The Issue In this disciplinary proceeding, the issues are: (1) whether Respondents, who are licensed real estate brokers, failed within a reasonable time to satisfy a civil judgment relating to a real estate commission; (2) whether Respondents failed to maintain trust funds in an escrow account as required; and (3) whether disciplinary penalties should be imposed on Respondents, or either of them, if Petitioner proves one or more of the violations charged in its Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Respondent Marlene Montenegro Toirac ("Toirac") is a licensed real estate broker subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Florida Real Estate Commission ("Commission"). Respondent Home Center International Corp. ("HCIC") is and was at all times material hereto a corporation registered as a Florida real estate broker subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Commission. Toirac is an officer and principal of HCIC, and at all times relevant to this case she had substantial, if not exclusive, control of the corporation. Indeed, the evidence does not establish that HCIC engaged in any conduct distinct from Toirac's in connection with the transactions at issue. Therefore, Respondents will generally be referred to collectively as "Toirac" except when a need to distinguish between them arises. Petitioner Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, has jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings for the Commission. At the Commission's direction, Petitioner is authorized to prosecute administrative complaints against licensees within the Commission's jurisdiction. The Veloso Judgment Toirac and Elena Veloso ("Veloso") did business together and wound up as opponents in court. Veloso got the better of Toirac, obtaining, on June 5, 2001, a judgment in the amount of $4,437.60 against her and HCIC from the Dade County Court. The judgment liquidated a real estate commission that Veloso claimed the defendants owed her. On June 12, 2001, Toirac filed a Motion to Set Aside Final Judgment, wherein she asked the county court to (a) vacate its judgment in favor of Veloso, on the ground that the defendants had not been served with process and (b) consolidate Veloso's county-court proceeding with an action then pending in circuit court, which Toirac had brought against Veloso.1 As of the final hearing in this case, Toirac's motion, after four years, had not been heard or decided. As of the final hearing in this case, Toirac had not satisfied the judgment in favor of Veloso. The Escrow Account Shortfall On January 24, 2002, Tibizay Morales, who was then employed by Petitioner as an investigator, conducted an audit of Toirac's records. (The impetus for this audit was Petitioner's receipt, on or about June 20, 2001, of a complaint from Veloso.) Pursuant to the audit, Ms. Morales determined that the balance in Toirac's escrow account was $4,961.05. Ms. Morales determined further that Toirac's trust liability, i.e. the total amount of money that she should have been holding in escrow on her clients' behalf, was $12,242.00. Thus, there existed a shortfall of $7,280.95 in Toirac's escrow account. Toirac was not able, at the time of the audit, to explain the shortfall. A few weeks later, however, by letter dated February 13, 2002, Toirac informed Ms. Morales that the shortfall had been caused by the issuance, "in error," of a check in the amount of $7,345.00, which was drawn on HCIC's escrow account and payable (evidently) to HCIC; HCIC had deposited the funds into its operating account, thereby creating, according to Toirac, an "overage" of $7,345.00 in the latter. To correct the problem, Toirac had arranged for the transfer of $7,345.00 from HCIC's operating account to its escrow account, which was accomplished on or about February 1, 2002. The Charges In counts I and IV, Petitioner charges Respondents with failing to account for and deliver trust funds, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes.2 Petitioner's position is that Respondents failed within a reasonable time to satisfy the county-court judgment in favor of Veloso. In counts III and V, Petitioner accuses Respondents of having failed to maintain trust funds in the real estate brokerage escrow account until disbursement was properly authorized, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes. Petitioner's position is that the escrow account shortfall identified on January 24, 2002, is proof that funds held in escrow had been disbursed without proper authorization. Ultimate Factual Determinations There is no dispute (for Toirac admitted at final hearing) that the judgment debt owed by Respondents to Veloso relates to a real estate commission. It is also undisputed that, as of the final hearing, the county-court judgment had not been satisfied. The undersigned determines that Respondents have failed to satisfy the civil judgment in Veloso's favor within a reasonable time.3 Therefore, the undersigned finds Respondents guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes.4 It is determined that the erroneous transfer, via check, of funds from HCIC's escrow account to its operating account constituted an unauthorized disbursement of funds entrusted to Toirac by others who had dealt with her as a broker. While this might have resulted from the simple mistake of an incompetent bookkeeper, as Toirac maintains, nevertheless the disbursement was unauthorized and substantial——amounting to approximately 60 percent of Toirac's total trust liability. Therefore, the undersigned finds Respondents guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes. In view of the foregoing, Petitioner has established the charges set forth in counts I, III, IV, and V of its Administrative Complaint, by clear and convincing evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order that: (a) finds Respondents guilty as charged in counts I, III, IV, and V of the Administrative Complaint; (b) suspends Respondents' respective real estate licenses for 90 days; and (c) imposes an administrative fine of $2,500 against Respondents, jointly and severally; and (d) places Respondents on probation for a period of at least 3 years, subject to such lawful conditions as the Commission may specify. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of September, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of September, 2005.
