of any of these requirements by a covered employee may result in termination. On March 21, 2000, Petitioner's Transportation Clerk Specialist II summoned Respondent to the transportation offices. When Respondent reported to her office, the clerk informed Respondent that she had selected him for random drug testing. Obviously, element of surprise is an important feature of random drug testing. Equally important to random drug testing is the control of the subject between the point at which he is informed that he is to take a random drug test and the production of the sample or samples to be tested; given enough time between the notification and the test, a subject might be able to ingest substances that could interfere with the ability of the test to detect drugs. Also important to random drug testing is the confirmation that the person presenting himself at the testing laboratory is the person who has been randomly selected for testing. Each of these elements plays a role in this case. Petitioner's clerk checked Respondent's identification, including his driver's license, and explained to him the procedures that he was to follow. Respondent had undergone random drug testing in the past while employed by Petitioner. In brief, Petitioner's clerk told Respondent that he had to report immediately to the testing laboratory, which is a short drive from the office. The clerk instructed Respondent to sign in upon arrival at the laboratory and, when called, to present all of the paperwork that she was giving him, as well as his driver's license. Petitioner's clerk warned him that he could not leave the laboratory premises until he had completed the drug test. Respondent reported immediately to the laboratory and signed in, as instructed. When called, Respondent presented his paperwork to the laboratory clerk, but he did not produce his driver's license, claiming that he did not have it with him. Respondent is not the first employee to appear at the laboratory without suitable identification. Petitioner's procedure is to maintain a photocopy of each employee's driver's license and fax the photocopy to the laboratory when employees report to the laboratory without identification. If the laboratory clerk cannot positively confirm the identification of the employee from the photocopied identification, then the laboratory employee detains the employee while Petitioner sends the employee's supervisor to the nearby laboratory to confirm the identity of the employee. Once done, the drug test proceeds. Pursuant to this procedure, the laboratory clerk telephoned Petitioner's clerk and informed her that Respondent had failed to produce his driver's license. The testimony of the laboratory clerk and Petitioner's clerk diverges at this point; each claims that the other clerk spoke to Respondent. However, the laboratory clerk testifies that she summarized the instructions given Respondent over the telephone by Petitioner's clerk. Just before Respondent left the reception room to search the bus for his driver's license, the laboratory clerk told him that he could go to the bus to look for his driver's license, but he was to return to the reception room. In any event, the clerks agree that Respondent received permission to return, unescorted, to his bus to search for his driver's license--a deviation from established procedure that prohibits the employee from leaving the laboratory once he has reported for a random drug test. The testimony of the clerks establishes that Respondent was permitted to return, unescorted, to his bus to search for his driver's license. The testimony of the laboratory clerk establishes that she clearly directed Respondent to look for his driver's license in the bus and return to the reception room. The discrepancy in the testimony of the clerks as to who conveyed the substance of the additional instructions to Respondent is, ultimately, immaterial; the possibility that one of the clerks could have given Respondent permission to leave the laboratory parking lot to search for his driver's license, or the possibility that Respondent could have misunderstood the clerk to have given him this permission, is negated by Respondent's later conversation with the Assistant Director of Transportation, as set forth below. Following his conversation with the laboratory clerk and possibly Petitioner's clerk, Respondent left the laboratory and went to his bus, ostensibly to search for his driver's license. Respondent did not return to the laboratory, but, instead, drove his bus back to the bus compound. Evidently, Respondent went home after returning his bus. One to one and one-half hours after leaving the laboratory, Respondent telephoned Petitioner's clerk and informed her that he had not found his license and had instead become sick, so he had gone home to eat something and take his medicine. Respondent told her that he had retraced his steps, but had not found his driver's license. At this point, Petitioner's clerk transferred the call to her supervisor, who is the Assistant Director of Transportation. The Assistant Director of Transportation started their conversation by stating her understanding that Petitioner had sent Respondent for a random drug test, but he had not completed it. Respondent answered that he could not find his driver's license and believed that Petitioner's clerk may have failed to return it to him earlier in the morning when she had examined it. The Assistant Director of Transportation replied that the clerk had looked for the driver's license and failed to find it, so that they were sure that she had not failed to return it to Respondent. Pausing for about five seconds, Respondent answered, "I wasn't feeling well. I had to go home and take my medication." The Assistant Director of Transportation replied that she would treat this as a refusal to submit to a drug test. They spoke for a few moments more, confirming that Respondent was calling from his home and that the bus was at the compound. The Assistant Director then directed Respondent not to report to work and told him that a personnel employee would be contacting him. Respondent concluded the conversation by repeating that he had not been feeling well. At no point in the conversation with Petitioner's clerk or the Assistant Director of Transportation did Respondent ever claim that he left the laboratory parking lot with the permission of Petitioner's clerk or the laboratory clerk or that he left the laboratory parking lot thinking that he had the permission of one of the clerks. It appears that he had ample opportunity in his conversation with the Assistant Director of Transportation to make this claim. Instead, Respondent merely repeated his claim that he became ill. Thus, it is very likely that Respondent clearly understood the final directions of the laboratory clerk: Respondent was to search his bus for the driver's license and then return to the laboratory reception room. It is thus not difficult to determine that it is considerably more likely than not that Respondent left the laboratory parking lot, knowing that he did not have the permission of either clerk to do so. Petitioner's witnesses testified candidly. The Assistant Director of Transportation did not appear overbearing or intimidating, so as to deter Respondent from presenting all of the facts in his defense, such as a claim that he had left the parking lot with the accurate or mistaken impression that he could do so in an effort to find his driver's license. It is only a little more difficult to determine that Respondent's claim of illness as the cause for his departure from the parking lot is more likely than not to be a fabrication. The coincidence of a random drug test, misplaced driver's license, and sudden onset of debilitating illness is unlikely. Presumably, the illness would have arisen after Respondent had spoken to the laboratory clerk, or else Respondent would have mentioned something to her when he was in the reception room. Even if Respondent had been suddenly struck by some illness while on his way to search the bus or while searching the bus, he would have been able to return to the reception room and tell the laboratory clerk either that he had fallen ill and had to go home immediately or that he had fallen ill and needed to produce a urine sample immediately, with or without further identification. Obviously, the illness had not been so debilitating to have prevented Respondent from returning to the reception room and telling the laboratory clerk of the illness; after all, Respondent was able to drive the bus to the bus compound and then drive himself home. Based on all of the facts, Petitioner properly treated Respondent's acts and omissions as the equivalent of refusing to submit to a random drug test and, as authorized by the collective bargaining agreement, properly terminated Respondent's employment as a school bus driver.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order terminating Respondent's employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. Howard Hinesley, Superintendent Pinellas County School Board 301 4th Street Southwest Largo, Florida 33770 Jacqueline M. Spoto, Staff Attorney Pinellas County School Board 301 4th Street Southwest Post Office Box 2942 Largo, Florida 33779-2942 Honorable Tom Gallagher, Commissioner Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Michael H. Olenick, General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Glenn Cromartie 1639 26th Street, South St. Petersburg, Florida 33712
