The Issue The issue is whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character in violation of section 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4), and if so, what penalty should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations in the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was employed as a corrections officer with the Gulf County Jail.1/ In May of 2010, officials for the Gulf County Jail in conjunction with the Gulf County Sheriff's Office investigated allegations that contraband was being smuggled to inmates at the jail. As a result of the investigation, seven people were dismissed from employment and/or charged with crimes. Part of the investigation addressed Respondent's alleged behavior. As part of that investigation, Investigator Shane Lee of the Gulf County Sheriff's Office interviewed inmate Jason Strimel. Michael Hammond, Administrator for the jail, also attended the interview, which was videotaped. Based on information received from the interview, a baggie was retrieved from Mr. Strimel, which contained two pills and some residue. Pictures of the pills were entered into evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 2. While Warden Hammond testified that the pills were tested and determined to be Ultram, no documentary evidence related to the testing was introduced. Based on the investigation by the Gulf County Sheriff's Office, Respondent was charged with introduction of contraband, in violation of section 951.22, Florida Statutes. Respondent entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement on January 27, 2012. His employment at the Gulf County Jail was terminated. No competent evidence was presented in this proceeding connecting Respondent to the introduction of contraband.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of March, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 2013.
Findings Of Fact On December 20, 1985, Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission and issued certificate no. 14-84-502-04. Respondent's work in law enforcement in Florida has been as a correctional officer. On the night of December 27, 1986, Respondent left his home to go to the American Legion in Lake City, Florida. On his way he met his friend Eddie Goodbread, Jr. Goodbread asked the Respondent if he could go with him to the American Legion Club. The Respondent agreed to have Goodbread come with him. Once at the American Legion the two men socialized. When they got ready to leave the club the Respondent left with his girlfriend. Goodbread took the Respondent's car and parked it on Myrtle Street. Goodbread then went with the Respondent and the Respondent's girlfriend and another person, which the Respondent describes as a girl, to the house of a friend other than Goodbread. At that point the Respondent and Goodbread split up again. Respondent was then with his girlfriend and Goodbread had the keys to Respondent's car. The Respondent came back later and met with Goodbread. Prior to the rendezvous, while Respondent had been with his girlfriend in her car, he had placed a .25 caliber automatic pistol in the glove box of that car. He had a license to carry this weapon issued by local authorities. The weapon was not contemplated as being a necessary item for his work as a correctional officer. When the Respondent got out of his girlfriend's car and approached Goodbread, the Respondent had the pistol in his coat pocket. Respondent told Goodbread that he was ready to go home because he had to go to work the next morning. Goodbread said, in kidding with the Respondent, that he did not have the car keys and that he had locked them in the car. Respondent recognized that he was joking with him. Nonetheless, Respondent looked in the car and saw that the keys were not there. Respondent returned to Goodbread and told Goodbread to give him his keys. Goodbread again told Respondent that the keys were locked in the car. Respondent told Goodbread that he was starting to go home. Goodbread's reaction to this remark was to get in the car and say "let's go." Goodbread then jumped out of the car and said that he was not ready to go. Respondent told him to come on and give him his keys. Respondent told Goodbread "come on man. Let's go." Goodbread told Respondent that he wasn't ready to go that he wanted to talk to some girl. Respondent said "come on let's go." Respondent took the gun out and said "you are going to make me put this on you. Come on let's go." Goodbread grabbed the gun unexpectedly and the gun discharged and killed Goodbread. Respondent never intended to injure Goodbread in his display of the pistol. Eight or ten witnesses saw the incident. It was investigated by the Lake City Police Department and Respondent cooperated in that endeavor to include turning over the pistol to the police and giving a voluntary statement about the incident. Respondent was charged through the Grand Jury of Columbia County, Florida, with the exhibition of the handgun in a rude, careless, angry, or threatening manner, not in necessary self defense and contrary to Section 790.10, Florida Statutes. A copy of that indictment may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. As set forth in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, Respondent plead guilty to the offense and was fined $176. The firearm was forfeited to the state, he received 11 days in jail and a condition was placed upon him not to possess a firearm for one year. Respondent claims that as a consequence of the incident with his friend Goodbread he began to drink more than he had before. There being no frame of reference to compare his drinking habits before and after the incident, this comment has little utility in understanding his motivation to drink and drive. It has been established that on September 13, 1987, in the early morning hours of that day, specifically around 1:30 a.m., the Respondent was observed by Deputy Sheriff Charles R. Tate of the Columbia County, Florida Sheriff's office, driving in a reckless manner. In this incident the Respondent pulled out of Church Street onto Bay Avenue in Lake City, Florida, in a reckless manner. The officer speeded up in his attempt to stop the Respondent and engaged the emergency equipment in the officer's car. Respondent went west bound on Bay and turned south on Marion Street which is U.S. 41. In the course of this pursuit Respondent accelerated to speeds up to 65 miles per hour. Respondent finally pulled over around the intersection of Marion Street and Grandview Avenue. Respondent cooperated with Officer Tate in the investigation of the driving offense. This included the officer noting that the Respondent had the smell of alcohol about his person. As a consequence, the Respondent was asked to perform certain activities associated with a field sobriety test to ascertain if Respondent was capable of operating his motor vehicle. When the Respondent tried to perform the finger to nose test which is given with each hand, he was unable to do that with either hand. In trying to perform the walking test Respondent staggered and when he made the return trip in the walking test he nearly fell over and had to support himself. From the observations of the Respondent Officer Tate believed that the Respondent was driving under the influence when the stop was made. He arrested the Respondent for that offense and took him to the Florida Highway Patrol station where Robert Bellamy, a trained breathalyzer operator, administered a breathalyzer test to the Respondent. The results show that the Respondent was registering at .16 at 2:25 a.m., and registering at .15 at 2:27 a.m. with .10 being the legal presumption for impairment. Respondent was then taken to the Columbia County Jail. While at the jail correctional officer Jacklyn Yvonne Jones- Holland attempted to fingerprint his right hand. Ms. Holland knew of the Respondent before this evening but had had no opportunity before to speak to the Respondent. In the