The Issue The issues for determination are whether Petitioner, Paul F. Meloy (Meloy), is an employee of Petitioner, Alva Fire Protection and Rescue District (District), and is entitled to participate in the Florida Retirement System (FRS) pursuant to Section 121.051, Florida Statutes (2001). (All references to statutes are to Florida Statutes (2001) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Section 121.051 requires participation in the FRS by all employees hired after December 1, 1970. The District hired Meloy after 1970. Meloy has worked for the District as the fire chief and administrator since the District's inception in 1976. Meloy was instrumental in establishing the District. The other requirement imposed by Section 121.051 for participation in the FRS is that Meloy must be an employee. Section 121.021(11), in relevant part, defines an employee as any person receiving salary payments for work performed in a regularly established position. Respondent denies that the payments Meloy receives from the District are salary payments. Respondent asserts that the payments are reimbursement for expenses. Respondent denies that the payments to Meloy are compensation. Section 121.021(22) defines the term "compensation" to mean: . . . the monthly salary paid a member by his or her employer for work performed arising from that employment. The payments from the District to Meloy since October 1990 have been compensation. In October 1990, the District began paying Meloy a monthly salary "for work performed arising from his employment with the District." Before October 1990, the District reimbursed Meloy for expenses he incurred in housing fire trucks in the garage at Meloy's auto service business. The District also reimbursed Meloy for the maintenance and repair of District vehicles. In 1988, the District began reporting the payments made to Meloy as salary for purposes of the federal income tax. Each year from 1988 to the present, the District has reported the payments to Meloy on a W2 Wage and Tax Statement. Between 1988 and October 1990, the District stopped housing vehicles in Meloy's garage, and Meloy stopped servicing vehicles for the District. In October 1990, the amount of the monthly payment to Meloy increased substantially. Thereafter, the District provided annual cost of living increases to Meloy. The payments to Meloy from October 1990 to the present have been unrelated to expenses incurred by Meloy. Those payments have been regular monthly salary payments for work performed to implement the policy of the District and to administer the day-to-day operations of the District. Even if the payments are salary payments, Respondent argues that Meloy did not receive those payments for work performed in a regularly established position. Section 121.021(52)(b) defines a regularly established position as one that will be in existence for six months. Meloy's position has been in existence since 1976. It will be in existence for six months. Respondent asserts that the position occupied by Meloy is a temporary position defined in Section 121.021(53)(b). Section 121.021(53)(b) defines a temporary position as one that will exist for less than six months or as defined by rule, regardless of its duration. Respondent claims that the position occupied by Meloy is a temporary position because it is an "on call position" defined in Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S- 1.004(5)(d)5. The rule defines an on call position as one filled by employees who are called to work unexpectedly for brief periods and whose employment ceases when the purpose for being called is satisfied. (All references to rules are to rules promulgated in the Florida Administrative Code in effect on the date of this Recommended Order.) Meloy performs some of his duties unexpectedly when called anytime 24 hours a day. He performs his other duties in the normal course of business. Meloy does not maintain any time sheets, and the District does not require Meloy to perform his duties within an established work schedule. Meloy does not occupy an "on call position" within the meaning of Rule 60S-1.004(5)(d)5. Meloy's employment does not cease when the purpose of his being called is satisfied. Meloy has been performing his on-call duties and his other duties for approximately 25 years. In 1994, Mr. William D. Wilkinson became the Chairman of the District (Wilkinson). Wilkinson is also the Court Administrator for the Circuit Court in the Twentieth Judicial Circuit of Florida, in which the District is located. After Wilkinson became Chairman, he determined that Meloy receives compensation in a regularly established position and is entitled to membership in the FRS. Wilkinson testified at the hearing. Meloy has sole responsibility for implementing the District's policy and administering the day-to-day operation of the District. Relevant portions of Wilkinson's testimony are instructive. Q. And whose job is it to carry out that policy? A. Mr. Meloy. Q. When you came on board in 1994, Mr. Meloy, was he employed by the district? A. That's correct. Q. How many other administrators does the district employ? A. None. Q. Who runs the day-to-day affairs of the fire district? A. Mr. Meloy. Q. He is required to work a certain work schedule? A. No, sir. Q. What is he required to do as far as hours go? A. Once we set the policy, then we expect, you know, the chief to carry that out. And for however many hours it takes during the week, you know, the month to see it is fulfilled. Q. Do you know if he is on call? A. He is on call 24/7. Q. And what does that mean? A. 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Q. Is that 365 days a year? A. That's correct. * * * Q. Let me ask you to put your other hat on as the court administrator for the 20th Judicial Circuit. Are you involved with the Florida Retirement System? A. Yes, I am. Q. And you are a participant? A. Yes, I am. Q. Your duties as the court administrator, how would you compare that to Mr. Meloy's duties as the fire chief administrator of the Alva Fire District? A. Well, with the exception that I certainly make a lot more than he does for the duties that he has, it is similar. You know, I'm paid an annual salary and expected to get the job done. If you have to work 60 hours, you have to work 60 hours. If you get through sooner, hopefully you do. But that never happens. The District requires Meloy to spend as much time as is needed to implement the policy of the District and to administer the day-to-day business of the District. The hours vary, and there are no set hours. Some days, Meloy's day begins at 6:00 a.m. Other days, Meloy does not get to work until 9:00 a.m. or noon. Some days, Meloy leaves work at 5:00 p.m. and then must return immediately to the office. "It is whatever is needed." The District employs four individuals. One is Meloy. Two are certified firefighters. The other is a part- time bookkeeper. The bookkeeper and the two certified firefighters are members of the FRS. The two full-time firefighters maintain time sheets, and the District pays them for overtime. The District compensation of its full-time firefighters is consistent with compensation on an hourly basis. Meloy is not a certified firefighter, and the District does not compensate Meloy on an hourly basis. Meloy does not maintain or submit time sheets. The District does not pay Meloy for overtime. Like the certified firefighters, Meloy performs some of his duties when called anytime, 24 hours a day. However, neither the certified firefighters nor Meloy has the option to refuse to work when called. The employment positions of the certified firefighters and Meloy do not cease when the purpose for being called is satisfied. Although the bookkeeper for the District is never on call, she maintains a schedule similar to that of Meloy. She works those hours necessary to perform her duties. Like Meloy, the bookkeeper's position does not cease when she completes her work. The District pays compensation to Meloy in accordance with an annual salary rather than an hourly rate. Meloy does not have an established schedule during which he must implement the board's policy and administer the day-to- day operations of the District. Meloy occupies a regularly established position within the meaning of Section 121.021(52)(b). Meloy is the District administrator. The position has been in existence since 1988 and is not a temporary position within the meaning of Section 121.021(53)(b) or Rule 60S-1.004(5). Respondent's final argument is that a determination of Petitioners' request to enroll Meloy in the FRS is barred by the judicial doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel. Respondent argues that final agency action determined that the payments received by Meloy through June 29, 1992, are reimbursement for expenses. Respondent argues that nothing has changed since that time, and Meloy cannot now revisit the issue of his compensation. Findings regarding Respondent's final argument require some historical perspective. The District joined the FRS in 1988. At that time, the District purchased past service credit for a number of employees, including Meloy. Meloy enrolled as a member of the Special Risk Class. When Meloy enrolled as a member of the Special Risk Class, a question in the enrollment form asked Meloy if the applicant was certified as a firefighter or required to be certified as a firefighter. Meloy answered in the affirmative. Meloy has always been required to be certified as a firefighter in order to receive retirement benefits as a member of the Special Risk Class. However, Meloy has never been certified as a firefighter pursuant to Section 633.35. Meloy has never completed an essential firefighting course that is a statutory prerequisite to certification. By letter dated June 29, 1992, Respondent notified Meloy that Respondent was terminating Meloy's membership in the FRS. The letter stated two grounds for termination. One ground was that Meloy had not completed the firefighting course required for membership in the Special Risk Class. The second ground was that the payments Meloy received from his employer are reimbursement for expenses rather than compensation. Meloy did not appeal either ground stated by Respondent on June 29, 1992, for the termination of benefits. Meloy does not contest the first ground and is not now seeking enrollment in the FRS as a member of the Special Risk Class. Rather, Meloy now seeks benefits as a member in a regularly established position defined in Section 121.021(52)(b). Meloy does contest the second ground stated by Respondent on June 29, 1992, for terminating Meloy's membership in the FRS. Respondent determined that Meloy did not receive compensation from 1988 through June 29, 1992. The time for appealing that determination has expired, and Meloy cannot now amend the scope of this proceeding