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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs LEONARD WALKER, M.D., 00-003253PL (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Pierce, Florida Aug. 08, 2000 Number: 00-003253PL Latest Update: Sep. 24, 2024
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ROSEVELT HUGHES vs CITY OF LEESBURG, 03-000055 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Leesburg, Florida Jan. 09, 2003 Number: 03-000055 Latest Update: Mar. 10, 2004

The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner's failure to file a Petition for Relief constitutes a failure to properly invoke the jurisdiction of the Division of Administrative Hearings and, if not, whether Respondent violated Section 760.10, Florida Statutes, by discriminating against Petitioner based on his disability.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner began his employment as a firefighter with the City of Leesburg on or about October 20, 1987. Respondent operates two fire stations: Station One and Station Two. At all times material here, Petitioner was assigned to Station One. In the months prior to October 15, 2001, Respondent began using an advance life support (ALS) rescue truck at Station One. The ALS rescue truck had to have a paramedic on board for all emergency calls, a requirement that did not exist for fire trucks. The ALS rescue truck was required to respond to all emergency calls for both rescue stations. All firemen, even those who were not paramedics or emergency medical technicians (EMTs) had to take turns, on a rotating basis, riding with the paramedic in the ALS rescue truck. Petitioner was nearing the time when he could retire. He felt that his seniority in the department entitled him to a transfer to Station Two, which answered fewer calls and did not have an ALS rescue truck. Petitioner requested the transfer, telling some of his superiors that he did not feel he was qualified to ride the ALS rescue truck. Petitioner told Lieutenant Richardson that he did not like riding the ALS rescue truck and "wanted off of it." Captain Pierce, Petitioner's supervisor, denied Petitioner's request to transfer to Station Two. However, Captain Pierce did agree to ask some of the more junior firemen to take Petitioner's rotation on the ALS rescue truck from time to time. On or about October 15, 2001, the firefighters assigned to Station One were viewing a training video. During the video presentation, Petitioner was reclining on a sofa with a built-in recliner. Petitioner had his arm over his eyes and a sucker in his mouth. Lieutenant Richardson asked Petitioner if he was sick. Petitioner replied that he was taking his temperature. Lieutenant Richardson asked Petitioner what he meant in stating that he was taking his temperature. Petitioner responded that he was going to get off that rescue truck, one way or the other. Shortly thereafter, Lieutenant Richardson again asked Petitioner if he was OK. Petitioner replied that he was fine. Station One then got a call to respond to an emergency. Petitioner questioned Lieutenant Richardson about the ALS rescue truck responding to the call. Lieutenant Richardson explained that the ALS rescue truck was to follow the fire engine. Petitioner then stated that he wanted to make sure that he was doing things properly because his time on Rescue One, the ALS rescue truck, was limited. Lieutenant Richardson asked Petitioner to repeat his statement. Petitioner complied with the request. The emergency call on the afternoon of October 15, 2001, came in about 4:00 p.m. The weather was hot and sunny. The firemen were bunkered out, wearing heavy fire pants and jackets, safety boots and gloves, and helmets. The firemen did not wear their air packs/breathing units. The emergency was located at the scene of an automobile accident on Dixie Highway near Leesburg Regional Medical Center in Leesburg, Florida. The accident involved two vehicles: a small car and a large truck/trailer. There were two persons in the car. The driver of the car died in the accident. The passenger in the car was alive, but unconscious, when the firemen arrived at the scene. The rescue crew immediately removed the passenger, who was sent to the hospital by ambulance. Petitioner assisted in the rapid extrication of the passenger. The firemen could not extricate the deceased driver of the car until a wrecker pulled the semi-truck off of the car. Therefore, the firemen stood around, during a brief delay, waiting for the wrecker. A large crowd gathered at the scene because the accident was very severe. Petitioner assisted in crowd control, asking some people to stand back. Alphonso Sanders, Petitioner's former neighbor was in the crowd. Petitioner did not appear to be his usual chipper self, so Mr. Sanders asked Petitioner what was wrong. Petitioner replied, "I don't feel good. I think it's my sickle cell and my legs are hurting." After the wrecker moved the truck, the firemen began extricating the driver of the car. The extrication required the use of heavy hydraulic equipment. For a while, Petitioner assisted in operating the levers that turned the hydraulic power off and on. As the extrication process continued, other firemen began operating the hydraulic equipment. Petitioner, who was no longer involved in the operation, leaned casually back on the rear of the car that contained the deceased victim. Petitioner had his legs and feet crossed in front of him. Lieutenant Richardson, the officer in charge of the operation, was standing within six feet of Petitioner. Lieutenant Richardson perceived Petitioner’s stance to be unprofessional and disrespectful due to the severity of the accident and the presence of the deceased victim in the car. Lieutenant Richardson gave Petitioner a direct order to stop leaning on the car. Petitioner replied that he was tired and did not change his position. Lieutenant Richardson then gave Petitioner a second direct order to stand up. Petitioner responded that his leg hurt and did not obey the order. Petitioner did not appear to be in pain to Lieutenant Richardson, who is trained as an EMT to observe and assess people in physical distress. Captain Pierce was also standing close to Petitioner. He asked Petitioner if he had heard his lieutenant give him two orders and if he was going to obey his superior officer. Petitioner responded, "No, I'm tired, my leg hurts, I'm not going to stand up." Captain Pierce then ordered Petitioner to get into the Captain’s vehicle in order to leave the scene. Once ordered to leave the scene by Captain Pierce, Petitioner walked unassisted from the car to the Captain’s vehicle and sat inside. The car and the Captain’s vehicle were approximately 50 feet apart. Petitioner was not limping and did not appear to be distressed in any way. When Petitioner and Captain Pierce got into the Captain's vehicle, Captain Pierce asked Petitioner whether he was hurt or injured. Petitioner denied being hurt or injured. Petitioner then began to chastise Captain Pierce for not transferring him to Station Two. After returning to the fire station, Petitioner stood outside in the sun, filling out paperwork. He did not request nor receive any medical attention. Upon report of the incident to Deputy Chief Geoffrey Beyer, Petitioner was placed on administrative leave pending an investigation of the incident at the scene and Petitioner’s failure to obey direct orders. Petitioner continued on administrative leave until November 20, 2001, when he was terminated. Petitioner was told he had sickle cell trait in 1971 when he was in the military. In 1981, Petitioner complained to a physician that he had blood in his urine on two occasions. In 1991, he complained to a physician had blood in his urine on one occasion. Petitioner admits, and his medical records reflect, that he is diagnosed with sickle cell trait and not sickle cell disease. All firefighters like Petitioner are required to undergo an annual medical examination. The doctors performing these exams do not make any report to Respondent about the exams unless they find some indication that a fireman is not fit to perform their duties pursuant to state guidelines. Petitioner also had medical examinations every time Respondent changed health insurance carriers and on certain occasions when Petitioner was ill. During at least some of these exams, Petitioner informed the physicians that he had sickle cell trait. However, Respondent was not entitled to review Petitioner's medical records without his permission. Moreover, Respondent never had a reason to make such a request. Sickle cell trait in and of itself is not a disease or disability. Rather, sickle cell trait is a genetic predisposition for the presence of Hemoglobin S in the blood. Petitioner has had only a few occasions throughout the past 20 years where he experienced any symptoms related to sickle cell trait. Dr. Lourdes Mathew, Petitioner's hematologist, classified the occurrence of these symptoms, such as urine in the blood, thrombosis or cramping, dehydration or joint pain, as sporadic in nature. Permanent effects or long-term impact have only been observed in rare cases where severe nerve damage has occurred. Dr. Mathew’s opinion is that despite Petitioner’s diagnosis with sickle cell trait, he was physically able to perform his normal job duties at the City of Leesburg as a firefighter. Dr. Mathew also testified that sickle cell trait does not substantially impair any of Petitioner’s major life activities. However, Dr. Mathew would not advise Petitioner to engage in fighting forest fires where he might become overexerted and unable to maintain his hydration. There are no medications that are generally prescribed for individuals with sickle cell trait. Treatment for individuals with sickle cell trait is merely self-policing in nature and involves preventative and corrective measures, such as maintaining hydration and avoiding overexertion. Respondent learned for the first time of Petitioner’s alleged "disability" as a result of the charge filed against Respondent. At no time prior to the incident on October 15, 2001, did the City of Leesburg or its employees have knowledge of any physical limitations of Petitioner due to sickle cell trait. Any evidence to the contrary is not persuasive. Respondent's Human Resources Director, Jakki Cunningham-Perry, performed an investigation of the October 15, 2001, incident. During her interview of Petitioner, he told her that he had been diagnosed as having sickle cell trait. Petitioner also told Ms. Cunningham-Perry that he could have moved away from the vehicle when Lieutenant Richardson ordered him to stand up but that he did not know what to do because whatever he said seemed to fall on deaf ears. Respondent has written rules and regulations, operating procedures, and general orders that are provided to all firemen. The document contains the following provisions, in pertinent part: ATTENTION TO DUTY Department personnel shall at all times be attentive to their duties and by their alertness and observations, demonstrate their interest in their work. They shall act with dignity, maintaining a bearing conducive to a good department at all times. OBEDIENCE TO ORDERS All personnel shall respect and obey all laws and ordinances and the provision of departmental orders from their superior, including rules and regulations, duties, and procedures. Respondent's disciplinary policy defines insubordination as refusal to carry out a reasonable request/directive given by a supervisor. The disciplinary range for insubordination includes suspension for one to three days, suspension for four to five days, and discharge/termination. Ms. Cunningham-Perry recommended termination of Petitioner in a report dated November 13, 2001. Termination of Petitioner's employment was appropriate instead of some form of progressive discipline due to Petitioner's refusal to obey direct orders during a rescue operation. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Petitioner refused the orders because he wanted to be transferred to Station Two and not because he was experiencing a flare up of symptoms related to sickle cell trait. Respondent did not receive any medical information from Dr. Mathew about Petitioner's sickle cell trait diagnosis until November 15, 2001. Petitioner admits he did not give prior direct notice to anyone at the fire department of any physical limitations or symptoms he experienced as a result of sickle cell trait. Petitioner’s physical performance on the job had always been outstanding. Prior to receiving Dr. Mathew's letter on November 15, 2001, Respondent never had a reason to question Petitioner's fitness for duty. In fact, Petitioner was extremely fit for his age. On one occasion, Petitioner won a foot race with other younger firemen. The race took place in August during a training session in which the firemen were fully bunkered out and wearing their air packs. Petitioner’s alleged disability was not a factor in the Respondent’s decision to terminate him. The decision was based solely upon Petitioner’s insubordination, failure to show attention to duty, and failure to obey direct orders in violation of City policy and fire department rules.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is

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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs JAVIER PEREZ-FERNANDEZ, M.D., 07-000487PL (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Jan. 29, 2007 Number: 07-000487PL Latest Update: Sep. 24, 2024
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs SERGE VILVAR, M.D, 06-004545PL (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:North Miami Beach, Florida Nov. 13, 2006 Number: 06-004545PL Latest Update: Sep. 24, 2024
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ABOLGHASEM ZOLFAGHARI vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF STATE GROUP INSURANCE, 20-000146 (2020)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jan. 14, 2020 Number: 20-000146 Latest Update: May 04, 2020

The Issue Whether Petitioner’s request for coverage of proton beam radiation therapy (“proton beam therapy” or “PBRT”) is a covered benefit pursuant to the State Employees’ Health Maintenance Organization (“HMO”) Plan (“Plan”), administered by AvMed.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency charged with administering the state employee health insurance program pursuant to section 110.123. At all times material hereto, Petitioner was a member of the Plan. AvMed is the third-party administrator for the Plan at issue in this cause. As the third-party administrator, AvMed provides claims processing, utilization, and benefit management services. The applicable benefit document is the State Employees’ HMO Plan, Group Health Insurance Plan Booklet and Benefits Document (“Plan Document”), effective January 1, 2019. Petitioner is a 66-year-old male who was diagnosed with prostate cancer in November 2017 and underwent a prostatectomy to remove his prostate on April 12, 2018. Subsequent to his initial surgery and treatment, Petitioner experienced increasing prostate specific antigen (“PSA”) in three follow-up tests. His prostate cancer had returned. Petitioner’s physician sought to treat his condition with PBRT, a form of external beam radiation utilizing protons, rather than traditional intensity modulated radiation therapy (“IMRT”), which is, without question, covered under the Plan. Medicare, a federal healthcare insurance program, agreed to pay 80 percent of Intervenor’s charges for PBRT, leaving Petitioner responsible for the remaining 20 percent being sought to be paid by Petitioner’s Plan. On July 3, 2019, Petitioner, through his healthcare provider, Maria-Amelia Rodrigues, M.D., and Intervenor, Miami Cancer Institute, submitted a request for coverage of PBRT to AvMed. On July 10, 2019, AvMed denied the preservice request for coverage on the basis that the therapy was experimental/investigational and, therefore, not medically necessary treatment for the member’s condition. The request was reviewed by Sri Gorty, M.D., a consultant radiation oncologist at Magellan Healthcare, which is under contract with AvMed. On July 23, 2019, Petitioner submitted a request for a Level I appeal to AvMed. The appeal was reviewed by Dr. Gregg Goldin, M.D., a consultant radiology oncologist at Dane Street, which is under contract with AvMed. He filed a report dated August 19, 2019. On August 20, 2019, AvMed denied the request for Level I appeal on the basis that the therapy was experimental/investigational and, therefore, not a medically necessary treatment. On November 19, 2019, Petitioner submitted a request for an “Expedited” Level II appeal to Respondent. The Level II appeal was reviewed by Dearline Thomas-Brown, a registered nurse and Level II appeal coordinator for Respondent. On November 21, 2019, Respondent denied Petitioner’s Level II appeal on the basis that the therapy is experimental/investigational and, therefore, not medically necessary for treatment of the member’s condition. Pursuant to the Plan Document, the Plan pays its share of the cost of covered services, if the services are: Ordered by a Network Provider (a provider who is in AvMed’s network); Considered Medically Necessary for the covered person’s treatment because of accident, illness, condition or mental health or nervous disorder; Not specifically limited or excluded under this Plan; and Rendered while this Plan is in effect. Pursuant to the Plan Document, Section I. Introduction: The Plan is not intended to and does not cover or provide any Medical Services or benefits that are not Medically Necessary for the diagnosis and treatment of the Health Plan Member. AvMed determines whether the services are Medically Necessary on the basis of terms, conditions, and criteria established by the Plan as interpreted by the state, and as set forth in medical guidelines. This chart provides a description of services and supplies covered under the Plan. Coverage Access Rules are specified under the Plan as follows: Cancer Services Diagnosis and Treatment Includes both inpatient and outpatient diagnostic tests and treatment (including anti-cancer medications administered by Network providers), including cancer clinical trials as set forth in the Florida Clinical Trial Compact. Does not include Experimental or Investigational Treatment. In order to be a covered benefit, the treatment must be “medically necessary,” not “experimental or investigational,” and it must not be specifically excluded by the Plan. “Medically Necessary” is defined as follows: The use of any appropriate medical treatment, service, equipment and/or supply as provided by a Hospital, skilled nursing facility, physician or other provider which is necessary for the diagnosis, care and/or treatment of a Health Plan Member’s Illness or injury, and which is: Consistent with the symptom, diagnosis and treatment of the Health Plan Member’s condition; The most appropriate level of supply and/or service for the diagnosis and treatment of the Health Plan Member’s condition; In accordance with standards of acceptable medical practice; Not primarily intended for the personal comfort or convenience of the Health Plan Member, the Health Plan Member’s family, the physician or other health care providers; Approved by the appropriate medical body or health care specialty involved as effective, appropriate and essential for the care and treatment of the Health Plan Member’s condition; and Not experimental or investigational. The service must meet all of the above-referenced criteria in order to be medically necessary. Given the above definition, if a service is experimental or investigational, then it cannot be medically necessary. Section VI. Limitations and Exclusions in the Plan Document specifically exclude services that are “experimental/investigational or not medically necessary treatment with the exception of routine care in connection with a clinical trial in cancer, pursuant to the Florida Clinical Trial Compact and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.” “Experimental and/or Investigational” is defined as follows: For the purposes of this Plan a medication, treatment, device, surgery or procedure may initially be determined by AvMed to be experimental and/or investigational if any of the following applies: The FDA has not granted the approval for general use; or There are insufficient outcomes data available from controlled clinical trials published in peer- reviewed literature to substantiate its effectiveness for the disease or injury involved; or There is no consensus among practicing physicians that the medication, treatment, therapy, procedure or device is safe or effective for the treatment in question or such medication, treatment, therapy, procedure or device is not the standard treatment, therapy procedure or device utilized by practicing physicians in treating other patients with the same or similar condition; or Such medication, treatment procedure, or device is the subject of an ongoing Phase I or Phase II clinical investigation, or Experimental or research arm of a Phase III clinical investigation, or under study to determine: maximum tolerated dosage(s), toxicity, safety, efficacy, or efficacy as comparted with the standard for treatment or diagnosis of the condition in question. If any one or more of the above-cited criteria are met, then the treatment is experimental and/or investigational and is not a covered service. In making an adverse determination as to coverage in both the Level I and Level II appeals, Edwin Rodriguez, M.D. (note the slightly different spelling of Petitioner’s expert Dr. Maria-Amelia Rodrigues versus Dr. Edwin Rodriguez), and Nurse Thomas-Brown utilized AvMed’s Medical Coverage Guideline on PBRT. This coverage guideline regarding PBRT provides AvMed’s “Exclusion Criteria” explaining “PBRT is not covered, and is considered investigational, as to all other tumors not listed” in the guideline. PBRT is not an approved treatment option for localized prostate cancer under the NIA Magellan criteria. The Medical Technology Assessment Committee at AvMed drafts clinical policy guidelines and is responsible for maintaining or changing them as technology advances. AvMed’s policy on use of PBRT for the treatment of prostate cancer states that it is not medically necessary because studies have not shown clinical outcomes to be superior to conventional radiation therapy (i.e., IMRT). This policy was developed following extensive review of studies in peer-reviewed medical literature, available guidelines, technology assessments, and opinions from experts. The policy is updated on a yearly basis in order to take into consideration any new evidence. A recent review of the policy on PBRT resulted in no change in AvMed’s position on coverage for treatment of prostate cancer. The medical coverage guidelines are meant to be used in conjunction with the Plan Document to determine whether services are medically necessary and a covered benefit. Dr. Gorty, AvMed’s external reviewer from Magellan Healthcare, who was accepted as an expert in the field of radiation oncology, testified that his recommended denial of coverage of PBRT was informed by Petitioner’s medical records, Intervenor’s Letter of Medical Necessity, clinical trials, the model policy from the American Society of Therapeutic Radiation and Oncology (“ASTRO”), and the National Comprehensive Cancer Network (“NCCN”) guidelines. PBRT PBRT is a procedure that uses protons to deliver a curative radiation dose to a tumor, while reducing radiation doses to healthy tissues and organs, which results in fewer complications and side effects than IMRT. As stated earlier, Petitioner’s prostate was removed in April 2018. Thereafter, rising PSA levels indicated that he needed further treatment, and Dr. Rodrigues, a board-certified radiation oncologist at Miami Cancer Institute, became his treating physician. Dr. Rodrigues has been treating patients for 23 years, including prostate cancer patients. She was accepted as an expert in her field for these proceedings. Dr. Rodrigues determined PBRT to be the appropriate radiation treatment for Mr. Zolfaghari given his type of prostate cancer—recurrent prostate cancer. Dr. Rodrigues testified that recurrent prostate cancer occurs when a cancer has been treated and then reoccurs. In addition to PBRT, Dr. Rodrigues recommended, and Petitioner received, androgen deprivation therapy, generally referred to as hormone therapy, to be used in conjunction with PBRT. Dr. Rodrigues testified that the androgen deprivation therapy blocks the production of testosterone. She testified that patients with recurrent prostate cancer or certain high-risk patients have better overall survival when the two treatments are used in conjunction. As an additional aggravating factor to Petitioner’s cancer treatment, Petitioner was diagnosed with colon cancer leading to surgery in January 2020. Dr. Rodrigues testified that