Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been licensed as a certified electrical contractor in the State of Florida, having been issued License No. EC0000971. At all times material hereto, Respondent has been the sole qualifying agent for AAA Quality Electric, Inc. (hereinafter "AAA"), a California corporation with its principal office located in Riverside, California. At all times material hereto, Respondent has been a permanent resident of the State of California. By Order of Emergency Suspension of Licensure entered on September 12, 1990, by the Secretary of the Department of Professional Regulation, Respondent's license as a certified electrical contractor in Florida was summarily suspended. At the time, Respondent held either master's licenses or contractor's licenses in 21 states and held hundreds of city licenses. Between January, 1989 and June, 1990, AAA operated in 11 states. During that time period, AAA had as many as 65 people working in the office in California, with as many as 85 electricians in the field. During that time period, AAA had as many as 14 electricians working in the State of Florida. AAA only hired electricians who possessed either a journeyman's or a master's license in the jurisdiction where they worked since that level of licensure enables that electrician to work without direct, on-the-job supervision. AAA advertised when a position was open and administered to job applicants an examination which AAA considers equivalent to a journeyman's examination. To be hired, one needed to pass the examination. AAA would also require that a new employee provide AAA with his or her license number or a copy of his or her current licensure. AAA also employed area supervisors and regional supervisors. Respondent was available to any of the journeymen or masters working for him either by telephone or by sky pager at all times. If anyone doing an installation had a problem, that person could contact Respondent to discuss the problem with him. Respondent's permit-pulling policy was to pull a permit whenever one was required. He had on file, in the various jurisdictions, letters allowing one of his employees to pull permits under his State of Florida license number. For example, in Pompano Beach, which is located in Broward County, Respondent had on file a letter allowing Bill Mopis to pull permits under Respondent's license even though Mopis held a master's license in Broward County and could pull permits under his own license number. By the time that Petitioner suspended Respondent's license to practice electrical contracting in the State of Florida, Respondent had changed his permitting policies so that a permit was pulled for any type of work performed in the State of Florida. AAA advertised in newspapers and in telephone directory yellow pages. When a request for service was made, one of the journeymen or master electricians employed by AAA would be dispatched to the work location. AAA in California was aware of which employee had been dispatched to perform which job. On the day following the job, AAA would call the customer to make sure that the customer was satisfied by the work that had been performed. In March, 1989, Anna and Rudolf Reider contacted AAA pursuant to an ad in the telephone directory yellow pages and requested that an electrician come to their residence to install a ceiling fan. The residence was located in Pompano Beach, Broward County, Florida. Terry Stewart, who holds a master's license from Broward County, responded to their call. When he arrived, Mrs. Reider explained to him that she also wanted a wall outlet which was located behind her bed in a different room to be moved a few feet to the side in order to make it accessible. Stewart took down a light fixture from the ceiling and replaced it with a ceiling fan. He also moved the wall outlet located in the master bedroom by running conduit along the wall and mounting a metal outlet box on the wall in the outlet's new location. Stewart charged the Reiders $391.30, which represented the rate of $46.50 per 1/2 hour plus materials. He also applied a senior citizen discount of 10% to the labor portion of the bill. The hourly rate charged by Stewart was that rate which was quoted over the telephone by AAA to Mrs. Reider when she placed the service call and is in accordance with the labor rate reflected on the work order. The Reiders were satisfied with the ceiling fan installation and with the price charged by Stewart. Although Mrs. Reider had shown Stewart an electrical installation located on her porch, which installation is a pipe with wires inside, and told him that was what she expected, and although she admits that she knew that the new wall outlet would not look the same as the other outlets in the room because there had to be an exposed pipe on the wall, she and her husband were dissatisfied with the appearance of the wall outlet extension in their bedroom. Mrs. Reider subsequently contacted AAA, and Stewart returned her phone call. He advised her that he was willing to come back to her residence and change the appearance of the installation by using a smaller pipe, but he would need to charge her $46.50 for the return service call. Mrs. Reider was unwilling to pad any additional monies for Stewart to return and has never had that work accomplished. Both the ceiling fan and the extended wall outlet work properly. Stewart did not obtain a permit before performing the electrical work. There was no licensure barrier to Stewart obtaining a permit and the inspections that attend the obtaining of a permit since at the time Respondent was licensed by Petitioner, AAA had an occupational license to perform work in Broward County, and no occupational license was required for the City of Pompano Beach since AAA did not maintain an office within that municipality. When Stewart completed the job, he gave the Reiders a 5-year extended warranty, and both Mr. and Mrs. Reider signed the work order authorizing the work and payment therefor, and acknowledging satisfactory completion of the work. The Chief Electrical Inspector for the City of Pompano Beach believes that an electrician, to work without supervision, must be either a journeyman or a master electrician, which Terry Stewart was. The City of Pompano Beach has taken no action against AAA for failure to pull a permit for the Reider job. Although the Chief Electrical Inspector believes that a permit is required for any electrical work performed within the City of Pompano Beach, as provided in the City's permitting ordinances at Section 301.1(e), Section 301(b) (2) sets forth exceptions to the permitting requirements and provides that: No permit shall be required, in this or any of the following Sections, for general maintenance or repairs which do not change the Occupancy and the value of which does not exceed Eight Hundred Dollars ($800.00) in labor and material. ... At the time that AAA performed the work at the Reider residence, the ad which appeared in the yellow pages portion of the telephone directory did not contain Respondent's license number. The City of Pompano Beach has adopted the South Florida Building Code which adopts the National Electrical Code. The National Electrical Code provides that the bonding jumper is to be a green wire or the wire is to be left bare. In the receptacle installed by Stewart, a white wire was used for the bonding jumper. That violation of the National Electrical Code is easily remedied by stripping the white wire bare or by substituting a green wire. Such work is covered under the warranty given by AAA to the Reiders. Although the 1990 National Electrical Code prohibits the use of outlet boxes as the sole support for a ceiling fan and provides an exception from that requirement, the evidence is unclear as to the requirements of the National Electrical Code in force at the time the work was performed. Within the electrical trade, taking down an existing light fixture and replacing it with a ceiling fan and moving a wall outlet are considered to come within the definition of repair and maintenance work. Accordingly, the work performed by AAA at the Reider residence was excluded from permitting requirements both by definition and by cost. Mary Scalza is the owner of Rub-A-Dub Laundromat in West Palm Beach. Early Saturday morning, on June 2, 1989, she experienced a breaker box "blowout", which incapacitated 14 of her washing machines. She located AAA's ad in the yellow pages of the telephone directory and called. AAA quoted her the price for emergency, weekend repairs, and she agreed. Terry Stewart responded to the call. When he arrived at Rub-A-Dub, he saw that the breaker box was located between two rows of washing machines on the floor and next to the overflow drain. He advised Scalza that the location of the box was a code violation, and the box had to be relocated. He told her the approximate cost of doing so but told her that she would have to call AAA to verify with the Company what the cost would be. She told him that the cost of relocating the box was too expensive and implored him to effectuate some repair so that her machines would be operable as soon as possible. Stewart explained to her the dangerous nature of the location of the box but agreed to effectuate a temporary repair. Stewart was unable to replace the entire breaker box; rather, he replaced all inside parts, using the old box. Although Scalza denies that Stewart told her he was simply effectuating a temporary repair until Monday morning when he could obtain the proper parts from a parts supply company, the work order signed by Scalza conforms with AAA's policies regarding temporary repairs. Specifically, the work order provides that no guarantee was given for the work. It is clear that Stewart did return to Rub-A-Dub Monday morning, and Scalza refused to let him touch the breaker box. When Stewart finished