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GULF TRUST DEVELOPMENT, LLC AND ROBINSON FARMS, INC. vs MANATEE COUNTY, 11-004502GM (2011)

Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Satellite Beach, Florida Sep. 02, 2011 Number: 11-004502GM Latest Update: Apr. 10, 2012

The Issue The issues to be determined in this case are whether the amendments to the Manatee County Comprehensive Plan adopted through Ordinance No. 11-01 (“Plan Amendments”), are "in compliance" as that term is defined in section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2011).1/

Recommendation Based on foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Economic Opportunity enter a final order determining that the Plan Amendments adopted by Manatee County Ordinance No. 11-01 are in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 2012.

Florida Laws (7) 120.57, 163.3177, 163.3178, 163.3180, 163.3184, 163.3245, 163.3248

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ANDREW MACHATA vs DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, 90-008074 (1990)

Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Dec. 21, 1990 Number: 90-008074 Latest Update: Nov. 09, 1995

The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether Respondent should issue a permit for coastal armoring to protect Petitioners' homes.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order granting Petitioners' application for a coastal armoring permit subject to conditions stated by Respondent on the record and imposed by the terms of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of February 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 1994.

Florida Laws (8) 120.52, 120.54, 120.56, 120.57, 120.68, 161.053, 380.06, 7.28

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CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE BOATING, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 93-005699RX (1993)

Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Oct. 04, 1993 Number: 93-005699RX Latest Update: Feb. 04, 1994