to include any payments he received on or before June 29, 1992. Respondent asserts that its determination on June 29, 1992, also establishes that payments received by Meloy after June 29, 1992, are not compensation. Respondent argues that Meloy's duties have not changed, and the payments Meloy receives are reimbursement for expenses. On June 1, 1999, Respondent sent a letter to Wilkinson explaining Respondent's denial of Meloy's application for enrollment in the FRS. In relevant part, the letter stated: By certified letter dated June 29, 1992 (copy enclosed), the State Retirement Director, Mr. A.J. McMullian III, advised Mr. Meloy that he was inelligible for Florida Retirement System (FRS) participation since the monthly payments he received were for "expenses" and not compensation. Subsequent to Mr. McMullian's letter, a hearing was conducted by the Division of Administrative Hearings and Mr. Meloy's payments were defined as expenses as a statement [sic] of fact (copy enclosed). In light of this, the Division has already made a determination that Mr. Meloy is ineligible for FRS participation from 1979 through 1992. Since your letter indicates that Mr. Meloy's duties and payments he has received have not changed since 1988, he remains ineligible for FRS participation. Respondent's Exhibit 10. The DOAH hearing referred to in the letter on June 1, 1999, involved allegations that Meloy had violated state ethics laws when he first attempted to enroll in the FRS in 1988. In 1992, the Florida Commission on Ethics (Commission) investigated Meloy's participation in the FRS. The Commission entered an order finding probable cause that Meloy violated Section 112.313(6) when he submitted his enrollment form for retirement benefits by corruptly using or attempting to use his official position to retain retirement benefits for himself and his assistant fire chief when neither was qualified to receive benefits. The findings concerning the assistant fire chief are neither relevant nor material to this proceeding. Meloy requested an administrative hearing, and the Commission referred the matter to DOAH to conduct the hearing. ALJ Susan B. Kirkland conducted the administrative hearing and entered a Recommended Order on July 8, 1994. The Recommended Order found that Meloy misrepresented his entitlement to membership in the Special Risk Class and did so with wrongful intent. The Order concluded that Meloy violated the relevant statute because Meloy attempted to use his position, or the property and resources entrusted to him, to secure a benefit. The Order recommended a civil penalty, public censure, and a reprimand. The Final Order of the Commission adopted the Recommended Order. The Recommended Order contains three paragraphs that discuss the payments received by Meloy. Those three paragraphs state: 3. In 1976, the . . . District was established. The firefighting equipment and vehicles were originally located in Meloy's garage, where he maintained an automotive repair shop. Meloy received a fixed reimbursement from the District each month for the use of his garage and for repair services which he rendered for the District. * * * 5. In 1988, the District joined the . . . (FRS). At that time the District employed four full-time firefighters and a part-time secretary. Meloy worked part-time as the administrator of the District but did not draw a salary and continued to receive remuneration in the form of the monthly reimbursement for expenses. . . . * * * 18. By letter dated June 29, 1992, [Respondent] notified Meloy that his membership in the FRS . . . was being terminated. The grounds for termination were that Meloy had been receiving payments for expenses and not compensation. . . . The Recommended Order does not operate under the judicial doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel to preclude a determination of whether the payments received by Meloy after 1988 are compensation. The Recommended Order limits the finding that Meloy received payments for expenses to those received in 1988. Paragraph 5 expressly states, "At that time. . . Meloy . . . continued to receive . . . reimbursement for expenses. . . ." The findings in paragraph 18 merely recite the grounds stated by Respondent but do not make findings on the merits of the stated grounds. The findings in paragraph 3 are not probative. The Recommended Order made no findings concerning the payments Meloy received after 1988. Respondent determined that the payments between 1988 and June 29, 1992, were payments for expenses rather than compensation. Irrespective of whether Respondent's determination was legally and factually correct, Meloy did not appeal Respondent's determination. The determination by Respondent on June 29, 1992, involved a separate and distinct application from the application at issue in this case. No determination has been made that the payments since June 29, 1992, either are or are not compensation. The application at issue in this case is a new application for different benefits. Meloy is not applying for benefits to which he would be entitled if he were a member of the Special Risk Class. Nor can Meloy apply for benefits related to the payments received on or before June 29, 1992. Respondent argues that nothing has changed in the course of Meloy's tenure with the District. Payments that were reimbursement for expenses before 1992 arguably have not now been transformed into compensation. Respondent is incorrect. Something has changed in the course of Meloy's tenure with the District. Sometime after September 1990, the payments to Meloy changed from reimbursement for expenses to monthly salary payments. The District no longer housed equipment at Meloy's garage, Meloy no longer serviced the equipment at the garage, and the amount of the monthly payments to Meloy increased from $540 to $833. Relevant portions of the transcript of the administrative hearing in the ethics case are instructive. Meloy asserted in the ethics case that in 1988, he was a volunteer fireman. As a volunteer, rather than a salaried employee, Meloy argued that he was not required to be certified as a firefighter. The attorney who represented the Commission sought to show that Meloy was not a volunteer after 1990 but was a salaried employee of the District. As long as I'm volunteering, I don't have to have it. Q. Okay. You are also the administrator for the full-time firemen, is that right? A. Yes. Q. You have the power to hire and fire them? A. Yes. Q. You set their hours? A. Yes. Q. The district also has a part-time secretary, is that right? A. Yes. Q. And currently that's Ms. Connie Bull? A. Correct. Q. She handles payroll matters? A. Yes. Q. She writes checks? A. Yes. Q. Pays bills? A. Yes. Q. She and you both answer questions that the full-time firemen might have about vacation or sick leave or retirement, is that right? A. To the best of our ability, yes. Q. Okay. Now, before 1990 you were not an employee of the fire district, is that right? A. According to how you define it, I guess. I was paid more as an expense type arrangement up until sometime around '90. I don't remember the exact date. Q. Okay, you received the expense reimbursement prior to 1990 for working on the fire equipment; is that right? A. It covered a lot of things. We worked on the fire equipment there in my business, we housed a lot of equipment there, used my facilities for -- well, we have used my facilities as a station for awhile. Q. When you say your facilities, you mean the Alva garage that you used to own? A. Right. Q. When you got the expense reimbursement, you would get the same amount every month, is that right? A. Yes. Q. It changed some over time, though, didn't it from '73 to 1990? A. Yes. Q. You got that same reimbursement amount regardless of the number of hours that you worked for the district? A. Yes. Q. And regardless of what any actual expenses might be? A. Correct. Q. Now, sometime in 1990 you became an employee of the district on a part-time basis; is that right? A. That's when they started taking out taxes and all and that reverted to more of a salary type reimbursement rather than expense. In other words, I was paying income tax and Social Security and everything and at that time it was considered more of a salary. Q. And they started doing that in 1990 sometime? A. I don't remember the date. It was approximately then. Q. When you started receiving a salary, you stopped getting the reimbursement; is that right? A. Right. Q. Isn't it true that when you first started getting the salary that the amount of the salary was several hundred dollars a month more than what the reimbursement had been? A. I couldn't tell you. Q. Isn't it a fact that the last-- A. I don't believe that would be right, though, because it didn't go up very much any one time, I don't think. I would have to see the figures to tell for sure. Q. All right. Isn't it a fact that the last time you received a monthly reimbursement you were receiving about $540 a month? A. I don't have those figures in front of me. Q. You don't remember? A. No. Q. Isn't it a fact that when you first got a salary in October 1990, you got $833 a month? A. I still couldn't tell you. I don't have those figures in front of me. I have them wrote down if I can get my papers. Q. All right. You don't know how much you get now? A. Yeah, but this ain't 1990. Respondent's Exhibit 3 at 29-32. The state argued in the ethics case that Meloy has been salaried since October 1990 and was required to be certified as a firefighter before enrolling in the FRS as a member of the Special Risk Class. The state now argues that Meloy has never been salaried and cannot enroll in the FRS as member of the regular class. The state cannot have it both ways. Meloy is entitled to membership in the FRS for the period after June 29, 1992. During that time, the District has paid a salary to Meloy that is compensation for duties performed in a regularly established position.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order granting Petitioners' request for Meloy to participate in the FRS. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of January, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _________ ________________ DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of January, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: J. Frank Porter, Esquire Porter & Jessell, P.A. 1424 Dean Street Ft. Myers, Florida 33901 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Division of Retirement P.O. Box 3900 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-3900 Erin B. Sjostrom, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Mallory Harrell, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this matter, Respondent, Paul Meloy, Sr. (Meloy), was Volunteer Fire Chief of the Fire Protection and Rescue District for Alva, Florida. As such, he was a "public officer" of an "agency" within the meaning of Sections 112.312(2) and 112.313(1), Florida Statutes. Meloy helped to establish a volunteer fire department in the rural community of Alva, Florida in 1973. Meloy was selected as the volunteer fire chief. In 1976, the Alva Fire Protection and Rescue Service District (District) was established. The firefighting equipment and vehicles were originally located in Meloy's garage, where he maintained an automotive repair shop. Meloy received a fixed reimbursement from the District each month for the use of his garage and for repair services which he rendered for the District. In approximately 1984, Meloy took a 40-hour volunteer firefighting course and became certified as a volunteer firefighter. Full-time firefighters were required to complete a 280-hour firefighting course to become certified as firefighters pursuant to Section 633.35, Florida Statutes. Meloy never took the 280-hour course and has never been a state certified fire fighter pursuant to Section 633.35, Florida Statutes. In 1988, the District joined the State of Florida Retirement System (FRS). At that time the District employed four full-time firefighters and a part-time secretary. Meloy worked part-time as the administrator for the District, but did not draw a salary but continued to receive remuneration in the form of the monthly reimbursement for expenses. The full-time firefighters were enrolled in the FRS in 1988 as special risk members, which would allow them to retire at an earlier age than regular members of the FRS and with greater benefits. In June, 1990, Meloy was interviewed by an investigator from the Florida Commission on Ethics (Commission) concerning an Ethics Complaint unrelated to the complaint filed in the instant case. Meloy told the investigator that he was not receiving a salary from the District, but that he was receiving reimbursement for expenses. Additionally, he told the investigator that he was not certified to be a full-time professional firefighter. In 1990, Connie Bull, was employed as a part-time secretary for the District. Until the District received a letter from the Commission explaining that part-time employees should be enrolled in the retirement system, neither Ms. Bull nor Meloy was aware that part-time employees filling established positions were to be enrolled in the retirement system from the date of their employment. Ms. Bull called the Division of Retirement (Division) which is the agency responsible for administering the FRS. She talked with Ira Gaines concerning the requirement for the enrollment of part-time employees. Ira Gaines is the retirement services representative with the Division who is responsible for determining eligibility for members in the special risk plan of the FRS. Neither Ms. Bull nor Mr. Gaines recalls any discussion they may have had concerning certification requirements for enrollment in the special risk class. Ms. Bull obtained enrollment forms from the Division. She and Meloy filled out and signed the enrollment forms. The form Ms. Bull used for her enrollment was for regular membership. The form used by Meloy was for enrollment in the special risk plan. On September 22, 1990, Meloy represented on his enrollment form that he was a firefighter certified, or required to be certified, by the Bureau of Fire and Training and that he was the supervisor or command officer of special risk members whose duties included on the scene fighting of fires. Additionally, Meloy in his capacity as fire chief certified that his position meets the criteria for special risk membership in accordance with Section 121.0515, Florida Statutes, and Florida Retirement System Rules, and he was certified or required to be certified in compliance with Section 943.14 or Section 633.35, Florida Statutes. When he was completing the enrollment form, he told Ms. Bull that he knew that he was not certified. Meloy testified in his defense that when he signed the application form that he knew that he was not a certified full-time firefighter and that he knew that special risk members were required to be certified. Meloy stated that by signing the application he was acknowledging that special risk members were required to be certified not that he was certified. Having judged the credibility of Meloy, I find that Meloy's testimony is not credible. Ms. Bull sent the executed enrollment forms to the Division on October 17, 1990, with a cover letter stating that she and Meloy had worked for the District for some time on a part-time basis, but were unaware that as part-time employees they should have previously have been enrolled in the retirement system. In either 1990 or 1991, after he had executed the enrollment form, Meloy began receiving a salary from the District instead of reimbursement for expenses. In January, 1991, the District purchased back retirement benefits for Meloy from August, 1985 through June, 1988 for $4,207.97. Sometime after the enrollment forms were submitted and Meloy had been enrolled in the FRS, Ira Gaines and Meloy discussed Meloy's certification. Meloy told Mr. Gaines that he had taken a course which certified him as a firefighter. Meloy did not tell Mr. Gaines that he was a firefighter certified pursuant to Section 633.35. Meloy sent Mr. Gaines a copy of a letter dated September 16, 1991, from the Department of Insurance which stated that Meloy had held a Certificate of Competency entitled Volunteer Basic since July 11, 1984. Meloy did not qualify for special risk membership in the FRS. In May, 1992, Meloy was interviewed by an investigator for the Commission concerning the allegations in the Ethics Compliant which had been filed against Meloy. Meloy told the investigator that he knew that the enrollment application which he signed required that the employee had to have taken the 280-hour course to be eligible for the special risk class. By letter dated June 29, 1992, the Division notified Meloy that his membership in the FRS and the Florida Retirement Special Risk Class was being terminated. The grounds for termination were that Meloy had been receiving payments for expenses and not compensation and that he was not certified in compliance with Section 633.35, Florida Statutes. Meloy did not appeal the Division's decision. If Meloy had been allowed to remain as a special risk member in the FRS, he would have been eligible to draw annually at least $2,024.92 in special risk benefits beginning as early as August, 1995. There was no evidence presented that established that Mr. Meloy had anything to do with Assistant Volunteer Fire Chief Brent Golden's application, membership, or retention of any benefits from the FRS and the parties so stipulated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order and Public Report be entered finding that Paul Meloy, Sr. violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, as it relates to the allegations concerning his retirement benefits but not as to the retirement benefits of the Assistant Fire Chief, imposing a civil penalty of $2,024.92, and issuing a public censure and reprimand. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of July, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of July, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-5984EC To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Advocate's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraph 2-4: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 5: Accepted. Paragraphs 6-7: Rejected as unnecessary detail. Paragraphs 8-12: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 13: The first, third, and fourth sentences are accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. In practice both Mr. Tiner and Meloy supervised the firefighters during on-the-scene fighting of fires. The last sentence is rejected as irrelevant to the extent that Meloy listed all the duties that he was actually performing for the fire department. Paragraph 14: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 15: Rejected as irrelevant. There was no evidence presented to show that Meloy knew that the Commissioners and not he should have executed the enrollment form on behalf of the employer. Paragraphs 16-17: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 18: Rejected to the extent that it implies that Meloy took no steps to seek help from the Division. He did direct Ms. Bull to call the Division which she did. Paragraph 19: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 21-22: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 23: Accepted in substance except as to the amount. 13. Paragraphs 24-25: Rejected as constituting argument. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1. Paragraph 1: Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Stuart F. Wilson-Patton Advocate For the Florida Commission on Ethics Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, PL-01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 John H. Shearer, Jr., P.A. Post Office Box 2196 Fort Myers, Florida 33902-2196 Bonnie Williams Executive Director Florida Commission On Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool, Esquire General Counsel Ethics Commission 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahasee, Florida 32317-5709
