Findings Of Fact Respondent is the owner and developer of the Plaza Venetia Marina, located in Biscayne Bay in Dade County, Florida, immediately north of the Venetian Causeway. The marina is constructed on submerged lands leased from the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund. On May 4, 1976, DER issued Permit No. 13-30-0364-6E to Respondent. That permit authorized the construction of two concrete marina docks, one "T" shaped and 255 feet long, and the other "J" shaped and 500 feet long. The project site is north of the Venetian Causeway on the western edge of Biscayne Bay, Section 31, Township 53 North, Range 42 East, Dade County, Florida. On August 18, 1977, DER issued Permit No. 13-30-3984 to Respondent. That permit authorized the construction of a 700 foot long "J" shaped pier with 24 finger piers and associated mooring pilings, and the construction of a 280 foot long "T" shaped pier. This permit authorized construction to be undertaken directly north of the docks authorized by Permit No. 13-30-0364-6E described above. On August 18, 1977, Respondent applied to DER's West Palm Beach office for a permit to construct the center pier of the Plaza Venetia Marina. On October 27, 1977, DER issued Permit No. 13-30-0740-6E to Respondent. This permit, which is the only one of the three permits at issue herein, authorized construction of a boat tie-up and fueling facility for a public marina. This facility represented a final phase of a master plan which includes the two other marinas with tie-up accommodations authorized by Permit Nos. 13-30-0364-6E and 13-30-3984. The drawings which accompanied the permit application carried the designation "FUEL" on the large platform at the end of the center pier of the marina. The cover letter from Respondent's authorized agent explained that " . . . the fueling area has been made sufficiently large so as to isolate the fuel pumps." No specific mention was made in the application or supporting materials of any building to be constructed on the central pier, and none of the permit drawings initially filed with DER depict any such building. DER employees who processed the permit, however, knew at some time during the processing of the permit application that some sort of structure would likely be constructed on the platform at the end of the center pier, although the plans did not disclose such a building, and the agency made no inquiries about, nor requested any additional information from Respondent concerning the type of structure contemplated. At the time of the issuance of Permit No. 13-30-0740-6E Respondent did not know the exact nature, size, or height of any structure that it might wish to build on the central platform. At the time, Respondent had only a conceptual idea of a structure that might accommodate the uses it contemplated for the platform. The words "fueling station" appear on the platform at the end of the center pier in one of the drawings attached to Permit No. 13-30-0740-6E. That drawing was not initially filed with the original permit application, but was provided during the permitting process by Respondent prior to issuance of the permit. Permit No. 13-30-0740-6E was issued to Respondent on October 27, 1977, pursuant to the authority granted DER under Chapters 253 and 403, Florida Statutes. Nowhere in the permit is there any reference to Section 258.165, Florida Statutes. The permit, by its expressed terms, authorized the following: To construct a boat tie-up and fueling facilities [sic] for a public marina. The facility will extend approximately 390 feet into Biscayne Bay from the bulkhead line. The dock will provide tie-up spaces for 20 boats and six fuel slips, and will contain floating oil collars in case of oil or gasoline spillage. This facility represents the final phase of a master plan which includes two other marinas with tie-up facilities . . . On January 11, 1979, some approximately fourteen months after issuance of the permit for the center pier, Respondent sent a letter to DER's West Palm Beach office which read as follows: Enclosed please find a copy of a letter as sent to the Army Corps, re: the service facility you and I discussed for the already approved fuel dock (State No. 13-30-0740-6E) for the Plaza Venetia Marina. I also enclose copy of the plans. Please review as quickly as possible since we intend to start construction on the marina within 30 to 45 days. (Emphasis added.) Enclosed with the January 11, 1979, letter to DER was a copy of a January 11, 1979, letter to the Army Corps of Engineers which read as follows: Recently I reviewed with [a Corps representative] the placement of a small service accommodation facility on the already approved fuel dock for the Plaza Venetia Marina . . . I left a set of plans with [the Corps] at the Corps office in Miami Beach. The facility is in close keeping with the permitted use of the marina. It will occupy less than half the already approved area of the fueling facility. It will be constructed on an already permitted facility. Included are a small bait and tackle shop; convenience store; captains' office; observation area and required bathrooms. The discharge from the bathrooms will flow directly into the main County sewer disposal system and will utilize a sewer pump-out facility located on the fuel dock. * * * After carefully reviewing my existing permit, the limited nature of the facility described, and its sole purpose of servicing the already permitted marina, please advise me if any modifications are required. I look forward to hearing from you as quickly as possible on this matter since construction of the marina is projected to begin within the next 30 to 45 days. A copy of the floor plan of the proposed building was attached to the January 11, 1979, letter received by DER. This floor plan indicates areas to be included in the building for bait and tackle facilities, a food store, storage areas, restroom facilities, and a marina office. Also shown on the floor plan is a storage area for electric carts to be used in servicing vessels utilizing the marina facility. The record in this cause establishes that Respondent never intended its January 11, 1979, letter to DER to be a request for a permit modification or an application for a new permit. Instead, the letter was intended only as a request for DER review of and comments on the proposed structure to be built at the end of the central pier. DER representatives in its West Palm Beach office forwarded the letter to the Tallahassee office of DER. DER never responded either orally or in writing to Respondent's communication of January 11, 1979, enclosing the building plan. On June 19, 1979, DER had opened its file No. 13-9916 in its standard form dredge and fill permitting section in Tallahassee in response to a letter received from Respondent requesting the addition of some dolphin pilings along the bulkhead at the Plaza Venetia Marina. The request from Respondent was treated as standard form application because the scope of the entire marina project exceeded short-form criteria. After receiving this request from Respondent, DER sent a completeness summary to Respondent within 30 days of receipt of the application requesting that Respondent provide approval from the Department of Natural Resources for the use of sovereignty submerged lands. Through various correspondence, this application was expanded to include several additional modifications to the overall marina, including reconfiguration of the fuel dock, addition of finger piers, reconfiguration of the "T" docks, and addition of a 12-foot boardwalk. Finally, the application was modified so that it constituted an application to consolidate the three existing permits. On January 29, 1980, Respondent submitted the last item of information required by the completeness summary except for DNR approval for use of sovereignty submerged lands. The aforementioned letter of January 11, 1979, from Respondent, which included the building floor plan, was apparently placed in DER file No. 13-9916 relating to Respondent's requested permit modification. Although the floor plan is contained in this file, the record in this cause clearly establishes that neither Respondent nor DER treated either the January 11, 1979, letter or the enclosed plan as a request for modification of Permit No. 13-30-0740-6E. DER file No. 13-9916 sat dormant for almost three years awaiting DNR consent for the use of state-owned lands. By letter dated July 10, 1981, DER requested Respondent to indicate whether it wished to pursue the permit modification application further since it had been 1,085 days since DER had notified Respondent of the necessity to furnish notification from DNR concerning further use of state sovereignty submerged lands. By letter dated July 15, 1981, Respondent withdrew its permit modification application. On April 20, 1979, the City of Miami issued a valid building permit for the marina fueling station. Respondent notified DER in July, 1979, that it was beginning construction of the marina. Construction of the central pier began on July 16, 1979, and ended on June 11, 1980. Construction of the fueling platform began on February 28, 1981, with erection of the fueling station walls beginning sometime after April 1, 1981. Subsequent to the commencement of construction DER representatives inspected the building site on several occasions. Respondent was not made aware in advance of when these inspections would occur since they were scheduled at the sole discretion of DER. DER first learned of the actual construction of the marina fueling station after receipt of a citizen complaint on December 1, 1981. Upon inspection of the site by DER personnel on December 2, 1981, it was discovered that the building on the fuel dock was partially complete with finish work and the placement of some interior and exterior walls remaining to be accomplished. DER served a warning notice on Respondent on December 7, 1981, advising Respondent of an alleged violation of its existing permit. A second warning letter was sent to Respondent on January 26, 1982, followed by the issuance of the Notice of Violation by DER. DER incurred costs and expenses of $405.40 in investigating the alleged violation. The structures authorized by Permit Nos. 13-30-0364-6E, 13-30-3984, and 13-30-0740-6E ("the structures") have been constructed by Respondent. The structures are located within the Biscayne Bay Aquatic Preserve ("the Preserve") established by Section 258.165, Florida Statutes. Biscayne Bay at the site of the structures is a navigable water of the State of Florida. A building with a floor area of approximately 3,800 square feet and a roof area of 5,292 square feet has been constructed at a cost of approximately $500,000 on the platform at the end of the center pier of the marina. The net area of the platform contains about 9,640 square feet. It has been stipulated by the parties that construction of the building on the center pier will not result in significant adverse water quality or biological impacts which were not contemplated when the above-referenced permits were issued for the marina. The building as presently constructed has provisions for the following uses: a waiting area for water-borne transportation, a bait and tackle shop and marine supply store, an electric cart parking and recharging station, and an attendant's room with cash register and equipment for the fuel pumps. All of these uses are customarily associated with the operation of marina facilities. The building as constructed differs in several minor respects from the one shown on the plans submitted to DER in the January 11, 1979, letter from Respondent. What had been shown on those plans as outdoor seating has been enclosed, walls and proposed uses have been relocated within the building, and the entire building has been moved back on the fuel dock. It is concluded, however, that these changes are of such a minor nature as to not constitute a material departure from the plans furnished to DER in January of 1979. As-built plans for the building have never been provided by Respondent to DER. At the time of Respondent's application for the permit for the center pier, DER rules required that a permit applicant provide cross-sectional drawings of proposed structures to be built in conjunction with docking facilities such as those proposed by Respondent. Drawings attached to the permit application show two cross sections through the center pier, but neither of these cross sections depict a building to be constructed on the pier. Respondent did not submit cross-sectional drawings for the building at the time of its application, and none had been submitted to DER as of the date of final hearing in this cause. However, DER at no time requested such cross-sectional drawings, despite the fact that those agency representatives processing Respondent's permit application assumed from the outset that some structure would and could be built by Respondent on the platform attached to the central dock under the terms of the October 27, 1977, permit. The estimated cost for removal of the building at the end of the central pier is $150,000-$200,000.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation, dismissing the Notice of Violation. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 1983, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM E. WILLIAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul R. Ezatoff, Jr., Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Clifford A. Shulman, Esquire and Thomas K. Equels, Esquire Brickell Concours 1401 Brickell Avenue, PH-1 Miami, Florida 33131 Victoria Tschinkel, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lee Rohe, Esquire Assistant Department Attorney Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Elton Gissendanner, Director Department of Natural Resources Executive Suite 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32303 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= BEFORE THE STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, Petitioner, v. CASE NO. 82-1640 FLORIDA EAST COAST PROPERTIES, INC., Respondent. /
The Issue The issue to be determined by this Order is whether the Petition for Formal Proceedings filed with the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) on February 4, 2009, was timely 1/ and, if so, whether Petitioners have standing to challenge the DEP?s issuance of the Minor Modification to FDEP Operation Permit 171331-002-UO for IW-1 under 171331-003-UC (the Permit Modification).