The Issue Whether respondents' real estate licenses should be revoked, suspended, or otherwise disciplined on charges of false promises, misrepresentation, culpable negligence, and breach of trust in a business transaction.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Terry L. Baker is now and was at all times material to the charges a licensed real estate broker holding license no. 204679. (P-1) He also was president, secretary, and treasurer of respondent Terry L. Baker and Associates, Inc., a licensed real estate brokerage corporation (lic. no. 213974) located at 1418 West Edgewood Avenue, Jacksonville, Florida. There are no other officers, directors, or members of this brokerage corporation; respondent owns 100 percent of the capital stock. (P-1) Respondent was, and continues to be, the active broker for this real estate brokerage corporation. (P-1) On July 21, 1982, respondent assisted in the negotiation and closing of a real estate sales transaction between Dolores B. Hawkins, as seller, and James W. and Patricia L. Dobson, as purchasers. The real estate involved was a residential lot and dwelling unit located at 7065 Bishop Hatcher Drive East, Jacksonville, Florida, and was, at the time, the subject of a mortgage foreclosure proceeding. (Testimony of Hawkins, Baker; P-2, P-6) The real estate sales contract was signed by the seller and buyers on July 21, 1982. At that time, respondent submitted a written estimate of the seller's closing costs. This estimate, signed by both respondent and the seller, showed that the seller would net $1,598.25 from the transaction. It was specifically noted that this net figure did not include an Atlantic Bank payment. This payment was a recognized obligation of the seller and was required to obtain the release of a record judgment lien held by the bank. Ms. Hawkins, the seller, understood that this payment was her obligation and was not included in the $1,598.25 figure. The written estimate also included seller's cost of approximately $2,000 for attorney's fees and back mortgage payments. The attorney's fees were related to the legal costs associated with the mortgage foreclosure proceeding. An existing mortgage balance, to be assumed by the buyers, was listed as approximately $19,000. (Testimony of Hawkins, Baker; P-3) On two separate occasions prior to closing, respondent told seller Hawkins that there had been an increase in the charge for attorney's fees associated with the mortgage foreclosure. (Testimony of Hawkins, respondent) Prior to closing, respondent loaned seller Hawkins $220 to help her pay her apartment rent. They agreed that the loan would be repaid out of the proceeds from the sale of her property. (Testimony of Hawkins, Baker; P-4) At closing on August 17, 1982, respondent presented the seller with a Seller's Closing Statement listing various charges to the seller, including the loan repayment of $220, the payment to Atlantic Bank (for release of lien) of $425, attorney's fees of $638.50, and an assumed mortgage of $19,847.51. The net amount due the seller was $675.82. The buyers paid the balance due at closing and the seller delivered the warranty deed to respondent for recording. A couple of days later, respondent, in turn, wrote a check for $675.82 and delivered it to the seller as net proceeds from the sale. Payment of respondent's commission was shared by the seller and buyers at closing. Respondent received the warranty deed at closing and the parties to the transaction expected him to have it recorded. He accepted this duty and undertook to perform it. However, he did not record the warranty deed on the public records until October 4, 1982--almost three months later--after repeated requests by the mortgage service company for a copy of the recorded deed. The delay was caused by respondent's waiting to receive a release of the Atlantic Bank lien so that he could record the two instruments at the same time. But after repeated requests for a copy of the recorded deed, he finally recorded it even though he had not yet received the release of lien. (Testimony of Baker, Hawkins, Dobson) Contrary to the Department's contention, respondent's delay in recording the deed does not constitute culpable negligence, false promises, misrepresentation, or breach of trust in a business transaction. His lack of diligence in recording the deed is, instead, an act of simple negligence. His carelessness exposed the buyers to unnecessary risk. During this delay of almost three months, the seller, while record titleholder, could have reconveyed the property or subjected it to additional encumbrances. Respondent, in delaying recordation almost three months, failed to exercise that degree of care which a reasonable man, in the same situation and with similar experience, would not have omitted. His failure to exercise due care does not, however, demonstrate willful, wanton, or reckless disregard for the rights of others. The Department also charges that respondent did not have--at time of closing--the lien of Atlantic Bank satisfied. Prior to closing, the respondent- -on behalf of the seller--negotiated the outstanding debt with attorneys for Atlantic Bank: He was told that the bank would accept fifty cents on the dollar, or $425. Thereafter, respondent collected this amount as a charge to the seller at closing. (Testimony of respondent) Respondent, however, did not have an executed release of lien form, or the judgment lien satisfied, at closing. He asserts--without contradiction-- that the bank's attorney at first offered to prepare the release, but later asked respondent to do so. By the time of closing, respondent had been either unable to obtain the release from the attorney, or he had been unable to obtain and complete the form on his own. When asked why he proceeded to close the transaction although the release had not been obtained, he states that both buyers and seller consented to the closing because the property was facing foreclosure. Respondent's assertion that the parties consented to closing, in the absence of a release of lien, is unrefuted and accepted as fact. No evidence was presented that, in light of the parties' consent, closing of the transaction was improper.