course of the fingerprinting Respondent took his left hand and rubbed it on the side of the officer's leg in the area of her groin. The first time he did this she stepped back on the chance that the Respondent was unaware of what he was doing at the time. However, when she moved the Respondent again put his hand on her leg in the area of her groin. Based upon the facts of this case in which Officer Tate describes the quality of the Respondent's impairment on a scale of 1 to 10, as being a 5 and Ms. Holland describes this impairment to be 6 or 7 on a scale of 1 to 10, Respondent is not found to be so under the influence that he did not realize what he was doing when inappropriately touching Ms. Holland in two instances. When he touched her the second time Ms. Holland went to another part of the building and made out a complaint against the Respondent for his assault and he was arrested for that offense. An Officer Myers read the Respondent his rights related to the assault during which conversation Respondent said, "I'm drunk. Oh yeah, that's what I'm here for. I'm drunk." There was no verbal exchange between the Respondent and Ms. Holland during the inappropriate touching. Ms. Holland had not invited those actions by the Respondent. The Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 3 constitutes the Florida Uniform Traffic Citation for the offense of driving under the influence and the disposition of that case in which the Respondent was fined $411, had his license suspended for six months, and attended school for persons who have driven under the influence. He also attended Alcoholics Anonymous and received other counseling contemplated for persons who may have drinking problems. Respondent says that he does not drink at present and no evidence was offered which would refute that claim. Respondent was charged under information with the unlawful, intentional and knowing touching or striking of Jacklyn Yvonne Jones-Holland and plead guilty to battery. He received a period of probation of one year for that offense. Certified copies of the information and order withholding adjudication of guilt and placing the defendant on probation can be found as exhibit numbers 5 and 4 respectively. The reckless display of the firearm leading to the death of his friend, and the battery committed on Ms. Holland are all indications of a lack of good moral character and are events for which the Respondent has no acceptable explanation or excuse. Driving under the influence is reprehensible but does not show a lack of good moral character.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered suspending the certificate of the Respondent for a period of six months. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of December, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-3816 The facts as presented by the Respondent are commented on as follows: Paragraphs 1-5 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 6 is not accepted to the extent that it argues that the incident involving the death of Mr. Goodbread is directly responsible for the fact that the Respondent was driving under the influence on the night in question and committed the battery on Ms. Holland. Furthermore, the suggestion that the Respondent was too under the influence to understand the fact of his battery against Ms. Holland is rejected. His testimony that he does not have a recollection of touching Ms. Holland runs contrary to the impression of the facts, that impression being that the act of the Respondent was volitional. The idea of his cooperation with Trooper Bellamy in the administration of the breathalyzer examination and the efforts to comply with what was expected of him in responding to the circumstance of the driving under influence offense is recognized as mitigation, but does not explain away the offense. The suggestion in Paragraph 7 that the death of the friend and the driving under the influence are interrelated is not accepted. Respondent did indicate that he was emotionally upset over the death of his friend, this would be expected but it is not clear to what extent his drinking increased following the death of the friend as compared to his drinking habits before that time. Respondent's suggestion that he is free from the effects of alcohol problems at present was not refuted. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that he presently has any problem with alcohol abuse. Reference to other traffic violations and his service record as a correctional officer leaves a neutral impression of the Respondent which is neither to his advantage or that of the Petitioner. Consequently, the facts of those prior events have not been reported in the fact-finding set forth in the Recommended Order. Paragraph 8 is contrary to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Stephen A. Smith, Esquire Post Office Drawer 1792 Lake City, Florida 32056-1792 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Moore, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 =================================================================
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent is guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against him, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him, if any.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission as a correctional officer on March 7, 2006. He holds certificate number 255361. On June 24, 2006, a Department of Corrections contraband interdiction team arrived at Gadsden Correctional Institution to conduct an operation that included the use of dogs to detect narcotics in vehicles parked in the Institution's parking lot. The Respondent was on duty at the Institution that day. After one of the dogs alerted on a car owned by the Respondent, the Respondent was summoned. He unlocked the car and consented to have his vehicle searched. The officer searching Respondent's car removed all the papers and other items from the glove compartment on the passenger side of the vehicle. He observed trash in the bottom of the glove compartment: sand, pebbles, hair, and the other normal debris that builds up over time in a glove compartment. Also on the bottom of the glove compartment was an unidentified sticky substance. The officer used his gloved hand to scrape up everything from the bottom of the glove box and placed it on a plain, white paper. Within the scrapings were a green leafy substance and a brown leafy substance. He separated these substances from the other debris on the white paper and placed them on his gloved hand. The quantity of substances he recovered was, according to his description, less than one gram, the size of a couple pinches of salt, a minute amount the size of a dime or smaller. He then took the substances on his hand to the interdiction team leader, who performed a reagent field test and determined that they were cannabis. It was the officer's opinion based upon his expertise in the identification of cannabis that the substances had been in the glove compartment for a long time. The officer then entered the back of Respondent's vehicle and removed the back seat. The area under the back seat had not been cleaned in a "very, very long time," and he discovered pebbles, gravel, sand, moldy French fries, and other debris. He also observed what looked to him like the residue of cannabis but did not bother to remove or test it. Doing so would have required hand-picking through the dirt and debris with a tweezers. Respondent was relieved of duty and has not worked as a correctional officer since that time. At the time, Respondent denied that the cannabis was his, denied any knowledge of it, and offered to take a urinalysis. However, he was not tested, and there is no evidence that any criminal charges were ever filed. At the time, Respondent owned two cars. His primary vehicle, which he drove to work and which he would not loan to others to drive, was a 2004 Chevrolet Impala. His secondary vehicle, which he did not drive to work and which he loaned to others to drive, was a 1999 Buick which he had purchased in March 2005. The vehicle searched by the interdiction team that day was the Buick, which had just been returned to him after being out on loan for approximately a month, and which he decided to drive to work that day. Among the persons who drove the Buick were Monica Phillips, Rontez Phillips, and Rontarius Phillips. The first two persons testified at the final hearing. Rontarius Phillips did not testify since he is incarcerated. The criminal conduct causing his incarceration was not revealed at the final hearing. Monica Phillips is Respondent's girlfriend. They have been together for seven years and have 3 children. Rontez Phillips and Rontarius Phillips are cousins of Monica, but Respondent sometimes refers to them as his cousins since he and Monica have been together for so long.