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding is whether the Board's disciplinary policy on violation of its drug-free workplace policy is an invalid unpromulgated rule.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Patricia Gadson, age 51, was employed as a department secretary by Petitioner, the Escambia County School Board. She worked for the School Board of Escambia County from April 12, 1968, through January 27, 1998.1 She was employed by the Board for twenty-nine years and nine months. Throughout this period of time, Ms. Gadson worked as a school or administrative secretary at various locations throughout the school system. Prior to 1994, Ms. Gadson was a successful employee who received good evaluations of her work. However, sometime prior to January, 1994, several departments were consolidated as a result of downsizing. Ms. Gadson was assigned as the sole administrative secretary for six departments working for four different supervisors. Ms. Gadson found her new job very stressful. The stress resulted in her missing work frequently due to illness and medical treatment. After being examined by her own and the School Board's psychiatrists, Ms. Gadson was diagnosed with depression and took a six-week leave of absence to recuperate. She was not involved with drugs at this time. However, sometime in 1996, approximately two years before her discharge in 1998, Ms. Gadson was introduced to crack cocaine by her sister. She did not refuse the drug and eventually became addicted. She used the drug with full knowledge of the Board's drug-free workplace policy and its policy of zero tolerance for such use. As a result of her addiction, Ms. Gadson's life spiraled downward. She had increased absences from work and deteriorating job performance. In fact, her supervisors had already decided to terminate her for her poor performance. However, her supervisors recognized that she was exhibiting the symptoms of someone suffering from substance abuse and instructed her to take a drug test on November 3, 1997. Ms. Gadson fully cooperated in taking the test. On the way home, Ms. Gadson volunteered to Dr. Larry Reed, one of her supervisors, that the test would be positive. The test came back positive for crack cocaine since Ms. Gadson had last smoked crack on November 2, 1997, the day before her drug test. As a result she was terminated on January 27, 1998, retroactive to December 5, 1997, for violation of the School Board's drug-free workplace policy and for having tested positive for an illegal drug. Ms. Gadson has not smoked crack since November 2, 1997. With the assistance of Dr. Reed, her supervisor, Ms. Gadson was admitted to an out-patient rehabilitation program at the Pavilion Chemical Dependency Hospitalization Program on November 12, 1997. She was discharged from that program on November 26, 1997. She continued the recommended program of treatment in the Aftercare Program until approximately February 1998. She stopped attending the aftercare program in order to care for her grandmother who is an invalid. Ms. Gadson is willing to voluntarily undergo regular drug testing in order to demonstrate her continued abstinence should she be reinstated. The School Board maintains and strictly follows a "zero tolerance" policy for use of illegal drugs. When an employee or student is found to have used illegal drugs, they are automatically terminated or expelled after exhaustion of any due process procedures available irrespective of any mitigating factors. The discipline which would be imposed on an employee for violation of the Board's drug policy was set forth in a memo from the superintendent. The memo was given to all employees, including Ms. Gadson. Additionally, the drug policy was made part of an employee's contract. This policy was applied to Ms. Gadson in this case. The School Board has not adopted the disciplinary part of the drug policy as a rule pursuant to Section 120.54, Florida Statutes (1997). However, the Board has adopted a disciplinary rule and has incorporated that rule in the contract it has with the union. The zero tolerance policy is generally applicable to all employees and, as stated in the School Board's answer, it implements the School Board's drug-free workplace policy, authorized under Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and School Board Rule 6Gx17-2-62. Indeed, the very intent of the zero tolerance rule is to announce to all concerned that the sole penalty for illegal drug use is termination. Illegal drug use in a school setting is a serious misconduct. Such behavior in this instance, the Board's "policy" of termination for illegal drug use by an employer falls within the disciplinary rule of the Escambia County Civil Service Board and the collective bargaining agreement for Escambia County. Therefore the School Board's zero tolerance drug use policy is already implemented by Board rule. The rule adequately defines the discipline imposed for employee misconduct and need not define specific instances which warrant termination of any other type of discipline. Respondent's use of cocaine violated the Board's policy and her employment contract. The District has consistently terminated employees found in possession of or using controlled substances with or without evidence of prior disciplinary problems. No exceptions have ever been allowed with one exception related to arbitration. Violation of the Board's drug-free workplace program constitutes cause for termination. Additionally, even without the Board's zero tolerance policy, the use of crack cocaine over an extended period of time by a school employee which causes the employee's performance to fall below acceptable levels constitutes cause for termination. Therefore, superintendent's recommendation for termination of Respondent should be upheld.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's employment with Petitioner as a school bus driver should be terminated because he violated his rehabilitation contract and Petitioner's drug-free workplace policy and guidelines by testing positive for cocaine.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida public school district. Respondent was employed by Petitioner as a school bus driver for about ten years and three months prior to his suspension without pay in the summer of 1996. The position of school bus driver is a safety-sensitive position. In June of 1989, Petitioner adopted a drug-free workplace policy. Petitioner directed its superintendent to develop guidelines to implement the policy. In December of 1991, Petitioner adopted Drug-Free Workplace Guidelines, GBCBA-G, which state as follows in pertinent part: The purpose of these guidelines is to comply with the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988, 34 CFR Part 85, Subpart F, which requires grantees to certify that they will maintain a drug-free workplace. * * * Pre-employment Drug Abuse Screening examinations shall be required to prevent hiring individuals who use drugs or individuals whose use of drugs indicates a potential for impaired or unsafe job performance or for high risk positions such as bus drivers. Employees in job classification which require an annual physical will be required to submit to a drug screening as part of the annual physical. As a condition of continued employment, current employees shall submit to drug screening when reasonable suspicion exists to believe that an employee is using a substance that is impairing the employee and/or his job performance . . . . * * * All testing shall be conducted by a laboratory certified by the State of Florida as a Medical and Urine Drug Testing Forensic Laboratory which complies with the Scientific and Technical Guidelines for Federal Drug Testing Programs and the Standards for Certification of Laboratories engaged in Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration of the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services . . . . The procedures established by the laboratory shall be followed in administering drug tests to employees. * * * Employees who return to work after completion of a rehabilitation program shall be subject to follow-up drug testing with twenty-four hour notification . . . . Random testing of employees shall not be conducted. Respondent signed a notice to all applicants and employees on April 15, 1992, advising him in advance that the drug-free workplace policy would become effective on June 15, 1992. This notice stated as follows: All pre-employment applicants will be drug-tested prior to being hired. All employees who require fitness-of-duty examination will be drug-tested at least once annually. An employee