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times material to this proceeding, the Petitioner was employed by the City of North Port Fire Department, City of North Port, Florida as a paramedic and journeyman with certification as both a Firefighter and an Emergency Medical Technician from the state of Florida. The Division's Bureau of Fire Standards and Training is the state agency in the state of Florida responsible for the management and certification of firefighters in the state of Florida, and is charged under Section 633.382, Florida Statutes, with the responsibility of determining the eligibility of firefighters who are to receive supplemental compensation under the Firefighters Supplemental Compensation Program (Program). On July 25, 1991, Petitioner applied to Respondent for supplemental compensation at the bachelor's degree level of the Program. On August 6, 1991 and again on August 14, 1991 the Division advised the Petitioner by letter that his application for supplemental compensation under the Program had been denied because he did not possess either a bachelor's or an associate's degree that contained a major study concentration area which was readily identifiable and applicable as a fire-related degree. The record is unclear as to why the August 14, 1991 letter was mailed by the Division. On June 2, 1979, the Petitioner received a Bachelor of Arts degree from Cedarville College, Cedarville, Ohio (Cedarville) with a major study concentration area in psychology/behavioral science. During the period that Petitioner attended Cedarville, it did not offer courses in fire science. Petitioner attended Edison Community College (Edison), Fort Myers, Florida during 1980-1982 but did not receive an associate degree from Edison. Petitioner attended Manatee Community College, Bradenton, Florida beginning September 1988 and is currently enrolled at Manatee. Petitioner has not received an associate degree from Manatee. The transcripts from both Manatee and Edison show that Petitioner has taken some course work in fire-related subjects. However, these courses were not part of his study for the bachelor's degree and Petitioner has not earned an associate degree from either Manatee or Edison. Petitioner has had no other degree, bachelor or associate, conferred other than the bachelor's degree conferred by Cederville. Petitioner is not a fire officer. Petitioner's job does not require that he possess any supervisory skills, nor does it require him to engage in debriefing of fellow employees. He takes instruction from a fire officer. Petitioner has taken classes which would help further his chances of becoming a fire officer. These classes do not offer college credits, and Petitioner did not attend those classes as part of the course-work required to earn his Bachelor's degree. Rather, these classes constitute an in-service training program. Petitioner is not employed by his fire department as a psychologist or as a counselor. To the extent that his job requires him to utilize basic psychological principles, it is because he chooses to use those principles in that facet of his life, and not because his job requires an expertise in psychology. Likewise, Petitioner's testimony that his degree helps him in his verbal skills fails to tie that degree uniquely to his position as a paramedic. Petitioner's job description as a paramedic and his explanation of the mostly physical activities which accompany that job does not correlate with his degree. Petitioner's transcript for his bachelor's degree does not reveal a sufficient number of course hours which are readily identifiable and applicable as fire-related. Although the transcript does reveal the titles of the courses taken by Petitioner in earning his bachelor's degree, it is not accompanied by any catalogue from the university which explains the contents of any of the courses taken by him. Accordingly, none of the courses taken by the Petitioner are readily identifiable and applicable as fire-related. Petitioner's job description does not require that he render assistance to persons in crisis.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's application for supplemental compensation pursuant to the Firefighters Supplemental Compensation Program. RECOMMENDED this 9th day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-5982 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120- 59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in the case. Rulings on Proposed Finding of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner 1. Petitioner did not submit any proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent 1.-2. Adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 and 2, respectively. 3. Adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 3 and 4. 4.-5. Rejected as either being irrelevant to the issue involved herein or unnecessary for determination of the issue herein, but see Finding of Fact 9. Rejected as either being unnecessary to the issue herein or as a recitation of the testimony. Adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 6 and 7. 8.-10. Adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 10, 11 and 12, respectively. 11.-12. Adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 12 and 14, respectively. COPIES FURNISHED: Dean L. Scott 18178 Petoskey Circle Port Charlotte, FL 33948 Andrew Kenneth Levine, Esquire Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Tom Gallagher, State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil, Deputy General Counsel Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner's application for supplemental compensation pursuant to the Firefighters Supplemental Compensation Program should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is employed as a Captain with the Metro-Dade Fire Department. Petitioner earned a Bachelor of Arts Degree from the State University of New York at Buffalo, an accredited academic institution, on February 12, 1969. At the time that Petitioner attended that university, it did not offer courses in fire science. Petitioner applied to Respondent for supplemental compensation at the bachelor's degree level. His university transcript, which accompanied his application, indicates that Petitioner's major study concentration area was psychology. The Metro-Dade Fire Department requires its officers to attend an officers' training program. That program does not award college credits, and Petitioner did not attend that program as part of the course-work required to earn his bachelor's degree. Rather, it is an in-service training program. Although that program does include some instruction in some basic psychological principles, there is no indication that that program is different from in- service training programs for supervisors and managers in any occupation. Although Metropolitan Dade County does offer a tuition refund program for its employees, that program is unrelated to the State's Firefighters Supplemental Compensation Program and has different criteria. Further, Petitioner's bachelor's degree was not earned in conjunction with that program. Petitioner's job description as a captain does require that he possess supervisory skills. Those supervisory skills appear to be the same supervisory skills required in any occupation. His job description does not require that he have a degree or training in psychology. The only educational requirement for employment as a fire captain with the Metro-Dade Fire Department is graduation from a standard high school or possession of a Florida G.E.D. Petitioner's transcript for his bachelor's degree does not reveal a sufficient number of course hours which are readily identifiable and applicable as fire-related. Although it does reveal the titles of the courses taken by Petitioner in earning his bachelor's degree, it is not accompanied by any catalog from the university which explains the contents of any of the courses taken by him. Accordingly, none of the courses taken by Petitioner is readily identifiable and applicable as fire-related. Petitioner is not employed by the Metro-Dade Fire Department as a psychologist or counselor. To the extent that his job requires him to utilize basic psychological-managerial principles, it is because his job includes being a supervisor-manager and not because his job requires an expertise in psychology.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's application for supplemental compensation pursuant to the Firefighters Supplemental Compensation Program. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 23rd day of April, 1991. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of April, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's first, second, fourth through twelfth, fifteenth, and seventeenth unnumbered paragraphs have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument. Petitioner's third unnumbered paragraph has been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the credible evidence in this cause. Petitioner's thirteenth and sixteenth unnumbered paragraphs have been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues involved herein. Petitioner's fourteenth unnumbered paragraph has been adopted in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, and 10 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 3, 11, and 13 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel, conclusions of law, or recitation of the testimony Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 6 and 12 have been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues involved herein. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 7 and 8 have been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues herein. Copies furnished: Andrew K. Levine, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer Division of State Fire Marshall 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dean J. John 6890 Scott Street Hollywood, Florida 33024 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil, General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaint and the penalties, if any, that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was the owner of a licensed assisted living facility located at 7701 Southwest 20th Street, Miami, Florida (the subject premises). This facility was licensed for six residents. Jose Gutierrez-Marti and Maria Witt were the owners of the Respondent. The residents of the subject premises were mentally ill adults. On November 21, 1996, Arturo Bustamante, a fire protection specialist and a health facility evaluator employed by Petitioner, conducted an inspection of the subject premises. Mr. Bustamante went to the subject premises in response to a complaint and to conduct a follow-up inspection to the previous inspection. During the course of his inspection, Mr. Bustamante determined that there were eight residents living at the subject premises. This determination was initially made by counting beds and inspecting the prescription medication that was provided each resident. Mr. Bustamante confirmed that there were eight residents by interviewing the residents, and by observing that the eight residents were removed from the subject premises later that day by the Department of Children and Family Services, formerly known as the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. There was no running water in the subject premises on November 21, 1996. Consequently, there were no functioning bathroom facilities in the subject premises. Mr. Bustamante observed fresh feces and the smell of urine in an area of the backyard that the residents reported they used in lieu of a bathroom. Respondent had not notified Respondent that the water services had been terminated. There was no evidence that Respondent had taken any action to correct this serious deficiency. There was insufficient evidence to establish when the water service had been terminated or whether water service had been terminated previously. Mr. Bustamante observed roach droppings throughout the subject premises. Mr. Bustamante observed a box of powdered milk on a shelf inside the facility. When he opened the container to inspect the contents, five or six roaches jumped out of the box. Metro-Dade Police Officers Mary Ippolito and Mary Jo LaMont came to the subject premises at the request of Mr. Bustamante. These police officers were present when the residents were removed from the subject premises. Officer LaMont observed cockroaches in the kitchen area.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order that finds that on November 21, 1996, Respondent exceeded its resident capacity and failed to meet licensure standards. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Final Order impose an administrative fine against the Respondent in the amount of $1,000.00 for exceeding its resident and capacity. It is further RECOMMENDED that Respondent be fined $4,000 and its license revoked for failing to provide for the residents' basic sanitation needs. It is further RECOMMENDED that Respondent be permitted to reapply for licensure when it can establish that its facility meets all licensure standards. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2st day of December, 1997.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, who on November 17, 1999 (two days prior to the final hearing in this case) was certified by Respondent to be eligible to receive, effective June 1, 1999, firefighter supplemental compensation pursuant to Section 633.382, Florida Statutes, is entitled to any further relief from Respondent in this administrative proceeding (which was initiated by Petitioner after he had received Respondent's June 2, 1999, notice of its preliminary determination that Petitioner was not entitled to firefighter supplemental compensation).
