The Issue The issue in this matter concerns the amount of monetary sanctions that the Agency for Health Care Administration may impose on Respondent pursuant to section 409.913, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-9.070(7)(e) based on the overpayment of Medicaid reimbursements made to Respondent.
Findings Of Fact AHCA is designated as the single state agency authorized to make payments for medical assistance and related services under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, otherwise known as the Medicaid program. See § 409.902(1), Fla. Stat. AHCA is responsible for administering and overseeing the Medicaid program in the State of Florida. See § 409.913, Fla. Stat. AHCA's Bureau of Medicaid Program Integrity (“MPI”) is the unit within AHCA that oversees the activities of Florida Medicaid providers and recipients. MPI ensures that providers abide by Medicaid laws, policies, and rules. MPI is responsible for conducting audits, investigations, and reviews to determine possible fraud, abuse, overpayment, or neglect in the Medicaid program. See §409.913, Fla. Stat. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was an enrolled Medicaid provider authorized to receive reimbursement for covered services rendered to Medicaid recipients. Respondent had a valid Medicaid provider agreement with AHCA, Medicaid Provider No. 0742236-00. The Medicaid provider agreement is a voluntary contract between AHCA and the provider. As an enrolled Medicaid provider, Respondent was subject to the duly-enacted federal and state statutes, regulations, rules, policy guidelines, and Medicaid handbooks incorporated by reference into rule, which were in effect during the audit period. Pursuant to its statutory authority to oversee the integrity of the Medicaid program, MPI conducted an audit of Respondent's paid claims for Medicaid reimbursement for the period from April 1, 2011, through October 31, 2013. The audit’s purpose was to verify that claims AHCA paid to Respondent under the Medicaid program did not exceed the amount authorized by Medicaid laws, policies, and applicable rules. As a result of the audit, AHCA determined that Respondent was overpaid in the amount of $177,717.69 for services that, in whole or in part, were not covered under the Medicaid program. AHCA also sought to impose sanctions upon Respondent consisting of an administrative fine of $34,192.30,2/ as well as investigative, legal, and expert witness costs of $1,127.66. Respondent is a dentist specializing in pediatric dentistry. He has practiced for over 43 years. He maintains offices in both Clearwater and Jacksonville, Florida. Respondent’s dental practice serves almost exclusively developmentally disabled children. Many of his patients suffer from severe behavioral, emotional, mental, physical, or social handicaps or other medical issues. Respondent’s practice is primarily based on referrals of special needs patients who other pediatric and general dentists send to him for treatment. Approximately, 95 percent of Respondent’s patients are Medicaid recipients. At the final hearing, AHCA presented the testimony of Robi Olmstead, an AHCA administrator with MPI. Ms. Olmstead's responsibilities include overseeing MPI investigations and supervising AHCA staff’s performance of Medicaid audits. With over 10 years of experience in her position, Ms. Olmstead is very familiar with and knowledgeable about how MPI conducts Medicaid audits. Specifically related to this matter, Ms. Olmstead, in her official capacity with AHCA, signed the FAR that MPI presented to Respondent on April 8, 2015. Ms. Olmstead described MPI’s Medicaid audit of Respondent’s Medicaid claims.3/ Using AHCA's data support system, MPI investigators accessed the complete universe of Respondent’s Medicaid claims. MPI selected the period from April 1, 2011, through October 31, 2013, as the audit period. MPI calculated the amount of overpayment based on its review of a random sample of 35 recipients for whom Respondent submitted 507 claims during the audit period. AHCA then contacted Respondent and requested that he submit documents to substantiate his Medicaid claims for the 35 recipients. In response to AHCA’s request for documents, Respondent provided his records of service and billing for each of the 507 claims for the 35 recipients. AHCA, upon receiving Respondent’s records, forwarded them for a peer review. The peer reviewer evaluated the records and prepared worksheets reflecting a determination regarding the nature of the dental services rendered for each claim, and whether such claim was eligible for payment under the Medicaid program. Based on the peer reviewer’s determination, MPI calculated that Respondent had been overpaid for all claims he presented within the audit period by a total of $177,717.69. After determining that Respondent had been overpaid, AHCA prepared and sent to Respondent a Preliminary Audit Report (“PAR”), dated February 12, 2015. The PAR notified Respondent that the audit revealed that he had been overpaid by $177,717.69. On April 8, 2015, AHCA issued the FAR. The FAR served as AHCA’s final determination that Medicaid had overpaid Respondent. The FAR set forth the following bases for AHCA’s determination that Respondent was overpaid: Documentation Supported a Lower Level of Service (“LL”): The peer review of Respondent’s records revealed that the documentation Respondent submitted for payment did not support level of service for some claims. These claims may involve an established patient that Respondent coded as a new patient (which is billed at a higher level). AHCA believed that Respondent should have used a different code for the service he provided. AHCA considered the Medicaid payments made to Respondent for these services in excess of the appropriate amount an overpayment.4/ No Documentation (“No Doc”): Respondent’s records revealed that some medical services for which Respondent billed and received payment were incomplete or lacked sufficient documentation. AHCA considered the Medicaid payments for these services an overpayment.5/ Not Medically Necessary (“NMN”): The peer review of Respondent’s claims revealed that the documentation did not support the medical necessity of some of the claims Respondent presented for payment. (Respondent explained that this category of claims related to occlusal x-rays he obtained from dental patients for whom he also had taken panorex x-rays. The peer review considered these charges duplicative.) Therefore, AHCA considered the Medicaid payments made to Respondent for these claims an overpayment.6/ Erroneous Coding (“EC”): The peer review of Respondent’s claims revealed that some services rendered were erroneously coded on the submitted claim. These services documented one activity, but another billing code was identified. Consequently, AHCA considered Medicaid payments made to Respondent for claims in excess of the appropriate service an overpayment.7/ Behavioral Management (“BM”) Services Not Reimbursable: The peer review of Respondent’s claims revealed that Respondent did not adequately explain his claims for BM services. Respondent should not have requested payment for BM without explaining why BM was used or the specific type of BM techniques utilized for treatment. Furthermore, the peer review determined that Respondent should not have included BM in his claim if he also billed for either sedation or analgesia on the same date of service. AHCA considered Medicaid payments made to Respondent for these BM claims an overpayment.8/ The FAR also notified Respondent that AHCA had calculated and was seeking to assess a fine of $35,543.54 (since lowered to $34,192.30). Ms. Olmstead explained that, in accordance with section 409.913(15), (16), and (17) and rule 59G- 9.070, AHCA must apply sanctions for violations of federal and state laws, including Medicaid policy. AHCA determined to sanction Respondent in the form of an administrative fine. After determining that Respondent had been overpaid for Medicaid claims, AHCA prepared a Documentation Worksheet for Imposing Administrative Sanctions (“Worksheet”). The Worksheet was signed on April 7, 2015, by an AHCA investigator. Ms. Olmstead also signed the Worksheet after she reviewed and approved the form. The Worksheet specified how AHCA calculated the fine it sought to impose on Respondent for the Medicaid claims violations listed above. As noted on the Worksheet, AHCA found a total of 58 claims violated Medicaid laws, policies, and rules. The specific number of claims in violation were: lower level of service 38; no documentation, 9; not medically necessary, 8; error in coding, 2; and behavior management/illegal documentation, 1. The Worksheet also contained a section that read: Confirm that you have considered the following via checking the box: I have considered the serious & extent of the violation. I have considered whether there is evidence that the violation is continuing after written notice. I have considered whether the violation impacted the quality of medical care provided to Medicaid recipients. I have considered whether the licensing agency in any state in which the provider operates or has operated has taken any action against the provider. If the sanction to be imposed is suspension or termination, I have considered whether the sanction will impact access by recipients to Medicaid services. The AHCA investigator placed a checkmark by each consideration. AHCA did not use any additional forms or methods to document its consideration of these factors. AHCA did not provide the Worksheet to Respondent with the FAR. The Worksheet is an internal AHCA document the investigator and administrator use to calculate the amount of a fine. However, AHCA did include in the FAR the final monetary sanction which AHCA calculated on the Worksheet ($35,543.54). Ms. Olmstead stated that AHCA considered Respondent’s failure to comply with Medicaid laws a “first offense.” Pursuant to rule 59G-9.070(7)(e), AHCA shall impose a $1,000 fine per claim found to be in violation for a first