will be drug-tested when reasonable suspicion of substance abuse exists. An employee will be drug-tested following any work-related accident or mishap involving actual or potential injury or property damage. An employee will be drug-tested during any probationary period following a drug- related suspension or approved drug treatment program. Petitioner acknowledged that he received a copy of the drug-free workplace policy and understood the consequences of violating the drug-free workplace guidelines by signing the notice. The notice clearly states that failure to comply with the guidelines could result in termination of employment and forfeiture of eligibility for workers' compensation medical and indemnity benefits. The guidelines for the drug-free workplace policy are a part of Petitioner's Collective Bargaining Agreement with the instructional and non-instructional bargaining units of the Alachua County Education Association (ACEA). The ACEA ratified the policy and guidelines in January of 1993. The Petitioner's drug-free workplace policy and guidelines have been continuously in effect since that time. Article XI, Section 1(B) of the 1995-1996 Collective Bargaining Agreement between Petitioner and the ACEA requires Petitioner to provide school bus drivers with an annual physical as required by the rules of the State Board of Education. Appendix F of the 1995-1996 Collective Bargaining Agreement sets forth the drug-free workplace guidelines. It states as follows in pertinent part: The purpose of these guidelines is to comply with the Drug-free Workplace Act of 1988, 34 CFR Part 85, Subpart F, which requires grantees to certify that they will maintain a drug-free workplace. * * * Pre-employment Drug Abuse Screening examinations shall be required to prevent hiring individuals who use drugs or individuals whose use of drugs indicates a potential for impaired or unsafe job performance or for high risk positions such as bus drivers. * * * Employees in job classifications which require an annual physical will be required to submit to a drug screening as part of the annual physical. * * * As a condition of continued employment, current employees shall submit to drug screening when reasonable suspicion exists to believe that an employee is using a substance that is impairing the employee and/or his job performance . . . . * * * When a reasonable suspicion exists, the Director of Employee Relations shall be contacted. The employee, if a member of a bargaining unit, shall be afforded the opportunity to have ACEA representation. The employee will be provided an opportunity to explain his/her condition. The employee will be provided with information regarding available drug counseling, rehabilitation, assistance programs, and leave options. A rehabilitation contract including drug testing may be agreed upon. Failure to participate in a treatment program following a positive drug screening will result in disciplinary action, up to and including termination. Due process will be followed. All testing shall be conducted by a laboratory certified by the State of Florida as a Medical and Urine Drug Testing Forensic Laboratory which complies with the Scientific and Technical Guidelines for Federal Drug Testing Programs and the Standards for Certification of Laboratories engaged in Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration of the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services. The laboratory shall be chosen jointly by ACEA and SBAC if the employee is a member of the bargaining unit. The procedures established by the laboratory shall be followed in administering drug tests to employees. Employees who seek voluntary assistance for substance abuse may not be disciplined for seeking assistance. Employees shall be subject to all employer rules, regulations, and job performance standards with the understanding that an employee enrolled in a rehabilitation program is receiving treatment for an illness. Employees who return to work after completion of a rehabilitation program shall be subject to follow-up drug testing with twenty-four (24) hour notification. Any employee who refuses the drug test or subsequently tests positive may be disciplined up to and including termination. Random testing of employees shall not be conducted except as required by state or federal law . . . . On December 13, 1994, Respondent signed the following statement: I have received, read, and understand the training materials on drug and alcohol testing under the U. S. Department of Transportation regulations. In January of 1995, Petitioner began complying with an additional drug testing program pursuant to a federal statute entitled Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act (OTETA). Petitioner did not formally adopt a written policy or develop written guidelines to implement the new drug-testing program. Petitioner's Collective Bargaining Agreement with the ACEA does not refer to OTETA or the federal regulations implementing it. Mandatory procedures governing drug testing in transportation workplaces under U. S. Department of Transportation regulations require that drug tests be performed using split samples. A "split specimen collection" consists of one urination followed by the splitting of that specimen into two bottles. If the primary specimen tests positive, the employee may request that the split specimen be sent to a different laboratory for testing. The majority of drug testing performed in this country is single specimen collection. Drug testing pursuant to state law and rules and the regulations of the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services does not require employers to utilize split samples in the collection process. A split specimen generally is used only for purposes of testing pursuant to the regulations of the U. S. Department of Transportation. The U. S. Department of Transportation requires Petitioner to provide the following testing in transportation workplaces: (a) pre-employment testing; (b) post-accident testing; (c) random testing; (d) reasonable suspicion testing; return-to-duty testing; and (f) follow-up testing. OTETA does not require a routine fitness-for-duty drug test as part of an annual medical examination. State law does require such a test. OTETA requires random testing and post-accident testing. State law does not require these tests. Petitioner's guidelines as adopted in 1991 specifically prohibit random drug testing of employees. However, Petitioner's guidelines, as incorporated into the Collective Bargaining Agreement, state that "[r]andom testing of employees shall not be conducted except as required by state or federal law." In June of 1995, Respondent received a routine fitness- for-duty drug test as part of his annual physical examination. The test yielded a positive result for cannabinoids and cocaine metabolites. Respondent did not contest the results of the test. On June 22, 1995, Petitioner's Director of Employee Relations had a conference with Respondent. During the conference, Respondent signed a medical records release and a rehabilitation contract. The rehabilitation contract stated as follows: . . . positive results indicating alcohol and/or illegal mind-altering substances, following the initiation of this contract, is prima facie evidence of violation of this contract. I understand that failure to comply with the terms of this contract may result in termination of my employment with the School Board of Alachua County, Florida. Respondent subsequently took leave to attend to his rehabilitation. By letter dated August 21, 1995, Petitioner's rehabilitation counselor at the Corner Drug Store reported that Respondent's drug tests from July 5th through August 16th were negative for illegal drugs. The counselor also informed Petitioner that Respondent had attended weekly intervention group meetings as required under the rehabilitation contract. The counselor did not recommend further treatment. A substance abuse professional, other than one who provided treatment, had to assess Respondent in order for him to return to work. In August of 1995, a clinical psychologist from The Education Center evaluated Respondent. The psychologist recommended that Respondent return to work subject to five years participation in the "random drug screening program that is in addition to the standard screening program." Respondent returned to his duties on or about August 26, 1995. His follow-up drug tests performed on October 25, 1995, January 17, 1996, and March 4, 1996, were reported as negative. On the morning of June 10, 1996, Petitioner informed Respondent that he was scheduled that day to take his regular annual physical examination, including a drug test. Respondent went to a medical facility in the northwest part of Gainesville for the physical exam during that morning. He went to Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., in the southwest part of Gainesville after work for his drug test. The following are routine procedures when a person goes to Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., in