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the administrative complaint, and all charges contained therein, be dismissed for failure of proof. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of September, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 1983.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Cluett Realty, Inc., is a licensed corporate real estate broker having been issued license number 0216798 and whose last known address is 4720 Palm Beach Boulevard, Fort Myers, Florida. The Respondent, Ernest H. Cluett II, is a licensed real estate broker having been issued license number 0191613 and at all material times was employed as a licensed real estate broker by Cluett Realty, Inc. In November, 1981, Mary Ann Knopic was shown a home in Cape Coral by the Respondents. She offered the owners $92,500 for the home with a $500.00 earnest money deposit. When the home was sold to another buyer, the Respondents and Knopic agreed that the Respondents would retain the $500.00 and attempt to find another home for the complainant. In December, 1981, the Respondents showed Knopic the Soviero home and Knopic made an offer on the home and secured the offer with an additional $1,500 security deposit. In late February, 1982, the complainant informed the Respondents that she would not close on the Soviero home. The complainant decided not to close because the cost of renovating the home exceeded the original estimate. Under these circumstances, the complainant was willing to lose her $2,000 deposit rather than spend $6,000 to renovate the Soviero home. On June 8, 1982, after the complainant agreed to the February disbursement, she sent the Respondents a letter demanding either a copy of the contract which amended the earnest money amount or a refund of her $1,500. Walter V. Horn, a Respondent, was not properly served and at final hearing the petitioner agreed that he was not a proper party to this proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against the Respondents, Cluett Realty, Inc., Ernest H. Cluett II and Walter V. Born. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of July, 1984, at Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of July, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Fred Langford, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Legal Section Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida Herbert A. Fried, Esquire 1625 Hendry Street, Suite 103 Fort Myers, Florida 33901 Mr. Walter V. Horn 4732 Dee Prado Boulevard Cape Coral, Florida 33904 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Fred M. Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue This is a proceeding pursuant to Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, in which the Petitioner, Florida Home Finders Realty, Inc. ("Realty, Inc."), seeks an award of costs and attorney's fees incurred in its successful defense of an administrative disciplinary proceeding. The disputed issues in this case are whether the case is moot, whether the person acting on behalf of the Petitioner is authorized to do so, and whether circumstances exist that would make an award of costs and attorney's fees unjust.
Findings Of Fact Realty, Inc., the Petitioner in this proceeding, was one of numerous Respondents in a multi-count Administrative Complaint filed by the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation in September of 1995. Two of the other Respondents named in the same Administrative Complaint were Ian R. Law and Benjamin Schiff. Most, if not all, of the other Respondents in that multi-count Administrative Complaint resolved the charges against them without resort to proceedings before the Division of Administrative Hearings. Ian R. Law and Benjamin Schiff both disputed the charges in the Administrative Complaint and requested an evidentiary hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings. Ian R. Law and Benjamin Schiff retained the services of the law firm of Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson, P.A., to represent them in their defense against the charges in the Administrative Complaint. Messrs. Law and Schiff were represented by Mark Herron, Esquire, and Chris Haughee, Esquire, of the previously mentioned law firm. Simultaneous with the filing of the Administrative Complaint described above, the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation issued an emergency suspension order. The effect of the emergency suspension order was to suspend the real estate broker licenses of Messrs. Law and Schiff and to suspend the corporate real estate broker registration of Realty, Inc. Immediately following the filing of the Administrative Complaint and the emergency suspension order, the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation filed a petition in circuit court seeking to place Realty, Inc., and a related corporation into receivership. The petition was granted, and Realty, Inc., and the related corporation were placed in receivership. Receivers were appointed to operate Realty, Inc., and the related corporation, and to take possession of the assets of Realty, Inc., and the related corporation. As of the date of the final hearing in this case, the