offense. Accordingly, based on the 58 claims reviewed for the audit, AHCA calculated a fine of $58,000.00. Thereafter, rule 59G-9.070(4)(a) instructs AHCA to limit the monetary sanction for a “first offense” violation of Medicaid laws under rule 59G-9.070(7)(e) to twenty percent of the amount of the overpayment. Thus, AHCA reduced the amount of the fine it seeks to impose on Respondent to $34,192.30. Finally, Ms. Olmstead testified that the FAR cited to several documents that AHCA distributes to guide and inform providers of the types of services that the Medicaid program covers and how to correctly bill Medicaid for these services. The documents applicable to this matter are: the 2007 Florida Medicaid Dental Services Coverages and Limitations Handbook; the 2008 Florida Medicaid Provider General Handbook; the 2011 Florida Medicaid Dental Services Coverages and Limitations Handbook; and the 2012 Florida Medicaid Provider General Handbook. Respondent testified on his own behalf. Respondent testified that this Medicaid audit was the first he has experienced. Prior to this matter, he has never been fined or sanctioned for any violations of the Medicaid program. Respondent also emphasized that this Medicaid audit did not show that he ever rendered sub-quality dental care to any of his patients. Respondent acknowledged that he currently receives the Medicaid Handbooks electronically. Respondent conceded that he is bound to adhere to the Medicaid guidelines in the Handbooks. Respondent offered the following explanations for the claims he submitted which resulted in the overpayments: Not Medically Necessary: Respondent understood that AHCA determined that his claims for occlusal x-rays were considered duplicative. Respondent explained that the occlusal x-rays reveal tooth decay and disease that panorex x-rays do not. Furthermore, Respondent’s use of the occlusal x-rays did not result in any harm to his patients. On the contrary, Respondent expressed that these x-rays only enhanced the services and treatment he provided to his patients. Behavioral Management (“BM”) Services: The BM fee compensates the provider for the effort and time it takes to prepare a patient for dental treatment or control the patient during treatment. In many cases, if Respondent cannot employ BM techniques, he cannot render effective dental treatment. Respondent charges approximately $35 for BM services. Insufficient Records: Respondent stated that the medical notes and records that his office maintains meet or exceed Florida standards. However, certain of his records apparently did not comply with Medicaid program requirements. Respondent further asserted that AHCA never alleged that he sought payment for services he never delivered or were not completed. Sabrina Blake is the office manager for Respondent’s dental practice. As part of her responsibilities, she handles billing practice inquiries. Regarding AHCA’s claim of insufficient records to support the BM charges, Ms. Blake explained that Respondent marked “BM” on the patients’ records to indicate that a behavior management technique was used. The error was that Respondent did not write out exactly what behavior management technique was used during the treatment. Medicaid rules required additional information or documentation. Therefore, while Respondent’s practice did not provide the requisite notation to support a Medicaid payment for BM charges, Respondent did actually provide the service claimed. Respondent stated that AHCA never provided him the opportunity to correct any alleged violations or billing errors. Respondent claims that none of the disallowed charges or medical services were submitted to intentionally obtain an unauthorized payment from the Medicaid program. AHCA did not produce evidence to contradict Respondent’s assertion. Prior to the final hearing, the parties entered into an agreement wherein Respondent agreed to repay to AHCA the full amount of the overpayment Respondent received from the Medicaid program.9/ Based on the overpayment, AHCA seeks to impose on Respondent an administrative fine of $34,192.30. Accordingly, the primary issue for the undersigned to consider is whether AHCA is authorized under the applicable law to impose on Respondent an administrative sanction in the form of a fine as a result of his violation of Medicaid laws, rules, or policy. Based on the evidence presented at the final hearing, AHCA proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent failed to comply with provisions of the Medicaid laws.10/ As detailed below, section 409.913 and rule 59G-9.070 authorize AHCA to impose a fine on Respondent in the amount of $34,192.30 based on his violations of the Medicaid program. Consequently, a fine of $34,192.30 should be assessed against Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that AHCA issue a final order imposing an administrative fine of $34,192.30 for Respondent’s first offense of violating provisions of Medicaid provider publications adopted by AHCA rules, Florida or federal laws or regulations governing the Medicaid program, or the provider’s Medicaid agreement with AHCA. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of March, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of March, 2016.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent must repay Petitioner an amount of up to $144,471.25 in alleged Medicaid overpayments, for paid claims covering the period from January 1, 2010, to December 31, 2012.
Findings Of Fact AHCA is the agency responsible for administering Medicaid in the state of Florida. VMC was, at all relevant times, an enrolled Medicaid provider authorized to receive reimbursement for covered goods and services rendered to Medicaid beneficiaries. Exercising its statutory authority to oversee the integrity of Medicaid, the Agency conducted a review of VMC's medical records to verify that claims paid by Medicaid during the period from January 1, 2010, to December 31, 2012 (the "Audit Period"), had not exceeded authorized amounts. During the Audit Period, VMC had submitted claims for 9,783 discrete billable goods or services ("BGOSs") rendered to 1,313 patients (or recipients), on which Medicaid had paid a total of $459,572.82. Rather than examine the records of all 1,313 recipients served, the Agency selected a sample of 35 patients, whose records were reviewed first by a nurse consultant, and then by a physician "peer reviewer." VMC had submitted claims for 302 BGOSs during the Audit Period in connection with the 35 patients in the sample population. Medicaid had paid a total of $13,909.94 on these claims. The Agency's reviewers determined that, for various reasons, VMC had received a total of $6,901.64 in reimbursement of claims in the sample for services not covered by Medicaid, in whole or in part. Having discovered this alleged "empirical overpayment" of $6,901.64, the Agency employed a statistical formula for cluster sampling——for purposes of which a "cluster" comprises all claims relating to an individual patient in the sample population——to ascertain the alleged "probable total overpayment" that VMC had received from Medicaid for the 9,783 BGOSs presented in the totality of claims submitted during the Audit Period.1/ The statistical analysis revealed a probable total overpayment of $179,660.46, with a 95 percent probability that the actual overpayment is equal to or greater than such amount. (As discussed below, VMC disputes the cluster sampling methodology that AHCA used in determining the probable total overpayment based on the empirical overpayment associated with the sample population.) Shortly before the final hearing, based on documents which VMC belatedly produced, the Agency revised its preliminary adjudication of certain claims associated with four of the patients in the sample population, resulting in a reduction of the alleged empirical overpayment to $5,976.00. AHCA's statistical formula extended this figure to VMC's entire patient population for the Audit Period, calculating a total probable overpayment of $144,471.25. VMC does not dispute every one of AHCA's preliminary adjudications. To begin, for five recipients (Patient Nos. 15, 17, 19, 21, and 28) AHCA found no overpayments. Thus, none of the claims presented for BGOSs furnished to these patients is in dispute. In many additional instances, VMC agrees not only with the Agency's determination that Medicaid paid too much for a particular BGOS (or "encounter" as VMC refers to an individual good or service for which a claim was submitted), but also with the amount of the alleged overpayment. As a result of these admissions, none of the claims presented for BGOSs furnished to Patient Nos. 2, 9, 11, 13, 16, 25, and 34 is in dispute. In some instances, VMC suggests that the empirical overpayment for a particular BGOS should be more than the amount that AHCA has alleged. The sum of these suggested additional overpayments ("SAOs") is $303.19. Owing to VMC's inculpatory suggestions of insufficiently aggressive recoupment, it is undisputed that all of the overpayments AHCA has alleged in connection with the claims submitted for the treatment of Patient Nos. 3, 10, 23, 24, 26, and 32 are, in fact, overpayments. In sum, out of 35 patients in the sample population, only 17 involve one or more disputed encounters, where the existence of an overpayment must be decided. As for the 18 patients listed in the two preceding paragraphs, all of the overpayments alleged in those clusters are accepted as such based on the evidence presented, including the Agency's work papers and VMC's admissions, leaving only the question of what to do about the SAOs. All told, VMC admits having received an empirical overpayment of at least $2,488.50. VMC contends, however, that it was underpaid a total of $27.76 in connection with two BGOSs provided to Patient No. 18. VMC asserts that this alleged underpayment offsets the admitted overpayment by an equal amount, so that, in VMC's eyes, the net admitted empirical overpayment (taking into account the SAOs totaling $303.19) is $2,763.93.2/ VMC