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Conservation Alliance is a Florida not-for-profit corporation in good-standing, with its corporate offices currently located at 5608 Eagle Drive, Fort Pierce, Florida. The Conservation Alliance has approximately 200 members. Elaine Romano is a resident of St. Lucie County, Florida. The DEP is an agency of the State of Florida having jurisdiction for permitting UIC facilities and the waste-streams being discharged to such facilities, pursuant to chapter 403, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder. Pursuant to that authority, the DEP issued the Permit Modification that is the subject of this proceeding. FPUA provides utility service to the City of Fort Pierce, Florida. FPUA owns and operates a Class I industrial injection well (IW-1), discharges to which are the subject of the Permit Modification. Allied owns and operates a chlorine bleach manufacturing facility which produces a brine waste-stream that is proposed for disposal to IW-1. Issuance of the Permit Modification On December 19, 2008, the DEP issued a Notice of Permit, Permit Number 171331-002-UO (FPUA operation permit), which authorized the operation of IW-1 at the Gahn wastewater treatment plant. The Gahn wastewater treatment plant and IW-1 are owned and operated by the FPUA. The FPUA operation permit authorized the disposal of concentrate and water treatment by- product from FPUA?s reverse-osmosis water facility at a permitted rate of 2.8 million gallons per day. FPUA also owns and operates water production wells that serve the City of Fort Pierce potable water supply system. IW-1 was constructed within 500 feet of three of the FPUA production wells, which required FPUA to obtain a variance from setback requirements. On July 17, 2008, prior to the issuance of the FPUA operation permit, Allied submitted an application for a major modification of the FPUA operation permit. The application proposed the disposal to IW-1 of up to 21,600 gallons per day of a brine waste-stream that is a by-product of the production of chlorine bleach. The application cover letter provides that “[w]hile we have been notified that this project is only a Minor Permit Modification, we feel by submitting for a Major Permit Modification that the Department will have the ability to review the application and downgrade the application to a Minor Permit Modification, if needed.” On December 30, 2008, the DEP issued the Permit Modification as a minor modification of the FPUA operation permit. The Permit Modification allowed a maximum of 21,600 gallons of brine to be received at the FPUA facility and disposed of in IW-1. Notice of the Permit Modification On or about September 12, 2008, a paralegal for Ruden McClosky, Lucinda Sparkman, requested information from the DEP regarding the procedure for receiving notification of permit applications and DEP action thereon. Her request was subsequently refined to request notice regarding two permits, those being “injection Well Construction, application #171331- 003,” and the other being “Water-Industrial Wastewater, application #FLA017460-004.” DEP File No. 171331-003 is that pertaining to the Permit Modification. At the time of the request, Ruden McClosky represented Odyssey Manufacturing Company (Odyssey), an economic competitor of Allied.3/ On September 24, 2008, Ms. Sparkman asked to be “put on the distribution list for the URIC permit for Fort Pierce.” From September 24, 2008 through December 15, 2008, Ms. Sparkman made periodic requests for information, and received periodic updates from the DEP. On December 19, 2008, the DEP sent Ms. Sparkman an e- mail indicating that the FPUA operation permit had been issued, and later that same day sent Ms. Sparkman an electronic copy of the permit. On December 19, 2008, Ruden McClosky made a public records request to FPUA for, among other items, records pertaining to the disposal of brine to the Gahn Water Plant underground injection well, and any agreements between FPUA and Allied regarding the disposal of brine. The request was made on behalf of Florida Tire Recycling, Inc. (Florida Tire). On December 22, the DEP sent Ms. Sparkman a copy of the notice of intent for the FPUA operation permit. There is no record evidence of further communication or inquiry between Ruden McClosky and the DEP from December 22, 2008 to January 14, 2009. On January 9, 2009, notice of the Permit Modification was published in the Fort Pierce Tribune. The notice was prepared and publication arranged by counsel for Allied. The published notice provides the information required by rule 62-110.106(7)(d), and stated that any challenge to the Permit Modification was required to be received by DEP within 14 days of publication or, for persons that requested actual notice, within 14 days of receipt of such actual notice. On January 14, 2009, Ms. Sparkman called her contact person at the DEP to inquire about the Permit Modification. That call was not returned. On January 21, 2009, Ms. Sparkman again called the DEP to inquire about the Permit Modification. In response to Ms. Sparkman?s inquiry, the DEP sent Ms. Sparkman an electronic copy of the Permit Modification. Ms. Sparkman made further inquiry on January 21, 2009, as to whether the notice of the Permit Modification had been published in a newspaper. On January 22, 2009, the DEP replied that “[e]verything was noticed as required.” On January 22, 2009, the Fort Pierce Tribune prepared an affidavit of publication of the notice. The affidavit of publication was received by counsel for Allied on January 28, 2009, who sent the affidavit to the DEP by certified mail on January 29, 2009. Alleged Defects in the Notice of Permit Modification Petitioners have alleged a number of procedural defects that they contend render the published notice ineffective to establish a deadline of 14 days from the date of the notice to file a challenge to the Permit Modification. Late Proof of Publication Petitioners allege that Allied filed the proof of publication with the DEP more than seven days from the date of publication, and that delay made such publication ineffective to establish a deadline for filing the petition. Although the proof of publication was provided to the DEP on or shortly after January 29, 2009, the evidence demonstrates that Allied provided the proof of publication to the DEP immediately upon receipt from the Fort Pierce Tribune newspaper. The delay in filing was not within the control of Allied, or anyone else associated with the Permit Modification. As established by rule 62-110.106(9), proof of publication is required by the DEP to provide assurance to the DEP that required notice has, in fact, been published, with the sanction being the delay or denial of the permit. The rule does not suggest that a delay in providing proof of publication to the DEP serves to alter or extend the time for filing a petition. There is little case law construing the effect of a delay in providing proof of publication on the petition rights of a person challenging the proposed agency action. However, the undersigned agrees with, and adopts, the following analysis of the issue provided by Administrative Law Judge P. Michael Ruff: . . . the purpose of requiring an applicant to publish notice of agency action is to give substantially affected persons an opportunity to participate in an administrative proceeding. See Section 403.815, Florida Statutes, and Rule 17- 103.150(4), Florida Administrative Code. Consequently, the crucial element in the Department's publication requirement is that the notice be published to trigger the commencement of the time for affected persons to request a hearing. The requirement that proof of publication be provided to the Department does nothing to affect the rights of third parties, but merely is a technical requirement which allows the Department to determine whether a third party has timely exercised its rights to contest a published notice of intended agency action. If an applicant publishes notice of intended agency action, but fails to timely provide the Department with proof of that publication, the deficiency is one which is easily cured. No harm will occur because the permit will not be issued until proof of publication is received by the Department, in any event, because of Rule 17-103.510(4), Florida Administrative Code. Bio-Tech Tracking Systems, Inc. v. Dep?t of Envtl. Reg., Case No. 90-7760, ¶32 (Fla. DOAH Apr. 3, 1991; Fla. DER May 17, 1991). The filing of the notice beyond the seven-day period in rule 62-110.106(5) was, at most, harmless error, did not adversely affect any rights or remedies available to Petitioners, and does not affect the fairness of this proceeding. Notice Prepared by Counsel Petitioners allege that the notice was prepared by Allied?s counsel, rather than the DEP, and that the notice was therefore ineffective to establish a deadline for filing the petition. Publication of the notice of the Permit Modification was not required, since it was a minor modification. Thus, publication was at Allied?s option. Rule 62-110.106(10)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that: Any applicant or person benefiting from the Department?s action may elect to publish notice of the Department?s intended or proposed action . . . in the manner provided by subsection (7) or (8) above. Upon presentation of proof of publication to the Department before final agency action, any person who has elected to publish such notice shall be entitled to the same benefits under this rule as a person who is required to publish notice. The most logical construction of rule 62-110.106 is that the DEP is responsible for preparing required notices pursuant to rule 62-110.106(7)(c), but that non-required notices may be prepared and published at the applicant?s or beneficiary?s option without direct DEP involvement. In this case, the notice was prepared by an authorized agent of the corporate “person” that benefitted from the Permit Modification. The more salient point regarding the preparation of the notice is whether it contained all of the information required by rule. The evidence demonstrates that it did, and that the notice was sufficient to provide a meaningful and complete point of entry to the public of the Permit Modification and the rights attendant thereto. The fact that the notice was prepared by Allied?s counsel was, at most, harmless error, did not adversely affect any rights or remedies available to Petitioners, and does not affect the fairness of this proceeding. Lack of Actual Notice Petitioners allege error in the notice process because actual notice of the Permit Modification was not provided to Petitioners. The basis for the alleged deficiency was that Mr. Stinnette had, in 2003, asked to be placed on the DEP?s UIC mailing list, but did not receive the notice of the Permit Modification. Rule 62-110.106(2) provides that published notice establishes the point of entry for the public to challenge proposed agency action “except for persons entitled to written notice personally or by mail under Section 120.60(3), Florida Statutes, or any other statute.” Section 120.60(3) provides that a notice of proposed agency action shall be mailed “to each person who has made a written request for notice of agency action.” The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Stinnette was acting solely as an agent of Indian Riverkeeper when he requested to be placed on the UIC mailing list. He was not requesting notices in his personal capacity, or as an agent of the Conservation Alliance or Ms. Romano. Thus, Indian Riverkeeper was entitled to notice of the Permit Modification. Indian Riverkeeper is not a party to this proceeding. The undersigned is not willing to attribute a request for actual notice to any person other than the person requesting such notice. The DEP?s failure to provide written notice of the Permit Modification to Indian Riverkeeper did not adversely affect any rights or remedies available to the Conservation Alliance or Ms. Romano, and does not affect the fairness of this proceeding. Lack of Information Pursuant to Rule 62-528.315(7) Finally, Petitioners argue that the published notice was ineffective because it did not include the name, address, and telephone number of a DEP contact person, citing rule 62- 528.315(7)(d). The provision cited by Petitioners involves DEP notices that are required when the DEP has prepared a draft permit, draft consent order, or has scheduled a public meeting as identified in rule 62-528.315(1). The notice requirement in rule 62-528.315(7) does not apply to a notice of proposed agency action, which is governed by rule 62-528.315(10), and which provides that: “[a]fter the conclusion of the public comment period described in Rule 62-528.321, F.A.C., and after the conclusion of a public meeting (if any) described in Rule 62- 528.325, F.A.C., the applicant shall publish public notice of the proposed agency action including the availability of an administrative hearing under Sections 120.569 and 120.57, F.S. This public notice shall follow the procedure described in subsection 62-110.106(7), F.A.C. (emphasis added). The published notice of the Permit Modification was consistent with the notice described in rule 62-110.106(7), and therefore complied with rule 62-528.315(10). For the reasons set forth herein, there were no defects in the published notice of proposed agency action that serve to minimize the effect of that published notice on the time for filing a petition challenging the Permit Modification, that adversely affect any rights or remedies available to the Conservation Alliance or Ms. Romano, or that affect the fairness of this proceeding. Representation of Petitioners by Ruden McClosky Petitioners were not represented by Ruden McClosky at the time Ruden McClosky requested actual notice of any DEP agency action regarding FPUA. Petitioners were not represented by Ruden McClosky at the time Ruden McClosky requested actual notice of any DEP agency action