Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME-0027913, and was employed by the Norton Seminole Medical Group in Pinellas County, Florida. Respondent has been licensed in Florida since 1976. At approximately 3:50 p.m. on November 1, 1983, a 31 year old white male, with the initials R. L., arrived at the emergency room of Lake Seminole Hospital, Seminole, Florida, and was examined by the emergency room physician on duty. R. L. complained of substernal mid-chest pain radiating to his back, which had begun the night before. He was agitated and exhibited a great deal of emotional stress. The emergency room physician on duty treated R. L. for suspected cardiac pathology, placed him on a cardiac monitor, inserted a heparin lock into a vein, and ordered lab work which included a chest x-ray, electrocardiogram, electrolytes, cardiac enzymes, CBC (complete blood count), blood sugar, creatinine and BUN (blood urea nitrogen). These were appropriate tests under the circumstances. When the Respondent came on duty in the emergency room at 7:00 p.m., all lab work had been completed, except for the cardiac enzymes. The emergency room physician who had been on duty when R. L. appeared at the emergency room briefed Respondent about R. L.'s medical history, condition while in the emergency room, and the test results which had been received. After the cardiac enzyme values were received, Respondent reviewed R. L.'s medical history and lab test results, which he determined to be normal, and discharged R. L. at approximately 7:35 p.m. on November 1, 1983, with instructions that he see his family physician the next morning. Respondent's discharge diagnosis for R. L. was atypical chest pain secondary to anxiety. At approximately 11:21 p.m. on November 1, 1983, R. L. expired from cardiopulmonary arrest at the emergency room of Metropolitan Hospital, Pinellas Park, Florida. The autopsy report notes extensive coronary artery disease, but makes no mention of acute myocardial infarction. It was not established by clear and convincing evidence that R. L. suffered an acute myocardial infarction. There is conflicting expert testimony from Steven R Newman, M.D., and Stephen J. Dresnick, M.D., concerning whether Respondent should have admitted R. L. to Lake Seminole Hospital instead of discharging him from the emergency room, and also whether his E.K.G. taken at the emergency room was normal. Drs. Newman and Dresnick are experts in the care and treatment of patients in an emergency room, but their testimony was received by deposition instead of through live testimony at hearing. Thus, based upon this conflict in testimony, and the fact that the demeanor of these witnesses cannot be assessed, it is found that it was not established by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent failed to practice medicine with that level of care and skill which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances when he discharged R. L., and evaluated the tests which were administered to the patient while in the emergency room as within normal limits. A patient who appears at a hospital emergency room with unstable angina, such as R. L., does not necessarily require admission to the hospital. While serial electrocardiograms and serial cardiac enzymes are called for with patients whose symptoms of cardiac discomfort warrant hospitalization, these procedures are not usually and customarily performed in an emergency room. Therefore, since it was not established that Respondent should have admitted R. L. to the hospital as an in-patient, it was also not established that he failed to exercise the required level of skill and care by failing to order such serial tests while R. L. was in the emergency room. Although the emergency room physician on duty when R. L. arrived at the emergency room at approximately 3:50 p.m. on November 1, 1983, was initially responsible for obtaining a patient history and ordering the tests which were performed, when Respondent came on duty at 7:00 p.m. and took over this case, he was also responsible for insuring that his medical records concerning his evaluation and treatment of R. L., as well as his decision to discharge the patient, were full and complete. Respondent failed to document his review and findings based upon the lab tests and chest x-ray which had been completed, as well as the patient's medical history, and the specific reason or basis for his decision to discharge R. L. Respondent relied almost completely on the medical records compiled by the emergency room physician who was initially on duty when R. L. arrived at the emergency room, and made no significant additions to those records while the patient was under his care, or which would justify his course of treatment, including discharge, of this patient.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the Board of Medicine enter a Final Order reprimanding Respondent for his violation of Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes, and placing him on probation for a period of six months from the entry of the Final Order in this case, conditioned upon his complying with such reasonable terms and conditions as the Board may impose, including review and verification of the completeness of medical records prepared by the Respondent while on probation. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of July, 1990 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of July, 1990. APPENDIX (DOAH CASE NO. 89-6874) Rulings on the Department's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 3-4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 5-6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 8-9. Rejected in Finding of Fact 5. 10. Rejected in Finding of Fact 4. 11-12 Rejected in Finding of Fact 6. 13. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact Rejected in Findings 5 and 6. 7, but otherwise Rulings on the Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Findings of Fact 2 and 3. 4-5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 7-9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Rejected in Finding of Fact 5. Rejected in Finding of Fact 7. 12-13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 2, but otherwise Rejected in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Rejected in Finding of Fact 7. COPIES FURNISHED: Andrea Bateman, Esquire Kevin F. Dugan, Esquire 1940 North Monroe Street Wittner Centre West Suite 60 Suite 103 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 5999 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, FL 33710 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire General Counsel 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Board of Medicine Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether the Respondent, the Department of Professional Regulation, should pay the Petitioner, Kirk A. Woodson, M.D., attorney fees and costs under Section 57.011, Fla. Stat. (1989), the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act. As reflected in the Preliminary Statement, the parties stipulate that the Petitioner is a "prevailing small business party" and that reasonable fees and costs exceed $15,000, the statutory cap. The only remaining issue under the statute is whether the Respondent was "substantially justified" in filing the Administrative Complaint in Case No. 90- 5986 against the Petitioner. 1/
Findings Of Fact On or about June 7, 1988, a complaint was filed against the license of the Petitioner, Kirk A. Woodson, M.D., subsequent to closure of a professional malpractice liability claim against him without payment of indemnity. The substance of the complaint was that, on January 1, 1986, Woodson saw and performed a hysterectomy on a patient who had presented at the emergency room at University Community Hospital in Tampa, Florida, with heavy and continuous vaginal bleeding. The complaint stated that post-surgery the patient developed Adult Respiratory Distress Syndrome (ARDS) and died. The complaint questioned whether Woodson failed to practice medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment which a reasonably prudent similar physician recognizes as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. By letter dated June 30, 1988, the Department of Professional Regulation (the Department or DPR) notified Woodson that it had received the complaint and that it was initiating an investigation. DPR subpoenaed the hospital records which revealed that the patient arrived at the UCH emergency room at 5:28 a.m. on January 1, 1986, with at least a three-day history of vaginal hemorraging. An emergency room physician saw the patient, gave her two units of packed blood cells, and admitted her to Woodson's service. Woodson was called at approximately 8:30 a.m. and saw the patient later that morning. The patient's admission to surgery to determine the cause of the bleeding and perform necessary procedures was delayed until at least approximately 2:00 p.m. because the patient refused to consent to a dilation and curettage (D and C); she was insisting on a hysterectomy only. She finally consented to a D and C to be followed by a hysterectomy if Woodson found it to be medically necessary. During this delay, the patient continued to bleed and was transfused with two more units of packed blood cells at approximately 1:45 p.m. After the consent was given, there was a further delay, not explained by the records, until approximately 6:00 p.m. in getting the patient to surgery. The patient continued to bleed. Surgery took almost five hours. During surgery, the patient's bleeding got worse, and she was transfused with four more units of whole blood during the surgery. The DPR investigator was unable to ascertain from the hospital records the reason for the length of the surgery. The DPR investigator attempted to arrange an interview with Dr. Woodson and his attorney on or about February 28, 1989. The appointment was cancelled. When the DPR investigator contacted Woodson to reschedule the interview, Dr. Woodson questioned why DPR was pursuing the complaint when the malpractice claim was closed without payment of indemnity. Dr. Woodson agreed to be interviewed but expressed his preference that the investigator first review the "extensive depositions" taken in the malpractice litigation. 4/ Having already determined to request an expert evaluation of the case, the investigator decided to postpone the interview with Dr. Woodson. On July 10, 1989, the DPR asked a probable cause panel of the Board of Medicine to authorize the retention of an expert in gynecology to review the information obtained through investigation to that point in time to assist in the determination whether Woodson's treatment of the patient fell below that level of care, skill and treatment which a reasonably prudent similar physician recognizes as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. On July 22, 1989, the probable cause met and authorized the expert review. On or about November 2, 1989, the DPR requested an expert review by Doris N. Carson, M.D., a Board-certified gynecologist with extensive surgical experience, including emergency room experience. Dr. Carson reviewed the hospital records supplied by DPR, some of which were difficult to read. By letter dated November 20, 1989, Dr. Carson reported her impressions. Dr. Carson believed the records supported Dr. Woodson's diagnosis and ultimate course of treatment. In the patient's condition, the proper course of treatment was to attempt to stop the vaginal bleeding by doing a D and C; a hysterectomy only should have been attempted if the D and C did not stop the bleeding. However, Dr. Carson perceived other problems that were not explained to her satisfaction by the hospital records. First, Dr. Carson did not see anything in the records to justify the length of the surgical procedures performed by Dr. Woodson. She reported: Careful review indicated that the subject attempted to remove the fibroids vaginally, and when this only increased the bleeding, then decided to do a laparotomy. The uterus, although enlarged, was not huge and the procedure as described seemed to move along without difficulty. When, however, the time is reviewed five hours would indicate very serious problems of technique or what seems more likely a lot if indecision about how to proceed. Evidently there was no physician surgical assistant, and the subject proceeded alone. In retrospect better operationg room help should have been available. Second, Dr. Carson felt that the patient received too much whole blood replacement during the course of the day and the surgery. Her reading of the hospital records indicated to her that five units of whole blood were given to the patient in addition to four units of packed cells. She felt: "Packed cells altogether would have been a better choice in light of the volume given to the patient." Her concern was that "volume overload," rather than ARDS, may have resulted ultimately in the death of the patient. However, she disclaimed the necessary expertise to render a conclusive opinion on the question and recommended that, if the DPR wanted a conclusive opinion on the cause of death, it should have a specialist in intensive care or a respiratory expert review the records. Dr. Carson had some difficulty with the delay in getting the patient to the operating room. The records indicated that at least some of the delay was caused by the patient's unwillingness to give consent to the recommended D and C. But Dr. Carson nonetheless had concerns that the delay added to the amount of blood transfused. Dr. Carson closed her letter with this remark: "In conclusion: A poorly done sugical proceeding below the recognized normal level of care." For reasons not apparent from the evidence presented, DPR did not interview Dr. Woodson before asking the probable cause panel to find probable cause and file a draft Administrative Complaint against Dr. Woodson based on Dr. Carson's expert review and the rest of the investigative report, including the hospital records. The draft Administrative Complaint, drawn in two counts, sought to discipline Dr. Woodson under Count I for failure to practice medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment which a reasonably prudent similar physician recognizes as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances, in two respects: first, for allegedly causing volume overload in the patient by ordering units of whole blood, instead of packed blood, to replace the patient's blood loss; and, second, for allegedly taking too long, without justification, to perform the necessary surgery. Count II alleged that Woodson failed to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of the patient, specifically with respect to ordering whole blood instead of packed units and with respect to the length of the surgical procedures. The probable cause panel considered the matter at its meeting on June 22, 1990. Counsel for the panel pointed out that the "extensive depositions" Woodson had indicated he wanted the DPR investigator to read before Woodson was interviewed were not in the packet of materials reviewed by the panel. 5/ But members of the panel indicated that they had reviewed the material that was in the packet and that they thought the information contained in it was adequate to make a probable cause determination. One of the doctors on the panel called it a "horrendous case." She felt that Woodson had "swamped out the patient" and had performed "inappropriate types of fluid therapy and blood therapy." The other member mentioned the "five-hour operating time . . . without any real explanation." The panel's attorney pointed out the part of the report of investigation that referenced the patient's refusal to consent to Dr. Woodson's proposed surgery and asked whether it constituted "any semblance of an explanation for a delay?" It is not clear from the transcript of the probable cause proceeding how the panel resolved the attorney's question, but the panel voted to find probable cause notwithstanding the question. 6/ There is information in the materials reviewed by Dr. Carson, and by the probable cause panel, which tends to explain some of the time it took for Dr. Woodson to perform surgery on the patient. Some of this partially exculpatory information was difficult to read and decipher in the records. Some of the partially exculpatory information was acknowledged by Dr. Carson and may also have been taken into account independently by the panel. Notwithstanding this partially exculpatory information in the record, the finding of probable cause was substantially justified.