disputes the Agency's determinations regarding 55 specific BGOSs. Of these, AHCA found in 48 instances that the particular service which VMC had provided was not medically necessary. These 48 determinations relate to ten separate diagnostic procedures. AHCA further found a single instance of incomplete documentation in connection with one of those same ten procedures, bringing to 49 the total number of disputed adjudications pertaining to ten different procedures. Four disputed Agency determinations relate to what are known as "evaluation and management services" ("E/M services") provided (a) in the doctor's office or other outpatient setting to new or established patients or (b) to patients in hospitals. E/M services are billed to Medicaid using codes that reflect the intensity level of service provided. The codes are called "CPT codes"——"CPT" being short for Current Procedural Terminology®, a registered trademark of the American Medical Association, which developed and keeps up-to-date this widely used system for reporting medical procedures and services. Medicaid reimburses providers for E/M services pursuant to fee schedules that specify the amount payable for each level of service according to the CPT codes. It is the provider's responsibility, in presenting a claim to Medicaid for payment, to determine the appropriate CPT code for the service provided. Medicaid generally pays claims upon receipt, without second-guessing the provider's judgment regarding the level of care. When the Agency conducts an investigation to determine possible overpayment to a provider, however, one thing it might review is whether the provider's claims were properly "coded"—— that is, whether the CPT codes on the bills accurately reflected the level of service provided to the patients, as documented in the medical records. If the Agency determines that the level of service provided was lower than that claimed, then it will "downcode" the claim to the proper level and seek to recoup from the provider, as an overpayment, the difference between what Medicaid paid on the claim as originally coded and what it would have paid on the claim as downcoded. In this case, four of the 55 disputed claim determinations involve a downcode. Collectively, these four disputed items total $13.55. In two instances involving Patient No. 18, VMC agrees with AHCA's determination that there was no overpayment for the BGOS in question, but it asserts that Medicaid paid too little on the claims, which could have been billed under higher paying codes. As mentioned above, these alleged underpayments ("UPs") total $27.76. The table below summarizes the disputed overpayments, sorted by disputed overpayment ("OP") amount per patient (largest to smallest): Pt. # Disputed OP (w/SAOs) Admitted OP (w/SAOs) Alleged OP Number of Disputed BGOSs Number of SAOs Amount of SAOs Number of alleged UPs Amount of Claimed UP 22 545.00 401.83 946.83 8 7 523.79 57.75 581.54 5 35 466.10 112.83 578.93 7 6 376.65 91.89 468.54 5 1 15.98 31 194.88 73.21 268.09 3 1 14.85 27 157.73 479.12 636.85 2 8 157.73 12.85 170.58 2 5 153.54 16.61 170.15 4 18 150.97 280.56 431.53 5 2 -27.76 4 106.29 38.85 145.14 1 33 105.44 182.80 288.24 2 14 89.94 120.37 210.31 1 1 20.60 20 84.39 264.56 348.95 6 11 168.79 12 51.09 0 51.09 1 30 47.53 0 47.53 1 29 35.46 50.99 86.45 1 1 15.98 1 4.77 0 4.77 1 Subtotal 3,251.30 2,184.22 5,435.52 55 15 236.20 2 -27.76 Pt. # Disputed OP (w/SAOs) Admitted OP (w/SAOs) Alleged OP Number of Disputed BGOSs Number of SAOs Amount of SAOs Number of alleged UPs Amount of Claimed UP 2 0 23.32 23.32 9 0 23.32 23.32 11 0 37.58 37.58 13 0 32.57 32.57 16 0 33.10 33.10 25 0 46.85 46.85 34 0 36.14 36.14 Subtotal 0 232.88 232.88 32 (1.50) 37.64 36.14 1 1.50 26 (2.00) 203.04 201.04 1 2.00 3 (15.56) 37.64 22.08 1 15.56 24 (15.97) 34.13 18.16 1 15.97 10 (15.98) 31.07 15.09 1 15.98 23 (15.98) 31.07 15.09 1 15.98 Subtotal (66.99) 374.59 307.60 6 66.99 15 n/a 0 17 n/a 0 19 n/a 0 21 n/a 0 28 n/a 0 TOTAL 3,184.31 2,791.69 5,976.00 55 21 303.19 2 -27.76 Before addressing the disputed BGOSs, two subjects will be resolved, to further refine the issues. First, the undersigned has decided that each of the 21 separate SAOs should be treated as no more or less than corroboration that the alleged overpayment is correct——not used as a basis for increasing the amount AHCA alleges is due. Thus, for example, if AHCA alleged that the overpayment for a particular encounter was $36.14 and VMC offered evidence that the overpayment for that encounter was actually $37.64, the undersigned will find that the undisputed overpayment is $36.14. As a result, nothing else needs to be decided in regard to any of the claims presented for BGOSs furnished to Patient Nos. 3, 10, 23, 24, 26, and 32. Second, the undersigned rejects VMC's assertion that the empirical overpayment should be reduced by a total of $27.76 because it provided BGOSs to Patient No. 18 for which it did not bill Medicaid enough.3/ This reduces the number of disputed encounters from 55 to 53. The table below summarizes the disputed overpayments after taking account of the foregoing determinations, sorted by disputed overpayment amount per patient (largest to smallest): Pt. # Disputed OP Admitted OP Alleged OP Number of Disputed BGOSs 22 545.00 401.83 946.83 8 7 523.79 57.75 581.54 5 35 466.10 112.83 578.93 7 6 392.63 75.91 468.54 5 20 253.18 95.77 348.95 6 31 209.73 58.36 268.09 3 27 157.73 479.12 636.85 2 8 157.73 12.85 170.58 2 5 153.54 16.61 170.15 4 18 150.97 280.56 431.53 3 14 110.54 99.77 210.31 1 4 106.29 38.85 145.14 1 33 105.44 182.80 288.24 2 29 51.44 35.01 86.45 1 12 51.09 0 51.09 1 30 47.53 0 47.53 1 1 4.77 0 4.77 1 Subtotal 3,487.50 1,948.02 5,435.52 53 2 0 23.32 23.32 0 3 0 22.08 22.08 0 9 0 23.32 23.32 0 10 0 15.09 15.09 0 11 0 37.58 37.58 0 13 0 32.57 32.57 0 16 0 33.10 33.10 0 23 0 15.09 15.09 0 24 0 18.16 18.16 0 25 0 46.85 46.85 0 Pt. # Disputed OP Admitted OP Alleged OP Number of Disputed BGOSs 26 0 201.04 201.04 0 32 0 36.14 36.14 0 34 0 36.14 36.14 0 Subtotal 0 540.48 540.48 0 15 n/a 0 n/a 17 n/a 0 n/a 19 n/a 0 n/a 21 n/a 0 n/a 28 n/a 0 n/a TOTAL 3,487.50 2,488.50 5,976.00 53 Each side presented opinion testimony regarding the compensability of the disputed BGOSs under Medicaid. On the question of medical necessity, AHCA's medical expert was Ronald Machado, M.D., upon whose testimony, together with the notations of the Agency's nurse reviewer appearing in the audit worksheets, AHCA relies in support of its overpayment allegations. VMC's medical expert was Dr. Michael Sterns, whose written opinions were presented through the report of L. Lamar Blount, a health-care consultant who, at VMC's request, conducted a shadow audit of the claims AHCA had examined. To assist in his review, Mr. Blount engaged the services of a coding specialist (Rae Freeman) and a statistician (Frank Collins) in addition to Dr. Sterns. The undersigned has considered all of the opinion testimony presented, together with the medical records and other evidence received. Each of the findings that follow is based upon a preponderance of the evidence which the undersigned deemed credible and persuasive, and each constitutes a rejection of other evidence to the extent of any conflict between the finding and such evidence. In determining whether a particular claim should be allowed or disallowed, the undersigned considered, as necessary, the relevant provisions of the pertinent statutes, rules, and Medicaid handbooks, the operative terms of which are identified in the Conclusions of Law following these Findings of Fact. The undersigned's determinations as to each of the disputed BGOSs are set forth below in summary fashion, using abbreviations where possible. This is consistent with the manner in which the parties' respective experts addressed the individual claims. The brevity of the discrete rulings is not a reflection of the attention that has been given each item, all of which were carefully and thoroughly examined. For analytical efficiency, the undersigned sorted the disputed claims by procedure, from highest to lowest overpayment subtotal. The claim-specific findings are presented below in that fashion. The descriptions of the procedures are adapted from the American Medical Association's Physician's Current Procedural Terminology® Handbook. Each disputed claim is identified by Patient Number – Encounter Number ("Pt. # - Enc. #"), using the recipient numbers assigned by AHCA. The Encounter Numbers correspond to the identically designated numbers in column C of Appendix D to Respondent's Exhibit JJ, which in turn match the claim numbers appearing in AHCA's "Listing of All Claims in Sample by recip name" worksheet, a 73- page document attached to the FAR, Petitioner's Exhibit 4. Ultrasound, retroperitoneal (e.g., renal, aorta, nodes), real time with image documentation, complete – CPT 76770. A complete ultrasound examination of the retroperitoneum consists of real time scans of the kidneys, abdominal aorta, common iliac artery origins, and inferior vena cava, including any demonstrated retroperitoneal abnormality. If the clinical history suggests urinary tract pathology, a complete evaluation of the kidneys and urinary bladder also comprises a complete retroperitoneal ultrasound. The undersigned makes the following findings of fact regarding VMC's claims for this BGOS: Pt.# - Enc.# AHCA Determination Disputed Overpayment ALJ Determination of Overpayment – CPT 76770 5-15 NMN 52.00 MN established by diagnosis of microscopic hematuria. 0.00 6-2 NMN 53.44 78-year-old man presents with hematuria and nocturia plus a renal cyst. MN established to rule out BPH (enlarged prostate). 0.00 8-1 NMN 51.44 Patient reports pain and history of kidney stones during review of genitourinary ("GU") system plus low back pain. MN established to rule out recurrence of renal calculi. 0.00 18-12 NMN 51.44 Patient complains of flank pain, giving reason to rule out renal calculi. No evidence that a kidney, ureter, and bladder ("KUB") X-ray would have been cheaper, nor proof that renal US was outside generally accepted standards of medical practice. MN shown. 