regarding Allied. The parties stipulated that an attorney-client relationship was formed between the Petitioners and Ruden McClosky on or after January 1, 2009. No further specificity was stipulated. On February 3, 2009, Ruden McClosky sent an engagement letter to the Conservation Alliance regarding governmental and administrative challenges to the Permit Modification. The engagement was accepted by Mr. Stinnette on behalf of the Conservation Alliance on February 4, 2009. The Petition for Formal Proceedings, which named the Conservation Alliance as a party, was filed with the DEP on February 4, 2009. On February 10, 2009, Ruden McClosky sent an engagement letter to Ms. Romano regarding governmental and administrative challenges to the Permit Modification. There is no evidence that the engagement was accepted by Ms. Romano. Ms. Romano testified that she has never spoken or corresponded with anyone from Ruden McClosky, and had no knowledge that she was being represented by Ruden McClosky. Ms. Romano had no input in drafting any of the petitions filed on her behalf, and had no recollection of having ever read the petitions. The Amended Petition for Formal Proceedings, which named Ms. Romano as a party, was filed with the DEP on February 12, 2009. Both of the Ruden McClosky engagement letters reference an “Other Client” that had an interest in challenging the Permit Modification, which “Other Client” would be responsible for paying all fees and costs, and would be involved in the approval of all work performed by Ruden McClosky. The parties stipulated that the “Other Client” was Odyssey. The date of an engagement letter is not dispositive as to the date on which an attorney-client relationship is established. It is, however, evidence that can be assessed with other evidence to draw a conclusion as to the date that the relationship commenced. The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that requests for notice made prior to January 21, 2009, regarding the FPUA operation permit and the Permit Modification that is the subject of this proceeding were made on behalf of Odyssey or Florida Tire, existing clients of Ruden McClosky. The preponderance of the evidence leads the undersigned to find that Ruden McCloskey commenced its representation of the Conservation Alliance with regard to the instant case no earlier than January 21, 2009, the date on which Ruden McClosky received notice that the Permit Modification had been issued. The preponderance of the evidence leads the undersigned to find that Ruden McCloskey commenced its representation of Ms. Romano with regard to the instant case after January 21, 2009, if at all. Filing of the Petitions The 14th day after publication of the notice of the Permit Modification fell on January 23, 2009. On February 4, 2009, the initial Petition for Formal Proceedings was filed challenging the DEP issuance of the Permit Modification. The Petition named the Conservation Alliance as a party. On February 12, 2009, an Amended Petition for Formal Proceedings was filed that, among other things, added Ms. Romano as a party. Allegations of Standing - Conservation Alliance The Conservation Alliance is a non-profit, Florida corporation incorporated in 1985. It has at least 100 members that reside in St. Lucie County. It was formed for the general purpose of protecting the “water, soil, air, native flora and fauna,” and thus the environment of St. Lucie County. In the Petition for Formal Proceedings, as it has been amended, the Conservation Alliance made specific allegations as to how the issuance of the Permit Modification may affect its substantial interests. Those allegations are related, first, to the effect of the Permit Modification on the FPUA public water supply that serves members of the Conservation Alliance and, second, to the effect of the Permit Modification on the ability of the members to recreate and enjoy the waters of St. Lucie County. FPUA Water Service In its Second Amended Petition for Formal Proceedings, the Conservation Alliance alleged that “[m]embers of the Alliance own real property or otherwise reside within the service area of FPUA, and are, in fact, serviced by FPUA.” As a result, the members “will be adversely affected by the injection of the Allied waste stream into IW-1, which is located within 500 feet of three potable water supply sources, from which . . . Romano and the Alliance?s members are provided with potable water,” resulting in “a potential for those contaminants and hazardous materials to get into Petitioners? source of potable water.” Mr. Brady, the Conservation Alliance?s president, does not receive water service from the FPUA. Mr. Brady did not know how many members of the Conservation Alliance received water service from the FPUA. Persons living in unincorporated areas of Fort Pierce do not receive potable water from the FPUA. A mailing address of “Fort Pierce” does not mean that the person lives in the incorporated City of Fort Pierce. Mr. Brady “assumed” many of the members lived in the City of Fort Pierce, but offered no admissible, non-hearsay evidence of any kind to support that assumption. Mr. Stinnette testified that he was “confident that we have members that receive water from [FPUA]” but was not able to quantify the number of said members. As with Mr. Brady, Mr. Stinnette offered no admissible, non-hearsay evidence of any kind to support his belief. Recreational and Environmental Interests In its Second Amended Petition for Formal Proceedings, the Conservation Alliance alleged that “. . . Romano and the Alliance?s members utilize and protect the waters of St. Lucie County. Petitioners? recreational and environmental interests will be adversely affected if the Allied waste stream leaves the injection well area and flows into the rivers, streams, and or ocean.” Mr. Brady understood that one member of the Conservation Alliance, George Jones, fished in the C-24 canal, although Mr. Brady had not personally fished there for 25 years. Mr. Brady otherwise provided no evidence of the extent to which members used or enjoyed the waters in or around St. Lucie County. Mr. Stinnette has recreated in various water bodies that are tributaries of the Indian River Lagoon system. He indicated that he had engaged in recreational activities in and on the waters of St. Lucie County with “dozens” of people over the past 16 years, some of whom were members of the Conservation Alliance. There was no evidence offered as to how many of those persons were members of the Conservation Alliance, as opposed to members of other organizations or of no organization at all, or whether they were current members during the period relevant to this proceeding. Mr. Stinnette testified that the previously mentioned Mr. Jones said that he kayaked in the waters of St. Lucie County but, as to the recreational activities of other members, testified that “I don't know, I don't keep up with their day-to-day activities to that extent.” Although Mr. Jones testified at the hearing, he provided no information as to the nature or extent of his recreational uses of the waters of St. Lucie County. The only evidence of Mr. Jones? use of the waters of St. Lucie County is hearsay. Thus, the only finding that can be made as to the recreational use of the waters of St. Lucie County by current members of the Conservation Alliance is limited to the recreational use by a single member, Mr. Stinnette. Petitioner, Elaine Romano Ms. Romano is a member of the Conservation Alliance. The allegations regarding Ms. Romano?s substantial interests in this proceeding were the same as those of the Conservation Alliance as set forth above. FPUA Water Service Ms. Romano has her primary residence at 3436 Roselawn Boulevard, Fort Pierce, Florida. Her residence is not served by FPUA. Ms. Romano is the executor of the estate of her mother, Marion Scherer. The estate owns a residence at 1903 Royal Palm Drive, Fort Pierce, Florida that is currently vacant. That residence is served by FPUA. The estate is not a party to this proceeding. Recreational and Environmental Interests Ms. Romano attends certain meetings and functions of the Conservation Alliance, but offered no testimony of her use or enjoyment of any natural resources that could be affected by the Permit Modification. In that regard, her interest in this case was precipitated by a desire to support her mother?s interest in ecology.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Environmental Protection, enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Formal Proceeding as amended. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of May, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 2013.
The Issue This proceeding concerns an Intent to Issue a dredge and fill permit given by the Department of Environmental Regulation ("DER") to Respondent, Edmund Burke ("Burke"), for construction of a retaining wall and wooden pile-supported bridge crossing a portion of the South Fork of the St. Lucie River in Martin County, Florida. The ultimate issues for determination are whether Petitioner has standing to challenge the proposed DER action, and if so, whether the proposed agency action complies with the requirements of Sections 403.91 through 403.938, Florida Statutes, and applicable rules.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Edmund Burke, on January 15, 1988, filed with the Department of Environmental Regulation ("DER") application number 431441608 for a permit to construct a permanent, pile supported, wooden bridge approximately 80 feet long and 10 feet wide connecting the mainland with an island in the South Fork of the St. Lucie River in Martin County, Florida. The bridge was to span a 50 foot canal or creek ("channel") in the River. One of two retaining walls was to be located on the mainland peninsula. The other retaining wall was to be located on the island (the "initial project"). Between January 15, 1988, and April 28, 1989, the initial project was modified by Respondent, Burke, to satisfy DER concerns over potential impacts, including secondary impacts, relevant to the application. The width of the bridge was reduced from 10 feet to 6 feet. The retaining wall initially planned at the point where the bridge intersects the island was eliminated. The retaining wall on the mainland side of the bridge was relocated above mean high water. Sixty feet of the proposed bridge runs from mean high water to mean high water. An additional 10 feet on each end of the bridge is located above mean high water. The project remained a permanent, pile supported, wooden bridge (the "modified project"). The Intent to Issue, dated April 28, 1989, indicated that the modifications required by DER had been made, that the modifications satisfied DER concerns relevant to the initial project, and that DER intended to issue a permit for construction of the modified project. The elimination of the retaining wall obviated any necessity for backfill on the island. The reduction in the width of the bridge virtually eliminated the secondary impacts on the surrounding habitat, resulted in less shading of the water, and precluded vehicular traffic over the bridge. The final modification that was "necessary in order for [DER] to approve this application" was the reduction in the width of the bridge from 10 feet to 6 feet. Petitioner's Exhibit 17. DER's requirement for this final modification was communicated to Mr. Cangianelli in a telephone conversation on April 6, 1989 (Petitioner's Exhibit 18), and memorialized in a letter to Respondent, Burke, on April 14, 1989 (Petitioner's Exhibit 17). The final modification was made, and the Intent to Issue was written on April 28, 1989. Petitioner's Case. Property commonly known as Harbor Estates is adjacent to the site of the modified project. A constructed harbor and contiguous park are located within the boundaries of Harbor Estates. Both are used by residents of Harbor Estates and both are proximate to the site of the modified project. The harbor entrance and site of the modified project are located on opposite sides of a peninsula approximately 40 feet wide and approximately 125 feet long. Boats operated by residents of Harbor Estates that can navigate under the modified project need only travel the length of the peninsula, a distance of approximately 125 feet through the channel, in order to reach the harbor entrance. Boats operated by residents of Harbor Estates that cannot navigate under the proposed bridge must travel around the island, a distance of approximately 1800 feet in the main body of the St. Lucie River, in order to reach the harbor entrance. However, Petitioner presented no evidence that prior to the construction of the bridge the channel was navigable by boats not capable of passing under the bridge after the bridge was completed. Petitioner, Harbor Estates Associates, Inc., submitted no evidence to show facts necessary to sustain the pleadings in the Petition concerning the inadequacy of modifications required by DER. Of Petitioner's 26 exhibits, Exhibits 1-19, 24 and 25 were relevant to the initial project but were not material to claims in the Petition concerning the inadequacy of the modifications required by DER. Petitioner's Exhibit 20 was cumulative of DER's Exhibit 6B. Petitioner's Exhibits 22 and 26, respectively, concern a 1980 bridge permit and a Proposed Comprehensive Growth Management Plan for Martin County, Florida. Petitioner offered no expert testimony in support of the pleadings in the Petition including assertions that: the modified project will have a direct adverse impact upon water quality and the welfare or property of others; the channel is navigable by deep-draft motor vessels; the modified project will result in shoaling that will have to be corrected at the expense of Harbor Estates; the modified project will result in prohibited destruction of mangroves; or that the modified project will cause any of the other specific adverse effects described in the Petition. The testimony of fact witnesses