Findings Of Fact Citizens for Responsible Boating, Inc., the Petitioner, is a not-for- profit corporation organized under the laws of Florida. Its approximately 500 members own, sell and use boats and boat related products on the waters regulated by the State. Their purposes are to promote boating and water sports and to protect the boating public's right to access and use of Florida waters. The Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") is the state agency with primary responsibility for rulemaking to regulate boat speeds incident to protection of manatees, pursuant to Subsection 370.12(2), Florida Statutes. After a series of public hearings on earlier versions of the rule, the Secretary of DEP approved the rules on August 11, 1993, to be effective on September 9, 1993. Subsection 370.12(2), Florida Statutes, the Florida Manatee Sanctuary Act, was enacted to give DEP the authority to regulate: (f). . . the operation and speed of motorboat traffic, only where manatee sightings are frequent and it can be generally assumed, based on available scientific information, that they inhabit these areas on a regular or continuous basis . . . . The challenged rules enacted pursuant to the Act have the effect of limiting boat speeds in western Volusia County in the Hontoon Dead River, and the parallel St. Johns River, roughly from a point just south of the Beresford Peninsula at Marker 63 extending south to Marker 81; and in eastern Volusia County on the Indian River from the North Bridge in New Smyrna Beach through Ponce Inlet to Rock House Creek, and on the Indian River in Edgewater and Oak Hill from Marker 65 to Marker 9A. The waterways are designated year round slow speed zones. Slow speed zones are, according to the definitions in Rule 16N- 22.002, designated areas . . . "within which it has been established that manatees are known to congregate." Eastern Volusia County (Halifax and Indian River) In the slow speed zone north of New Smyrna Beach, Michael Godfrey, Sr., a boat dealer from Edgewater who formerly water-skied in the area, reported seeing probably 6 manatees over 27 years. His average speed on the water was 45 miles per hour in boats, and in excess of 38 miles per hour on water-skis. The only manatees he is able to see are the ones which have come to the surface of the water to feed. High speed corridors are included in most of the Volusia County waterways. Exemptions from the speed limits are available for boat dealers with service departments, but no application has been made based on Mr. Godfrey's unexplained conclusion that it is not economically feasible. What was a 15 minute demonstration ride for boats from his Edgewater dealership through the Ponce Inlet prior to the enactment of speed restrictions, now takes 45 minutes. Water-skiing is impossible in the slow speed zone, and because he is a professional skier, Mr. Godfrey has to use a freshwater lake in Volusia County to ski at speeds exceeding 35 miles per hour. The nearest available freshwater lake is 35 miles from Edgewater. For nonprofessionals, water-skiing is still available in a 35 mile per hour designated water sports area near a power plant. That area is particularly congested on weekends. The water temperature is usually below 68 degrees in December, January and February. Surface temperatures go as low as 58 degrees. The rule also applies to jet skis and other types of personal watercraft, skies which average 300 pounds in weight, and extend approximately three inches into the water and have no propellers. These watercraft are not equipped with speedometers. Some barges on the St. Johns River extend six feet into the water and have not had the speed at which they operate affected by the rule. The speed allowed for boats depends, in part, on the type of hull. Mr. Godfrey knows how to determine if a boat is operating on a plane, not causing a wake, and coming off plane. A United States Coast Guard licensed ocean master, Edward J. Stupack, Jr., operated commercial fishing, diving and tour boats in Volusia County to see shuttle launches and to tour Tomoka State Park. The speed limits have caused him to eliminate Tomoka State Park tours, because trips that took four hours now take a full day. Shuttle launch tours which previously took 1 1/2 hours to the shuttle, now take 3 to 4 1/2 hours to the shuttle site. Registration for the Greater Daytona Strike and Fish Tournament has fallen from 250 boats to less than 200 in the past two years. At slower speeds, more carbon collects in boat engines, and more maintenance is required. In addition, exhaust fumes and heat make boat rides less comfortable at slow speeds. In eleven years of boating in eastern Volusia County, Mr. Stupack has seen two manatees both hugging the shoreline, one going out Ponce Inlet to sea and another around Rock House Creek. There is undisputed expert testimony in this case, however, that manatees do not always, or as a general rule, travel along the shoreline. Mr. Stupack has not applied for an exemption from the rules because he does not believe his small, part-time business has enough clout. In the 50 miles of Intercoastal Waterway from Flagler to Brevard County, eight of the total ten and a half miles regulated were regulated idle speed areas for boating safety prior to the manatee protection speed limits. The manatee slow speed zone resulted in the addition of two and a half miles of regulated area. There are two designated recreational areas along the 50 miles. DEP relied, in part, on the 1988 report of the Marine Manual Commission to support regulation in Eastern Volusia County. Western Volusia County (St. Johns River) Richard E. Rawlins, the owner and operator of a fish camp in Deland with a 150 boat slip and 59 unit campground, operates guided fishing tours exclusively in the St. Johns River Basin from Lake George at Putnam County to Lake Monroe in Seminole County. Prior to the adoption of the rule, idle zones existed around bridges and marinas on the St. Johns. Mr. Rawlins operated guided fishing tours at speeds of 40 to 45 miles per hour. The camp is close to bankruptcy having gone from 8 to 3 employees, from 80 to 85 percent to 10 percent wet storage occupancy and 30 to 35 percent dry storage occupancy. Having received three tickets and many warnings for exceeding the speed limit, Mr. Rawlins has reduced, by approximately half, his own recreational boating and fishing. Pulling persons on innertubes has also been eliminated by slow speeds, which he estimates equates to 5 to 7 miles per hour, as compared to innertubing at 40 miles per hour prior to the rule. Although, innertubing at 40 miles per hour was probably unsafe. Mr. Rawlins 20 foot boat with a 200 horsepower engine gets up on a plane at approximately 28 miles per hour and maintains a plane at 25 miles per hour. Prior to the rule, water-skiing on the St. Johns occurred primarily between Markers 38 and 20 at Cross Creek. The area now has a 30 mile per hour speed limit above Marker 32 and 25 miles below it. From the fish camp to the lower basin of the Hontoon Dead River takes over four hours, as compared to 45 to 50 minutes by boat prior to the adoption of the rule. The camp's operation of bass fishing tournaments has been eliminated by the inability to cover greater distances in shorter periods of time. In 32 years of St. Johns River boating and fishing, Mr. Rawlins estimates having seen manatees on one of every 18 to 20 trips, although the waters of the St. Johns River and its tributaries are relatively dark. He recalls one boat related manatee killing near his camp two and a half years ago, and a couple more at the Hontoon Dead River at about the same time. Recently, he has seen manatees outside of the Blue Springs area near Marker 20. Prior to that, he had not seen manatees in the area for 60 to 70 days. Although it varies, generally in December, January and February, the guide sees up to 70 manatees congregating in Blue Springs. When water temperature drops below 68 degrees in the rest of the river basin, the manatees move to Blue Springs because of its constant water temperature of 72 degrees. Mr. Rawlins does not need a speedometer to determine whether his boat is settled in the water. Because different boats settle differently depending on the type of hull, Mr. Rawlins believes Marine Patrol enforcement is not uniform. The speed limits in the areas north of the camp in the Norris Dead River to Lake Woodruff are at least 25 miles per hour, except for areas of idle zones established for marinas and for public safety, but not under the manatee protection rules. Access to southern fishing areas through the Hontoon Dead River have been adversely affected by the rule. Mr. Rawlins has not filed any written application for an exemption from the rule. He claims to have applied and been turned down by telephone. One boat manufacturer in Volusia County has received an exemption to test its boats at higher speeds. William B. Flowers, Sr., is a fishing guide who lives near the Lake Beresford Peninsula, and operates a 14 foot boat powered by a 48-horsepower motor at slower speeds than 300 foot long barges pushed by tugboats with two five foot propellers. It now takes approximately 4 hours to reach the areas of the Wekiva, River which he could reach in 35 minutes prior to the adoption of the rule. He will not apply for an exemption from the rule based on concern for his neighbors who would still have to adhere to the slow speeds. Lake Beresford is too crowded with fishermen to also accommodate water-skiers. Lake Woodruff and Lake Dexter are in a Federal Wildlife Refuge infested with alligators. On the St. Johns River, three miles of idle speed zone is imposed for boating safety and an additional nine-tenths of a mile for manatee protection, seven miles around Blue Springs and south of it, and another four and a quarter miles going into the southern Norris Dead River. The best estimate is that two thousand manatees live in Florida waters. Up to 76 manatees spend some time during the winter months in Blue Springs, particularly when water temperatures elsewhere drop to 20 degrees Centigrade or 68 degrees Fahrenheit. As water temperature approaches 50 degrees, manatees stop feeding and must get to warmer water to survive. Except for times of the most severe cold fronts, manatees in Blue Springs venture out into the St. Johns River system on a daily basis. In general, they venture out 12 kilometers from the springs, but have been known to go to Jacksonville. Mr. Flowers sees manatees around the springs from December to early March, and a few in Lake Beresford when there is grass left in the lake. The Regulations Rule 16N-22.003(6) authorizes exemptions for commercial fishermen and professional fishing guides and adopts, by reference, a written application form. Exemptions may not be granted for speeds in excess of 20 miles per hour nor in "motorboat prohibited" and "no entry" zones. There have been no denials of exemption applications from Volusia County. One exemption has been granted in Volusia County, other applications are pending. DEP relied, in part, on the Bengston study of manatees in the St. Johns River, which shows manatees move from one area to another depending on the availability of grasses for feeding. DEP also relies on the federal Endangered Species Recovery Plan for Manatees, which lists as its first priority reducing boating speeds in order to reduce boating-related accidental manatee deaths. A killing of a manatee by personal watercraft has been reported in Puerto Rico. There are no documented cases of manatees being killed by airboats. The rules apply to personal watercraft and airboats. Although, there was undisputed expert testimony that exemptions are available for airboats in some slow zones. In the last 15 to 20 years, an average of two manatees a year have been killed in Volusia County. There was no evidence of the types of watercraft causing the fatal injuries. Average boating speeds in Broward, Palm Beach and Pinellas Counties are 26 to 28 miles per hour, and lower in the rest of Florida. The majority of smaller recreational boats plane safely at speeds of 25 miles per hour or less. Because of its size and depth of the hull, DEP acknowledges that a barge going 5 miles per hour may pose more danger to manatees than smaller vessels traveling faster. The meaning of slow speed, as taught to Marine Patrol officers, is that a vessel is fully settled and level in the water and the wake does not endanger other vessels operating on the water or tied up along the shore. If an officer approaches a boat which settles into the water after reducing its speed, then the boat has not been operating at a slow speed. The view from a moving boat is a poor vantage point to determine the presence of manatees. Manatees are only able to move at speeds up to 15 miles per hour for short distances. To allow vessels to plane at approximately 20 miles per hour, 25 miles per hour zones have been adopted due to the absence of lower effective boat speeds between slow and 25 miles per hour, at which a boat could plane. The regulations also include 30 and 35 mile per hour speed zones. At 30 miles per hour, virtually all vessels, except the largest cigarette boats, can plane. At 35 miles per hour, innertubing, parasailing and water-skiing are possible if the water is deep and wide enough, except for barefoot and professional water- skiing. Although many boats are not equipped with speedometers, relatively accurate and inexpensive ones are available to determine speeds in excess of 10 miles per hour. Personal watercraft and jet skis cannot be equipped with speedometers. Other methods for determining speed are frequently used by boaters. Some of the higher speed zones in Volusia County decrease to 25 miles per hour at night, although moving boaters are unlikely to see manatees and manatees are unlikely to see boats. Manatees are able to see only two or three feet ahead, depending on water clarity, but there was unrefuted expert testimony that they are more aware of surroundings in daylight and better able to sense where to move to avoid boats.