0.00 18-27 NMN 52.00 Patient continues to complain of unexplained right flank/abdominal pain. Diagnoses of hydronephrosis and renal colic. MN established. 0.00 Pt.# - Enc.# AHCA Determination Disputed Overpayment ALJ Determination of Overpayment – CPT 76770 20-8 NMN 51.44 Patient presents with complaint of dark- colored urine. Dysuria and hematuria noted. MN shown. 0.00 22-2 NMN 53.44 1/11/10 Patient experiencing unexplained hematuria. US revealed two kidney cysts. MN shown. 0.00 22-11 NMN 53.44 7/12/10 US to follow up on kidneys cysts. No documentation of symptoms or need for such close monitoring. NMN 53.44 22-16 NMN 53.44 11/10/10 Repeat US of kidney to monitor cysts. Excess of need for a benign condition. NMN 53.44 22-21 NMN 51.44 11/29/11 Patient presents with hematuria and history of kidney cysts. MN established in light of symptom and need to reexamine the cysts for possible enlargement. 0.00 27-17 NMN 53.44 No reason given for repeat study of kidney after apparently asymptomatic cyst found via renal US on 6/30/10. NMN 53.44 29-4 NMN 51.44 Contemporaneous urinalysis ("UA") found occult blood and renal epithelial cells, warranting study to rule out kidney disease. MN shown. 0.00 31-12 NMN 51.44 Patient in his early 70s complains of dysuria and abdominal pain. US not preceded by review of UA results and prostate exam. NMN 51.44 31-20 NMN 52.00 Progress notes do not provide grounds for this study. NMN 52.00 33-6 NMN 53.44 Patient presents with persistent hematuria notwithstanding treatment of UTI. MN shown. 0.00 33-11 NMN 52.00 Patient reports dysuria and renal colic. MN for US established by new symptoms. 0.00 35-2 NMN 51.44 Progress note reports patient complaint of nephrolithiasis plus hematuria per UA results. MN established. 0.00 35-26 NMN 50.00 Patient presents with undiagnosed hematuria plus absence of menstruation. MN shown. 0.00 Subtotal 938.72 263.76 Echocardiography, transthoracic, real-time with image documentation, complete, with spectral Doppler echocardiography, and with color flow Doppler echocardiography – CPT 93306. A standard echocardiogram is also known as a transthoracic echocardiogram ("TTE"). The echocardiography transducer (or probe) is placed on the chest wall of the patient, and images are taken through the chest wall. This noninvasive procedure allows for the assessment of the overall health of the patient's heart valves and degree of heart muscle contraction, which is an indicator of the ejection fraction. The undersigned makes the following findings of fact regarding VMC's claims for this BGOS: Pt.# - Enc.# AHCA Determination Disputed Overpayment ALJ Determination of Overpayment – CPT 93306 4-3 NMN 106.29 Patient presents with heart murmur and/or rub. TTE ordered to assess left ventricular ejection fraction ("LVEF") and rule out valvular disease of heart, which was confirmed by finding of mitral valve disease. MN shown. 0.00 7-4 NMN 104.29 Patient presents with history of palpitations and chest pain and has a heart murmur on examination. MN for TTE shown. 0.00 8-2 NO DOC 106.29 Patient presents with murmur, palpitation, and chest pain, as documented in progress note. TTE ordered to rule out valvular disease. Echocardiogram Report is in the file. Documentation shown. 0.00 14-4 NMN 110.54 Teenage patient presents with recent history of seizure and loss of consciousness. TTE ordered to rule out mitral valve prolapse. MN shown. 0.00 27-14 NMN 104.29 85-year-old man reports dizziness and has murmur on examination. TTE ordered to rule out worsening of valvular disease and assess LVEF. MN shown. 0.00 31-10 NMN 106.29 Patient presents with heart murmur. TTE one year earlier found numerous abnormalities. TTE ordered to assess function and rule out worsening of condition. MN shown. 0.00 35-23 NMN 104.29 Patient presents with complaint of migraine. No cardiac symptoms. History of mitral valve prolapse indicated. NMN 104.29 Subtotal 742.28 104.29 Duplex scan of lower extremity arteries or arterial bypass grafts, complete bilateral study – CPT 93925. Duplex Doppler ultrasound uses standard ultrasound methods to produce an image of a blood vessel and the surrounding organs. A computer converts the Doppler sounds into a graph that provides information about the speed and direction of blood flow through the blood vessel being evaluated. The undersigned makes the following findings of fact regarding VMC's claims for this BGOS: Pt.# - Enc.# AHCA Determination Disputed Overpayment ALJ Determination of Overpayment – CPT 93925 6-9 NMN 156.21 Patient presents with limb swelling, symptomatic varicose veins, chronic venous insufficiency, and peripheral edema. MN shown. 0.00 7-7 NMN 156.21 Patient presents with limb pain or swelling and symptomatic varicose veins. Diagnoses of peripheral artery disease and venous insufficiency. MN shown. 0.00 35-9 NMN 156.21 Patient presents with lower extremity swelling, chronic venous insufficiency, and peripheral edema; heart murmur noted on exam. MN shown. 0.00 Subtotal 468.63 0.00 Noninvasive physiologic studies of upper or lower extremity arteries, multiple levels or with provocative functional maneuvers, complete bilateral study (e.g., segmental blood pressure measurements, segmental Doppler waveform analysis, segmental volume plethysmography, segmental transcutaneous oxygen tension measurements, measurements with postural provocative tests, measurements with reactive hyperemia) – CPT 93923. The undersigned makes the following findings of fact regarding VMC's claims for this BGOS: Pt.# - Enc.# AHCA Determination Disputed Overpayment ALJ Determination of Overpayment – CPT 93923 6-10 NMN 91.02 Patient presents with limb swelling, symptomatic varicose veins, chronic venous insufficiency, and peripheral edema. This study excessive in combination with lower extremity study of same date. NMN 91.02 7-8 NMN 91.02 Patient presents with limb pain or swelling and symptomatic varicose veins. Diagnoses of peripheral artery disease and venous insufficiency. This study excessive in combination with lower extremity study of same date. NMN 91.02 22-6 NMN 91.02 Patient presents with muscle pain in the left leg but progress note lacks support for this study to check blood flow. NMN 91.02 35-10 NMN 91.02 Patient presents with lower extremity swelling, chronic venous insufficiency, and peripheral edema; heart murmur noted on exam. This study excessive in combination with lower extremity study of same date. NMN 91.02 Subtotal 364.08 364.08 Duplex scan of extremity veins including responses to compression and other maneuvers, complete bilateral study – CPT 93970/93971. The CPT code 93970 is described as a "complete bilateral study." The CPT code 93971 states: "unilateral or limited study." The undersigned makes the following findings of fact regarding VMC's claims for this BGOS: Pt.# - Enc.# AHCA Determination Disputed Overpayment ALJ Determination of Overpayment – CPT 93970/93971 7-5 NMN 122.74 Patient presents with limb pain or swelling and symptomatic varicose veins. Diagnoses of peripheral artery disease and venous insufficiency. This study excessive in combination with lower extremity study of same date. NMN 122.74 22-7 NMN 122.74 Patient presents with muscle pain in the left leg but progress note lacks support for this study. NMN 122.74 22-27 (93971) NMN 70.20 Insufficient support in the progress notes for this study. NMN 70.20 Subtotal 315.68 315.68 Ultrasound, pelvic (nonobstetric), real time with image documentation; complete – CPT 76856. Pelvic ultrasound codes are used for both female and male anatomy. Elements of a complete female pelvic examination include a description and measurement of the uterus and adnexal structures, endometrium, bladder, and of any pelvic pathology (e.g., ovarian cysts, uterine leiomyomata, free pelvic fluid). Elements of a complete male pelvic examination include the evaluation and measurement (when applicable) of the urinary bladder, prostate and seminal vesicles to the extent they are visualized transabdominally, and any pelvic pathology (e.g., bladder tumor, enlarged prostate, free pelvic fluid, pelvic abscess). The undersigned makes the following findings of fact regarding VMC's claims for this BGOS: Pt.# - Enc.# AHCA Determination Disputed Overpayment ALJ Determination of Overpayment – CPT 76856 5-5 NMN 51.09 Patient is reported to have pelvic pain on 5/3/11 and referral to GYN is made. Pelvic pain again noted on 8/24/11. Study performed on 9/13/11 found uterine fibroid. MN established. 0.00 5-16 NMN 47.68 Excessive in light of retroperitoneal US of same date. NMN 47.68 6-4 NMN 51.09 78-year-old man presents with hematuria and nocturia plus a renal cyst. Excessive in light of retroperitoneal US of same date. NMN 51.09 12-2 NMN 51.09 Patient presents complaining of irregular periods, pelvic pain (non- radiating, pressure-like), nausea, and urinary changes for several weeks. MN for study shown. 0.00 20-9 NMN 51.09 Patient presents with complaint of dark-colored urine. Dysuria and hematuria noted. Excessive in light of retroperitoneal US of same date. NMN 51.09 Subtotal 252.04 149.86 Ultrasound, soft tissues of the head and neck (e.g., thyroid, parathyroid, parotid), real time with image documentation – CPT 76536. The undersigned makes the following findings of fact regarding VMC's claims for this BGOS: Pt.# - Enc.# AHCA Determination Disputed Overpayment ALJ Determination of Overpayment – CPT 76536 7-3 NMN 49.53 Patient presents complaining of neck mass and swollen glands. MN shown. 0.00 18-10 NMN 47.53 Patient presents with complaints of memory loss and dizziness. Progress notes reflect presence of carotid bruits and possible neck swelling. Insufficient documentation of grounds for this study. NMN 47.53 20-4 NMN 49.53 Patient presents with swollen glands and physical exam reveals thyroid abnormality. MN established. 0.00 22-30 NMN 49.28 Insufficient documentation of grounds for the study; no mention of history or findings relating to thyroid issue. NMN 49.28 30-1 NMN 47.53 Patient presents with swollen glands and neck lumps, complaining of dizziness, and physical exam reveals thyroid abnormality. MN established. 