The Issue Should discipline be imposed against Respondent based upon the allegation that she failed to meet minimal standards of acceptable and prevailing nursing practice in violation of Section 464.018(1)(n), Florida Statutes (2002)?
Findings Of Fact STIPULATED FACTS: Petitioner is the state department charged with regulating the practice of nursing pursuant to Section 20.43, Florida Statutes, Chapter 456, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 464, Florida Statutes. At all times material to the Complaint, Respondent was licensed to practice as a certified registered nurse anesthetist ("C.R.N.A.") within the State of Florida. Respondent's address of record is 4409 Hoffner Avenue, Suite 328, Orlando, Florida 32812. On or about March 13, 2003, Patient M.M. presented to Endosurg Outpatient Center (Endosurg) for a colonoscopy. The colonoscopy began at or about 7:16 a.m. According to the Respondent's Anesthesia Record, Patient M.M. had a blood pressure of 120/70 at 7:30 a.m., and a blood pressure of 140/84 and an oxygen saturation of 96 percent "at the end of case." Respondent began mouth-to-mouth resuscitation and CPR at or about 7:46 a.m., then provided oxygen via a bag-valve mask at or about 7:48 a.m., and then provided oxygen by intubation at or about 7:50 a.m. Section 464.018(1)(n), Florida Statutes (2002), subjects a licensed nurse anesthetist to discipline for failing to meet minimal standards of acceptable and prevailing nursing practice. ADDITIONAL FACTS: The indications for the endoscopic procedure performed on Patient M.M. were in relation to bright red blood per rectum and anemia. The endoscopic diagnosis confirmed by the procedure was diverticulosis and internal hemorrhoids. According to Patient M.M., this was the first colonoscopy she had ever had. In the history reported by Patient M.M. prior to the procedure, there was no report of chest pain, indigestion, heart burn, or nausea. The patient did report rectal bleeding. Patient M.M. provided a history of bronchitis, but it was noted that there were no recent problems with the bronchitis. In the recount of her past medical history, she made no reference to congestive heart failure, coronary artery disease, diabetes, atrial fibrillation, angina, heart murmur, heart valve problems, or irregular heart. She did have a history in her family of heart disease; the family member was her father. By history, the patient suffered from high blood pressure. At the time the patient was seen at Endosurg she was 67 years old, 5 feet 5 inches tall, and weighed 215 pounds. Respondent has practiced for 30 years in numerous settings. Respondent was an independent contractor recently employed at Endosurg. Over time she has met her obligations in relation to continuing education for her profession. When Respondent first saw Patient M.M. on the date in question, the patient was in the holding area adjacent to the procedure room. Respondent introduced herself to the patient and checked the intravenous access. The line had been placed and Respondent checked to make certain that the line was patent. Respondent explained to the patient that the patient would be given sedation. In particular, Respondent told the patient that she would be placed under conscious-sedation during the procedure. The patient responded that her son had had post- operative nausea and vomiting, having undergone sedation, but that the patient had experienced no problems with anesthesia in the past. Respondent listened to the patient's chest. The heart was regular, in that there were no audible sounds of irregularity or murmur at that time. The patient's chest was clear. No signs of wheezing or bronchi or rales were present that would indicate upper-respiratory difficulties. Respondent was aware that the patient suffered from hypertension. Before the procedure Respondent did not observe anything in the patient's demeanor which suggested that the patient was overly anxious. As the anesthesia record reflects, the administration of anesthesia by Respondent commenced at 7:15 a.m. and ended at 7:26 a.m. The procedure commenced at 7:16 a.m. and concluded at 7:25 a.m. Before providing the anesthesia, Respondent placed a blood pressure cuff on the patient, a pulse oximeter, an EKG monitor, and a pre-cordial stethoscope. The patient was anxious and Respondent administered a total of 2 mg of Versed. The Versed was administered twice. After waiting to see the reaction to the first administration, a second administration was provided. During the administration of this medication, Respondent discussed its subjective influence with the patient. Two other persons were in the procedure room with Respondent. They were the physician gastro-endrologist, who was performing that procedure, and an anesthesia technician. The doctor involved was Dr. Nehme Gebrayel. When the scope used to perform the procedure was inserted the patient winced. In response to those circumstances Respondent provided Fentanyl, an ultra-short acting narcotic in an amount considered appropriate to the circumstances. When the scope reached the area within the colon where the scope needed to be turned, the patient grasped the arm of the technician and dug her nails into his forearm. The physician called upon Respondent to provide other sedation to allow him to continue the procedure while providing some comfort to the patient. In response Respondent gave the patient 30 mg of Propofol, an hypnotic sedative with a short half-life. Later the patient began to dig her nails into the technician's forearm once more, which the technician reported to the physician. The physician told Respondent to provide additional sedation. Respondent gave the patient 30 mg more of Propofol. While the procedure was ongoing Respondent monitored the patient's vital signs. Before the procedure, the blood pressure was 142/100, the heart rate was 72. The second reading on blood pressure taken by Respondent during the procedure occurred between 7:18 a.m. and 7:20 a.m., with a reading of 126/66. Pulse oxygen readings that were recorded at the beginning and during the procedure reflected 98 percent and 95 percent saturation respectively. When the physician began to withdraw the scope at the end of the procedure, Respondent told the patient that the procedure was being finished and that the physician was taking the scope out. The patient responded by giving a "thumbs up" gesture. When the Doctor finished the procedure, Respondent asked the patient if the patient was doing "O.K." Respondent asked the patient if the patient was experiencing discomfort, the patient responded "not really." Respondent told the patient that the patient was being taken back to the holding area where she had been picked up before and brought into the procedure room. While the physician was still in the procedure room, Respondent went to the door and opened it into the holding area, and the nurse from the PACU at Endosurg came into the procedure room. Maureen Mayhew, R.N., was that nurse. When nurse Mayhew entered the procedure room, the vital signs in relation to blood pressure, pulse, and the pulse oximeter reading were still displayed on the monitor in the procedure room. Those readings at the end of the case were blood pressure 140/84, heart rate 74, respiratory rate 16 per minute and the saturated oxygen level 96 percent. At that time the patient responded to queries and stimuli. The reference to responding to queries means that the patient was able to converse with the Respondent. When Respondent turned over the care to nurse Mayhew, she told the other nurse that the patient had high blood pressure and a history of bronchitis but that the chest was clear when listened to prior to the procedure. Respondent explained that the patient had undergone a colonoscopy, in which 2 mg of Versed, 50 mg of Fentanyl, which is the equivalent to 1 cc and a total of 60 mgs of Propofol, divided into two doses had been provided. Respondent told nurse Mayhew that the patient was awake and talking and that her blood pressure had started at 140, had drifted down to 120 and was back at 140, as to systolic readings. After Respondent released the patient to the care of nurse Mayhew, she proceeded to address the next case. The administration of anesthesia to that patient commenced at 7:27 a.m. At about 7:45 a.m. a C.N.A. at Endosurg came into the procedure room where the next case was underway. The C.N.A. stated that there was a problem with Patient M.M., in that the patient was not responding as she had been. The C.N.A. asked that the doctor and Respondent come and see the patient. After arranging for someone to continue to monitor the patient that was being examined at that moment and with the placement of intravenous fluid with that patient to keep him hydrated, Respondent and the doctor left the procedure room and entered the holding area where Patient M.M. was found. When Respondent and the physician approached the patient, the patient was alone, flat on the bed. Respondent checked the patient's pulse at her neck, while the physician checked the patient's pulse at the wrist. Respondent called the patient's name and rubbed on the patient's chest. The patient made no response. The patient had no pulse. Respondent told the doctor "I don't have a pulse here." The doctor responded "Neither do I." When Respondent and the doctor addressed the patient in the holding area, they were uncertain when the patient had stopped breathing. The doctor commenced chest compressions as a form of CPR. Respondent leaned over the patient and breathed two quick breaths into the patient through mouth-to-mouth CPR. Respondent asked someone else employed at Endosurg to bring the CODE cart. Someone asked the Respondent if they needed to call 911. Respondent said, "yes" and the call was placed. Respondent was handed an ambubag with a valve mask to assist the patient in breathing. To check the bag's operation Respondent squeezed twice and found that the bag was not working. This bag belonged to Endosurg, and by inference Endosurg, not the Respondent is found to be responsible for its maintenance. During the inception of the mouth-to-mouth resuscitation provided by her, Respondent noticed that the patient's chest rose which is an indication that the patient was being ventilated. By contrast, the initial ambubag provided no evidence that ventilation was occurring. When the facility ambubag failed, Respondent asked another employee at Endosurg to go and pick up her personal ambubag that was located in another part of the procedure room. While someone went to retrieve Respondent's personal ambubag, the Respondent continued to provide mouth-to-mouth resuscitation while the physician gave closed chest compressions to the patient. During that time the chest was rising, indicating that the patient was making ventilatory efforts. When the second ambubag, belonging to Respondent, was handed to her, it was connected to oxygen and it performed as expected. The patient was given several quick breaths of the oxygen through the ambubag. Respondent then used a laryngoscope and an endotracheal tube to intubate the patient and the patient was intubated. While being ventilated through the endotracheal tube, Respondent used a stethoscope to listen to the breath sounds of the patient and she found evidence that the endotracheal tube was secure. While this was occurring the physician continued chest compressions. The physician also administered certain drugs to the patient to assist the patient. One drug being administered to the patient at the time was Epinephrine. The patient was then defibrillated. The defibrillator did not have a separate monitor. It was one in which the paddles associated with the defibrillator were not hooked to a device that would produce print strips of the results when the paddles were applied. This defibrillator belonged to Endosurg. The Respondent and the physician relied upon the EKG monitor hooked up to the patient to gain information and her status. When the Respondent and the doctor had come into the holding area, the patient was not on the monitor. The physician placed the leads on the chest of the patient to connect the monitor to reflect the pulse rate, if any were present. When the patient was first defibrillated and there was no change in the heart rhythm, another dose of Epinephrine was administered. About that time the fire rescue unit that had been summoned by the 911 call arrived. That was at 7:51 a.m. The fire rescue personnel included an EMT paramedic qualified to maintain the airway for the patient. Those persons took over the patient and prepared the patient for transfer. Respondent asked the doctor if it was acceptable to return to the procedure room and check the status of that patient. The physician gave her permission but Respondent did not return to the procedure room until the EMT paramedic had checked the position of the endotracheal tube in Patient M.M. Through the efforts made by Respondent and the physician the patient regained her pulse. A note in the patient's records refers to the existence of the heart rate and pulse when the patient was turned over for transport to a hospital. That hospital was the Villages Regional Hospital. There the patient was diagnosed with cardiac arrest and anoxic brain damage, encephalopathy. Subsequently the patient was transferred to Leesburg Regional Medical Center. The decision was eventually made to remove the patient from life support, given her condition. In an interview nurse Mayhew gave to an investigator with the Department of Health, relied upon by the parties at hearing, Ms. Mayhew told the investigator that five patients were in the PACU at Endosurg when Patient M.M. was transferred to that unit. At the time there was only one registered nurse and a single C.N.A. in the unit. Liz Singleton was the C.N.A. Ms. Mayhew told the investigator that Ms. Singleton indicated to Ms. Mayhew that the patient was alert and talking when the patient entered the unit. Ms. Mayhew said that she gave Patient M.M. a rapid assessment shortly after the arrival of the patient in the unit. Ms. Mayhew told the investigator that she noted that the Patient M.M. had declined from alert to responsive at that time. When checking the color and vital signs, a decrease in blood pressure was noted and the patient was placed in the Trendelenberg position (head down, feet raised) to try to increase the blood pressure. Ms. Mayhew mentioned giving Patient M.M. a sternal rub. The patient was noticed to blink her eyes and move her shoulder. Fluids were started, and the patient was given Romazicon intended to reverse the effects of anesthesia that had been provided to the patient