Gainesville for a urine drug test: The front desk checks the donor's photographic identification, such as a driver's license. The collector takes the photo ID and the donor into a separate room to sign in. The collector asks the donor to remove any hat, if he or she is wearing one, and to empty his or her pockets onto the counter. The collector watches the donor wash and dry his or her hands. The donor selects a testing kit, which is individually packaged in a plastic bag, from a box. The kit contains a urinalysis bottle. The collector opens the bag, breaks the seal on the specimen bottle, and gives it to the donor. The collector shows the donor how much urine is required on the bottle. The collector takes the donor to the bathroom. The donor is informed that the toilet water contains bluing. The donor is instructed not to flush the toilet. After the collector leaves the bathroom, he or she cuts off the water to the sink using a lever outside the door. The donor stays in the restroom no longer than two and a half or three minutes. The donor comes out of the bathroom and hands the specimen bottle to the collector who is waiting outside. The collector checks the amount of urine in the bottle to be sure the quantity is at least 40 ML. The collector measures the temperature by means of a gauge on the outside of the bottle to be sure that the temperature is between 90 and 100 degrees Fahrenheit. The collector notes this information on the chain-of-custody form. The bottle's cap is screwed on tightly. The collector also checks the appearance of the urine for any unusual color. The collector asks the donor to place his or her initials in the following three places: on the bag; on the chain-of-custody form peel-off label; and on the security seal. The security seal is placed over the top of the bottle. The collector dates and also initials the peel-off label. The collector then removes the label from the form and applies it to the bottle. The collector completes and signs part II of the multi-part chain-of-custody form. The collector separates copies one through three from copies four through seven. The collector hands the donor copies four through seven so that he or she can fill out part III with the donor's name, address and two telephone numbers. The donor signs the form certifying that he or she provided the specimen to the collector, that the bottle was sealed with a tamper-proof seal in the donor's presence, and that the information on the form and on the bottle label is correct. The collector completes part IV of the multi- part forms, copies one through three, initiating the chain-of-custody documentation. The specimen bottle is then placed inside the plastic bag, which is sealed. Copies one through three of the multi-part form, which do not contain the name of the donor, are placed in a pouch on the side of the bag. Copies four through seven of the multi-part form are not sent with the specimen. Instead, one copy is retained at the collection site. Another copy is sent to the employer. The third copy is given to the donor. The bagged specimen bottle is kept in a box in a locked refrigerator with other packaged specimens prior to shipment by courier to the testing laboratory. The collector gives the donor a written checklist showing the steps to be taken in the urine collection process. The donor is asked to read the list and check to make sure that the procedures were followed. The donor signs this form indicating that the collector followed all appropriate steps in the collection process. Once a collector begins the collection process, he or she completes the process alone. No other collector at the site may perform any of the required steps or safeguards. In this case, Respondent signed the following statement in part III of the multi-part chain-of-custody form: I certify that I provided my specimen(s) to the collector, that the specimen bottle was sealed with a tamper-proof seal in my presence, and that the information provided on this form and on the label attached to the specimen bottle is correct. The collector gave Respondent a copy of the donor's checklist to read and verify that the collection procedures were followed. Respondent signed the donor's checklist. Elizabeth Verbeke was the person at Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., in Gainesville, Florida, who collected Respondent's urine specimen on June 10, 1996. She usually collected 50 to 60 urine specimens per week for drug testing. She has no independent recollection of collecting Respondent's specimen. However, there is no reason to believe that she failed to follow the laboratory's routine procedures in this case. Ms. Verbeke entered the word "none" at question five of part II on the chain-of-custody form, indicating the collection of Respondent's specimen was entirely routine. She noted no irregularities of any kind. The chain-of-custody identification number for Respondent's urine specimen was 026A13381. In part II of the chain-of-custody form, Ms. Verbeke indicated that she checked Respondent's picture identification, collected the urine specimen, and read the specimen's temperature within four minutes of collection. The specimen's temperature of 94 degrees Fahrenheit was within the proper range. The volume of the specimen was at least 40 milliliters. Later in the day on June 10, 1996, a courier picked up Respondent's urine specimen and transported it to Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., in Valdosta, Georgia. The laboratory performs forensic drug testing, as well as other kinds of tests. It processes about 8,000 specimens a month. The accessioner at the laboratory receives the specimens from the courier. Next, the accessioner examines the packaging and the sample bottles for any possible compromise of the security seals. Then, the accessioner compares each specimen bottle with the custody documents to ensure that they are accompanied by the correct paperwork. The accessioner places the urine specimens in batches with approximately 40 in each group. The accessioner pours a small portion of each specimen (an "aliquot"), one at a time, into a collection cup for analysis. The original specimen bottle with the remaining portion of the specimen is placed into temporary refrigerated storage until the initial test is deemed negative or positive. If the test is positive, the accessioner retrieves the original specimen bottle from temporary storage and pours a second aliquot for confirmation testing. The original specimen bottle, with the remaining portion of the specimen, is then placed in long-term frozen storage. Once testing is completed, the aliquots are discarded. Urine drug testing consists first of a rapid and relatively inexpensive procedure which is known as an immunoassay test. A positive result is confirmed by a more sophisticated and expensive technique called gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS). The second test, if properly performed, is one hundred percent accurate. The function of the initial test (immunoassay), is strictly to weed out the negatives. Perhaps 90 percent of all the samples that the laboratory processes are negatives. The initial test also identifies which drug group or groups should be the focus of the extraction procedure because there is no universal extraction procedure for all drugs. The second test (GC/MS), makes an unequivocal identification of a molecule based on its molecular structure. If the confirmation test is positive, the laboratory reports the results to the medical review officer (MRO) as positive for the particular drug group. On June 10, 1996, the laboratory's accessioner received Respondent's specimen from a courier. The specimen's chain-of- custody identification number was 026A13381. The accessioner assigned the specimen a unique lab accession number, number 01298048. Subsequently, Respondent's specimen was tested in the laboratory in the usual manner. The initial test on Respondent's specimen used the total cocaine metabolite screening method. When this method is used, any compound similar to cocaine in the specimen will give a positive result. The initial test on Respondent's specimen was reported as "8H," which means that it was a presumptive positive. For the immunoassay test, any compound similar to cocaine in an amount equal to or in excess of 300 nanograms per milliliter (ng/ml) is positive. In the confirmation test, Respondent's specimen tested positive for benzoylecgonine, a cocaine metabolite. After a person consumes cocaine, benzoylecgonine is present in that person's urine specimen. Respondent's specimen contained 303 ng/ml of benzoylecgonine. For the GC/MS test, any amount of benzoylecgonine equal to or in excess of 150 ng/ml is positive. Respondent's urine sample had an abnormally low level of creatinine. Creatinine is a waste product produced by every human being. Respondent's sample had a creatinine level of 17 milligrams per deciliter (mg/dl). Any creatinine level below 20 mg/dl may indicate dilution. When the creatinine level is low, it is possible that the donor consumed a large amount of fluid at least two to three hours before donating the sample in an attempt to dilute the specimen. It is also possible that water was added to the sample. The laboratory checked the specific gravity of Respondent's sample to determine whether the sample was adulterated. Respondent's specimen passed the specific gravity test. It had a specific gravity of 1.004. Anything over 1.003 is within normal range for specific gravity. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Respondent's sample was not diluted outside of his body because the specific gravity of the specimen was normal and because the specimen's temperature was 94 degrees within four minutes of collection. Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., inserted blind quality controls in the initial testing runs to determine whether the test analysis was valid. Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., receives proficiency test inspections by the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services and the State of Florida. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., in Valdosta, Georgia, was certified by the National Institute of Drug Abuse, the State of Florida, and the College of American Pathologists to perform the kind of test at issue here. A scientist employed at Doctor's Laboratory, Inc., certified that the final result of the testing performed on Respondent's specimen was accurate. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that the tests of Respondent's urine specimen were performed in conformity with all applicable testing guidelines. On June 11, 1996, Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., in Valdosta, Georgia, reported Respondent's test results to the MRO in Brunswick, Georgia, as being positive for benzoylecgonine. Dr. Robert H. Miller was the MRO who received the Respondent's drug test report. Dr. Miller is certified as an MRO through the American Association of Medical Review Officers. He works for MRO Services, Inc. The function of the MRO is to ascertain whether there is any medical reason for a given test result. If the individual has a legitimate prescription for a medication that showed up on a drug screen and there is no safety concern over the individual having a significant blood level of that particular substance at work, then the report to the employer is negative. In this case, the MRO reviewed the chain-of-custody form. He did not find any irregularity in the chain-of-custody for the Respondent's specimen. The MRO's office telephoned Petitioner on June 12, 1996, and requested that Petitioner have Respondent contact the MRO. Respondent returned the MRO's call that same day. During their conversation, the MRO informed Respondent about his drug test report. The MRO asked Respondent whether there might be any medical reason for the positive test result. Respondent informed the MRO that he had taken a prescription for a toothache. Respondent did not furnish the MRO with the name of a specific drug to account for the positive test result. Benzoylecgonine is the metabolite measured to identify cocaine. Cocaine is rarely used in ear, nose, and throat medical procedures, such as bronchoscopy. It is not available by prescription. The MRO properly determined that there was no medical reason for Respondent's positive drug test result. The MRO explained to Respondent that a re-test of his specimen was available. The MRO gave Respondent a toll-free telephone number to call if he wanted a re-test performed. By letter dated June 12, 1996, the MRO informed Petitioner that Respondent's drug test was positive for cocaine. By correspondence dated June 13, 1996, the MRO provided Respondent with directions for obtaining a re-test of his specimen. Respondent did not request a re-test. MRO Services, Inc. receives about 1000 reports of drug tests from Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., each month. In the past three years, MRO Services, Inc., has not documented any cases where a re-test of a specimen created a discrepancy with initial test results produced by Doctors' Laboratory, Inc. Petitioner's Director of Employee Relations conducted a pre-termination conference with Respondent on June 18, 1996. The purpose of this meeting was to give Respondent an opportunity to present mitigating circumstances. In the conference, Respondent indicated his belief that a co-worker, Debra Martin, put cocaine in his drinking water without his knowledge. The Director of Employee Relations talked to individuals that Respondent thought might have witnessed his activities and the activities of Debra Martin on June 10, 1996. During the time in question, Respondent and Ms. Martin were washing and waxing buses. Respondent and Ms. Martin often would get drinking water for each other. Ice was available in coolers located in a building near the gas pumps and washrack. Water was available from a spigot next to the place where Respondent and Ms. Martin were washing the buses. Ms. Martin specifically denied that she ever put cocaine or any other illegal drug in Respondent's drinking water. Ms. Martin also tested positive for a controlled substance on June 10, 1996. She subsequently signed a rehabilitation contract with Petitioner. After completing her rehabilitation treatment, Ms. Martin returned to work as a school bus driver for Petitioner. Persuasive evidence indicates that Ms. Martin did not put cocaine in Respondent's drinking water without his knowledge at any time prior to his June 10, 1996, drug test. By letter dated June 19, 1996, Respondent was informed that the Superintendent intended to recommend that Petitioner terminate Respondent's employment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a Final Order, terminating the employment of Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of September, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of September, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas L. Wittmer, Esquire Alachua County School Board 620 East University Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32601 Francisco M. Negron, Jr., Esquire Florida Education Association/United 118 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1700 Robert W. Hughes, Superintendent Alachua County School Board 620 East University Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32601-5498 Michael H. Olenick, Esquire Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Frank T. Brogan, Commissioner Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character in violation of section 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes (2011)1/ and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B- 27.0011(4)(d), and if so, what penalty should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact The Commission is an agency of the State of Florida responsible for the certification, and the revocation of certification, of officers and instructors in the criminal justice disciplines. Ms. Lorrie Gerdon was certified as a Correctional Officer in the State of Florida by the Commission on June 8, 2009, and issued Correctional Certification #284320. Ms. Gerdon was employed by the Florida Department of Corrections from October 17, 2008, to January 19, 2011. Although originally employed as a Correctional Officer, Ms. Gerdon took a step down in assignment to a Clerk Typist due to a back injury sometime early in 2010. It was too hard for her to continue to wear all of the equipment that Correctional Officers must wear. She is still receiving payments from workers’ compensation and is under treatment for her back injuries. Lieutenant Georgiana Hand is employed at the Apalachee Correctional Institute in Sneads, Florida, where she has worked since about 1988. It is Lt. Hand’s responsibility to supervise the Corrections Officers, listen to Disciplinary Reports, and fill in for the shift supervisors when one of them is on leave. On January 14, 2011, Lt. Hand was the Officer in Charge, fulfilling the duties of a Shift Supervisor, insuring that Officers were posted at their assigned locations. Ms. Gerdon was assigned to a non-sworn position as a Clerk Typist in the Classifications Department. As Lt. Hand was posting the shift, Ms. Gerdon stated, “Me and Jarvis will go work for you in P-Dorm.” (Officer Jarvis was a Classification Officer.) Lt. Hand thought that this was an odd comment because P-Dorm had been closed down for a couple of years. Lt. Hand asked Ms. Gerdon to repeat what she said. Ms. Gerdon again volunteered to work with Officer Jarvis in P-Dorm. Lt. Hand observed that Ms. Gerdon was “real jovial” and that her speech was slurred. Ms. Gerdon’s eyes appeared to be glassy. Ms. Gerdon’s appearance and behavior concerned Lt. Hand. Ms. Gerdon was not behaving normally and Lt. Hand thought Ms. Gerdon might be on medication or “something else.” Lt. Hand notified Assistant Warden Tommy Barfield. Shortly after, Lt. Hand was asked to report to the Warden’s Office. When Warden John Palmer received the reports about Ms. Gerdon’s unusual behavior, he had asked to talk to her so that he could observe her