0.00 Subtotal 243.40 96.81 Ultrasound, abdominal, real time with image documentation, limited (e.g., single organ, quadrant, follow-up) – CPT 76705. The undersigned makes the following findings of fact regarding VMC's claims for this BGOS: Pt.# - Enc.# AHCA Determination Disputed Overpayment ALJ Determination of Overpayment – CPT 76705 6-3 NMN 40.87 78-year-old man presents with hematuria and nocturia plus a renal cyst. Excessive in light of retroperitoneal US of same date. NMN 40.87 20-7 NMN 42.87 Patient presents with complaint of dark-colored urine. Dysuria and hematuria noted. Excessive in light of retroperitoneal US of same date. NMN 42.87 Subtotal 83.74 83.74 Ultrasound, abdominal, real time with image documentation; complete – CPT 76700. A complete ultrasound examination of the abdomen consists of scans of the liver, gallbladder, common bile duct, pancreas, spleen, kidneys and the upper abdominal aorta and inferior vena cava including any demonstrated abdominal abnormality. The undersigned makes the following findings of fact regarding VMC's claims for this BGOS: Pt.# - Enc.# AHCA Determination Disputed Overpayment ALJ Determination of Overpayment – CPT 76700 20-17 NMN 55.01 Patient presents with abdominal pain and abdominal mass related to an incisional hernia. This study was in excess of need in light of CT scan ordered same date. NMN 55.01 Subtotal 55.01 55.01 Electrocardiogram, routine EKG with at least 12 leads; with interpretation and report – CPT 93000. The undersigned makes the following findings of fact regarding VMC's claims for this BGOS: Pt.# - Enc.# AHCA Determination Disputed Overpayment ALJ Determination of Overpayment – CPT 93000 35-25 NMN 10.37 Patient presents with heart murmur. TTE one year earlier found numerous abnormalities. This EKG excessive in combination with TTE ordered on same date to assess function and rule out worsening of condition. NMN 10.37 Subtotal 10.37 10.37 Office or other outpatient visit (established patient) – CPT 99213. This level of care is located in the middle of the coding spectrum for office visits with established patients. Usually the presenting problems are of low to moderate severity. The documentation for this encounter requires two out of three of the following: (1) expanded problem focused history; (2) expanded problem focused examination; and (3) low complexity medical decision making. Physicians typically spend 15 minutes face-to-face with the patient in connection with a 99213-level appointment. In contrast, 99212 is a CPT code for office or other outpatient visit for the evaluation and management of an established patient with a problem focused history and examination, and straightforward medical decision making. The documentation for this encounter requires two out of three of the following: problem focused history; (2) problem focused examination; and (3) straightforward medical decision making. Physicians typically spend ten minutes face-to-face with the patient in connection with a 99212-level appointment. The undersigned makes the following findings of fact regarding VMC's claims for office or other outpatient visits: Pt.# - Enc.# AHCA Determination Disputed Overpayment ALJ Determination of Overpayment – CPT 99213 1-1 LL - 99212 4.77 Problem focused history and exam plus straightforward medical decision making. 99212 4.77 5-6 LL - 99212 2.77 Problem focused history and exam plus straightforward medical decision making. 99212 2.77 35-19 LL - 99212 2.77 Problem focused history and exam plus straightforward medical decision making. 99212 2.77 Subtotal 10.31 10.31 Initial Hospital Care – CPT 99223. The undersigned makes the following findings of fact regarding VMC's claim for a patient being admitted to the hospital: Pt.# - Enc.# AHCA Determination Disputed Overpayment ALJ Determination of Overpayment – CPT 99223 20-20 LL - 99221 3.24 Evidence supports 99221, not 99223 as billed. Applicable Fee Schedule (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) provides for payment of 49.12, not 52.36 as VMC urges. 3.24 Subtotal 3.24 3.24 The table below summarizes the foregoing findings, showing the per-patient overpayments (including both the adjudicated and admitted subtotals per patient, listed in separate columns), sorted from lowest to highest numbered patient: Pt. # ALJ Disallow Admitted OP Finding of OP 1 4.77 0 4.77 2 Undisputed 23.32 23.32 3 Undisputed 22.08 22.08 4 0 38.85 38.85 5 50.45 16.61 67.06 6 182.98 75.91 258.89 7 213.76 57.75 271.51 8 0 12.85 12.85 9 Undisputed 23.32 23.32 10 Undisputed 15.09 15.09 11 Undisputed 37.58 37.58 12 0 0 0 13 Undisputed 32.57 32.57 14 0 99.77 99.77 15 n/a n/a n/a 16 Undisputed 33.10 33.10 17 n/a n/a n/a 18 47.53 280.56 328.09 19 n/a n/a n/a 20 152.21 95.77 247.98 21 n/a n/a n/a 22 440.12 401.83 841.95 23 Undisputed 15.09 15.09 24 Undisputed 18.16 18.16 25 Undisputed 46.85 46.85 26 Undisputed 201.04 201.04 27 53.44 479.12 532.56 Pt. # ALJ Disallow Admitted OP Finding of OP 28 n/a n/a n/a 29 0 35.01 35.01 30 0 0 0 31 103.44 58.36 161.80 32 Undisputed 36.14 36.14 33 0 182.80 182.80 34 Undisputed 36.14 36.14 35 208.45 112.83 321.28 TOTAL 1,457.15 2,488.50 3,945.65 Thus, the undersigned finds that the entire empirical overpayment for the Audit Period is $3,945.65, an amount that comprises $1,457.15 as the sum of all adjudicated overpayments and $2,488.50 as the sum of all admitted overpayments. To be clear, each of the numbers in the "ALJ Disallow" column above is based on findings supported by a preponderance of the evidence. The figure of $1,457.15 is not supported, however, by clear and convincing evidence. The grand total of $3,945.65 is, more likely than not, the correct empirical overpayment for the claims in the sample population. The figure of $3,945.65 is not supported, however, by clear and convincing evidence. As mentioned above, AHCA determines the probable total overpayment based upon the empirical overpayment observed in the sample population, using a statistical formula for cluster sampling to extend the empirical data to the provider's entire patient population. AHCA is statutorily authorized to use generally accepted statistical methods in making a determination of overpayment to a provider, and to offer the results of such statistical methods as proof of overpayment.4/ The formula that AHCA uses is reproduced below: VMC contends that the statistical formula upon which AHCA has relied produces less accurate results than other methods that could have been used, and that AHCA made mistakes when it employed the formula in this case. The latter argument is rejected as contrary to the persuasive evidence, which shows that AHCA correctly performed the calculations required to implement the statistical formula for cluster sampling. As for the efficacy of the Agency's formula, the undersigned accepts that there are other statistical methodologies that AHCA could use, and that it would be possible to obtain a more accurate result using other methods. The Agency does not dispute this. But, according to AHCA's expert witness, Dr. Fred Huffer, a statistician whose testimony the undersigned credits with qualifications as explained below, increasing the accuracy of the statistical methodology most likely would result in a higher probable total overpayment because there is supposed to be only a five percent chance that the figure AHCA's formula produces is too high. The undersigned determines that the statistical formula for cluster sampling that AHCA uses is a generally accepted, valid, and reliable method of extending the overpayment observed in a sample population to the entire relevant population. That said, there is less to the relative persuasiveness of the number produced by the Agency's formula than meets the eye. The confidence level of 95 percent assumes that every numerical value going in to the formula is absolutely (not just probably) true. For some of the values, i.e., F, Bi, U, and N, this degree of confidence (namely, 100 percent) is justified. For others, i.e., Ai, it clearly is not. The total overpayment in the sample cluster is not an objective truth, such as the number of clusters in the random sample, or a mathematical constant such as pi. Rather, each alleged overpaid claim in the sample reflects a judgment by AHCA (or more precisely its medical reviewers) founded on findings of historical fact, legal conclusions, and determinations of ultimate fact. Indeed, each figure contributing to the total empirical overpayment numerically represents an ultimate factual determination based upon the application (and interpretation when necessary) of Medicaid rules to a limited body of evidence——mostly medical records——of past events. Of none (or very few) of those figures can it be said with 100 percent certainty that the number is absolutely (not just probably) true. No one involved in the decision making process is omniscient or infallible. As here, the provider may dispute some or all of AHCA's preliminary adjudications of the claims behind the total alleged overpayment in the sample cluster and demand a hearing, at which each (disputed) individual overpayment in the sample cluster must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. The standard of proof being what it is, the Agency does not need to prove each of the disputed overpayments to an absolute certainty. To recoup an overpayment, it is sufficient for AHCA to show with a 51 percent probability that the amount alleged to have been overpaid for a given claim is, in fact, the amount overpaid. In the paragraphs above, the undersigned has set forth his findings regarding the disputed claims. Each individual finding of an overpayment reflects the undersigned's determination that the disallowed amount is, more likely than not, the correct adjudication of the disputed claim. There is, in the undersigned's estimation, approximately a 60 percent probability that the sum of all adjudicated overpayments ($1,457.15) is the correct figure, which satisfies the preponderance