during the procedure. Ms. Mayhew told the investigator that she gave C.N.A. Singleton instructions not to leave the patient's bedside and to give the patient one-on-one care. Ms. Mayhew then went to arrange for another C.N.A. to assist in the PACU. At some time during the care provided by nurse Mayhew, she indicated that there was a monitor for blood pressure, oxygen saturation, respiration and pulse and that the alert alarms were set. Nurse Mayhew told the investigator that she was starting an IV two beds away and heard the second C.N.A. talking to Patient M.M. just before the alarms went off. She said that Patient M.M. was in respiratory arrest and that she called a CODE, meaning nurse Mayhew called a CODE. Any entries concerning the vital signs in relation to Patient M.M. that were made following the procedure while the patient was in the holding area were made by C.N.A. Singleton, according to nurse Mayhew's statement. The monitor had printout capabilities at the time but was not activated. Notwithstanding these remarks attributed to nurse Mayhew in the interview process, it is found that when Respondent and the doctor addressed the patient in the holding area the monitor was disconnected. Although in her remarks made to the investigator nurse Mayhew said that the vital signs were recorded by the C.N.A., the record of nursing assessments reflecting the recording of the vital signs was signed by nurse Mayhew. They show that at 7:30 a.m. the patient's blood pressure was 78/46, with a pulse rate of 52, and a respiratory rate of 12. At 7:35 a.m. the blood pressure was 74/42, with a pulse rate of 40, and a respiratory rate of 14. The physician gave certain post-op orders concerning Patient M.M. which were noted by nurse Mayhew when she affixed her signature. One of those orders indicated that Ms. Mayhew was obligated to "notify physician for blood pressure less than 90/60, pulse >110." This order was not followed. EXPERT OPINION: Cenon Erwin Velvis, C.R.N.A., has been licensed in Florida for eleven years. He was called as an expert for Petitioner to testify concerning Respondent's care rendered Patient M.M. in this case. The witness was received as an expert. Both the Respondent and Mr. Velvis have provided anesthesia on numerous occasions while patients were undergoing colonoscopies. To prepare himself for the testimony, nurse Velvis reviewed medical records pertaining to Patient M.M. and the investigative report of the Department of Health. His opinion is that Respondent in caring for Patient M.M. fell below the standards expected of a C.R.N.A. when considering acceptable and prevailing nursing practice. Concerning his opinion, nurse Velvis believes that Patient M.M. was transferred to the PACU in an unstable condition, that Respondent did not remain with the patient long enough to ascertain this instability and the need for treatment and to conduct an ongoing evaluation secondary to the side effects of the anesthesia, and that once the patient experienced difficulties, the airway and circulatory system were not secured by Respondent in a timely manner. Nurse Velvis believes that the blood pressure reading at 7:30 a.m. of 78/46 and heart rate and pulse of 52 are low, dangerously so. According to nurse Velvis the normal range is 120/80 for blood pressure. There can be an acceptable 15 to 20 per cent departure from what is considered normal. This takes into account that nature of the procedure that the patient had undergone. The vital signs that were reflected at 7:30 a.m. demonstrate patient instability at 7:30 a.m., in Mr. Velvis' opinion. The Romazicon administered to the patient would not ordinarily be used given the amount of anesthesia provided the patient in the procedure. The patient's responsiveness had progressed to a point from what was initially assessed as responsive or responding to queries, to an unresponsive state. This would account for the administration of Romazicon, a reversal agent to the tranquilizer that had been used during the procedure. Nurse Velvis notes that the patient had gone from responding to inquiries to a state of unresponsiveness where the patient would only move when given painful stimuli. Mr. Velvis was aware that the blood pressure at 7:35 a.m. was 74/42, with a pulse rate of 40, indicating a further decline. The approximate time of arrest for the patient was 7:45 a.m. from records reviewed by Mr. Velvis. Mr. Velvis believes that the Respondent was responsible for verifying the patient's vital signs upon admission to PACU. He also originally expressed the opinion that Respondent failed to utilize the intubation equipment in a timely fashion to restore breathing following the emergency. Mr. Velvis concedes that if the cardiac arrest that occurred with Patient M.M. were related to anesthesia, the respiratory response by the patient would be lowered. But the recording of a respiratory rate of 12 at 7:30 a.m. and 14 at 7:35 a.m. does not satisfy Mr. Velvis concerning the quality of ventilation in the patient, even with the efforts of the patient being recorded. He also makes mention that the level of oxygen saturation at those times was unknown when reviewing the record. He does acknowledge that a respiratory rate of 14 as such is not consistent with respiratory arrest. Mr. Velvis acknowledges that nothing in the record indicates that nurse Mayhew notified the doctor when the low blood pressure readings were taken at 7:30 a.m. and 7:35 a.m., contrary to post-op orders. When provided a hypothetical under interrogation at hearing, that reflects the facts that have been reported here concerning the Respondent and the doctor in their effort to restore Patient M.M.'s breathing, Mr. Velvis retreated from his opinion that the airway and circulatory system of the patient was not secured in a timely manner when confronted with the crisis. While Mr. Velvis changed his opinion during cross- examination at hearing concerning the response by Respondent leading to the defibrillation, he still continued to express the opinion that Respondent fell below the standard of care and was responsible for hypoxia in the patient, the patient not breathing. He also restated his opinion that Respondent was below the standard of care for her release of the patient from the procedure room into the PACU in an untimely manner. Mr. Velvis expresses the opinion that immediate patient care was the Respondent's responsibility but in the atmosphere of team work the physician was the captain of the ship. Although the physician was the captain of the ship, the Respondent was responsible to do what was most important for the patient, according to Mr. Velvis. Mr. Velvis recognizes that nurse Mayhew would have been more helpful if she had notified Respondent and the physician earlier about Patient M.M.'s condition in the holding area, and Ms. Mayhew's error in leaving the patient when the patient was unstable. Mr. Velvis expresses the opinion that the mechanism behind the cardiac arrest in Patient M.M. was a lack of oxygen, in that the airway was not secure. Mr. Velvis in his testimony concedes that the patient could have had cardiac failure not due to a problem with respiration. Michael A. Binford, M.D., was called by Respondent as an expert. He is a practicing anesthesiologist in Florida who completed his anesthesiology residency approximately ten years ago. He works with C.R.N.A.s in his practice and as such is able to offer opinion testimony about the performance of C.R.N.A.s in their practice. He is familiar with the type of procedure which Patient M.M. was undergoing and the drugs administered to provide anesthesia. Having reviewed the patient's records and the investigative report from the Department of Health, his opinion is that Patient M.M. was stable when transferred from Respondent's care to nurse Mayhew's care. That opinion is based upon vital signs recorded at the commencement, during, and at the end of the procedure. From what he saw in the record concerning the medication administered to the patient during the procedure, it was appropriate. Nothing that he saw in the record made Dr. Binford believe that the Respondent should have stayed with the patient for a longer period of time, given the amount of medication provided. By contrast Dr. Binford refers to the vital signs recorded when the patient was under nurse Mayhew's care at 7:30 a.m. and 7:35 a.m. Those are not vital signs of a patient in a stable condition. Dr. Binford believes that the patient was deteriorating at that time and that nurse Mayhew violated the physician's post-op order by not immediately notifying the doctor of the vital signs she found. Dr. Binford in referring to nurse Mayhew's statement given to the investigator, reads the statement to indicate that the patient was stable when entering the PACU but declined from alert to responsive. To Dr. Binford this reflects a change in mental status in the patient. Definitive evidence in the change in status is borne out by the vital signs taken at 7:30 a.m., and 7:35 a.m., in Dr. Binford's opinion. Although the Romazicon given by Nurse Mayhew would not have been a drug of choice for Dr. Binford, he understands that nurse Mayhew may have considered it appropriate to provide an antidote to the Versed by using Romazicon. Dr. Binford did not believe that the Versed would have caused the low vital signs encountered by nurse Mayhew. Having reviewed the autopsy report related to Patient M.M., Dr. Binford believes that a cardiac event was associated with the lower vital signs. He does not believe that the respiratory rate of 12 and 14 found at 7:30 a.m. and 7:35 a.m. respectively are consistent with respiratory arrest. Dr. Binford explains that the process involved with a heart attack, which is also referred to a myocardial infarction, is in relation to the entire heart or some segment within the heart not getting sufficient oxygen. If the patient is not breathing for a period of time, the total level of oxygen in the blood drops significantly. That is a possibility. The second possibility is that if there is plenty of oxygen in the blood, but one of the blood vessels supplying the heart muscle becomes blocked and no blood can get past the obstruction, this can also cause oxygen deprivation. Either explanation can cause damage to the heart and the brain. The first example is one in which problems are experienced in getting air and oxygen into the lungs, that can be picked up and transported around the body and the second explanation involves a problem with getting the blood flow into the area as needed. The first example related to problems of respiration is referred to by Dr. Binford as a primary respiratory event. The second example is referred to as a primary cardiac event, involving restricted blood flow. In Dr. Binford's opinion if the patient has respiratory difficulty, the respiratory rate ranges from 0 to 8, which was not the case here. In Dr. Binford's opinion neither the Versed or Romazicon were responsible for the vital signs shown in the patient while she was in the holding area. In Dr. Binford's opinion the cause of the patient's decline was indicative of a primary cardiac event, as opposed to a primary respiratory event and the anesthesia as a causative agent would not explain it. He expresses this opinion within a reasonable degree of medical certainty. Given his knowledge of the case, Dr. Binford did not find any deficiencies in the way the Respondent treated the patient. Within a reasonable degree of medical certainty Dr. Binford believes that the Respondent met her obligations as to the basic standards for her profession in the pre-operative phase, during the procedure, upon the release of the patient to nurse Mayhew and in response to the emergency in the holding area. Having considered the opinions of both experts, the opinion of Dr. Binford is more persuasive and is accepted as it exonerates Respondent for her conduct.
Recommendation Based upon the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of December, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of December, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Irving Levine Assistant General Counsel Department of Health Prosecution Services Unit 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 Damon A. Chase, Esquire Chase Law Offices, P.A. Post Office Box 196309 Winter Springs, Florida 32719 Alex Finch, Esquire 2180 Park Avenue, Suite 100 Winter Park, Florida 32789 Dan Coble, Executive Director Board of Nursing Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue Whether on or about March 6, 1978, the Respondent, Ronald M. Tauber, D.O., performed an abortion on Gloria Small at the Orlando Birthing Center, Orlando, Florida; during the course of which procedure, the patient's uterus was perforated and other complications ensued and despite an agreement from a hospital staff member at Orange Memorial Hospital, Orlando, Florida, between that staff member and Respondent to allow the transfer of the patient, Small, to Orange Memorial Hospital for emergency treatment the Respondent did not transfer the patient to the hospital until March 7, 1978, and further, that notwithstanding an emergency hysterectomy operation performed at that hospital, Gloria Small died. It is alleged that should the above-stated facts be proven, the Respondent, Ronald M. Tauber, D.O., would have failed to demonstrate satisfactory professional skill, judgment or knowledge expected of him and to have exhibited an inability to practice osteopathic medicine with reasonable skill and safety and that his professional conduct departed from minimal standards of acceptable and prevailing osteopathic medical practice, in violation of Subsections 459.14 (2)(c) and (m), Florida Statutes. (The Administrative Complaint in this cause contained paragraphs 1 and 2 which were dismissed by the undersigned with leave for the Petitioner to amend. The Petitioner did not undertake such an amendment and the paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Administrative Complaint were not considered in the course of the hearing. Paragraph 5 of the Administrative Complaint was stricken and has not been considered. The phrase found in paragraph 3 of the Administrative Complaint which is constituted of the language "as well as other abortion procedures" was stricken and was not the subject of consideration in the course of the administrative hearing. Finally, the Petitioner moved to withdraw any reference to the substantive allegations found in paragraph 4 of the Administrative complaint pertaining to Subsections 459.14(2)(h), (k), and (n), Florida Statutes, and that motion was granted without opposition from the Respondent.)