his temporary repair on Saturday afternoon, he submitted to Scalza a statement in the amount of $892.10. She gave him a check for $600.00 and paid him the balance in cash. When Scalza's husband came to the laundromat, he became very angry about the amount of the bill. On Monday morning, Scalza contacted the electrical inspector for the City of West Palm Beach, who came to the laundromat, looked at the work that had been accomplished, and "red tagged" the job due to the location of the breaker box. Scalza did not advise him that it was simply an emergency temporary repair. Scalza stopped payment on her check and contacted AAA, advising them not to return to complete the job. When an emergency repair is effectuated in West Palm Beach, it is Permissible for the permit to be pulled on the next business day. Since AAA was fired from the job on the next business day, AAA did not apply for a permit. Instead, AAA sent Stewart back to Rub-A-Dub to refund to Scalza the cash portion of her payment to AAA and to remove the parts Stewart had used for which Scalza would not pay. Scalza gave Stewart the parts which AAA had supplied which had already been removed by the other electrical company hired by her to do the work. That subsequent company did pull a permit for the work at Rub-A-Dub and did relocate the breaker box, which apparently Scalza authorized that company to do. The electrical inspector for the City of West Palm Beach agrees that the responsibility for pulling the permit on the Rub-A-Dub job was that of the subsequent company that effectuated the repairs and not the responsibility of AAA which had been fired from the job before it could pull a permit on Monday, the next business day following the emergency repairs effectuated over the weekend. Petitioner's witnesses agree that if the work done by AAA was a temporary repair for a few days, then the work that was accomplished by Stewart was, in fact, a safe, temporary repair. Further, it is a "judgment call" as to whether an electrician is required to bring electrical service up to code requirements, regardless of the nature of the work an electrician has been called upon to do. Further, anything involving water is always a "judgment call." Even Petitioner's expert would consider effectuating repairs to the breaker box in the location it was in when Stewart came to Rub-A-Dub if the box was completely enclosed and weatherproofed. No evidence was offered as to whether the box was completely enclosed and weatherproofed. Alton F. LaBrecque is an employee of AAA. He holds a journeyman's license from Pinellas County. Pinellas County and Hillsborough County have a reciprocal agreement regarding licensing, i.e., as long as a person holds a journeyman's license from one of those counties, he is not required to obtain a journeyman's license to work in the other county which is on the other side of the bridge. It is the practice in both Pinellas and Hillsborough Counties that if a journeyman who is licensed in one of those counties shows his card to an inspector from the other county, that is all that is required by the inspector of the other county to insure himself that the journeyman is properly licensed. The City of Tampa, which is in Hillsborough County, allows Hillsborough County to regulate licensing. If a person is licensed to work in Hillsborough County, then he is also licensed to work within the City of Tampa. At all times material hereto, AAA had an occupational license to work within the limits of the City of Tampa. On September 26, 1989, Heidi Bekiempis contacted AAA to request that someone come to her residence in Tampa to replace a dimmer switch. Alton LaBrecque responded to that call. When he arrived at the Bekiempis residence, Mrs. Bekiempis also advised him that certain lights within the house were flickering. LaBrecque replaced the dimmer switch which had been completely burned. It is LaBrecque's practice to involve the customer in the work that he is doing as much as possible so that they understand what is being done and why. When he checked the breaker box, he noticed that there were loose connections within the breaker box. He had Mrs. Bekiempis "running around the house" turning lights on and off while he tightened wires and checked the breakers. LaBrecque tested each breaker in the box with a digital meter and then with an infrared tester. Using the two different pieces of equipment, he tested both the line side and the load side of the breakers while they were carrying a full load. He discovered that three single-pole 20-amp breakers and one double- pole 60-amp breaker were consuming electricity as it passed across the breakers. Manufacturer specifications allow a breaker to consume up to .029 volts. The four breakers in question were each consuming one volt which is equal to 120 watts. He understood that the implication of the fact that those breakers were "hot" and consuming electricity meant that they would not trip properly and there was a danger of wires burning or even a fire starting. He also understood that a bad breaker had been the cause of the dimmer switch burning. Although his work order completed at the time indicated that a breaker was only giving off 87-93 volts and he testified at the final hearing that each of the breakers was consuming one volt, even the one volt consumption testified to at the final hearing was sufficient to show that a dangerous condition existed and the breakers needed replacing. Even though Mrs. Bekiempis denies authorizing the replacement of the circuit breakers, she does admit that LaBrecque told her about the danger of a fire, and she signed the work order after completion of the job acknowledging the satisfactory completion of the work. That work order clearly reflects the replacement of the breakers, the results of LaBrecque's testing, the reason why the breakers were replaced, and an itemized listing of the costs for the replacement breakers. It is found that Mrs. Bekiempis authorized replacing the breakers. Mrs. Bekiempis paid AAA $384.00 for the work performed. The replacement dimmer switch works properly, and the Bekiempis' lights stopped flickering after LaBrecque replaced the bad breakers. Mrs. Bekiempis unsuccessfully tried to stop payment on her charge card for all of the work performed by AAA. Between September 26, 1989, and February 15, 1990, the replaced breakers and the replacement breakers were primarily in the possession of Mr. and Mrs. Bekiempis. During that time, Mr. Bekiempis gave breakers to two different electricians for testing. On February 15, 1990, he gave breakers to an investigator for the Department of Professional Regulation. On February 20, 1990, the investigator gave breakers to Joe Bolesina, the Chief Electrical Inspector for Pinellas County. At some subsequent time, Bolesina marked four breakers and gave them to a clerk in his office to send to General Electric for testing. When Bolesina subsequently received breakers from General Electric, he returned them to Petitioner's investigator who retained custody of them until his deposition was taken in this case on October No explanation was offered as to how the breakers which were marked as an exhibit to the deposition of Petitioner's investigator on October 10 got to the deposition of Joe Bolesina taken on October 11 at which time the breakers were marked as an exhibit to his deposition. No explanation was offered as to who had custody of the breakers between October 11 and the time they were produced at the final hearing commencing on October 17, 1990. It is probable that the breakers that were marked at some unidentified time by Joe Bolesina are the same breakers which were admitted in evidence at the final hearing in this cause since the tags placed on the breakers by Bolesina remain on the breakers. However, there is no basis for assuming that the breakers which were replaced by LaBrecque five months before Bolesina received them and marked them were the same breakers that were replaced by LaBrecque. During the afternoon of Saturday, March 17, 1990, a tornado blew down a huge oak tree located in the front yard of the residence of Clarence Cruey in the City of Tampa. As it fell, the tree tore the entire electrical service off the front of the Cruey residence, including the meter, the riser, and the wires. The customer had no power at all. Cruey looked in the yellow pages to find an electrical contractor who would come to his residence immediately to effectuate the repair work even though it was still storming. AAA responded to his call, quoted to him its rates for 1-hour emergency service, and dispatched Alton LaBrecque and another AAA employee to perform the services. The two men worked there in the dark and in the rain for four hours, replacing Cruey's electrical service. Few of the parts were capable of being reused since they had been damaged by the tree or because they did not meet code requirements. For example, a Delta surge arrester had been used previously, and that type of equipment was, at the time, illegal in Tampa. AAA completely replaced the riser, hub, meter can, meter socket, wiring, and many other parts. At the conclusion of their work, AAA presented an itemized bill to Cruey in the amount of $2,556.17, and Cruey signed the acknowledgment that all work had been performed satisfactorily. He paid for the work by credit card but subsequently stopped payment, and AAA has been paid no monies for their labor or material regarding the Cruey job. Since the work at the Cruey residence was performed on an emergency basis on a Saturday, on the following Monday LaBrecque went to pull the permit for the work. Employees at the City of Tampa would not accept his permit application saying that he was not authorized to pull a permit for AAA and that a copy of AAA's workmen's compensation insurance was not on record with the City. Although authorization letters had been