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Respondent not guilty and dismissing the Administrative Complaint in this cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of May, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael Crews, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Joseph S. White, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Damari V. Wade
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Harvey Jackson, in an inmate at UCI and has been at all times pertinent hereto. During the month of September, 1986, consistent with the rules of DOC, Jackson had a list of individuals on file who he desired to be allowed to visit him at the institution. These included members of his family and his fiancee, Ms. Ann Alexander. On September 22, 1986, Ms. Alexander came to visit Jackson at UCI. According to the routine procedure followed for the preparation of visitors' entrance into the Visitor's Park area, Ms. Alexander's purse was searched and she was subject to a pat search prior to being allowed into the secure area. During the search, it was determined she had $50.00 in U.S. currency in her possession and she was permitted to take that money into the Visitor's Park, leaving her purse at the waiting area. While Jackson and Ms. Alexander were together in the Visitor's Park, she purchased two cartons of cigarettes at the canteen and two orange drinks. The cartons of cigarettes were $12.00 each and the drinks were 35 each. Therefore, she spent approximately $24.70 of the $50.00 she brought in. Because she did not have a purse, she claimed later, upon questioning, that she put the change in the brown paper bag she got with the drinks and when she disposed of the bag in a trash can, inadvertently threw out the money as well. When she left the Visitor's Park area, she was subject again to a pat search and requested to indicate how much money she had. At that time, it was determined she had only $3.00 in her possession. According to corrections personnel who interviewed her, she gave several different stories as to what happened to the money she could not account for. Though both Ms. Alexander and Jackson stated she bought him two cartons of cigarettes, when he was searched prior to leaving the Visitor's Park, he had only one carton with him. The strip search conducted of him at that time also failed to reveal any money in his possession. Ms. Alexander was asked to go back into the Visitor's Park and look through the trash cans to try to find the money, and was accompanied by a guard. Because of the heat, however, it was an odious task and she admits her search of six or seven cans was not thorough. Unfortunately, she was unable to locate the money. As a result of this missing money, an incident report, (IR) was prepared. Ms. Alexander was not detained but was orally informed that her visiting privileges might be suspended and Jackson was allowed to return to his quarters. The IR merely outlined the information cited above but did not draw any conclusions as to what happened to the money. Mr. Davis, the corrections supervisor who was in charge of the corrections shift, concluded that Ms. Alexander disregarded the department's rules and regulations and recommended that her visiting privileges be revoked for an indefinite period. This IR was processed through channels to Mr. Cunningham, the Classification Supervisor, who under the provisions of Section 33-5.007(5), F.A.C., had the authority, in the absence of the Superintendent, to approve the suspension. He did so, and made sure that the Superintendent was informed. Thereafter, on September 29, 1986, Mr. K. W. Snow, who worked for Mr. Cunningham, on behalf of the Superintendent, Mr. Barton, sent a letter to Ms. Alexander at her home address on file at the institution, indicating that her visiting privileges were suspended indefinitely beginning that date and would be reinstated on October 31, 1986, one month later. Notwithstanding that inconsistency regarding the length of the suspension, the practice at UCI, in the case of indefinite suspensions, is to reconsider the suspension on receipt of a request for reinstatement. In the case of a suspension for a definite term, they will reinstate upon request at the end of the suspension period. On the afternoon of September 26, 1986, several days prior to the dispatch of the suspension letter to Ms. Alexander, inmate Jackson was called to Mr. Snow's office where he was told that Ms. Alexander's visiting privileges were to be suspended for 30 days. At that time, he was advised that the basis for the suspension was her inability to account for the money she brought into the Visitor's Park on September 22. Though he requested a copy of the IR at that time, Jackson was not given a copy of it until in response to a discovery request after the filing of the rule challenge petition. Jackson was not advised of any opportunity either he or Ms. Alexander might have for a hearing on the matter prior to the suspension, or any appeal rights. Thereafter, Jackson wrote to Mr. Snow asking that he be notified of the suspension in writing, but this request was denied. The September 29, 1986 letter was not received by Ms. Alexander but was returned undelivered because of an erroneous address. On October 1, 1986, however, she wrote to Mr. Cunningham, having been advised by Jackson of the suspension, and the address on her stationery was used to again send her a letter of notification. This second letter was not returned. In her letter, Ms. Alexander explained her reasons for taking so much money into the Visitor's Park, and what she had done with a part of it. She also outlined her efforts to find the extra money. These explanations were not credited by the institution officials, however. Ms. Alexander's suspension has had a bad effect on Jackson, he claims. He felt frustrated and considered that his ability to be heard by the authorities was unnecessarily thwarted. He is of the opinion that the suspension was unfair because neither he nor his fiancee had broken any rules, and neither of them was given any opportunity to explain to the decision maker what had happened other than in writing and after the action was taken. As a result of the suspension, which has now expired, he missed two separate visits from his fiancee. It should be noted, however, that Ms. Alexander's suspension did not place any limits on visits by the other 7 or 8 people on his visitor's list. This suspension action has been utilized frequently as to other visitors as well as Ms. Alexander. Ms. Decker, for example, on September 29, 1986, was notified of the suspension of her visiting privileges on the basis that she had allegedly written a threatening letter to an official at the institution. She found out about her suspension through a phone call from her inmate fiancee. Neither she nor he, initially, was told of the reason for her suspension, and she was given no opportunity to rebut the allegations against her prior to the suspension action. Subsequent to the suspension, she was able to clarify the situation and her visiting privileges