Findings Of Fact This cause comes on for consideration based upon the Administrative Complaint filed by the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Professional and Occupational Regulation, Florida State Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners, against Ronald M. Tauber, D.O., Respondent. The date of that Administrative Complaint is April 24, 1978. The dispute to be resolved in the hearing process is as set forth in the issue statement of this Recommended Order. To that end, a formal hearing was held in accordance with the provisions of Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, during the course of which, testimony and other evidence were presented by the parties. The Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Professional and Occupational Regulation, Florida State Board of Osteopathic Medical Examiners, is an agency of the State of Florida whose purpose is that of licensure and regulation of those individuals who practice osteopathic medicine in the State of Florida. The Respondent, Ronald M. Tauber, D.O., is licensed by the Petitioner in the State of Florida to practice osteopathic medicine and his license number is 3430. At all times pertinent to the Administrative Complaint, Dr. Tauber was so licensed. The facts in the case reveal that the Respondent in the month of March, 1978, was practicing osteopathic medicine in a facility located at 419 North Magnolia, Orlando, Florida. This particular structure was a building with approximately 9,000 square feet of office space which Dr. Tauber used in the practice of his specialty, obstetrics and gynecology. His type facility has been referred to as a "free standing clinic" that offers among other services elective abortions, to include those performed in the late first trimester or early second trimester of the patient's pregnancy. Some of the equipment in the installation included a maternal fetal monitor, a cardiac monitor and defibulator which were part of a crash cart. The crash cart also contained items for resuscitation of adults and infants, including drugs, tubes, scopes, Laryngoscopes and Ambu bags. There was an operating room with an operating-obstetrical table. There were sources of sterilization by gas and steam. The office also contained instruments for minor gynecologic surgery, to include abortions and laparoscopy. There was an office area used by the Patient Education Coordinator- Counselor who was a member of the Respondent's staff. This Counselor conferred with prospective abortion patients concerning the pros and cons of such a procedure, to include alternatives to pregnancy termination. The office contained a laboratory which had equipment for the performance of blood counts, cultures, urine tests, other chemistry tests, blood typing and blood cross-matching. In connection with the blood work-ups, there was a blood bank refrigerator; however, no arrangements had been consummated for the storage of blood in that refrigerator prior to the abortion which was performed on the patient, Gloria Small, the subject of this complaint. In a related area, the Respondent intended to employ an anesthetist who would give Dr. Tauber the capability of utilizing general anesthesia in his operative procedures. This arrangement had not been made on or before March 6, 1978, and the abortion performed on Gloria Small was without the benefit of any form of general anesthesia. The personnel who worked in the facility in March, 1978, included a full-time registered nurse, a number of part-time registered nurses; a full-time licensed practical nurse, a number of part-time licensed practical nurses; a full-time certified operating room technician; a part-time licensed practical nurse who functioned as a LaMaze instructor and other functions associated with the maternity aspect of the facility; a medical records librarian; a receptionist; a full-time housekeeper; a part-time maintenance man and a business advisor/bookkeeper. Dr. Tauber had arranged for backup personnel in the persons of a pediatrician in the child delivery cases and a medical doctor who specialized in obstetrics and gynecology. These individuals were to assist in the procedures at the clinic and to cover for Dr. Tauber when Dr. Tauber was unavailable. However, the medical doctor in the field of obstetrics and gynecology did not have hospital privileges and neither did Dr. Tauber. There were two other physicians who had agreed to give hospital coverage for Dr. Tauber in complicated cases, but this arrangement excluded abortion procedures. On March 2, 1978, the patient, Gloria Small, was seen by Dr. Tauber and he accepted her case. Ms. Small requested a pregnancy termination and sterilization. During his initial interview and examination, the Respondent took the patient's personal history and conducted a physical examination and determined that the patient was pregnant approximately fourteen to fifteen weeks according to the gestational size. In addition to the physical examination, Dr. Tauber counseled the patient about the abortion and sterilization procedures and indicated alternatives to those procedures and the risks involved in each course that might be pursued. The patient indicated a desire to go forward with the abortion and sterilization procedures and in preparation for the procedures the Respondent ordered certain laboratory work, including hematology; type and Rh and urinalysis. This lab work was performed. Subsequent to this time, the patient was seen by the office counselor and continued to indicate her desire to have the procedures performed and the patient was scheduled for the procedures to be conducted on March 6, 1978. When the patient arrived on the morning of March 6, 1978, she was prepared for the abortion and sterilization procedures to the extent of being sterilly cleaned and having a medication administered to relax the patient. (At the time the Respondent performed the abortion and sterilization procedures on the patient, he had performed a significant number of these procedures before.) When the patient was presented in the operating room, she had been administered Nisentil in the amount of 40 milligrams. This is an analgesic drug designed to decrease the pain during the procedure. The patient was also given Atropine, a parasympathetic, to slow down the digestive track and to decrease the chance of nausea and to retard salivation. Intravenous lines were opened and the patient was given compositions of fluids which had a mineral and sugar content. The doctor was assisted by a scrub technician and there was a circulating registered nurse available. The procedures began at approximately 12:00 noon and were concluded at 1:25 p.m. The patient was dialated and the suction cannula was placed in the uterus and the suction machine turned on, at which point the materials in the uterus began to flow into the suction machine. In view of the advanced stage of the pregnancy, it was then necessary to place various instruments, ring forceps, to withdraw the pregnancy tissue. In the course of the manipulations, placental tissue was observed being brought down. At that point, the patient began to bleed heavily. Dr. Tauber placed the ring forceps into the uterus and the ring forceps went beyond normal depths expected in such an examination of the uterus. This preliminary procedure led to the eventual verification that a perforation had occurred. At this juncture, the doctor was working in the cervical canal. The doctor's response to the apparent perforation was to place the laparoscope and attendant instrument into the abdomen, setting up the procedure with a local anesthesia. When this action was taken, the Respondent, using a fallopian applicator (which was to be used in the sterilization procedure) lifted the uterus and saw a perforation two to four centimeters in length in the right posterior aspect of the lower uterine segment. At this point of observation, the perforation was not bleeding. There was a certain amount of blood in the lower dependent portion of the abdomen which did not measure more than 25 cc and this was consistent with a perforation that was not bleeding. The operating room technician was allowed to visualize the perforation through the laparoscope and the medical doctor who specialized in obstetrics and gynecology was called to assist. While the Respondent was waiting for the arrival of the backup physician, he allowed the operating room technician to assist him by viewing through the laparoscope while the Respondent turned to the vaginal aspect of the procedure and entered the uterus. During the process of the evacuation of the remaining placental tissue, the Respondent placed an instrument through the performation a second time; however, no additional bleeding was observed at that point. The bleeding which had been observed initially had slowed to a continuous ooze and this amount of bleeding caused the Respondent to observe the area of the perforation for an additional period of thirty minutes or more to confirm that the bleeding was not increasing in volume. The backup physician also observed the area of the perforation and consulted with the Respondent about the complication. The dialation and evacuation procedure was completed and the fallope rings applied and when the Respondent was convinced that he didn't have bleeding intra-abdominally, the patient was packed by placing gauze-type material in the vagina, thereby promoting pressure against the bleeding area. (The sequence of observations through the laparoscope that have been mentioned before occurred after the packing had been placed.) During the pendency of the observation, no blood was observed to be coming through the packing. Contemporaneous to the observations, fluids were used to replace the high blood loss. That amount of blood loss was believed to be in the amount of 1500 cc. When the complications occurred in the course of the operation, there was a drop in blood pressure and an increase in the pulse rate. In addition, the pre-operative hemoglobin was 13.5 g.m. as compared to 9.5 g.m. post- operative, and the hemoglobin ranged from around 8.2 g.m. through the higher 8.0 g.m. and lower 9.0 g.m., from the period immediately following the operation until around 5:00 p.m.., March 7, 1978. A more complete detail of the change in blood pressure, pulse rate and hemoglobin count may be found in Petitioner's Composite Exhibit No. 1, which is a copy of the Respondent's case records on the patient, Gloria Small. From an examination of all the vital signs, the patient was hypovolemic to the extent of being in hypovolemic shock following the aforementioned procedures. At the conclusion of the operation, Dr. Tauber instructed his staff to monitor the patient closely, and she remained on the cardiac monitor which had been employed during the operative procedures and the patient's vital signs, to- wit, blood pressure and pulse, were checked frequently. In addition, the staff was instructed to catherize the patient after six hours if the patient did not void and to record the amount of fluid intake and output and to observe the patient for vaginal bleeding. The patient was also given fluids to include dextrose and water and Normasol M, together with certain medication. These instructions were carried out by the staff. Dr. Tauber continued to give the patient fluids and to consider whether the patient should be transfused with whole blood. Around 3:00 p.m. on March 6, 1978, Dr. Tauber decided to infuse the patient with whole blood. He contacted the managing director of the Central Florida Blood Bank to attempt to gain the permission of that organization to provide whole blood for the benefit of the patient, Gloria Small. There had been some preliminary contact with the blood Bank about providing blood for patients of Dr. Tauber, but that arrangement had not been finalized prior to Gloria Small's operation. The managing director conferred with the medical director of the blood bank and a decision was made to honor Dr. Tauber's request for blood. Some delay ensued due to a mix-up on the part of Dr. Tauber's staff on the question of labeling the samples; nonetheless, this problem was rectified and at 6:10 p.m., and again at 7:25 p.m., blood was delivered for the benefit of the patient, Gloria Small, and that blood was infused into the patient. Contrary to the recollection of the Respondent, there is no record of further units of blood being requested by the Respondent, Dr. Tauber, for the benefit of the patient, Gloria Small, and, therefore, officially no such request was made of the blood Bank during the pendency of Dr. Tauber's treatment of the patient. As a consequence, the further treatment which Dr. Tauber gave the patient, Gloria Small, was without the benefit of the immediate availability of further units of blood. As previously stated, Dr. Tauber did not have hospital privileges and had not made any prior arrangement for the patient to be turned over to a physician with hospital privileges, in the event a medical emergency arose which required the hospitalization of the patient, Gloria Small. His first effort at making such an arrangement occurred between 5:00 and 5:30 on March 6, 1978, when he contacted a Dr. Lassiter, a resident in obstetrics and gynecology at the Orange Memorial Hospital, Orlando, Florida. The purpose of such conversation was to arrange for the patient to transfer if her condition worsened. Dr. Lassiter was unable to make this arrangement and it was only after the physician in charge had been conferred with that it was arranged for the patient, Gloria Small, to be accepted at Orange Memorial Hospital. This agreement was reached by the Respondent and the physician in charge, one Dr. Herran. Dr. Herran then confirmed this agreement with Dr. Lassiter, the resident, and instructed Dr. Lassiter to accept the patient, Gloria Small, if she were transferred and to immediately notify Dr. Herran if such transfer did occur. Dr. Tauber left his clinic around midnight of the morning of March 7, 1978, and left the patient in charge of a staff nurse. He returned to the hospital on the morning of March 7, 1978, and the patient's condition remained stabilized until approximately 5:00 p.m. on March 7, 1978. Up until that point, the bleeding that had been experienced following the initial hemorrhage was slight, and it was decided to remove the packing which had been placed at the conclusion of the operation. Most of the packing had been removed and there was no sign of bleeding, when a substantial hemorrhage took place in the cervical canal. At that point, Dr. Tauber repacked and made arrangements for an emergency ambulance, to transfer the patient to the hospital, and to notify Dr. Herran. The patient's vital signs began to deteriorate and during the transportation of the patient from Dr. Tauber's facility to Orange Memorial Hospital, the patient began to show marked signs of hypevolemic shock. Upon arriving at the Orange Memorial Hospital, the patient became the charge of that hospital staff and Dr. Tauber was no longer responsible, although he stayed with the patient and offered assistance, which was declined. The events which transpired at the Orange Memorial Hospital evidenced an inordinate delay on the part of the staff in properly administering to the needs of the patient. Whether this significantly contributed to the patient's ultimate demise is unresolved, but having arrived at the hospital in a condition where her body was already at a low ebb and unable to tolerate further insult, the patient died following a hysterectary performed in the Orange Memorial Hospital. The principal factor in that death was hypovolenic shock. Out of these events, the Petitioner has charged Dr. Tauber with a failure to demonstrate satisfactory professional skill, judgment or knowledge in the treatment of the patient, Gloria Small, and the accusation that Dr. Tauber has exhibited an inability to practice osteopathic medicine with reasonable skill and safety and that his professional conduct departed from minimal standards of acceptable and prevailing osteopathic medical practice. The particular substantive allegations which remain to be considered at this time are found in Subsections 459.14(2)(c) and (m), Florida Statutes, which state the following: 459.14 Refusal, revocation and suspension of license, etc.-- (c) Gross malpractice or the inability to practice osteopathic medicine with reasonable skill and safety. In enforcing this paragraph the board shall, upon just cause shown, have authority to compel a physician to submit to a mental or physical examination to be conducted by physicians designated by the board, such examination to be at the expense of the board. Failure or refusal of a physician to submit to such an examination when so directed by the board shall constitute an admission of his inability to practice osteopathic medicine with reasonable skill and safety. (m) A finding by the board that the indivi- dual is guilty of immoral or unprofessional conduct. Unprofessional conduct shall include any departure from, or failure to conform to, the minimal standards of acceptable and prevail- ing osteopathic medical practice, without regard to the injury of a patient, or the committing of any act contrary to honesty, whether the same is committed in the course of practice or not. In addressing the question of the application of these substantive standards set forth above to the facts reported in this case, the parties have offered the testimony of a number of persons within the profession of osteopathic medicine and other physicians who are medical doctors. An analysis of their testimony in view of the accusations in this cause establishes that the Respondent has evidenced an inability to practice ostepathic medicine with reasonable skill and safety within the meaning of Subsection 459.14(2)(c), Florida Statutes, and is likewise guilty of unprofessional conduct for departing from minimal standards of acceptable and prevailing osteopathic medical practice within the community where he practiced as required by Subsection 459.14(2)(m), Florida Statutes. The facts that led to these conclusions are those which show that the Respondent went forth with the dialation and evacuation and sterilization procedures of Gloria Small at a time when he did not have hospital privileges and at a time when he was unassociated with those persons who would have the necessary hospital privileges to address complications which might occur during these procedures, which complications might need immediate and well-defined access to a hospital facility. In addition, the possibility existed that the patient would need whole blood and other products associated with fluid replenishment and the Respondent had failed to make adequate arrangements for such eventuality, which failure caused undue delay in the infusion of the whole blood in the patient, Gloria Small. The problem in this case concerning the lack of readily available blood or blood products constituted a violation of the aforementioned standards on the part of Dr. Tauber and the very fact that Dr. Tauber had not made the prior arrangements to have available such blood or blood products constituted a further violation of the aforementioned standards. In a related area, that condition which would cause a necessity of the infusion of blood, to-wit, hypovolemic shock, had not adequately been anticipated, in violation of the necessary standards, even if you assume that Dr. Tauber made a sufficiently prompt response to the patient's hypovolemic condition which occurred following Dr. Tauber's operative procedures. Had the blood been needed more promptly, the Respondent was not prepared. There was considerable debate on the question of the necessity to transport the patient, Gloria Small, to a hospital following the substantial hemorrhage which occurred in the dialation and evacuation and sterilization procedures. After close scrutiny, it does not appear that the Respondent was remiss for not transferring the patient to Orange Memorial Hospital as opposed to the occasion when he did transfer her, remiss within the meaning of a violation of a standard set forth in Chapter 459, Florida Statutes. The procedures which Dr. Tauber used in discussing the case with his patient, Gloria Small, and providing other counseling do not violate provisions of Chapter 459, Florida Statutes, nor is the act of perforation itself and the contemporaneous management of that perforation in violation of Chapter 459, Florida Statutes. Likewise, the response which Dr. Tauber made in the second emergency on March 7, 1978, when the bleeding occurred did not violate the provisions of Chapter 459, Florida Statutes. Finally, it cannot be determined from this record whether Dr. Tauber could have avoided the confusion which took place after the patient was transferred to Orange Memorial Hospital, by earlier coordination with Dr. Herran; and in view of the fact that the patient was no longer his charge once she had been admitted to Orange Memorial Hospital, there can be no responsibility, within the meaning of Chapter 459, Florida Statutes, for those events which transpired when the patient was admitted to Orange Memorial Hospital. The parties have availed themselves of the opportunity to submit findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations and these offerings have been reviewed prior to the rendition of this Recommended Order and to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the Recommended Order, they have been utilized in aid of the preparation of this Recommended Order. To the extent that these proposals are inconsistent with the Recommended Order, they are hereby specifically rejected.