previously submitted, and although a copy of the insurance certificate had been filed with the City in January when AAA's City of Tampa occupational license was renewed, LaBrecque had AAA send additional copies of those documents to the City. When he again attempted to apply for the permit, the City advised him that they still did not have copies of those documents. LaBrecque contacted AAA and another set of documents was provided to the City. When LaBrecque returned, he was told that the documents still had not been received. When LaBrecque hand- carried another set of those documents to the City and "stuffed it in their faces," they accepted his permit application, ten days after he first applied. The permit itself was not issued for several months, and by the time of the final hearing in this cause the City had still refused to make the required inspection although Respondent had called for the inspection a number of times, including once on the record during a hearing conducted by the Unified Construction Trades Board of the City of Tampa. Although refusing to make an official inspection, the Chief Electrical Inspector for the City of Tampa inspected the work at the Cruey residence on an "unofficial" basis. Based upon that unofficial inspection, he concluded that AAA had replaced parts that did not need replacement and that AAA had not done all of the work for which it had charged Cruey. On July 3, 1990, the Unified Construction Trades Board of the City of Tampa revoked Respondent's permitting privileges for 1 year for the work done at the Cruey residence. On August 7, 1990, the Unified Construction Trades Board of the City of Tampa suspended Respondent's permitting privileges to run concurrently with the revocation entered on July 3, 1990. On September 11, 1990, based on the fact that the City of Tampa had taken disciplinary action against Respondent, the Electrical Board of Adjustment, Appeals and Examiners of Hillsborough County suspended Respondent for a period of 5 years. These two disciplinary actions are not involved in the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent in this cause, and proof of them was offered by Petitioner for the sole purpose of aggravation of any penalty to be assessed against Respondent. Photographs admitted in evidence at the final hearing in this cause clearly refute the testimony given by the Chief Electrical Inspector for the City of Tampa which resulted in the July 3, 1990, revocation of Respondent's permitting privileges. The photographs reveal the work done by AAA and also depict the damaged parts which were replaced by AAA since those damaged parts were still lying in Cruey's yard at the time the photographs were taken. Respondent was prohibited by the Unified Construction Trades Board from offering the photographs and other evidence in defense of the charges then pending against him.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint and dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent in this cause. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 20th day of November, 1990. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 90-6172 Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 1 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting a conclusion of law. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 2-5, 7, 10, 16, 17, 20, 23, and 25-27 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 6, 9, 11-15, 18, 19, 22, and 28 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the credible evidence in this cause. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 8 has been rejected as being contrary to the weight of the evidence in this cause. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 21, 24, and 29 have been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues herein. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 4, 4.1, 5-7.5, 7.9, 7.10, 7.13-7.16, 8, 8.1, 8.3-8.6, 8.8, 8.9, 9.0, 9.2-9.7, 9.10, 9.12-9.14, 9.16- 9.20, 10, 10.1, 10.3, 10.4, 10.6-10.19, 10.21-10.23, 12-12.8, 13.9, and 13.10 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of laws, recitation of the testimony, or argument of counsel. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 2, 3, 7.6-7.8, 7.11, 7.12, 8.2, 8.10-8.12, 9.1, 9.8, 9.11, 9.15, 10.20, 11-11.2, 13.2, 13.4-13.8, and 13.11 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 8.7 has been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the credible evidence in this cause. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 10.2, 10.5, 13, 13.1, and 13.3 have been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel O'Brien Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Robert G. Harris, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 David M. Gaspari, Esquire Adams, Coogler, Watson & Merkel Suite 1600, NCNB Tower 1555 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33402-2069 Neil F. Garfield, Esquire World Executive Building, Suite 333 3500 North State Road Seven Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33319 Scott Anderson, Esquire 2033 Main Street, Suite 402 Sarasota, Florida 33427 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact In February of 1990, the Petitioner filed an application to take the unlimited electrical contractor examination. To be eligible to take the examination, it was necessary for the Petitioner to demonstrate that he had at least three years of management experience in the field of electrical contracting. The information in the application and the evidence submitted at the hearing demonstrate that the Petitioner has had more than three years of experience in the field of electrical contracting. However, the information in the application and the evidence submitted at hearing are insufficient to demonstrate how much, if any, of that experience was "management experience in the trade." 1/
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is recommended that the Electrical Contractors' Licensing Board enter a Final Order in this case denying the Petitioner's application to take the licensure examination. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 30th day of September 1991. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of September 1991.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Subsection 489.531(1), Florida Statutes (2003),1 by engaging in the unlicensed practice of electrical contracting, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence and testimony of the witnesses presented and the entire record in this proceeding, the following facts are found: At all times material hereto, Respondent was not licensed or had ever been licensed to engage in electrical contracting in the State of Florida. At all times material hereto, Sundance Home Remodeling, Inc., did not possess a certificate of authority to practice as an electrical contractor qualified business. At all times material hereto, Respondent was the sole owner/operator of Sundance Home Remodeling, Inc. Respondent has an occupational carpentry license from Hillsborough County, Florida, and uses the general contractors’ licenses of others. In April 2003, Respondent contracted with Phyllis Price to do the following work at Ms. Price's residence in Riverview, Florida: enclose her back porch, add on a screened room, change the French doors in some of the bedrooms, and install electric ceiling fans, an electric outlet, and an exterior light. On or about April 17, 2003, Respondent contracted with Ms. Price to install and hook up four electric ceiling fans and install one exterior light for $130.00. On or about April 26, 2003, Respondent submitted a proposal to Ms. Price for the installation of one electric outlet at her residence for $25.00. Respondent completed the work that he contracted to do for Ms. Price, including the electrical work. Ms. Price paid Respondent at least $5,240.00 for the work that he performed. Of that amount, Ms. Price paid Respondent a total of $180.00 for the electrical work he performed at her residence. The electrical work contracted and performed by Respondent required a permit. No evidence was presented that, prior to this time, Respondent has been subject to disciplinary action for the unlicensed practice of electrical contracting. The total investigative costs to the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, excluding costs associated with any attorney’s time, was $313.00.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered that (1) finds Respondent not guilty of the charges alleged in Count One of the Administrative Complaint; (2) finds Respondent guilty of the charges in Count Two and Count Three of the Administrative Complaint; (3) imposes on Respondent an administrative fine of $1,000.00 for each violation, for a total administrative fine of $2,000; and (4) assesses Respondent costs of $313.00, for the investigation and prosecution of this case, excluding costs associated with an attorney's time. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of July, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 2006.