Florida Laws (5) 120.52, 120.54, 120.56, 120.60, 120.68

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FLORIDA ENGINEERS MANAGEMENT CORPORATION vs KELVYN WHITFIELD, P.E., 08-004415PL (2008)

Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Sep. 09, 2008 Number: 08-004415PL Latest Update: Feb. 03, 2025

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MANATEE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, L.P. vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 99-003321CON (1999)

Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 05, 1999 Number: 99-003321CON Latest Update: Nov. 29, 2000

The Issue Whether the application of Manatee Memorial Hospital, Inc. (CON 9170) to establish a 120-bed satellite hospital in eastern Manatee County should be granted?

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the application of Manatee Memorial Hospital, L.P. (CON 9170) be granted by the Agency for Health Care Administration. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of September, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of September, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: John F. Gilroy, III, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building Three, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Robert D. Newell, Jr., Esquire Newell & Terry, P.A. 817 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303-6313 John D.C. Newton, II, Esquire Berger, Davis & Singerman, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 705 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-6313 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Building Three, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Julie Gallagher, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Building Three, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403

Florida Laws (5) 120.57, 408.032, 408.034, 408.035, 408.039 Florida Administrative Code (2) 59A-3.080, 59C-2.100

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JANE R. WILKINSON vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 92-001070 (1992)

Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Bradenton, Florida Feb. 20, 1992 Number: 92-001070 Latest Update: Apr. 08, 1993

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The Petitioner, Jane R. Wilkinson, f/n/a Jane Nelson Riley and Wilkinson were married on February 12, 1983 and lived together as man and wife until his death, except for a short period of separation from mid-October, 1990 until December 31, 1990. During this short period of separation, Wilkinson continued to perform chores and special tasks for his wife at their home. After being reunited in January, 1991, they lived together in a close relationship until Wilkinson's death. Petitioner is the surviving spouse and designated sole beneficiary of Wilkinson for any benefits under the Florida Retirement System having been so designated by Wilkinson at the time of their marriage. Wilkinson was employed full time by the Manatee County Sheriff and remained employed by the Manatee County Sheriff until his death. At the time of his death, Wilkinson was classified as a correctional officer carrying the rank of sergeant. Wilkinson was certified as a special risk member of the Florida Retirement System effective January 1, 1983. Before his marriage to Petitioner, Wilkinson had been married to Audrey Lynn Wilkinson, n/k/a Audrey Lynn Batchelor. There were two children born of this marriage. This marriage was dissolved in 1982. The former wife was granted custody of the children. Wilkinson was ordered to pay child support to the former wife. Sometime around March, 1991, the former wife petitioned the court for an increase in child support from Wilkinson. This action by the former wife had caused some concern for Wilkinson, mainly because of its effect on his present wife. However, they apparently had reached some sort of settlement just prior to his death but the settlement was not presented to the court before his death. Wilkinson served in the United States Army in the United States and overseas between December 30, 1974 and February 13, 1981. Wilkinson's military service between December 30, 1974 and May 7, 1975, comes within the definition of military service as defined in Section 121.021(20)(b), Florida Statutes. In 1989, after obtaining permission from the Manatee County Sheriff's Office, Wilkinson was employed part time on the ground crew of American Airlines (AMR Services) at Sarasota-Bradenton Airport. Wilkinson had expressed hope of obtaining ten years of creditable service in the Florida Retirement System before resigning from the Manatee County Sheriff's Office to work full time with AMR Services. Wilkinson's last duty assignment with the Manatee County Sheriff's Department was at the Port Manatee Stockade (Port Manatee). Port Manatee was operated under a method known as "direct supervision" of inmates. This method allowed the inmates to be supervised in a dormitory type setting or "pod" from approximately 5:30 a.m. to approximately 11:30 p.m. with the correctional officers "locked in" with approximately 48 inmates. The inmates were locked in the cells between approximately 11:00 p.m. and 5:30 a.m. This type supervision is more in favor of inmates than correctional officer. Port Manatee was one of three of this type facility in Florida and one of ten in the United States. Since Wilkinson's death the facility has begun shifting back to the traditional type facility. During the time Wilkinson worked with the Sheriff's Department the Department was cited for overcrowding correctional facilities in Manatee County, including Port Manatee. Although there were no "life felons" incarcerated in Port Manatee, there were second and third degree felons who exhibited aggressive and violent behavior creating problems for the correctional officers "locked in" with them. There were times when the inmates assaulted and injured the correctional officers, including Wilkinson. Port Manatee was understaffed during the time Wilkinson was assigned there. Wilkinson favored the more traditional method of handling inmates rather than direct supervision and this resulted in problems between Wilkinson and some of his supervisors. Additionally, this created problems between Wilkinson and some of the inmates. Wilkinson's concern about his own safety and the safety of those under his supervision at Port Manatee created a stressful situation for Wilkinson. Wilkinson's coworkers, including some of his supervisors, considered Wilkinson a hard worker, dedicated to those whom he supervised, a "go-getter" and a "perfectionist". Sheriff Wells considered Wilkinson an excellent correctional officer, and on a scale of one to ten would rate him as an eight. In the Spring of 1991 Wilkinson began having difficulty in coping with the pressures and stresses of his job with the Sheriff's Department. Wilkinson had conflicts with certain supervisors and felt that these supervisors were not backing him in protecting "his men" at Port Manatee. As early as the Spring of 1991 Wilkinson was "stressed-out", "tired all of the time", tense, "wired" and a "bundle of nerves". Wilkinson was frustrated with his job and was sad and withdrawn. During this time, Wilkinson suffered from sleeplessness which is an indication of depression. On August 15, 1991, Wilkinson spoke with David Clooney, a close friend and coworker at Port Manatee. Wilkinson was in tears and depressed about not being able to handle his job at Port Manatee. Wilkinson wrote a good-bye letter to the Petitioner on this date and went to the Skyway Bridge with the intention of killing himself. Instead of killing himself on August 15, 1991, Wilkinson called Petitioner and told her that he needed help. Petitioner and David Clooney picked Wilkinson up and carried him to Manatee Memorial Hospital where he was admitted for treatment as a voluntary patient in the Life Management Center. Wilkinson was admitted to the hospital under the care of a psychiatrist, Dr. Hector Fosser. Wilkinson's mental condition on admission was diagnosed as major depression by Dr. Orrosio, a psychiatrist covering for Dr. Hector Fosser in his absence. However, upon Dr. Fosser's return, Dr. Fosser diagnosed Wilkinson,s mental condition as major depression with suicidal ideation. During his stay at the Life Management Center, Manatee Memorial Hospital, Wilkinson was treated by Dr. Hector Fosser, a licensed psychiatrist, Dr. David Thomas, a licensed psychotherapist and Rebecca Gramblin, RN, specializing in psychiatric nursing. On August 28, 1991, Dr. Fosser discharged Wilkinson from the hospital, apparently improved. Dr. Fosser's diagnosis upon discharge was major depression, single episode with suicidal ideation. After his discharge from the hospital, Wilkinson continued under the care of Dr. Fosser on an outpatient basis. Early in Wilkinson's post-hospitalization period his mental condition appeared to improve for a time. Apparently, Wilkinson complied with the medication prescribed by Dr. Fosser. However, Wilkinson's mental condition deteriorated, and he became anxious and depressed. Wilkinson was scared, apprehensive about working with inmates, fearful for his "troops", and fearful of what he considered unsafe conditions at Port Manatee. Wilkinson felt that he had "lost his edge and the ability to handle risks and problems at Port Manatee". On September 30, 1991, Wilkinson kept his appointment with Dr. Fosser who prescribed lithium and another medication for him. Dr. Fosser also wrote a note of authorization for Wilkinson to return to work at AMR Services but not for returning to work at the Sheriff's Department. Also on September 30, 1991, Wilkinson wrote six suicide letters addressed to Sheriff Wells, several family members and a friend. On October 1, 1991, Wilkinson continued to be upset about his job at Port Manatee and wrote four additional suicide letters addressed to his wife, mother and two friends. Also, Wilkinson talked to his close friend, David Clooney and advised him that he intended to kill himself. Clooney was unable to delay him long enough for someone to get to Wilkinson's home and possibly prevent the suicide. After talking to Clooney, Wilkinson went into his backyard and killed himself with a gunshot to his head. Dr. Fosser, Dr. Thomas and Nurse Gramblin all testified that matters such as Wilkinson's former wife demanding more child support could have been the cause of some of the stress that Wilkinson was experiencing. However, they were all of the opinion that his job at Port Manatee was the major cause of his stress which led to his mental illness, diagnosed as major depression with suicidal ideation. There is competent substantial evidence to establish facts to show that Wilkinson's mental condition was caused or aggravated by the stress resulting from his employment with the Manatee County Sheriff's Department, and that his suicide was the result of his mental illness. There is competent substantial evidence to establish facts to show that Wilkinson became disabled in the line of duty on August 15, 1991, and died as a result of his disabling illness on October 1, 1991. At the time of his death on October 1, 1991, Wilkinson had 9.91 years of creditable service which included his time with the Manatee County Sheriff's Department, Manatee Memorial Hospital and Sarasota County Public Hospital Board but did not include any military time. At the time of Wilkinson's death his rate of pay was $1,038.88 biweekly or an annual and monthly rate of $27,010.88 and $2,250.91, respectively.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Division of Retirement enter a final order finding that Dale S. Wilkinson suffered death in the line of duty and awarding his surviving spouse and designated beneficiary, Jane R. Wilkinson, the appropriate benefits commensurate therewith. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of March, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 1993.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57, 121.021, 121.091, 121.111