have been reinstated, albeit on less convenient days than she had previously. She believes this change in days was intended as punishment, but there is no evidence of this. Ms. Decker denies ever having been told that she could only spend $25.00 in the canteen as is alleged in Ms. Alexander's letter. In fact, there is no rule or policy limiting the amount that visitors may spend in the canteen nor is there a rule or policy which limits inmates to no more than one carton of cigarettes at a time. Mr. Jackson complains of the fact that neither he nor Ms. Alexander was afforded a hearing prior to the imposition of the suspension. There is no provision in the rule for a hearing prior to suspension in this type of case. This suspension was not intended as punishment for improper behavior by Jackson, but more a means of correcting an unauthorized situation and avoiding a security problem. Officials at UCI interpret the provisions of paragraph 33-5.007(5), F.A.C., as permitting the removal of a visitor from the visiting list for criminal activity, for a serious rule violation, for continuous infractions of visiting procedures, for security breaches, or a combination of those. While the instant situation is not considered to be criminal activity, a serious rule violation, or a continuing infraction, it is considered to be a security breach and it was to correct this situation that the institution officials suspended Ms. Alexander. Final action on the issue of a suspension of visiting privileges based on the IR is, by the rule, to be taken by the Superintendent, or the Assistant Superintendent, Classification Supervisor, or the next senior officer present in the chain of command in the absence of the Superintendent. Here, while the suspension letter in question was signed by Mr. Snow, the assistant classification supervisor, and while the Superintendent, Mr. Barton, was present on the day the suspension letter was signed, the letter clearly shows that the action was taken in the name of the superintendent and the testimony of Mr. Cunningham established that it was done with his concurrence. There is nothing in the rule that requires that the inmate or the visitor be afforded a hearing prior to the action suspending visiting privileges. If an inmate feels that the action suspending the visiting privileges of an individual on his list is improper and he can show a direct effect on him as a result thereof, he may file a grievance. Though Jackson indicates he filed a grievance in this case, there is no evidence of it. The incident report in question related strictly to the activity of Ms. Alexander and the action was taken against her even though, in so doing, an adverse effect was felt by Mr. Jackson. No doubt had he desired to do so, he could have grieved that situation, but, as was stated above, there is no evidence that he did so. There is a difference between an IR, as was written here, and a disciplinary report, (DR), which was not involved in this case. A DR involves misconduct on the part of an inmate which may result in disciplinary action, including a suspension of visiting privileges. An IR is nothing more than a memorialization of an unusual incident which is to be brought to the attention of institution authorities. Whereas an inmate is entitled to a hearing before action is taken on the basis of a DR, no hearing is required when an IR is written. If the incident resulting in an IR also results in a DR, a hearing would be afforded the inmate based on the proposed disciplinary action, not on the memorialization in the IR. There is no doubt that the removal of visitors from an inmate's visitors list does have an adverse effect on the morale and possibly the well- being of the inmate involved. However, the action is normally taken on the basis of the conduct of the visitor, not the inmate, and if a decision is made to suspend the visiting privileges of the visitor, the direct effect is on that visitor with a secondary effect only on the innate. In the instant case, officials concluded that Ms. Alexander's inability to account for approximately $20.00 in currency constituted a breach of security which authorized and in fact dictated a need to curtail her entry into the institution for a period of time. There is no evidence that Jackson committed any offense or did anything improper and it is, indeed, unfortunate that he was forced to suffer the deprivation of not being visited by his fiancee for a period of time. Notwithstanding this, it is clear from the testimony of the numerous individuals involved in the investigation of this incident that the action taken under the terms of the rule to suspend Ms. Alexander's privilege to visit was not taken lightly and was based on a bona fide evaluation of a security risk to the institution.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner’s application for an educator’s certificate should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is 31 years old. He has lived in Florida for the past 11 years. Petitioner works at a rehabilitation center that provides services to individuals with substance abuse problems. He has worked in that job for about a year. As a client advocate, he works with children 16 years of age and older. For ten years Petitioner has served as a volunteer basketball coach in the Flagler County Police Athletic League (PAL). He currently coaches the high-school-aged girls' travel team. Over the years he has coached boys and girls in the fourth grade through the twelfth grade. For three or four years Petitioner has been a volunteer in a church-based youth ministry program. He supervises, mentors, and provides encouragement to the children in the program. Petitioner applied for an educator’s certificate so that he can coach basketball at the high school level. He does not need the certificate to continue coaching in the PAL, but he needs the certificate to work or even volunteer as a high school coach. Petitioner was employed as a certified correctional officer at Tomoka Correctional Institution (TCI) for about four years, until September 23, 2007. TCI is a state prison in Volusia County, Florida, operated by the Florida Department of Corrections (DOC). As Petitioner was driving to work at TCI on September 23, 2007, he saw a team of DOC investigators conducting a drug interdiction at the facility. He pulled his car over to the side of the facility’s entrance road and threw a small package out of the car window before proceeding to the parking lot. TCI staff saw Petitioner throw the package from his car and informed the DOC investigators. The DOC investigators went to the area and recovered the package. The package contained marijuana. It was in a plastic baggie and had been tightly wrapped in paper towels and then covered with medical tape. The manner in which the marijuana was wrapped is consistent with the most common way that drugs are packaged when they are smuggled into a prison. The package was small enough and flat enough to be hidden in a man's boot or around his crotch area and not be detected during a cursory pat-down search. After Petitioner was told by DOC investigators that a drug-sniffing dog alerted to his car, he voluntarily spoke to the investigators and admitted that the package found next to the entrance road was thrown there by him, that he knew it contained marijuana, and that he threw it out of his car when he saw the drug interdiction team at the facility. However, Petitioner denied that he planned to sell or give the marijuana to an inmate or anyone else “inside the walls” of the facility. Petitioner told the DOC investigators, and he testified at the final hearing, that he received the marijuana the day before the incident while he was at a fundraising car wash for his PAL basketball team. The children on the basketball team were at the car wash when the marijuana was delivered, as were Petitioner’s children. Petitioner told the DOC investigators, and he testified at the final hearing, that