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Bert S. McLaughlin, qualifies for licensure as an unlimited electrical contractor in the state of Florida by endorsement pursuant to Section 489.511, Florida Statutes. Whether the Resolution adopted by the Florida Electrical Contractrors' Board (Board) on July 19, 1985 and readopted in substance on March 30, 1987 and May 15, 1987 estops the Board from denying the Petitioner an unlimited electrical contractor's license by endorsement pursuant to Section 489.511, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: On July 19, 1985, the Florida Electrical Contractors' Licensing Board (Board) adopted a Resolution which provides in pertinent part as follows: WHEREAS, the Florida Electrical Contractors Licensing Board has diligently compared its licensing standards with those of the unlimited electrical contractors licensed by the North Carolina State Board of Examiners of Electrical Contractors, and, WHEREAS, the Florida Electrical Contractors Licensing Board has thoroughly reviewed the examinations that North Carolina candidates for unlimited licensure must pass and found them substantially similar to or equivalent to, the Florida licensure examination, now, THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, that the Florida Electrical Contractors Licensing Board will, upon receipt of a properly completed application from a properly licensed unlimited North Carolina electrical contractor who has obtained licensure by the North Carolina written exam, license by endorsement in accordance with Section 489.511(9), Florida Statutes NOTICE OF CANCELLATION, this Resolution may be rescinded upon 90 days notice to North Carolina, if it is determined by the Florida Electrical Contractors Licensing Board, that the licensing standards for unlimited electrical contractors in North Carolina are no longer comparable with the licensing standards of certified electrical contractors licensed pursuant to Chapter 489, Florida Statutes The above Resolution was readopted in substance by the Board on March 30, 1987 and Nay 15, 1987. The Board made a specific finding on May 15, 1987, when it readopted the Resolution, that the North Carolina examination for unlimited electrical contractors were "substantially similar to or equivalent to, the Florida licensure examination." The Board relied on that finding, without any further finding as to equivalency of the examinations, to grant licensure by endorsement from unlimited electrical contractors licensed in North Carolina who had successfully passed the North Carolina written unlimited electrical contractors examination up until August 31, 1988. In October, 1988, the issue of the equivalency of the Florida examinations and the North Carolina examinations was raised by the Board. In December, 1988, the Board was provided current and previous examination blueprints of the North Carolina examinations by Block and Associates, who prepared the North Carolina examinations. Upon review of the examination blueprints of the North Carolina examinations, the Board determined that the North Carolina examinations were not "substantially equivalent to" the Florida examinations. This finding was based mainly on the fact that North Carolina's examinations did not contain any portion on business which the Board considered essential. From the documents reviewed by the Board, the Board was unable to make a determination as to whether the business portion of the examination was included in the North Carolina examinations at the time of its finding of equivalency on May 15, 1987. However, the Board did determine apparently based on those documents, no later than its February 1, 1989, meeting, that at the time Petitioner took the North Carolina examination on September 23, 1988 it did not contain a business portion, and thereby was not "substantially equivalent to" the Florida examination. Petitioner took and passed the examination in North Carolina for unlimited electrical contractors on September 23, 1988. On November 28, 1988, Petitioner was granted a unlimited classification licence to practice electrical contracting in the state of North Carolina. Petitioner submitted an application to the Board on December 8, 1988, for licensure as an unlimited electrical contractor in the state of Florida by endorsement based on having passed the North Carolina examination, being licensed in the state of North Carolina as an unlimited electrical contractor and practicing electrical contracting in the state of North Carolina. On December 22, 1988, the state of North Carolina was notified by Paul H. Morgan, Jr., Chairman, Florida Electrical Contractors' Licensing Board that the 90 day cancellation provision of the Resolution was in effect and the "endorsement agreement" would be cancelled effective March 22, 1989. The Board did not officially authorize the letter by Mr. Morgan. The Board's official position was that the "endorsement agreement" was of no effect. Petitioner obtained a City of Winston-Salem, North Carolina, City Privilege License, as an electrical contractor with one helper on January 5, 1989. At its February 1, 1989, meeting the Board reviewed Petitioner's application for licensure by endorsemert, and by letter dated February 28, 1989, advised Petitioner of its denial based on the criteria for issuance of his North Carolina license not being equivalent to the criteria set forth for licensure in the state of Florida at the time Petitioner received his North Carolina license. At its March 15, 1989, meeting the Board again reviewed Petitioner's application, and by letter dated March 15, 1989, advised Petitioner of its decision to uphold its denial of his application of February 1, 1989 as set out in its letter of February 28, 1989. Although not specifically addressed in the letters dated February 28, 1989 and March 15, 1989, the criteria which caused the Board concerned was the lack of North Carolina's examination being "substantially equivalent to" the Florida examination, whether the Petitioner had been engaged in electrical contracting in North Carolina immediately preceding his application for licensure by endorsement in Florida and whether North Carolina required Petitioner to show certain financial responsibility standards prior to issuance of Petitioner's electrical contractor's license in North Carolina. In its letter of February 28, 1989 the Board advised Petitioner that although it had denied his application for licensure by endorsement, it had approved his application as one for licensure by examination. The Petitioner has presently elected not to take the Florida unlimited electrical contractors' examination or the examination for licensure as an alarm system contractor. Prior to taking and passing the North Carolina electrical contractor's examination, Petitioner had been engaged in all types of electrical contracting work, including fire alarm installation, in several counties in the state of Florida, and was licensed in several Florida counties as a county master electrical contractor but not as a state certified unlimited electrical contractor. Under the present law in Florida, county master electrical contractors, who are not state certified electrical contractors or licensed to practice alarm system contracting by the state of Florida, cannot practice alarm system contracting in the state of Florida. It was Petitioner's intent at the time of taking the North Carolina examination to open an electrical contractor's business with his brother in North Carolina. Petitioner's primary reason for taking the North Carolina examination was to further this business relationship with his brother in North Carolina.. However, secondary to obtaining the North Carolina license, was licensure by endorsement in Florida. While Petitioner was aware of Florida's "endorsement agreement" with North Carolina at the time he took the North Carolina examination, there was no evidence to show that the Petitioner relied on this "endorsement agreement" to his detriment. Subsequent to obtaining his North Carolina license, Petitioner's brother died, and the North Carolina business was put on the "back burner" so to speak. Two electrical permits for electrical work was "pulled" by Petitioner in the City of Winston-Salem, North Carolina on March 6, 1989 and with the work being inspected and approved on March 8, 1989. A third electrical permit was "pulled" by Petitioner for electrical work in the City of Winston-Salem, North Carolina on March 6, 1989 but there was no evidence to show that this work was completed by Petitioner. There was no evidence to show that the North Carolina electrical contractors' examination was "substantially equivalent to" the Florida electrical contractors' examination. In fact, the Petitioner stipulated at the beginning of the hearing that he was relying entirely on Florida's "endorsement agreement" with North Carolina.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact the Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for licensure as a unlimited electrical contractor by endorsement. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of September, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of September, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NUMBER 89-2614 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the Petitioner's proposed finding of fact: 1(1); 2(2); 3(1); 5(3); 7-8(15); 9(6); 10(7,19); 11(16); 12(18); and 15(9). Proposed findings of fact 4 and 13 are unnecessary to the conclusion reached in the Recommended Order. Proposed findings of fact 14 is rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. See Findings of Fact 11 and 13. Letter referred to the equivalency of criteria. Proposed findings of fact 16 and 18 are rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. See Findings of Fact 4 and 6. Proposed finding of fact 6 is more correctly considered as a Conclusion of Law. Although proposed finding of fact 17 is a restatement of Neely's testimony it is rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. See Proposed Finding of Fact 9. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the Respondent's proposed finding of fact: 1(1); 2(2); 4(4); 5(6,16); 6(8); 7(10); 8(19); 9(11); 10(12) and 11(12). Proposed finding of fact 3 is more correctly described as a Conclusion of Law. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven Meisel, Esquire 5425 St. Augustine Road Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Clark R. Jennings, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Suite 1603 - The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Ms. Pat Ard Executive Director Florida Board of Electrical Contractors 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, who was never licensed as a contractor, engaged in the unlawful practice of contracting when he entered into (and attempted to perform under) an agreement to build a dental office; and whether, if Respondent is found guilty of unlicensed contracting, Petitioner should penalize him by imposing an administrative fine and assessing investigative costs.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Department of Business and Professional Regulation ("Department") has jurisdiction to take punitive action against unlicensed persons who unlawfully engage in the business of contracting. At no time relevant to this proceeding was Respondent James Bresnahan ("Bresnahan") licensed, certified, or registered to do business as a contractor of any sort. In June 2007, Bresnahan entered into a contract with University Dental Health Care Center, Inc. ("University"), whereby, in exchange for University's agreement to pay Bresnahan a total of $42,350 in compensation for his work, Bresnahan promised to remodel a bay at the Shoppes of Rolling Hills ("Rolling Hills"), a shopping center located in Davie, Florida, where University planned to operate a dental office. The contract described the scope of the work that Bresnahan would perform as follows: Remove all walls per plans. Redesign interior space to reflect new office plans. New electrical per plans. New plumbing per plans. New droped [sic] ceiling and lighting per plans per Ken. Finish all walls with new paint colors per Angela. New flooring [illegible] tile to be picked by owner. Install new compressor bracket on back of building. Bring all utilities to dental chairs (vac[uum], water, electric, air and drain; five chairs per plans per Ken. Proposal is for drawings and permits and construction of office. Cabinets and installation by others. Equipment and plumbing fixtures by others per Ken. Handycap [sic] bathroom by Shops [sic] of Rolling Hills. (Quoted text reformatted from "all uppercase" to "sentence case.") Bresnahan had not previously undertaken a construction project such as this. He had, however, overseen the build-out of his wife's bakery, which was located in Rolling Hills. For that project, Bresnahan had engaged a general contractor, Johnson Beckett, Inc. ("Johnson Beckett"). Bresnahan, in other words, had been the client, Johnson Beckett the builder. Bresnahan had been introduced to University's principals by their mutual landlord, who——perhaps being unaware of Bresnahan's actual role in the construction of the bakery—— touted Bresnahan as a "builder." Bresnahan had not advertised or promoted himself as a builder, but neither did he disclaim such expertise upon meeting the principals of University; to the contrary, he ultimately offered to build a dental office for University, leading to the contract described above. On June 21, 2007, upon entering into the construction agreement with Bresnahan, University made a down payment of $10,000 to Bresnahan. Because he was not in fact a builder, Bresnahan's plan was to use this money, and other payments he would receive from University, to hire Johnson Beckett to act as the "general contractor" for all aspects of the project except the plumbing and electrical work, for which Bresnahan intended to engage separate subcontractors. Johnson Beckett would not bid a fixed price for the project, however, without a proper construction plan. Consequently, Bresnahan entered into a contract (in his personal capacity, not as an agent for University) with Johnson Beckett, pursuant to which the general contactor was to obtain a blueprint for the dental office project, appropriately sealed by a licensed engineer. For this drafting work, Bresnahan agreed to pay Johnson Beckett $5,000. As Johnson Beckett proceeded, it encountered some difficulty in obtaining information, which the engineer needed, concerning the equipment that would be installed in the dental office. Meantime, little or no work was being accomplished at the jobsite, which began to create tensions between Bresnahan and University. Nevertheless, University gave Bresnahan another check, for $5,000, on July 19, 2007. As the weeks passed, however, University became increasingly frustrated at the lack of tangible progress; it began to lose patience with Bresnahan. When Linda Commons, an owner of the company, started pressing Bresnahan for an accounting, the relationship deteriorated further. On or around August 21, 2007, Bresnahan sent University a letter that announced he was unilaterally canceling their contract. Thereupon, Bresnahan abandoned the job. As of the final hearing, Bresnahan had not refunded to University any of the compensation he received. In connection with the instant matter, the Department has incurred investigative costs in the amount of $209.55. Ultimate Factual Determinations Bresnahan's negotiation of, entry into, and attempt to perform under the construction agreement with University constituted the practice of contracting under Florida law. Thus, Bresnahan, who was not a licensed contractor, is guilty of unlicensed contracting, as charged in Count I of the Administrative Complaint. Bresnahan's negotiation of, entry into, and attempt to perform under the construction agreement with University also constituted the practice of electrical contracting under Florida law. Thus, Bresnahan, who was not a licensed electrical contractor, is guilty of unlicensed electrical contracting, as charged in Count II of the Administrative Complaint.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order which: (1) finds Bresnahan guilty of (a) engaging in the business of contracting without a license and (b) practicing electrical contracting without a license; (2) imposes an administrative fine of $10,000 for these incidents of unlicensed contracting; and (3) assesses investigative costs in the amount of $209.55. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of September, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.stae.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of September, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Sorin Ardelean, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 James Bresnahan 4950 Southwest 70th Avenue Davie, Florida 33314 Ned Luczynski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 G.W. Harrell, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Nancy S. Terrel, Hearing Officer Department of Business and Professional Regulation Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The primary issue for determination in this case is whether Respondent, Bruce P. Boston, engaged in the unlicensed practice of electrical contracting in the State of Florida without being certified or registered in violation of Chapter 489, Part II of the Florida Statutes; and secondarily, if Respondent committed that violation, what penalty should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact The Department of Business and Professional Regulation (Petitioner) is a state agency charged with the duty and responsibility of regulating the practice of electrical contracting in the State of Florida. Respondent's address is 18204 Southwest 200 Street, Archer, Florida 32618. At no time material hereto was Respondent certified or registered in the State of Florida to engage in the practice of electrical contracting or to perform electrical contracting work. Mrs. Dawn Wingert is the owner of the residence located at what is currently designated as 16675 Southwest 143rd Avenue, Archer, Florida. Mrs. Wingert, as lawful owner, had the authority to enter contracts regarding the residence. The Wingert residence was previously known as 110 Park Avenue, Archer, Florida, prior to the assignment of the current address. Wingert entered into a contract with Respondent to perform construction of a carport and perform electrical contracting work at Wingert’s residence subsequent to assignment of the address of 110 Park Avenue, Archer, Florida. Respondent received compensation for the contracted work directly from Wingert via personal check, which Respondent then cashed. Terry Vargas, a licensed electrical contractor having been issued license number ER 13012448, was subsequently contacted by Respondent to perform the electrical contracting work at the Wingert residence. Vargas installed an electrical outlet on the back porch, put a flood light on the back porch, moved the switch board to a more convenient location, and put a security light in the front of Wingert’s residence. All work required electrical fixtures to be permanently affixed and become a permanent part of the structure of the Wingert residence. Although Vargas completed the electrical contracting work at the Wingert residence, Wingert paid the Respondent for the services because the work was contracted for through Respondent. At no time pertinent to this matter did Terry Vargas contract with Wingert to complete the electrical services enumerated above. After he completed the work at Wingert’s residence, Vargas invoiced Respondent for the electrical contracting work. Respondent, however, refused to pay Vargas for the electrical contracting work performed, despite having received compensation for the work from Wingert.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order, in accordance with Section 489.533(2)(c), Florida Statutes, requiring that Respondent pay an administrative fine in the amount of $5,000.00 to the Department of Business and Professional Regulation. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of February, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce P. Boston Post Office Box 331 Williston, Florida 32696 Drew F. Winters, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Nancy S. Terrel, Hearing Officer Office of the General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Josefina Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Respondent's, Florida Department of Transportation ("the Department"), decision to award a contract to Intervenor, DBi Services, Inc. ("DBi" or "Intervenor"), pursuant to the Bid Solicitation Notice and the Specifications Package (jointly referred to as "Solicitation") for Contract No. E5X18 (highway lighting maintenance in District Five), was contrary to its governing statutes, rules, or policies, or the solicitation specifications; and, if so, whether the award was contrary to competition, clearly erroneous, arbitrary, or capricious.