Petitioner’s colon cancer made his need for PBRT even more necessary, because now Petitioner is at a higher risk for adverse effects from the unwanted spread of toxicity common with IMRT. Dr. Rodrigues, as a Miami Cancer Institute physician, wrote letters requesting treatment and appealing denials of treatment as set forth above, and testified at the March 9, 2020, administrative hearing in support of Petitioner’s efforts to obtain coverage through AvMed for PBRT, which she considers to be a medically necessary treatment modality. Dr. Rodrigues was asked why she had not gone forward and provided Petitioner IMRT in order to prevent any further delay due to the passage of time from unsuccessful appeals of the denial by AvMed for the PBRT treatment of his recurring prostate cancer. She replied that she was attempting to secure a less toxic treatment modality, PBRT, for her patient who was already approved by Medicare for coverage of 80 percent of the cost of the treatment. MEDICAL NECESSITY OF PBRT VERSUS IMRT There is no dispute that IMRT is an accepted treatment modality for Petitioner’s recurrent prostate cancer, even bearing in mind his complicating factor of colon cancer surgery and treatment endured following his 2018 prostatectomy. The remaining dispute here is whether PBRT is both medically necessary and not an experimental and/or investigative form of radiation treatment. IMRT is a recognized form of treatment for Petitioner’s recurrent prostate cancer. Dr. Rodrigues testified that Miami Cancer Institute considered only candidates for PBRT as those who would qualify for IMRT, such as Petitioner. Given the availability of another treatment option, IMRT, which is the most widely recognized standard of care within the medical establishment for the treatment of Petitioner’s condition, Respondent’s experts conclude that PBRT is not medically necessary because it is not the most appropriate level of service in this case. While PBRT has been accepted by AvMed, according to its Plan, for certain types of cancer, the insurer has not yet authorized it for the treatment of prostate cancer. This is where the semantics of the contract come into play. Petitioner and Intervenor argued that Respondent mistakenly based its denial upon a diagnosis of “localized prostate cancer” (Dr. Rodrigues’ reading of the proscription of the use of PBRT for Petitioner) rather than “recurrent prostate cancer” (not specifically proscribed by the Plan according to her reading), combined with the fact that Petitioner’s unique medical condition requires lower toxicity in the specific type of radiation used. PBRT, she testified, offers lower radiation toxicity, which will have less of a harmful effect on Petitioner’s colon and rectum as a survivor of colon cancer surgery. Dr. Rodriguez, the AvMed senior medical director, testified that studies comparing PBRT to 3-D confirming radiation or IMRT are limited. Overall studies have not shown clinical outcomes to be superior to conventional radiation therapy. In addition to the preservice and Level I appeal reviews by AvMed, and Respondent’s Level II appeal review, an Independent Organization Review (“IRO”) was conducted by a licensed radiation oncologist employed by Independent Medical Expert Consulting Services. As a result of this independent review, the Plan’s denial was upheld. Dr. Rodrigues presented studies in her testimony and a letter of medical necessity which cited the potential for favorable outcomes with PBRT. Dr. Gorty, Respondent’s expert in radiation oncology, contradicted her testimony in that many of the studies she cited noted a need for further study regarding the safety and efficacy of PBRT for treatment, and all of these studies were based upon “localized prostate cancer,” rather than “recurrent prostate cancer.” Dr. Gorty also testified that Petitioner's records indicated that his cancer was localized, although it could also be "recurrent." Dr. Gorty testified that clinical studies show no significant difference in the toxicity between IMRT and PBRT. Further, Dr. Rodriguez explained that localized cancer can be recurrent. “Localized” refers to where the cancer may be found, while “recurrent” refers to a repeat or re-occurrence of a cancer, which might return to the same location or reappear in a different location. Paragraph 15 lists the criteria to determine whether a treatment or procedure is “medically necessary” under the AvMed policy. PBRT does not meet the third criterion of the definition of “medically necessary,” as PBRT treatment of prostate cancer is not in accordance with standards of acceptable community practice. Dr. Gorty testified that AvMed medical guidelines utilize IMRT as the “next generation” treatment, rather than PBRT. Further, Dr. Gorty testified that he was aware of several recent clinical trials concerning PBRT and IMRT, and these studies do not reach a conclusion that PBRT is preferable to IMRT. PBRT does not meet the fifth criterion of the definition of “medically necessary,” as PBRT has not been approved by the appropriate medical body or healthcare specialty involved as effective, appropriate, and essential for the care and treatment of prostate cancer. PBRT is not essential for the treatment of prostate cancer. There are several treatment modalities that are generally available for the treatment of prostate cancer and, as discussed above, several of those treatment options were reasonable treatment options for Petitioner. While Dr. Rodrigues believes PBRT to be preferable for Petitioner in this case due to, in her opinion, fewer adverse side effects of the treatment, she admitted that Petitioner is a suitable candidate for IMRT. Therefore, PBRT does not meet the sixth criterion of the definition of “medically necessary,” as it meets the definition of “experimental and/or investigational.” Specifically, criteria 2, 3, and 4 of the definition of “experimental and/or investigational” are met, which lead to the ultimate conclusion that PBRT is not medically necessary in this case. EXPERIMENTAL AND/OR INVESTIGATIONAL TREATMENT Paragraph 18 sets forth the criteria for determining whether a treatment or procedure is “experimental and/or investigational.” The second criterion from the definition of experimental and/or investigational treatment is met in this case. Insufficient outcomes data are not available from controlled clinical trials published in peer-reviewed literature to substantiate PBRT’s safety and effectiveness for treatment of prostate cancer. Dr. Rodriguez testified that there is a lack of peer-reviewed, published, randomized studies regarding proton beam therapy. Further, PBRT treatment is not the generally accepted standard of care. Dr. Rodrigues testified that only a handful of medical centers in the United States are using PBRT to treat cancer malignancies. Only two such programs are located in Florida—the University of Florida and Intervenor. Outside of Florida, only Massachusetts General and Loma Linda offer the treatment. Prior to Intervenor offering the treatment, Dr. Rodrigues referred her patients to one of these other facilities for PBRT when she deemed it appropriate to do so. Current randomized trials are on-going and being published in peer- reviewed medical literature. PBRT treatment for prostate cancer is considered investigational and not a standard of care option and, therefore, not medically necessary. Nurse Thomas-Brown testified that a treatment considered experimental or investigational is, automatically, not medically necessary. NIA Magellan Clinical Guideline Number NIA_CG_124, which was developed in July 2018 for implementation in January 2019 to assist physicians in the application of treatment, states that both surgery and radiation therapy should be used to treat organ confined prostate cancer, as well as prostate cancers extended into adjacent tissues. This guideline finds that PBRT is not an approved treatment option for localized prostate cancer as studies comparing it to 3-D conformal radiation or IMRT are limited. Leading organizations, such as NCCN and ASTRO, have noted insufficient data outcomes and a need for more study of proton beam therapy, which these organizations have not yet accepted as the standard of care. PBRT also meets the third criterion of the definition of “experimental and/or investigational.” There is no consensus among practicing physicians that PBRT is safe or effective for the treatment of prostate cancer or that PBRT is the standard treatment utilized by practicing physicians in treating other patients with the same or similar conditions. Both Dr. Gorty and Dr. Rodriguez testified that proton beam therapy is experimental and investigational and, therefore, not medically necessary for all forms of prostate cancer; two additional radiation oncologists reviewed the appeal and reached the conclusion that PBRT is not medically necessary. Additionally, there was uncontroverted evidence that IMRT, not PBRT, is the standard form of treatment utilized by practicing physicians for treatment of prostate cancer. Dr. Gorty testified that AvMed approved the NIA Magellan clinical guidelines for prostate cancer, which are based on the peer-reviewed studies; and he explained three such studies. His testimony noted that the second study from the University of Pennsylvania at Baltimore, Maryland, specifically matched Petitioner’s medical condition. This study compared 307 men and their comparative toxicity outcomes of PBRT verses IMRT for post-operative sites. It concluded that future prospective investigation and ongoing follow-up will determine whether dosimetric differences between treatment with IMRT and proton beam therapy convert to meaningful differences in long-term outcomes. As part of the appeal process on behalf of Petitioner, Intervenor also requested a review by an IRO. The review was completed by a board-certified radiation oncologist, and a report was generated on January 9, 2020. The “List of Materials Reviewed” is extensive and includes Petitioner’s medical records and Intervenor’s supporting documentation. The independent reviewer upheld the denial and noted that medical necessity has not been established. The IRO states that “until the current randomized trials ongoing are published in peer reviewed medical literature, proton beam treatment for prostate cancer is considered investigational and not a standard of care treatment option.”

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of State Group Insurance, enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for coverage for proton beam therapy. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of May, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Erica D. Moore, Esquire Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Abolghasem Zolfaghari 10910 Southwest 140th Avenue Miami, Florida 33186 Frank A. Florio, Esquire Maria D. Garcia, Esquire Latasha Gethers Hines, Esquire Kozyak, Tropin & Throckmorton, LLP 2525 Ponce de Leon Boulevard, Ninth Floor Coral Gables, Florida 33134 (eServed) William Chorba, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)

USC (1) 26 U.S.C 125 Florida Laws (4) 110.123110.161120.569120.57 DOAH Case (1) 20-0146
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs RONALD EVAN WHEELER, M.D., 16-006149PL (2016)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sarasota, Florida Oct. 20, 2016 Number: 16-006149PL Latest Update: Apr. 24, 2017

The Issue Whether Respondent, a licensed physician, violated the applicable standard of care by diagnosing prostate cancer in four patients, and recommending and participating in a course of treatment for these patients, without confirming prostate cancer through tissue biopsy results; and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty?

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is responsible for the investigation and prosecution of complaints against medical doctors licensed in the state of Florida, who are accused of violating chapters 456 and 458 of the Florida Statutes. Respondent is licensed as a medical doctor in Florida, having been issued license number ME 46625. Respondent is not board-certified in any specialty recognized by the Florida Board of Medicine. Respondent has never had disciplinary action against his license to practice medicine. Respondent's Practice Since his residency concluded in 1985, Respondent has practiced urology. For more than 20 years, the focus of his practice has been prostate disease, its diagnosis, and treatment. In 2006, Respondent became the lead investigator for a General Electric study regarding its 3-Tesla magnetic resonance spectroscopy imaging machine (3T MRI-s) as part of an Institutional Review Board measuring the heat generated by the machine to ensure the safety of patients. Between 2006 and 2010, 1,600 prostates were scanned with a 3T MRI-s as part of the study. Respondent reviewed the results of each radiology report associated with these scans and compared them to the clinical data he had for each patient. Respondent also completed a double-blind study of 200 of these patients who had prostate biopsies during 2008 and 2009, as well as the 3T MRI-s, correlated the results of the biopsies and the scans, and became convinced that the 3T MRI-s technology alone is a positive predictor of prostate cancer 95 percent of the time. According to both parties' experts, as well as Respondent, the standard of care in Florida and throughout the United States is to use a needle tissue biopsy to identify prostate cancer. As admitted by Respondent, medical schools teach that needle biopsy is "the way" to diagnose prostate cancer. Absent a biopsy showing malignant tissue, it is not possible for a reasonably prudent physician to diagnose or treat prostate cancer. Biopsies are usually performed to diagnose prostate cancer if a man has a combination of risk factors, such as family history, an abnormal digital rectal exam, and/or increasing levels of Prostate Specific Antigen (PSA). However, needle biopsies for prostate cancer carry a false negative rate of 20 to 50 percent, which means that a standard 12-point needle biopsy (where 12 samples of tissue from different locations in the prostate are sampled) often misses cancerous tissue. Prostate needle biopsies are sometimes painful and carry a risk of complications, including common complications such as bleeding and infection, and the unlikely complications of septic shock and death. Respondent is convinced that there is a significant risk from a prostate needle biopsy to spread prostate cancer cells outside the prostate capsule, which is referred to as "seeding" or "needle tracking." Respondent's belief is founded upon a one-page 2002 article published in the American Urological Association, Inc.'s Journal of Urology (Journal), which refers to two cases in which a tumor was discovered in the rectal wall after prostate biopsies and cryoblation.1/ The tumors were suspected of being the result of needle tracking from prostate cancer biopsies. Significantly, this article makes clear that needle tracking resulting from prostate biopsies are rare and "exceedingly uncommon." Respondent's concern, regarding prostate biopsies spreading prostate cancer, is also in part founded upon a one-paragraph 1991 Journal abstract reporting a Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine study of 350 patients in which needle tracking was suspected in seven patients (two percent).2/ According to Respondent, his belief that prostate biopsies spread prostate cancer is "intuitive," although he acknowledges this is not the prevailing view in Florida. Respondent argues that doctors do not want to believe needle tracking takes place with prostate biopsies and suggests there is a financial motivation for doctors to require a positive biopsy before definitively diagnosing prostate cancer. Respondent is so convinced of the dangers of needle biopsies for prostate cancer that he published a book, Men at Risk: the Dirty Little Secret – Prostate Biopsies Really Do Spread Prostate Cancer Cells, in 2012, which he provides to all his patients. In his book, Respondent states: For me, a 3T MRI scan is the best objective marker to a diagnosis of prostate cancer. To summarize, patients must answer one question. Should I agree to a prostate biopsy procedure where it has been proven to spread prostate cancer cells or do I keep my fingers and toes crossed, hoping for the best? In two words, . . . "absolutely not." To me, the decision is easy – the literature validates avoiding random biopsies and supports imaging with a 3 T magnet. There is no other organ in the human body where diagnosis is dependent on sticking needles randomly and blindly into a delicate organ in an attempt to find cancer. This practice is archaic, patently barbaric, unacceptable and preferentially favored by virtually all urologists. Beyond the obvious benefit to being able to see a cancer and its pattern of invasion with the 3.0 Tesla MRI scan, there is no other exam or scan that competes in terms of diagnostic accuracy or predictability. The discerning patient will soon recognize that guessing where cancer is located, through random biopsies, is for the less informed.[3] Respondent refers to the use of 3T MRI-s as the "truth serum" of prostate cancer diagnosis. During all times material hereto, Respondent held himself out as a urologist who could diagnose and treat prostate cancer without a needle biopsy. In fact, the four patients at issue in this case found Respondent through an Internet search. Respondent defines his office, the Diagnostic Center for Disease (DCD) as, "A comprehensive prostate cancer diagnostic center in Sarasota, Florida specializing in non-invasive diagnostics (MRI/MRIS) without biopsy as an integral part of the diagnostic evaluation of prostate cancer."4/ Respondent also advertised himself as "a world expert in High Intensity Focused Ultrasound (HIFU), having diagnosed and treated more patients for prostate cancer from more countries than any other treating doctor in the world."5/ HIFU is a treatment alternative to brachytherapy (the insertion of radioactive seeds into the prostate), radiation, and prostatectomy (the surgical removal of the prostate gland) for prostate cancer and uses highly focused ultrasound waves in a small area to create intense heat, which destroys prostate cancer tissue. HIFU was not an approved treatment for prostate cancer in the United States until October 9, 2015, at which time the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the use of the Sonablate machine for prostate tissue ablation. Prior to that time, Respondent referred his patients to treatment facilities in Mexico and the Caribbean where he performed HIFU treatments. The standard of care in Florida precludes treating prostate cancer with HIFU in the absence of a tissue biopsy confirming the presence of cancer. In order to be eligible for HIFU treatment, in addition to a positive diagnosis, the patient's prostate gland must be less than 40 grams. HIFU is not appropriate on patients with multiple calcifications in their prostate because they interfere with the treatment. Because a smaller prostate gland is easier to work with, prior to undergoing HIFU treatment, patients are often prescribed Bicalutamide (also known by its brand name, Casodex) and Trelstar. Bicalutamide suppresses the uptake of testosterone and Trelstar suppresses the production of testosterone, with both drugs having the effect of shrinking the prostate gland. Side effects of these drugs include hot flashes, weakness, and a sense of a loss of well-being. Facts Related to Patient G.P. Patient G.P., a 69 year-old retiree, had a prostate biopsy performed in December 2005 after a rise in his PSA level. This biopsy was negative for prostate cancer, but Patient G.P. was diagnosed with an enlarged prostate and benign prostate hyperplasty (BPH). In May 2008, Patient G.P. learned through a physical exam for a life insurance policy that his PSA level was elevated. After another check of his PSA level in November 2008, Patient G.P. was advised to undergo another prostate biopsy. Because his first prostate biopsy was painful, Patient G.P. searched the Internet for alternatives to biopsy and learned of Respondent and his use of the 3T MRI-s at the DCD in Sarasota for diagnosing prostate cancer. Patient G.P. traveled to Florida from Michigan to meet with Respondent on January 5, 2009. Patient G.P. underwent a 3T MRI-s scan at Respondent's office. Respondent told Patient G.P. that he was unsure of the results because they were consistent with BPH and not prostate cancer. However, Respondent advised Patient G.P. was considered "high risk" because his father died from prostate cancer in 2002. Rather than undergoing any treatment at that time, Patient G.P. was prescribed Avodart for his BPH and agreed to active surveillance (A.S.) whereby he would receive regular PSA screening. When Patient G.P.'s December 2009 PSA level went up after being on Avodart for most of the year, he was concerned and telephoned Respondent's office. Respondent prescribed Casodex based upon his telephone call with Patient G.P. on January 15, 2010. By February 2010, G.P.'s PSA level decreased significantly, but not as much as he believed it should have after taking Casodex for several weeks. Patient G.P. also experienced urinary frequency problems and pain. He returned to Respondent's office where Respondent performed an ultrasound and digital rectal exam. Respondent told Patient G.P. it was likely he had prostate cancer, but that he could not be sure without a biopsy. However, Respondent's medical records reflect that Respondent diagnosed Patient G.P. as having prostate cancer without a tissue biopsy.6/ Respondent offered to do a targeted biopsy based on an MRI scan. Respondent also discussed his concerns regarding needle tracking from biopsies with Patient G.P. Patient G.P. made it clear he did not want a biopsy, and he wanted to proceed to HIFU. Respondent advised Patient G.P. of the risk of erectile dysfunction following HIFU, but did not discuss the possibility of urinary stricture problems. In April 2010, Patient G.P. traveled to Mexico where the HIFU procedure was performed by Respondent. In March 2011, Patient G.P. saw a urologist in Michigan about his diminished urinary stream and pain. The urologist used a reamer to open Patient G.P's urethra, but on April 15, 2011, he went to the emergency room because he was completely unable to urinate. Patient G.P. was catheterized and subsequently underwent electro-vaporization on April 25, 2011, to relieve the urinary stricture. In August 2011, Patient G.P. also underwent hydro- dilating in an attempt to relieve the symptoms of his urinary stricture. In September 2011, Patient G.P. saw board-certified urologist Dr. Joel Gelman, who specializes in urethral reconstruction. At that time, Patient G.P. was advised that his urinary stricture, caused by the HIFU treatment, was a significant problem because his urethra was closed off almost to the bladder neck. Dr. Gelman performed a transurethral resection of the prostate (TURP). As part of the TURP procedure, Dr. Gelman took samples of Patient G.P.'s prostate tissue and no evidence was found of prostate cancer. Although Patient G.P. had no complaints regarding his course of treatment from Respondent, Dr. Gelman filed a complaint against Respondent because he was concerned that Respondent prescribed medications and performed HIFU on Patient G.P. for prostate cancer without a tissue biopsy. Facts Related to Patient J.W. Patient J.W., a 74 year-old retired dentist, had two biopsies performed in 2005 and 2007 ordered by his urologist in Alabama in response to elevated PSA levels. No evidence of malignancy was found. Patient J.W.'s PSA level was again elevated when tested in March 2012. He was reluctant to have another biopsy because the first two were painful. Patient J.W. was told about Respondent by a friend, and he viewed Respondent's website. Patient J.W. was interested in consulting with Respondent because Respondent advertised he had an MRI machine that could detect cancer cells, and Respondent believed prostate biopsies spread cancer. Patient J.W. traveled from Alabama to meet with Respondent at the DCD on May 14 and 15, 2012. After a sonogram and MRI, Respondent diagnosed Patient J.W. with prostate cancer. Respondent discussed a treatment plan which included what Respondent called "chemical castration" for a period of six months, to be followed with a trip to Mexico for HIFU treatment at the cost of $32,000.00. Respondent did not suggest any other treatment options to Patient J.W. or recommend a tissue biopsy. The idea of "chemical castration" scared Patient J.W., who sought a second opinion in June 2012 from another urologist, Dr. M. Eric Brewer. Dr. Brewer told J.W. that HIFU was not an accepted treatment in the United States for prostate cancer. Patient J.W. declined to go forward with treatment by Respondent. Dr. Brewer recommended A.S. and, as recommended by Dr. Brewer, Patient