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MIAMI YACHT DIVERS, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 96-005850 (1996)

Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Apr. 15, 1996 Number: 96-005850 Latest Update: Mar. 05, 1998

The Issue Whether Petitioner, Miami Yacht Divers, Inc., is entitled to reimbursement for cleanup costs.

Findings Of Fact The Respondent is the state agency charged with the responsibility of administering claims against the Florida Coastal Protection Trust Fund. Petitioner is a company located in Dade County, Florida, which performs commercial diving operations. Such operations include oil pollution containment and clean-up. At all times material to the allegations of this case, Dan Delmonico was the principal officer or owner for the Petitioner who supervised the operations of the company. In April of 1993, Mr. Delmonico discovered a fuel discharge next door to the premises of Defender Yacht, Inc., a company located on the Miami River in Dade County, Florida. The source of the discharge was an abandoned sunken vessel. This derelict vessel had no markings from which its ownership could be determined. Upon discovering the vessel, Mr. Delmonico did not contact local, state, or federal authorities to advise them of the discharge. Instead, Mr. Delmonico contacted several colleagues whose help he enlisted to assist him to clean up the discharge. In this regard, Mr. Delmonico procured the services of a diver and a crane company to remove the vessel from the water. Additionally, Mr. Delmonico utilized a boom and oil absorbent clean-up pads to remove the discharged fuel from the water. In total, Mr. Delmonico maintains it took four work days to complete the removal of the discharge and the salvage of the derelict vessel. At no time during this period did Mr. Delmonico contact local, state, or federal authorities to advise them of the foregoing activities. No official from any governmental entity supervised or approved the clean-up operation or salvage activity which is in dispute. After the fact Petitioner filed a reimbursement claim with the United States Coast Guard. Such claim was denied. Upon receipt of such denial, Petitioner filed the claim which is at issue in the instant case. In connection with this claim with Respondent, Petitioner submitted all forms previously tendered to the Coast Guard including the standard claim form, labor receipts, rental receipts, supply receipts, trailer and storage receipts, cash expenses, a job summary, and photographs. On or about September 20, 1996, Respondent issued a letter denying Petitioner's claim for reimbursement for expenses associated with the above-described salvage and clean-up activities. The grounds for the denial were the Petitioner's failure to obtain prior approval for the activities and the absence of "good cause" for the waiver of prior approval. Additionally, the Respondent maintained that Petitioner had failed to provide evidence that a pollutant discharge existed and that the removal of the vessel was necessary to abate and remove the discharge. It is undisputed by Petitioner that prior approval for the clean-up activities was not obtained. Petitioner timely disputed the denial and was afforded a point of entry to challenge such decision.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's claim for reimbursement. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. Parrish Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathy Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 F. Perry Odom, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Kathelyn M. Jacques Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 N. Paul San Filippo, Esquire Seidensticker & San Filippo Parkway Financial Center 2150 Goodlette Road, Suite 305 Naples, Florida 34102