Recommendation In view of all the facts and circumstances, it is recommended that the Respondent, Ronald M. Tauber, D.O., have his license to practice osteopathic medicine in the State of Florida suspended for a period of two (2) years. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of May, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald C. LaFace, Esquire Post Office Box 1752 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Sigman, Esquire Suite 1515 CNA Tower Orlando, Florida 32801 Roy Lucas, Esquire 1055 Thomas Jefferson Street, N.W. Suite 604 Washington, D.C. 20007 Samuel Weiss, Esquire 1180 Hartford Building 200 East Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801
Findings Of Fact Surgicare III is the sponsor of Surgicare Outpatient Center of Leesburg, a proposed freestanding ambulatory surgical center to be located in Leesburg, Florida. LRMC is an existing hospital located in Leesburg. It has four operating rooms where general surgery is performed and one cystoscopy room. Lake is an existing hospital located in Leesburg, Florida. It has three operating rooms and one cystoscopy room. Two additional operating rooms are presently under construction, one of which is intended to be used for minor surgeries under local anesthesia. Waterman is an existing hospital located in Eustis, Florida. It has four operating rooms, one urology procedures room, and one endoscopy room. Waterman has a certificate of need to add two additional operating rooms As originally proposed Surgicare's application was to construct a one- story building containing 10,000 square feet and two operating rooms. The original plans have been amended to reduce the size of the building to 8,000 square feet. The total cost as projected will not exceed $1,570,064. The service area proposed to be served by this facility includes Lake County and a 30-minute driving radius, approximately 20 miles, from Leesburg. Surgeries proposed at this facility are those surgeries, performed under general or local anesthesia, after which the patient will be able to be taken home and cared for, rather than remain overnight or longer in the hospital. Most such surgeries are elective as contrasted to emergency. Surgicare projects a total of 1 ,269 procedures in the first year and 2, 011 in the second year of operation. Based on construction costs or the original 10,000 square foot building, with permanent financing at 12 percent and these numbers of procedures, at an average cost of $390 per procedure the first year and $413 per procedure the second year, the facility will show a slight profit in the second year. The presently proposed facility containing ,090 square feet will be less costly than the 10,000 square foot facility and, even if interest is higher than the estimated 12 percent, Petitioner will be able to pass the break-even point during the second year of operation, if necessary by increasing fees. The average charge for similar surgeries in the Lake County hospitals is $1,309, so a slight increase by Petitioner, if necessary, is acceptable. There is currently no rule establishing the methodology to be used in determining need for an ambulatory surgical center. Nor is there a local health system plan applicable to such need. IRS uses a pro-competitive methodology which is based upon a policy which has not been adopted as a formal rule. This methodology uses the total reported surgery cases in a given county for the most recent 12-month period, the population estimate for the period, and derives a surgical utilization rate per 1,000 population. Similarly, the reported number of outpatient procedures in that county for the same period is used to derive the outpatient surgical use rate. Applying the outpatient use rate to projected future population, HRS then determines the number of outpatient procedures expected in future years in that service area. In evaluating ambulatory surgery center CON applications, HRS utilizes a two-year planning horizon. Surgicare is expected to complete its second year of operation in 1988, so 1988 becomes the relevant year For looking at projected need. Since December, 1982, HRS has assumed that 29 percent of all surgeries could be performed in an outpatient setting. This 29 percent target is the mean between 18 percent (the actual percentage of total surgeries which are reported to have been performed on an outpatient basis by hospitals participating in a 1981 survey by the American Hospital Association) and 40 percent (that percentage which a survey of literature relating to ambulatory surgeries projected could be performed in outpatient settings) . The outpatient surgeries performed in Lake County hospitals during the most recent reported 12-month period was well below the 18 percent average nationwide. This 29 percent target is a reasonable estimate of the percentage of surgeries that can be performed on an outpatient basis. In the past two years, as is shown by the testimony presented at this hearing, hospitals in Lake County have become more receptive to facilitating outpatient surgeries on their premises. This would have the effect of increasing the 18 percent found in 1981, if a survey similar to the 1981 survey was taken today. A more recent report of the American Medical Association indicates that this low end of the range has, in fact, risen to 20.0 percent. Accordingly, a mean of 30.4 percent of all surgeries performed on an outpatient basis is reasonable. By applying the target factor to projected total surgeries, HRS calculates the projected number of potential ambulatory surgeries for a given year in the future. Subtracting the outpatient surgeries projected to be performed in existing facilities in the future from the total potential outpatient surgeries yields a projected unmet need for outpatient surgical care. Applying the 29 percent factor to the surgeries performed in Lake County for the last 12 months reporting period and projecting this figure to 1988, HRS projects a potential need for outpatient surgeries in Lake County at 3,090. Based on the 1983 reported outpatient surgical use rate for Lake County and a target of 29 percent, 1,455 of the 3,090 surgeries would be performed in hospital settings in 1988 leaving an unmet need of 1,635 potential outpatient surgeries to be performed in Lake County. The intervening hospitals all contend that they have adequate capacity in their existing operating rooms to provide for all needed outpatient surgery in Lake Count and there will be excess capacity when the four additional approved operating rooms become operational. However, none of these existing or to be added operating rooms is dedicated to outpatient use although Lake will open in the near future an operating room in which only minor surgery under local anesthesia will be performed. Until very recently the Lake County hospitals were charging outpatient surgery patients the same charges imposed on inpatient surgery patients, except for the overnight room charge. As a result the average charge for outpatient surgery per procedure in Lake County is $1,309. Petitioner's initial proposed average charge per procedure is less than $400. Recently one or more of the Lake County hospitals have offered a flat charge for use of their facilities for minor surgeries. However, these new charges greatly exceed the charges proposed by petitioner. Many of the surgical procedures performed in hospitals are classified as emergency and take precedence in the use of operating rooms ever elective surgical procedures which most outpatient surgeries are classified. As a result it is difficult for doctors to schedule outpatient surgeries in hospital operating rooms and have those schedules met. An exception would be, of course, if the doctor reserved and kept the operating room in which he scheduled the first operation that day. The facilities now provided to patients undergoing outpatient surgery at LRMC is not well suited to outpatient surgery because outpatient surgery patients go from the operating room to the post anesthesia recovery area whether they had local or generate anesthesia. This same space is used as a postoperative recovery area for all surgical patients, some of whom have undergone serious and extensive surgery. These are not pleasant surroundings for patients following their minor surgery. LMRC outpatient surgical facilities are as good or better than those in the other Lake County hospitals. Even if the existing and approved operating rooms available in Lake County hospitals are adequate, as shared outpatient-inpatient facilities, to provide for the outpatient surgeries needed in 1989, this does not preclude the need for the proposed facilities as a competitive factor in reducing hospital costs. None of the existing, and authorized, operating rooms in Lake County are dedicated for outpatient surgery, and according to federal regulations none can be so dedicated as presently organized. Medicare has recognized the cost saving aspects of ambulatory surgical facilities by paying 100 percent of the cost of surgeries performed at dedicated outpatient surgical facilities on Medicare patients while paying only 80 percent of the cost of surgeries performed at non- dedicated facilities. At present there are no freestanding ambulatory surgical facilities in Lake County. Only freestanding facilities can be dedicated and thereby receive from Medicare 100 percent of the charge for outpatient surgery. Accordingly, this will be the only facility in Lake County capable of offering this service to the residents of Lake County. Since their rates are lower than the reimbursement Medicare would pay to Lake County hospitals for the outpatient surgery performed at these facilities, use of dedicated outpatient surgical facilities will reduce the cost of health care. The filing of the application in this case induced the Lake County hospitals to speed up the review of their outpatient surgical procedures to provide better and less costly service. Without competition in outpatient surgical procedures, the hospitals have no incentive to institute cost-cutting measures apart from the measures they may have to adopt as a result of the newly implemented diagnostic related groupings (DRG) by the federal government. However, the DRGs are primarily aimed at reducing length of hospital stays and eliminating unnecessary diagnostic procedures, rather than directly reducing surgical costs.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is and has been at all times material hereto a licensed physician in the state of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0019670. Respondent is a board-certified obstetrician and gynecologist. On March 20, 1989, at approximately 1:04 a.m., Patient #1 (Derrick Prince) was presented to the emergency room at Weems Memorial Hospital in Apalachicola, Florida. Prince was a twenty-year-old male suffering from a stab wound to his left thigh that was inflicted by a butcher knife. Prince was actively bleeding and had lost a large amount of blood, as evidenced by the condition of his clothing, the amount of blood on the walls and floor of the hospital, and blood on his companions. Prince was placed on a table in the trauma room. When his blood-soaked pants were removed, blood spurted from the wound on his left thigh to a height of one to two and one-half inches. The emergency room R.N., Ms. Page, controlled the bleeding by direct pressure, first with her hand and then with a towel. Prince was semiconscious, muttering, "I can't breathe," and was randomly combative. Emergency room personnel had to forcibly restrain him on the table. Respondent, working as the emergency room physician, was summoned to the trauma room by the nurse. Hospital personnel attempted to establish Prince's blood pressure and pulse. Ms. Simpson, the L.P.N., could detect no blood pressure or pulse on Prince. Ms. Page, the R.N., could detect no blood pressure or pulse although she checked radial, cubital, and popliteal areas. Mrs. Estes, a paramedic who came in to help, could detect no pulse. Respondent was advised repeatedly that no blood pressure or pulse could be detected. Respondent instructed Ms. Simon to call respiratory and laboratory personnel and the Sheriff's Department, which she did. The laboratory director, Tracy Pierce, was called at his home in St. Joe Beach. When pressure was removed from the wound area, there was little blood on the towel and the wound was not bleeding. Respondent commented to the nurse that she did a good job stopping the bleeding. The nurse and paramedics attempted to begin intravenous infusion but were unable to establish any IV lines because all veins were concave (collapsed). The nurse and paramedic interpreted this peripheral vascular collapse as meaning there was no blood volume to keep the veins open. Respondent was advised that no IV could be started because the veins were concave. Respondent had ordered a suture tray. He explored the wound with his finger and commented that the wound went all the way to the bone. Respondent commented that the boy would be all right, that he wasn't hurt that bad. Respondent proceeded to treat Prince by suturing the wound in three layers. He stated he tied off some minor arterial branches during this suturing. After suturing the wound, Respondent again commented that the boy would be all right because he wasn't hurt that bad. After suturing the wound and noting no jugular access, Respondent began a cutdown in order to establish an intravenous line. Ms. Estes, the paramedic, suggested using MAST trousers to help venous pressure, and Respondent agreed. MAST trousers also can act as a tourniquet to control bleeding. The pants were applied and Prince's legs were elevated in an effort to establish a positive venous pressure. At 1:30 a.m., while Respondent was setting up for a cutdown, Prince had a seizure and respiratory arrest. He was intubated by Respondent. He vomited, was suctioned, and breathed by AMBU bag. Respondent then inquired, for the first time, about the availability of blood. He was told there was none in the hospital. Sufficient blood was available and could have been obtained from Gulf Pines South Hospital in St. Joe within 30 minutes had a request been made for Mr. Pierce to bring it