of evidence standard. In contrast, the undersigned estimates that there is approximately an 80 percent probability that the sum of all admitted overpayments ($2,488.50) is the correct figure, meaning that this portion of the empirical overpayment was established by clear and convincing evidence. This discussion of the undersigned's relative confidence in the overpayment findings made in this Recommended Order is meant to demonstrate that using the figure $3,945.65 as the value Ai in the Agency's formula for cluster sampling, while consistent with the standard of proof for an action to recoup an overpayment, nevertheless injects uncertainty into the equation, which logically must reduce the confidence level in the formula's outcome from 95 percent to something less than that.5/ Based on the instant record, the undersigned cannot quantify the probable accuracy of the formula's output, as applied to the facts found here. The bottom line is that although the undersigned finds AHCA's statistical formula to be a sufficiently reliable method of calculating, to the degree of certainty required under the preponderance of evidence standard of proof, the total probable overpayment to VMC, the formula's output (in this instance) does not satisfy the stricter clear and convincing standard.6/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that AHCA: Recalculate the probable total overpayment using the statistical formula for cluster sampling to extend the empirical overpayment of $3,945.65 in the sample population to the entire population during the Audit Period. Make a preliminary determination of the amount of costs that may be recovered from VMC, taking into consideration the financial resources, earning ability, and needs of VMC to the extent VMC demonstrates such factors. Remand the matter to DOAH for an evidentiary hearing on recovery of costs if necessary. Enter a final order directing VMC to repay the Agency the total probable overpayment as recalculated using the findings herein, plus statutory interest, for paid claims covering the period from January 1, 2010, to December 31, 2012; imposing an administrative fine against VMC in the amount of $5,000; and taxing recoverable costs, full payment of these monies to be due within 30 days after the rendition of the final order and payable on the Agency's instructions. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of April, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of April, 2015
The Issue The issue to be decided is the amount to be paid by Petitioner to Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA"), out of her settlement proceeds, as reimbursement for past Medicaid expenditures pursuant to section 409.910, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Alia Juarez ("Alia") was born on September 12, 2016. A few hours after birth, Alia was found, in the arms of a relative in her mother's hospital room, to be unresponsive and not breathing. She was resuscitated, but suffered catastrophic brain damage as a result of lack of oxygen. Due to the catastrophic and permanent brain damage, Alia is unable to ambulate, communicate, toilet, eat or care for herself in any manner. She is completely dependent on others for every aspect of her daily life. Alia's medical care related to the injury was paid by Medicaid and Medicaid provided $168,054.34 in benefits. Accordingly, Alia's entire claim for past medical expenses was in the amount of $168,054.34. Alia's parents and natural guardians, Sandra Perez Luna and Jose Luis Juarez, brought a medical malpractice claim against the medical providers responsible for Alia's care ("Defendants") to recover all of Alia's damages associated with her injuries, as well as their own damages associated with their daughter's injuries. The medical malpractice claim against the Defendants was settled for a lump sum unallocated settlement of $925,000. Due to Alia being a minor, court approval of the settlement was required and the court approved the settlement by Order of November 26, 2018. As a condition of Alia's eligibility for Medicaid, Alia assigned to AHCA her right to recover from liable third-parties medical expenses paid by Medicaid. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(H) and § 409.910(6)(b), Fla. Stat. During the pendency of Alia's medical malpractice claim, AHCA was notified of the claim. AHCA did not "institute, intervene in, or join in" the medical malpractice action to enforce its rights as provided in section 409.910(11), or participate in any aspect of Alia's medical malpractice claim against the Defendants. Instead, AHCA asserted a $168,054.34 Medicaid lien against Alia's cause of action and settlement of that action. Application of the formula at section 409.910(11)(f) to Alia's $925,000 settlement requires payment to AHCA of the full $168,054.34 Medicaid lien. Petitioner presented the testimony of Alfred R. Bell, Jr., Esquire, a Florida attorney with 22 years' experience in personal injury law, including medical malpractice. Mr. Bell is board-certified in Civil Trial by the Florida Bar. He represented Alia and her family in the medical malpractice action. As a routine part of his practice, he makes assessments concerning the value of damages suffered by injured clients. He also stays abreast of jury verdicts in his area by reviewing jury verdict reporters and discussing cases with other trial attorneys. He was accepted as an expert in valuation of damages without objection. Mr. Bell explained the seriousness of Alia's injuries, stating that within a few hours of being born, Alia went from a healthy baby to a child who will never have a normal life. Mr. Bell testified that Alia is unable to swallow and requires suction every five to 15 minutes and will be dependent on others for her care for the remainder of her life. "I can't think of much worse to have happened to a child than the damages that she suffered," said Mr. Bell. The damages of Alia's parents are similarly catastrophic. Mr. Bell testified that he had reviewed life care plans and economist reports in cases involving similar injuries to children and the present value of Alia's future needs would approach $20 million. Further, her lost ability to earn money in the future would have a present value of $1.7 million. Mr. Bell testified that to these economic damages, the value of Alia's noneconomic damages would be added. Mr. Bell outlined that the "worst damage in my opinion that she sustained isn't an economic damage, it's the damage to the person because that's something that you can't give them back what's been taken away." Mr. Bell testified that Alia's noneconomic damages would have a similar significant value. Based on his training and experience, including the review of jury verdicts in comparable cases, Mr. Bell opined that the damages recoverable in Alia's case had a conservative value of $20 million. Petitioner also presented the testimony of R. Vinson Barrett, Esquire, a Tallahassee trial attorney with more than 40 years' experience. His practice is dedicated to plaintiff's personal injury, as well as medical malpractice, medical products liability, and pharmaceutical products liability. He has handled cases involving catastrophic brain injury to children and handles jury trials. He routinely makes assessments concerning the value of damages suffered by injured parties. He was accepted as an expert in the valuation of damages without objection. Based on his training and experience, Mr. Barrett opined that Alia's damages are conservatively valued in excess of $20 million. He testified that Alia's economic damages alone would have a value of $20 million and then, her noneconomic damages would also have a value of $20 million alone. In regard to the noneconomic damages, Mr. Barrett testified that the jury verdicts in cases comparable to that of Alia's case support his valuation of Alia's damages--noting that the average noneconomic award alone in those comparable verdicts was $19.4 million. Both experts testified that using $20 million as the value of all damages, Alia only recovered 4.63 percent of the value of her damages. Accordingly, they opined that it would be reasonable, rational, and conservative to allocate 4.63 percent of the settlement, or $7,780.92, to past medical expenses paid by AHCA through the Medicaid program. AHCA did not call any witnesses, present any evidence as to the value of damages, propose a different valuation of the damages, or contest the methodology used to calculate the allocation to past medical expenses. In short, Petitioner's evidence was unrebutted. The testimony from Mr. Bell and Mr. Barrett is compelling and persuasive. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Petitioner has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that $7,780.92 of the settlement represents reimbursement for past medical expenses.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner was overpaid by the Medicaid program as set forth in Petitioner's Final Agency Audit Report dated June 12, 2006 for the period January 1, 2002 through December 31, 2004.