appearance and behaviors himself. Warden Palmer has been employed in various capacities in the corrections system for over 20 years, and based upon his training and experience is able to determine whether or not there is reasonable suspicion that someone is under the influence of a controlled substance. Warden Palmer testified that he observed that Ms. Gerdon had “glassed over” eyes and slurred speech. The Warden reasonably concluded that she was under the influence of some type of substance. Lt. Hand was present in Warden John Palmer’s office as he questioned Ms. Gerdon about what was going on. Lt. Hand recalled that Ms. Gerdon was upset and crying. Lt. Hand remembered that after Warden Palmer told Ms. Gerdon that he was going to send her for a reasonable suspicion drug test, Ms. Gerdon told the Warden that she knew she would test positive and that her son had put drugs in her coffee. Warden Palmer also testified that Ms. Gerdon had told him that she had tested herself previously and had tested positive for marijuana. She told the Warden that her son had “poisoned” her coffee with marijuana. As a result of the behavioral and physical changes noted in Ms. Gerdon, on January 14, 2011, Regional Director R. Bryant approved an order requiring Ms. Gerdon to submit to a Reasonable Suspicion Drug Test. Ms. Gerdon, in compliance with the order issued to her by her employer, the Florida Department of Corrections, reported to the Marianna Family Care Center in Marianna, Florida, on January 14, 2011, at approximately 8:45 a.m., and gave a specimen of her urine, by urinating in a sterile, previously unused specimen cup provided to her by personnel at the Marianna Family Care Center. After Ms. Gerdon urinated into the specimen cup provided to her, she delivered the cup containing her urine specimen to a Marianna Family Care Center employee who immediately capped and sealed the specimen container, assigned the specimen ID# 0288508894, and labeled it in a manner making it uniquely identifiable as Ms. Gerdon’s January 14, 2011, urine sample. Ms. April Sadousky is employed as a Medical Assistant in the Marianna Family Care Center and in the office of Dr. Rodriguez, where she is responsible for operating the laboratory and conducting drug screenings. After having Ms. Gerdon sign the chain of custody form indicating that she had provided the specimen, Ms. Sadousky placed the urine sample in a bag, sealed that bag, and placed it in the refrigerated LabCorp drawer, where it was picked up that day by LabCorp personnel. Specimen ID# 0288508894 was received in LabCorp’s accession laboratory by Ms. Catherine Hess, who took the paperwork and the specimen out of the sealed chain-of-custody bag. No one had tampered with or altered the specimen since it was initially collected, as evidenced by the intact seals and the chain-of-custody records. Ms. Phyllis Chandler is a Responsible Person and Lab Manager who works in the Occupational Testing Division of LabCorp. LabCorp holds a Florida Laboratory Permit with Certificate number 052, which was in effect in January of 2011. LabCorp is also licensed by SAMHSA, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. LabCorp participates in proficiency testing of samples with known concentrations submitted by regulatory agencies to insure accurate testing. LabCorp conducts initial testing of urine samples by immunoassay, and confirmation testing by “GC-MS” or gas chromatography-mass spectrometry. It is the regular practice of LabCorp to make reports of the results of its testing. A marijuana metabolite is produced by the body of a person who consumes marijuana either by ingestion or by smoking it. The marijuana is absorbed into the body and it is broken down by the liver, producing the marijuana metabolite, which is excreted though the kidneys, hair, or saliva. As Dr. Dash testified, the only substance other than marijuana that produces a marijuana metabolite is the prescription medication marketed under the name “Marinol” or its generic equivalent “dronabinol.” These prescription drugs have active tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) in them, as does marijuana. LabCorp conducted immunoassay and confirmation testing on Specimen ID# 0288508894. As is their usual practice, records of the testing on Specimen ID# 0288508894 were made at or near the time of the tests and were made by a person with knowledge of the information that was recorded, as was testified to by Ms. Chandler, who is a custodian of these records. In initial screening, the THC cut-off was 50. Specimen ID# 0288508894 tested at 555. In confirmation testing, Specimen ID# 0288508894 tested at 171 nanograms per milliliter of marijuana metabolites. The confirmation cut-off was 15 nanograms per milliliter. All test batches at LabCorp contain blind controls that are run within the batch to assure that the testing process is accurate. The blind controls within the batch containing Specimen ID# 0288508894 were tested correctly. The drug analysis conducted by LabCorp indicated that urine Specimen ID# 0288508894 contained marijuana metabolites. A secure chain of custody was maintained from the time the urine sample was collected until the test results were produced. The Department of Corrections has contracted with Doctors Review Service to receive test results from the laboratory and to contact the specimen donor on all non-negative results to determine if there is any medical documentation that would explain the test results. Dr. Neil Dash is employed by Doctor Review Services and received the test results from Ms. Gerdon’s sample. After Doctors Review Service obtained the laboratory results on Ms. Gerdon’s sample, Ms. Gerdon called them on January 19, 2011. In response to questioning, Ms. Gerdon did not provide Doctor’s Review Service with information on prescriptions or any medical explanation for the finding reported by the laboratory that her sample contained marijuana metabolites. Dr. Dash prepared a Controlled Substance Test Results report indicating that specimen 0288508894 had tested positive for marijuana metabolites. These results were sent to the Department of Corrections. The drug test was conducted in accordance with sections 112.0455 and 440.102, Florida Statutes, and evidenced the introduction of a controlled substance into Ms. Gerdon’s body. Ms. Gerdon testified that her ex-husband abused her. Ms. Gerdon had three children, two girls and a boy. Her ex- husband would threaten the daughters to control Ms. Gerdon. He would not allow her to be around her parents, except when they came over to see her at the house. If she left the house, he would destroy something. Several walls and doors were damaged by her ex-husband. Ms. Gerdon’s son has been diagnosed as manic bipolar through the North Florida Therapy Center. Ms. Gerdon was experiencing a high level of domestic stress at the time of the incident. Ms. Gerdon testified that she had numerous medical problems and was on the following prescriptions at the time of the January 14, 2011, incident: Seroquel, Buspar, Cymbalta, Zoloft, Triazadone, Synthroid, Hydrocodone, Topomax, Fioricet, Nexium, Peridium, Macrodanton, Flomax, Cipro, Indocin, Skelaxin, Zofran, Medrol, Klonopin, Rstrace, Levothroxine, Atarax, Ativan, Reglan, Effexor, and Prozac. Ms. Gerdon testified that she took these medications for anxiety and depression, and that she has a thyroid disease, a kidney disease, and suffers from cluster migraine headaches. She testified that now she is down to only three or four of these medications since she is no longer in an abusive relationship. The drug Fioricet is a prescription medication that contains butalbital, often prescribed to treat migraine headaches. Butalbital is a barbiturate. Ms. Gerdon testified that she takes the Fioricet every day for migraine headaches. Ms. Gerdon testified that prior to the incident of January 14, 2011, with the help of her parents, who own the house, Ms. Gerdon was repairing walls and doors that had been destroyed by her abusive husband. Ms. Gerdon testified that her mother was making coffee and noticed that something was wrong with the coffee: . . . when my mother had noticed that there was something weird about it, she called me and I said, I’m not quite sure what that is, I said, I believe that that is marijuana, and I actually went down and I did get a test, I got a home test. It tested me for marijuana, it tested me for barbiturate and I flipped out. Ms. Gerdon testified that she had not noticed anything before, because “90 percent of the time” she did not even turn on the lights when she scooped out her coffee. Ms. Gerdon testified that she went over her list of medications and was confused about why she tested positive for marijuana. None of the drugs that Ms. Gerdon testified she was taking at the time of the incident would have resulted in a positive test for marijuana metabolites. Ms. Gerdon has been tested almost every other month since the January 14, 2011, incident, and she has not had any test that was positive for marijuana. She testified that she also has not tested positive