called by Petitioner was not material to Petitioner's claims that modifications required by DER were inadequate. The testimony of Bob Nicholas was relevant to allegations of prior violations but was not dispositive of any issue concerning the adequacy of modifications required by DER. The testimony of William Burr was admitted as rebuttal testimony relevant to precedents in the general area of the modified project but failed to address the adequacy of modifications required by DER. Petitioner consistently demonstrated a lack of knowledge of the applicable law, the proper scope of the formal hearing, and the distinction between argument and evidence. Petitioner repeatedly attempted to establish violations of laws not relevant to the proceeding including local laws and other environmental laws. Petitioner attempted to establish issues by arguing with witnesses during direct and cross examination, and by repeatedly making unsworn ore tenus representations of fact. There was a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact in this proceeding because Petitioner failed to show facts necessary to sustain the pleadings. Petitioner presented no evidence refuting Respondent, Burke's, showing that the modifications required by DER were adequate to assure water quality and the public health, safety, or welfare, or the property of others. Evidence presented by Petitioner was not material to the issue of whether the modifications required by DER were adequate for the purposes of the law applicable to this proceeding. Therefore, Petitioner participated in this proceeding for a frivolous purpose, primarily to cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly increase the cost of licensing or approval of the proposed activity. Respondents' Case. The island to be accessed by the modified project is approximately 2.5 acres in area and contains mostly wetland. The island is approximately 900 feet long. The portion of the island that is beyond DER permit jurisdiction is less than 200 feet long and less than 50 feet wide. The site of the modified project is located in Class III waters. Respondent, Burke, provided adequate assurances that portions of the modified project not extending over open water will be constructed upon property owned by him. The single retaining wall to be constructed at the southeastern terminus of the modified project will be constructed landward of DER jurisdiction. The modified project permits neither the installation of water or electrical conduits to the island nor any excavation, filling, or construction on the island. Respondent, Burke, must provide notification to DER before any such activity is begun. The bridge will accommodate no vehicular traffic larger or heavier than a golf cart. Golf cart access is necessary in order to accommodate a physical disability of Respondent, Burke. The modified project employs adequate methods to control turbidity, limit mangrove alteration on the island, and limit potential collisions with manatees. Vegetation, including mangroves, will not be removed. Incidental, selective trimming of vegetation will be allowed to create access to the island. The single retaining wall to be constructed on the mainland will be located landward of mangroves. Turbidity curtains will be used during construction to minimize short term water quality impacts. The modified project requires turbidity screens to be installed if there is any indication of sedimentation. No mechanical equipment will be located on the island during construction. No boats will be moored at the site of the modified project. The modified project will cause no significant downstream shoaling or silting. The site of the modified project is located approximately 15 feet from an existing fishing platform. No significant shoaling has been associated with that platform. The impacts associated with the modified project are similar to the impacts associated with single family docks in the area. No significant shoaling has been associated with such docks. The modified project is not a navigational hazard. The elevation is sufficient to accommodate small boats, canoes, and row boats. Reflective devices are required to alert night boat traffic of its presence. There is adequate clearance under the bridge to prevent obstruction. DER reviewed all applicable rules and criteria in considering the modified project. The modified project will have no adverse effect upon public health, safety or welfare, or the property of others. The modified project will not adversely impact the conservation of fish, wildlife, or their habitats. The modified project will not adversely affect navigation, the flow of water, or cause harmful erosion or shoaling. The modified project will not adversely impact fishing value or marine productivity in the area. The modified project will have no adverse impact upon recreational values in the vicinity. The modified project was reviewed in a manner that is customary for similar projects reviewed by DER. It is common practice for DER employees, as they did in this case, to rely upon opinions of other DER professionals in formulating an intent to issue. Other projects within DER jurisdiction in the general geographic area of the modified project and within the same region were considered in DER's review process. Other docks and marinas have been constructed and are proposed for construction within the South Fork of the St. Lucie River. Bridges including pedestrian bridges have been and are proposed to be constructed in Martin County. DER did not require a hydrographic study because the modified project was considered a minor project. DER review took into account the intended future use of the island property and DER's past experience with Respondent, Burke. As part of its review, DER reviewed a conceptual bridge to a single family residence on the island which would not require any fill or construction of retaining walls. In addition, DER considered previous violations on the island under Florida Administrative Code Rules 17-4.070, 17-4.160, and 17-4.530 in connection with an earlier permit that expired before the initial project was begun. Respondent, Burke, provided reasonable assurances that he is the owner of the site of the proposed project. Respondent, Burke, signed DER's property ownership affidavit and submitted a survey. DER's Intent to Issue does not authorize any construction in any area within the jurisdiction of DER other than the modified project. The Intent to Issue constitutes compliance with state water quality standards. DER has not received any requests for a jurisdictional determination in the general geographic area of the modified project. No enforcement action has been initiated by DER or at the request of a third party against Respondent, Burke, for alleged violations of DER rules.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a Final Order on the merits issuing the requested permit and awarding reasonable attorney's fees and costs in accordance with this Recommended Order. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 4th day of April, 1990. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April, 1990. APPENDIX Petitioner has submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Although most of Petitioner's proposed findings were cast in the form of "fact", they were in substance argument and rejected accordingly. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 Included in part in Finding 1 Findings as to ownership are rejected as beyond the jurisdiction of the undersigned. Finding as to the late filed exhibit is rejected as irrelevant. 2-4, 10-12, Rejected as either irrelevant 16, or not supported by the record. 5 and 6, 37, 40 Rejected as unsupported by 42 the record. 7, 8, 15 Rejected as irrelevant 17, 21-29 and immaterial 9, 13, 14, 18-20 Rejected as immaterial 30-33, 35 and 36 37(a), 38, 39, 41, 48 20(A) Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial except the last sentence is included in Finding 13 34 Included in Finding 12 Rejected as not supported by the record, hypothetical and immaterial. Rejected as not established by clear and convincing evidence. Respondent, Burke, has submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Respondent. Burke's, Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 15 and 16 Included in Finding 1 17, 26, 27 Included in Finding 2 18, 48 Included in Findings 15 and 16 19, 30, 31, 42 Included in Finding 13 20, 21, 44 Included in Findings 4 and 14 22, 23, 25, 32 Included in Finding 17 24 Included in Finding 16 25, 36-38 Included in Finding 17 Included in Finding 18 Included in Finding 3 Included in Finding 10 Included in Finding 19 35, 39, 43 Included in Finding 20 40, 41 Included in Finding 11 45-47 and 49 Included in Finding 16 51 and 52 Included in Findings 6-8 54 Included in Finding 5 and 8 50 and 53 Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial Respondent, DER, has submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 and 2 Included in Findings 1 and 2 3 Included in Finding 10 4 and 5 Included in Finding 16 6, 9 Included in Finding 2 7 and 8 Included in Findings 9 and 11 10 Included in Finding 13 11 Included in Finding 15 Included in Finding 17 and 14 Included in Finding 16 COPIES FURNISHED: Dale H. Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Patricia E. Comer Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Patricia V. Bartell Qualified Representative 615 S.W. St. Lucie Street Stuart, FL 34997 J. A. Jurgens Jones, Foster, Johnson & Stubbs, P.A. 505 South Flagler Drive West Palm Beach, FL 33402
The Issue Whether the finger pier portion of Respondent Raab's dock creates a navigational hazard. The resolution of that issue will determine whether the dock qualifies for an exemption from an environmental resource permit under Rule 40E-4.051(3)(b), Florida Administrative Code, and Section 403.813, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact DEP has the authority to regulate the construction of docks in jurisdictional wetlands and other waters of the State of Florida and on state submerged lands under Chapters 253, 373, and 403, Florida Statutes, and Chapters 62-330 (which adopts Chapter 40E-4) and 18-21, Florida Administrative Code. The Association is a residential community located in Sewall's Point, Martin County, Florida. All lots within the community abut navigable channels which provide ingress and egress to the ICW. These channels converge so that there is only one channel that connects to the ICW. Most of the residents of the community have large vessels that routinely navigate the channels within the community. At the time of the formal hearing, many of the vessels owned by residents of the community had drafts of four feet and at least two had drafts of five feet. In 1997, Mr. Raab purchased a residence in the Association that is located very close to where the channel meets the ICW. Because of that location, practically all residents of the Association have to pass in front of Mr. Raab's property when going into or returning from the ICW. The property at issue is located at 22 Simara Street, Sewalls Point, Martin County, Florida. The dock at issue in this proceeding is subject to DEP's regulatory authority. When Mr. Raab purchased this property in 1997, there was an existing marginal dock parallel to the bulk-head. Mr. Raab subsequently sought and received approval from DEP to demolish the existing marginal dock and replace it with a virtually identical structure. The existence and configuration of the marginal dock is not at issue in this proceeding. Mr. Raab thereafter sought to modify his approved marginal dock by adding a finger pier which extended into the channel 36 feet so he could dock his vessel perpendicular to the bulkhead. Mr. Raab's plan also called for the construction of two pilings 12 feet from the end of the finger pier. Mr. Raab had, as of the time of the formal hearing, re-constructed the marginal dock and had constructed the finger pier. 3/ The two additional pilings had not been constructed at the time of the formal hearing. After reviewing the modified project, DEP determined that the project was exempt from the need for an environmental resource permit under Rule 40E-4.051(3)(b), Florida Administrative Code, and Section 403.813, Florida Statutes. DEP also authorized Mr. Raab to use state-owned submerged lands if necessary. The Association thereafter timely challenged DEP's determination that the finger pier portion of the project (and the two additional pilings) did not require an environmental resource permit. There was a conflict in the evidence as to the functional width of the channel in front of Mr. Raab's property. 4/ Mr. Holly testified on behalf of the Association that the functional width of the channel was 83 feet. Mr. Lidberg, testifying on behalf of Mr. Raab, testified that the functional width was 101 feet. This conflict is resolved by finding that the functional width of the channel in front of the Raab property is 101 feet. 5/ The prevailing winds in the area in front of Mr. Raabb's dock blow into the dock. The depth of the water in the channels is influenced by tides. The principal reason Mr. Raab wants the finger pier is so that he can moor his boat with the bow to the prevailing winds in times of high winds. At the time of the formal hearing, Mr. Raab owned a vessel with an overall length of 44 feet. There was a conflict in the evidence as to whether Mr. Raab's finger pier and the two pilings that have been authorized, but not constructed, constitute a hazard to navigation. 6/ Based on the totality of the evidence, it is found that these structures do not create a navigational hazard. 7/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that DEP enter a final order dismissing the Association's challenge to the determination that Mr. Raab's project qualifies for an exemption from an environmental resource permit. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of March, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 2000.