with him. Mr. Pierce arrived during the cutdown procedure. Mr. Pierce was the laboratory director for both hospitals. An intravenous fluid line was finally established via the cutdown and some fluid begun. The Life-Flight helicopter was ordered at approximately 1:40 a.m. At approximately 1:55 a.m. Prince suffered a cardiac arrest. When Life-Flight arrived at 2:40 a.m., it was impossible to transport Prince in his moribund condition. Resuscitative efforts were employed until approximately 3:00 a.m., when Respondent pronounced Prince dead. An autopsy conducted by Dr. Thomas Wood, the Medical Examiner, on March 21, 1989, revealed that the stab wound to the left thigh was located six inches above the knee, was seven inches deep, passed by the bone, and completely severed both the femoral artery and vein. The autopsy also revealed 3 layers of sutures: the first closing the skin and two other layers within the subcutaneous fatty tissue, not more than three-fourths of an inch below the surface. There was no evidence of any arterial or venous repair. The cause of death of Derrick Prince was exsanguination from the severed femoral vessels. After an investigation was initiated, Respondent was interviewed by Investigator Reese. Respondent stated that peripheral pulses were obtained and the patient's pulse rate was 120 from admission until the time of his respiratory arrest. Respondent stated to Investigator Reese that two IVs were started but that the patient pulled them out. Statements of Ms. Page and Ms. Estes written immediately after the incident indicate that no IVs were started, not because the patient pulled them out, but because all veins were collapsed. Respondent stated to Investigator Reese that he had to leave the patient after suturing the wound to examine a family member across the hall. At no time did Respondent leave the emergency room. Respondent stated to Investigator Reese that there was no indication that the femoral vessels had been cut, as he had checked the wound and that is not the direction the femoral artery runs. Respondent believed the wound was not life-threatening, that after the bleeding was stopped and the wound sutured the patient was in pretty good shape and was going to be fine. Respondent was not aware the femoral vessels had been severed until informed at the circuit court hearing of June 6, 1989. Respondent reported in his medical record the patient "became shocky" at approximately 1:30 a.m., after the suturing. The massive blood loss, disorientation and combativeness, peripheral vascular collapse, and lack of vital signs all indicate Prince was in shock when admitted and Respondent did not recognize this fact. Respondent instead believed Prince to be a combative drunk and his course of treatment indicates this perception. The emergency room physician should prioritize his actions in such a way that the most critical factor is treated promptly and other, less dangerous factors are given lesser priority. The correct treatment of this patient would have been for Respondent to direct all efforts of the E.R. team toward immediately reestablishing Prince's blood volume, then blood replacement. The wound itself could have been easily controlled by pressure, tourniqueted by the MAST pants, or even left for later care. Rather than misdirecting his attention to suturing the wound, Respondent should have performed the cutdown or placed a CVP catheter to start IV fluids as soon as it was evident that the nurses could not start the IVs and Respondent should have ensured that blood was being obtained as soon as possible. Respondent's suturing of the wound was ineffective in any case, as only superficial layers were stitched, and the wound remained unexplored. Respondent did not practice with the acceptable level of care, skill and treatment of a reasonably prudent similar physician under similar conditions and circumstances in that Respondent did not correctly assess Prince's physical condition and therefore misdirected his attention to suturing the wound instead of establishing intravenous access for immediate fluid replacement. Respondent's entire written medical record consists of his "Emergency Room Note." Respondent has documented no detailed history or physical examination: there is no documentation of the amount of blood loss, of the spurting blood, of the initial assessment of the patient's shock, or of consideration that the massive bleeding could have been from the great vessels and life threatening; there is no record that Respondent ever felt for pulses or obtained a pulse, no record of any neurological assessment or vascular status of the left leg distal to the wound, no conjunctival color noted, and no justification for giving his attention to the wound rather than immediately attempting to replace the lost blood volume; there is no note of a request for blood, how it could be or why it was not obtained. In short, prior to the cardiac arrest, there are no medical records written by Respondent which justify the course of treatment he followed with Prince.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a Final Order and therein REVOKE the medical license of Elliott F. Monroe. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of June, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of June, 1991. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 91-0377 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 2-13(1-9) and 14-53( 11-50). Proposed finding of fact 1 is unnecessary. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, Elliott Monroe Respondent's proposed findings of fact are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Mary B. Radkins, Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Alfred O. Shuler Attorney at Law Post Office Box 850 Apalachicola, FL 32320 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Respondent is, and at all material times has been, a licensed physician, having been issued license number ME 0040551, by the State of Florida. Respondent is a 1979 graduate of the University of Juarez. Respondent performed an internship at Mount Sinai Hospital in Chicago, Illinois, from 1979 to 1980. Between 1980 and 1982, Respondent performed a two year internal medicine residency at Grant Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. Respondent is "Board-eligible" in the area of internal medicine. Internal medicine involves a non-surgical approach to evaluating multiple organ systems. It involves understanding diseases at a "higher" level and dealing with multiple illnesses. Respondent once has taken, but did not pass, the examination to become Board certified in internal medicine. Respondent has had no other complaints filed against his license to practice medicine in Florida, other than the one at issue in this case. On or about May 2, 1986, Respondent admitted patient L. S. to Clearwater Community Hospital in Clearwater, Florida, because of a possible cerebral vascular accident which occurred 3 days prior to admission. Patient L. S. was a 76-year old male patient who was a member of the "Gold Plus" IMC Health Maintenance Organization. At or about the time of admission of patient L. S. to Clearwater Community Hospital, Respondent obtained a patient medical history from L. S. and performed a physical examination. As a result of the stroke, patient L. S. had speech difficulties at the time of admission to Clearwater Community Hospital. Respondent's initial patient history for L. S. included the following information: With respect to the cerebral vascular accident, the patient had awakened 3 days prior to the admission and had difficulty with speech and difficulty using his right hand. The patient was able to ambulate without difficulty and had noted no improvement or worsening in symptoms in the three days prior to admission. The patient had had intestinal surgery 50 years previously, which, according to Respondent's documented history, resulted in chronic diarrhea. Additionally, the patient had been hospitalized two years earlier for "dysphagia (a difficulty in swallowing) with a negative work-up." According to the patient, the patient had no coronary artery disease, hypertension, peptic ulcer disease or diabetes. The patient's social history provided the information that the patient smoked tobacco, one-half pack per day, and did not drink alcohol. The patient provided information that he was on the following medication: Lomotil p.r.n. (as needed); Lanoxin 0.125 mg. per day; and Quinaglute 100 mg., dose schedule unknown. Respondent performed an appropriate initial physical examination on patient L. S. Of significance was Respondent's finding with respect to the patient's heart: "Irregular, irregular rhythm with no gallops or murmurs appreciated." After completing the initial history and physical examination, Respondent's impression was: Acute CVA, patient now three days post-insult and appears to be stable. He already has good use of his right upper extremities and his speech is intelligible although slurred History of cardiac arrhythmia History of chronic diarrhea secondary to intestinal surgery 50 years ago. As part of his plan for the patient, formulated after obtaining the initial history and physical, Respondent noted, "Will also consider ECHO cardiogram as the heart irregularity may provide the source of the emboli." While patient L. S. was hospitalized during the May 2, 1986, admission, Respondent ordered the following tests which were performed on the patient: a complete blood count; a prothrombin time test; an activated partial thromboplastin time test; a routine urinalysis; a portable upright chest x-ray; a bilateral duplex carotid ultrasound study; a CT scan of head - stroke routine (non contrast study); a Brain CT Scan Stroke Protocol-Post contrast series only; an electroencephalogram (EEG); a blood chemistry profile; and an electrocardiogram (EKG)(the patient was also placed on a telemetry monitor). On admission, Respondent ordered Lomotil, one tablet to be given as needed for diarrhea, Lanoxin 0.125 mg. to be given four times a day, and Quinaglute 100 mg. to be given twice a day. On the same day of admission, Respondent changed the order for Quinaglute to 325 mg. to be taken by mouth twice a day. On admission and again on May 9, 1986, Respondent ordered blood serum levels of digoxin (Lanoxin is a drug containing digoxin). These blood levels revealed that the digoxin level was low on admission (normal laboratory values were listed as between 0.5 to 2.0 - the actual value was 0.1). The repeat digoxin level reflected that the digoxin was within normal limits on May 9, 1986 (the actual value was 1.1). Quinidine levels were also obtained (to determine the level of the drug Quinaglute in the blood), pursuant to Respondent's request. The quinidine level taken on admission was below normal (normal laboratory values were listed between 2.0 and 5.0 - the actual value was .7). The repeat quinidine level performed on May 9, 1986, reflected that the quinidine levels were within normal limits (2.6). Under the circumstances, the Respondent cannot be severely criticized for the initial history he took from the patient. In ideal circumstances, an internist would attempt to get more detail on the patient's smoking history pertinent to possible chronic obstructive lung disease or possible congestive heart failure, on the patient's chronic diarrhea, and on the patient's drug dosages. But the Respondent was dealing with a 76-year old man who came to see him for symptoms of a stroke three days before. The patient had difficulty making his speech understood and had no family or friends available to help him give his medical history to the Respondent. It was within acceptable standards of care recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician under similar circumstances for the Respondent to take as much history as the patient was capable of comfortably giving at that time. The Respondent was planning on referring the patient to the hospital's stroke team, which over the course of the hospital stay would completely evaluate the effect of the stroke on the patient. The Respondent planned to have blood serum levels done which would establish proper drug dosages. The Respondent's primary concerns were the possibility of an evolving stroke and the possibility of malignant cardiac arrhythmias. Since there were no complaints or symptoms of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease or congestive heart failure, it was not necessary to pursue the smoking details on the initial history on this admission. As for the diarrhea, the Respondent was dealing with a 76-year old man who reported chronic diarrhea for 50 years. It may have resulted from intestinal surgery 50 years ago, and it may have been exacerbated by the Quinaglute the patient had been prescribed for his heart arrhythmias. Severe malabsorption problems would show up on the blood screen and the complete blood count the Respondent was planning to have the patient undergo. Otherwise, it was acceptable under the circumstances of this case to concentrate on the two primary concerns and treat the diarrhea symptomatically with Lomotil as needed for the time being. The Respondent should have followed up on obtaining available previous hospital records, especially the local admission for dysphagia two years prior, but that information would not appear in the initial history. While L. S. was in the hospital, the Respondent appropriately and adequately evaluated the patient's heart as a possible cause of the stroke. The evidence suggests that it is fairly debatable among physicians whether to order a $500-$600 echocardiogram in a case such as this; it is not necessary to meet the standard of care. When the Respondent initially examined the patient and heard irregularly irregular heart rhythms, he initially considered an echocardiogram. Irregularly irregular heart rhythms suggest atrial fibrillation which can predispose a patient to heart clots (emboli) which can break off, travel through the circulatory system and cause a stroke. But the results of the CAT Scan indicated that the stroke was not caused by a heart embolus but by a constriction of smaller blood vessels. In addition, the results of the EKG and telemetry monitoring revealed