receivership was still in effect, although the assets of Realty, Inc., and the assets of the related corporation had been sold. The receivers were able to conduct the business affairs of both Realty, Inc., and the related corporation without either corporation being registered as a real estate broker. Accordingly, it was of no importance to the receivers that Realty, Inc.'s, real estate broker registration had been suspended by emergency order or that such registration might be revoked as a result of the Administrative Complaint.4 Therefore, the receivers took no action to challenge the emergency suspension order or to defend Realty, Inc., against the charges in the Administrative Complaint. Specifically, the receivers did not file any response to the Administrative Complaint and did not request an evidentiary hearing on the charges against Realty, Inc. In June of 1996, counsel for the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation filed a motion with the Florida Real Estate Commission seeking entry of a final order against Realty, Inc., on the charges in the Administrative Complaint. Grounds for the motion were that there were no disputed issues of material fact, because Realty, Inc., had failed to respond to the service of the Administrative Complaint and had failed to request a hearing on the charges in the Administrative Complaint. The receivers of Realty, Inc., did not oppose the motion, because they were not concerned about the disposition of the charges in the Administrative Complaint. The Department's motion was, however, opposed by Ian Law and Benjamin Schiff. Messrs. Law and Schiff, through their legal counsel, Mark Herron, Esquire, filed a response in which they argued that the motion should be denied on the grounds that a final order revoking the registration of Realty, Inc., would have an adverse impact on the substantial interests of Messrs. Law and Schiff. In this regard they directed attention to Section 475.31(1), Florida Statutes, which reads as follows: An order revoking or suspending the license of a broker shall automatically cancel the licenses of all sales persons registered with the broker, and, if a partnership or corporation, of all members, officers, and directors thereof, while the license of the broker is inoperative or until new employment or connection is secured. Based on the above-quoted statutory provision, Messrs. Law and Schiff argued that, in order to protect their own interests, they were entitled to litigate the issue of whether Realty, Inc., was guilty of the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint. Messrs. Law and Schiff also argued that it would be a violation of their personal due process rights if they were deprived of an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether Realty, Inc., was guilty of the violations charged in the Administrative Complaint. By order dated June 18, 1996, the Florida Real Estate Commission denied the relief requested in the Department's motion and directed that the charges against Realty, Inc., be referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for an evidentiary hearing.5 Since the issuance of the order placing Realty, Inc., in receivership (the order was issued October 6, 1995, nunc pro tunc to September 28, 1995), Messrs. Law and Schiff have not had any authority to take any action on behalf of Realty, Inc. That authority has been, and continues to be, vested solely in the receivers appointed to manage the affairs of Realty, Inc., and in the circuit judge who entered the receivership order. Neither the circuit judge nor the receivers ever retained legal counsel to represent Realty, Inc., in the underlying administrative proceedings from which this case arises. Neither the circuit judge nor the receivers ever authorized anyone else to retain legal counsel to represent Realty, Inc., in the underlying administrative proceedings from which this case arises. Specifically, neither the circuit judge nor the receivers ever retained or authorized anyone else to retain the law firm of Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson, P.A., to represent Realty, Inc., in the underlying administrative proceedings. Similarly, neither the circuit judge nor the receivers have authorized either the law firm of Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson, P.A., or Benjamin Schiff, Esquire, to file the instant proceeding on behalf of Realty, Inc.
The Issue Whether Hellender violated the provisions of Section 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Hellender is a registered real estate broker holding license number 0038269 issued by the Florida Real Estate Commission. Hellender had a listing for the sale of real property owned by Horace E. and Margaret C. Young. An offer to lease with option to purchase was made by Richard W. and Diane B. Milligan through their realtor, Susan Seligman, who was in contact with Seligman several times November 26 concerning the availability of the property and terms of the lease-purchase agreement. Both the Youngs and the Milligans did not live in the Orlando area where the two realtors and property were located. Susan Seligman, a broker-salesperson, presented Ralph E. Hellender with a Contract for Sale and Purchase when she met with Hellender between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m. on the evening of November 26, 1976. This offer, which was received into evidence as Exhibit 1, expired at 12:00 noon on November 27. Hellender took the contract and indicated that he would communicate the offer to the Youngs. Susan Seligman did not accompany Hellender to communicate the offer as is the general custom, because she needed to pick up her children from a football game that evening. Mrs. Ingrid Hellender, a broker salesperson, received a call later on the evening of November 26, 1976, from Susan Seligman. The general topic of the call was the fact that the contract which Seligman had given