his sister-in-law called him before the car wash and asked him to help her by allowing a friend to bring marijuana for her to Petitioner at the car wash. She said she would later pick it up from Petitioner. Petitioner told the DOC investigators, and he testified at the final hearing, that he did not give much thought to her request because she was a family member and one should always help out family members. When the marijuana was delivered, Petitioner was at his car which was a distance away from where the cars were being washed. He wrapped the marijuana in paper towels and medical tape, which he had in his car from a prior injury, so that his children, who were helping wash the cars, would not see it when he drove them home in his car. His sister-in-law did not come to pick up the marijuana after the car wash. He forgot that the marijuana was in his car until he was close to work the next day. When he saw the interdiction team at TCI, he stopped and threw the marijuana out of the car. He then drove into the parking lot, parked his car, and went in to work. Petitioner was immediately arrested after his confession to the DOC investigators. He was charged with possession of more than 20 grams of marijuana and introduction of contraband into a state prison. Both of those charges are felonies, but for reasons not explained in the record, the State Attorney elected not to prosecute either of the charges. Petitioner was immediately fired from TCI after his arrest, and he subsequently lost his certification as a correctional officer. Petitioner testified that he understands that what he did was wrong, that he is sorry for what he did, and that he will never do it again. This testimony appeared to be sincere. The character witnesses who testified on Petitioner’s behalf at the final hearing all testified that Petitioner is a good person and a good role model for the children that he coaches and mentors; that this incident was out of character for Petitioner; and that they have no concerns about Petitioner working with children. This testimony was sincere and clearly heartfelt. Although the DOC investigators weighed the marijuana while it was still wrapped and determined that it weighed 37.8 grams, they did not weigh the marijuana itself after removing it from its packaging. There is no competent evidence in this record as to the weight of the marijuana. Accordingly, it cannot be determined whether the amount of marijuana Petitioner threw from his car would have constituted a felony or a misdemeanor. Similarly, there is no competent evidence in this record as to whether Petitioner was on the grounds of a state prison when he threw the marijuana from his car. There are no security fences, no checkpoints, and no security towers before one reaches the signage for the correctional facility and its attendant structures. Petitioner believed that he would have been on prison property if he had passed by the signage for the facility and had crossed the road surrounding the perimeter of the prison. One of the DOC investigators testified that the property boundary was several hundred yards before the entrance sign. The photographs admitted in evidence visually suggest that the correctional facility's property commences beyond the sign and beyond the location where Petitioner threw out the marijuana. There is no competent evidence as to whether Petitioner was on state property with the marijuana in his possession. Petitioner denies that he intended to introduce contraband into the correctional facility. Rather, his actions in throwing the marijuana out of his car at a location he believed to be outside of the facility's property suggest he did not intend to bring the contraband onto the grounds of the facility. Petitioner has met the qualifications for obtaining an educator's certificate to enable him to coach basketball on the high-school level.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order granting Petitioner’s application for an educator’s certificate. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of December, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward T. Bauer, Esquire Brooks, LeBoeuf, Bennett, Foster & Gwartney, P.A. 909 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Sidney M. Nowell, Esquire Justin T. Peterson, Esquire Nowell & Associates, P.A. 1100 East Moody Boulevard Post Office Box 819 Bunnell, Florida 32110-0819 Kathleen M. Richards, Executive Director Education Practices Commission Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Room 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Deborah K. Kearney, General Counsel Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Room 1244 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Mariam Lambeth, Bureau Chief Bureau of Professional Practices Services Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Room 224-E Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
Findings Of Fact Respondent is currently certified by Petitioner as a corrections officer and holds certificate number 68-86-502-01, which was issued on March 14, 1986. At the time of the events in question, Respondent was employed as a correctional officer by the Orange County Sheriff's Office. On April 4, 1987, Sergeant Frank Fink of the Orlando Police Department was working undercover in plainclothes in Langford Park, which is located at 1800 East Central Boulevard in Orlando. Langford Park is a known gathering place for homosexuals. It is located in a residential neighborhood and near a school. Sgt. Fink's assignment was to work as part of a homosexual detail and arrest anyone who offered to commit a lewd act, which by Orlando City Ordinance 43-18 is defined as anything contrary to acceptable public standards. At approximately 6:00 p.m., while it was still daylight, Sgt. Fink observed Respondent near the restrooms. Ten to twenty minutes later, Sgt. Fink saw Respondent elsewhere in the park, talking to another man. Shortly thereafter, Sgt. Fink saw Respondent seated in a gazebo in a densely vegetated portion of the park. Sgt. Fink seated himself beside Respondent, about five feet away, and commented that it was a beautiful day and nice park. The ensuing conversation, which proceeded in a normal tone and volume so as to be clearly understood by both men, was innocuous up to the point at which Respondent asked Sgt. Fink what kind of people came to the park and Sgt. Fink answered, mostly gays. Then Respondent asked what these people did in the park, and Sgt. Fink answered, oral sex. Respondent asked if these people ever got caught, and Sgt. Fink replied, sometimes. Respondent asked where such acts took place, and Sgt. Fink told him, on the trails behind the bushes. Respondent then informed Sgt. Fink that Respondent went to a local pornographic newsstand and watched films of homosexual acts. He told Sgt. Fink that men performed oral sex on each other in booths at the newsstand. At this point, Respondent told Sgt. Fink that Respondent was thinking about performing sex with another man and that he would like to perform oral sex on Sgt. Fink. After confirming his understanding of Respondent's offer, Sgt. Fink asked if Respondent wanted to pay him money for the act, but Respondent declined. Respondent indicated that he did not want to get caught, so Sgt. Fink led him down a trail to a safe place. After leading him about 100 yards, Sgt. Fink took Respondent to police waiting in a clearing within the park where Respondent was arrested for lewd behavior.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of violating the requirement of good moral character and revoking his certificate as a corrections officer. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 8th day of August, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of August, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jack J. Curcio, pro se 1931 Stanton Street Deltona, Florida 32738 Robert R. Dempsey Executive Director Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Janet E. Ferris General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rod Caswell Director Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Respondent is guilty of violating Sections 943.1395(7) and 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2007), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and if so, what penalties should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact At all times material to these proceedings, Respondent was certified by Petitioner as a correctional officer, and issued certificate number 183026. On June 25, 2008, Respondent was a passenger in a vehicle that he owned but that was driven by his son, James Donaldson. The car was pulled over by Officer Paul King of the Starke Police Department because its brake lights were not working. Officer King explained to the driver the reason for the stop. Officer King smelled what he recognized to be burnt cannabis coming from inside the vehicle. He asked both occupants if they had any marijuana in the vehicle, and both men denied having any. Officer King asked James Donaldson to exit the vehicle. Upon searching his person, Officer King found in a pocket of James' trousers a plastic bag containing less than 20 grams of cannabis. He also seized a package of cigarette rolling papers, of a type commonly used to roll marijuana, from the seat of the car. James Donaldson identified the rolling papers as belonging to him. At that point, Officer King arrested James Donaldson, and placed him in handcuffs. Officer King then asked Respondent to exit the car, and asked him if he had anything on his person. Respondent stated that he had marijuana. A search revealed that in his right-front shorts pocket, there was a silver metal grinder with marijuana residue. In Respondent's left-front shorts pocket, Officer King found a clear plastic baggy containing a green leafy substance, less than 20 grams, along with a package of rolling papers. The metal grinder was of type commonly used to prepare cannabis for smoking, and was approximately the size of a chewing tobacco can. Officer King used a field test kit to test the specimens taken from both men. Both tested positive for cannabis. Officer King then arrested Respondent for possession of cannabis and possession of drug paraphernalia. Respondent did not deny having the marijuana or the metal grinder on his person. However, he claimed that both were hidden within a pack of cigarettes that belonged to his son, but that he had picked up the pack and put it in his shirt front pocket at his son's request. He claimed that he did not smell the marijuana because he has difficulty smelling anything. Respondent's claim is not credible. Even assuming that the metal grinder and the baggie of marijuana would fit in a cigarette package, it is not believable that Respondent would pick up a cigarette package containing such an implement and not realize the cigarette package contained something other than cigarettes. Officer King's testimony that he did not confiscate a cigarette package, on the other hand, was clear, straightforward and candid.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a Final Order finding that Respondent has violated Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2007), and revoking his certification. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of December, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Harry J. Donaldson Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Crews, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, William F. Reid, is currently and has been at all times pertinent to the issues herein, an inmate at UCI, having been committed to the custody of the DOC for an offense committed prior to July 1, 1978. At the time of filing of the Petition, he was in administrative confinement at UCI but, at the time of the hearing, had been released and was not in that status. Petitioner concedes that even during the period of his administrative confinement, he was awarded basic gain time as provided for since he was committed prior to July 1, 1978. However, due to the fact that he was unable to work while in administrative confinement, he did not receive any incentive gain time during that period. Work opportunities for inmates in administrative confinement status are extremely limited. This is because of the security and manpower problems involved in providing adequate supervision of this category of inmate during a work detail. Rule 33-3.081, Florida Administrative Code, allows the placing of an inmate in administrative confinement then disciplinary or criminal charges are pending against him and his presence in the general prison population would present a danger to himself, to others, or to the security and order of the institution. It is also authorized when an investigation is pending and the inmate's presence in the prison population might tend to interfere with that investigation. If, for medical reasons, an inmate's remaining in the prison population would create a health or safety risk, administrative confinement is also authorized. Another reason justifying administrative confinement is when the inmate is alleged to have committed misconduct and there is concern that because of that, his safety is at risk. The rule does not provide any maximum length of time for administrative confinement and the reason for this is that the investigations supporting it are of varying complexity and take differing lengths of time. Petitioner and the other inmates who testified on his behalf all of whom have been in administrative confinement in the past, all denied that they had received the required informal hearing called for under the rule. At best, they were told by the officer placing them in administrative confinement generally why this action was being taken. However, they contend they were never given any opportunity to submit anything to a senior official or a classification officer and they are of the opinion that at no time was there an emergency situation involved. The impression that the inmates have is that a corrections officer can have an inmate confined or released for any reason whether there is adequate justification or basis for the action. Clifford Towbridge has been an inmate at UCI since December, 1983. When he was placed in administrative confinement he was advised of this fact by a corrections officer who told him to pack his things and who put him in administrative confinement status without telling him why. He contends he got no hearing but was ultimately told he was being confined because a confidential informant advised that his life was in danger. Approximately two to three weeks later, he was released when he signed a paper indicating that his life was not in danger. At no time was he told who had made the allegation against him and he was not given a hearing either before confinement or before release. Curtis Mangram had an experience with administrative confinement at his prior incarceration at Belle Glade Correctional Institution. At that time he was given no hearing nor was he brought before a review board. When he left administrative confinement at Belle Glade he was assigned to UCI and remained clean until August 4, 1984 when he was placed in administrative confinement there. It appears that his name was mentioned in connection with the rape of a prisoner and he was placed in administrative confinement for several weeks pending investigation of that incident. One day after his release he was again placed in administrative confinement for possession of contraband wine. He was given no hearing prior to being placed into administrative confinement nor was he initially given a reason for this action. However, he wrote several letters to officials within the DOC to determine why this action was taken. The first response he got indicated he was being placed in for evaluation but regardless of the reason, he is sure he was not given a hearing. On neither occasion of his being