that the patient did not have atrial fibrillation but had significant and possibly malignant premature ventricular contractions (PVCs). While this particular heart beat irregularity is serious and can be fatal, it does not predispose a patient to heart emboli and resulting strokes. With this information, the echocardiogram was no longer necessary. While L. S. was in the hospital, the Respondent appropriately and adequately evaluated his lung function. The chest x-ray and EKG which the Respondent had done for the patient enabled the Respondent to diagnose obstructive pulminary disease (C.O.P.D.) if the patient had it. Milder cases of C.O.P.D. would have required with a pulmonary function test or a blood gas level. The evidence suggests that it is fairly debatable among physicians whether to have done one of those tests in this case; it was not necessary to meet acceptable standards of care recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician under similar circumstances. The patient had no complaint of shortness of breath with exertion that would suggest emphysema. To the contrary, he progressed well in physical therapy during the 10-day hospitalization with no indication of this symptom. Nor did the patient have cyanosis or clubbing that would be symptomatic of chronic bronchitis. Those are the two kinds of C.O.P.D. about which a physician evaluating L. S. would be concerned. Regarding the patient's chronic diarrhea, the Respondent performed some general screening tests which, while non-specific in nature, had potential to provide some information about the patient's nutritional status. The complete blood count (C.B.C.) may provide information about some deficiencies. Generally, in an isolated deficiency of vitamin B12 or folic acid, one would expect to find an elevated M.C.V. (mean corpuscular volume), which would show up on a C.B.C. In this case, however, the C.B.C. provided no real information about the nutritional status of patient L. S. The M.C.V. was only slightly elevated. A prothrombin time test can be done to evaluate vitamin K deficiencies and was done in this case. Additionally, the blood levels of several substances can provide information about malnutrition. In this case, the chemistry profile revealed malnutrition. The blood chemistry profile revealed low albumin levels, low globulin levels and low total protein levels. The possibility exists that patient L. S. suffered from diarrhea which was caused or aggravated by the Quinaglute that the patient was also taking. Quinaglute can cause diarrhea. This was not evaluated by the Respondent. It could not be evaluated by the medication history the patient was able to give (i.e., by determining how long the patient had been taking Quinaglute in relation to the period of time the patient had had diarrhea.) Besides, the Respondent made the decision to stabilize the patient's potentially life- threatening heart arrhythmias using the Quinaglute instead of withdrawing the Quinaglute in an attempt to cure the diarrhea problems with which the patient had lived for 50 years. The Respondent cannot be severely criticized for this decision. On this admission, it was acceptable to treat the patient's diarrhea symptomatically for the time being and further evaluate and treat it after the Respondent dealt with the more serious matters of the C.V.A. and the heart arrhythmias. On or about May 12, 1986, Respondent transferred patient L. S. to Druid Hills Skilled Nursing Center from Clearwater Community Hospital. As reflected in Respondent's discharge summary for patient L. S., Respondent was not able to determine the precise cause of the stroke which patient L. S. suffered prior to discharging the patient from the hospital. The discharge diagnoses reflect: (1) acute cerebral vascular accident; and (2) cardiac arrhythmias with frequent P.V.C.'s. The Respondent kept patient L. S. in Clearwater Community Hospital for ten days, from May 2 until May 12, 1986. Although the evaluation and tests were completed within five days, the Respondent did not want to discharge the patient to his home where he would be by himself, but rather to a nursing home. While waiting for a nursing home bed to become available, the Respondent used the resulting extended hospital stay to continue physical therapy. At the time of transfer from the hospital to Druid Hills, patient L. S. was frail. He was 76 years old, five feet ten inches tall and weighted only 113 pounds. Having just had a stroke, he was far from the picture of health, and this was noted by some of the nursing staff upon transfer to Druid Hills Skilled Nursing Center. He looked and was ill, but he was stable. At the time of admission to Druid Hills, patient L. S. was in essentially the same condition as when admitted to Clearwater Community Hospital, ten days earlier. The patient still suffered from slurred speech and had problems with his right arm. But he was stable and anxious to begin speech and physical therapy. On May 12, 1986, at about 2:00 p.m., Judith Salyer, L.P.N., attempted to contact Respondent in order to confirm routine house orders by "beeping" Respondent. Respondent called the nursing home at 4:30 p.m. on the same day to provide the following admission orders: Lanoxin 0.125 mg. by mouth four times a day ASA by mouth four times a day Persantine 75 mg. by mouth two times a day Quinaglute 325 mg. by mouth every eight hours Lomotil by mouth three time a day for diarrhea Tylenol by mouth four times a day Restoril 15 mg. by mouth at night for sleep as needed Physical Therapy Speech Therapy In addition to slurred speech, on May 14, 1986 (two days after admission to Druid Hills), patient L. S. began to have problems with his eye which was red and draining yellow matter (inaccurately described as "pus" in the nursing notes.) When asked by nursing staff if his eye hurt, L. S. advised them that it did. In all other respects, patient L. S.'s condition seemed essentially unchanged. Respondent was not advised of the change in the patient's eye. On the following date, patient L. S. developed additional symptoms. These included coughing and a runny nose with white mucous. The patient's eyes continued to be pink tinged with a moderate amount of yellow drainage from the eye noted. At 2:20 p.m. on May 15, 1986, Judith Salyer, L.P.N., spoke with Respondent and received the routine house orders which Salyer had called about on May 12, 1986. Salyer did not advise Respondent of the minor cold symptoms. Later on the evening of May 15, 1986, it was noted that patient L. S.'s appetite was poor. On May 16, 1986, at 2:00 p.m., it was noted that L. S. was refusing to eat meals and had a inoderately unsteady gait. On May 17, 1986, it was noted that L. S. informed the nurse on duty that he had had loose stools five times. Additionally, it was noted that the patient was refusing to eat meals. At 9:00 p.m. on May 17, 1986, patient L. S. was noted to be "out of bed." No complaints of diarrhea were noted. Additionally the patient ate 80% of his meal and requested ice cream. In the early part of the day on May 18, 1986, patient L. S. was noted to have "chronic diarrhea" by nursing staff. (Throughout his nursing home stay, the patient was given Lomotil, an anti-diarrheal agent, in an effort to treat the diarrhea.) Between at least 9:30 p.m. on May 18, 1986, and the evening of May 19, 1986, patient L. S. appeared to be doing reasonably well. The patient's appetite was good. There were no complaints of diarrhea. The runny nose, coughing and eye drainage were not noted after May IS, 1986. At 2:00 p.m. on May 20, 1986, Nurse Salyer noted that patient L. S. appeared slightly confused at intervals. The patient had mild congestion and a productive cough. The patient's gait was noted to be unsteady at times. At that time, Salyer "beeped" Respondent in an attempt to advise Respondent of the patient's change in condition. Respondent did not call back on May 20, 1986. A productive cough is a cough which produces "gobs" of mucous. Such a cough can be indicative of a lower (as opposed to upper) respiratory infection or congestion in the chest. The presence of a productive cough is a cause for concern. In a later entry made on May 20, 1986, a Nurse Rooker noted that the patient had remained in bed during the shift. His appetite was 40%. It was noted that L. S. was congested, coughing up large amounts of whitish mucous. On May 21, 1986, at some time before 2:00 p.m., Respondent was notified by telephone of patient L. S.'s stable vital signs, "cold symptoms," that the patient appeared slightly confused at intervals, was refusing to eat, was mildly congested with a productive cough and had an unsteady gait at times. Given this information, Respondent determined that the patient had a "cold" or upper respiratory infection. New orders were received and transcribed. On May 21, 1986, Respondent ordered Ampicillin 250 mg. to be taken every four hours for eight days. Respondent also ordered Actifed to be taken three times a day as needed for "sinus congestion." Respondent gave patient L. S. Ampicillin, which is an antibiotic, for his symptoms as a precautionary or prophylactic measure. Antibiotics should not, as a general rule, be ordered without having a well-grounded understanding why the patient is ill. The cause of the infection should be determined. The most basic reason for not giving an antibiotic without first evaluating the source of the infection is that the antibiotic then can serve to simply hide the symptoms. The antibiotic will cause some improvement, making it appear that the patient is not quite as ill, when in fact the infection persists. Additionally, there is a theory in medicine that the antibiotic can serve to cause a resistant strain of infection. Respondent assumed that, like most other nursing home patients, patient L. S. was suffering from a cold. Respondent ordered no further tests to evaluate the patient and Respondent declined to see the patient on May 21, 1986. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, it was inappropriate for Respondent to prescribe Ampicillin, an antibiotic, without first evaluating the source of the infection. Assuming that L. S. had a "cold" or upper respiratory infection, it was appropriate for Respondent to order Actifed, an antihistamine, for L. S. on May 21, 1986. However, given the presence of a productive cough, chest congestion could have been present. With chest congestion, an antihistamine like Actifed would have been inappropriate. Actifed will dry up the chest. Mucous in the chest which needs to be expectorated, and brought up and out, will remain in the chest. A mucolytic expectorant, not an antihistamine, should be ordered when the chest is congested. Given the facts that patient L. S. was recuperating from a recent CVA, had difficulty in swallowing, and had multiple medical problems, the Respondent could have been more aggressive in either examining this patient, who had a productive cough, or ordering appropriate testing. A reasonably prudent physician, under similar conditions and circumstances, could have personally examined the patient L. S. on May 21, 1986, or soon thereafter. Alternatively, a reasonably prudent physician could have ordered a C.B.C. and a chest x-ray or some other ancillary diagnostic modalities. A C.B.C. is a method by which one can obtain a count of blood cells, particularly white blood cells, in a patient in order to determine whether there is an ongoing infection. The type of white blood cells present (lymphatic cell or a leukocytic cell) can assist in the determination of whether the infection is bacterial or viral in nature. A chest x-ray is necessary to diagnose pneumonia or obstruction in the lungs. Given the history of patient L. S.'s difficulty in swallowing, it is entirely possible that the patient aspirated food or mucous. When such a foreign substance is inhaled into the lungs, it blocks off the bronchials (the airways into the lungs) and causes an obstruction which will lead to pneumonia. Given this patient's condition and history, Respondent could have used a chest x-ray to evaluate the patient to rule out the possibility of aspiration. But it was not necessary for the Respondent to have arranged to personally examine the patient or order tests at this stage. It would be appropriate to monitor a patient with a viral infection (or "cold") or to prescribe antibiotic such as Ampicillin for a bacterial infection. On May 21, 1986, the antibiotic Ampicillin was given to patient L. S. by nursing staff at Druid Hills. This antibiotic was administered as ordered until May 29, 1986, when it was discontinued on the eighth day. On May 22, 1986, Nurse Salyer noted that patient L. S. had diarrhea. Patient L. S. told Nurse Salyer that in the past the patient had taken Ampicillin and that the Ampicillin had caused diarrhea. Salyer further noted on that date that L. S. was coughing up large amounts of yellowish phlegm. On May 22, 1986, at some time prior to 3:00 p.m., Salyer "beeped" Respondent in an attempt to advise Respondent of L. S.'s statement that the antibiotic was causing diarrhea. Respondent did not call Salyer back by the end of her shift on May 22, 1986. On the 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift at Druid Hills, on May 22, 1986, Kathy Rooker, L.P.N., was involved in the care of patient L. S. At 4:50 p.m., Rooker noted that Respondent had not returned the earlier telephone call. Therefore, Rooker called the answering service for Respondent again and asked the answering service to "beep" Respondent again. The Respondent did not call Rooker back. On May 23, 1986, Nurse Salyer notified Respondent of L. S.'s statement that the antibiotic that patient L. S. was taking (Ampicillin) had previously caused the patient to have diarrhea. Respondent decided not to change the antibiotic order for patient L. S. Ampicillin is known to cause diarrhea in some individuals. But so do many other antibiotics. A reasonably prudent physician, after having been advised that the patient had diarrhea and that the patient previously had had diarrhea while on the same antibiotic, could either change the antibiotic therapy or wait and see if the diarrhea continued or became a problem. On May 23, 1986, at 2:00 p.m., Salyer