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Department is an executive agency of the state of Florida responsible for coordinating the planning of a safe, viable, and balanced state transportation system, serving all regions of Florida. § 334.044(1), Fla. Stat. The Department is tasked with providing a statewide transportation system that ensures the mobility of people and goods, enhances economic prosperity, and preserves the quality of Florida's environment and communities. § 334.046(2), Fla. Stat. To that end, the Department has authority to enter into contracts for the construction and maintenance of all roads under its jurisdiction. § 337.11(1), Fla. Stat. DBi is a transportation infrastructure asset operations and maintenance contractor that provides services primarily to owners of highway infrastructure, such as the Department, across the country. Most of the contracts DBi enters are performance-based contracts. DBi has performed more than 20 maintenance contracts for the Department. ALS is a certified electrical contractor specializing in highway lighting maintenance, roadway lighting, and traffic signalization, which previously performed work for the Department through DBi as its subcontractor on multiple occasions. The Solicitation On February 23, 2021, the Department issued a Solicitation for the performance of highway lighting maintenance work in District Five. District Five comprises Brevard, Flagler, Lake, Marion, Orange, Osceola, Seminole, Sumter, and Volusia counties. The Solicitation provided that "[t]he work under this Contract consists of maintaining the highway lighting system, including overhead, underdeck and sign lighting, at various locations throughout District Five." The Solicitation included two documents: (a) a Bid Solicitation Notice and (b) a Specifications Package containing Special Provisions that are specific to Contract No. E5X18. By its own terms, the Specifications Package replaced or added to specifications contained in the Department's Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction, January 2021 edition. To the extent not modified by the Specifications Package, the definitions supplied in the Standard Specifications apply to terms used in the Specifications Package. The January 2021 Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction define "bidder" as an individual, firm, or corporation submitting a proposal for the proposed work. It also separately defines "contractor" as the individual, firm, joint venture, or company contracting with the Department to perform the work. These definitions applied to the procurement of Contract No. E5X18. The Solicitation described the contract as a lump-sum "performance" contract or performance-based contract. This means that the Department will pay the winning contractor a fixed monthly price for maintaining certain performance levels. The goal of a performance contract is to achieve an ultimate result: to maintain a level of service as defined within the specifications and scope of the contract—here, the Department's highway lighting system throughout District Five. If the contractor satisfies its contractual obligations—whether by self-performing the work or by subcontracting the work—the contractor is paid on a lump-sum basis. With a performance contract, the Department does not know whether any of the work is subcontracted or whether the contractor self-performs the work. With a performance maintenance contract, the Department's Special Provisions typically do not require bidders to submit proof of licensure with their bids. It is up to the contractor, after contract execution, to conduct field assessments, to determine work needs, to determine what activities need to be performed, and whether any licensure is required to perform those activities. Performance contracts are distinguished from "task" or "work- directed" contracts, in which the Department, itself, identifies the work needs and issues work orders, or task orders, directing the contractor to furnish specific quantities for specific locations. With the Department's work-directed contracts, the Special Provisions generally require proof of licensure at bid time. The Bid Solicitation Notice contained the following requirement(s): EXPERTISE REQUIRED: For this Contract, the Contractor is required to have at least three years of experience in the performance of Highway Lighting, or the Project Superintendent must have at least three years of like experience as a Superintendent. A Contractor that presently has a certificate of prequalification with the Department in both "Underground Utilities (Electric)" and Traffic Signal" will suffice to meet the above requirements. The Solicitation included a form titled "Experience in Highway Lighting" ("Experience Form"), by which a bidder could demonstrate compliance with the Solicitation's expertise requirement. The Experience Form contained blank spaces in which a bidder was to list qualifying projects, as well as a space a bidder could mark with an "X" to indicate that it is prequalified with the Department in both Underground Utilities (Electric) and Traffic Signal, depending on how the bidder elected to meet the Solicitation's expertise requirement. To be eligible to bid on Contract No. E5X18, bidders were required to have either three years' experience in highway lighting or possess a certificate of prequalification with the Department in both Underground Utilities (Electric) and Traffic Signal. The Solicitation left it up to the bidder which method would be used. One of the special provisions in the Specifications Package, under the heading "Contractor Responsibility," was a modification of Article 715-2.1 of the Standard Specifications, which was deleted and replaced with the following: A license to do business as a certified or registered electrical contractor pursuant to Chapter 489, Part II, Florida Statutes is required. Provide a journeyman electrician possessing a valid journeyman electrician's license to supervise all work, Provide copies of all licenses, certificates, and registrations to document compliance with this Article upon request by the Engineer. The Specifications Package also provided in Article 8-1, titled "Subletting or Assigning of Contracts," that the "Contractor" may "sublet," or subcontract, the contract work. Article 8-1 provided that to subcontract any work, the Contractor must submit a written request to the Department's Engineer. This provision further stated that such a request is approved by default unless the Engineer notifies the Contractor within five business days of receipt of the request that the Department does not consent to the request. The Solicitation further stated that the Department's Proposal Budget Estimate for the contract was $476,000.00. No timely challenge to the Solicitation specifications was ever filed. The Parties' Submissions and the Intended Award On or before the March 25, 2021, due date, DBi and ALS submitted bids to the Department in response to the Solicitation. DBi's bid total was $547,308.00. DBi attested to having the requisite experience, listing three Department highway lighting contracts on which it served as prime contractor, spanning from July 2014 to June 2020. DBi also indicated that it was prequalified with the Department in both Underground Utilities (Electric) and Traffic Signal. Jeffrey Schechtman, DBi's Chief Operating Officer, testified that this indication of being prequalified was made in error, but that DBi nonetheless provided the information in the experience section which met the expertise requirement. ALS' bid total was $799,200.00. ALS also attested to having the requisite experience, claiming prequalification with the Department in both Underground Utilities (Electric) and Traffic Signal. Although it is undisputed that ALS has many years of experience in highway lighting, ALS chose not to list any qualifying projects, and instead relied solely on its prequalification for its bid proposal. On March 25, 2021, the Department issued the Vendor Ranking for the Solicitation, which indicated that DBi was responsive and had submitted the lowest bid, and the Technical Review Committee recommended the Department award Contract No. E5X18 to DBi. On April 1, 2021, the Contract Awards Committee indicated an intent to award Contract No. E5X18 to DBi. On April 6, 2021, ALS filed, with the Department, its notice of intent to protest and, on April 14, its Petition. ALS filed an Amended Petition on June 11, 2021. The Protest ALS contends that both the Solicitation and section 489, part II, Florida Statutes, required each bidder to hold an electrical contracting license, issued by the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation, at the time of bid submission. According to ALS, because DBi lacks such a license, DBi is nonresponsive and nonresponsible, and the Department's intended award to DBi is clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. Additionally, ALS contends that DBi does not have the highway lighting expertise required by the Solicitation. DBi and the Department Responses DBi admits that it did not have an electrical contractor license at the time of bid submission and does not have a certificate of prequalification. However, both DBi and the Department assert that neither the Solicitation nor chapter 489, part