placed in administrative confinement, in his opinion, was there any emergency reason for precipitous action. From first hand and from what he has seen and heard, it is his opinion that prisoners are placed in administrative confinement solely on the uncorroborated allegations of other prisoners and when this happens, there is no hearing prior to she placement nor within a timely period thereafter. As was stated previously, the witness was placed in administrative confinement on August 4 and was released on August 28. At that time he was told the reason for him having been placed in administrative confinement (the alleged rape) was resolved. The following day, August 29, he was placed back in administrative confinement and was told by a corrections officer that the action was being taken because Lt. Dixon, an investigator, wanted him back in. Later on, Officer Ward, Dixon's assistant, read him his rights and asked him some questions after which the witness was returned to administrative confinement. The witness admits that he had the wine which he subsequently found out was the basis for his second administrative confinement but he was never punished for the wine nor was he ever charged with the rape. He was in administrative confinement for a total of four months at UCI and had he been punished for the unlawful possession of the wine, it is his opinion he would have been placed in disciplinary confinement for fifteen or thirty days, a period much shorter than the entire period of his administrative confinement. Inmate Edwin Paul has been placed in administrative confinement for investigative reasons twelve or thirteen times during the two and a half years he has been an inmate at UCI. He relates that when he is placed there, the corrections officer comes up to him and tells him to pack his things but never gives him a reason for this action. The response to his inquiry is always that someone will tell him. It is his experience that at UCI, regardless of what the rule requires, no review is done and the inmate is not told anything until he files a grievance. That generally takes approximately ninety days to resolve and during this time, the inmate is in administrative confinement earning no incentive gain time. According to Paul, his requests for information as to the reason for his status are met with various answers such as "you're a menace," "none of your business," or "I don't know." It is his opinion that administrative confinement can be imposed on an inmate at the whim of a correctional officer. He contends that in all of his periods of administrative confinement either no charges were preferred against him, or he was found not guilty of the allegation that was laid, but during all that period, he has not received any gain time that he would have earned had he not been placed in administrative confinement. This has affected his status in that had he not been placed in administrative confinement, his sentence would have been up after forty months confinement. Because of his inability to earn gain time, he is not serving the fiftieth month of his period of confinement. Petitioner was placed in administrative confinement on March 17, 1985. He was not then nor has he since that time been given an informal hearing by a correctional officer, he states. He claims he was placed in administrative confinement by a corrections officer - and was not given an opportunity to sign anything regarding this action. On this occasion he was in for two and a half months. In a prior period of administrative confinement, he claims he was not told why he was there officially. Only through the information given him by a friendly corrections officer two weeks after the fact was he advised why he was incarcerated. Never has a senior corrections officer ever held a hearing with him, he states, nor has he ever been told how long the investigation on which his administrative confinement status is based will take. He has not seen any investigative report nor has he even been given any assistance in finding out the reason for his status. Even a personal interview with the superintendent of UCI has not changed this process, he says. Reid and the other inmates who testified on his behalf all contend that the implementation of the rule regarding administrative confinement creates great stress for them because of, (1) the loss of incentive gain time, (2) the inability to get appropriate exercise, and (3) the impact that the status has on the ability to receive visitors, and all agree that being afforded a hearing or being told why the administrative confinement action was being taken would tend to reduce that stress. Petitioner admitted that he does not have much of a problem with the rule except for the fact that it does not put any time limit on the length of the investigation. His complaint is primarily with the way the rule is followed by UCI. Mr. Tabah, the classification specialist at UCI, related that there is no formal board hearing when inmates are placed in administrative confinement. The inmates' case is reviewed by the chief correctional officer and this review is termed a hearing. This action, however, is itself reviewed by the classification team within 72 hours of the hearing. At the inmates' hearing, a form DC4-318 is prepared by the chief correctional officer on which the reason for the administrative confinement action is listed. The bottom half of this form is subsequently filled out by the classification team during its review as to its concurrence or non-concurrence and the team's recommendation for action. The inmate is given a copy of this review and has an opportunity to make comment thereon. Both the recommendation of the team and the comments of the inmate, if any, are referred to the superintendent. Every inmate in administrative confinement is reviewed weekly. Each inmate is usually advised of the reason for his being placed in administrative confinement either at the time or immediately thereafter. Only in emergency cases can the inmate be placed in administrative confinement without review/hearing by the chief correctional officer. In that case, the hearing is held within forty-eight hours. Review of the files on both Mangram and Towbridge reveal that, as to Towbridge, the inmate was advised by the corrections officer placing him in administrative confinement on February 13, 1985 as to the reason therefor. The chief corrections officer approved the actions of the corrections officer thereafter and the following day, the classification team reviewed the action and furnished the inmate with a copy of their recommendation. As to Mangram, the records reflect that he was placed in administrative confinement on August 18, 1984. An informal hearing was held that same day and the action was reviewed by senior corrections officer Bryant at 4:00 P.M. the same day. Mr. Mangram was retained in administrative confinement because of the belief that the safety of the institution required it. It was felt that Mangram was a potentially violent inmate who posed a clear danger to others. As to Mr. Paul, the file reflects that the two times he was in administrative confinement he was advised of the reasons and given a hearing. As to Petitioner, the record reflects that on January 24, 1985 he was placed in administrative confinement and given the reasons therefor by corrections officer Brown. The reviewing corrections officer supervisor Bryant concurred.