J.W. has his PSA level checked every six months. Patient J.W.'s PSA levels have decreased without any treatment. Dr. Brewer discussed Patient J.W.'s case with his partners, the tumor board, the president of the Southeastern Urological Association, and the president of the American Board of Urology, who unanimously advised Dr. Brewer to file a complaint with Petitioner against Respondent for cancer diagnosis and recommending treatment in the absence of a pathologic specimen. Facts Related to Patient K.S. Patient K.S. is a 62-year-old video producer and editor from Tennessee. He has no family history of prostate cancer. Patient K.S. had his PSA level tested in 2005 and 2009, at which time it was considered elevated. Patient K.S. was referred to a urologist by his primary care physician. After again showing elevated PSA levels, Patient K.S. underwent a prostate biopsy in 2011 and 2012. Neither biopsy was positive for prostate cancer. However, Patient K.S. and his wife were concerned about his rising PSA level and sought a second opinion. Patient K.S.' wife was concerned that if her husband had prostate cancer, his local urologist would recommend removal of the prostate. She researched alternative treatments on the Internet and found Respondent's website. On October 15, 2012, Patient K.S. and his wife traveled to the DCD in Sarasota to meet with Respondent. Respondent initially performed an ultrasound on Patient K.S. and then told Patient K.S. he was "concerned" Patient K.S. had prostate cancer. He recommended HIFU treatment to Patient K.S. Respondent made it clear to Patient K.S. that Respondent would not perform a needle biopsy because it pushes cancer further into the prostate. Respondent told Patient K.S. that the MRI would make it clear whether Patient K.S. had prostate cancer. Later that same day, Patient K.S. had an MRI performed at the DCD. Approximately a week later, Patient K.S. received a telephone call from Respondent with the MRI results who told Patient K.S. that based on the MRI, he had Gleason 7 prostate cancer, a fairly aggressive form of prostate cancer that could be treated with HIFU in Mexico the following month. This was followed up with an e-mail from the DCD to Patient K.S. demanding a payment of $32,000.00 within three days to schedule the HIFU procedure in Mexico. Patient K.S.' wife immediately secured a bank loan for the $32,000.00 Due to the seriousness of the diagnosis and the rush for payment for HIFU, Patient K.S. visited his primary care doctor for another opinion. Patient K.S' primary care doctor, Dr. Jeffrey Jump, told him that no one can diagnose prostate cancer as a Gleason 7 without a tissue biopsy. Further, it was a "red flag" to Dr. Jump that a cash payment of $32,000.00 was expected in such a short time frame to schedule treatment. After speaking to Dr. Jump, Patient K.S. decided not to have HIFU and instead opted for A.S. Subsequent PSA level tests for Patient K.S. have shown a decrease in his PSA level. Patient K.S.' wife filed a complaint with the Petitioner against Respondent. Facts Related to Patient V.P. Patient V.P. is a 63-year-old construction worker and guide from Alaska. He has no family history of prostate cancer. In August 2013, at age 60, Patient V.P. had his first physical examination. As part of the exam, he took a PSA test, which showed an elevated PSA level of 6.3. As a result, Patient V.P. was referred to a urologist who recommended a biopsy. Patient V.P. heard from friends that prostate biopsies are painful, so he looked on the Internet for alternatives. Patient V.P. found Respondent's website, which claimed Respondent could diagnose prostate cancer without a biopsy by using new MRI technology. Patient V.P. traveled to Sarasota to meet Respondent on September 11, 2013. Respondent performed a digital rectal exam and told Patient V.P. that his prostate was much enlarged. Respondent next performed a prostate ultrasound on Patient V.P. Immediately after the ultrasound, Respondent told Patient V.P., "I'm telling you right now you have prostate cancer." Respondent provided Patient V.P. with a prescription for Bicalutamide and Trelstar, which Respondent said would wipe out Patient V.P.'s testosterone and slow the growth of the cancer. Respondent told Patient V.P. that prostate biopsies are dangerous and metastasize cancer cells. Respondent said that even though he knew Patient V.P. had cancer, he wanted an MRI to see the amount of cancer. Respondent also offered Patient V.P. the opportunity to participate in a private placement offering for a HIFU company he was forming for a minimum investment of $50,000.00. The following day, Patient V.P. had an MRI and then met with Respondent to review the results. Respondent showed Patient V.P. his MRI images and pointed to areas of concern. Respondent told Patient V.P. he had extensive prostate cancer and that Patient V.P. did not have much time to decide whether to have HIFU because the cancer was about to metastasize. Respondent told Patient V.P. to take the Bicalutamide for ten days and then return for an injection of Trelstar to atrophy his prostate and make him ready for HIFU in 90 days. At Respondent's direction, Patient V.P. began the Bicalutamide and then returned to the DCD on September 20, 2013, for a three-month injection of Trelstar. During this visit, Patient V.P. questioned the cost if the HIFU was not successful in getting all the cancer and he needed further treatment. Respondent told Patient V.P. that he "doesn't miss," but an additional treatment of HIFU would cost another $10,000.00 to $12,000.00, in addition to the $32,000.00 for the initial treatment. Concerned about these costs, Patient V.P. asked about going to Loma Linda, California, for proton therapy as an alternative. Respondent told Patient V.P. that proton therapy would cause bladder cancer and any alternative to HIFU would require a needle biopsy first. Respondent actively discouraged Patient V.P. from any non-HIFU treatment for prostate cancer. As soon as Patient V.P. questioned Respondent about alternatives to HIFU, he was suddenly fast-tracked for HIFU scheduled October 24 through 26, 2013. He was told he needed to make a $10,000.00 deposit to hold the date and the total cost was $32,000.00. Despite his concerns regarding the expedited scheduling of his procedure and the cost of the HIFU treatment, Patient V.P. returned to the office with a check for $10,000.00 to cover the cost of the deposit to hold the October treatment date. While waiting to hand the check to Respondent's receptionist, Patient V.P. overheard Respondent on a speakerphone arguing with a radiologist concerning an MRI report. Respondent was insisting the radiologist include the word "cancer" on MRI reports and the radiologist insisted it was not possible for him to make such a diagnosis. After hearing this conversation, Patient V.P. immediately left Respondent's office with his check. Patient V.P. subsequently discussed his experience with a trusted friend who practiced as a nurse in a cancer clinic. She, too, expressed concerns about diagnosing and treating prostate cancer without a biopsy. Patient V.P. was referred by this friend to Dr. Vipul Patel, a physician specializing in urologic cancer in Orlando. Patient V.P. met with Dr. Patel on October 18, 2013. Dr. Patel advised Patient V.P. that it was not possible to diagnose prostate cancer without a biopsy. Dr. Patel also disputed that prostate biopsies can spread prostate cancer. Dr. Patel performed a digital rectal exam and found Patient V.P.'s prostate to be slightly enlarged (which is not abnormal for a man of Patient V.P.'s age), normal, and smooth. Dr. Patel told Patient V.P. that he doubted he had prostate cancer. Patient V.P. then underwent a prostate biopsy by Dr. Patel, which was negative for prostate cancer. This was surprising to Patient V.P. because Respondent led him to believe, based on the MRI, that his prostate was full of cancer. Patient V.P. experienced significant side effects as a result of taking the medications ordered by Respondent. The Bicalutamide caused Patient V.P. to experience overwhelming depression, shakes, hot flashes, tunnel vision, and headaches. The Trelstar caused erectile dysfunction, increased frequency of hot flashes, night sweats, and made Patient V.P. so weak he was unable to work for eight months. Standard of Care As discussed above, the experts who provided depositions or live testimony in this case were unanimous in their conclusions that the standard of care in Florida from 2008 through 2013 precluded diagnosis or treatment of prostate cancer in the absence of a tissue biopsy. A reasonably prudent physician would not tell a patient he had prostate cancer based upon an ultrasound and/or MRI. A reasonably prudent physician would not prescribe medication, suggest treatment, or participate in treating a patient for prostate cancer, based upon an ultrasound or MRI. Respondent claims that in each of these cases, he advised the patient that a needle biopsy was the definitive test for prostate cancer, but it was a method he did not favor due to the possibility of needle tracking. Respondent's testimony in this regard is not credible in light of the credible testimony of the three patients that Respondent made clear he would not perform a needle biopsy and actively discouraged them from anything other than diagnosis by MRI and subsequent HIFU treatment. Respondent's suggestion, that he offered needle biopsy as an option, is wholly inconsistent with the title, theme, and contents of his own book, and the manner in which he defined his method of diagnosing prostate cancer at the DCD in his book and on his website. It is self-evident that a patient's perceptions regarding the safety and efficacy of needle biopsies for prostate cancer detection are at least, in part, influenced by the discussion with the physician. Respondent's active efforts to dissuade these patients from having the one definitive test for prostate cancer, by dramatically over-inflating the infinitesimally small possibility of needle tracking, were wholly inconsistent with the standard of care. Respondent claims that these four patients insisted they did not want a needle biopsy, therefore, it was appropriate to diagnose them on the basis of "a preponderance of the evidence and concordance of data" and move forward with a treatment plan, including medications and HIFU. The standard of care in Florida during 2008 through 2013, for a situation in which a patient suspected of having prostate cancer refused a needle biopsy, was to prescribe a course of A.S., including regular and frequent PSA testing, and to offer no other treatment.7/ Ultimate Factual Determinations Petitioner established by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent committed medical malpractice in his treatment of Patients G.P., J.W., K.S., and V.P. by the following violations of the standard of care: failing to obtain and review prostate biopsy results before confirming the patient had, or diagnosing the patient with, prostate cancer (Patients G.P., J.W., K.S., and V.P.); prescribing Bicalutamide/Casodex to a patient without first confirming through a prostate tissue biopsy that the patient has prostate cancer (Patients G.P. and V.P); prescribing, injecting, or authorizing the injection of Trelstar to a patient without first confirming through biopsy results that the patient has prostate cancer (Patient V.P); recommending and/or attempting to facilitate HIFU treatment without first confirming through biopsy results that the patient has prostate cancer (Patients G.P., J.W., K.S., and V.P.); and participating in, and/or assisting with the performance of HIFU treatment for a patient without first confirming through biopsy results that the patient has prostate cancer (Patient G.P.). Accordingly, Respondent is guilty of the offense defined in section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order finding that Respondent violated section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes, as charged in Amended Administrative Complaints; imposing a fine of $30,000.00; revoking Respondent's medical license; and imposing costs of the investigation and prosecution of this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of February, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 2017.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57120.68456.41456.50458.331 Florida Administrative Code (1) 64B8-8.0011
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BOARD OF MEDICINE vs NABIL HILWA, 90-005192 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Aug. 17, 1990 Number: 90-005192 Latest Update: May 02, 1991

The Issue In an administrative complaint dated July 3, 1990, the Department of Professional Regulation (DPR) alleges that Respondent violated Section 458.331(l)(m) and (t), F.S., by failing to keep written medical records justifying a course of treatment, and by gross or repeated malpractice or the failure to practice medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. More specifically, the complaint alleges that in his treatment of "Patient #1", Nabil Hilwa, M.D. failed to document in his patient's records the patient's difficulty urinating and the need for a transurethral resection of the prostate (TURP), and that he mislabeled patient #1's adenocarcinoma. The complaint also specifically alleges that Dr. Hilwa inappropriately diagnosed patient #1's condition because the emphasis in March 1985 should have been on the patient's nodule and a diagnosis of prostate cancer, either by transrectal or transperineal biopsy, and not on the TURP, and that Respondent should have performed an acid phosphatase and a prostatic specific antigen on patient #1. The issues for disposition are whether those violations occurred and, if so, what discipline is appropriate.

Findings Of Fact Except for two conclusory paragraphs, Respondent has admitted all factual allegations of the amended administrative complaint. These facts are thus established: Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, Chapter 455, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. Respondent is and has been at all times material hereto a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0032104. Respondent's last known address is 6388 Silver Star Road, Orlando, Florida 32818-3235. From on or about March 5, 1985, to on or about April 22, 1985, and from on or about February 8, 1988, to on or about April 10, 1989, Respondent provided medical care and treatment to patient #1. On or about March 6, 1985, patient #1 was admitted to the hospital, with a complaint of difficulty urinating, for evaluation of prostatism, and Respondent subsequently performed a cystoscopy and found a one hundred percent obstruction of the prostatic urethra. On or about March 7, 1985, Respondent performed a Transurethral Resection of the Prostate (TURP). The pathology report revealed nodular hypoplasia without any evidence of malignancy. Respondent did not perform a prostate biopsy, an acid phosphatase, or a prostatic specific antigen. On or about April 22, 1985, patient #1 made his last postoperative visit after the TURP. On or about February 8, 1988, patient #1 presented to Respondent for evaluation of a prostatic nodule on the left prostatic lobe. Respondent advised patient #1 to have a prostatic sonogram with biopsy. On or about March 7, 1988, Respondent performed a transrectal sonography, which revealed a hypoechoic area, and a transrectal biopsy, which revealed a small focus of moderately differentiated adenocarcinoma of the prostate, on patient #1. Respondent did not perform an acid phosphatase or a prostatic specific antigen. On or about July 25, 1988, patient #1 was admitted to the hospital and Respondent performed a repeat prostatic biopsy, which revealed that adenocarcinoma of the prostate was present on all needle biopsy segments taken, in contrast to the biopsy performed on or about March 7, 1988. A sonogram was not repeated. On or about August 3, 1988, patient #1 was admitted to the hospital and Respondent performed a bilateral pelvic lymphadenectomy and a retropubic radical prostatectomy, which revealed the prostate had cancer up to the margin of resection. Respondent referred patient #1 to a radiation oncologist for a consultation. On or about August 3, 1988, Respondent's records indicate Respondent discussed the postoperative complications of impotence and urinary incontinence with patient #1. On or about March 23, 1989, patient #1 presented to Respondent with a complaint of gross hematuria. Respondent performed a cystoscopy which revealed hemorrhagic cystitis secondary to radiation. On or about April 10, 1989, patient #1 was doing well with no gross hematuria, and a repeat urinalysis was negative. 1985 -- First Referral of Patient to Dr. Hilwa for Evaluation and Treatment Don Buswell-Charkow (Dr. "B-C") is a physician who has practiced in the Orlando, Florida area since 1981. His field of practice is internal medicine. He is not and does not consider himself an expert in urology. A.C. (described as "patient #1" in DPR's Administrative Complaint and Amended Administrative Complaint) was a patient of Dr. B-C from March 10, 1983 to August 25, 1989. During the time period of 1983 to 1985, A.C. complained to Dr. B-C of urinary difficulty. On February 14, 1985, Mr. C. saw Dr. B-C for a sore throat and coughing. In the course of discussions, he mentioned that he was having difficulty with his bowels. Dr. B-C performed a rectal exam and felt an area which he described in his records as follows: "the left lobe of the prostate has a nodule." (Pet. Ex. 2) On March 1, 1985, Dr. B-C, by letter, referred Mr. C. to Dr. Hilwa for evaluation of his prostate. The letter stated: Would you please evaluate Mr. [C.'s] prostate. I felt the left lobe of his prostate had a nodule. A sigmoidoscopy was negative, a barium enema was negative, and an IVP showed enlargement of the prostate, though was otherwise normal. (Pet. Ex. #2) Including his training, Dr. Hilwa has specialized in the fields of urology and urological surgery for over 19 years. His specialty training includes post-graduate work in urology and urological surgery at Washington Hospital Center in Washington, D.C., a teaching facility affiliated with George Washington University; the University of Cincinnati Medical Center, a teaching facility; and Wayne State University, a teaching institution. Dr. Hilwa began his private practice in Orlando, Florida in 1978. The majority of his patients come from referring physicians. Approximately 25-30 physicians refer patients to Dr. Hilwa for speciality evaluation and treatment. Dr. Hilwa serves on the active medical staffs of AMI Hospital and West Orange Hospital. At AMI he is Chief of the Urology Department which consists of nine urologists. At West Orange Hospital, he is the Chief of Surgery (made up of approximately 15-20 physicians) and Chairman of the Surgical Practice Committee which addresses cases related to quality assurance matters. Dr. Hilwa has worked with the American Cancer Society as a Clinical Fellow at the University of Cincinnati where he performed research on cancer of the prostate and the significance of their serum acid phosphatase. He has also lectured for the American Cancer Society concerning cancer of the prostate. In addition, he has appeared on T.V. to discuss cancer of the prostate. In his practice, Dr. Hilwa sees approximately 1,000 patients a year for urological problems. Approximately 10% or 100 patients a year fall within the category of males with potential cancer of the prostate. He performs approximately 600 surgical procedures a year, of which approximately 60% fall within the category of major cases and 40% fall within the category of minor cases. To Dr. Hilwa's knowledge, he has never been (a) investigated by DPR (other than this case); (b) investigated or complained against by Medicare; (c) disciplined by any licensing agencies dealing with the practice of medicine; or (d) disciplined by any hospital with respect to hospital privileges. Dr. Hilwa has never had a patient with a diagnosis or suspected diagnosis of prostate cancer, other than A.C., complain to him with respect to his care and treatment. Neither has he had a referring physician tell him that someone had complained against him with respect to his care and treatment. On March 5, 1985, Dr. Hilwa first saw Mr. C. He personally took a history from him and documented in his records: "FREQUENCY 3X", "NYCTURIA [sic] 1-2X", decreased potency, "DRIBBLING YES", decreased stream force and caliber, and "HESITANCY YES". Upon physical examination of Mr. C.'s prostate, he found, according to his notes, that the prostate is 1+ enlarged; asymmetrical; and left prostatic nodule semi-firm. (Pet. Ex. #6, p. 70) Dr. Hilwa's use of the term "semi-firm" was not descriptive of "a cancerous feeling". "Semi-firm" is not a term he normally uses to refer to something that he would be suspicious of as cancer. His definition of a prostatic nodule that is cancerous is usually "firm or stoney-hard" -- not "semi-firm". The term "nodule" is a very broad term which signifies an aggregation of cells that may be anatomical or may be pathological. This definition is consistent with medical dictionary definitions of "nodule", e.g., Taber's Medical Dictionary. Dr. Hilwa's use of the term "nodule" in A.C.'s records referred to the left lobe of his prostate which was semi-firm and larger than the right. This is what he perceived as a "nodule". He did not feel an isolated, discrete, or raised surface on Mr. C.'s prostate gland. The term "induration" is a different feeling in the substance of the prostate than the surrounding tissue felt. Dr. Hilwa did not feel any induration on the surface of Mr. C.'s prostate in 1985. In Dr. Hilwa's practice, if he does find an induration he customarily draws a picture of it so that he will have a reference for himself. No such picture was drawn in 1985 in the case of Mr. C.'s prostate. The significance of finding an induration is that it provides a specific target towards which a biopsy needle may be directed. According to Dr. Hilwa, there was no discrete, isolated induration on the surface of A.C.'s prostate in 1985 to which he could have guided a biopsy needle. If he had performed such a procedure, it would have been a "blind biopsy". Following examination of A.C., Dr. Hilwa's initial clinical impression was "benign prostatic hypertrophy" which refers to a nonmalignant enlargement of cells of the prostate. His plan was to do a cystoscopy examination and a TURP if obstruction is present. Cystoscopy means looking inside the bladder through the urethra to determine whether or not there is obstruction. A TURP or transurethral resection of the prostate is a surgical procedure which involves cutting the interior tissue of the prostate gland. Prostatic stones are a hard, stoney substance. They can mimic a cancer or prostatic nodule. The finding of 100% obstruction upon cystoscopy examination of Mr. C. was consistent with documented symptoms in the medical records. In performing the TURP on Mr. Carty on March 7, 1985, Dr. Hilwa removed tissue and stones weighing a total of 13 grams. Following the cystoscopy and TURP, a pathology report was presented to Dr. Hilwa. It confirmed: (1) that he had dissected 13 grams by weight; (2) that the tissue removed was benign, and (3) that stones were present in Mr. C.'s prostate. On the basis of these findings, Dr. Hilwa's final diagnosis was benign prostatic hypertrophy. His hospital discharge summary, included in his office records for A.C., includes this statement: "...In view of the obstruction present and the patient's symptoms, it was felt that a TURP of the prostate is indicated rather than doing a biopsy of the prostate...". (Pet. Ex. #6, p. 115) Dr. Hilwa did not order a prostatic specific antigen test on Mr. C. because such was not available to him in 1985. The reason he did not do a serum acid phosphatase is that his diagnosis was benign prostatic hypertrophy. He had no reason to add this test, which often reveals false positives and false negatives. The TURP eliminated the obstruction found, as well as the multiple prostatic stones. Potential complications, if the prostatic obstruction and stones had not been removed by the TURP procedure, include worsening of the obstruction, irritation, recurring infection and surgery. A TURP is an accepted procedure in the field of urology for the elimination of prostatic stones and the elimination of an obstruction in the prostate. Dr. Hilwa saw Mr. C. on two occasions post-operatively in 1985: March 27, 1985 and April 22, 1985. He advised Mr. C. to come see him whenever he had any problems or needs. Otherwise he referred him back to his family physician, Dr. B-C. Dr. Hilwa had no further contact with Mr. C. from April 22, 1985 until February, 1988 -- approximately three years later. 