The Issue The issue is whether to approve an Environmental Resource Permit (ERP) modification for the construction of a surface water management system, to be issued to Respondent, Miromar Lakes, LLC (Miromar), which will serve a 29.08-acre single- family residential development known as The Peninsula Phase IV (Phase IV) located in Lee County, Florida.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Miromar is a Florida limited liability corporation that owns property in the Miromar Lakes community in Lee County on which a development known as Phase IV will be constructed. Miromar is the applicant for the Phase IV permit. The District is a government entity with the power and duty to exercise regulatory jurisdiction over the proposed project pursuant to part IV, chapter 373, Florida Statutes, and title 40E, Florida Administrative Code. In implementing this power and duty, the District has adopted the Applicant's Handbook (AH) to provide standards and guidance to applicants. Alico is a Florida limited liability corporation with its principal place of business in Fort Myers, Florida. It is the owner of property immediately adjacent to and north of Miromar's property. Respondents have stipulated to the facts necessary to establish Alico's standing. The Conceptual Permit This case concerns Miromar's application to modify a conceptual permit issued by the District more than 15 years ago. On June 10, 1999, the District issued ERP Permit No. 36-03568-P, a conceptual approval permit for the development of a large, mixed-use residential development with a golf course, known as Miromar Lakes, that lies east of Interstate 75 (I-75), south of Alico Road, and north of Florida Gulf Coast University. The permit also approved a surface water management system designed to serve a 1481.1-acre mixed-use development within Miromar Lakes. Alico asserts that the permit is so vague in future development details that it is impossible to determine whether Phase IV is consistent with its terms and conditions. However, the 1999 permit was not contested, and any attempt in this proceeding to challenge that permit, or subsequent modifications to the permit that are now final, is untimely. A conceptual permit is available to applicants who wish to have their design concept approved for a master plan or future plan. So long as the future phases are consistent with the conceptual permit and there are no changes to applicable state water quality standards or special basin criteria, the applicant does not need to reapply under the current rules for subsequent phases. Instead, it allows an applicant to take advantage of the rules in effect at the time of the original permit issuance. A conceptual permit typically leaves construction details to future development decisions. As District witness Waterhouse explained, this is "the nature of a conceptual permit." Because the landowner does not know the precise manner in which the property will be developed years down the road, "it doesn't make sense to force the landowner to pretend that they do because it's a pretty good bet that those things are going to change to some extent in the future." By way of example, Waterhouse noted that "[a]s long as it's single family proposed then and it's proposed now, I would characterize that as sufficient detail." It is not surprising, then, that the 1999 permit contains very little detail regarding the existence, location, or development of roads, lots, a stormwater management system, or grading, and that the construction permit for Phase IV has far more detail than the conceptual permit. Even Alico's expert agreed that there is no requirement that a conceptual permit include the details of each subsequent construction phase. A fair inference to draw is that the District intended for the developer to have considerable latitude in developing the large tract of undeveloped land, phase by phase, over the life of the conceptual permit. The 1999 permit has been modified over 60 times since its issuance, and to date, significant portions of Miromar Lakes have been constructed. Except for the current, on-going feud between Miromar and Alico over several recent or pending applications (see Case Nos. 15-1050, 15-3937, and 15-5621), none of these modifications were contested. The Property at Issue Phase IV is a 29.08-acre subdivision within an area of the Miromar Lakes community known as the Peninsula. Located within Basin 6, Phase IV is the last phase of development approved by the conceptual permit for residential development in the Peninsula. All prior Peninsula phases have been permitted and developed, or are in the process of development. Prior phases were permitted based on their consistency with the conceptual permit, and none were challenged by third parties. The area under Miromar's requested permit in the instant case was conceptually authorized for single-family residential development. This is confirmed by language in the 1999 permit, which describes the conceptual proposal for Basin 6 as "includ[ing] 639.7 acres of residential, golf course, and mixed-used [sic] development." Jt. Ex. 3, p. 275. The permit also provides that each of the four sub-basins in Basin 6 should "have a water quality structure that provides treatment for the first one inch of stormwater runoff from the sub-basin . . . and that attenuation for Basin 6 is achieved onsite via the proposed sub-basin lakes and also by an existing 244.2-acre borrow lake." Id. While the 1999 permit establishes standards for flood control elevations, minimum lot elevations, and discharge rates, more specific development guidance is not provided. When the conceptual permit was issued, Basin 6 contained one former mining pit dredged from uplands to be used as a man-made lake for recreational purposes. A second mining pit, later converted to a lake, continued mining operations until 2006. The following year, the District authorized the two borrow lakes to be connected by a series of channels and canals, forming a privately-owned, 660-acre waterbody now known as Lake 5/6. Alico's property includes Lake 5, which makes up the northern portion of Lake 5/6, while Lake 6 to the south, owned by the Miromar Lakes Community Development District, is surrounded by Miromar's development. Alico has an easement over portions of Lake 6 for recreational uses under a Lake Use Agreement. Because the two connected lakes are to be used only for recreation and attenuation purposes, Lake 5/6 is designated as Class III waters and cannot be used for stormwater treatment. It is not classified as an Outstanding Florida Water (OFW) or an Impaired Florida Waterbody. Lake 5/6 discharges over a control weir into an un- channeled slough system known as the Stewart Cypress Slough. The water travels several miles through the slough system, passes several intervening properties that also discharge waters into the slough, and then runs underneath I-75. It eventually reaches the Estero River, an OFW and Impaired Florida Waterbody, which flows into the Estero Bay, an OFW. There is no direct discharge of waters from Lake 5/6 to the Estero River. The evidence shows that the project will not increase the overall discharge rate from the control weir for Lake 5/6. In February 2013, the District approved another Miromar application, known as Phase III, which authorized the third phase of development within the same peninsula where the Phase IV project will be located. That development contains two wet detention structures (Lakes 1 and 3) that will also service the Phase IV project. The Phase III permit was issued using the 1999 rules and regulations and was not contested. The Application The Original Application On November 25, 2014, the District issued its notice of intent to issue Miromar a permit authorizing the construction and operation of a stormwater system serving 29.08 acres of residential development that included multi-family residences, single-family residences, 49 boat slips, and road construction. Phase IV is a very small portion of the 1,481-acre development approved in the conceptual permit. The project is located on Via Salerno Way and Via Cassina Court within Basin 6. Construction was originally proposed in Sub-Basins 1 and 3. There is an approved Master Plan for stormwater management facilities within the project area. The site was previously cleared and filled and no wetlands are located on the site. The original construction in Sub-Basin 1 consisted of a roadway, 22 single-family residential lots, and stormwater conveyance facilities. Also included were shoreline contour shaping, placement of rip-rap on portions of the Lake 5/6 shoreline to enhance stability, enhanced littoral zones, and boat docks. Stormwater within that Sub-Basin flows via sheet flow and interconnected inlets to the existing wet detention area (Lake 1) located in Phase III north of the site. The wet detention area provides the required water quality treatment volume for the project prior to discharge to Lake 5/6. The original proposed construction in Sub-Basin 3 consisted of a roadway, 11 single-family residential lots, and 16 multi-family buildings with associated internal roadway, parking areas, and stormwater treatment, storage, and conveyance facilities. Also included within the original plans were shoreline contour shaping, placement of rip-rap on portions of Lake 5/6 shoreline to enhance stability, enhanced littoral zones, and boat docks. Stormwater runoff within Sub-Basin 3 flows via sheet flow and interconnected inlets to the existing wet detention area (Lake 3) located in Phase III north of the site. The original application included a request to increase the surface area of Lake 3 by approximately 0.1 acre and to construct three dry detention areas within the multi-family development area. The wet and dry detention areas provide the required water quality treatment for the project prior to discharge to Lake 5/6. The Revised Project After the case was referred to DOAH, by letter dated June 8, 2015, Miromar's project engineer provided the District with proposed changes to the site plan, to be used at the final hearing then scheduled to begin on June 24, 2015, which include the replacement of 16 multi-family buildings and driveways on Via Cassina Court with 23 single-family residential lots; removal of the 16 multi-family boat docks located at the southern end of Via Cassina Court; reducing the number of boat docks to 45 single-family docks; relocation of the three dry detention areas shown on the proposed site plan; and clarification of the lot grading cross-section to ensure that stormwater runoff from the development will be directed to the stormwater management system and not Lake 5/6. Updated plans, drawings, and specifications, and new water quality calculations accompanied the letter and were intended to replace original Exhibits 2.0 and 2.3 of the permit. See Jt. Ex. JA-1, pp. 244- 257. The changes resulted in a continuance of the final hearing and Alico's filing of an Amended Petition. By amendment at final hearing, Miromar removed the 45 single-family docks. The June 8 letter states that the changes will not increase pollution or reduce the efficiency of the stormwater management system. Miromar acknowledges that some of these changes were to resolve concerns raised by Alico. Miromar now seeks approval of the Phase IV permit, incorporating the changes proposed by the June 8 letter and those agreed to at the final hearing. Because there was no requirement to provide a site- specific nutrient loading analysis when the 1999 permit was issued -- this analysis was not yet formally developed -- the District did not require, and Miromar did not submit, such an analysis with its application. Under the conceptual permit, Miromar was required to provide treatment for one inch of stormwater runoff in Basin 6. Relying on this condition, Miromar applied that treatment to the Phase IV permit. This results in the treatment of 7.09 acre- feet of stormwater for the basin. After the construction shown in the permit, the stormwater management system will treat 9.21 acre-feet, or more than is required under the 1999 permit. The District established that new flood routing calculations for the project were not necessary because Miromar has set elevations for the water control structures in Lakes 1 and 3 at the same level as the road elevations, and the project connects to an existing surface water treatment system. This provides reasonable assurance that the project will not cause flooding despite having no calculations from the applicant. Alico's Objections Although couched in different terms, Alico's concerns can be generally summarized as follows. First, it contends the application should be treated as a major modification of the conceptual permit and that Miromar must satisfy current rules and regulations, and not those in effect in 1999. Second, it contends both the original and revised applications are inconsistent with the conceptual permit and must be treated as a new design, subject to all current rules and regulations. Third, even though Miromar agreed at hearing to revise its permit to address certain errors/deficiencies identified by Alico's experts, Alico contends no revisions can be made at this stage of the proceeding, and that a new application must be filed with the District and the review process started anew. Is the Application a Major or Minor Modification? If the modification is minor, Miromar is required only to satisfy applicable rules for issuance of a permit when the conceptual permit was issued. Rule 62-330.315 and AH section 6.2.1 provide guidance in resolving this issue. Rule 62-330.315(2)(g) defines a minor modification as one "that do[es] not substantially alter the permit authorization, increase permitted off-site discharge, increase the environmental impact of the project, decrease required retention, decrease required detention, decrease required flood control elevations, or decrease pollution removal efficiency." The rule also provides that the "factors that will be considered in determining whether a change is minor are described in section 6.2.1 of Volume I [of the Applicant's Handbook]." Section 6.2.1(d) lists a series of 14 factors to be considered in determining whether a modification will cause more than minor changes under rule 