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent has failed to maintain the qualifications established in Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, which require that a correctional officer have good moral character, and if not, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (CJSTC) certified Respondent as a correctional officer on September 24, 1995. The CJSTC issued Respondent Correctional Certificate No. 159769. Gulf Correctional Institution (GCI) employed Respondent as a correctional officer on August 18, 1995. GCI terminated Respondent's employment on September 2, 1997. Respondent's maiden name is "Manley." Cheryl Manley and Cynthia Manley are Respondent's sisters. At all times material here, Petitioner lived at 1909-A Mack Lewis Drive, Panama City, Florida. At all times material here, Alan Belsky was an inmate at Gulf Correctional Institution. Inmate Belsky was acquainted with Respondent as a correctional officer but did not know her sisters. In late June 1997 or early July 1997, Respondent agreed to sell Inmate Belsky some marijuana. Respondent made this agreement while she was on duty as a correctional officer at GCI. She directed Inmate Belsky to have the money for the marijuana sent to Cheryl Manley using a Western Union Money Transfer with the proceeds in the amount of $50 to be picked up at a Winn Dixie store in Panama City, Florida. Subsequently, Inmate Belsky requested his grandmother, Ester Belsky from Halendale, Florida, to send $50 to Cheryl Manley as directed. Inmate Belsky told his grandmother that the money would cover his gambling debts. Using a Western Union Money Transfer, Ms. Belsky sent the money to Cheryl Manley on July 13, 1997. Thereafter, Respondent personally delivered a quarter gram of marijuana to Inmate Belsky. Respondent agreed to sell Inmate Belsky some marijuana a second time. She directed Inmate Belsky to send $100 to Cynthia Manley at 1909-A Mack Lewis Drive, Panama City, Florida. Inmate Belsky again told his grandmother that he needed money to pay gambling debts. Inmate Belsky asked his grandmother to send $100 to Cynthia Manley at 1909-A Mack Lewis Drive, Panama City, Florida. Ms. Belsky sent Cynthia Manley a personal check dated August 1, 1997, in the amount of $100. Respondent admits that she endorsed the check under the signature of Cynthia Manley. Respondent's testimony that she only endorsed the check because her sister did not have a checking account at the bank is not credible. After receiving the check for $100, Respondent used another inmate as a go-between to deliver the marijuana to Inmate Belsky. Sometime thereafter, GCI gave Inmate Belsky a urine test for controlled substances. Inmate Belsky tested positive for marijuana use. The money that Ms. Belsky sent to Respondent's sisters was compensation for Respondent's delivery of marijuana to Inmate Belsky on two occasions. Therefore, Respondent received unlawful compensation while acting in her official capacity as a public servant.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That CJSTC enter a final order revoking Respondent's certification. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of September, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the following Findings of Fact are made: Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on February 11, 1983, and issued certificate number 19-82-502-08, which he still holds. For approximately the past eight years, Respondent has been employed by the Metro-Dade County Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department). During the first six years of his employment with the Department, he held the position of Correctional Officer I. His duties as a Correctional Officer I included supervising crews of inmates performing lawn maintenance work on public grounds outside the correctional facility in which they were housed. One of Respondent's supervisors was Jerry Meese, the Director of the Department's Operations Division. On September 26, 1986, while returning to his office from a lunchtime excursion, Meese observed a Department truck used to transport inmate work crews parked outside a private residence. The truck's presence in the residential area aroused Meese's suspicion. He therefore stopped to investigate. He soon discovered that Respondent and some inmates were in the area. One of the inmates was found to have some chewing gum in his possession. The inmate told Meese that Respondent had given him money to purchase the gum at a nearby store. A short walking distance from where Meese had encountered the inmate was a bag containing seven containers of beer. The containers were cold to the touch. Meese went to the store to which the inmate had referred and spoke to the store clerk. The store clerk advised Meese that the inmate, a short time before, had bought the beer that Meese had found in the bag. Meese discussed the matter with Respondent. It appeared to Meese that Respondent's speech was slurred and that his eyes were red. Upon his return to the office, Meese was provided with statements from inmates supervised by Respondent in which the inmates indicated that they had drank beer and smoked marijuana with Respondent. Shortly thereafter Meese learned that the inmates had tested positive for drugs. The Department had a policy which required a correctional officer to submit to drug testing if there existed a reasonable suspicion that the officer was involved in the illicit use of drugs. Based upon what had occurred that afternoon, Meese justifiably believed that he had grounds to invoke this policy and he therefore directed Respondent to submit to a drug test. He gave Respondent until Monday, September 29, 1986, to take the test. On September 29, 1986, prior to submitting to the test, Respondent was interviewed by Robert Sobel, an investigator with the Department's Internal Affairs Unit. Respondent freely admitted to Sobel that he "smok[ed] marijuana on a regular basis" and that he "would like to enroll in a program to overcome this problem." Later that day, at 3:10 p.m., in compliance with Meese's directive, Respondent went to the Consulab facility at the Cedars Medical Center in Miami and gave a urine specimen. The sample was screened by the use of an enzyme immunoassay testing procedure. The screening test was performed twice. On both occasions, the sample tested presumptively positive for cocaine and marijuana. The sample was then subjected to confirmatory testing. The thin layer chromatography (TLC) method was used. When performed by a competent technologist, TLC testing is accurate 95 to 99 percent of the time. The two technologists who tested Respondent's urine sample using the TLC method were highly competent. Their tests, which were completed at about 4:50 p.m., revealed the presence of cocaine metabolites 1/ and cannabinoids (marijuana). 15. The tests were accurate. Respondent had knowingly used cocaine and marijuana on or about the date of the testing. Notwithstanding the results of the testing, Respondent was not terminated by the Department. Instead, he was suspended. As a condition of continued employment, he was required to participate in a drug rehabilitation program and to remain drug-free. Respondent has met these requirements to the satisfaction of the Department. Not only has Respondent remained in the employ of the Department, he how occupies the position of corporal, a supervisory position to which he was promoted approximately two years ago. His post-September, 1986, employment record reveals that he has taken full advantage of the opportunity given him by the Department to rehabilitate himself.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order (1) finding Respondent guilty of having failed to maintain "good moral character" in violation of Section 943.1395(5), Florida Statutes, by virtue of his unlawful use of cocaine and marijuana on or about September 26, 1986; and (2) based upon such a finding, (a) suspend Respondent's certification for 30 days, (b) place Respondent on probation for a period of two years to commence upon the expiration of this 30-day suspension, and (c) include among the terms and conditions of his probation the requirements that Respondent submit to scheduled and monthly drug testing and that he agree to release the results of such testing to the Commission or its designee. DONE and ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 30th day of May 1990. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division Administrative Hearings this 30th day of May 1990.