noted that patient L. S. continued to experience congestion and a productive cough, and continued to have a poor appetite. The same information was noted on the evening shift on May 23, 1986. This condition persisted on May 24, 1986. Additionally, the patient's temperature was 100 degrees on May 24, 1986. Previously, the patient had had an essentially normal temperature. On May 25, 1986, it was noted that patient L. S. was still congested with a productive cough. Additionally, the patient's temperature continued to be elevated. On May 26, 1986, no entry was made in the nurses' notes as to the status of the patient's congestion and cough. It was noted that the patient's friend, "John," came to request permission to take L. S. out for the day. However, L. S. indicated that he felt too weak to go. Both L. S. and his friend asked that Respondent be called for a leave of absence order in the future. It was further noted that the patient continued to have a poor appetite. In the morning on May 27, 1986, Nurse Salyer "beeped" Respondent for the leave of absence order. Respondent did not return that call during Salyer's shift on May 27, 1986. In the 2:00 p.m. entry for May 27, 1986, Salyer noted that patient L. S.: had bed rest during the shift; suffered from chronic diarrhea with mucous in the stool; was refusing to eat with poor fluid intake; had yellow mucous draining from his eyes; and had continued congestion with a productive cough. At 9:00 p.m. on May 27, 1986, it was noted that the patient's condition as described above had persisted. Additionally, it was noted that Respondent had not returned the telephone call made by Salyer that morning. In fact, it does not appear that Respondent ever returned Salyer's call made on May 27, 1986. On May 28, 1986, it appeared that patient L. S. was improving some in comparison to the patient's condition on previous dates. It was noted that the patient's respirations were "easy." However, it was also noted that the patient still had periods of confusion, still had poor appetite, still was congested and had yellowish drainage from the right eye. On May 29, 1986, the patient's condition further deteriorated. On this date, in the morning, it was noted that the patient remained congested. In the afternoon, a friend of L. S. named Sigfred Ivanicki, came to see L. S. Ivanicki had visited L. S. in Druid Hills twice a week (on Sundays and Thursdays) while L. S. was in the nursing home. When Ivanicki saw L. S. on Thursday, May 29, 1986, in the afternoon (Ivanicki usually visited between 4:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m.), Ivanicki was very concerned about the deterioration he saw in L. S.'s condition and believed at that point that L. S. was dying. Ivanicki had had an opportunity to see patient L. S. several times before May 29, 1986. Initially, when Ivanicki saw patient L. S. shortly after the admission of the patient to Druid Hills, patient L. S. appeared cheerful and on the road to recovery. Ivanicki would, on each visit, perform tasks of a personal nature for L. S. Thereafter, the patient developed bad congestion with a productive cough and had diarrhea. None of these symptoms appeared too serious to Ivanicki. However, on May 29, 1986, Ivanicki became truly concerned about L. S. After seeing patient L. S. on May 29, 1986, Ivanicki went to see the head nurse at Druid Hills and asked that Respondent be called to come see the patient and transfer the patient to the hospital. At that time, Ivanicki was told that Respondent was very hard to reach. At 6:00 p.m. on May 29, 1986, a nurse Febbo assessed patient L. S.'s condition. Nurse Febbo noted that the patient refused to eat, complained of shortness of breath and had a flushed face. The patient's skin was warm and dry. The patient's vital signs were as follows: pulse 102 beats per minute, temperature 99.8, blood pressure 120/60 and respiration rate 28 per minute. The patient's lungs were clear with decreased breath sounds. The patient was congested and was expectorating thick clear mucous. The patient was incontinent of bowel. On May 29, 1986, at 6:00 p.m., Nurse Febbo noted that she attempted to contact Respondent at 546-5702 unsuccessfully, and had notified Respondent's answering service that she was attempting to contact Respondent. Respondent returned Nurse Febbo's call at 8:00 p.m., on May 29, 1986. The nursing staff advised the Respondent of patient L. S.'s condition as reflected in Finding 52, above. In response, the Respondent provided the following telephone order for the patient: Lomotil three times a day, discontinue betadine to the little finger, and obtain a splint for right hand. Respondent did not order a C.B.C. or a chest x-ray at that point, even though both tests would have been appropriate. Additionally, Respondent did not go see the patient when advised of the patient's condition. Regardless whether the nursing staff had placed a "STAT" call, a reasonably prudent physician, after being advised of the condition of patient L. S., would have either gone in to see the patient or promptly ordered a C.B.C. and a chest x-ray. The vital signs and physical examination results reflect a very sick individual. The decreased breath sounds indicated that pneumonia or a pneumonic process had begun in the patient's lungs. Additionally, the diarrhea had advanced to the stage where the patient was incontinent. Respondent should have either seen the patient (something he had decided not to do up to this date) or should have ordered a chest x-ray and C.B.C. The nurses' notes for 8:00 p.m. on May 29, 1986, reflect that the patient L. S. was given Actifed by mouth for congestion, consistent with Dr. Hayward's orders given on May 21, 1986, and not changed. Given the presence of a pneumonic process in L. S.'s lungs, Actifed was inappropriate. See Finding 36, above. On May 30, 1986, it was noted prior to 9:30 a.m. that the patient L. S. was growing increasingly weak and was coughing up a greenish yellow mucous. The patient's lungs were noisy and appeared to be filled with fluid. The nursing staff had begun attempts to contact Respondent, probably beginning as early as 7:30 a.m. At 9:30 a.m., the nurses' notes reflect that the nursing staff had attempted to call Respondent several times and had paged Respondent at the hospital but had received no return telephone call. At 10:00 a.m., Gold Plus called the nursing staff at Druid Hills. Mr. Ivanicki had contacted Gold Plus to complain about Respondent's failure to transfer L. S. to the hospital for treatment. Gold Plus, after talking to the nursing staff, was also to attempt to contact Respondent. At 10:15 a.m., on May 30, 1986, over two hours after the first telephone calls, Respondent finally called Druid Hills and ordered that the patient be sent to the emergency room at Clearwater Community Hospital. Confusion occurred over the transfer of the patient to the hospital, due to no fault of Respondent. As a result of this delay, the patient was not transported to Clearwater Community Hospital until about 11:45 a.m., on May 30, 1986. However, before the actual transport could occur, the patient partially "coded" or had a cardiopulmonary arrest. At the time of the arrival of patient L. S. at Clearwater Community Hospital, the patient had a cardiopulmonary arrest and resuscitation techniques were successfully used. A chest x-ray performed showed haziness in the lungs which was suspicious for aspiration pneumonia. On June 14, 1986, patient L. S. died at Clearwater Community Hospital. The patient had been in a coma since arrival at the hospital. The immediate cause of death was listed as cardiogenic shock. Respondent's final diagnoses were: (1) cardiopulmonary arrest; (2) aspiration pneumonitis; (3) possible acute myocardial infarction; (4) thrombocytopenia; (5) cardiac arrhythmia with frequent PVCs; (6) hyperkalemia; (7) status post-recent CVA; and (8) severe post-anoxic encephalopathy. It was the practice of nursing personnel at Druid Hills to identify calls to physicians as "STAT" calls when an emergency or critical situation existed. With a STAT call, an immediate response was necessary. Nursing staff at Druid Hills did not consider patient L. S.'s condition to be an emergency or critical until May 30, 1986. The calls to Respondent were not identified as "STAT" calls. It would have been inappropriate for the Respondent to delay his response to telephone calls made by Druid Hills nursing staff pertaining to patient L. S. on May 29 and 30, 1986. A reasonably prudent physician, acting under similar conditions and circumstances, would have returned such telephone calls within an hour unless other emergencies existed. But it was not proved that the Respondent received and delayed his response. The Respondent generally was good about returning telephone calls and was experiencing difficulty both with the Gold Plus switchboard and with his answering service. The Respondent's response to those calls may well have been reasonable under the circumstances. In contrast, the calls on May 20, 22 and 27 were not of any emergency nature and did not require priority response. It was not proved that the Respondent's response to' those calls were delayed unreasonably. (Gold Plus had a policy of not permitting a leave of absence, the subject of the May 27, 1986, call.) Except to the extent that the Respondent's course of treatment was inappropriate, as noted above, the Respondent's records (including the hospital and nursing home records) justify his course of treatment of L. S. Respondent, in his treatment of patient L. S., failed to practice medicine with the level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances, as a result of the deficiencies and omissions noted above.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is recommended that the Board of Medicine: (1) hold the Respondent, Edward C. Hayward, M.D., guilty of violating Section 458.331(t), Florida Statutes (1985)(Count One of the Administrative Complaint); (2) dismiss the charges in Count Two of the Administrative Complaint (alleged failure to maintain adequate medical records); (3) place the Respondent on probation for two years under such terms as the Board of Medicine deems appropriate; and (4) fine the Respondent $1,000.00. RECOMMENDED this 13th day of April, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of April, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-2568 To comply with Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1987), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings Of Fact. 1.-11. Accepted and incorporated. Proposed findings regarding the milk of magnesia order, rejected. It was part of routine orders. The patient never developed constipation so it never was administered. The proposed finding is irrelevant and unnecessary. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated. Accepted and incorporated. 14.-17. Rejected as contrary to facts found. The paragraphs reciting the tests the Respondent had done are accepted and incorporated; the rest is rejected as contrary to facts found. First three sentences, accepted and incorporated; the rest is rejected as contrary to facts found. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as contrary to facts found. Nurse's description of the patient as "acutely ill" is subordinate to facts found. It is not a diagnosis. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated. 23.-25. Accepted and incorporated. 26. Except that the use of the word "pus" is rejected as inaccurate, accepted and incorporated. 27.-36. Accepted and incorporated to the extent necessary and not subordinate. Accepted but subordinate to facts found. Accepted and incorporated to the extent necessary and not subordinate. Rejected that the Respondent made no attempt to determine the cause of the patient's illness as contrary to facts found; the rest is accepted and incorporated. Rejected, as contrary to facts found, that Actifed was "inappropriate." What was inappropriate was the failure to properly evaluate whether the patient had chest congestion. 41.-44. Accepted and incorporated to the extent necessary and not cumulative. 45. Rejected as contrary to facts found. 46.-57. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted and, to the extent not subordinate, incorporated. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted and, to the extent not subordinate, incorporated. 61.-68. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as contrary to facts found. Accepted but subordinate to facts found. Rejected as contrary to facts found. Accepted and incorporated. Respondent's Proposed Findings Of Fact. 1.-7. Accepted and, to the extent necessary, incorporated. Penultimate sentence rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence; the rest is accepted and incorporated. Accepted, as far as it goes, and incorporated. However, the proposed findings ignore the productive cough that was observed throughout the period May 20-29, 1986, and which was reported to the Respondent on May 21 and 29, 1986. Third sentence, to the extent it implies it states all the symptoms, rejected as contrary to facts found. Fourth sentence rejected as contrary to facts found--temperature was somewhat elevated and both pulse and respirations were up for a patient in bed rest. Sixth sentence rejected as contrary to facts found--the patient was awake at intervals during the night. Rest is accepted and incorporated with some additional facts. First sentence rejected as contrary to facts found--the patient's condition began to worsen seriously on May 29, 1986, and continued to worsen through the night. The nurses were alarmed at his condition on the morning of May 30, 1986, and began trying to call the Respondent at approximately 7:30 a.m. Third sentence, rejected as not proven when the Respondent received the message that the nursing staff was trying to contact him. The rest is accepted and incorporated. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephanie A. Daniel, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Richard W. Payant, Esquire 2349 Sunset Point Road Clearwater, Florida 34625 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 William O'Neil General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