62-330.315(2). None of the factors is dispositive alone, and the presence of any single one of the factors does not necessarily mean that a modification is major. All 14 factors are considered together in determining whether a modification is major. Using the factors set forth in rule 62-330.315(2), in conjunction with section 6.2.1, the District reviewed the application to determine whether it was a minor modification. Based on these criteria, the District determined that the application qualified as a minor modification of a conceptual permit and that it satisfied applicable rules for issuance of a permit for this subsequent phase of the project. Alico contends that the initial review by a District staffer was only cursory and was in no way a meaningful assessment. Even if this is true, subsequent reviews by District staff, including witness Waterhouse, who supervises the ERP Bureau, was a signatory on the 1999 permit, and has reviewed thousands of ERP applications, confirmed that the application, as revised on June 8 and at final hearing, meets the criteria for a minor modification. The testimony of District witnesses Waterhouse and Waters has been accepted as being the most credible on this issue. In its review of the original application, the District considered the inclusion of boat docks as the only aspect of the application that made the project a major modification. In all other respects, the District determined that the modification would not cause more than minor changes. With the removal of the boat docks, the District concluded that the application did not substantially alter the design of the activities or the conditions of the conceptual approval permit. Alico's expert, who has never performed a similar consistency analysis on any project, testified that several of the 14 factors in section 6.2.1(d) might be affected. But he opined with certitude that factor 2 is implicated by the Phase IV permit. Factor 2 comes into play when there is an "[i]ncrease in proposed impervious and semi-impervious surfaces more than 10 percent or 0.5 acres, whichever is less, unless the activities were permitted with stormwater treatment and flood attenuation capability sufficient to meet the permitting requirements for the proposed modification." By citing only one factor, the expert implicitly conceded that the other 13 factors are not present, thus weighing towards a finding of consistency. Alico's expert focused only on the first part of factor 2 by calculating the impervious area of the project, as he did not believe the conceptual permit approved a master stormwater management system capable of sufficiently meeting the treatment and attenuation requirements for the Phase IV project. However, the more persuasive evidence is that the Master Plan in the 1999 permit is capable of meeting the treatment and attenuation requirements for the project. Therefore, factor 2 is not implicated by the Phase IV permit. Even if the factor were present, it would be insufficient to outweigh the other 13 factors and render the project a major modification of the 1999 permit. The preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that the District may consider as minor the revised application. Consistency with the Conceptual Permit A consistency analysis is conducted under two related rules. First, rule 62-330.315 identifies when a subsequent permit is either a major or minor modification of a prior conceptual permit. As found in the previous section of this Recommended Order, the modification is minor. Second, rule 62- 330.056 provides a rebuttable presumption that subsequent consistent development phases are likely to meet the applicable rules and regulations if the factors listed in subsections (7)(a) through (7)(d) are met. The primary factors for consistency comparison are identified in subsection (7)(a) as "the size, location and extent of the activities proposed, the type and nature of the activities, percent imperviousness, allowable discharge and points of discharge, location and extent of wetland and other surface water impacts, mitigation plans implemented or proposed, control elevations, extent of stormwater reuse, detention and retention volumes, and the extent of flood elevations." Subsections (7)(b) and (c) provide that in order to have consistency, there can be no changes to state water quality standards, in this case the standards for Lake 5/6, or special basin criteria. There is no evidence that applicable state water quality standards or special basin criteria have changed. Finally, subsection (7)(d) requires that there can be no substantive changes to the site characteristics. Except for the conceptual permit, there is no requirement that the District compare the Phase IV permit with any other permit. The District views the location and the land use type of the project as the two most important criteria for determining consistency. As required by the rule, the District also compares the environmental impacts of the modification to the conceptual permit, control elevations, and discharge rates. The District credibly determined there is no inconsistency. While some site characteristics in Basin 6 have obviously changed over the last 16 years, the District's review found no substantive changes that would affect whether the design concepts approved in the conceptual approval permit can continue to be reasonably expected to meet the conditions for authorizing construction of future phases. The District credibly determined that the activities in Phase IV, as revised, were similar to or less intensive than those authorized in the conceptual approval permit and may actually provide a net benefit to Lake 5/6. Alico contends that a meaningful consistency analysis was not conducted by the District staffer who reviewed the original application. But subsequent reviews by witnesses Waterhouse and Waters confirmed that Phase IV, as revised, is consistent with the conceptual permit based upon the rule and AH criteria. Besides the District's review, Miromar's expert testified that Phase IV is consistent in land use as a single- family residential development. He also testified that the Phase IV permit was consistent with the 1999 permit in size and location; it maintained the same allowable rate of stormwater discharge; and it maintained required flood control elevations. He further testified that the Phase IV permit did not change the mitigation plans, permitted stormwater reuse, flood routings, or storm stages provided by the 1999 permit. This testimony has been credited in resolving the issue. The preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that the Phase IV land uses are the same as contemplated in the conceptual permit and the already-approved prior phases of Miromar Lakes, and the new permit is consistent with the conceptual permit. Therefore, Miromar is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that it meets the applicable rules and standards in place when the 1999 permit was issued. Alico failed to rebut this presumption. Revisions and Amendments at the Final Hearing During the final hearing, Alico's experts identified several errors and/or deficiencies in the design of Miromar's project, described below, that should be addressed before a permit can be issued. Miromar agrees with some of these concerns and asks that they be addressed through revisions incorporated into its permit. The District also concurs with these changes. The record shows that they are appropriate, minor in nature, and do not change the character of the permit. There is no evidence that Alico is prejudiced by allowing these revisions. Alico's expert testified that the Phase IV permit does not provide sufficient information regarding the soils on the Phase IV site. At hearing, Miromar agreed that any unsuitable soils discovered during construction would be excavated and removed and correctly disposed of in a landfill or other uplands. This is the common method of dealing with soils in Lee County, where it is not unusual to find unsuitable soils during construction. A special condition to this effect should be included in the final permit to ensure clarity. Through a series of treatment ponds, Miromar proposes to treat nearly all stormwater that falls on-site prior to its discharge to off-site properties. Alico's expert testified that the lot grading detail drawings inaccurately reflect the elevations of certain portions of the lots and can result in runoff from some lots being routed to Lake 5/6, instead of Lakes 1 and 3. Miromar agrees with this concern and represented that the intent of the June 8 letter is that drainage for all lots, except for the portion of lots within the 20-foot Lake Maintenance Easement (LME), which surrounds the project on three sides, be directed to the front of the lots toward the street, and then to the treatment ponds. Water that falls naturally within the LME will be treated by attenuation in Lake 5/6 prior to off-site discharge. Miromar also agrees to submit new Tabular Lot Grading Revisions and a new Typical Lot Grading Detail and to update its June 8 plans to reflect proposed lot grading elevations consistent with the lot detail. Alico's expert acknowledged that roof gutters are an additional solution, and they should be installed on all roofs in order to direct runoff to the front yards and then to the stormwater system. Finally, to ensure proper lot drainage, Miromar agrees that the secondary drainage pipes to convey runoff from roofs, gutters, and grassed areas will have a minimum size of six inches. The District agrees that these changes will improve water quality and ensure that all stormwater is properly captured and directed into the stormwater system. A special condition requiring these revisions should be included in the final permit to ensure clarity. Alico's expert also testified that the plans should include a requirement that Miromar follow best management practices (BMPs) for the replacement of a control structure in Lake 3, which serves as a stormwater treatment pond. General Condition 3 already addresses this issue by requiring Miromar to use BMPs that prevent adverse impacts to the water resources and adjacent lands. In addition, the June 8 letter provides plans for BMPs for work at the site, including Lake 3. Although the District found that reasonable assurances were provided by General Condition 3 and the June 8 letter, to ensure clarity, a special condition should be included in the final permit that requires the use of BMPs for all construction, including the replacement of an old boat ramp and the control structure in Lake 3. Miromar and the District agree that this revision is appropriate. Alico's expert opined that control structures CS-1 (Lake 1) and WQS-1.3 (Lake 3), which have a circular bleeder orifice with a four-inch diameter, should be limited to a bleeder orifice of 3.7 inches in diameter. Although the District found reasonable assurances existed with four-inch bleeder orifices, Special Condition 3 should be modified to reflect a 3.7-inch bleeder for these control structures. This will ensure that before being discharged, the water leaving the two control structures receives the appropriate amount of water quality treatment. Both Miromar and the District agree that this revision is appropriate. With the removal of all docks and an old boat ramp, Special Conditions 2, 10, 11, and 13 through 17 require modification, or deletion if necessary, to eliminate obsolete language relating to the docks and ramp and to add language to provide that construction and operation of the docks shown on the plans, specifications, and drawings are not authorized. Miromar and the District agree to these revisions. Other Concerns Alico's expert contended that under current District rules, Miromar is required to provide stormwater treatment equal to the greater of (a) one inch multiplied by the total project acreage, and (b) 2.5 inches multiplied by the project's impervious area. However, Alico did not pursue this issue in its PRO, probably because its expert agrees that the current design of the project meets District rule criteria for one inch of water quality treatment. Alico's expert also contends that Miromar is required to provide an additional 50 percent of stormwater treatment above the one-inch requirement. This is contrary to the conceptual permit, which does not require additional stormwater treatment. Also, the requirement does not apply when there is no direct discharge of stormwater into an OFW. Even so, Miromar voluntarily agreed to increase the stormwater treatment capacity for Phase IV, which results in excess treatment in Basin 6 greater than 50 percent above the treatment required for the Phase IV area. Alico argues that the additional treatment is illusory, as it relies on additional treatment from an adjoining phase, and not Phase IV. Even if this is true, Alico's expert admits that the current one inch treatment meets the requirements of the rule for issuance of a permit. Alico's expert contended that the Phase IV permit allows the bulkhead to be developed on more than 40 percent of total shorelines, in contravention of AH section 5.4.2, Volume II, which restricts a bulkhead to no more than 40 percent of the lake perimeter. However, Miromar's expert established that the Phase IV hardened shorelines would comprise less than 40 percent of the total shoreline in the Phase IV area and therefore comply with this requirement. His testimony was not credibly refuted. Even though there is no direct discharge from the project into the Estero River or Estero Bay, and the project will not result in higher discharge rates from the overall system outfall from Lake 5/6, based on water samples taken in August 2015, Alico's expert opined that the project will cause a discharge of excess nutrients into an OFW. The evidence shows, however, that these water samples were taken after heavy rains when the expert observed water flowing upstream from the slough into Lake 5/6, rather than downstream. The expert also admitted he had done no testing, analysis, or modeling demonstrating that any pollutant would even reach the Estero River. He failed to take a baseline sample of water quality for any nutrients for which the slough, Estero River, or Estero Bay may be impaired, and he conceded that it was