Mr. Hellender earlier that evening provided for conventional financing of the purchase, and Seligman had second thoughts about the Milligans' desires on financing. She requested that she be given the opportunity to check with the Milligans to determine whether they intended to use conventional or FHA financing. At this point a conflict developed in the testimony of Mrs. Seligman and Mrs. Hellender regarding whether Mrs. Seligman requested that Mr. Hellender hold the contract or whether Mrs. Seligman requested that he present the offer with reservations concerning the nature of the financing. In any event, Mrs. Hellender advised her husband to hold the contract. Similarly, a conflict exists in Mr. Hellender's and Mrs. Seligman's testimony concerning whether Hellender said that the offer has been accepted by the Youngs. Mrs. Seligman stated that Mr. Hellender advised her on November 27, 1976, that the Youngs had accepted the offer. Hellender stated that he did not present the offer and therefore there was no basis for him to communicate an acceptance to Mrs. Seligman and did not communicate an acceptance to her. It should be particularly noted that Mrs. Seligman stated that on November 27 she had Mr. Hellender agreed that the Milligans should execute a new contract on Hellender's forms when the Milligans were to be in Orlando on December 1, 1976. It is also noted that Mrs. Seligman did not request telegraphic confirmation of the acceptance by the Youngs of the offer which she initially submitted to Mr. Hellender, although telegraphic confirmation is the generally accepted practice when dealing with an out-of-city seller and was not standard practice in the real estate firm with which Mrs. Seligman worked. The Hearing Officer discounts the testimony of Mrs. Seligman that Hellender told her the Youngs had accepted the offer because she did not request written confirmation of the acceptance, and because Mrs. Seligman stated that a second written offer was to be prepared on December 1, 1976. All the realtors who testified stated that it was the custom to obtain telegraphic confirmation of an offer from an out-of-town seller. Mr. Seligman, the broker for Mrs. Seligman's company, stated this was the general procedure for his company. Although the record is unclear whether Mrs. Seligman talked with Mr. Hellender before noon or after noon, she was aware the offer expired at noon November 27 and she did not press for written confirmation of acceptance before noon. Instead, she agreed to the preparation of a second offer is totally contrary and repugnant to any theory of acceptance of the first offer. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that there was no acceptance of the first offer communicated by Hellender to Mrs. Seligman. Mrs. Seligman may have formed the opinion that there was an acceptance because Mr. Hellender agreed to the terms presented in the first offer, but her agreement to a second offer to be prepared is in fact and law inconsistent with any assertion that the first offer was accepted. Mrs. Seligman stated, that it is clear from the actions of Mr. Hellender, that they expected a second contract to be presented in behalf of the Milligans. This explains his call to Mrs. Seligman advising her on December 5 that there was activity of the property. It also explains why December 6 he did accept a second offer on the property which was presented by Joe Deligna which he and Delinga communicated to the Youngs together as is the general custom after no offer was presented by the Milligans on December 1. Lastly, it explains why Hellender contacted Mrs. Seligman immediately after the Youngs had accepted the offer by the Maccagnanos and confirmed it telegraphically.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida Real Estate Commission take no action against the registration of Ralph E. Hellender. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 15th day of March, 1978. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce I. Kamelhair, Esq. 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Mark A. Koteen, Esq. Post Office Box 3431 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent should grant Petitioner a real estate broker license.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Mouflouze has held real estate licenses in New Hampshire and Maine for about 28 years. He lives in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, which abuts the Maine border. It was because he lives in close proximity to Maine, that he maintained a license there, also. The Commission, pursuant to Chapter 475, regulates real estate brokers and sales associates. The Commission accomplishes this regulation through the Division of Real Estate of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation. Mr. Mouflouze currently holds a broker's and salesperson's license in New Hampshire. He has not experienced any disciplinary action in that state. These licenses have an expiration date of April 1, 2008. From 1982 until 2004, Mr. Mouflouze held a designated broker's license in Maine. Prior to February 19, 2004, Mr. Mouflouze failed to complete the required hours of continuing education in Maine, according to the Maine Real Estate Commission (Maine Commission). He disagreed with this conclusion. He attended a hearing before the Maine Commission and after the hearing the Maine Commission ordered him to pay a fine of $900 and to complete six hours of continuing education. Mr. Mouflouze refused to pay the fine or otherwise obey the order. As a result, the Maine Commission had another hearing in his case on August 19, 2004, based on his failure to comply with its order. As a result of that hearing, his designated broker license was revoked effective the date of the hearing. As of the date of the hearing in this case, his license in Maine had not been reinstated. Mr. Mouflouze is a person who is regarded as a highly qualified and ethical real estate broker. He is reputed to be honest and hard-working.