Florida Laws (2) 376.09, 376.11

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CITY OF CLEARWATER AND ANTONIOS MARKOPOULOS vs. DANNY FIVECOAT, 81-000090 (1981)

Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-000090 Latest Update: Apr. 14, 1981

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner in this action is the City of Clearwater, Florida, a municipality in the State of Florida which provides governmental services to the citizens within that community, to include police protection. It has among other powers, the power to hire and dismiss employees and in keeping with that authority, the City has enacted Ordinance No. 1831, pursuant to Chapter 21153, Special Laws of Florida, 1941. This ordinance deals with a career civil service system for employees of the City of Clearwater and it sets forth the rights which an employee would have if that employee had been accused of misconduct. A subunit within the City of Clearwater is the Clearwater Police Department which has rules and regulations which would apply to the employees within that Department. This case concerns charges placed by the Petitioner, City of Clearwater, against the Respondent, Danny Fivecoat, who held the position of Sergeant in the Clearwater Police Department on July 25, 1980. Those charges placed under the terms and conditions of a "Termination Dismissal Notice" which may be found as Joint Exhibit No. 3, admitted into evidence, set forth the accusations as alluded to in the Issues statement of this Recommended Order. The termination and dismissal notice was placed against the Respondent on December 15, 1980, when he was relieved as a police officer and dismissed from employment with the City of Clearwater. This action was taken in keeping with the authority of City of Clearwater Ordinance No. 1831 and pursuant to Rule 14, Section 6, Civil Service Rules of Clearwater, Florida. Subsequently, the Respondent attempted to explain and answer the charges and specification placed against him, but the explanation and answer were found to be insufficient by the appointing authority, City Manager, City of Clearwater, Florida, and pursuant to the terms and conditions of City of Clearwater Ordinance No. 1831, Section 2-38, the Respondent requested a formal hearing to be held before the Division of Administrative Hearings. That formal hearing was held in keeping with the terms of the aforementioned ordinance and the agreement between the City of Clearwater and the Division of Administrative Hearings to provide a Hearing Officer for these matters. See also Subsection 120.65(6), Florida Statutes. The hearing in this cause was conducted on March 25, 1981. In July, 1980, while employed as a sergeant in the Clearwater Police Department, the Respondent was assigned as supervisor of a TAC unit. Within that unit were five (5) or six (6) subordinate officers to the Respondent. One of the duties of the TAC unit in July, 1980, concerned an effort to ascertain the identity of a person or persons who were suspected of committing the felony offenses of burglary and arson at a commercial premises now known as Gulf Branch Saloon and formerly known as Bobby Sands 60. This bar was located on State Road 60 within the corporate limits of the City of Clearwater, Florida. To apprehend the offenders, Fivecoat established a surveillance network in the area of the bar location. The rough details of that network may be seen as Employee's Exhibit No. 6, admitted into evidence, which is a sketch, not to scale, depicting surveillance locations in July, 1980, and in particular, on July 25, through July 27, 1980. The numbers 1, 2 and 3 depict surveillance points of members of the TAC unit who were on foot. The word van indicates the location of the command post of the surveillance unit and in addition, there were two unmarked automobiles that were east and west of the location of the bar. These locations are not depicted with any particularity. The primary surveillance was being conducted by the three individuals shown by the numbers on Employee's Exhibit No. 6, with the idea being that from the three locations, the entire bar area could be surveilled. The van served as a command post and a rallying point for the officers on the surveillance team and was used as a location for taking breaks and meals while on the surveillance assignment. Those persons in the outlying surveillance posts would come to the van to take breaks and to have their meals after being relieved by Respondent and an Officer Adamson. Officer Adamson was assigned to drive the van and to assist Sergeant Fivecoat. The van itself was not equipped as a police unit per se, it was unmarked and did not have police emergency lights or sirens or communications equipment and was not designed for pursuit responsibility, although it had been used as mobile surveillance and on occasion, Officer Adamson had attempted to use it as a pursuit vehicle. The Respondent did not find it to be an appropriate pursuit vehicle, he did, however, feel that it could be used as mobile surveillance and as an apparatus for blocking suspects who were fleeing a scene of a crime in an automobile. The van had two front seats and other additional seating that had been placed there by arrangement of members of the TAC unit and it contained bicycles to be utilized for transportation in the area of a surveillance setting. The van was not primarily used for the surveillance, but it did allow a view of the west side of the subject bar and this observation was principally the assignment of Officer Adamson. On the evening of July 25, 1980, prior to setting up the surveillance operation alluded to herein, the Respondent and members of his unit went to a local restaurant in Clearwater, Florida, to have dinner and to discuss the plans of operation for that evening. While at the restaurant, the Respondent and one Kim Dubois, an employee in the State Attorney's Office which has jurisdiction in Clearwater, Florida, engaged in a conversation through which the woman Dubois determined that the surveillance activities were ongoing, specifically that the Respondent could be found in the parking lot of the Western Sizzler on State Road 60 later on that evening. In the course of this conversation, Fivecoat let it be known that it would be acceptable for Dubois to come to the stakeout and carry on a conversation while the surveillance was ongoing. Between 2:45 A.M. and 3:00 A.M., on July 26, 1980, Kim Dubois and one Diana Scanlan, another employee of the same State Attorney's Office, went to the location of the van in the Western Sizzler parking lot. At that time, the surveillance operations had been underway for a period of approximately an hour and forty-five minutes. The two women sat in their automobile and talked to Sergeant Fivecoat and Officer Adamson who were seated in the van. Fivecoat was on the passenger side of the van. At times the women were outside their car talking to the officers who remained in the van. Other officers who were on the surveillance team came to the van while the women were present and Officers other than Adamson and Fivecoat entered into conversation with the women. The two women remained in the area of the van engaging in a conversation until around 5:00 to 5:30 A.M., at which point they left the area of the surveillance and the members of the surveillance team left shortly thereafter. Nothing other than the conversation between the women and Respondent and other members of his team took place and no burglary or other incident occurred which required police intervention. Neither Fivecoat nor other members of his team asked the women to leave the area of their surveillance. While these events were going on, cars were operating on State Road 60 and at times, other persons were in the parking lot of the Western Sizzler eating establishment. None of the officers were wearing police uniforms on this occasion nor were they in uniform on the night of July 26, 1980, in the early morning hours of July 27, 1980. Again, in the early morning hours, around 2:45 to 3:00 A.M., July 27, 1980, the women came to the location of the van in the parking lot of the Western Sizzler where the Respondent and Officer Adamson were located. The surveillance team members were located in approximately the same positions as depicted in Employee's Exhibit No. 6. Initially, the women sat in their car and talked to the Respondent and Officer Adamson who were seated in the van, until the police officers ran out of soft drinks and the women departed and brought soft drinks back to the police officers in the van. The drinks were given to the officers and the women were allowed in the van, into the back part of that vehicle. While they were inside, the side cargo door remained open and no other matters transpired between the women and the police officers other than conversation between them. Sergeant Fivecoat never indicated that the women should not be in the van and the women were lead to believe that it was acceptable for them to be inside. The women remained in the van for approximately an hour and left the scene of the surveillance around 5:00 to 5:30 A.M. and the Respondent and members of his team concluded the surveillance shortly thereafter. Again, the pattern of traffic on State Road 60 and in the Western Sizzler parking lot was essentially the same as the evening and morning before and no criminal violation occurred which required the action of the police officers in the TAC unit. Had such activity occurred as was the expectation of sergeant Fivecoat, the members of the TAC team outside the van proper would have been primarily responsible for enforcement and he and Adamson were mostly responsible for relieving those officers during breaks. Nonetheless, Sergeant Fivecoat was the overall supervisor and responsible for the surveillance operation in question. On the second night and morning, other officers came to the van and entered into conversation with the women. On the second morning and evening, neither Sergeant Fivecoat nor any members of the TAC unit asked the women to leave the area of the surveillance. Sergeant Fivecoat knew that the presence of the two women at the TAC command post was in violation of the prohibition against their presence as set out in Rule 23, Rules and Regulations of the City of Clearwater Police Department.