possible that there was no net discharge from Lake 5/6 into the slough during the time of his testing. There is insufficient evidence to sustain this allegation. Other alleged deficiencies or errors in the application, as revised, that are not addressed in this Recommended Order have been considered and found to be without merit. ERP and Public Interest Criteria The criteria the District uses when reviewing an ERP application are contained in the AH and rules 62-330.301 and 62-330.302. In addition, an applicant must provide reasonable assurance that a proposed project is not contrary to the public interest. § 373.414, Fla. Stat.; AH § 10.2.3. Alico failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Miromar has not provided reasonable assurance that the activities authorized by the ERP comply with all applicable ERP permitting criteria. Alico failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Miromar has not provided reasonable assurance that the proposed project is not contrary to the public interest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the South Florida Water Management District enter a final order approving Miromar's application, as revised, for a permit modification, subject to the following additional conditions: That the plans, drawings, and specifications submitted with the June 8 letter that appear in Joint Exhibit JA-1, pages 244-53, be used as Exhibit 2.0 of the permit. That the water quality calculations submitted with the June 8 letter that appear in Joint Exhibit JA-1, pages 254-57, be used as Exhibit 2.3 of the permit. That Special Conditions 2, 10, 11, and 13 through 17 be revised or eliminated to remove obsolete language relating to the removal of the boat docks and boat ramp. That Special Condition 10 be revised to require that all construction, including the removal of the boat ramp and replacement of Control Structure No. 3, be conducted using BMPs. That a new special condition be added to reflect that the construction and operation of docks will not be authorized by the permit. That a new special condition be added with new Tabular Lot Grading Revisions and a revised Typical Lot Grading Detail and address the following: the project shall be constructed to ensure that stormwater from the project, except stormwater from within the LME, is routed to the stormwater treatment system prior to discharge to Lake 5/6; the lot grading on all lots shall be in accordance with the revised lot grading to reflect the high point of the lots located adjacent to the LME to ensure that runoff from the lots is directed to Lakes 1 and 3; that the revised lot grading require the installation of six-inch secondary drainage pipes; and that roof gutters be installed on all roofs to ensure that runoff from the residential lots is directed to the stormwater treatment system. That a new special condition be added to address unsuitable soils encountered during construction and to ensure that they are removed and disposed of in an appropriate manner. That Special Condition 3, relating to discharge facilities, be revised to reflect that a 3.7-inch circular orifice will be installed in Sub-Basins 1 and 3, rather than a four-inch orifice shown in the existing plans. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of January, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Peter Antonacci, Executive Director South Florida Water Management District 3301 Gun Club Road West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-3007 (eServed) Kevin S. Hennessy, Esquire Lewis Longman & Walker, P.A. Suite 620 101 Riverfront Boulevard Bradenton, Florida 34205-8841 (eServed) Brian J. Accardo, General Counsel South Florida Water Management District 3301 Gun Club Road West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-3007 (eServed) Keith L. Williams, Esquire South Florida Water Management District 3301 Gun Club Road West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-3007 (eServed) Martin L. Steinberg, Esquire Hogan Lovells US, LLP Suite 2700 600 Brickell Avenue Miami, Florida 33131-3085 (eServed) Timothy J. Perry, Esquire Oertel, Fernandez, Bryant & Atkinson, P.A. Post Office Box 1110 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1110 (eServed)
The Issue The issue is whether appellant's application for a conditional use permit should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the entire record, the following findings of fact are determined: Appellant, Nostimo, Inc. (appellant, applicant or Nostimo), is the owner of Lots 8, 9, 10 and 11, Block 8, Revised Plat of Clearwater Beach Subdivision, located at 32 Bay Esplanade, Clearwater Beach, Florida. The property is subject to the land use requirements codified in the City of Clearwater Code of Ordinances (code or city code). By application filed on April 25, 1989 appellant sought the issuance of a conditional use permit from appellee, City of Clearwater (City or appellee). If approved, the permit would authorize the sale of beer and wine for off-premises consumption by a Pick Kwik Food Store to be constructed on the property under a lease agreement between appellant and Pick Kwik, Inc. Appellant's property is properly zoned for a retail establishment (CB or Beach Commerical), and it needs no further zoning permits from the City in order to convert the existing structures on the property to a convenience store. Indeed, appellant has already received approval for the construction and operation of the store. However, under subsection 137.024(b) of the city code, appellant is required to obtain a conditional use permit because it intends to engage in the sale of packaged beer and wine for off-premises consumption. In order to obtain such a permit the applicant must satisfy a number of criteria embodied in the code. The parties have stipulated that, with the exception of one standard, all other relevant criteria have been met. The disputed standard requires that "the use shall be compatible with the surrounding area and not impose an excessive burden or have a substantial negative impact on surrounding or adjacent uses or on community facilities or services." It is noted that appellant must secure the necessary land use permit from the City before it can obtain the alcoholic beverage license from the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. The application was considered by the Clearwater Planning and Zoning Board (Board) on June 13, 1989 and denied by a 5-0 vote with one member abstaining. As a basis for the denial, the Board adopted a staff report that concluded that "due to the beach area being saturated with this use (sale of alcoholic beverages), public nuisances requiring police action are taxing community services." It further concluded that the proliferation of this activity "has a substantial negative impact on surrounding or adjacent uses or on community facilities and services, specifically police services in handling nuisances related to alcoholic beverage establishments." Members of the public who testified in opposition to the application expressed concern over increased traffic in the area, the glare of lights from a 24 hours per day establishment, and potential problems arising from customers who will consume the beer and wine during the evening hours. In addition, two letters in opposition to the application were considered by the Board. Finally, besides a presentation by applicant's attorney, two witnesses appeared on behalf of the applicant and established that Pick Wick, Inc. provides security services at its stores, if needed, and training for employees to prevent the sale of alcoholic beverages to minors. The subject property is located on the western side of the intersection of Bay Esplanade and Mandalay Avenue in Clearwater Beach, an elongated strip of land to the west of the mainland portion of the City and separated from the mainland by Clearwater Harbor. Mandalay Avenue runs north and south through the heart of Clearwater Beach and is a principal traffic artery in that part of the community. The avenue narrows from four to two lanes just south of where the store is to be located. Bay Esplanade is a much shorter street and runs in an east-west direction between the Gulf of Mexico and Clearwater Harbor. In general terms, the property is surrounded by mixed uses and include a 7-11 convenience store immediately across the street to the east, motels and rental apartments, a restaurant, retail businesses and resort facilities, residences, public areas and a city fire station. Maps received in evidence more definitively depict the nature of the uses surrounding Nostimo's property. In addition to a number of commercial establishments within the immediate area, there are also tennis courts, a parking area, community boat ramp, soccer field, playground and public park. Finally, the area is replete with apartments, rental units and condominiums, including some directly behind the proposed establishment. Although there are presently no active businesses located on the subject property, the premises were once occupied by a hotel, apartments, hot dog shop and a small lounge that offered both on and off premises consumption of alcohol. The applicant contends that the proposed use is compatible with both the property's former use and the present surrounding area, particularly since a 7-11 convenience store directly across the street has been in business selling beer and wine for the last twenty-five years, and there are several restaurants or motels within a block that sell alcoholic beverages. The applicant added that, in all, there are approximately fifty-three active alcoholic beverage licenses within two miles of the proposed convenience store. At both the Board hearing and final hearing in this cause, the City Police Department offered testimony in opposition to the issuance of the requested permit. According to the uncontradicted testimony of Lt. Frank Palumbo, who is the Clearwater Beach police department district commander, additional noise, vandalism, traffic congestion and congregation of younger people are expected if the permit is issued. This opinion was based upon his law enforcement experience with other convenience stores on the Beach side that sell beer and wine, including another Pick Wick convenience store. Further, Mandalay Avenue is an important north-south traffic artery in Clearwater Beach, and there are no alternative streets for residents and visitors to use to avoid the traffic build-up that will occur around the store. Lieutenant Palumbo disputed the assertion that the lounge that once occupied a portion of the subject property generated substantial numbers of customers and associated traffic and that the new enterprise is actually a downgrade in use. He pointed out that the former lounge was very small, and a congregation of four or five customers at any one time was a "large crowd." In contrast, the police officer distinguished that situation from the proposed store where the sale of beer and wine around the clock is expected to generate larger volumes of traffic and customers, particularly during the evening hours. Finally, it has been Lt. Palumbo's experience that convenience stores that sell beer and wine attract the younger crowd, including minors, during the late hours of the night, and they create noise and sanitation problems for the adjacent property owners. The witness concluded that all of these factors collectively would have a negative impact on "community services" by placing a greater demand on police resources. This testimony was echoed by a city planner who gave deposition testimony in this cause. The nexus between the sale of alcoholic beverages and increased traffic and noise was corroborated by Daniel Baker, the manager of another Pick Wick store and a former employee of the 7-11 store across the street, who recalled that when beer sales stopped at that store at midnight, the noise and traffic also came to a halt. In this regard, it is noted the proposed store will operate twenty-four hours per day. To the above extent, then, the proposed use is incompatible with the requirements of section 137.011(d)(6). Two other witnesses testified at final hearing in opposition to the application. One, who is a member of a church that lies a block from the proposed store, pointed out without contradiction that a playground sits next to the church and is used by area young people, many of whom use bicycles as their means of transportation. She was concerned that if more traffic is generated by the store, it would make access to the playground more hazardous and discourage the children from using the facility. The second member of the public is concerned that the store will be incompatible with the surrounding area. This is because much of the neighboring area is made up of public areas, apartments, rental units or condominiums, and he contended an establishment selling alcoholic beverages would be inconsistent with those uses.
Findings Of Fact Application for consumptive use permit No. 75-00225 is a request for an existing use to be withdrawn from the Floridan Aquifer from two different wells. These two wells are located in the Hillsborough Basin and in Polk County. The property contiguous to the wells encompasses approximately 80.9 acres. The water is to be used for citrus processing and disposed of off site. The permit seeks, for average daily withdrawal, 2.98 million gallons per day for one well and 1.566 million gallons per day for the other well for a total average daily withdrawal of 3.864 million gallons per day. For maximum daily withdrawal the permit seeks 4.096 million gallons per day for one well and 2.792 million gallons per day for the other well for a total maximum daily withdrawal of 6.888 million gallons per day. The amount of water sought to be consumptively used by this application greatly exceeds the water crop of the subject lands owned by applicant. Mr. John C. Jennings and Mr. William Sunderland, owners of property adjacent to the Kraft property, appeared in their own behalf and stated that they felt that their wells were being hurt because of the large quantities of water pumped by Kraft. They did not attempt to offer expert testimony nor did they claim to be hydrologists. They did note that each had substantial problems with their wells running out of water.