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: In August 1994, Petitioner applied to Respondent for entry in the Firefighters Supplemental Compensation Program (1994 Application). The application materials that Respondent received were a completed and signed Firefighters Supplemental Compensation Program Transcript Request form; a copy of Petitioner's transcript from North Carolina Central University (reflecting that he had graduated on May 10, 1986, with a Bachelor of Science degree in biology), along with a cover letter to Respondent from the Office of the University Registrar; a job description; and a letter to Respondent from Petitioner, which read as follows: Enclosed [y]ou will find information regarding my educational earnings. I received a Bachelor of Science (Biology) in May, 1986 from North Carolina Central University in Durham. Additionally, I have earned 29 credits at Miami Dade Community College [a]nd I [a]m [a] Paramedic. Please [r]eview [t]his information and include me in the supplemental compensation program. I[']d [l]ike to thank you in advance for your time and consideration. The job description that was included in the application materials Respondent received was for the classification of Fire Fighter and read as follows: NATURE OF WORK: Skilled fire-fighting work in combating, extinguishing and preventing fires, and in the operation and maintenance of fire department equipment, apparatus and quarters. Work involves responsibility for protecting life and property by fire-fighting and rescue activities, usually under close supervision. Employees of this class are required to learn and participate in the operation of fire apparatus and equipment, and the performance of hazardous tasks under emergency conditions which may require strenuous exertion under such handicaps as smoke and cramped surroundings. Although fire-fighting and rescue activities are the primary responsibilities of this class, the major portion of time is spent in drilling and studying methods, techniques and organization, and in routine duties in the care and maintenance of fire department property and equipment. Employees of this class may be assigned to duty as communications officer, chief driver and aide, and fire prevention inspector, which involves the application of specialized abilities and knowledge developed through experience and training. Specific orders and directions are given by superior officers, but the work requires initiative and a thorough individual understanding of fire- fighting methods. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES OF WORK PERFORMED: (The examples of work as listed in this class specification are not necessarily descriptive of any one position in the class. The omission of specific statements does not preclude management from assigning specific duties not listed herein if such duties are a logical assignment to the position. Examples of work performed are not to be used for allocation purposes.) Attends training courses; participation in fire drills and attends classes in fire- fighting and first aid; reads and studies assigned materials related to fire-fighting and prevention. Responds to fire alarms with a company; operates pumps, aerial ladders and auxiliary equipment; lays and connects hose; holds nozzles and directs fog or water streams; raises and climbs ladders; uses chemical extinguishers, bars, hooks, lines and other equipment. Performs general maintenance work in the upkeep of fire department property; cleans and washes walls and floors; makes minor repairs to property and equipment; washes, hangs, and dries hoses; washes, cleans, polishes and tests apparatus. Performs limited fire prevention activities; inspects commercial and residential properties for the existence of fire hazards, and seeks removal of such hazards through education and persuasion. When assigned to the Rescue Division the Fire-Fighter should be able to accurately and efficiently evaluate and gather patient assessment information; interpret assessment finding; formulate a working diagnosis (i.e. possible M.I.); plan, prioritize and implement necessary treatment as per Rescue protocol and/or physician direction via the radio; evaluate treatment outcome and re- assess the patient's status; plan and implement additional treatment or modifications as indicated by re-assessment and follow-up evaluation. When assigned as a fire inspector, inspects buildings and premises; reviews plans for compliance with fire regulations specified in the City of Miami Building Code; checks on complaints; and may aid investigation of arson cases when assigned to fire prevention duties. Performs other related work as required. DESIRABLE KNOWLEDGE, ABILITIES AND SKILLS: (The knowledge, skills and abilities identified in this class specification represent those needed to perform the duties of this class. Additional knowledge, skills and abilities may be applicable for individual positions in the employing departments.) Some knowledge of the street system and physical layout of the City of Miami. Ability to learn a wide variety of fire- fighting duties and methods within a reasonable working test period. Ability to establish and maintain effective working relationships with other employees and the general public. Ability to understand and follow oral and written instructions. Ability to perform limited mechanical work involved in maintaining fire-fighting and rescue apparatus, equipment and tools. Physical strength, endurance, agility and freedom from serious physical defects as shown by a physical examination. Coordination and dexterity. DESIRABLE BASIC TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE: Graduation from high school or State of Florida Equivalency Certificate OR Equivalent combination of training and experience. By letter dated August 23, 1994, Respondent advised Petitioner that it had determined that he was not qualified to receive supplemental compensation. The letter, which was received by Petitioner on September 6, 1994, read as follows: After reviewing your transcript, it has been determined that you do not possess an appropriate Major Study Concentration Area to qualify for the Firefighters Supplemental Compensation Program at the Bachelor level. Rule 4A-37.084, Florida Administrative Code, does not list Biology as a "Major Study Concentration Area." Rule 4A-37.084, Florida Administrative Code, states: "4A-37.084 Definitions. For purposes of this part, terms used in Rules 4A-37.082-4A- 37.089 are as defined in Section 633.382(1), Florida Statutes, and terms which are not otherwise defined in said statutes are defined as follows: 'Bachelor's Degree' means a Bachelor of Arts or Bachelor of Science degree conferred by an accredited post-secondary institution provided the major study concentration area is readily identifiable and applicable as fire related. A firefighter may receive Supplemental Compensation based on possession of a Bachelor's Degree regardless of whether or not an Associate Degree was previously earned. In no event shall receipt of a transcript for an Associate Degree be used in consideration for qualification of the Bachelor's Degree Supplemental Compensation. The major study concentration area, at least 18 semester hours or 27 quarter hours, [must] be readily identifiable and applicable as fire related. Specific Authority 633,45(2)(a) FS. Law Implemented 633.382(2) FS. History-New 01-03-90." 1/ At this level of the Firefighters Supplemental Compensation Program it has been determined that your Bachelor Degree is not readily identifiable and applicable as fire related, per Rule 4A-37.084, Florida Administrative Code. Pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, and Rule Chapters 4-121 and 28-5, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C.), you have a right to request a proceeding to contest this action by the Department. You may elect a proceeding by completing the attached Election of Rights form or filing a Petition. Your Petition or Election of a proceeding must be in writing and must be filed with the General Counsel acting as the Agency Clerk, Department of Insurance. If served by U.S. Mail, the Petition or Election should be addressed to the Florida Department of Insurance, at 612 Larson Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300. If Express Mail or hand delivery is utilized, the Petition or Election should be delivered to 448 Fletcher Building, 101 East Gaines Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300. The Petition of Election must be received by, and filed in the Department within twenty-one (21) days of the date of your receipt of this notice. If a proceeding is requested and there is no dispute of fact, the provisions of Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes, would apply. In this regard you may submit oral or written evidence in opposition to the action taken by this agency or a written statement challenging the grounds upon which the agency has relied. While a hearing is normally not required in the absence of a dispute of fact, if you feel that a hearing is necessary one will be conducted in Tallahassee, Florida or by telephonic conference call upon your request. If you dispute material facts which are the basis for this agency's action, you may request a formal adversarial proceeding pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. If you request this type of proceeding, the request must comply with all of the requirements of Rule Chapters 4-121 and 28-5, F.A.C. and contain: A statement