Recommendation The Respondent's Composite Exhibit No. 5, admitted into evidence, is a compilation of fitness reports and other items related to the Respondent's performance as a police officer. These items are taken from the personnel file of the Respondent as administered by the Petitioner. With the exception of the incident occurring in June, 1977, related to a liaison of a sexual nature between the Respondent and a female which occurred in the months of March or April, 1977, for which the Respondent was given a ten-day suspension, the Respondent has not been disciplined in the past and has an acceptable record. The details of the other disciplinary action may be found in the Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence. The actions of Sergeant Fivecoat, as set forth in this Recommended Order, related to the incident involving the two civilian females is reprehensible and having occurred with the knowledge of Sergeant Fivecoat that he was committing a violation is inexcusable. Nonetheless, it is not of such magnitude that it would warrant the ultimate imposition of the penalty of dismissal as would be contended for by the City Manager, City of Clearwater. Likewise, the recommendation of demotion from Sergeant to patrolman and a five (5) day suspension as made by the interim Police Chief would seem too lenient. Under the circumstances, the recommendation herein would be that Sergeant Danny J. Fivecoat be reduced in grade to patrolman and be suspended for a period of thirty (30) days to run from the entry of a final order in this cause. 1/ DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of April, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of April, 1981.

Florida Laws (1) 120.65

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DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES vs. FERNPASSAT SHIPPING, LTD., 88-002479 (1988)

Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-002479 Latest Update: May 25, 1992

The Issue By this action Petitioner seeks to recover costs, expenses and damages associated with state response to an oil spill incident occurring February 26, 1987, within three miles of the Florida shoreline. Respondent's vessel was responsible for that spill. In particular the costs, expenses and damages claimed are related to salaries, per diem allowances, Federal Express charges, beach sand replacement, equipment, use of a cellular phone, and consulting work at the shore and off site. Petitioner also seeks damages for bird mortality resulting from the spill. See Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 16N- 16, Florida Administrative Code.