Recommendation It does not appear that the district has had a reasonable opportunity to examine the objections and comments of Messers. Jennings and Sunderland with regard to the effect of the applied for consumptive use on their property. These objections were apparently raised for the first time at the hearing. As noted in paragraph 6, if the wells of Messers. Jennings and Sunderland are substantially affected in an adverse manner by applicant's use of such large quantities of water, such a use would not seem to be a reasonable, beneficial use as is required for permit unless further conditions were placed upon the permit. Therefore, it is recommended that the Southwest Florida Water Management District staff further investigate the effect of the applied for consumptive use on the wells located on the property of John C. Jennings and William Sunderland prior to the Board taking formal action on this application. ENTERED this 26th day of May, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHRIS H. BENTLEY, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Jay T. Ahern, Esquire Staff Attorney Southwest Florida Water Management District P. 0. Box 457 Brooksville, Florida 33512 Douglas T. Moring, Esquire Kraftco Corporation Kraftco Court Glenview, Illinois 60025
Findings Of Fact Parties Mr. Boynton has applied for a dredge and fill permit to construct a dock to allow him access to an island which he owns in Lake Iamonia in Leon County, Florida. Petitioners Wilkinson, Frye, Gary, Pennington, Dunlap and Buford 1/ are riparian landowners who use the waters of Lake Iamonia for recreation, fishing and duck hunting. The Respondent Department of Environmental Regulation is the state agency charged with the responsibility of enforcing the state statutes and rules regulating water quality and dredging and filling in the waters of the State of Florida. Nature of Project According to his application (as amended at the final hearing) Mr. Boynton requests a dredge and fill permit to construct a boat dock which will be 150 feet long and 10 feet wide. It will be strong enough to support a motor vehicle. Mr. Boynton owns a parcel of land on the west shore of Lake Iamonia just north of what is known as the North Meridian Road Bridge. He also owns Island #33, known locally as Live Oak Island, which is 300 feet east of the mainland. Between the mainland and the island is a neck of the lake which is a shallow slough. As proposed the dock will extend from the west side of the island toward Mr. Boynton's mainland parcel at approximately the narrowest portion of the slough. The dock will be constructed of creosoted pilings and planks. The pilings are to be sunk into the lake bottom by jetting to a depth of 10 to 12 feet. Mr. Boynton plans to construct a hunting cabin on his island. The purpose of the dock is to allow him to transport supplies to the cabin from the mainland by means of a small boat. In order to supply electric power to the planned cabin Mr. Boynton also applied for a permit to construct a subaqueous cable crossing between the mainland and the island. No objection to the cable crossing has been raised by Petitioners. In 1981 Mr. Boynton filed an application with both the Department of Environmental Regulation and the Department of Natural Resources for permits to construct a 300 foot long bridge from the mainland to his island in the same location as the proposed dock. The bridge application generated considerable opposition from adjacent landowners on the lake and as a result, Mr. Boynton stayed his application. In November 1981 he wrote a letter to the Department of Natural Resources which stated: November 2, 1981 Ted Forsgren Department of Natural Resources Tallahassee, Florida 32303 RE: Case #81-1910 Dear Ted: Please do not submit a report to the Cabinet for the bridge permit I had requested. I would prefer there be no position stated either pro or con about this project. Sincerely, /s/ Ben C Boynton Mr. Boynton later stated in a letter dated April 8, 1982 to Mr. William Williams at the Department of Natural Resources that: I have stopped the bridge application. This is not to be construed as a withdrawal of the application. I plan to resume the re- quest at a later date. I have earlier sent a letter to Mr. Ted Forestgren, permitting, DNR, stating the same. Should there be any other information requested, please let me know. Much of the opposition from Petitioners to the proposed dock application is founded in a fear that the dock is just a first step in later constructing a bridge. This fear is reasonable. The proposed dock is precisely half of the original proposed bridge. At the final hearing Mr. Boynton was unable to provide a reasonable explanation of why he needs such a large dock to service a simple hunting cabin. Water Quality and Wildlife Impact The impact of the proposed dock on water quality in Lake Iamonia is insignificant. Lake Iamonia is a Class III water of the State of Florida. The proposed placement of pilings in the lake bottom will cause some turbidity for a short duration. This turbidity can be adequately controlled by the use of turbidity curtains at the time of construction. Petitioners have raised no objection in their Petition for Formal Hearing to the dock on the basis of water quality and it did not became an issue at the final hearing. Some impact by the dock on wild ducks was alleged by Petitioners. Lake Iamonia is a wintering area for certain migratory waterfowl most notably, the ringneck duck. Most of the Petitioners are hunters who are concerned about preserving their recreational interest in killing the ringnecks. As with water quality, the impact of the dock on waterfowl will be de minimis. Ducks are wary of any new man-made structure and a dock of the size proposed here is certain to be noticed by them. They will initially be "blind shy" of the dock, but will readily adapt to its presence. Were there to be constant human activity on the dock, it would have a noticeable effect on the ducks' flight paths. The occasional off-loading of supplies for a hunting cabin will frighten few, if any ducks. There are other structures, such as the residences of other riparian owners, and docks along the lake shore which have not frightened the ducks away. The fearless ringnecks even tolerate being shot at, yet return to the lake annually. At the final hearing Petitioners recognized the de minimis impact of the proposed dock on wildlife and water quality. Their concern is that the dock is the first step toward constructing a bridge and that the permitting of such a bridge will unleash an avalanche of additional permit applications for the development of the numerous islands in Lake Iamonia. With respect to Lake Iamonia no evidence was presented at the final hearing of a significant number of dock permit applications or of any bridge applications before the Department of Environmental Regulation. If enough structures were permitted by the Department to begin serious consideration of cumulative impact on the lake, the precedent of having permitted the first few docks would not be binding upon the Department because the facts on which the first permits were based would be different from those facts before the Department on consideration of the later applications. Navigation The slough between the mainland and Live Oak island is navigable by only small craft such as johnboats and canoes. There is a "channel" which runs north-south through the slough at a depth of several feet. Even though the proposed dock projects halfway to the mainland it will not block the channel. DNR Consent The submerged land over which the proposed dock will be constructed belongs to the State of Florida. Mr. Boynton has requested permission from the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to use the land. Permission for the construction of a dock longer than 100 feet long was conditionally granted by DNR in a letter dated June 4, 1982 which said in part: We recognize that the lake is very shallow in the proposed dock location and the length was designed to avoid dredging. However, we can not recommend approval of a 200 foot long dock across this 300 foot wide area of the lake. We would have no objections to a 100 foot long dock. Additionally, should you ob- tain written statements of no objection from the adjacent landowners currently living on Lake Iamonia for a 150 foot long dock, we would then have no objections to a dock of that length. Our approval of a docking facility does not in any way indicate a favorable Position to- wards your previous bridge easement request which you have withdrawn. The use of state owned lands to construct a bridge would be in conflict with current rules and policies. Our intent in approving the docking facility is to allow you to have reasonable ingress and egress to your island. Consider this the authority sought under Section 253.77, Florida Statutes, to pursue this project upon our receipt of the revised drawings indicating a reduced length of 100 feet or the no objection statements for a re- vised length of 150 feet. This letter in no way waives the authority and/or jurisdiction of any governmental entity nor does this letter disclaim any title in- terest that the State may have in this project site. Sincerely, /s/ Henry Dean Interim Director Division of State Lands (Emphasis added)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a Final Order issuing a permit to Ben C. Boynton for the construction of a 150 foot by 10 foot dock and subaqueous cable crossing in Lake Iamonia as requested in his permit application, subject however, to obtaining a letter from the Department of Natural Resources indicating that Mr. Boynton has satisfied the terms outlined in the letter dated June 4, 1982 granting consent to use state owned submerged lands. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 15th day of December, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL P. DODSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 1982.
The Issue The issues in this case are: Whether Petitioner, Warren M. Briggs ("Briggs"), should be issued a Wetland Resource Permit (WRP) for the construction of a single-family dwelling on a lot with jurisdictional wetlands in Santa Rosa County, Florida, as proposed in his application submission of 1998; and Whether the Department would permit the construction of a single-family dwelling on the subject lot under conditions and circumstances other than those set forth in Briggs' application.
Findings Of Fact Briggs is the owner of Lot 67, Block H, Paradise Bay Subdivision, located in southern Santa Rosa County ("Briggs lot"). Paradise Bay Subdivision was developed in approximately 1980, prior to the passage in 1984 of the Warren Henderson Wetland Protection Act. (Official Recognition of Section 403.918, Florida Statutes). The subdivision consists of modestly priced single- family homes that are attractive to young families because of the quality of nearby schools. The typical non-waterfront home in the subdivision is single story, approximately 2,000 square feet in area, and built on a concrete slab. The typical setback from the road to the front edge of a home is 75 feet. This fairly consistent setback from the road prevents the view from one home into the adjacent property owner’s back yard and, thereby, adversely affecting the neighbor’s property value. The undeveloped Briggs lot was purchased in 1981 for approximately $15,000 and remains undeveloped. Briggs bought the lot, along with three other lots in the subdivision, as investment property. The other three lots have been sold. One of the lots sold earlier by Briggs was a waterfront lot on East Bay located in jurisdictional wetlands. The entire lot was filled pursuant to a permit issued by the Department. The Briggs lot is 90 feet wide by 200 feet deep. It is located on the south side of Paradise Bay Drive. The lots on the north side of Paradise Bay Drive are waterfront lots on East Bay. To the rear (south) of the Briggs lot and other lots on the south side of Paradise Bay Drive, is a large swamp that eventually discharges into East Bay. The major connection between the Briggs lot and East Bay is through a culvert under Paradise Bay Drive. The Briggs’ lot consists of 2,914 square feet of uplands and 15,086 square feet of state jurisdictional wetland, with all of the uplands located in the northern half of the lot. Converted to acres, the Briggs lot consists of 0.067 acres of uplands and 0.347 acres of state jurisdictional wetland. Lot 66, immediately east of the Briggs lot, has been cleared and is about half tietie swamp with the remainder consisting of uplands and disturbed wetlands. Some fill has been placed on the lot. Lot 68, immediately west of the Briggs lot, is undeveloped and consists of all tietie wetlands. Lots 69, 70 and 71 of Block H of the subdivision are undeveloped and consist primarily of wetlands. The Department issued a permit on October 31, 1996, that allowed the owners of Lot 71 to fill 0.22 acres (9,570 square feet) of wetlands. The fill is allowed to a lot depth of 145 feet on the west side, and to a width of 73 feet of the total lot width of 90 feet. The fill area is bordered on the east and west by wetland areas not to be filled. The Department issued a permit on November 13, 1997, that allowed the owner of Lot 61 to fill 0.26 acres (11,310 square feet) of wetlands. Fill is allowed over the entire northern 125 feet of the 185 foot-deep lot. On April 28, 1998, Briggs applied to the Department for a permit to fill Lot 67. The Department, in its letter of August 7, 1998, and its permit denial of September 2, 1998, erroneously described the project as consisting of 0.47 acres of fill. The entire lot consists of only 0.41 acres, of which 0.067 acres is uplands, leaving a maximum area of fill of 0.343 acres. If Briggs’ residential lot is to be used, some impact to the wetlands on the lot is unavoidable. Alternatives discussed by Briggs and the Department, three of which are still available for Briggs to accept, included the following: One hundred feet of fill with a bulkhead separating the fill from the wetland area, with no off-site mitigation; Fill pad could be placed on property with the remainder of the wetlands on the site to remain in their natural state with no backyard, with no off-site mitigation required; One hundred feet of fill with a bulkhead separating the fill material from the wetland, with a small back yard, with no off-site mitigation required. Briggs did not accept any of the foregoing alternatives or proposed acceptable mitigation measures.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying the permit application, provided that the parties may reach subsequent agreement regarding proper mitigation in order to make the construction of a single-family dwelling possible on the Petitioner’s property in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _ DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles T. Collette, Esquire Lucinda R. Roberts, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard The Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Jesse W. Rigby, Esquire Clark, Partington, Hart, Larry Bond and Stackhouse 125 West Romana Street, Suite 800 Post Office Box 13010 Pensacola, Florida 32591-3010 Kathy C. Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard The Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Teri L. Donaldson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard The Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