Findings Of Fact AHCA audited certain of Dr. Negrette's Medicaid claims pertaining to services rendered between January 1, 2002 and December 31, 2004, hereinafter the audit period. Dr. Negrette was an authorized Medicaid provider during the audit period. During the audit period, Dr. Negrette had been issued Medicaid provider number 061422000. No dispute exists that, during the audit period, Dr. Negrette had a valid Medicaid Provider Agreement with AHCA. For services provided during the audit period, Dr. Negrette received in excess $79,523.70 in payments for services to Medicaid recipients. By a preliminary audit report dated August 25, 2005, AHCA notified Dr. Negrette that a preliminary determination was made that he was overpaid by the Medicaid program in the amount of $137,051.25. Subsequently, by a FAR dated June 12, 2006, AHCA notified Dr. Negrette that, after a review of all documentation submitted, it determined that he had been overpaid by the Medicaid program in the amount of $79,523.70, thus, reducing the amount of the overpayment. The FAR further provided how the overpayment was calculated using a sample of the claims submitted during the audit period, including the statistical formula for cluster sampling; and indicated that the statistical formula was generally accepted and that the statistical formula showed an overpayment in the amount of $79,523.70, with a 95 percent probability of correctness. Dr. Negrette agrees that the mathematical computation of the audit is correct.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding that Jesus Negrette, M.D., received overpayments from the Medicaid program in the amount of $79,523.70, during the audit period January 1, 2002 through December 31, 2004, and requiring Jesus Negrette, M.D., to repay the amount of overpayment. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of February, 2007.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner must reimburse the Respondent for Medicaid overpayments as set out in the Amended Final Agency Audit Report dated November 13, 2000, and, if so, the amount to be repaid.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Agency is the state agency responsible for the administration of the Medicaid program in Florida, and, as one of its duties, the Agency is charged with recovering overpayments made to Medicaid providers. Section 409.913, Florida Statutes (2000). At all times material to this proceeding, Peripheral Medical Services provided durable medical equipment and home health services to Medicaid recipients in Florida pursuant to a contract with the Agency, and it was assigned Medicaid provider number 950348000.2 The Medicaid Provider Agreement entered into by Peripheral Medical Services provides in pertinent part: The Provider agrees to participate in the Florida Medicaid program under the following terms and conditions: * * * (5) The Medicaid provider shall: * * * (b) Keep and maintain in a systematic and orderly manner all medical and Medicaid related records as the Agency may require and as it determines necessary; make available for state and federal audits for five years, complete and accurate medical, business, and fiscal records that fully justify and disclose the extent of the goods and services rendered and billings made under the Medicaid program. The provider agrees that only contemporaneously made records of goods and services provided will be admissible in evidence in any proceeding relating to payment for or provision of services for the purpose of supporting any claim submitted to or paid by the Medicaid program. After the Agency received a routine report from its Medicaid Program Office located in Miami, Florida, the Agency conducted an audit of the claims submitted by Peripheral Medical Services for the 27 Medicaid recipients to whom it provided oxygen durable medical equipment and services during the audit period extending from August 5, 1996, to July 6, 1998. Pursuant to certificates of medical necessity, Peripheral Medical Services provided each of the 27 Medicaid recipients with an oxygen concentrator during the audit period, and it submitted Medicaid claims for monthly visits to each of these patients. During the period of time covered by the audit, Peripheral Medical Services received payments for services provided to the 27 Medicaid recipients in an amount totaling $76,926.74. Peripheral Medical Services maintained patient records for these 27 Medicaid recipients, and, during the audit, it provided the Agency with the patient records as documentation to support the claims. At the times material to this proceeding, the DME/Medical Supply Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook governing "Oxygen and Oxygen Related Equipment" provided in pertinent part: "Monthly Home Visit Requirements: When the CRTT, RRT or RN conducts a home visit, the following information about the recipient's condition and the condition of the equipment must be documented in the recipient's record: . . . the monthly checks of the operation and safety of the equipment." The Agency's inspector compared the patient records to the list of claims submitted by Peripheral Medical Services for which it received payment from Medicaid, and he reached the following conclusions, which were memorialized in the audit work papers and the summary report he prepared: Peripheral Medical Services made 21 claims for payment for monthly visits to patient M.C., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at 14 of the visits; $3,639.90 of the $6,106.80 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made 12 claims for payment for monthly visits to patient C.M., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at eight of the visits; $2,498.20 of the $3,747.30 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made 14 claims for payment for monthly visits to patient J.P-O., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at eight of the visits; $2,498.20 of the $4,340.55 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made 13 claims for payment for monthly visits to patient F.A., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at eight of the visits; $2,361.63 of the $3,915.18 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made 20 claims for payment for monthly visits to patient N.V., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at 12 of the visits; $3,595.18 of the $6,061.98 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made ten claims for payment for monthly visits to patient M.P., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at six of the visits; $1,325.22 of the $2,270.36 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made one claim for payment for a monthly visit to patient M.A., and it provided documentation establishing that a check of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators was performed at this visit; the payment made by Medicaid was supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made one claim for payment for a monthly visit to patient M.B., and it provided documentation establishing that a check of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators was performed at this visit; the payment made by Medicaid was supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made 21 claims for payment for monthly visits to patient R.Q., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at 15 of the visits; $4,172.69 of the $6,015.04 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made 19 claims for payment for monthly visits to patient M.P., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at 12 of the visits; $3,975.64 of the $5,833.64 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made 11 claims for payment for monthly visits to patient E.D., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at six of the visits; $1,813.19 of the $3,366.74 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made 15 claims for payment for monthly visits to patient I.S., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at ten of the visits; $2,679.60 of the $4,233.15 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made five claims for payment for monthly visits to patient R.G., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at any of the visits; the entire $1,522.25 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made one claim for payment for a monthly visit to patient R.B., and it provided documentation establishing that a check of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators was performed at this visit; the payment made by Medicaid was supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made two claims for payment for monthly visits to patient A.A., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that a check of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators was performed at one of the visits; $320.10 of the $640.20 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made one claim for payment for a monthly visit to patient L.B., and it provided documentation establishing that a check of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators was performed at this visit; the payment made by Medicaid was supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made 20 claims for payment for monthly visits to patient D.C., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at 14 of the visits; $3,868.24 of the $5,726.24 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made one claim for payment for a monthly visit to patient D.M., and it provided documentation establishing that a check of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators was performed at this visit; the payment made by Medicaid was supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made one claim for payment for a monthly visit to patient K.R., and it provided documentation establishing that a check of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators was performed at this visit; the payment made by Medicaid was supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made 16 claims for payment for monthly visits to patient D.G., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at ten of the visits; $2,954.88 of the $4,812.88 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made 23 claims for payment for monthly visits to patient M.V., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at 15 of the visits; $4,172.69 of the $6,639.59 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made one claim for payment for a monthly visit to patient L.F., and it provided documentation establishing that a check of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators was performed at this visit; the payment made by Medicaid was supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made six claims for payment for monthly visits to patient R.N., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at any of the visits; the entire $1,920.60 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made 22 claims for payment for monthly visits to patient