identifying with particularity the allegations of the Department which you dispute and the nature of the dispute; An explanation of what relief you are seeking and believe you are entitled to; Any other information which you contend is material. These proceedings are held before a State hearing officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings. Unless the majority of witnesses are located elsewhere, the Department will request the hearing be conducted in Tallahassee. Unless a Petition or Election or your written submission challenging this action is received by the Department within twenty-one (21) days from the date of the receipt of this notice, the right to a proceeding shall be deemed waived. Failure to follow the procedure outlined with regard to your response to this notice may result in the request being denied. All prior correspondence in this matter shall be considered freeform agency action, and no such correspondence shall operate as a valid request for an administrative proceeding. Any request for administrative proceeding received prior to the date of this notice shall be deemed abandoned unless timely renewed in compliance with the guidelines as set out above. Petitioner did not file a "Petition or Election or . . . written submission challenging this action [described in Respondent's August 23, 1994 letter]" within 21 days of the date of his receipt of the letter. He next corresponded with Respondent in May of 1999, when he applied for a second time for entry in the Firefighters Supplemental Compensation Program. Along with a completed and signed Application for Initial Entry into Supplemental Compensation Program (Second Application), he sent Respondent a copy of his transcript from North Carolina Central University and an "official job description for current position held: FIREFIGHTER/PARAMEDIC," which was different than the job description that had accompanied his 1994 Application and which read as follows: Firefighter Definition: The term firefighter is used to describe all individuals assigned to the various areas within the City of Miami Fire Department. The responsibilities of a Firefighter are very diverse and require specialized training in many areas. Fire Suppression: These individuals are responsible for protecting life and property by means of fire extinguishment. This individual must have a working knowledge of pumps, water friction and resistance tables as well as ropes, foams and nozzles, infra- red cameras and basic building construction and style. Throughout the fire service, physical fitness is important. Hazardous Material Team: Work involves protecting life and property from toxic substances. Must have a working knowledge of fundamental chemistry and chemical interactions with each other. Must be able to identify Department of Transportation Placards to determine substances being transported by vehicles. Additionally, individuals must be familiar with explosive ranges of gases and mixture that have the potential to explode or cause harm to others. Must understand hazardous materials containment areas and the various levels of protective clothing w[o]rn. Emergency Medical Services: Work involves protecting life through use of basic life support and advance life support methods. Individuals involved in these services work under the license and management of a medical director. Paramedics are generally assigned to these positions when possible. Individuals should be able to accurately gather and interpret patient information to formulate a working diagnosis and provide necessary treatment as per protocol or physician[']s direction. Personnel [are] responsible for calculating and administering various drugs under stressful conditions (i.e. cardiac arrest and major trauma) and reporting patient status and treatment via radio to the medical director. A working knowledge of anatomy and physiology, medical terms and conditions is required. Fire Prevention Bureau: Work involves inspecting buildings and premises; reviewing plans for compliance with fire regulations specified in the City of Miami Building Code; checking on complaints; investigating arson cases and conducting public education throughout the City of Miami. Petitioner did not indicate, in submitting his Second Application, that he was seeking anything other than prospective entry in the Firefighters Supplemental Compensation Program. Respondent preliminarily determined that Petitioner's Second Application should be denied because his "Major Study Concentration Areas of Biology does not meet the criteria found in Rule 4A-37.084, Florida Administrative Code, for entry in the program," and so advised Petitioner, who subsequently requested an administrative hearing on the matter. Respondent, however, subsequently changed its mind regarding Petitioner's eligibility for the program and, by letter dated November 17, 1999 (two days prior to the final hearing in this case) advised Petitioner that, "[u]pon [f]urther review of [his] application, it had "found [Petitioner] to be eligible" and that he would receive supplemental compensation effective June 1, 1999. Respondent also prepared and sent to Chief James Fisher of the City of Miami Fire Rescue an Official Acceptance Notification, which read as follows: James E. Kemp, Social Security Number, . . ., has met the eligibility requirements for entry into the Firefighters Supplemental Compensation Program. Effective June 1, 1999, Mr. Kemp will receive Supplemental Compensation for qualifying under the requirements of Section 633.382, Florida Statutes, and Rule 4A-37.085 for possession of a Bachelor's degree. Mr. Kemp will be eligible to receive up to $110.00 a month until such time as he may become ineligible in accordance with Rule 4A- 37.087. Please insure that the referenced firefighter's name and the amount of Supplemental Compensation paid, appears on your Quarterly Report (form FSTE-3). If any further information is needed, please do not hesitate to contact us. (A copy of this Official Acceptance Notification was sent to Petitioner.)
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order finding that Petitioner is not entitled to the additional relief he is seeking. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of January, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 2000.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner's application for supplemental compensation pursuant to Section 633.382, Florida Statutes, should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact 1. The Petitioner holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from Michigan State University. The degree was earned in the College of Communication Arts and Science. The major on the Petitioner's degree is advertising. 2. The transcript of the courses taken by the Petitioner to earn his bachelor's degree does not list any courses that appear to come within the criteria listed at Rule 4A- 37.084(5) (b)1, Florida Administrative Code. 3. The transcript of the courses taken by the Petitioner to earn his bachelor's degree lists several courses that appear to come within the criteria listed at Rule 4A-37.084(5) (b)2, Florida Administrative Code. However, there are not enough of such courses to comprise a major. 4. The transcript of the courses taken by the Petitioner to earn his bachelor's degree lists one course that appears to come within the criteria listed at Rule 4A.37.084(5) (b)3, Florida Administrative Code. 5. The Petitioner is presently employed by the Miami Beach Fire Department as a Firefighter I. The Petitioner has been employed full-time in his present firefighter position at all times material to the pending application. 6. The Petitioner's fire department duties are described in a written position description for the Firefighter I position. It is clear from the description of those duties that a Firefighter I position with the Miami Beach Fire Department is not one of the "management positions within a fire department," nor is it a position that includes "arson investigators." Such a position is also not one of the "special positions" contemplated by Rule 4A-37.084(5) (b)4, Florida Administrative Code. 7. When the Petitioner submitted his present application, Floyd Jordan, the Fire Chief of the Miami Beach Fire Department, by letter dated November 15, 2000, advised the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training as follows: After review of the attached college transcript and the City of Miami Beach Job Description for Firefighter I, it is my conclusion that this request does not meet the requirements of the Firefighters Supplemental Compensation Program. As of the date of the final hearing, Chief Jordan continued to be of the same view of the matter. 8. The Petitioner was previously employed by the Boca Raton Fire-Rescue Services as a firefighter/paramedic. The Petitioner's job duties in the Boca Raton position were essentially the same as his job duties in his present position. While employed with the Boca Raton Fire-Rescue Services, the Petitioner applied for supplemental compensation on the basis of the same bachelor's degree on which he bases his present application. The Petitioner's prior application was approved and he received supplemental compensation while employed with the Boca Raton Fire-Rescue Services.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Chuck Pereny, pro se 259 Northwest 90th Avenue Coral Springs, Florida 33071 For Respondent: Elenita Gomez, Esquire James B. Morrison, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333