II, require it. Rather, the license requirement is not for the bidder, but for the contractor (the entity that is successfully awarded the project) and can be satisfied by using the services of a licensed subcontractor. Further, DBi asserts that it properly listed three highway lighting projects which it supervised, thereby demonstrating the requisite experience. Both DBi and the Department question ALS' standing to bring this protest because, although ALS indicated it holds prequalification in both Underground Utilities (Electric) and Traffic Signal, ALS does not possess prequalification for Underground Utilities. To the extent ALS argues the Solicitation, by its scope of work, necessitates that a bidder has a license in electrical contracting, ALS is attempting to litigate an untimely specifications challenge. The License Requirement ALS contends "the entirety of the work [under Contract No. E5X18] constitutes electrical contracting for which an electrical contracting license is absolutely required." Amended Petition, ¶ 45. According to ALS, the requirement is set forth both expressly in the Solicitation and by the nature of the work described therein. ALS points to Article 715-2.1 of the Specifications Package, entitled "Contractor Responsibility": "A license to do business as a certified or registered electrical contractor pursuant to Chapter 489, Part II, Florida Statutes is required." Chapter 489, part II, governs electrical contracting. Under the statute, only certified or registered electrical contractors are permitted to perform electrical contracting in Florida. § 489.516(2), Fla. Stat. ("No person who is not certified or registered shall engage in the business of contracting in this state."). DBi and the Department stipulated on the record that most of the work described in the Specifications Package is electrical contracting work that requires an electrical contractor's license under chapter 489, part II. ALS expert, Curtis Falany, testified to the same. Mr. Falany conceded that under chapter 489, part II, work requiring an electrical contracting license begins the first time a worker approaches an electrically energized device and begins to manipulate it. Mr. Falany further admitted it is possible that, after Contract No. E5X18 is executed, a month could elapse without any such work needing to be performed. DBi does not dispute that work requiring electrical contracting licensure will likely arise under Contract No. E5X18, but contends that, in this performance maintenance contract, exactly what work will be performed is entirely speculative at this point. Further, while ALS refers to the Specifications Package as the contract's "scope of work," DBi asserts that the Specifications Package is a set of specifications that would apply to work that may need to be performed under the contract. Although ALS' argument, that intended electrical contracting work must be awarded to a licensed contractor, makes common sense, it ignores the explicit language of the Specifications and the reality of a performance- based maintenance contract. The only reference in the Specifications to a license requirement is under the heading "Contractor Responsibility," not "Bidder Responsibility." In fact, when the Department intends to require the bidder to have the electrical license, it is quite capable of asking for proof of the same at the time of the bid submission. For example, the Department entered into evidence the solicitation for a District Seven highway lighting maintenance contract that ALS was recently awarded, Contract No. E7N92, in which the solicitation expressly provides bidders "must possess and submit with their bid a license to do business as a Certified or Registered Electrical Contractor pursuant to Chapter 489, Part II, Florida Statutes." The Solicitation here contains no such provision. Likewise, the "Experience in Highway Lighting" form bidders were required to submit with their bids did not mention licensure. ALS contends DBi may not subcontract electrical work to a licensed electrical contractor. However, this ignores Article 8-1 of the Specifications, entitled, "Subletting or Assigning of Contracts," which states that the "Contractor" may "sublet," or subcontract, the contract work. The Department's witnesses testified that this means the contractor may subcontract up to 100 percent of the contract work. There is no provision in the Solicitation directing bidders to identify their subcontractors when submitting their bids. Indeed, with performance-based contracts, the Department typically does not ever learn whether any of the work is subcontracted or whether the work is self-performed. The competent, substantial evidence showed that not all work that might be performed under Contract No. E5X18 directly involves electrical work. For example, maintenance of traffic (referred to as "MOT"), tree trimming, and the general assessment of what work is needed typically do not involve installing, repairing, altering, adding to, or designing electrical wiring, fixtures, appliances, apparatus, raceways, conduit, or any part thereof that generates, transmits, transforms, or utilizes electrical energy in any form. See § 489.505(12), Fla. Stat. Consequently, the undersigned finds that Contract No. E5X18 is not an electrical contract per se, but rather is a performance maintenance contract that—like a broader, general performance maintenance contract— should eventually involve electrical work that requires electrical contracting licensure. The undersigned also finds that, while such work is likely to occur, whether and when it will is entirely speculative. Accordingly, only requiring the actual contractor (either on its own or through a subcontractor) instead of the bidder to possess an electrical contractor's license at the time of work, is the only logical interpretation of the Solicitation language. The Experience Requirement As discussed above, the Solicitation instructed each bidder to demonstrate, using one of two methods, the expertise that qualifies it to perform the contract. Bidders could describe "at least three years of experience in the performance of Highway Lighting" or show that they were prequalified by the Department in two specified work classes. On the "Experience in Highway Lighting" form each bidder was required to submit, DBi listed three contracts, all performance-based contracts with the Department's District Five, and all active contracts when bids for Contract No. E5X18 were submitted. In the space to describe the "Type of Work Performed," DBi stated, "Asset Maintenance/Highway Lighting." In the space to specify "Prime or Sub," DBi stated, "Prime."1 ALS contends DBi lacks the required expertise in two ways: (1) DBi did not self-perform the electrical work on those contracts but instead subcontracted the work; and (2) those contracts were "asset maintenance" 1 DBi also checked the “prequalified” box, but its Chief Operating Officer testified that this was an error. contracts, not "highway lighting maintenance" contracts. DBi readily admits that ALS performed some of the electrical work as a subcontractor on each contract listed and contends that DBi's position as prime contractor on all three contracts renders the work it subcontracted DBi's experience for purposes of the Solicitation. That the contracts DBi listed were general asset maintenance contracts instead of, specifically, lighting maintenance contracts, does not matter here. The Solicitation expressly refers to Contract No. E5X18 as a "Maintenance Performance Contract" and lists as the sole work item "Highway Lighting Maintenance." The Department considers highway lighting to be an asset of the Department, which is consistent with calling Contract No. E5X18 a maintenance contract. Further, Ms. Hutchison, the State Administrator for Maintenance Contracting, testified, although some of the Department's asset maintenance contracts are broad in scope and cover all work in a geographic area, that is not always the case; sometimes an asset maintenance contract is specific to only one type of work. The Solicitation provided that a bidder could demonstrate expertise by showing it had "at least three years of experience in the performance of Highway Lighting." The Solicitation does not state that experience must be direct- or self-performed or that the bidder may not include experience of subcontractors. From the Department's and DBi's perspectives, DBi "performed" those contracts—including the electrical work—within the meaning of the Solicitation's expertise provision. DBi is the one that contracted with the Department and is responsible to ensure all work under the contracts is timely completed in accordance with the contracts' terms. DBi is the one that invoiced the Department and the one the Department has paid and pays for all work under the contracts. And because, like the contract at issue here, these contracts are performance contracts, DBi was and is the one responsible for determining what work needs to be performed and how. DBi does not simply oversee others' performance of work items determined to be necessary by the Department, as occurs with a work-item contract. That certain work was performed by subcontractors does not negate that DBi successfully completed the contracts. The Department's practice, when procuring performance-based contracts, of treating a prime contractor's experience to include the experience of subcontractors is rational, reasonable, and justifiable. Accordingly, DBi met the experience requirement of the Solicitation. In contrast, ALS did not meet the experience requirement. ALS did not list three years' experience in highway lighting work, instead choosing to demonstrate expertise solely through its Department-issued prequalification. ALS submitted a copy of its current Certificate of Qualification and checked the "prequalified" box on the