Findings Of Fact On the evening of February 26, 1987, the motor vessel Fernpassat struck the south jetty at the entrance to the St. Johns River at a location within three miles of the Florida shoreline. In doing so it ruptured the hull and spilled a substantial amount of heavy fuel oil. The type of the oil was No. 5 or 6 Bunker C. A preliminary estimate placed the amount of oil in excess of 100,000 gallons. While the true amount may have been somewhat less, it was a significant spill in that it substantially threatened the public's welfare and the environment and generated wide public interest. Petitioner's exhibit 3 is a map which depicts the basic location where the vessel collided with the jetty with an "X" mark. The area impacted by the discharge ran from roughly Atlantic Beach, Florida, to Guana State Park in St. Augustine, Florida. This is approximately 25 miles of beach front. Beach property over which Petitioner has regulatory and proprietary responsibility had oil deposited upon it. The oil spill killed or injured a number of birds. The event was responded to by the "Federal Region IV Regional Response Team" (RRT). The federal on-scene coordinator (OSC) was Captain Matthew Woods, U.S. Coast Guard. The RRT, through management and control provided by the OSC, took necessary steps to combat the effects of the spill. Respondent immediately accepted responsibility for the cleanup through the use of a consultant and cleanup contractor. Under this arrangement the OSC monitored the contractor's cleanup efforts to make certain that the job was done satisfactorily. Florida officials were part of the RRT. Rule 16N-16.009(21), Florida Administrative Code, calls for personnel from Petitioner; the State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation (DER); and the State of Florida, Department of Community Affairs (DCA) to represent state interests as members of the RRT. Each of these agencies participated as members of the RRT. This furthered the legislative intent expressed at Section 376.021(6), Florida Statutes, to support the RRT through implementation of the "Federal Water Pollution Control Act," which is also known as the "Clean Water Act," 33 U.S.C. ss. 1251-1376. By its efforts the RRT promoted the removal of the oil in accordance with a national contingency plan. Pursuant to Section 376.021(6), Florida Statutes, the state is expected to complement applicable provisions within the "Federal Water Pollution Control Act" as well as render the support previously described. Both the support and complementary functions of the state are part of Florida's "Pollutant Spill and Prevention Control Act," Sections 376.011-376.17, 376.19-376.21, Florida Statutes. Chapters 16N-16, Florida Administrative Code, more completely identifies the role played by the state agencies in this instance. This chapter was adopted pursuant to authority set out in Section 376.07, Florida Statutes, which, among other things, empowered Petitioner to make rules which developed and implemented criteria and plans to respond to spills such as the one at issue. In its complementary role the state has established a "State Response Team" (SRT). This organization in defined at Rule 16N-16.009(13), Florida Administrative Code. It is constituted of predesignated state agencies available continually to respond to a major spill. This incident was a major spill or discharge as defined in Rule 16N-16.009(18), Florida Administrative Code. The predesignated state agencies, pursuant to the rule defining the SRT and Section 376.07(2)(e), Florida Statutes, act independently of the federal authorities, although they are expected to cooperate with the federal authorities in the efforts at cleanup. What that meant here is that notwithstanding the concerns which Captain Woods had and the state participation in the RRT through Petitioner, DER and DCA, there was a parallel function by the SRT which had its own mandate. This allowed the SRT to pursue an independent agenda in the spirit of cooperation with the OSC in an attempt to protect the resources over which the state has jurisdiction, including the beach front and birds. Both Captain Woods and the consultant to the spiller, James L. O'Brien, who is a man of considerable credentials in giving advice about oil spill problems, expressed their understanding of the interests which the state might have in carrying out its functions and did not find that reality a hindrance in performing their duties. As a result, even though state employees and equipment and consultants to the state had limited utility for the OSC and the consultant to the spiller in carrying out their duties, it does not follow that claims by the state for reimbursement in categories set out in the statement of issues must fail unless found to support the OSC or spiller's choice in attempts at cleanup. The question is whether the costs, expenses and damages are reasonably related to support for the RRT or complementary of that function through the SRT and owed or expended from the Florida Coastal Protection Trust Fund (Fund) for recoverable items. See Section 376.11, Florida Statutes. Petitioner's exhibit 15 is a copy of the state contingency plan. See Section 376.07(2)(e), Florida Statutes. It identifies the membership of Petitioner, DER and DCA. Other claimants for costs, expenses, and damages who were involved in the response to this incident as predesignated agencies are the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission (Commission), the State of Florida, Department of Transportation (DOT), and the Attorney General. The state contingency plan explains the operational responsibilities of state agencies when responding to the incident. This is a more specific reference to those responsibilities as envisioned by the general guidelines announced in the "Pollution Spill Prevention and Control Act." Having considered the testimony and exhibits in the context of the state support and complementary role in responding to the spill contemplated by the aforementioned laws, regulations and contingency plans, the costs, expenses and damages sought by the Petitioner are reasonably related to those purposes. Those costs, expenses and damages are detailed in Petitioner's exhibit 16 and summarized in Petitioner's exhibits 8 and 9. With the exception of $15,654.37 in costs and expenses for Petitioner's Executive Office and Division of Law Enforcement and $3,336.16 for salaries for the Commission, DOT and DCA, all claims for expenses and costs have been paid from the Fund. Petitioner wishes to impose the costs, expenses and damages in the state response whether or not claims were disbursed from the Fund. The damage claim associated with future beach re-nourishment by replacement of sand that had been befouled by oil and needed to be removed is a reasonable claim in the amount of $10,222.50. It has been paid from the Fund and is held in the Erosion Control Trust Fund until needed. The on-scene consulting fee of $3,525.00 and the oil spill assessment study fee of $9,880.00 commissioned by Petitioner through Jacksonville University are reasonably related to the Department's role in response to the spill. As Petitioner's exhibit 8 depicts, $30,312.53 has been disbursed from the Fund in costs, expenses and damages reasonably related to the response to the spill. There remains unpaid from the Fund the aforementioned costs and expenses in the amount of $18,990.53 which are reasonably related to the response to the spill. Those latter amounts, although presented for payment from the Fund by the agencies in question, were not paid, based upon some fiscal anomaly. By inference, it does not appear from this record that the Fund owes the agencies for these claims. According to Section 376.13, Florida Statutes, on February 27, 1987, Governor Martinez declared a state of emergency in response to the oil spill. That proclamation was withdrawn on March 25, 1987. The activities for which claims for costs and expenses are advanced transpired in the time frame of the state of emergency declaration. The amount which Respondent has expended in the cleanup effort is $700,000 plus or minus $200,000. None of this money has been paid to satisfy claims for costs, expenses and damages previously described. While it has been found that costs, expenses, and damages are reasonably related to the state's purposes in responding to the spill, not all items are recoverable. They are only recoverable if recognized for recovery by Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 16N-16, Florida Administrative Code, and owed or expended from the Fund. Petitioner's claims in its exhibit 8 in the amount of $12,901.30 and DOT claims for $675.19 in that exhibit qualify for recovery as well as the on-scene consulting fee of $3,525.00. Other claims do not qualify with the exception of a limited recovery for bird mortality. Reasons for this fact finding are set forth in the conclusions of law. Petitioner has disbursed $176,058.00 to the Commission for damages related to alleged bird mortality. This money was disbursed from the Fund. Petitioner now concedes that the amount should be reduced by half. This recognizes that the cost estimate for damages dealt with pairs of birds not single birds. Petitioner now asks for $88,075.00. Two hundred fourteen (214) birds are said to have died as a result of the spill, according to Petitioner. Petitioner seeks damages for each of these birds. The number proven to have been killed by the event and the theory upon which the damage claim is predicated leads to a result which diminishes the claim for reasons to be explained. As with other claims, Section 376.021.