Recommendation On the basis of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order denying the Petitioner's application and dismissing the petition in this case. Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. = DONE AND ENTERED this CS “day of June, 2001, in CH heseu Loe € MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this Q — day of June, 2001.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner properly secured the payment of workers' compensation benefits for employees by securing proper workers' compensation insurance coverage, as delineated by Subsection 440.107(2), Florida Statutes (2004) and, if not, what if any penalty for such failure is warranted.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner in this proceeding is a Florida corporation engaged in the construction industry. Its business domicile is Destin, Florida, and the job site at issue was in the town of Cinco Bayou, Florida. The Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged with enforcing the provisions of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, specifically Section 440.107, Florida Statutes (2004), requiring employers to secure the payment of compensation benefits for employees in the event they have an on- the-job injury. In this proceeding the Respondent has charged that the Petitioner failed to abide by the workers' compensation insurance coverage requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, regarding two subcontractors, Scott Williams, d/b/a Vinyl Masters, LLC, (Williams) domiciled in Alburn, Alabama, and J & L Concrete a/k/a Moses Construction, Inc., (J & L) of Liliburn, Georgia. There is no dispute that the Petitioner did not have its own workers' compensation insurance policy as of February 10, 2005. The most recent policy ended July 2, 2003. The Petitioner thus did not itself secure payment of workers' compensation on behalf of Williams or J & L during the period of proposed penalty assessment, September 8, 2004 through February 10, 2005. The Petitioner was the general contractor engaged to perform construction operations at 1028 Anniston Court, Cinco Bayou, Florida (job site), on February 10, 2005, the date of the investigator's inspection visit and investigation. The Petitioner was sub-contracting certain vinyl siding work at that job site to Williams, a subcontractor. The Respondent's investigator, Ralph Taylor, conducted his investigation at the job site and observed four workers installing vinyl siding. Upon investigation he determined that the four workers were employed by Williams in this effort and identified the workers as Juan Oriz, Noe Mendieta, Jose Palma, and Jose Aboyte. Mr. Taylor's investigation revealed that Williams did not have a current workers' compensation exemption applicable to Florida law nor did he have a Florida workers' compensation insurance policy. He determined this by examination of the Respondent's data base, the Coverage and Compliance Automated System (CCAS). Williams informed Mr. Taylor, however, that he had obtained a policy of workers' compensation insurance through the Cruchfield Insurance Agency of Birmingham, Alabama. A facsimile of the declaration page from a workers' compensation insurance policy issued by Alabama Home Builders Self Insurance Fund to Vinyl Masters, LLC (Williams) was transmitted to Mr. Taylor by a representative of the Cruchfield Insurance Agency of Birmingham. Florida law requires that an employer who has employees engaged in work in Florida must obtain a Florida policy or endorsement for such employees which employs Florida class codes, rates, rules, and manuals that are in compliance with the provisions of Chapter 440 as well as the Florida Insurance Code. See § 440.10(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (2004). Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.019(2) requires that in order for an employer to comply with Sections 440.10(1)(g) and 440(38)(7), Florida Statutes, any policy or endorsement used by an employer to prove the fact of workers' compensation coverage for employees engaged in Florida work must be issued by an insurer that holds a valid certificate of authority in the State of Florida. The insurance policy held by Williams did not satisfy the standard. First, the Alabama Home Builders self-insurance fund is not authorized to write insurance in Florida. Secondly, the premium was based on a rate that was less than the Florida premium rate. The policy declaration page shows that Alabama Home Builders insured Vinyl Master effective January 1, 2005, for carpentry operations under class code 5645 at a premium of $20.58 per $100 of payroll. The premium rate using Florida rates for that same class code should have been $38.40 for $100 of payroll. Thus Vinyl Masters/Williams was not in compliance with the coverage law requirements at that job site at the time of the investigation on February 10, 2005. Employers employing on job sites in Florida are required to keep business records that enable the Respondent to determine whether the employer is in compliance with the workers' compensation law. § 440.107(2), Fla. Stat. (2004). Investigator Taylor issued a request for production of business records to Williams on February 10, 2005. That same date the Respondent issued a request for production of business records to the Petitioner. Each request asked the employer to produce, for the preceding three years, documents that reflected payroll, payments to each subcontractor, and proof of insurance. Williams produced no records. The Petitioner produced no records related to employment of Williams or Vinyl Masters. When an employer fails to provide requested business records which the statutes requires it to maintain and to make available to the Respondent Agency, the Respondent is authorized to impute that employer's payroll using "the statewide average weekly wage as defined in Section 440.12(2), multiplied by l.5." § 440.107(7)(e), Fla. Stat. (2004). The statewide average weekly wage for the four quarters beginning June 30, 2004, was $651.38. The Respondent thus could have imputed payroll for the entire three-year period for which it requested business records which were not produced. The Respondent imputed payroll however, for a lesser period, January 11, through February 10, 2005. This corresponds to the one-month period that the four Williams workers had told Investigator Taylor that they had worked "in the area." The amount that the Petitioner would have paid in premium under Section 440.107(7)(e), Florida Statutes (2004), based on payroll imputed from the statewide average weekly wage of $651.38 for work under class code 5651, during the period January 11, through February 10, 2005, multiplied by the statutory multiplier factor of 1.5, yields a penalty amount of $5,629.52. In any event, Williams did not properly secure the payment of compensation for Williams or the four workers in question, named above. Under Section 440.10(1)(b), Florida Statutes, (2004), the Petitioner could became the "statutory employer" of Williams and its workers if Williams, the subcontractor, had not secured the payment of workers' compensation. The credible evidence at hearing reveals, however, that Williams has already entered into a payment agreement with the Respondent to pay the subject penalty, referenced above, concerning Williams' failure to have "Florida-complaint" workers' compensation coverage properly secured for Florida workers and Florida operations. Additionally, the testimony of Mr. Grubbs, the manager for the Petitioner (which is accepted), reveals that the four workers in question only worked three days at most. Moreover, their hourly wage rate was only $15.00 per hour. Therefore, although the Petitioner supplied no business records in advance to the investigator regarding the subcontractor, Williams, which might allow the Respondent to impute payroll based on average weekly wage for calculation for a penalty under the applicable statutory authority; in this de novo proceeding context, the Petitioner did supply sworn testimony and records showing the actual wage rate and time worked for these employees, thus obviating use of the average weekly wage and imputed payroll for penalty calculation. Additionally, the Petitioner showed, through the testimony of Mr. Grubbs, that indeed the Petitioner had a certificate of insurance showing, to the best of Petitioner's knowledge at the time, that Williams had secured the payment of workers' compensation through the Alabama insurance carrier, named above, in accordance with accepted industry practice. Thus the Petitioner was under a good faith, reasonable belief that this subcontractor, Williams, had secured proper payment of workers' compensation coverage at the time the Petitioner engaged Williams as a subcontractor on the job-site in question. In summary, in view of these facts the assessment of penalty to the Petitioner is incorrect. The Investigator, Mr. Taylor's, testimony itself shows that had he known that the workers only worked for three days, the penalty should only be based upon that amount of work or hours applied to the penalty calculation formula. Because Williams has undertaken and agreed to pay the penalty in question for not properly securing workers' compensation coverage, no penalty is justifiably assessed against the Petitioner. If that were done the Respondent, in effect, would be treating both Williams and the Petitioner as employers of the same employees simultaneously, for the same job and occurrence. No evidence justifying this, given the relevant statutory scheme and case law, has been adduced. Subcontractor J & L Concrete In response to the Respondent's request for business records from the Petitioner concerning subcontractor J & L Concrete, the Petitioner produced ledgers showing payments to J & L. The Petitioner contracted with J & L during the period September 8, 2004 through February 10, 2005. During that period it paid J & L $155,413.98 for labor under class code 5403. During this period of time J & L had a workers' compensation policy covering its employees issued by Auto Owners Insurance Company of Lansing, Michigan (Auto Owners). The testimony of Maureen Haxton, a senior underwriter in the workers' compensation underwriting department of Auto Owners, confirmed that a policy endorsement was issued which took effect on July 13, 2004. That endorsement listed the State of Georgia in item 3A but did not list the State of Florida in item 3A. Auto Owners later issued a policy endorsement on May 10, 2005, that added Florida to item 3A, effective on March 18, 2005. The later endorsement issued by Auto Owners was not effective on February 10, 2005, when the SWO was issued to the Petitioner. The penalty sought to be assessed against the Petitioner for work attributable to J & L, based upon Section 440.107(7)(d)1., Florida Statutes (2004), is based on remuneration paid by the Petitioner to J & L for work under class code 5403 for period September 8, 2004 through February 10, 2005. Keith Cowart is an authorized insurance agent for Auto Owners Insurance Company. His agency is located in Lawrenceville, Georgia. He originally issued a workers' compensation policy to J & L in July of 2002 and a current policy is in effect for J & L to and including July 2006 and was in effect during the penalty assessment period. Mr. Cowart testified that had an employee in Florida suffered an injury on or before February 10, 2005, that the employee would have received workers' compensation benefits from Auto Owners and that employees injured in Florida would have received the level of benefits required by Florida law. Cowart indicated in his testimony that there are annual audits of J & L, under their contractual arrangement, by Auto Owners, to determine how much of its payroll is attributable to work conducted in Florida for workers' compensation insurance premium purposes. The J & L payroll is audited annually and J & L is billed a premium rate based upon Florida work and payroll and premium rates for workers' compensation insurance attributable to work done by its employees in the State of Florida. J & L is thus charged a higher premium for