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission deny William Peter Mouflouze's application for licensure as a real estate broker. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of October, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of October, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Barnhart, Esquire Claudel Pressa, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 William Peter Mouflouze Bill Mouflouze Real Estate Post Office Box 6541 Portsmouth, New Hampshire 03802-6541 Nancy B. Hogan, Chairman Real Estate Commission Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 801N Orlando, Florida 32801 Josefina Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Shirley A. Cramer, is a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida. Her license number is 0460613. On or about June 9, 1990, the Respondent entered into a six-month residential lease in Clearwater, Florida. She entered into the lease on her own account. She was not acting as a real estate broker. The Respondent breached the lease, and the landlord sued in civil court for damages and recovered a judgment in the amount of $9,740.29. The Respondent has not paid the judgment, or any part of it. (The Respondent made an offer to settle the judgment for less than the full amount, but the landlord rejected the settlement offer.) The landlord has not been able to collect any money on the judgment. A deposition in aid of execution has been taken, but the landlord has not levied on the judgment. Not long after entering into the lease, the Respondent advertised it for sublease. The advertisement was answered on or about June 29, 1990, by Thomas E. Maloney. In response to the ad, Maloney went to see the Respondent at her office. (The evidence was not clear whether it was a real estate office.) There, she asked for a partial rental deposit in the amount of $1,000, with another $500 due at a later date. The Respondent told Maloney that she was a Florida licensed real estate broker and assured him that his deposit would be safe with her. The Respondent later contacted Maloney and told him that his credit references did not check out and that she was not going further with the sublease arrangement. When Maloney asked for his deposit back, she told him that she would return it to him as soon as she could raise the money. The Respondent never returned any of the deposit to Maloney, and he sued her in civil court to recover the $1,000. The case was tried, and a judgment was entered in Maloney's favor but only in the amount of $500. The evidence was not clear why Maloney was not awarded the full $1,000. He testified that, when he responded to the ad for the sublease, he learned that there already was a woman living there who was supposed to have moved out but did not. The Respondent suggested to Maloney that the woman could sleep on the couch. It is not clear from the evidence whether Maloney agreed to this arrangement. He testified only: "I says, you know --- It was just a stupid move on my part so -- and she is not going to pay me." It may be that the circumstances of the existence of the other tenant, and the possibility that Maloney initially agreed to the arrangement, had something to do with the amount of the judgment Maloney was able to recover. The Respondent has not paid Maloney any money on the judgment he recovered against her. Maloney has decided not to spend any more of his own money trying to recover on the judgment. On or about September 28, 1991, the Treasurer of the State of Florida, acting in his capacity as Insurance Commissioner, entered a Final Order suspending, for one year, all insurance licenses and eligibility for licensure held by the Respondent. The Final Order was based on findings that the Respondent had failed either to secure insurance after receipt of insurance premiums from two customers, or to account and deliver the insurance premiums she had collected from them. In one case, the evidence proved that the Respondent was "professionally responsible" for the misconduct of someone acting as her employee, and was personally responsible only for having a refund check dishonored for insufficient funds. In the other case, the Respondent was personally responsible for the entirety of the transaction, and it was found: "If not outright fraud and misrepresentation, Respondent's conduct constitutes, at best, gross negligence and incompetence " On or about August 9, 1991, the Treasurer of the State of Florida, acting in his capacity as Insurance Commissioner, filed an Administrative Complaint against the Respondent alleging that she engaged in insurance activities which required a license while her licenses were suspended and that she misappropriated, unlawfully withheld, or converted fiduciary funds. On or about August 20, 1992, the Treasurer of the State of Florida, acting in his capacity as Insurance Commissioner, entered another Final Order requiring that the Respondent pay a $500 administrative fine and placing the Respondent's insurance licenses on probation for two years. This Final Order was based on findings: (1) that, on November 28, 1990, less than two months after her insurance licenses were suspended for a year, but while she was "under the impression" that she could continue to sell insurance while the suspension was on appeal (although the suspension never was stayed pending appeal), the Respondent was selling worker compensation insurance; and (2) that she collected a $3,000 premium from a customer, did not put the money into a trust account, failed to place the coverage, withdrew the money from the account and used it for her own benefit on two occasions (replacing it after the first time), and failed to return the premium to the customer until March 8, 1991. The Respondent, through counsel, asserted that the Respondent has paid the fine referred to in the preceding Finding, but there was no evidence in the record to support that claim.