1986 Re-evaluation of Patient By Dr. B-C On June 26, 1986, Dr. B-C examined Mr. C. and made the following notation in his records: "The rectal has a firm left lobe and normal right." (Petitioner's Exhibit #2) Dr. B-C was specifically looking for a prostatic nodule in Mr. C. in June of 1986. However, he did not palpate a nodule. He did not feel the same thing that he felt in 1985. On February 2, 1988, in his annual physical check up of Mr. C., Dr. B-C found the patient's prostate enlarged on the left and quite firm without a definite nodule. The right side was normal. 1988 -- Second Referral of Patient to Dr. Hilwa For Evaluation & Treatment Mr. C. was again referred by Dr. B-C to Dr. Hilwa for prostatic evaluation on February 8, 1988. Upon physical examination, Dr. Hilwa felt a one by one centimeter firm, left prostatic nodule. A picture was drawn on his medical records. It was not the same nodule that he felt in 1985 in Mr. C.'s prostate. It was a discrete, raised, distinct nodule surrounding prostatic tissue on the surface of the left lobe that he could measure with his finger. Dr. Hilwa's plan was to proceed with prostatic sonogram and biopsy. Mr. C. was scheduled for a sonogram on February 22, 1988, but did not show up. Two weeks later, the procedure was conducted. It revealed a hypoechoic area, which is an area that is usually characteristic of cancer of the prostate. The pathology report came back on March 9, 1988. It indicated that the vast majority of tissue was benign, except for a very small microscopic focus of moderately differentiated adenocarcinoma. Dr. Hilwa had Mr. C. come to his office where he explained his findings. Because Mr. C. asked a lot of questions and had a history of emotional illness, Dr. Hilwa pulled one of his textbooks, sat with him, went through all phases of cancer of the prostate, and described what he felt his situation was. Dr. Hilwa next commenced a metastatic workup involving x-rays of the abdomen and pelvis to determine whether the prostatic cancer was contained in the prostate or had spread outside. It was contained and had not spread. Next, Dr. Hilwa explained to Mr. C. the plan to repeat sonogram of the prostate with biopsy in two to three months. Another biopsy of Mr. C.'s prostate was performed on July 25, 1988. At that time, Dr. Hilwa felt clinically that Mr. C.'s cancer was stage B. The decision was made to proceed with a radical prostatectomy. On August 3, 1988, a radical prostatectomy was performed. The cancer was removed from A.C.'s prostate. According to the pathology report there was no indication that the cancer had spread beyond the surgical capsule of the prostate. With respect to the "labeling" of Mr. C.'s adenocarcinoma, the description "stage B" appears throughout Dr. Hilwa's notes and transcriptions in the hospital records. (See, for example Pet. Ex. #8, pages 195, 204, 210 & 260). DPR's Expert Testimony Dr. Richard H. Lewis is a physician practicing in Jacksonville who specializes in urology. He is Board certified. At DPR's request, Dr. Lewis examined medical records concerning Dr. Hilwa's case and predicated his opinions on portions of Dr. Hilwa's records. Dr. Lewis opined that a transurethral resection of the prostate ("TURP") is not an adequate method of evaluating a patient for prostate cancer; that a biopsy of the prostate, either through a transrectal or transperineal approach is the appropriate standard of care for evaluating or ruling out this particular diagnosis. Such biopsies are performed " . . . by guiding the needle to the area that you are concerned about so that you can actually feel the nodule and the needle and so you can be sure the needle is entering the area that you are concerned about." (Pet. Ex. #13, pages 10-11). Dr. Lewis stated that the key issue is that Dr. Hilwa did not "aggressively seek" to prove whether the patient did or did not have prostate cancer. (Pet. Ex. #13, page 16). Dr. Lewis further testified that about 50% of the time when you are biopsying a nodule you are going to miss it. He further conceded that a stone in the prostate is relatively common and if the physician is comfortable that he felt a stone he would be justified in not doing a biopsy. Dr. Lewis agreed that it was reasonable for Dr. Hilwa to not order the acid phosphatase and prostatic specific antigen tests in 1985. It would not be appropriate to draw those tests until a diagnosis of prostate cancer had been made. Dr. Lewis agreed that in this case the available evidence suggests that the patient had no spread of the prostate cancer outside the prostate and that a radical prostatectomy was an appropriate treatment option. Dr. Lewis believes Dr. Hilwa's records are logical and appropriate in terms of his thought patterns once the diagnosis of cancer was made. He conceded that records is an area where he may be "a little confused." "The medical record is there to document what was done so that you can look back at it in retrospect." His criticism of Dr. Hilwa's records was: So to me where he fell below the standard of care is that he didn't do what needed to be done. His records did not explain why he did that. (Pet. Ex. #13, pages 40-41) This conflicts with his opinion in his earlier written report of May 9, 1990, which stated: The physician does state the reasons for his treatment and course of actions in the records. (Attached Exhibit 2 to Pet. Ex. #13, page 4). Dr. Lewis believed that there was a "discrete nodule" in 1985. It was his further assumption that the "nodule" palpated in 1988 was the same "nodule" palpated in 1985. Such assumptions are inconsistent with the facts proven in this case. Dr. Lewis did not hear the final testimony of Dr. B-C wherein he stated that he did not palpate a nodule in or on Mr. C.'s prostate in 1986. He also did not hear the final hearing testimony of Dr. Hilwa describing what he, the clinician actually performing the evaluation, perceived. Dr. Lewis conceded that the practice of medicine is not a precise science; that there is room for clinical judgment based upon a physician's experience in his field; and that how a physician documents matters in a medical record may vary from physician to physician. Dr. Wajsman's Expert Testimony Dr. Zev Wajsman is a Professor of Surgery in the Division of Urology, and Chief of Urologic Oncology, at the University of Florida, College of Medicine, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida. Dr. Wajsman is Board certified in urology and licensed in Florida and New York. He has published more than 112 articles in his field and gives presentations and lectures on an ongoing basis. In preparation for giving testimony for Dr. Hilwa in this case, Dr. Wajsman reviewed all medical records of Mr. C. pertaining to Dr. Hilwa's treatment of him in 1985 and 1988. In addition, he reviewed the depositions taken in this case, the transcript of the final hearing, and Dr. B-C's office records. Dr. Wajsman opined that Dr. Hilwa did not fall below the accepted standard of care in his care and treatment of Mr. C. in 1985 and 1988. He further testified that no acts or failures to act by Dr. Hilwa in treating Mr. C. caused any injury to him. Dr. Wajsman testified that on the basis of all the information he reviewed, there is no evidence that the patient had clinical evidence of prostate cancer in 1985. He found no evidence in the charts to suggest that Dr. Hilwa should have done a biopsy at the time. Many patients are referred to urologists as experts because of abnormal prostatic findings. A biopsy will not be done just because someone else believed that he felt an abnormal prostate. Quite often, in Dr. Wajsman's experience, his response to the referring physician will be that he didn't find or feel any abnormality. He consequently does not feel that he "has to do" a biopsy. It is Dr. Wajsman's understanding that the reason Dr. Hilwa did not do a biopsy was because in his clinical judgment there was no suspicious finding to perform a biopsy upon. So based on this finding and the fact that on the subsequent transurethral resection the specimen did not contain any cancer, Dr. Wajsman believed that there was no evidence of cancer at that time and therefore there was no substandard care by Dr. Hilwa. Dr. Wajsman believes the testimony of Dr. B-C describing an examination that he performed one year later on Mr. C. (1986) was significant in that he did not palpate a nodule at that time. In '85 this Dr. B-C referred this patient to Dr. Hilwa because of abnormal rectal findings. Then a year later, after TUR was done the same physician did not find any abnormality. So the question is what happened during this year, and the only explanation I can find out is that at the time of surgery, I mean transurethral resection, stones were removed from the prostate during the section, and it is possible that what the Dr. B-C felt the year prior to is that he felt a stone or hardened tissue around the stone which disappeared after transurethral resection. That enforced the reason Dr. Hilwa didn't do a biopsy because what he felt probably at the time, the referring physician felt was an abnormality not cause by cancer but by a stone or inflammatory reaction or whatever. (Resp. Ex. #1, page 12). Dr. Wajsman further opined that the records do not reveal that Dr. Hilwa in any fashion acted in bad faith or without due regard for the prevailing standard of care in treating Mr. C. Dr. Wajsman is unaware in the context of 1985 or even today of any requirement in the field of urology for a clinician in documenting a medical record to record a "degree of difficulty urinating," for example, 10 degrees or 50 percent or some fixed number, in order to conform to the standard of care. The notes described in paragraph 9, above, adequately document the difficulty. With respect to DPR's allegations that Dr. Hilwa should have performed prostatic specific antigen and acid phosphatase tests in 1985, Dr. Wajsman confirmed that the prostatic specific antigen test was not available on the market in a majority of places in 1985. The acid phosphatase test was available, but is done for patients who actually have prostate cancer. It was not necessary in 1985 or 1988. 1/ By not performing the two tests, no damage was done to the patient and such did not affect the ultimate treatment for this patient. With respect to the radical prostatectomy performed by Dr. Hilwa, it was done properly, and it successfully removed the cancer. The patient became incontinent, a very unfortunate, but accepted and known risk of complication with this type of surgery. With respect to DPR's allegations concerning the adequacy of Dr. Hilwa's records, Dr. Wajsman testified that while the records could be better, he believes that anyone's records can be better. He does not believe that Dr. Hilwa's records fall below the standard of care. The records do properly document why a biopsy was not done in 1985, and they do properly refer to the cancer as level B, which according to Dr. Wajsman, is a nodule or abnormality, confined to one lobe, usually less than 1 1/2 centimeters.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED That the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine, enter its Final Order dismissing the Amended Administrative Complaint against the Respondent. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of May, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of May, 1991.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57455.225458.331
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs JOHN L. LENTZ, JR., M.D., 15-002890PL (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Destin, Florida May 22, 2015 Number: 15-002890PL Latest Update: Jan. 27, 2017

The Issue The issues to be determined in this proceeding are whether Respondent, John L. Lentz, Jr., M.D., committed the disciplinary violations charged with respect to seven patients in three Administrative Complaints that have been consolidated for the purpose of hearing. If the facts demonstrate that any of the charged violations have been committed, then the appropriate penalty to be imposed for such violations must be recommended.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony and documentary evidence presented at hearing, the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is the state agency charged with the licensing and regulation of the practice of medicine pursuant to section 20.43 and chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes. At all times material to these proceedings, Respondent was a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 82437. Respondent’s address of record is 15200 Emerald Coast Parkway, St. Marten Unit 506, Destin, Florida 32541. Respondent was board-certified by the Academy of Family Physicians until 2009. He currently holds no board certification in any specialty area, and did not complete any residency other than his residency in family medicine. Respondent went to medical school at the University of South Carolina and initially practiced in that state. He moved to Florida in 2001 and since that time, has worked in a variety of practice settings, including working as an emergency room physician in several hospitals in areas such as Phenix City, Alabama; Panama City, Florida; and Defuniak Springs, Florida. At some point, Respondent became interested in the diagnosis and treatment of Lyme disease, and in approximately 2007, he opened a clinic in Destin named the Lentz Lyme Clinic. Respondent attended four continuing medical education courses that focused on the diagnosis and treatment of Lyme disease. Each of the courses he attended was three to four days long. Diagnosis and Treatment of Lyme Disease Lyme disease is an infectious disease caused by the bacteria Borrelia burgdorferi. Lyme disease is typically transmitted by a tick bite from what is often referred to as a deer tick, more formally known as the Ixodes scapularis tick. The tick is usually very small, and must remain on the person’s skin for approximately 36 hours or more in order for the disease to be transmitted. Lyme disease is generally considered to be endemic to the Northeastern United States, in states such as the New England states, Pennsylvania, upstate New York, Delaware, and northern Virginia. While it is not impossible to contract Lyme disease in Florida, the more persuasive evidence established that it is not prevalent in this state. The most credible, compelling evidence presented established that most people who are diagnosed in Florida with Lyme disease were most likely infected while traveling in a part of the country that is endemic for the disease, and that states in the Southeastern United States are in a low-risk area for Lyme disease. There was some conflict in the testimony concerning the stages and symptoms of Lyme disease, and what factors should be considered in diagnosing the disease at the various stages. The more credible and persuasive descriptions of Lyme disease and its stages describe the disease as having three stages: early localized Lyme disease; early disseminated Lyme disease; and late Lyme disease. The probable stage of the disease at the time a patient presents for diagnosis and treatment determines what is necessary for a diagnosis. Early localized Lyme disease is the disease as it typically presents within the first four weeks of the tick bite. The patient often, but not always, presents with a rash called an erythema migrans, which is generally over five centimeters wide (and can be as large as 19 centimeters) and is sometimes clear in the center, leading to the term “bull’s-eye rash” to describe it. In addition to the erythema migrans, a patient may present with virus-like symptoms, such as fatigue, malaise, fever, chills, myalgia (muscle aches), and/or headache. Often the symptoms at this stage, or any stage, for that matter, are non-specific symptoms that are common to a variety of conditions, including ALS and MS. According to Respondent’s expert, Dr. Cichon, these are conditions that a physician should also consider when diagnosing Lyme disease, Babesiosis, or Bartonellosis. In other words, when a patient presents with symptoms that do not include the erythema migrans, but are vague and non-specific, Lyme disease and co-infections related to Lyme disease should not be the only diagnoses considered. In order to diagnose Lyme disease a thorough history is required, including information on a patient’s travel locations, whether travel included states that are typically endemic for Lyme disease; the time of year the travel occurred; whether the patient engaged in the type of activity (such as hunting, fishing, hiking, or other outdoor activities) that would expose him or her to the possibility of a tick bite; any history of rashes; and whether the patient remembers a tick bite. The history should also include any symptoms the patient is experiencing and when the symptoms began. If the patient reports travel to an endemic area, and presents with an erythema migrans that the physician can examine, a diagnosis of early Lyme disease can be made without confirmatory laboratory tests. At that early stage, laboratory tests would not be particularly useful because they detect antibodies to the Borrelia burgdorferi, as opposed to detecting the bacteria itself. At that early stage of the disease, there is not sufficient time for the body to develop the antibodies necessary for detection through laboratory testing. The second stage of Lyme disease is called early disseminated Lyme disease, which may be characterized by multiple erythema migrans lesions; cardiac symptoms, such as atrioventricular block; arthralgia (joint pain); myalgia; or neurologic involvement, such as lymphocytic meningitis, facial nerve Palsy (Bell’s palsy), or encephalitis. If a patient presents with some combination of these symptoms, along with a history indicating travel to an endemic area and activities in that area consistent with tick exposure, a reasonable prudent physician would seek confirmatory laboratory tests to reach a diagnosis of Lyme disease, assuming the patient presents four weeks or more after possible exposure to a tick bite. The type of test to use is discussed below. Late Lyme disease is characterized by neurological symptoms, such as encephalomyelitis, peripheral neuropathy; and arthritis and arthralgia, usually in a single joint, such as a knee. As with early disseminated Lyme disease, a thorough history and physical is required for a diagnosis, as well as a confirmatory laboratory test. There was a great deal of testimony presented regarding the type of testing that is appropriate for the diagnosis of Lyme disease. Petitioner advocated the use of the ELISA test, followed by the Western blot test, commonly referred to as the two-tiered approach. ELISA and Western blot will be discussed in more detail below. Respondent contends that this two-tiered approach is inaccurate and that other tests are more definitive. His argument regarding the testing to use is consistent with his claim that there are two “standards of care,” one recognized by the Infectious Disease Society of America (IDSA), and one recognized by the International Lyme and Associated Diseases Society (ILADS). The tests recognized as standard for diagnosis of Lyme disease by Drs. Robbins, Anastasio, Robertson, Rosenstock, and Powers, are the two-tiered approach ELISA and Western blot tests. The ELISA is an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay screening test. If the screening test is positive or equivocal for enzymes indicative of Lyme disease, a Lyme Western blot test is performed to confirm the presence of antibodies to Borrelia burgdorferi. For patients with early Lyme disease, the two-tier testing process may produce false negatives because the patient has not had sufficient time to develop antibodies in response to the bacteria. For those with late Lyme disease, the test is highly sensitive and specific because late Lyme disease patients have ample time to develop antibodies. The two-step approach is recommended by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) because it provides for both sensitivity and specificity. Usually lab tests are either sensitive or specific, but not both. For a test to be considered “sensitive,” there are no false negatives. ELISA is considered a sensitive test. Specificity refers to the specific antibody bands being evaluated. With Western blot, there is an examination of different specific antibody bands. A Western blot IgM test looks for antibodies that are created initially from white blood cells that specifically attach to the infectious organism. A Western blot IgG looks for a different set of antibodies that continue to persist long after the infection is gone. A Western blot IgG is considered positive if five of the ten antibody bands are positive, while an IgM is considered positive if two of three bands are positive. The ILADS guidelines criticize use of the ELISA and Western blot tests because in the organization’s view, the two- tiered testing lacks sensitivity. The guidelines state that several studies “showed that sensitivity and specificity for both the IgM and IgG western blot range from 92 to 96% when only two [as opposed to five] specific bands are positive.”2/ While the ILADS guidelines criticize the two-tiered approach represented by ELISA and Western blot and indicate that other testing has been evaluated, “each has advantages and disadvantages in terms of convenience, cost, assay standardization, availability and reliability.” The ILADS guidelines do not expressly advocate not using the ELISA and Western blot, and note that while other tests remain an option to identify people “at high risk for persistent, recurrent, and refractory Lyme disease,” the tests have not been standardized. Dr. Michael Cichon, testifying for Respondent, opined that the ELISA and Western blot tests had little value and that Respondent’s failure to use them was not a departure from the standard of care. However, while at hearing he denied that he would order either test, in his deposition he indicated that he would order both tests, as a guide to diagnosis. His testimony that the ELISA and Western blot tests are not useful in the diagnosis of Lyme disease is rejected as not credible. Clear and convincing evidence at hearing established that a reasonable, prudent physician who is presented with a patient having possible exposure to Lyme disease occurring four weeks or more before seeing the physician would order the two- tier testing of ELISA and Western blot if it was appropriate to test for Lyme disease. While performing other tests in conjunction with the two-tier tests is not per se a departure, the standard of care requires either ordering the ELISA and where necessary, the Western blot, or reviewing any test results for these tests previously obtained by the patient. Treatment of Lyme disease also depends on the stage at which the condition is diagnosed. If a patient is diagnosed with early localized Lyme disease, a single course of doxycycline for 14 to 28 days is generally appropriate. Early disseminated Lyme disease and late Lyme disease may be treated with IV antibiotics, for a similar period of time. In summary, the standard of care in the diagnosis and treatment of Lyme disease requires a physician to take an appropriate medical history, perform a physical examination, obtain objective laboratory test results in the absence of an erythema migrans rash, and refer patients who do not improve after an initial course of antibiotic treatment to an infectious disease specialist for further evaluation. An appropriate history must include the information described in paragraph nine, and the testing to be ordered should include an ELISA and, where positive or equivocal, a Western blot test. Diagnosis and Treatment of Babesiosis Babesiosis is a parasitic disease of the blood caused by infection with Babesia. Babesiosis, like Lyme disease, is typically transmitted by a tick bite, and can be transmitted by the same tick that carries Lyme disease. There are occasions when a patient properly diagnosed with Lyme disease also will have Babesiosis as a co-infection. It is, however, not a common diagnosis, and even infectious disease specialists may go an entire career without diagnosing it. If a family practice physician suspects Babesiosis, the better approach would be to refer the patient to an infectious disease specialist. However, failure to refer a patient to a specialist, assuming that the family physician performs the appropriate testing and treatment, is not necessarily a departure from the standard of care. At all times material to the allegations in the Administrative Complaints, the standard of care for the diagnosis and treatment of Babesiosis included the physician taking an appropriate medical history, performing a physical examination of the patient, and obtaining objective laboratory test results in order to make an evidence-based diagnosis. As with Lyme disease, the patient’s medical history should contain information regarding the patient’s travel; whether they had exposure to a tick bite; whether they recall being