employees working in Florida and is obligated to pay that Florida premium rate. J & L previously paid $40,000.00 in payroll for Florida workers on Florida jobs and was billed Florida premium rates for workers' compensation coverage based upon that payroll after an annual audit. It was projected for the year 2005-2006 J & L would owe premiums for at least $70,000.00 of workers' compensation payroll in Florida and had paid premiums due for workers' compensation coverage in the past for Florida job workers based upon Florida premium rates, according to Mr. Cowart. In summary, the evidence, including Mr. Cowart's sworn testimony, establishes that J & L had a workers' compensation policy coverage in effect during the period of alleged non- compliance. Mr. Cowart opined that injured Florida employees during that period of time would have received the benefits authorized by Florida law. He established that J & L was charged Florida premium rates, and pursuant to the audit being conducted in July 2005, would be charged Florida premium rates for workers, jobs performed, and payroll attributable to Florida during the period of time in question in this case. Although the endorsement issued by Auto Owners showing Florida as a listed state in "item 3A," for purposes of the rule cited below, did not take effect until after March 18, 2005, the persuasive evidence, in the form of Mr. Cowart's testimony, shows that J & L had secured workers' compensation coverage which paid Florida- mandated benefits at Florida premium rates for workers at Florida jobs at times pertinent to the SWO. Moreover, the Petitioner required the sub-contractor J & L to provide evidence of workers' compensation coverage and relied on that evidence reasonably and in good faith. It changed its position to its detriment by continuing to work on the job without securing its own appropriate coverage.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Respondent Agency rescinding Stop Work Order number 05-0721-1A issued to the Petitioner on February 10, 2005, and the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued to the Petitioner on March 30, 2005. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of November, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael William Mead, Esquire Post Office Drawer 1329 Fort Walton Beach, Florida 32549 David C. Hawkins, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Carlos G. Muniz, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether at the time of his father's death, Armando Martinez, Jr., was a "dependent beneficiary" of his father, a vested member of the Florida Retirement System, so as to be entitled to his father's retirement benefits?
Findings Of Fact Armando Martinez, Jr., was born on February 22, 1974, to Natalie M. Martinez and the late Armando Martinez, Sr. In 1992, when Armando, Jr., was eighteen years old, Mr. and Mrs. Martinez were divorced. The following year, 1993, less than two weeks after Armando, Jr.'s, nineteenth birthday, Armando Martinez, Sr., died. The cause of death was liver cancer, a disease from which Ms. Martinez presently suffers. At the time of his death on March 7, 1993, Mr. Martinez was a vested member of the Florida Retirement System. A municipal employee, he had been a bus operator. At some point close to commencement of his employment, slightly more than ten years prior to his death, Armando Martinez, Sr., had executed a Form M-10. The form named his wife, Natalie, as his primary beneficiary. Armando, Jr., the only child of Armando, Sr., and Natalie Martinez, was named as the sole contingency beneficiary. Following Mr. Martinez, Sr.'s death, Ms. Martinez disclaimed Florida Retirement System benefits. She did so in order for Armando, Jr., as the contingent beneficiary, to be able to receive the benefits. On February 17, 1997, the Division of Retirement denied Armando, Jr., survivor benefits. Had Mr. Martinez, Sr., died one-year and several weeks earlier, that is, prior to Armando, Jr.'s eighteenth birthday, the Division would have approved distribution of survivor benefits to him. But, although he was still a high school student, since he was older than nineteen by a few days at the time of his father's death, the Division required proof that Armando, Jr., had received half of his support from his father at the time of his father's death. No such proof was provided to the Division prior to or at the time of its preliminary denial. In fact, in his 1992 tax return, Mr. Martinez did not claim his son Armando, Jr., as a dependent. In this formal administrative proceeding, however, Armando Martinez, Jr., provided such proof, proof which was lacking until hearing. The year 1992 was very difficult for Armando Martinez, Jr., and his family. His parents separated, Armando, Jr., lived with his mother. Armando, Sr., lived elsewhere. Prior to his death, divorce proceedings were finalized. In the meantime, Ms. Martinez had lost her job. She remained unemployed for the entire year and in early 1993 as well. Armando, Jr., was still in high school at the time of his father's death. During the 1992-93 school year, to support himself and his mother, he obtained work part-time while he remained in school. Ms. Martinez paid the rent for their apartment at a rate of between $370 and $500 per month. The monthly phone bill of Ms. Martinez and Armando, Jr., was approximately $50; utility payments $70; groceries $300; gasoline $10, automobile insurance $100; and school supplies $40. There were other expenses, clothes, for example, that occurred from time-to-time. In addition to minimal government support to Ms. Martinez and Armando, Jr.'s, part-time employment income, Armando, Jr., was supported by cash payments provided by his father. Two or three times a month, Armando's father and a girl friend, Karen Jones, would drive to the front of the house. Because of his illness, Mr. Martinez remained in the car while Ms. Jones brought cash, usually between two and five hundred dollars in an envelope to the front door. On more than one of these occasions, Ms. Jones, the envelope, and the cash were observed by friends of the family at the moment of delivery. Ms. Martinez log of the estimates of these payments totals approximately $8,500, an amount in excess of Mr. Martinez's income reported in his 1992 tax return filed before his death in 1993 to be $6,389.00. But, Mr. Martinez, Sr. had access to other means of support and other monies including proceeds from insurance policies. The $8,500 provided to Armando, Jr., by Armando Martinez, Sr. constituted more than half of Armando, Jr.'s, support for the year 1992 and up until Mr. Martinez, Sr.'s, death in early 1993.
Recommendation Accordingly, it is hereby recommended that the Division of Retirement recognize Armando Martinez, Jr., to have been the dependent beneficiary of Armando Martinez, Sr., at the time of Mr. Martinez, Sr.'s, death, and therefore entitled to retirement benefits. DONE AND ORDERED this 27th day of January, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert B. Button, Esquire Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Natalie Martinez Suite 3811 3801 Northgreen Avenue Tampa, Florida 33624 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 A.J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner is entitled to supplemental compensation pursuant to Section 633.382(2)(a)2, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is certified as a firefighter. She has been so certified at all material times. The Petitioner is presently employed as a "firefighter-paramedic" with the City of Rivera Beach Fire Department. She has been so employed at all material times. In her present position the Petitioner performs the "essential job functions" described in her job description. Those functions are: Lays, connects and places hose line in operation. Raises and climbs ladders. Enters building and other fire involved areas. Uses extinguishers, bars, hooks, lines, and axes and other hand equipment. Ventilates burning buildings and structures. Throws salvage covers and removes debris. Makes regular inspections of apparatus and equipment and notifies supervisor of defects. Assists Driver-Engineer routine maintenance and apparatus check-out as required. Makes visual and physical inspections of buildings to locate fire hazards. Rescues and removes individuals from danger. Administers Advanced Life Support medical treatment to sick, injured or afflicted persons. Makes periodic inspections of buildings to locate fire hazards. Performs physical cleaning and maintenance tasks on department buildings and equipment using brooms, mops, vacuum cleaners, etc. Performs hydrant maintenance. Attends training and drill sessions in such subjects as firefighting and inspection methods, equipment operations and emergency medical treatment. In her present position the Petitioner is required to have and use the "knowledge, skills, and abilities" described in her job description. The required knowledge, skills, and abilities set forth in the job description are: Knowledge of the street locations, geography and takes of construction in the City. Knowledge of advanced Life Support Emergency Medical procedures, practices and techniques. Knowledge of various types of fire hazards of the City. Knowledge and skill in the use of Advanced Life Support (ALS) emergency medical treatment, practices, and procedures. Knowledge of firefighting techniques, policies, procedures and practices. Ability to learn and perform many and varied fighting techniques and procedures. Ability to understand and follow oral and written instructions. Ability to perform prolonged and arduous work under adverse conditions. Ability to work at heights. Ability to drive fire apparatus over the road safely under emergency conditions. Skill in the use and maintenance of firefighting equipment. In 1987 the Petitioner was awarded a Bachelor of Liberal Studies degree, with a major in Liberal Studies, by Barry University. Review of the Petitioner's transcript from Barry University does not reveal any course that appears to be "readily identifiable as applicable to fire department duties" performed by the Petitioner in her present position.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying the Petitioner's application for Firefighters' Supplemental Compensation. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us. Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th of March, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Maria Fonzi-Gonzalez 212 Southwest 12th Avenue Boynton Beach, Florida 33435 Maria Fonzi-Gonzalez 14915 78th Place, North Loxahatchee, Florida 33470 Elenita Gomez, Esquire Department of Insurance 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Honorable Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capital, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