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order: (1) finding the Respondent guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b) and (d)1., Fla. Stat. (1991); (2) requiring her to immediately (in any event, not more that 30 days after entry of the Final Order) return to Thomas E. Maloney his $500 and to provide the Commission with evidence of payment; (3) requiring her to pay a $1,000 administrative fine within 30 days after entry of the Final Order; (4) requiring her to successfully complete 60 hours of post-licensure education for brokers, including a 30-hour broker management course, and to provide evidence of completion to the Commission; and (5) suspending her real estate broker license for five years, subject to being reduced to a one-year suspension upon evidence of compliance with (2), (3), and (4), above. RECOMMENDED this 31st day of March, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-3322 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1991), the following rulings are made on the Department's proposed findings of fact (the Respondent not having filed any): 1.-4. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 5. Rejected in part as not proven. (Maloney did not testify that he was not told about the woman, and indicated that he asked for his deposit back after the Respondent told him that his credit references did not "check out.") 6.-10. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 11. The date of the Final Order was August 20, 1992, not 1991. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate Legal Section - Suite N 308 Hurston Building North Tower 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1772 Peter C. Clement, Esquire 35084 U.S. 19 North Palm Harbor, Florida 34684 Darlene F. Keller Division Director 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Jack McRay, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact During all times material to the Complaint Respondent Genaro O. DiDiego was licensed as a real estate broker under Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. From May 1, 1976 until February 7, 1977, Mr. DiDiego did business under the trade name "Lauderdale Realty" in the Miami Beach Area. In the spring of 1976 Ms. Arlene Channing through a salesman, Anita Kandel, employed by Lauderdale Realty met the Respondent. Ms. Channing was naive about the real estate business and any related transactions. After their initial meeting the Respondent attempted to interest Ms. Channing in a variety of business ventures. Eventually she became involved in two. One was the Choice Chemical Company loan and the other was the Qualk Building purchase. On May 10, 1976, Ms. Channing loaned Mr. DiDiego $30,000.00 for his purchase of stock in the Choice Chemical Company. This loan was to be secured by a note and mortgage from Mr. DiDiego to Ms. Channing in the principal sum of $30,000.00 with interest at 10 percent until the principal was paid. The note and mortgage were due and payable within 18 months. Specifically, the security was 50 percent of the outstanding stock of Choice Chemical Corporation and also Lauderdale Realty's lots and telephone land operation. The security was to be held in escrow by Gerald S. Berkell, who at that time was counsel to Mr. DiDiego. In fact no such security was ever delivered into escrow. From the facts and circumstances of the transactions between Ms. Channing and Mr. DiDiego, it is found that Mr. DiDiego never intended to secure the $30,000.00 loan. That security was a material inducement to Ms. Channing for the loan. The principal sum of the loan, $30,000.00, was deposited into the account of Lauderdale Realty, account number 60-943-7 at County National Bank of North Miami Beach. Subsequently on April 18, 1978, Ms. Channing filed an action in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida, against Mr. DiDiego for the unlawful conversion of her $30,000.00. On June 19, 1978, a final judgement by default was entered against Mr. DiDiego in the amount of $30,000.00 plus legal interest. The Qualk Building purchase concerned a building represented to Ms. Channing to cost $700,000.00. Mr. DiDiego induced her to invest $150,000.00 in the purchase of the Qualk Building. To effect the purchase, Mr. DiDiego and Ms. Channing entered into a limited partnership agreement in which Mr. DiDiego would be the general partner, investing $1,000.00 and Ms. Channing would be a limited partner, investing $150,000.00. Subsequently Ms. Channing deposited $150,000.00 into the Lauderdale Realty escrow account. Her check dated June 18, 1976, in the amount of $150,000.00 was deposited in Account number 60-944-8 for Lauderdale Realty. In fact, the total purchase price for the Qualk building was $585,000.00. The building was however encumbered by first and second mortgages totaling $535,855.90. The total amount therefore required to close was less than $33,000.00. These facts were known to Respondent but were not disclosed to Ms. Channing. From the facts and circumstances of this transaction, it is found that the facts were misrepresented to Ms. Channing for the purpose of inducing her to part with her $150,000.00. Ms. Channing never received any accounting for her investment and she subsequently brought an action in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida. On July 8, 1977, final judgment was entered against Respondent, Genaro O. DiDiego in the amount of $150,000.00 less $32,662.84, which were actually applied to the purchase price of the Qualk building, and less $9,780.00 which represents a portion of the income of the Qualk Building paid by Respondent to Ms. Channing. In entering its final judgment, the Court found that Respondent breached His fiduciary duty to Ms. Channing. This judgment has never been satisfied.