for barbiturates, although it is not clear why her use of Fioricet would not result in a positive test. Ms. Gerdon was under the influence of marijuana on the morning of January 14, 2011, as evidenced by her physical symptoms, her statement that she knew she would test positive for marijuana, and her drug test results. As both Dr. Dash and Ms. Chandler testified in response to Ms. Gerdon’s questions, it would be possible for persons to ingest marijuana without knowing that they were doing so. It was not clear why LabCorp’s testing of the January 14, 2011, urine sample would not have tested positive for barbiturates as a result of the Fioricet. Dr. Dash testified that if a person was taking Fioricet it would show up in the drug testing if the test was screening for barbiturates and the amount taken exceeded the cut-off set at the laboratory. He did not know what cut-off amount was set by the laboratory. Ms. Gerdon’s ex-husband was incarcerated shortly after their divorce was final. Her son is also now incarcerated. Stress on Ms. Gerdon was reduced after she divorced her husband. Ms. Gerdon is no longer taking many of the medications she was taking earlier. Ms. Gerdon unlawfully injected, ingested, inhaled, or otherwise introduced marijuana into her body. Ms. Gerdon has failed to maintain good moral character. The position of Correctional Officer is one of great public trust. No evidence of any prior disciplinary history was introduced for Ms. Gerdon.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Florida Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order finding Lorrie Gerdon in violation of section 943.1395(7), as defined in Florida Administrative Law Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(d). It is further recommended that Respondent's certification as a Corrections Officer be suspended for a period of two years, followed by probation for a period of two years. As condition of probation, it is recommended that the Commission require random or scheduled drug testing and substance abuse counseling, as provided for in Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B- 27.005(7)(c). DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of December, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of December, 2012.
The Issue An Administrative Complaint, dated March 8, 1990, but amended with leave of the Hearing Officer in an order dated December 17, 1990, alleges that Respondent violated the provisions of Section 943.1395(5) and (6), F.S., and Rule 11B- 27.0011(4)(d), F.A.C., by failing to maintain the qualification established in Section 943.13(7), F.S., requiring "good moral character". The complaint, as amended, alleges that Respondent James E. Lyons, Jr., attempted to purchase, and introduced, cocaine into his body in violation of Section 893.03, F.S., on or about January 20, 1989. The issues are whether those violations occurred and, if so, what discipline is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact James Edward Lyons, Jr., Respondent, was certified as a law enforcement officer by the Petitioner on June 14, 1986, and was issued certificate number 02-86-002-02. At all times relevant to the issues in this proceeding, Officer Lyons was employed as a law enforcement officer by the Brevard County Sheriff's Department and was assigned to the Special Investigations Division, a vice/narcotics enforcement unit. Around midnight on December 31, 1988, Brevard County Sheriff's Deputies, Billy Mitchell Young and Timothy Pemberton, sat in their parked vehicle near Railroad Avenue, an area of the county well-known for illicit drug activity. They had binoculars and were looking for activity with the purpose of intercepting dealers or buyers. They observed a vehicle which, as Deputy Young remarked to his partner, looked alot like "Eddie's" (Respondent's) unmarked department vehicle: a white Thunderbird. Respondent was not a participant in the detail to which the two officers were assigned that evening. The Thunderbird was immobile, and there were two or three people standing around it and moving around in a manner consistent with activity of street dealers competing for a sale. The vehicle stayed parked for about 10-15 minutes. As the two deputies were leaving to back up another team on a traffic arrest, they noticed the Thunderbird run a stop sign at Cross Road and Highway U.S.-1. They commenced pursuit, still unaware of the identity of the occupant. With blue lights flashing, and a spotlight on, the deputies followed the car about three miles before it finally pulled over. The Respondent got out and walked back to the deputies' car to present himself. They were his colleagues, and they knew him to be happy-go-lucky and affable. In this encounter he was very nervous and, according to Deputies Mitchell and Pemberton, he was uncharacteristically anxious to leave. He told them something about hearing about a traffic stop on his radio and going to the Railroad Avenue site to assist. This did not make sense, as the stop to which he referred had occurred much earlier. Mitchell and Pemberton were uncomfortable and somewhat saddened by the event and, at some point, mentioned it to Phillip Shimer, who at that time was in charge of the Brevard County Sheriff's Staff Services Division (including Internal Affairs). On January 20, 1989, Phillip Shimer became involved in an internal investigation involving James "Eddie" Lyons when he was contacted at home early in the morning and was informed that Deputy Lyons was being detained by the Melbourne Police Department on an alleged narcotics violation. The prior evening Deputy Lyons had been found in an area of the City of Melbourne known for narcotics activity. He was in his department Thunderbird attempting to buy crack cocaine from two undercover Melbourne police posing as drug dealers. When one of the undercover police pulled his gun to apprehend him, he fled and was arrested a few blocks away at a convenience store. In a voluntary interview given to Phillip Shimer after his release to the Brevard County Sheriff's personnel, Deputy Lyons explained that he was in the area to meet another Special Investigation Divisions Agent and drove into north Melbourne to see if he could initiate some case activity involving the sale of crack cocaine. He approached two black males on the street and initiated a conversation with them. He attempted to purchase a quantity of cocaine. As the transaction started to take place they identified themselves as police. Deputy Lyons feared that he was going to be robbed, and drove away. The account given by Respondent in his testimony at hearing was similar, but instead of affirmatively trying to make an arrest through a bogus buy, he claimed he was looking for a suspect, "Bobo", and was inquiring of his whereabouts of the two street males when one pulled a gun and he fled. The story would be more plausible if it were not for ensuing events. After listening to Deputy Lyons' explanation, Phillip Shimer suspended him with pay, removed his credentials and secured his department vehicle. He was released on his own recognizance by the Melbourne Police. He was ordered to return to Staff Services at 10:00 a.m. This was delayed until later in the day when Deputy Lyons contacted his superior officer and indicated that he was somewhat upset and did not feel he could respond yet. The parties' prehearing stipulation establishes the following: On January 20, 1989, the Respondent reported to Wuesthoff Hospital in Rockledge, Florida; [in the company of an Internal Affairs Investigator, as required by his superior officer.] At about 2:30 p.m., in a private area of Wuesthoff Hospital, the Respondent urinated into a sterile urine sample cup provided by Wuesthoff Hospital. The cup containing the Respondent's urine sample was promptly received from the Respondent by Wuesthoff Hospital laboratory employee Mr. Wade Wallace. Mr. Wallace immediately capped and sealed the sample cup and labeled it in a manner making it uniquely identifiable as the Respondent's urine sample. At about 2:35 p.m., the sealed sample cup containing the Respondent's urine sample was delivered to the Wuesthoff Hospital Toxicology Laboratory by Mr. Wallace. On January 20, 1989 at about 3:00 p.m., the sample cup containing the Respondent's urine sample was retrieved by laboratory employee Deborah Lanza. Ms. Lanza dispensed a portion of the Respondent's urine sample from the sample cup and performed an initial chemical screen for the purpose of determining if there was evidence of controlled substances or their metabolites in the Respondent's urine sample. On January 20, 1989 at about 3:15 p.m., laboratory employee Valerie Lasobeck Davies dispensed a portion of the Respondent's urine sample from the sample cup and performed a confirmation analysis of the sample. Neither the sample cup nor the Respondent's urine sample had been tampered with, altered or adulterated since the respondent's urine sample was initially collected in the sample cup. Ms. Davies tested the Respondent's sample utilizing the fluorescence polarization immunoassay analysis method. The test results showed that the sample was positive, containing some 4,830 nanograms per milliliter of a metabolite of cocaine, benzoylecgonine. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Davies performed a confirmation analysis by gas chromatography/mass spectrometry. This analysis yielded a positive finding for the cocaine metabolite, ecgonine. Both benzoylecgonine and ecgonine are unique metabolites of cocaine. The quantity of cocaine metabolite in the Respondent's urine sample was indicative of illicit use of the drug by the Respondent within seventy-two hours previous to the time at which he gave the urine sample. The quantity of cocaine metabolite was wholly inconsistent with casual handling of articles contaminated with cocaine or the mere handling, as opposed to ingestion, of the drug itself. Although cocaine residue can be absorbed through the skin, the level that would be achieved on a drug analysis would be substantially less than a 300 nanogram cutoff for a "positive" finding. In addition to evidence of his use of cocaine, Respondent's explanations of the events of December 31st and January 20th are further discredited by the fact that his mode of operation was contrary to well- established instructions and prudent practices of undercover law enforcement. Officers must not work alone, for their own safety and to preserve the integrity of the operation. A witness is important for the legal proceedings that follow. When an undercover operation is planned, law enforcement agencies with concurrent jurisdiction are informed to avoid the obvious possible result: cops arresting cops. After a jury trial, Respondent was acquitted of the criminal offense of attempted purchase of a controlled substance.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, recommended that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter its final order finding Respondent guilty as charged in the Amended Administrative Complaint and imposing the penalty of revocation of his certificate. RECOMMENDED this 7th day of May, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 James E. Lyons 415 18th Street, S.E. Winter Haven, FL 33880 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 James T. Moore, Commissioner Dept. of Law Enforcement P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302
The Issue Whether Sapa Precision Tubing Rockledge, LLC (Respondent), discriminated against Christopher Brian Edwards (Petitioner) on the basis of age.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is over 40 years of age, and was employed by Respondent from 2009 until May 21, 2013. Prior to his termination, Petitioner received favorable work evaluations and demonstrated good work attendance. Respondent is a manufacturing company that makes aluminum tubing for commercial purposes. Safety in the work environment is critical to Respondent’s success. Part of Respondent’s safety regimen includes maintaining a drug-free workplace. To that end, Respondent retains an outside company, Edge Information Management, Inc. (Edge), to conduct random drug tests of Respondent’s employees. Respondent’s drug-free policy is set forth in its employee handbook that is provided to all employees. Petitioner received a copy of the handbook and knew or should have known of the company’s drug-free policy upon his employment. In order to screen Respondent’s employees, Edge creates a random matrix that assigns all employees a number. The computer program used by Edge then generates a random sampling of employees for the given test date. In this case, approximately one month before the test date, Edge randomly selected employees who were to be tested on May 14, 2013. Petitioner was named among the randomly selected employees. Edge is accredited by the Drug and Alcohol Testing Industry Association and is fully authorized to conduct drug screenings. Edge employee, Leonard Clarke, was fully trained in the process of collecting samples to assure conformance with all applicable testing standards. Prior to the test date, Petitioner attended a meeting with other employees and voiced concerns to Respondent regarding working conditions by “bringing up stuff that they were not comfortable with.” Although not part of his original claim of discrimination, Petitioner now maintains that his termination was also in retaliation for his comments during that meeting. On May 14, 2013, based upon the employees randomly selected by Edge, Respondent notified supervisors to send the employees to a conference room for drug testing. Clarke prepared the paperwork and waited for the 27 employees to report for the screening. No one at Respondent selected the employees to be screened, conducted the collection of samples, or tested the samples taken. Clarke was solely responsible for the drug testing. All of the employees were required to review the testing form, sign, and date it before returning it to Clarke. Each was given a lollypop stick with a sponge attached to one end. By placing the sponge in the mouth and collecting saliva, the sample can then be tested to issue a preliminary result for drugs. Clarke had a difficult time collecting a saliva sample from Petitioner. Eventually, on the second or third attempt Petitioner produced enough saliva to place the sponge in the vial to allow the test strip to render a result. The test strips are designed to react to substances such as marijuana, cocaine, or amphetamines. In Petitioner’s case, the test strip showed positive for drug metabolites and/or alcohol. After testing positive on the saliva test (the only employee who did), Clarke asked Petitioner to give a urine sample so that a complete drug analysis could be performed by the Edge lab. Petitioner consented to all testing procedures and the collection of samples on May 14, 2013. For the purpose of the urine sample, Petitioner was given a cup and asked to go into the adjacent bathroom to produce the sample. When Petitioner returned the cup to Clarke it was noted that the cold, clear liquid did not register a temperature. Based upon his training, Clarke suspected that Petitioner had not urinated into the cup and discarded the sample. Next, Clarke accompanied Petitioner while a second sample was collected for urinalysis. Clarke marked the sample, packaged it in accordance with all applicable standards, and sent it by FedEx to Edge’s lab. Petitioner’s testing went from “random” to “reasonable suspicion/cause” based upon his saliva test and behavior with Clarke. It appeared to Clarke that Petitioner attempted to evade the drug testing process. Based upon the preliminary test results, Petitioner was suspended from work. Petitioner knew he had tested positive for drugs and that his urine sample would be further evaluated. It is undisputed that Petitioner’s urine tested positive for cocaine. Prior to notifying Respondent of the test results, Edge notified Petitioner that the sample tested positive for cocaine and gave Petitioner an opportunity to contest or explain how the result might be erroneous. Petitioner did not contest the result and has not disputed the presence of drugs in his saliva and urine on May 14, 2013. On May 21, 2013, Edge sent Petitioner’s drug results to Respondent. At that time, Respondent decided to terminate Petitioner’s employment with the company, and Chapman notified Petitioner by telephone that he was terminated because he tested positive for cocaine. Respondent gave Petitioner an opportunity to contest the drug results, but he did not. At hearing, Petitioner did not contest the drug results. Of the persons tested with Petitioner, twenty were younger than he and six were older. Only Petitioner tested positive for drugs. In the last ten years, all employees at Respondent who have tested positive for drugs have been terminated. No one younger or older than Petitioner has been retained if they tested positive for drugs. Petitioner’s age did not impact Respondent’s decision to terminate his employment. None of Petitioner’s comments were considered in the termination of his employment. Petitioner did not raise retaliation with FCHR and has not established that Respondent retaliated against him because of comments he made during a company meeting. In short, Petitioner was terminated because he tested positive for cocaine. There was no competent, substantial evidence that persons younger than Petitioner were treated differently from Petitioner or were subject to dissimilar policies or practices. All of Respondent’s employees who tested positive for drugs have been terminated.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s claim of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of July, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of July, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Christopher Brian Edwards 4605 Ocean Beach Boulevard Cocoa Beach, Florida 32931 Mary Susan Sacco, Esquire Ford and Harrison, LLP Suite 1300 300 South Orange Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 (eServed) Tammy Scott Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399