bitten by a tick; as well as what symptoms the patient is experiencing. Babesiosis typically presents with virus-like symptoms, fever, sweats, and the identification of Babesia parasites in the patient’s blood. The tests that a reasonably prudent similar physician would order to determine whether a patient had Babesiosis are either a blood smear to identify Babesial parasites or a polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification of Babesial DNA. Should a patient be diagnosed with Babesiosis, the normal and customary treatment is a ten-day course of clindamycin and atovaquone. Diagnosis and Treatment of Bartonellosis Bartonellosis is an infectious disease caused by bacteria of the genus Bartonella. It is generally transmitted by lice or fleas on a person’s body, coming off of other animals, such as rats. It also can be transmitted through a cat scratch, as the cat gets fleas under its claws by scratching itself. As is the case with Babesiosis, a family practice physician is unlikely to diagnose Bartonellosis. It is not a common diagnosis, and even infectious disease specialists may go an entire career without diagnosing it. If a family practice physician suspects Bartonellosis, the better approach would be to refer the patient to an infectious disease specialist. However, failure to refer a patient to a specialist, assuming that the family physician performs the appropriate testing and treatment, is not necessarily a departure from the standard of care. In order to make a diagnosis, a thorough history and physical is required, along with objective laboratory test results. A physician should inquire about exposure to animals that could carry fleas, ticks, or lice, and whether there had been any recent instances where the patient has been scratched by a cat. The symptoms of Bartonellosis are nonspecific and include fever, headaches, myalgia, and arthralgia. The generally accepted test used to confirm a diagnosis of Bartonellosis would be a PCR amplification of Bartonella DNA, or paired blood serologies. DOAH Case No. 15-2888PL; DOH Case No. 2011-15106 (Patient C.C.) From approximately September 28, 2010, through approximately February 28, 2012, Respondent provided medical care and treatment to patient C.C. At the time of her original presentation to Respondent, C.C. was 27 years old. Prior to seeing Dr. Lentz, C.C. had a series of orthopedic injuries. For example, in 1998, C.C. was involved in a serious car accident, resulting in multiple broken bones and internal injuries requiring a two-week stay in the hospital. C.C. joined the Air Force in 2006, where she served as an aircraft mechanic. During basic training she suffered an injury to her shoulder, which caused problems with her neck, back, and shoulder. While in the military, C.C. was involved in two additional accidents: she broke her wrist in a motorcycle accident at some point, and on March 31, 2009, she had a second accident where the car she was driving was struck by another vehicle. While C.C. denied any injuries as a result of this second accident, shortly thereafter in July 2009, she had neck surgery because of discs impinging on the nerves in her neck. C.C.’s work as an aircraft mechanic required her to work in the fuel tanks of an airplane, which is a very confined space. C.C. is approximately 5’10” tall, and the work she performed required her to become contorted in a very small space for approximately 13 hours at a time. After her neck surgery, she started having increasing amounts of pain in her back and hips, to the point where she could no longer perform her job duties and in August of 2010, resorted to a wheelchair because of her inability to walk. Although she consulted multiple doctors both in the military and through referrals to outside physicians, she did not discover the cause of her pain. On or about September 28, 2010, Respondent evaluated C.C. for complaints of severe back, buttock, and right leg pain. When she presented for her first office visit, Dr. Lentz’s review of symptoms indicated that C.C. had a frontal headache with pain at a level of 10 out of 10; sensitivity to light and sound; loss of hearing and buzzing; nausea but no vomiting; withdrawal symptoms described as sweats when she did not take Ultram or Lortab; and feelings of hopelessness and emotional lability. His physical examination reported that C.C. was in a wheelchair, and documented “soles of feet painful, SKIN: rashes, soles of feet red, NEURO: paresthesia, pain, tender extremity.” At that time, Respondent diagnosed C.C. as having chronic fatigue syndrome and chronic pain syndrome. In C.C.’s history, Respondent noted that she “grew up in Texas/Arkansas-hunting, forests, etc. There is no notation of recent travel on this first visit. Dr. Lentz asked her about any flu-like symptoms, which she denied having. Many of the symptoms listed by C.C. are general symptoms that are common to a variety of ailments. Respondent, however, focused only on chronic fatigue, chronic pain, Lyme disease, Babesiosis, and lupus. On this first office visit, Respondent prescribed CD57, C3a, C4a, and eosinophilic cationic protein (ECP) laboratory tests of C.C.’s blood. With respect to the order for CD57, Respondent listed Lyme disease as a diagnosis. For the C4a and C3a, he listed Lyme disease and Lupus as the diagnoses, and for the ECP he listed a diagnosis of Babesia infection. Respondent did not prescribe an immunoassay (ELISA) test or Western blot test for Borrelia burgdorferi for C.C. The ECP test result for C.C. collected on October 6, 2010, was 20.8. The reference range for a normal test result is 1-10. The notation for the test on the lab result states: This test uses a kit/reagent designated by the manufacturer as for research use, not for clinical use. The performance characteristics of this test have been validated by Advanced Diagnostic Laboratories at National Jewish Health. It has not been cleared or approved by the US Food and Drug Administration. The results are not intended to be used as the sole means for clinical diagnosis or patient management decisions. On or about October 15, 2010, Respondent diagnosed C.C. with Lyme disease. He based his diagnosis of Lyme disease on the results of the CD57 blood test. The CD57 test is a cluster designation test that measures a marker found on lymphocytes, which are a type of white blood cell that are sometimes referred to as natural killer cells. Although Respondent claimed at hearing that he did not consider the test to be definitive, in his deposition he indicated that he believed that it was in fact definitive. Dr. Cichon, on the other hand, testified that the CD57 test used by Dr. Lentz is not a definitive test for Lyme disease, but is useful for measuring the progress of treatment. At least one test result for C.C. reflecting the results for a CD57 panel has the following notation from the laboratory: This test was developed and its performance characteristics determined by Labcorp. It has not been cleared or approved by the Food and Drug Administration. The FDA has determined that such clearance or approval is not necessary. Results of this test are for investigational purposes only. The result should not be used as a diagnostic procedure without confirmation of the diagnosis by another medically established diagnostic product or procedure. On or about October 15, 2010, Respondent also diagnosed C.C. with Babesiosis. Respondent did not prescribe a blood smear examination for Babesial parasites or PCR amplification for Babesial DNA for C.C. He based his diagnosis on the ECP test. On October 15, 2010, Dr. Lentz received an e-mail from C.C.’s roommate, M.B., informing him that C.C. had visited the emergency room over the weekend because of the level of her pain. The e-mail asked whether C.C. could begin with her treatment before her next appointment. In response, Dr. Lentz called in prescriptions for doxycycline and Cleocin, both of which are oral antibiotics. On or about October 18, 2010, Respondent described C.C. as being in no acute distress, with a gait that is within normal limits. He also noted some wheezing, pain all over, tears, and cramps in her muscles. Respondent prescribed long-term IV antibiotic therapy and referred C.C. to a specialist for venous port placement for the administration of intravenous (IV) antibiotic therapy. The specific medications prescribed at this visit are acetaminophen-oxycodone 300 mg - 7.5 mg oral tablets to be taken three times daily; Cymbalta 30 mg oral, once a day; Flagyl 500 mg oral tablets, to be taken three weeks on, one week off; heparin 5000 units/ml injectable solution, once a day; Omnicef 300 mg oral capsules, once a day; Interfase Plus Prothera, a supplement; and boluoke lumbrokinase, also a supplement. At the October 18, 2010, visit, he also ordered a Fry test for Bartonellosis and prescribed intravenous vancomycin, with weekly vancomycin trough levels. Dr. Lentz testified at hearing that the prescription for vancomycin was to treat Bartonellosis.3/ However, at this juncture, no diagnosis for Bartonellosis had been made. Heparin is an anticoagulant that is used for a variety of issues, such as blood clots, pulmonary emboli, and Berko emboli. It is also used in coronary heart disease if a patient has a myocardial infarction. The more persuasive and credible testimony established that it was below the standard of care to use heparin in the treatment of Lyme disease, Babesiosis, or Bartonellosis. Not only did heparin have no efficacy, it had the potential to be very dangerous for C.C., or any other patient. On October 28, 2010, Respondent noted that the vancomycin was at 1.5 grams and still not therapeutic, and ordered that the medication be changed to Primaxin and that the Omnicef and vancomycin troughs be stopped. On November 10, 2010, Respondent noted that C.C. was experiencing flu-like symptoms, but was now resting fewer hours each day. For the first time, he noted “past 4 years in military=Virginia, Canada, Honduras, as sites for exposure to Lyme.” He also noted “no wheelchair, but slow to move, pain to rt LS-hip-leg.” He continued to list her diagnoses as Lyme disease, Babesiosis, chronic pain syndrome, and chronic fatigue syndrome. Respondent also saw C.C. in the office on December 8, 2010, and January 10, 2011. At the December 8, 2010, visit, he discontinued the use of Flagyl because of her nausea and switched to Tindamax (one tablet daily for three weeks, then off one week) instead. On January 19, 2011, Dr. Lentz received an e-mail from C.C.’s roommate regarding a fall C.C. had over the weekend. As a result, he wrote an e-mail to C.C. and told her to stop the Tindamax and “add the neurotoxins to remove the neurologic toxins that are being created by the antibiotics.” He also directed her to stop the heparin injections, as she needed to be off of heparin before having some hand surgery to remove a cyst. C.C. returned for an office visit on February 9, 2011. At that time, Respondent’s notes indicate that she was ambulatory but still significantly fatigued and still falling. He noted, “rt hip. sciatic nerve still #1 symptom, can not stand or walk for long periods of time, not sure if neurologic/Lyme or degenerative nerve dis.” In his assessment, he stated she “needs CT lumbar sacrum to r/o orthopedic issue with back pain.” During the course of treatment, Respondent was consistently prescribing OxyContin at 10 mg, three times daily. On March 16, 2011, he referred C.C. to Dr. Beach at Andrews Institute to detox off the OxyContin. He also noted that she had been given 100 percent disability through the military, and would take approximately four months to process out of the military. He also noted “electrical ablation at T9, T10 for chronic back pain per Dr. Nyguen.” Dr. Lentz continued to see C.C. on April 12, 2011; May 4, 2011; and May 13, 2011. Throughout her treatment with IV antibiotics, C.C. experienced problems with nausea, rashes, and diarrhea, but claims that over time, her symptoms began to improve so that she could walk and eventually was able to hold down part-time employment. Toward the end of her military tenure, C.C. needed a referral in order to continue to see Dr. Lentz. To that end, on June 8, 2011, she saw Dr. Janelle Robertson, M.D., a board certified infectious disease specialist at Eglin Air Force Base. Dr. Robertson evaluated C.C. for Lyme disease, and documented her history, including travel history and history of tick bites. She reviewed prior records from Eglin Air Force base that indicated C.C. had an ELISA screening on June 10, 2010 (approximately two and a half months before seeing Dr. Lentz), that was negative. The ELISA test was not only performed before C.C. saw Dr. Lentz, but well after C.C. began suffering the symptoms that led her to seek out Dr. Lentz. Accordingly, the ELISA test was administered at a time at which C.C. would have developed sufficient antibodies for the test to be useful. Dr. Robertson also noted that while C.C. had a history of tick bites in Florida, Texas, and Alabama, she did not report any rashes or illness at or near the time of the tick bites. She also had no history of migratory arthralgia or Bell’s palsy. Dr. Robertson testified credibly that C.C. was having no night sweats, weight loss, changes in vision, palpitations, difficulty breathing, or gastrointestinal problems, and that her primary complaint was back and hip pain. C.C.’s pain remained in the same locations and persisted without resolution since 2009. Dr. Robertson concluded that C.C. did not have Lyme disease, and that her prior negative ELISA test conclusively established that she did not have the disease. She opined that, given that C.C.’s symptoms had persisted since 2009, if she had actually had Lyme disease, she would have developed antibodies that would have been detected with the ELISA test. She also determined that Respondent did not have Babesiosis and recommended to C.C. that she immediately stop the therapy prescribed by Dr. Lentz, because in Dr. Robertson’s view, the therapy was unsafe. C.C. has since transitioned out of the military into civilian life. Although she believes that the treatment by Dr. Lentz was effective in treating her condition, the events since she stopped treatment for Lyme disease suggest otherwise. For example, C.C. testified in her deposition that her treatment ended in mid-May 2011 because Dr. Lentz determined that she did not need more treatment, yet it appears that the military would no longer authorize treatment by Dr. Lentz once C.C. saw Dr. Robertson. Moreover, she continues to have some of the same pain that led her to treatment with Dr. Lentz. In approximately October 2014, she had hip surgery because her “hips are pretty much shot.” She has had three surgeries for kidney stones, steroid injections for temporary relief from her back pain, and acupuncture treatments for her back pain. At least one physician attributed her problem to the kind of work she performed as an aircraft mechanic, and at deposition she indicated that a recent MRI indicated that she has some lumbar narrowing. In short, it appears that the months-long IV antibiotic therapy she endured has provided no lasting solution to her pain. Respondent’s care and treatment of C.C. was a departure from the standard of care in that he diagnosed Lyme disease based upon an inadequate history and no objective laboratory test results from an ELISA test and Western blot. Specifically, Respondent failed to obtain C.C.’s travel history or any history of rashes, possible tick bites, including the size of the tick, and in fact obtained a history devoid of any flu-like symptoms characteristic of Lyme disease. C.C.’s primary symptoms were related to her back pain. Respondent’s own expert, Dr. Cichon, testified that the key to a diagnosis of Lyme disease is the patient’s history.4/ With this inadequate history in mind, Respondent did not obtain an ELISA test or Western blot, but instead relied on a test that, on its face, indicates that it is for investigational use only and should not be used as a diagnostic procedure without confirmation of the diagnosis by another medically-established diagnostic product or procedure. The more persuasive and compelling testimony established that the failure to obtain objective laboratory confirmation of Lyme disease through the use of the ELISA and Western blot tests is a departure from the standard of care recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician. The more persuasive and compelling evidence also established that C.C. did not actually have Lyme disease, despite Respondent’s diagnosis of the disease. Respondent also departed from the appropriate standard of care by his failure to use the appropriate tests for the diagnoses of Babesiosis and Bartonellosis. His test of preference, the ECP test, is by its own terms, not intended to be used as the sole means for clinical diagnosis or patient management decisions. As stated by Dr. Robbins, it has no clinical relevance and is diagnostic of nothing. Likewise, his credible testimony indicated that use of the Fry test was not appropriate, as it is a proprietary test of the laboratory and not FDA approved.5/ Respondent’s care and treatment of C.C. also departed from the applicable standard of care by prescribing surgery for placement of a venous port for administration of intravenous medication, and by prescribing both intravenous and oral antibiotic therapy in inappropriate and excessive amounts. The more credible and persuasive testimony demonstrated that C.C. did not have Lyme disease, Babesiosis, or Bartonellosis, and therefore did not need any of the antibiotic therapy prescribed. Even had C.C. received a correct diagnosis, the more persuasive evidence demonstrated that the amounts and duration of the antibiotics prescribed were not only unwarranted, but potentially dangerous for the patient. C.C. had the possibility of negative reactions from the many antibiotics prescribed, but also the very real possibility that she has built up a resistance to the antibiotics such that they will be ineffective should she actually need them in the future. Finally, Respondent’s care and treatment of C.C. departed from the applicable standard of care by the prescription of heparin. There was no medical justification for the prescription of an anticoagulant for the treatment of Lyme disease, even if appropriately diagnosed (which did not happen here), and as with the prescription of multiple long-term antibiotics, was potentially dangerous and harmful to the patient. DOAH Case No. 15-2889PL; DOH Case No. 2011-18613 (Patients D.H., S.L., J.L., W.L., and D.D.) Patient D.H. Respondent provided care and treatment to patient D.H. from approximately November 24, 2010, to approximately October 14, 2011. D.H. was previously seen by a physician’s assistant, Thomas Gregory Roberts, who at various times worked under Respondent’s supervision, including the period from April 29, 2009, to May 26, 2010, and again from September 21, 2010, through December 18, 2010.6/ Mr. Roberts had ordered a previous CD57 test for D.H., and had prescribed doxycycline for him on a long-term basis. Mr. Roberts’ office was closing and his records were no longer available, so on November 24, 2010, D.H.’s wife, J.H., e-mailed Dr. Lentz to request laboratory tests and to schedule an appointment for D.H. She stated in part: Dear Dr. Lentz: Both my husband and I have been to you before, but not at your current office. [D.H.] went to Tom Roberts at Village Health Assoc. and was sent for blood work. His CD57 counts were off, so he put him on Doxycycline [sic] and was on it for several months. His last blood work was done in July and by the sound of it showed some improvement, but he told him to stay on the antibiotics. Tom Roberts gave him an order for follow up bloodwork which reads CD57 + NK Cells Dx2793. Since he is currently not practicing that we know of, we are requesting that you please write an order so that [D.H.] can have blood work done and come to you for the results. Based upon this e-mail, Respondent ordered a CD57 test, using the diagnostic code for and reference to Lyme infection, and an ECP test using the diagnostic code for and reference to Babesia infection. He did so without actually seeing D.H., taking a history, or performing a physical examination. Respondent diagnosed D.H. as having Lyme disease and Babesiosis. He communicated the diagnoses to D.H. on December 25, 2010, via e-mail, stating, “CD57 is positive for Lyme and ECP positive for Babesia. Call Amy at 424-6841 for an appointment. Dr. Lentz.” It does not appear from the record that he considered or ruled out any other condition for D.H.’s complaints. Respondent did not prescribe or order for D.H. an ELISA or Western blot test, PCR amplification of Bartonella or Babesial DNA, or blood smear tests at any time during D.H.’s care and treatment. Respondent did not refer D.H. to a specialist in the diagnosis and treatment of infectious diseases, such as Lyme disease, Bartonellosis, and Babesiosis at any time during Respondent’s treatment and care of D.H. D.H.’s first office visit was January 17, 2011. At that time, J.H., D.H.’s wife, who attended the majority of his doctor’s visits with him, testified that his only complaint at that point was fatigue, and ongoing diarrhea she attributed to the lengthy time he had already been on antibiotics. She acknowledged that he checked off those items on a form at the doctor’s office, but was not going to see Dr. Lentz complaining about those: he went simply because of his fatigue. He had no rash at that point, and never complained of a tick bite. Dr. Lentz’s records, however, indicate that he complained about exhaustion; face-neck, jaw, and orbital pain; diarrhea; cramping; stiff and painful joints; mood swings; irritability; explosive [sic]; and poor concentration. From what J.H. could remember, the physical examination Respondent performed on D.H. was very brief. Respondent took D.H.’s blood pressure, possibly looked in his mouth, palpated his abdomen, and did a knee reflex test. She did not remember him doing anything else, except having D.H. fill out a long form. Dr. Lentz’s medical records for this visit contain no prior medical history, no pulse, and no respiration rate. Respondent diagnosed D.H. with Lyme disease. When J.H. asked him if he was sure, Respondent said, absolutely. J.H. had done some research and knew that Respondent had only ordered a CD57 for D.H. She asked him about ordering the Western blot, but he did not order it. She could not remember Respondent’s exact response, but was led to believe that he did not think that the Western blot test was as accurate in diagnosing Lyme disease. At this first visit, Respondent also ordered the Fry test. Results from the Fry test are dated January 25, 2011, and indicate: Based on the accompanying test results for the sample for listed patient and accession number is suggested for follow up confirmation of the putative organism(s). Protozoan: The Special Stains (100x magnification) or the Advanced Stains (magnification listed) for this sample is suggestive of a protozoan. PCR testing for putative FL1953 is suggested for follow-up confirmation. EPierythrozoan/Hemorbartonella: The Special Stains (100x magnification) or the Advanced Stains (magnification listed) for this sample is suggestive of epierythrozoan/ hemobartonella. PCR or serology testing for the putative epierythrozoan/hemobartonella (Bartonella spp.) is suggested for follow up confirmation and speciation. (emphasis added). The records do not indicate that Respondent ordered any of the follow-up testing recommended by the Fry laboratory which, ironically, is the very testing for Bartonellosis that a reasonably prudent similar physician should order for this condition. His records also do not indicate that he ever added Bartonellosis as a diagnosis for D.H. During the course of his treatment, Respondent prescribed for D.H. the antibiotics Omnicef, azithromycin, and Cleocin, as well as Interface Plus Prothera (an enzyme supplement formulation), boluoke lumbrokinase (a fibrinolytic supplement), atenolol (a beta blocker used primarily in cardiovascular disease, added March 7, 2011), heparin injections (an anticoagulant, also added March 7), artemisinin (an antimalarial, added June 14), Mepron (an antiparasitic, added June 14), Tindamax (added June 14), Plaquenil (an antimalarial), and Vermox (an anthelmintic)(both added August 21). J.H. understood that, based upon Respondent’s explanations, the heparin was prescribed to help other medicines be absorbed into the cells, or something along those lines. She was concerned about D.H. being on the heparin, in part because as a result of him injecting the heparin in his abdomen, D.H. had a lot of bruising and knots all over his belly. She was also concerned because D.H. worked as a boat captain on the Mississippi River, which required him to be away from home for weeks at a time. She was concerned about the ramifications should he have an accident