(4)(c), Florida Statutes, anticipates the payment of damages from the Fund. Section 376.11(1), Florida Statutes, is in aid of recovery of damages, as is Section 376.11(4)(d), Florida Statutes. However, these claims must be susceptible to proof that readily identifies and explains valuation methods of the birds and recognizes the predicate of establishing the actual number lost in this episode. For the most part, Petitioner has failed in the endeavor. Mark Damian Duda is a wildlife biologist with the Commission. He earned a bachelor of science degree from West Virginia University and received his master's degree in natural resource policy and planning from Yale University, both with honors. He was assigned the task of trying to arrive at an acceptable method for valuing birds that had been killed. His assessment is generally set forth in a report, a copy of which is Respondent's exhibit 3. Having considered a number of options, he reached the decision to employ what he describes as the replacement value method. Quoting from his report concerning this method, he has this to say: Replacement Value Method We believe the replacement value method is the most useful and logical method to determine the value of wildlife lost in the February 27 Jacksonville oil spill. A replacement cost approach can avoid many of the problems involved in attempting to estimate the use of value of biological resources. Under the replacement cost approach, the resource is valued at what it would cost to replace it. If the resource is replaced, the problems of identifying all its uses, the monetary value of these uses, and the users affected by the resource loss are eliminated, except for the period between the initial loss and the replacement. Four Florida institutions were asked to estimate the cost of obtaining specimens of the birds killed in the Jacksonville oil spill, or the price at which they would be willing to sell members of each species. Their estimates are shown in Table 4. One problem with most of these estimates is that they are not true replacements costs; but rather the cost of collecting already existing specimens from the wild and redistributing them to the Jacksonville Area. This does not represent true replacement, since true replacement requires a complete recovery of the species population. This can be most clearly assured by using only captive breeding programs for replacement. However, many of the species in this list probably cannot be bred in captivity. Therefore, true replacement of these species through captive breeding is probably impossible. It is absurd to value them at zero since they cannot be replaced. Therefore, this section presents some calculations on the assumption that they could be redistributed or replaced. Table 1 presents the replacement costs for the birds. The numbers were derived by multiplying the number of dead birds times the average replacement costs given in Table 4. Using this approach, the total replacement costs for the birds estimated to have been killed in the Jacksonville oil spill is $176,058.00. It should be noted that we use a deliberately conservative approach, using body counts only, and thereby underestimating the total mortality. There is an increasing amount of scientific literature indicating that actual body counts appear to significantly underestimate the total mortality resulting from a spill. For example, there have been a variety of experiments that show only 5 percent to 25 percent of the birds that die at sea, wash in or beach themselves on shore. The percent of loons found is probably even lower because of their low buoyancy and wide-ranging distribution. An alternative approach to estimating replacement costs is to estimate the cost of creating new habitat or enhancing existing habitat to support enough nesting pairs of each species to replenish the population. Again, to represent true replacement costs, this should be new or enhances habitat, not just the cost of acquiring already existing habitat. Tables 1 and 4 within Respondent's exhibit 3 are replicated here for convenience as Appendix 2 and Appendix 3, respectively. The numbers of birds shown in Duda's table are not numbers about which he has direct knowledge. They are numbers purportedly obtained from Tim O'Meara and Peter Southall, biologists who work for the Commission who got their information from the Central Region and Northeast Region, respectively. In particular, they allegedly received their information from rehabilitators working in the two regions. Neither biologist testified at hearing, and the exhibits do not satisfactorily establish what involvement the biologists had in a direct inventory of birds, if any, or the other sources of their information which was then given to Duda in preparing his report. The rehabilitators in the Central Region did not testify nor were any exhibits presented which spoke to records kept by those individuals that set out bird deaths in that area. The only person who presented any reliable information concerning bird mortality was Cindy Mosling, rehabilitator in the Northeast Region. Any records which she maintained were not produced at hearing. Nonetheless, she did remember some details concerning bird mortality, and from this testimony 56 common loons, 3 gannets, 1 black skimmer and 2 hooded mergansers are found to have died as a result of the oil spill. The replacement value method by Duda speaks to the fact that his method does not constitute a complete recovery of the species population. Instead, what is shown in Respondent's exhibit 3 is averaging of estimates from Table 4 on costs for collecting existing specimens from the wild and releasing them back to the Jacksonville area after a period as opposed to a captive breeding program. That explanation is not correct, either, because there is no intention to release birds to the wild after raising them or rehabilitating them in captivity in one of the Florida institutions mentioned in Table 4. Moreover, only one of those programs has been relied upon by Petitioner in arriving at a cost estimate. That program is Sea World. As a consequence, the cost analysis in Table 1 related to hooded mergansers is incorrect in that it reflects an average of $150 and not the $200 quoted by Sea world. Again, the prices reflect pairs and not single birds. Robin Friday is the curator from Sea World who supplied cost estimates for pairs in Table 4 to Respondent's exhibit 3. He arrived at his price estimates in a 15 to 20 minute telephone conversation with Duda. To the extent he had no actual experience with price lists reflecting cost of a specie, he assumed that theoretical permits would be issued to collect live birds or eggs in the wild and that he would keep them in a captive environment, hoping they would breed while in captivity. In the latter category, the costs to promote the outcome of breeding in captivity formed his estimate. It can be seen that this departs from Duda's method for valuation. Notwithstanding this fact, Duda relied upon the price quotation by Friday. The main species of birds which Friday has had experience with are waterfowl. Of the species which have been verified as lost in this incident, he had had experience with common loons and hooded mergansers. The hooded merganser is a waterfowl with which he has close experience in breeding, acquisition and disposition. The common loon is a shore bird. In his career he has worked to rehabilitate two or three of those birds. He has had no experience with gannets and black skimmers, which are shore birds. As Friday identified, waterfowl may be sold, shore birds may not. Sale of the shore birds is prohibited by law. His price quotes for the hooded mergansers are from actual experience in sales. His quotations on the other species are matters of conjecture in collecting, housing, feeding and establishing a breeding program for them based upon limited experience in rehabilitating common loons and no experience with gannets and the black skimmer. The price estimate on the hooded merganser of $100 per bird is accepted. The price estimates for common loons, gannets and black skimmers are not. They are too speculative. Jean Benchinol is a curator in Gulf Breeze, Florida, who works for Animal Park, Inc. She testified at hearing. She was presented as a witness who could corroborate the Friday opinion on bird valuation. Her cost estimates may be found as Petitioner's exhibit 14, quotes for single birds. She has had direct involvement with hooded mergansers. She has sold those birds and quoted the price at hearing as being $100. This coincides with the price per bird quoted by Friday. For other birds in her price estimates that cannot be bought and sold and that remain at issue here, that is, common loons, gannets and the black skimmer, she categorized them as capable of surviving in captivity or not. The black skimmers can live in captivity and the common loon and gannet cannot, according to the witness. She had had a common loon in captivity before and noted that it did not do well, being more receptive to northern climes. At hearing her opinion about birds that could not survive in the Florida environment was rejected. In this final analysis, that refers to the common loons and gannets. Likewise, having considered her explanation concerning her valuation for the black skimmer, that opinion is rejected. In rejecting this method, the cross examination at hearing concerning valuation for the royal tern was significant in that it pointed out the inexact and unreliable nature of the method. This method contemplated receiving a live bird in her facility and the costs for medication, housing, feeding and staff time for approximately 60 days. In summary, on the subject of bird mortality, there is no inherent prohibition against valuation; birds do have a value that can be measured in monetary terms. Here the effort to arrive at that understanding fails in the inventory of casualties and method of valuation, with a limited exception. It is also observed that the Respondent had paid the rehabilitators to house, feed and nurse birds back to health that were injured, a similar activity to the theoretical exercise envisioned by Duda, Friday and Benchinol.

Florida Laws (11) 120.57, 376.021, 376.041, 376.051, 376.07, 376.09, 376.11, 376.12, 376.13, 376.21, 90.803

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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF INSURANCE AGENTS AND AGENCY SERVICES vs IVETTE J. JIMENEZ, 12-003758PL (2012)

Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Nov. 16, 2012 Number: 12-003758PL Latest Update: Feb. 03, 2025

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