Recommendation In light of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED That the license of Genaro O. DiDiego as a real estate broker be revoked by the Board of Real Estate, Department of Professional Regulation. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of November, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL P. DODSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Tina Hipple, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 2009 Apalachee parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 C. B. Stafford Board Executive Director Board of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Genaro O. DiDiego 3745 N.E. 171st Street North Miami Beach, Florida 33160
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a licensed real estate salesman and was so licensed at all times relevant to this proceeding. However, his license is currently inactive. At the time of the transaction with Des Lauriers in October, 1981, which is the basis for these charges, Respondent was employed by Romill Realty, Inc. with offices in Pompano Beach, Florida. Respondent's supervising broker at that time was David Lee O'Dell. Both Des Lauriers and Respondent are Canadian citizens and had done business in Montreal where Respondent was a securities dealer. Discussions on the purchase of Florida property began in Montreal and eventually resulted in an offer which Respondent arranged between Des Lauriers and his associates as buyers and a Robert G. Lubbers as seller. The property at issue is located in Broward County, Florida. A $30,000 deposit was required and was paid by an associate of Des Lauriers in Canada to Ronald Miller's business account there. Although the $30,000 deposit apparently never reached Florida, Respondent concedes that he did receive it. His supervising broker should have been, but was not, involved in this transaction, nor did he receive this deposit. Subsequently, the offer to Lubbers was rejected and Des Lauriers demanded that Respondent return the $30,000. The money has not been returned. Respondent attempted partial payment at onetime, but his check was dishonored. He eventually transferred his interest in a Florida condominium to Des Lauriers and executed a mortgage on his house in Canada. However, the value of these assets is only about $10,000.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order revoking Respondent's real estate salesman license. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of May, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert W. Lee, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Ronald A. Miller Post Office Box 297 Champlain, New York 12919 Harold Huff, Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Fred M. Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, Respondent Bruce D. Robertson ("Respondent") was a licensed real estate broker, license #0343680, operating as a president and qualifying broker for IDC Properties ("IDC") At all times material to this case, IDC was a corporation registered as a real estate broker, license #0234614, located at 17980 San Carlos Boulevard, Fort Myers Beach, Florida. By agreement dated January 16, 1990, the Respondent agreed to pay to salesperson Randy Thibault a commission of $10,362.50 upon the closing of the sale of property at "Old Pelican Bay, Inc.," to Paula E. Brown, hereinafter referred to as the "Brown transaction". On July 5, 1990, the Brown transaction closed. The Respondent received the commission funds related to the sale of the property. The Respondent subsequently issued a check in the amount of $10,362.50 payable to Mr. Thibault. When Mr. Thibault attempted to negotiate the check, he was informed that the Respondent had issued a stop payment order on the check. Mr. Thibault thereafter filed a civil complaint against the Respondent in the Circuit Court of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit in and for Lee County, Florida Case No. 90-5851-CA. The matter was heard in a bench trial. On October 3, 1991, Mr. Thibault obtained a Final Judgement in the amount of $11, 817.42 against IDC for the sum owed plus interest. On October 28, 1991, Mr. Thibault obtained a Final Judgement in the amount of $14,551.31 against IDC for the sum owed plus interest, attorney's fees and costs. On November 4, 1991, the Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal in the matter in the Second District Court of Appeal but subsequently abandoned the appeal. At hearing, the Respondent asserted that Mr. Thibault received his commission share at the closing. The Respondent presented no credible documentary evidence to support the claim. The Respondent also asserted that Mr. Thibault misled the Respondent as to Mr. Thibault's role in the sale of other unrelated property and that the Respondent intends to take legal action against him. The Respondent presented no credible documentary evidence to support the claim. The Respondent admitted that the Final Judgement obtained by Mr. Thibault remains unsatisfied and stated that stated that he will not pay the judgement pending resolution of the unrelated matter alleged above.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, enter a Final Order determining Bruce D. Robertson and IDC Properties, Inc., guilty of the violations set forth herein and revoking the licenses identified herein. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of March, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of March, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-6308 The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order. The Respondent did not submit a proposed recommended order. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene F. Keller, Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation Hurston North Tower 400 W. Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation Hurston North Tower 400 W. Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Mr. Bruce D. Robertson IDC Properties, Inc. 17980 San Carlos Boulevard Fort Myers, Florida 33931