at work when he had no access to medical care. Her concerns were warranted. The couple also had concerns about the number of medications D.H. was taking while under Respondent’s care. He developed blurred vision, did not sleep well, and had chronic diarrhea. When D.H. came home from his last visit, which J.H. apparently did not attend, he reported that Dr. Lentz had said something about having a port placed for the administration of more antibiotics. That shocked her, so before he would go through with port placement, they sought a second opinion. Dr. Patrick Anastasio is an osteopathic physician who is a board-certified infectious disease specialist. During all times relevant to these proceedings, he was a solo practitioner in private practice at Emerald Coast Infectious Diseases in Fort Walton Beach, Florida. He has worked in the area for approximately 12 years. D.H. sought a second opinion from Dr. Anastasio regarding his Lyme disease and Babesiosis diagnoses. To that end, he saw Dr. Anastasio for the first time on September 29, 2011. Dr. Anastasio did not believe that D.H. had the symptoms initially to place him in a high risk group for Lyme disease. During his examination, he looked for signs that would be consistent with Lyme disease, such as arthritis, cognitive problems, or neurological problems, but did not discover any. Dr. Anastasio did not believe that D.H. had either Lyme disease or Babesiosis, but ordered a blood smear, and a Western blot and a Babesia PCR test to rule out the conditions. All tests came back negative.7/ Dr. Anastasio recommended to D.H. that he stop taking all of the medications prescribed by Dr. Lentz, and D.H. did so. It still took months for the diarrhea, most likely caused by the long-term antibiotic therapy, to subside. However, D.H. began to feel better once he stopped taking the antibiotics. Dr. Charles Powers, M.D., testified that Dr. Lentz’s medical records for D.H. were not adequate for the evaluation of whether D.H. had Lyme disease. He also believed that it was below the standard of care to use the CD57 for the diagnosis of Lyme disease as opposed to the ELISA and Western blot tests, and that it was below the standard of care not to order the ELISA and Western blot tests in the absence of an erythema migrans rash that Dr. Lentz could physically observe. Dr. Powers believed that there was no basis upon which to diagnose D.H. with Lyme disease, and therefore any treatment based on this faulty diagnosis would be below the standard of care. Even assuming the diagnosis was correct, Dr. Powers opined that the treatment ordered also was below the standard of care. According to Dr. Powers, a reasonably prudent family practitioner would usually prescribe doxycycline for the majority of cases, as opposed to the regimen of medications used by Dr. Lentz. Prescribing antibiotics the way they were prescribed would include adverse side effects, such as nausea and/or diarrhea with resistance to bacteria; development of C. difficile infection, which can be difficult to treat; and potential for allergic reactions, which can be fatal. Dr. Powers testified that when a combination of antibiotics is being used, with each additional antibiotic prescribed, the risk for complications increases exponentially. His testimony is credited. Dr. Powers also opined that the use of heparin in the treatment of Lyme disease, Babesiosis, or Bartonellosis was a departure from the standard of care, and was a dangerous choice for this or any other patient who did not have a need for a blood thinner. Dr. Robbins also believed that Respondent’s care and treatment of D.H. was below the standard of care. He testified that Respondent breached the standard of care by diagnosing D.H. with Babesiosis using the ECP test and the Fry testing for the purpose of diagnosing Bartonellosis. He also testified, consistent with Dr. Powers, that using heparin in the treatment of any of these three diseases was an egregious departure from the standard of care. The testimony of Drs. Robbins and Powers is credited. Dr. Cichon expressed concerns about the amount of medications prescribed by Dr. Lentz to D.H., specifically singling out the prescriptions for Plaquenil and Vermox. While his testimony fell far short of declaring that prescribing these medications represented a departure from the standard of care, his testimony was certainly not a ringing endorsement. It seemed as if he was trying to convince himself that Respondent’s care and treatment of this patient fell within the standard of care. His testimony to that effect is rejected as not credible. D.H. did not have a medical condition that justified the prescription of any of the medications and supplements that Dr. Lentz prescribed, much less for the duration taken. The prescription of any of these medications without a valid diagnosis was a departure from the standard of care attributed to a reasonably prudent similar physician. Patient S.L. Respondent provided care and treatment to patient S.L. from on or about August 17, 2010, to on or about January 7, 2011. On or about August 17, 2010, at her first office visit with Dr. Lentz, S.L. presented with and reported to Respondent a history of heavy rectal bleeding, which occurred every four to five days. At that visit, S.L. informed Respondent that in June, she had been advised to get a colonoscopy. Because of economic constraints, S.L. did not obtain the requested colonoscopy. There is no indication in the patient records for S.L.’s first office visit (or any later visit) that the reason for S.L.’s bleeding prior to his treatment of her had been determined or that it had resolved. S.L. first went to see Dr. Lentz at Hope Medical Clinic8/ because she believed that she had a urinary tract infection. She also had severe back pain, with pins and needles down both legs. Her back pain had started in 2005, following a car accident. S.L. does not recall Respondent ever performing a physical examination, although the patient records indicate that at least a minimal examination was performed. She does recall him talking to her about being from Pennsylvania, but does not recall him asking her about any travel history, whether she had been exposed to ticks, or had ever been bitten by a tick. Dr. Lentz’s medical records for this first visit make no mention of a travel history; no mention of tick exposure; and no mention of any type of rash. Much of the history related to other issues, such as S.L.’s history of bleeding, as opposed to any symptoms that could be said to be indicative of Lyme disease. The symptoms documented are “paresthesis to both legs due to lumbar path. Recent hematochezia. No melena. No upper abd. Pain. No diarrhea. Mostly awake sxs, not hs.” Yet in his assessment/plan notes, he lists diagnoses of lumbago, displacement of lumbar intervertebral disc without myelopathy, and chronic pain syndrome. He prescribed Lyrica, Elavil, Lortab, and ordered a CD57, listing the Lyme disease diagnostic code. There was no medical basis, based on the history presented, to suspect or test for Lyme disease. On September 21, 2010, S.L. presented to Dr. Lentz for a follow-up appointment. At this appointment, Respondent diagnosed S.L. as having Lyme disease. He ordered a Fry Bartonella test as well as an ECP test, and prescribed doxycycline, Omnicef, and Flagyl. On September 30, 2010, S.L. called Respondent and reported throwing up all of her antibiotics, and asked about medication for her nausea. Dr. Lentz added the diagnosis of Bartonellosis without seeing S.L. or performing any further physical examination. The results of the Fry test in the patient records state: “rare (1-4 organisms per total fields observed) coccobacilli adherent to erythrocytes – indicated by yellow arrow(s). This is suggestive of Hemobartonella(1) or Hemoplasma(2).” The notes also state, “[t]his stain is not FDA approved and is for research only.” At S.L.’s next appointment on October 5, 2010, Dr. Lentz prescribed rifampin and Cleocin, as well as Lovenox injections. Lovenox is a low molecular weight heparin that can be given subcutaneously. At the time Dr. Lentz prescribed it, there was no determination regarding the cause of her heavy rectal bleeding just a few months before. On October 19, 2010, just two weeks after starting the Lovenox injections, S.L. presented to the emergency room at Sacred Heart Hospital with complaints of blood in her urine.9/ Physicians in the emergency room attributed the blood in her urine to the Lovenox injections, and discharged her with a diagnosis of hematuria. That same day, she presented to Dr. Lentz and told him about her emergency room visit. Dr. Lentz lowered the dose for Lovenox, but did not discontinue its use. His notes for this visit indicate that she had left flank pain, slight liver tenderness, no masses, and a “light liver test elevated, <2X normal.”10/ He added a diagnosis for Babesiosis, but did not appear to explore what was causing the liver tenderness and elevated tests. Under his assessment and plan, it states: “1. Cut Lovenox BID to QAM. 2. Add Culturelle/probiotics to GI tract due to antibiotics being used, if urine lightens up and less blood on dipstick, then improvement.” Respondent did not prescribe S.L. a PCR amplification or Bartonella or Babesial DNA, or Western blot immunoassay tests at any time during Respondent’s care and treatment of S.L. Respondent did not refer patient S.L. to a specialist in the diagnosis and treatment of infectious diseases, such as Lyme disease, Bartonellosis, and Babesiosis, at any time during Respondent’s care and treatment of S.L. S.L. testified that the physicians at Sacred Heart Hospital informed her that there was no reason for her to be on the antibiotics or blood thinner prescribed by Dr. Lentz, and based upon their advice, she stopped the medication regimen he prescribed. The medical records from Sacred Heart do not mention this advice, and she saw Dr. Lentz at least twice after her emergency room visit: October 19 and November 2, 2010. After that, the only communications in Dr. Lentz’s medical records for S.L. appear to be requests for medication related to urinary tract infections as opposed to treatment for Lyme disease, Babesiosis, or Bartonellosis. In any event, she quit seeing Dr. Lentz for Lyme disease, Babesiosis, and Bartonellosis at least as of November 2, and testified credibly that she feels fine. Based on the credible testimony of Drs. Powers and Robbins, Dr. Lentz’s diagnosis and treatment of S.L. violated the applicable standard of care in that he failed to obtain an appropriate history to diagnose Lyme disease, Babesiosis or Bartonellosis in the first place. He failed to obtain a travel history, any information regarding possible tick bites, and if there was such a bite, the size of the tick and duration of the bite. He also failed to document symptoms that would suggest the possibility of Lyme disease to justify any objective laboratory testing. S.L.’s symptoms were related to back pain and a history of heavy bleeding. Her symptoms simply did not justify testing for Lyme disease. The evidence was not clear and convincing that Respondent failed to perform an adequate examination. As noted above, while S.L. does not remember one, the medical records reflect notations indicating that one was in fact performed. The problem is that the history and physical examination do not support further investigation for Lyme disease. Respondent also departed from the applicable standard of care by relying on tests that were not appropriate for the diagnosis of Lyme disease, Babesiosis, or Bartonellosis. As stated above, there was no basis to test for these conditions at all, but if testing was going to be performed, then the appropriate tests were not the CD57, ECP, and Fry tests, but rather the ELISA, Western blot, PCR, and serologies discussed above. Respondent’s prescription of multiple antibiotics of lengthy duration also violated the standard of care, for reasons discussed above at paragraphs 60 and 79. Likewise, Respondent’s prescription of Lovenox fell below the standard of care. The use of Lovenox for Lyme disease, Babesiosis, and Bartonellosis is not warranted at all, but is especially egregious here, where S.L. had excessive bleeding problems of which Respondent was aware just months before Lovenox was prescribed, with no documentation that the cause of the bleeding had been identified and addressed, and no indication that Respondent did anything to investigate the cause of the bleeding. That he continued to prescribe the Lovenox, albeit at a lower dose, after her visit to the emergency room with hematuria, just compounds the problem. Dr. Cichon testified that Respondent met the standard of care in diagnosing and treating S.L., saying that she had unexplained pain that could be due to Lyme disease. He struggled to identify any symptoms that are commonly associated with Lyme disease. His testimony seemed to indicate anytime there is unexplained pain, Lyme disease is a possibility. His testimony on this issue is not credible. The same can be said for his support of the diagnosis of Babesiosis. Dr. Cichon identified the primary symptoms of Babesiosis as headaches, sweating, and air hunger. S.L. did not have these symptoms, leaving only the ECP test as a basis for diagnosis. Relying on the ECP (which is only slightly elevated) is contrary to Dr. Cichon’s own testimony regarding the primary importance of a thorough history to support such a diagnosis. Similarly, Dr. Cichon acknowledged in his testimony that he could not tell from Respondent’s medical records whether S.L. had any symptoms to support a diagnosis for Bartonellosis, and stated that her symptoms could be due to her lumbar pathology. Given these inconsistencies, his opinion that Dr. Lentz did not depart from the applicable standard of care in the diagnosis of each of these diseases is not credible and is rejected. Medical records must justify the course of treatment for a patient. Dr. Lentz’s medical records for S.L. do not justify the diagnosis or treatment of Lyme disease, Babesiosis, or Bartonellosis. The medical records do not document symptoms that are consistent with the diagnoses of any of these diseases, and fail to provide a complete medical history. Patients J.L., W.L., and D.D. J.L. is the mother of S.L. W.L. is J.L.’s husband and S.L.’s father, and D.D. is S.L.’s son and J.L. and W.L.’s grandson. On September 22, 2010, approximately one month after S.L. began treatment with Dr. Lentz, J.L. wrote him the following e-mail: Dr. Lentz: Thank you for talking with me on the phone today. We are really concerned about S.L. and we can not [sic] express to you how much you are appreciated for all you have done for her. You are a true blessing to our family. My husband was bitten by a tick over the July 4th weekend in MO. He developed the bulleye [sic] rash and went to our family doctor. Dr. Calvin Blount. He was give [sic] 10 days of antibiotics, but no follow up or blood test were ever ordered. We would like to be tested for Lyme. We believe that S.L. might have contracted Lyme before she became pregnant with D.D. and would like him tested also. Here is our information. Please let me know if you need any additional information. Thank you again for all you have done. As noted above, there was an insufficient basis to justify the ordering of any tests related to Lyme disease for S.L. The only basis for ordering tests for D.D. is the suspicion that S.L. may have been infected prior to giving birth to D.D. If there is no basis for suspecting S.L. has Lyme disease, there is no basis for suspecting D.D. has Lyme disease. Respondent did not make an appointment for, take a history from, or perform a physical examination of J.L., W.L., or D.D. Based upon this e-mail alone, he ordered CD57 and ECP tests for all three of them, as well as C4a and C3a tests for J.L. and W.L. To justify ordering the tests, he listed “Lyme Disease (088.81)” under his assessment/plan for each patient. Although he never saw any of these patients, he coded each encounter as “high complexity.” On October 14, 2010, Dr. Lentz sent an e-mail to J.L. stating that “D.D. is positive for Lyme and negative for Babesia.” On October 24, 2010, Dr. Lentz sent an e-mail to J.L. stating, “W.L. C4A is back=20,000+ indicative of active Lyme.” On October 25, 2010, Dr. Lentz sent an e-mail to J.L. which stated, “[t]he CD57 is 50=positive, and the ECP is 11.5=positive for Babesia. My initial charge is $400 and $200 for return visits. Since I will be seeing both you and [W.L.], I will drop that to $300 initial visits. Call Amy for the schedule.” Dr. Lentz testified that he did not diagnose J.L., W.L., or D.D. with any condition, and did not really consider them to be patients. In his view, he was simply doing a favor for the family members of a patient. However, he created records that referred to each patient as being new patients needing tests for Lyme disease, and included diagnostic codes for the lab tests. With respect to each of them, he made an interpretation of the tests that he ordered. At least with respect to D.D., he admitted in his deposition that he diagnosed D.D. with Lyme disease based on the laboratory tests. Both S.L. and W.L. testified credibly that, based on the communications received from Dr. Lentz, they each believed that he had diagnosed them with Lyme disease, and that he had diagnosed J.L. with Babesia. It is found that he did, in fact, provide diagnoses to J.L., W.L., and D.D., without the benefit of a personal history, or a physical examination. Respondent did not refer J.L., W.L., or D.D. to a specialist in the diagnosis and treatment of infectious diseases such as Lyme disease, Bartonellosis, or Babesiosis. Respondent did not order for J.L., W.L., or D.D. an ELISA or Western blot test, PCR amplification of Bartonella or Babesial DNA, or blood smear tests. J.L. and W.L. decided to get a second opinion regarding the Lyme disease and Babesiosis diagnoses, and went to see Dr. Anastasio. Dr. Anastasio testified that J.L. did not have the required exposure to or symptoms for Lyme disease. Because she came to him with a Lyme disease diagnosis, he ordered a Lyme Western blot, a PCR for Babesiosis, and a PCR for Bartonellosis. J.L.’s Western blot IgM was negative, with two of the three antibody bands tested returning as absent. The Western blot IgG was negative, with all ten antibody bands returning as absent. J.L.’s PCRs for both Babesiosis and Bartonellosis were negative. Dr. Anastasio testified that he did not believe that J.L. had either Lyme disease or Babesia. His testimony was persuasive, and is credited. Dr. Anastasio testified that, given W.L.’s history of a tick bite followed by a rash, there was at least a basis to believe his symptoms could be an indication of Lyme disease. The tick bite and rash were approximately six months prior to W.L. presenting to Dr. Anastasio, and almost three months prior to Dr. Lentz ordering tests for him. Given these time frames, there was plenty of time for W.L. to develop antibodies to Lyme disease if he was in fact infected with the disease. Dr. Anastasio testified that at the time he saw W.L., W.L.’s symptoms were not consistent with late Lyme disease. Dr. Anastasio ordered several tests for W.L., including a Lyme Western blot, a PCR for Babesiosis, a blood smear for Babesiosis, and a PCR for Bartonellosis. The Western blot test was negative, with zero out of ten antibodies present. Both PCR tests and the blood smear were also negative. Dr. Anastasio concluded that W.L. did not have Lyme disease, Babesiosis, or Bartonellosis, and his testimony to that effect is credited.11/ Respondent failed to meet the applicable standard of care with respect to the care and treatment of patients W.L., J.L., and D.D. Based on the credible testimony of Drs. Powers and Robbins, Dr. Lentz departed from the standard of care in ordering tests for all three patients when he did so without seeing them, taking a history with respect to any of them, or conducting a physical examination of any of them to determine whether any of the requested tests were warranted or even justified. Respondent also departed from the applicable standard of care when he ordered tests that would not even assist in diagnosing Lyme disease, Babesiosis, or Bartonellosis had testing for those conditions been appropriate. Moreover, Dr. Powers testified credibly that the appropriate way to order tests for a suspected condition is to use the symptoms that are being investigated by the physician ordering the test, as opposed to the suspected disease being considered. For example, one ordering a mammogram would list “screening” or “diagnostic,” not “breast cancer,” because at that point, breast cancer has not been, and might never be, diagnosed. Documenting the symptom as opposed to the disease is important in terms of continuing care, so that there is no confusion by a subsequent health care provider reading the records about a premature diagnosis. Dr. Powers’ testimony is credited. Dr. Lentz also claimed that because J.L., W.L., and D.D. were not his patients, he did not need to have medical records for them that complied with section 458.331(1)(n). However, Dr. Lentz created patient records for all three in order to order the laboratory tests for them. He coded the action taken as having high complexity. The definition of medicine includes “diagnosis, treatment, operation, or prescription for any human disease, pain, injury, deformity, or other physical or mental condition.” § 458.305(3), Fla. Stat. Respondent clearly engaged in the practice of medicine when he wrote prescriptions for tests for the purpose of diagnosing disease. By ordering these tests, creating medical charts for them (however limited they may be), interpreting the test results and communicating those results, he established a physician-patient relationship with J.L., W.L., and D.D. Accordingly, he was required to have patient records that justified the course of treatment (here, the diagnosis of Lyme disease, Babesiosis, and Bartonella). The records presented do not meet that requirement. DOAH Case No. 15-2890PL; DOH Case No. 2012-01987 (Patient C.H.) At the time of the events giving rise to this case, C.H. was a 23-year-old woman. She was married and attending her final year of chiropractic school in Kennesaw, Georgia. C.H. testified that in December 2010, she had experienced a bout with the flu, including an episode where she passed out in the shower, for which she was prescribed a Z-pack, and recovered. She then had gum surgery during the Christmas break, requiring anesthesia, after which she visited her husband’s family in Missouri over the Christmas holiday. After C.H. returned to Georgia, she returned to class for the spring semester. In early February of 2011, she had an episode in class where her heart started beating very rapidly, and upon a physician’s advice, went to the emergency room. Tests given there were normal. Follow-up tests also did not reveal the basis for her symptoms, and in March 2011, her mother contacted Dr. Lentz based upon the suggestion of a family friend who had treated with him. On or about March 20, S.H. contacted Respondent by e-mail regarding her 23-year-old daughter, C.H. S.H. had been referred to Respondent by a family friend. S.H. reported that she had found a checklist for Lyme disease symptoms online, which included some of the symptoms her daughter was experiencing, such as fatigue, rapid heartbeat, chest pain, headaches, blurry vision, and difficulty concentrating. She also related that C.H. was in her final year of chiropractic school and had recently completed her national boards, and thought that some of the symptoms might be related to stress and anxiety from her studies. In that e-mail, S.H. reported to Respondent that C.H. had tested negative for Lyme disease the previous week. Respondent received a copy of C.H.’s negative Lyme disease test report from blood collected on or about March 16, 2011. On or about March 22, 2011, Respondent documented his assessment of C.H. as Lyme disease and chronic fatigue syndrome. He ordered CD57, C3a, C4a, and ECP laboratory tests of C.H.’s blood. At the time these tests were ordered, Respondent had not seen or talked to C.H., taken her history, or performed a physical examination. Respondent did not at any time prescribe an ELISA test or Western blot test for C.H. On April 14, 2011, S.H. e-mailed Dr. Lentz to see if any test results had been received for C.H. Dr. Lentz replied, “CD57 51+ positive for Lyme. Babesia is negative at this time.” When asked how to proceed, he told her she needed to start treatment until the CD57 is over 120.12/ S.H. asked via e-mail whether C.H. should get treatment from Dr. Lentz or her family doctor, saying they would prefer to work through him, as this is his specialty. Dr. Lentz responded, “This is more than a good family physician can handle. I have 35 years of family practice and know first hand. Lyme is a multi-faceted problem and requires extra time and effort