Experience in Highway Lighting form, representing that it held both Underground Utilities (Electric) and Traffic Signal prequalification. However, ALS' Certificate of Qualification reflects that ALS is prequalified in the work classes Traffic Signal and Electrical Work, but not Underground Utilities (Electric). ALS attempted to show, through the testimony of its Region Manager Richard Calledare, that Electrical Work is a "major" work class and Underground Utilities (Electric) is a "minor" work class subsumed within the umbrella of Electrical Work and that, therefore, ALS was effectively prequalified in both work classes. In support, Mr. Calledare suggested that the undersigned should "check the [Department's] website." However the website was not introduced into evidence and constitutes uncorroborated hearsay which cannot support a finding of fact. ALS presented no competent, substantial evidence supporting this argument—no evidence as to what major and minor work classes are and no evidence that the Electrical Work work class encompasses Underground Utilities (Electric). Further, the only evidence ALS presented was testimony from Mr. Calledare, yet there was no evidence Mr. Calledare was ever employed by the Department or had any specialized knowledge or other qualification that would render his perspective on this issue competent and substantial evidence sufficient to support a finding that ALS' prequalification in Electrical Work sufficed to meet the Underground Utilities (Electric) requirement. In contrast, the Department presented competent, substantial evidence showing that ALS' argument fails. As Mr. Calledare conceded, the Solicitation's plain language makes no mention of the work class Electrical Work. The Department's current list of qualified contractors shows that multiple contractors are prequalified in both these classes, demonstrating that a contractor can be prequalified in Electrical Work without being prequalified in Underground Utilities (Electric) and reflecting that being prequalified in Electrical Work is not the same as being prequalified in Underground Utilities (Electric). Deanna Hutchison, a Department State Administrator for Maintenance Contracting, testified that Underground Utilities (Electric) and Electrical Work are separate, mutually exclusive classifications and that Electrical Work is not inclusive of Underground Utilities (Electric). ALS' failure to hold a Department-issued prequalification in Underground Utilities (Electric), as well as Traffic Signal, and failure to demonstrate the required expertise by any other means, rendered ALS' bid nonresponsive.2
Conclusions For Petitioner: Karen D. Walker, Esquire Holland & Knight, LLP 315 South Calhoun Street, Suite 600 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James Keith Ramsey, Esquire Ben W. Subin, Esquire Holland & Knight, LLP 200 South Orange Avenue, Suite 2600 Orlando, Florida 32801 For Respondent: Sean W. Gellis, General Counsel George Spears Reynolds, Esquire Douglas Dell Dolan, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 For Intervenor: Megan S. Reynolds, Esquire William Robert Vezina, III, Esquire Vezina Lawrence & Piscitelli, P.A. 413 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the protest filed by American Lighting and Signalization, LLC, should be dismissed, and the Department of Transportation should enter a final order awarding Contract No. E5X18 to DBi. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of September, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of September, 2021. Douglas Dell Dolan, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Ben W. Subin, Esquire Holland & Knight, LLP 200 South Orange Avenue, Suite 2600 Orlando, Florida 32801 Karen D. Walker, Esquire Holland & Knight, LLP 315 South Calhoun Street, Suite 600 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William Robert Vezina, III, Esquire Vezina, Lawrence and Piscitelli, P.A. 413 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 George Spears Reynolds, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Amber Greene, Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Megan S. Reynolds, Esquire Vezina, Lawrence & Piscitelli, P.A. 413 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Sean W. Gellis, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 James Keith Ramsey, Esquire Holland & Knight, LLP 200 South Orange Avenue, Suite 2600 Orlando, Florida 32801 Kevin J. Thibault, P.E., Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 57 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Luther E. Council, Jr., who is now 32 years old, is no stranger to the business of contracting. His father, Luther E. Council, Sr., began instructing him in the trade when Petitioner was approximately 10 years old. Mr. Council, Sr. operates Council Brothers, Incorporated, a commercial plumbing, heating and air conditioning contracting firm. From July 1969 until July 1973 Petitioner was employed as a plumber by Prescott Plumbing Company in Tallahassee, Florida. His duties included assembling and repairing pipes and fixtures for heating, wastewater, and drainage systems according to specifications and plumbing codes. In September 1973 Petitioner entered the United States Navy where he served as an aviation electrician. He attended numerous training schools including electrical, electronics, and avionics schools at the Naval Air Station in Memphis, Tennessee, and at the Naval Air Station at Cecil Field, Jacksonville, Florida. This instruction included over 1,500 hours of classroom time. After two years of service he was honorably discharged. Upon his discharge from the Navy in 1975, Petitioner went to work for Litton Industries at their Ingalls Shipyard in Pascagoula, Mississippi. He began in the position of Maintenance Electrician B but was promoted to Journeyman in less than six months. After approximately one and a half years at Ingalls Petitioner was hired at Brown & Root Construction Company as a Journeyman Electrician on their electrical termination crew. In that position he was responsible for the termination of all electrical equipment in the steam power plant for Mississippi Power Company. He remained in that position until the plant was shut down. Petitioner then returned to Ingalls where he was a Maintenance Electrician on the automated equipment crew. He maintained and repaired equipment such as boilers, welding machines, x-ray machines, air compressors, bridge cranes, communications equipment, sheet metal shop equipment, and fire and security alarm systems. This period of employment was from July 8, 1976 until February 2, 1977. Thereafter Petitioner was again employed by Brown & Root Construction Company, this time in Axis, Alabama. In his position as Work Leaderman Electrician (assistant foreman) he was responsible for the construction, installation, and termination of all electrical equipment for a particular utilities area at the Shell Chemical Plant. He worked on equipment such as boilers, air compressors, water treatment facilities, pump motors, hot oil furnaces instruments, monitoring and control panels, and incinerators with a crew of up to 18 men. Petitioner did not have a foreman but was directly responsible to the project superintendent. From June 1978 until June 1979 Petitioner was employed as an electrician by Union Carbide in Theodore, Alabama. As the only electrician on duty at night, Mr. Council was responsible for the electrical maintenance of all machinery ranging from the power plant distribution system to overhead bridge cranes to small electronic devices. Included within his responsibilities were maintaining air conditioning systems, interior and exterior lighting systems, and repairing huge sandblasting equipment. Upon completion of his work for Union Carbide he returned home to Council Brothers, Inc. Since his return to Council Brothers in June of 1979 Petitioner has had a variety of responsible duties. His functions can be placed in two categories: roving foreman and estimator. Council Brothers is a mechanical contractor with a gross profit of over 1.1 million dollars for the year 1983. Some of the firm's recent projects include installing heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) equipment at several local high schools; pressurizing the stairwells and elevator shafts in the State Capitol building, modification of HVAC systems at several state office buildings in Tallahassee, Florida, and renovation work at the State Hospital in Chattahoochee, Florida. As an estimator Petitioner supervises the project design and is responsible for the firm's mechanical contracting projects. On most of its projects Council Brothers is the general contractor for the mechanical work. It then subcontracts out the specific electrical work required. In his capacity as a roving foreman Respondent serves as a trouble shooter available to assist those projects which may encounter particular problems. He is then responsible for solving the problems through a redesign of the project, the use of alternative equipment, or some other means. Since August of 1981 however, Mr. Council has spent most of his time in the office estimating and bidding jobs. On August 4, 1983 Petitioner became Vice-President of Council Brothers, Inc. The firm first registered as an electrical contractor in June 1983. Petitioner holds licenses as a certified building contractor, plumbing contractor, mechanical contractor and underground utilities contractor.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Electrical Contractors Licensing Board enter a Final Order denying Petitioner permission to take the examination for licensure as a certified electrical contractor. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 14th February, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL PEARCE DODSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 1984.