to educate and direct this complex problem.” On or about April 18, 2011, Respondent prescribed the antibiotics Omnicef (cefdinir) and azithromycin to C.H. At the time he prescribed these medications, Respondent had not seen C.H., and there is no documentation in the patient records that Respondent made any inquiry regarding potential allergies before prescribing these antibiotics. On or about April 25, 2011, C.H. presented to Respondent for the first, and only, office visit. The medical records for that date contain symptoms that C.H. credibly denies having reported to him, such as double vision, twitching, tremors and shakes, explosive (behavior), and shortness of breath. C.H. does not recall being weighed at that visit, although the record contains a weight for her. It does not however, indicate her temperature, pulse, or respiration rate. She recalls a minimum examination for which she remained clothed in shorts and a t- shirt. During the examination, Respondent asked if she had ever been bitten by a tick or had a rash, and checked some areas of her body for a tick bite/rash, which she denied ever having. Dr. Lentz did not inquire about her travel history. Despite the fact that one of her symptoms was the inability to take a deep breath and had suffered from heart palpitations, his patients do not reflect a temperature, pulse, or respiration rate. At that visit, Respondent added the antibiotic Flagyl (metronidazole) and Interfase Plus Prothera, an enzyme formulation, to C.H.’s medications. C.H. testified that at that visit, Dr. Lentz told her that he was a specialist with numerous years of experience, and that he was the only one certified to be able to treat this, and she would have to be under his constant care. C.H. also testified that he told her she would need to be medicated for the rest of her life, because Lyme disease lives forever in your body, and that she would probably never be able to get pregnant or have children. C.H. was devastated by this information. The entire visit with Dr. Lentz, including both the taking of her history and the physical examination, lasted approximately ten minutes. C.H.’s testimony is credited. On or about June 10, 2011, Respondent prescribed CD57, C3a, C4a, and ECP tests for C.H. On or about July 2, 2011, Respondent prescribed C.H. with Babesiosis. He made this diagnosis completely on the basis of test results, as C.H. had not returned to his office after her first and only visit. On or about July 9, 2011, Respondent added artemisinin (an antimalarial), Hepapro (a nutritional supplement); Mepron (atovaquone, an antiparasitic), heparin injections (an anticoagulant), magnesium oxide (antacid, laxative, dietary supplement), and omega-3 fatty acids to C.H.’s treatment. Respondent did not prescribe a blood smear examination for Babesial parasites or PCR amplification for Babesial DNA for C.H. At no time during her treatment did Dr. Lentz refer C.H. to a specialist. Indeed, he represented to her and to her mother that he was a specialist in Lyme disease and that he was better equipped to treat these conditions than a normal family practitioner would be. C.H.’s condition worsened rather than improved under the medication regimen Dr. Lentz prescribed. She suffered diarrhea and blurred vision and her other symptoms did not improve. Dr. Joel Rosenstock is a medical doctor licensed to practice medicine in the State of Georgia. He is board certified in internal medicine with a subspecialty in infectious disease, and has practiced infectious disease medicine for over 30 years. During the time related to this proceeding, Dr. Rosenstock was practicing in Atlanta, Georgia, at the AbsoluteCARE Medical Center and Pharmacy. C.H. first presented to Dr. Rosenstock on July 12, 2011, at which time she reported Dr. Lentz’s diagnoses of Lyme disease and Babesiosis. In contrast to her brief visit with Dr. Lentz, her consultation with Dr. Rosenstock lasted two to three hours. Dr. Rosenstock immediately ordered a Western blot test for C.H., which was negative. He conducted a thorough history and physical for her, and asked C.H. questions about her travel history, her dogs and where they slept, her hobbies, etc. He advised her that he did not believe that she had Lyme disease or Babesiosis, and recommended that she stop all of the antibiotics and other medications that Dr. Lentz had prescribed. He warned her that it could take several months before the drugs were out of her system, so relief from the side effects would not be immediate. Within a few weeks of stopping the medications, C.H. was feeling much better and was on her way to feeling back to her old self. Dr. Rosenstock did not believe that any of the tests that Dr. Lentz ordered for C.H. were useful in diagnosing Lyme disease or Babesiosis, and did not believe that heparin served any purpose in treating C.H. Based on the credible opinions of Drs. Powers and Robbins, and the testimony of Dr. Rosenstock as a subsequent treating provider, it is found that Dr. Lentz departed from the applicable standard of care in the care and treatment of C.H. in several respects. First, Respondent departed from the applicable standard of care by ordering blood tests and prescribing antibiotic treatment for C.H. (as well as other medications) when he had never actually seen her. At the time he ordered the blood tests, and at the time he first ordered medications for C.H., he had not obtained a history for her, much less a history that was suggestive of Lyme disease, and had not conducted a physical examination of any kind. All he had as a basis for ordering tests was the e-mail from her mother. This e-mail was an insufficient basis upon which to determine that testing for Lyme disease was warranted. When he did actually see C.H., he failed to perform an adequate physical examination and failed to take an adequate history that included travel history, possible exposure to ticks, how long any tick bite may have lasted, and the size and appearance of the tick. Respondent failed to use the generally accepted tests for the diagnosis of Lyme disease and Babesiosis, instead relying on tests that are meant for investigational purposes and indicate on their face that they are not meant for diagnostic purposes. Moreover, as noted above, at the time he ordered the tests, he had no basis upon which to believe C.H. had Lyme disease. Although even his own expert witness consistently stated that a diagnosis of Lyme disease is based in large part upon a thorough history, here, Dr. Lentz had no history. Dr. Cichon’s testimony that it was appropriate to rely on the information in S.H.’s e-mail about her daughter’s symptoms (keeping in mind that her daughter is an adult, not a child) is rejected as not credible. Respondent also departed from the applicable standard of care by prescribing Omnicef, azithromycin, artemisinin, Hepapro, Mepron, heparin injections, magnesium oxide, and omega-3 fatty acids for a condition that she did not have. Given that C.H. had no condition justifying the prescription of these drugs, the prescriptions were both inappropriate and excessive. They also were prescribed for a duration that was not justified, and exposed C.H. to complications that were unnecessary. Respondent was required to keep medical records that justified the course of treatment. His medical records for C.H. fell well short of this requirement. He failed to document a complete history, an adequate physical examination, or why he did not refer her case to a specialist. He also departed from the applicable standards when he used a diagnosis of Lyme disease as the basis for blood tests at a time when he had never seen the patient. Failure to Timely Report Diagnoses or Suspicion of Lyme Disease to the Department of Health (DOAH Case Nos. 15-2889 and 15-2890) Finally, in DOAH Case Nos. 15-2889 and 15-2890, the Department alleged that Respondent failed to report his diagnoses of Lyme disease or suspicions of Lyme disease for patients D.H., J.L., W.L., S.L., D.D., and C.H. to the Department of Health. Section 381.0031, Florida Statutes (2010-2011), requires certain licensed health care practitioners and facilities in Florida to report the diagnosis or suspicion of the existence of diseases of public health significance to the Department of Health. Lyme disease is one of the diseases identified by rule that meets the definition of a disease that is “a threat of public health and therefore of significance to public health.” § 381.0031(2), Fla. Stat.; Fla. Admin. Code R. 64D-3.029. There are forms that are identified by rule for use in reporting these cases. Fla. Admin. Code R. 64D-3.030(3). Ashley Rendon is a biological scientist for the Department of Health in Okaloosa County. Ms. Rendon is an epidemiologist whose duties include investigating reportable disease conditions and outbreaks of public health significance in Okaloosa County. According to Ms. Rendon, whose testimony is consistent with the Department’s rules on this subject, all diagnosed or suspected cases of Lyme disease must be reported to the Department. Once reported, the county health office will conduct an analysis of the reported diagnosis or suspicion, based on a “guidance to surveillance” document, to determine whether the reported case meets the definition for Lyme disease such that the case needs to be reported to the statewide system and to the CDC. Ms. Rendon testified that whether a suspected case or a diagnosis meets the case definition is not for the practitioner to decide. Ms. Rendon’s testimony is credited. According to Ms. Rendon, the Department maintains records both for those reported cases that met the case definition and those reported cases that did not. For 2010, there was one case of Lyme disease that was confirmed, probable, or suspect. None were reported for 2011. There were seven to eight additional cases that were reviewed, but not reported as probable, confirmed, or suspect. Not all reported results are confirmed by ELISA or Western blot. Ms. Rendon reviewed the records of the Department to determine whether Dr. Lentz had reported any cases of Lyme disease, whether suspected or diagnosed, to the Department. There was one instance where a patient of Dr. Lentz’s apparently called in and asked questions, but there was no record of Dr. Lentz or anyone in his office reporting Lyme disease. Dr. Lentz claimed that he had at least on one occasion attempted to report in the past, but that he could not say if he had reported any of the patients named in the Administrative Complaints. He claimed that the Department would not accept reports that are not supported by two-tier testing results, so he stopped trying to report. His claim is rejected as not credible. There is clear and convincing evidence to establish that Respondent failed to report his diagnoses of Lyme disease for patients D.H., J.L., W.L., D.D., S.L., and C.H. General Observations Of the seven patients presented in this proceeding, Dr. Lentz saw only two before ordering tests for Lyme disease and in some cases, Babesiosis or Bartonellosis. With respect to C.H., not only did he fail to see her before ordering testing, but he ordered medications for her without ever obtaining a medical history or performing a physical examination. Some of the patients specifically requested testing for Lyme disease. However, it is the physician’s responsibility to determine whether there is any realistic reason to believe that a patient has a need for such tests. Moreover, in several instances, the general, non-specific symptoms related by the patients suggest several other alternative conditions that could cause the patients’ problems. Even Respondent’s expert opined that Lyme disease, Bartonellosis and Babesiosis share a lot of general, non-specific symptoms with other illnesses, including serious diagnoses such as ALS, MS, and rheumatoid diseases. These are all, according to Dr. Cichon, differential diagnoses that a physician should sometimes consider when trying to find a diagnosis. Yet with all of these patients, Dr. Lentz went straight to Lyme disease every time. He did not consider much of anything else when even to a lay person, the records cry out for a more thoughtful and measured approach. In short, it seems that Dr. Lentz wanted to find Lyme disease regardless of the symptoms presented, and so he did. By doing so, he cost these patients not only the money used for testing and, with respect to C.C., W.L., S.L., and C.H., subjecting them to treatments they did not need and, in at least with respect to S.L., could not afford, but he subjected them to a treatment regimen that made them miserable, was of questionable benefit, and exposed them to unnecessary risks. Petitioner presented the expert testimony of Dr. Charles Powers, a general family practitioner, and Dr. William Robbins, an infectious disease specialist. It also presented the testimony of subsequent treating physicians: Dr. Janelle Robertson, Dr. Patrick Anastasio, and Dr. Joel Rosenstock. Each subsequent treating physician testified credibly that the symptoms presented simply did not justify a diagnosis of Lyme disease, and the testing they either conducted or reviewed did not indicate a basis for such a diagnosis. Their testimony was consistent with that of both expert witnesses presented by the Department, and the testimony of these subsequent treating physicians and expert witnesses have been accorded great weight. Respondent presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Cichon, a retired infectious disease specialist. Dr. Cichon’s testimony was in many respects inconsistent, and at times he seemed to be struggling to actually support the care and treatment that Respondent performed in these cases. While he championed Respondent’s use of the CD57, the ECP, and the Fry test, he also admitted that he seldom, if ever, used some of these tests, and that there were problems with standardization of the tests. Moreover, the tests themselves indicated on their face that they were for investigational, as opposed to diagnostic, use, and should not be used as the sole basis for diagnosis of patients. Because of the significant inconsistencies with his testimony and the contrasts between what he advocated and what Dr. Lentz sometimes did, his testimony is given little weight.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order finding that Respondent has violated section 458.331(1)(g), (m), and (t), as alleged in the three Administrative Complaints at issue in this proceeding; and by the findings that Respondent violated section 458.331(1)(t) with respect to all seven patients, Respondent is guilty of repeated malpractice. It is further recommended that the Board of Medicine revoke his license to practice medicine in the State of Florida, impose an administrative fine in the amount of $30,000, and impose costs pursuant to section 456.072. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of July, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of July, 2016.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.5720.43458.331
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JEFFERY A. HESS AND JEANMARIE HESS, ON BEHALF OF AND AS PARENTS AND NATURAL GUARDIANS OF SAMUEL HESS, A MINOR vs FLORIDA BIRTH-RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION ASSOCIATION, 06-000187N (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Jan. 17, 2006 Number: 06-000187N Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2007

The Issue At issue is whether Samuel Hess, a minor, qualifies for coverage under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (Plan).

Findings Of Fact Stipulated facts Jeffrey Hess and Jeanmarie Hess are the natural parents of Samuel Hess, a minor. Samuel was born a live infant on January 7, 2002, at St. Vincent's Medical Center, a licensed hospital in Jacksonville, Florida, and his birth weight exceeded 2,500 grams. The physician providing obstetrical services at Samuel's birth was Karen D. Bonar, M.D., who, at all times material hereto, was a "participating physician" in the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, as defined by Section 766.302(7), Florida Statutes. Coverage under the Plan Pertinent to this case, coverage is afforded by the Plan for infants who suffer a "birth-related neurological injury," defined as an "injury to the brain . . . caused by oxygen deprivation . . . occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired." § 766.302(2), Fla. Stat. See also §§ 766.309 and 766.31, Fla. Stat. Here, Petitioners are of the view that Samuel suffered such an injury. More particularly, Petitioners believe Samuel's neurologic impairments are the result of a brain injury caused by hydrocephalus, secondary to an intraventricular hemorrhage (diagnosed at six days of life), that was precipitated by oxygen deprivation (a hypoxic ischemic insult), and which occurred during labor and delivery. In contrast, NICA is of the view that Samuel's impairments are most likely developmentally based, as opposed to birth related, and that, whatever the etiology of Samuel's impairments, he is not permanently and substantially physically impaired. Samuel's birth and immediate newborn course At or about 12:55 p.m., January 7, 2002, Mrs. Hess, with an estimated delivery date of January 21, 2002, and the fetus at 38 weeks' gestation, was admitted to St. Vincent's Medical Center, following spontaneous rupture of the membranes, with clear fluid noted, at 9:00 a.m. On admission, mild, irregular contractions were noted; vaginal examination revealed the cervix at 2 to 3 centimeters dilation, 60 percent effacement, and the fetus at -1 station; and fetal monitoring was reassuring for fetal well-being, with a baseline of 120 to 130 beats per minute. Given rupture of the membranes, Mrs. Hess was committed to deliver, and she was admitted for pitocin augmentation. Following admission, an IV was started at 1:48 p.m.; an epidural was placed at 3:56 p.m.; pitocin drip was started at 4:05 p.m.; Mrs. Hess was noted as pushing at 9:24 p.m.; and Samuel was delivered spontaneously at 10:24 p.m., with "Nu[cal]/Hand" (the umbilical cord wrapped around the hand) noted. In the interim, staring at or about 8:00 p.m., monitoring revealed, over time, late decelerations; marked decelerations with slow return to baseline; and evidence of a hypertonic uterus (starting at 9:24 p.m., and persisting, following periods of relaxation, until 10:22 p.m.), with exaggerated fetal heart rate variability. Such a pattern is consistent with fetal stress, and raises concerns regarding fetal reserves and adequate oxygenation. However, at delivery, Samuel was not depressed; did not require resuscitation; was accorded normal Apgar scores of 8 and 9, at one and five minutes, respectively, reflective of a healthy newborn2; and no abnormalities were observed at birth, except pronounced molding.3 Following delivery, Samuel was transferred to the nursery, and ultimately discharged with his mother on January 10, 2002. In the interim, Samuel's newborn course was normal, except for evidence of mild jaundice (diagnosed the morning of January 9, 2002), which did not require light therapy. However, on discharge, instructions were given to follow-up the next day at the Seton Center for a repeat bilirubin check. As instructed, Mrs. Hess presented with Samuel at the Seton Center on January 11, 2002, for a repeat bilirubin check. At the time, Samuel was noted to be active, alert, and in no apparent distress; his temperature was recorded as normal (as it had been following delivery, and during his admission in the nursery at St. Vincent's Medical Center); his newborn examination, apart from evidence of jaundice, was within normal limits; and Mrs. Hess reported that Samuel had fed well.4 The results of the bilirubin test were obtained at or about 1:30 p.m., that afternoon, and called to a staff physician (Dr. Vaughn), who gave instructions to initiate phototherapy. Accordingly, later that afternoon, Samuel was put under the bilirubin lights at home, with instructions to monitor his temperature every two hours. On January 12, 2002, Samuel recorded a temperature of 100.6, and on the instructions of Dr. Vaughn, Samuel was taken to the emergency room at Wolfson Children's Hospital for evaluation.5 There, Samuel was received at 6:35 p.m., and triaged at 6:42 p.m. Chief complaint was jaundice, and temperature was noted as 100.7, otherwise no abnormalities were observed. Samuel's physical examination and immediate hospital course were documented, as follows: PHYSICAL EXAMINATION: His temperature is 100.7 in the ER. The rest of his vitals are normal. His weight is 2.7 kg. He is resting, easily aroused. Anterior fontanelle is soft and flat, with normal sutures. Has good red reflexes bilaterally. Ear canals are patent. Nose without congestion. Oropharynx is clear, no cleft. Heart is normal S1 and S2 without murmurs. Abdomen is soft and nontender. Chest is clear to auscultation. Extremities are without rashes, cyanosis, clubbing or edema. He does have good femoral pulses bilaterally, and no hip clicks. Neurologically, he is alert and active . . . . LABORATORY: . . . Total bilirubin on admission was 14.2, direct was 0.5. He was tapped, and had a white count in his spinal fluid of 2,500 and red count of 241,250. He had 65 segs, 17 lymphocytes and 18 monocytes, and the spinal fluid Gram stain showed no organisms, but an occasional leukocyte. IMPRESSION AND PLAN: My impression is that we have a six-day-old with fever and abnormal leukocytosis in his spinal fluid. He was placed on ampicillin, and gentamicin . . . . He was also cultured for herpes [, which was negative]. He was started on Acyclovir 20/kilo q.8 hours. He will continue to feed. A repeat spinal tap was attempted to clear up the meningitis issue on two occasions; however, both times they were bloody. We, therefore, are going to obtain a head CT with contrast to rule out an intracranial bleed. A CT of the head was done on January 13, 2002, and revealed a bilateral intraventricular hemorrhage (IVH) and a left posterior parietal cephalohematoma.6 The CT scan was read, as follows: FINDINGS: There is molding of the bones of the calvarium, compatible with recent vaginal delivery. Curvilinear area of increased density identified within the scalp soft tissues in the left posterior parietal region, compatible with a cephalohematoma. Increased densities identified within the lumen of the left lateral ventricle, predominantly involving the left choroid plexus, but also layering in the dependent portion of the lateral ventricle, compatible with intraventricular hemorrhage from the choroid plexus bleed. In addition, increased density is identified in the dependent portion of the right lateral ventricle consistent with intraventricular hemorrhage. No extra axial fluid collections are identified. Linear area of increased density is identified in the right frontal region, only seen on images #11, and therefore likely not due to subarachnoid hemorrhage. The ventricular system is not dilated. No focal parenchymal mass is identified. After contrast administration, there are no abnormal areas of parenchymal or meningeal enhancement identified. IMPRESSION: Left posterior parietal cephalohematoma Bilateral intraventricular hemorrhage, left greater than right, with the left intraventricular hemorrhage due to choroid plexus bleed. Molding of the bones of the calvarium compatible with history of recent vaginal delivery . . . . Given the abnormalities reported on the CT scan, Dr. Randell Powell, a neurosurgeon, was requested to see Samuel for neurosurgical input. That consultation occurred on January 16, 2002,7 and was reported, as follows: . . . I have been requested to see the child for neurosurgical input. I am informed that the baby is now doing well. Septic work-up was completely negative and antibiotics have since been discontinued and the baby is anticipating discharge later on today. PHYSICAL EXAMINATION: Reveals a beautiful, sleeping, male infant with a very soft head, a very soft fontanelle, no splitting of the sutures. The head circumference is measured to be slightly less than the 50th percentile for a newborn. There is no nuchal rigidity and bending the legs did not appear to cause irritation as well. The child has a bilateral red reflex. Pupils are equal and reactive. The Moro reflex is symmetric. Computed tomographic scan shows hemorrhage emanating from the choroid plexus and the trigone of the left lateral ventricle. There is mild ventricular dilatation. Follow-up ultrasound shows similar findings. IMPRESSION: Intraventricular hemorrhage. DISCUSSION: Intraventricular hemorrhages in the newborn perinatal period that are caused by choroid plexus hemorrhage generally have an excellent prognosis as no significant brain parenchyma is disrupted and these hemorrhages usually resolve without sequelae. However, there is roughly a 20% chance of developing post hemorrhagic hydrocephalus which in 50% of cases could require more aggressive treatment. That means the baby's chances of needing neurosurgical intervention is somewhat less than 10% and this was discussed extensively with the parents who were happy to hear this news. There are no overt signs of hydrocephalus at this time and in my opinion I think that we can safely follow the baby with serial physical examination consisting of palpation of the fontanelle and head circumference measurements. I would be glad to see the baby at age one month for follow- up, but I suspect a good prognosis here. Samuel was discharged from Wolfson Children's Hospital at 6:15 p.m., January 16, 2002, with instructions to monitor his head circumference once a week, and for follow-up appointments with Dr. Hamaty (his pediatrician at the time8) and Dr. Powell. Samuel's subsequent development Following discharge, Samuel was followed by Dr. Powell for mild posthemorrhagic hydrocephalus, that appeared to stabilize, but then got worse between ages four and six months.9 Serial studies showed progressive ventricular enlargement consistent with hydrocephalus, and after discussing treatment options Samuel's parents elected to proceed with endoscopic third ventriculostomy, which was performed on August 26, 2002. Initially, Samuel appeared to be doing reasonably well, but then he developed an accelerated head circumference (53.8 centimeters, which placed him above the 98th percentile), consistent with progressive hydrocephalus, and on December 6, 2002, a Codman programmable ventriculoperioneal shunt was placed. Since that time, Samuel has done fairly well, without symptoms related to increased intracranial pressure. However, he continues to evidence macrocrania (above the 98th percentile), ventriculomegaly (enlargement of the laterial ventricules), and atrophy of brain tissue.10 (Exhibit 34). Samuel's current presentation With regard to Samuel's current presentation, the parties agree, and the proof is otherwise compelling, that Samuel is permanently and substantially mentally impaired.11 As for his physical presentation, while there may be room for disagreement, the complexity of Samuel's difficulties support the conclusion that he is also permanently and substantially physically impaired. In so concluding, it is noted that on the Vineland Adoptive Behavior Scales Form (VABS), related to daily living skills and motor skills, Samuel scored in the mentally handicapped range. "He is not yet toilet trained despite intensive efforts in this regard"; "[h]e is able to assist with simple dressing and undressing tasks but is not yet independent with these skills"; and he "continues to display gross-motor, fine-motor, visual-motor, and motor planning impairment." (Exhibits 18 and 30). It is further noted that Samuel presents with impaired postural control (aggravated by his large head), impaired strength, hypotonia, and bilateral pronatal feet. As a result, Samuel has moderate to severe impairment in strength, endurance, postural control, balance responses (with unexpected falls), functional mobility, and activities of daily living. Notably, at approximately five years of age, Samuel requires a stroller for extended outings, and caregiver assistance for 90 percent of self care needs. (Exhibit 10). The cause of Samuel's impairments As for the cause of Samuel's neurologic impairments, the proof demonstrates that, more likely than not, they are the result of a brain injury, caused by hydrocephalus, secondary to the intraventricular hemorrhage (IVH) he suffered, and which was diagnosed at six days of life. What remains to resolve is the genesis of Samuel's IVH or, stated otherwise, whether the proof demonstrated, more likely than not, that the IVH was caused by oxygen deprivation, and occurred during labor, delivery or resuscitation. § 766.302(2), Fla. Stat. ("'Birth-related neurological injury' means injury to the brain . . . caused by oxygen deprivation . . . occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period."); Nagy v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, 813 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)(The oxygen deprivation and injury to the brain must occur during labor, delivery, or immediately afterward.). The genesis of Samuel's IVH Regarding the intraventricular hemorrhage Samuel suffered, the proof is compelling that an IVH in a term infant, such as Samuel, is a rare occurrence, and its cause frequently cannot be identified. Indeed, among the physicians who addressed the issue, there is apparent agreement that the majority of IVHs (approximately 50 percent) are related to oxygen deprivation (hypoxia-ischemia) or trauma, and the remainder fall into one of two groups, those with another identifiable cause (such as vascular malformation, infection, clotting disorder, venous infarct, or genetic disorder) and those of unknown etiology (idiopathic). To address the cause and timing of Samuel's IVH, the parties offered the deposition testimony of Julius Piver, M.D., J.D., a physician board-certified in obstetrics and gynecology (albeit one who has not practiced obstetrics for 20 years); Mary Edwards-Brown, M.D., a physician board-certified in radiology, with subspecialty certification in neuroradiology; David Hammond, M.D., a physician board-certified in pediatrics, neurology with special competence in child neurology, and clinical neurophysiology; Donald Willis, M.D., a physician board-certified in obstetrics and gynecology, and maternal-fetal medicine; and Michael Duchowny, M.D., a physician board- certified in pediatrics, neurology with special competence in child neurology, electroencephalography, and clinical neurophysiology.12 The testimony of Doctors Piver, Edwards- Brown, and Hammond were offered in support of Petitioners' view on causation, and testimony of Doctors Willis and Duchowny were offered in support of NICA's view on causation. Pertinent to the issue of causation, Doctors Piver, Edwards-Brown, and Hammond were of the opinion that an infant can suffer a intraventricular hemorrhage during labor and delivery, as a result of a hypoxic-ischemic insult, and not show any clinical evidence in the immediate postnatal period. However, although offered the opportunity to do so, Dr. Hammond declined to offer an opinion as to the likely etiology (cause and timing) of Samuels IVH.13 Consequently, we are left to consider the testimony of Doctors Piver and Edwards-Brown with regard to Petitioners' view on causation. As for the etiology of Samuel's IVH, it was Dr. Piver's opinion, based on his review of the medical records, that Samuel's IVH was most likely caused by partial prolonged asphyxia, that was sufficient to cause a subtle, slow bleed during labor and delivery, which progressed to the significant IVH noted at 6 days of life, but that was initially insufficient to reveal itself (by clinical evidence of a bleed) in the immediate postnatal period. In reaching his conclusion, Dr. Piver relied heavily on his evaluation of the fetal monitor strips, which he opined revealed, starting at 6:48 p.m. (18:48), and continuing for 30 to 35 minutes, evidence of marked loss of beat-to-beat variability; late decelerations at 8:01 p.m., 8:03 p.m., 8:05 p.m., 8:25 p.m., 8:28 p.m., 8:31 p.m., and 8:33 p.m.; a marked deceleration to a low of 70 beats per minute at 8:50 p.m., with a slow return to baseline at 8:56 p.m.; a marked deceleration from 180 beats per minute to 90 beats per minute between 9:14 p.m. to 9:20 p.m.; a late deceleration at 9:23 p.m.; and evidence of a hypertonic uterus starting at 9:24 p.m., and persisting to 9:42 p.m., again at 9:50 p.m., and persisting to 10:14 p.m., and again at 10:20 p.m. and persisting to 10:22 p.m., with exaggerated fetal heart rate variability. While acknowledging the bleed could have started at any time between the 7th of January (Samuel's delivery date) and the 12th of January, when Samuel presented to Wolfson Children's Hospital, Dr. Piver was of the opinion, given his review of the fetal monitor strips, that Samuel's bleed was most likely caused by hypoxia, and that it began during labor and delivery. Dr. Piver variously noted the likely onset of the bleed as "[b]etween 2030 and 2130 hours"; "around 2000 hours"; "from 2000 hours to 2130 hours"; "between 1800 and 2224 hours"; "between 1800 and 2100 hours"; and "the 21:24 to 22:20 time interval." (Exhibit 23, pages 34, 48, 49, 57, 80, 82; Exhibit 23, deposition Exhibit 6). Dr. Edwards-Brown, like Dr. Piver, was of the opinion that Samuel's IVH was most likely caused by hypoxia, that caused a slow bleed during labor and delivery, but an insufficient bleed to reveal evidence of brain damage during the immediate postnatal period. Dr. Edwards-Brown's opinion was explained, as follows: Q How are you able to determine, based on the films that you reviewed, that the hemorrhage began during labor and delivery? A Based on the films alone, we can't make that determination. It's simply the path of physiology of the hemorrhages and the hospital course as well as the labor and delivery records that allow me to make that conclusion. * * * Q Are you able to look at the effect of the hemorrhage on the brain structures to determine or time when the hemorrhage may have occurred? A What I see is a large hemorrhage wherein the ventricle that is pretty bright and that hemorrhage is causing hydrocephalus; and the hydrocephalus, I'm sure, is causing symptoms, but hemorrhages don't cause hydrocephalus initially. It takes some time before that occurs. So all I can say is yes, the hemorrhage is having an effect on the brain, and that effect is hydrocephalus and ischemia, and it could have occurred sometime from the time of labor and delivery until the time that film was obtained. Q It could have occurred at any time in between there? A. The hydrocephalus and the ischemia. Q But not the hemorrhage? A Certainly the hemorrhage could have occurred after birth, but I would have expected some evidence of that in the clinical history. I would have expected evidence that this child had suffered a profound hypoxic injury as one might see if this child had had a code or a profound drop in his oxygen status. None of that is in the record; therefore, I don't think it's a post natal event. * * * Q Okay. How are you able to rule out in this case that the hemorrhage did not begin on January 9th, 10th, 11th or 12th? A Several things. Number one, I don't have evidence on the 9th, 10th, 11th, or 12th of January that this child suffered any hypoxic injury. Q Hemorrhage [can] be caused by something other than hypoxic injury? A It can. Q Okay, and what are the other possible causes? A Intraventricular hemorrhage might result from a tumor, might result from a vascular malformation, it could result from an infection, but it usually results from hypoxia. Q We sometimes do not know what causes intraventricular hemorrhage? A I think when we don't know what causes intraventricular hemorrhage, it is a reasonable presumption that there was hypoxia at a time when someone was not looking, as in the prenatal or labor and delivery period. If there wasn't a fetal heart monitoring strip obtained during that period and the child is born with -- excuse me, with intraventricular hemorrhage, I think the presumption should be that there was hypoxia during that time. But certainly there may be some times when we don't have an answer. Q Sometimes we simply don't know what caused the hemorrhage? A That is undeniably true; however, one should not make that presumption until we have excluded the usual causes. And in this case, based on Dr. Piver's testimony that there was evidence of hypoxia during labor and delivery, one must assume that that was the cause. We don't make the diagnosis of an idiopathic cause. That means we don't have the answer when we have evidence of a reasonable cause, which we have here. Q In your letter to Mr. Sharrit that we referred to earlier, you state on Page No. 2 further down that, "The absence of symptoms in the three days following birth is not unusual since bleeding begins small and increases with time." What do you mean by that? A That's the nature of bleeding. I'm sure you know this. We have all bled. You don't -- Well, bleeding -- unless it's the result of an aneurism -- is not so massive initially. It starts out as a leak in the vessels, and the longer it bleeds the more it accumulates . . . . (Exhibit 27, pages 39, 41, 42, 44-46). Contrasted with the opinion held by Doctors Piver, Edwards-Brown, and Hammond, Doctors Willis and Duchowny were of the opinion that if a hypoxic event is significant enough to cause an intraventricular hemorrhage during labor and delivery, there will be clinical evidence in the immediate newborn period. Dr. Willis expressed his observations on the medical records, as well as the basis of his opinions on causations, as follows: Q . . . Dr. Willis, in reviewing the records and the fetal heart tracings, were you able to identify any intervals, any intervals of concern, I suppose, or any that you thought that may have been hypoxic intervals? A Well, the fetal heart rate monitor strip looks pretty good until about an hour and a half before delivery, and then there are fetal heart rate decelerations that pretty much continue until the time of birth. Q And what was the significance of those intervals that you're talking about, to you? A Well, the decrease in fetal heart rate usually means that there's some decrease in oxygen supply to the baby. Q Okay. A Or umbilical cord compression, which could lead to that same thing. Q So are you saying you found intervals that were suspicious for oxygen compromise? A That's correct. Q Did you identify intervals of lack of beat-to-beat variability that you thought were of concern? A Well, I'll look, but most of what I saw were fetal heart rate decelerations along with really exaggerated fetal heart rate variability, which usually you see with umbilical cord compression. Q Well, are you saying, then, that there were episodes in this case where you felt there was significant cord compression? A Well, the fetal heart rate tracing certainly is consistent with umbilical cord compression. Q And over what time period would you say the fetal heart tracings are consistent with cord compression? A Well, off and on for the last hour and a half prior to birth. Q And could that create a scenario, an hypoxic scenario that could lead to some kind of vascular insult within the brain? A Now, let me be sure I understand the question. Are you asking me if I believe this fetal heart rate pattern, the abnormalities that I see led to that or can abnormalities in fetal heart rate pattern in general lead to brain injury? Q I guess my question would be, the pattern that you've identified in this case, is that consistent with a pattern that can lead to injury, vascular injury within the brain? A Well, I think it shows that there's probably some lack of oxygen during that time period. Now, the question then is, you know, did that lack of oxygen lead to brain damage. And in this case, you know, my feeling is or my opinion is that it did not lead to brain damage. Q Let's break that up a little bit. Without knowing, without looking at the final result -- I presume you're looking at the early neonatal period right after birth to help you make that conclusion. Am I correct? A Yes. Q If we for the moment put aside the early clinical course of the child, just by looking at the heart tracings and the patterns that you've identified, are those consistent with or perhaps suspicious for the kind of pattern that could lead to a fetal compromise, brain compromise? A Well, I don't know if anyone could predict fetal brain damage simply based on a fetal heart rate pattern. You really have to look at the baby, the condition of the baby after birth to be able to say whether or not the abnormalities in the fetal heart rate pattern resulted in oxygen deprivation and brain injury. * * * Q Now, you did, no doubt, note that the child did return to the hospital after discharge and was found to have a bloody spinal tap, and ultimately it was determined that it had an intraventricular hemorrhage? A That's correct. That's, I believe, on the fifth day after birth. Q Well, having identified hypoxic consistent patterns within the fetal heart tracings, how is it that you can say that perhaps did not lead to a vascular insult that slowly progressed over a period of four or five days into an extensive hemorrhage? * * * A . . . I think that it's pretty clear that if you're going to have an hypoxic injury to the brain that's substantial enough to cause brain injury then the baby really is going to be depressed at time of birth and is going to have an unstable newborn period. Simply having an abnormal fetal heart rate pattern is not enough to say that any lack of oxygen that occurred during labor caused brain damage. Q . . . And I guess you're saying across the board and without exception there can be no slowly progressing brain damage that can occur due to labor and delivery hypoxia? A Well, in order to have an hypoxic event during labor or delivery that would be substantial enough to cause an hypoxic- related brain injury, then really the baby is going to have to be depressed at birth. Now, I mean, you can have intracranial hemorrhages, choroid plexus bleeds in babies that have normal, spontaneous vaginal births with normal-looking fetal heart rate tracings. I mean, there are spontaneous hemorrhages that can occur during labor, delivery, at some point after the baby is born, in the newborn period. But what I'm saying is that if you're going to have an intracranial hemorrhage due to an hypoxic event during labor or delivery, then the baby really should be depressed at time of birth and have an unstable newborn course. Q When you say depressed after the birth, do you put any outer limit on the time frame during which the baby might become depressed? A Well, usually, by the newborn -- by the immediate post-delivery period they mean immediately after birth and until the baby is essentially stabilized after birth. For instance, in this case the baby had Apgar scores of eight and nine, required no resuscitation at all. So, you know, we really don't have anything to suggest that there's a problem in the immediate newborn period. And then during the hospital stay, other than the jaundice, the baby did not really have any problems. The baby breast-fed. It did not have any neurologic findings that were abnormal, didn't have renal failure, did not have seizures, you know, the types of things that we see with babies that suffer an hypoxic insult during labor or delivery. * * * Q I know that your opinion is that if an hypoxic event is significant enough to cause a brain damage, then you're going to have to necessarily see signs of depression at birth or shortly after birth. Am I stating that correctly? A Very nicely. Q Okay. What if we're not talking about brain damage or encephalopathy in the broad sense but we're just talking about a very small insult to one of the blood vessels in the brain that doesn't readily turn into brain damage but, rather, becomes a progressive problem over a period of several days? Is that a possible scenario? A I guess most things are possible, but that seems unlikely to me. Q It seems unlikely to you that you could have a weakening of a blood vessel or some injury that lessens the integrity of the blood vessel and that the brain damage is then latent and that's perhaps the reason why it would not negatively impact the early clinical course? A Well, let me say -- and I think we kind of went over this before -- that you can have intracranial hemorrhages on babies that have no apparent problems at all during labor, delivery. Just for reasons unknown you can have intracranial hemorrhage and blood vessels can rupture. But I guess what we're talking about is brain injury due to lack of oxygen or mechanical trauma. And my point being that if you're going to get a hemorrhage due to lack of oxygen or mechanical trauma, then the baby really should be depressed at time of birth (Exhibit 28, pages 23-30). Dr. Duchowny expressed his observations of the medical records, as well as his opinions on causation, as follows: Q. Let me at this time suggest a brain injury pathway that has been offered by others in this case for Samuel Hess and ask you to comment on that. Others have suggested that in this case there was labor and delivery hypoxia that resulted in a choroid plexus bleed and was associated with an isolated -- excuse me, where the blood was isolated -- the bleed was isolated within the ventricles during the pre-natal course and that that later produced hydrocephalus -- MR. BAJALIA: Pre-natal? MR. SHARRIT: Yes, in the first few days after birth. Q. Are you with me, doctor? A. Yes, I am, but I think you mean post- natal course. Q. I'm sorry, I'm sorry. I do. Thank you. Labor and delivery hypoxia, the choroid plexus bleed isolated within the ventricles during the post-natal course that later produced hydrocephalus and increased the internal cranial pressure that later after - - well after discharge from the hospital resulted in periventricular white matter damage. Is that a reasonable interpretation for Samuel Hess' brain injury? A. No. Q. Why not? A. There's no evidence of hypoxia. * * * Q. . . . [Y]ou don't think that they are a result of hypoxia because you don't discern evidence of hypoxia on the fetal monitor strips? A. There are abnormalities on the fetal monitoring strips. As I said before, I don't think they are associated with hypoxia. * * * Q. I understand your testimony to the contrary, but if -- if it turned out that after reviewing Samuel's fetal monitor strips you decided that there was evidence of hypoxia, would that be a reasonable link to the hemorrhage that was diagnosed? A. No, because Samuel didn't show any of the signs of hypoxia at birth so I don't believe he had any type of hypoxic damage. * * * Q. Do you not find any evidence at all of hypoxia on the fetal monitor strips? A. I believe the fetal monitoring strips indicate some fetal stress and that's all. Q. As opposed to distress? A. It just shows stress to the fetus during the inter-partum experience. That's all. Q. How do you define stress? A. I think the decelerations indicate, you know, stress on -- you know, stress is being placed on the fetus. Q. . . . [But] can't late decelerations be an indication of hypoxia? A. It's possible. Q. Could bradycardia in the 60 to 70 be[at]s per minute range be an indication of hypoxia? A. It's possible but not necessarily. * * * Q. . . . If you have an intraventricular hemorrhage that you attribute to a hypoxic ischemic insult that resulted during the course of labor and delivery and late in delivery, as has been suggested in this case, wouldn't you expect to see some clinically recognizable neurologic dysfunction in the neonate during the immediate newborn period? A. Yes, you would. Q. Even if the hemorrhage was, to use opposing counsel's words, isolated? A. Yes. If you're claiming that the neurologic problems are related to hypoxia, you would expect to see clinical signs of hypoxia at the time. Q. Even if the hemorrhage was isolated? A. Yes. Q. Can you explain that? A. You would see clinical manifestations in some way. You know, there would be some compromise in respiratory status, evidence of compromise in organ function because the lack of oxygen would affect not only the brain but other organ systems as well. You might see elevation of cardiac enzymes, liver enzymes, changes in renal function, changes in mental status, seizures, changes in blood pressure, respirations, etcetera. Q. And just so I'm clear, that is true even if the hemorrhage was isolated just within the ventricle? A. Yes, if you're attributing it to hypoxia. * * * Q. And based upon your review of the medical records, did you see any indication that Samuel had any such clinically recognizable neurological impairment or dysfunction during the immediate newborn period? A. No, I did not. Q. Did you note what his APGAR scores were? A. Yes, I believe he had normal APGAR scores. I believe they were eight and nine and one at five minutes. Q. Is that consistent with Samuel having suffered an isolated intraventricular hemorrhage that was the result of a hypoxic ischemic insult that occurred late in delivery -- A. No. Q. -- labor and delivery? A. I don't believe so. Q. Is the fact that there was no documented evidence of impaired neurologic function in Samuel during the immediate newborn period consistent with Samuel having suffered an isolated intraventricular hemorrhage that occurred late in labor and delivery? A. No. (Exhibit 29, pages 17, 18, 20-23, and 36-39). Here, there is no apparent reason to credit the testimony of Petitioners' witnesses on the issue of causation over the testimony of NICAs witnesses. Indeed, as among those who spoke to the issue of causation, Doctors Willis and Duchowny are the more qualified to address the issue, and their testimony the more persuasive.

Florida Laws (8) 766.301766.302766.303766.304766.305766.309766.31766.311
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