T.P., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at 15 of the visits; $4,172.69 of the $6,335.14 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made nine claims for payment for monthly visits to patient A.V., but it failed to provide documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at eight of the visits; $1,889.30 of the $2,102.70 paid by Medicaid was not supported by documentation. Peripheral Medical Services made two claims for payment for monthly visits to patient R.P., and it provided documentation establishing that checks of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators were performed at these visits; the payments made by Medicaid were supported by documentation. aa. Peripheral Medical Services made one claim for payment for a monthly visit to patient E.R., and it provided documentation establishing that a check of the operation and safety of the oxygen concentrators was performed at this visit; the payment made by Medicaid was supported by documentation. The patient records provided by Peripheral Medical Services do not contain documentation that the required operation and safety checks were performed in the months identified by the Agency in its audit work papers, and the Agency's calculations of the amounts paid by Medicaid that are subject to recoupment are supported by the summary report prepared by the Agency's inspector, as well as by the Agency's summary report. Peripheral Medical Services received payments totalling $49,380.20 from Medicaid on claims not supported by documentation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding that Peripheral Medical Services, Inc., was overpaid for services provided to Medicaid recipients for the audit period extending from August 5, 1996, to July 6, 1998, and requiring Peripheral Medical Services, Inc., to repay the Agency for Health Care Administration the principal amount of $49,380.20. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of November, 2001.
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Petitioner is the state agency that administers the Florida Medicaid program, which includes pharmacies that participate in the program. The Petitioner's Office of Program Integrity is responsible for insuring that the goods and services billed to the Medicaid program are those that are actually provided to Medicaid recipients. Medicaid is a joint program, funded by the federal government and by the State of Florida, and is administered pursuant to both state and federal statutes and rules. All services or goods billed to the program must be necessary, Medicaid compensable, and must also have actually been provided to eligible recipients by providers prior to submitting claims. Any payment made by the Medicaid program for goods or services not actually provided to an eligible recipient is subject to recoupment by the Petitioner, and the provider is also subject to the imposition of administrative fines and exclusion from the program for a specified period of time. The Respondent is a community pharmacy located in a hispanic section of Miami, Florida, which has been owned and operated for the past six years by Frances Larin, a licensed pharmacist, who makes all drug purchases and does all Medicaid billings at the pharmacy herself. Most of Respondent's customers have limited financial resources and are Medicaid recipients. The Respondent has participated in the Medicaid program for approximately eight years, and has not previously been charged with overbilling the Medicaid program. The Respondent has cooperated fully with the Petitioner throughout these proceedings. Prior Review From February to April 1988, the Petitioner's Office of Program Integrity had a review performed of the Respondent's billings to Medicaid from March 1, 1987 to December 31, 1987. This review was conducted for the Petitioner by the Foundation for Health Care, Inc. (Foundation), contract auditors, and resulted in the determination that the Respondent had overbilled the Medicaid program for prescription drugs dispensed to program recipients during the review period. In performing this review, the Foundation used an across-the-board Medicaid percentage of 54% in determining the available units of the various drugs on hand for dispensing to Medicaid recipients. Based upon the Foundation's review, the Petitioner sought recoupment for overpayments in the amount of $28,649.99 by letter to the Respondent dated July 20, 1988, as well as an administrative fine of $7,162.49, and a three month suspension from the program. The Respondent timely sought a formal administrative hearing in which it disputed the results of the Foundation review. However, after the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings, the Petitioner withdrew its notice of overpayment and imposition of administrative sanctions, and thus, without a determination on the merits, the Division of Administrative Hearings file was closed and jurisdiction was relinquished to the Petitioner. Subsequently, the Petitioner entered a Final Order which provided that the Respondent would be re-audited. The Respondent timely sought judicial review of this Final Order in which it challenged that Petitioner's right to conduct a further review of the period March 1, 1987 to December 31, 1987. However, the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, dismissed the Respondent's appeal, and the Petitioner proceeded with a further review. The KPMG Review (a) For purposes of its further review, the Petitioner employed the public accounting and management consulting firm of KPMG Peat Marwick which designed a statistically valid sampling methodology to determine the Respondent's Medicaid percentage for each drug, and also to perform a management review of the Respondent. It was established by competent substantial evidence in the record, and in particular by the expert testimony in statistics from Dr. Robert Ladner and Robert Peirce, that the KPMG methodology was statistically valid. The KPMG review was conducted during the latter half of 1989, and included developing a Medicaid percentage for individual drugs based upon an analysis of prescriptions for all drugs in question to determine the portion of each drug's total sales that went to Medicaid recipients, calculating the total units claimed for each drug for which the Respondent sought reimbursement during the audit period, and calculating the total units purchased by the Respondent for each drug claimed for reimbursement during the audit period. The Medicaid percentage of each drug was then applied to total purchases for each specific drug to determine the amount of each drug that was on hand at the Respondent's pharmacy for dispensing to Medicaid recipients. This number of available units was then compared with the total units claimed for reimbursement. Where the units claimed exceeded the units available for dispensing, a positive variance was noted, and this number of excess units claimed was then multiplied by the per unit reimbursement amount for that particular drug in order to obtain the amount of the apparent overbilling for that particular drug. Where the total units available for dispensing exceeded the total units claimed for a particular drug, a negative variance was noted. It was stipulated by the parties that negative variances did not indicate underpayments, and the evidence, including specifically the testimony and report of Dr. Victor Pestien, an expert in statistics, does not establish that such negative variances should be offset against the positive variances or that they in any way reduce the positive variances. This is the first instance in which this methodology has been utilized by the Petitioner in seeking a recoupment of an alleged Medicaid overpayment from a pharmacy, and this methodology was not set forth in any rule or regulation of the Petitioner that had been adopted at any time material hereto. Previous audits used an overall Medicaid percentage to calculate the portion of a pharmacy's business that was comprised of Medicaid recipients, and the quantity of drugs that were available to them. Using a drug specific Medicaid percentage, however, is a more accurate and conservative approach to determining overpayments than using a fixed percentage. Based upon the consideration of all evidence in the record, it is specifically found that the greater weight of evidence establishes that the methodology used by KPMG in this review for calculating Medicaid percentages was sound and reasonable, and in no way precluded the Respondent from presenting additional competent substantial evidence to the Petitioner, or at hearing, which would have established different Medicaid percentages for particular drugs. (a) The type of review conducted by KPMG is known as an aggregate analysis, a generally accepted type of statistical analysis, in which drugs that have been billed to and paid for by the Medicaid program are reviewed to determine whether the pharmacy under review purchased or otherwise acquired a sufficient quantity of drugs to justify its billings to Medicaid. Interchangeable brand-name drugs and generic equivalents were grouped together so that in conducting this review, whole equivalent groups of drugs were considered as one type of drug, regardless of differences in individual product names. To obtain a statistically random sample, prescriptions were put in numerical order and every fourth prescription for the review period was examined, and since prescriptions may be refilled for up to a year after they are originally filled, reviewers also examined every prescription for the year prior to the review period. Competent substantial evidence establishes that KPMG performed an appropriate and valid statistical analysis, and that they used an acceptable sampling methodology which produced a truly random result. The underlying assumption of this analysis is that before a drug can be claimed to have been dispensed and billed to Medicaid, the pharmacy under review must have that drug in its possession. (b) The approach taken by KPMG and the Petitioner was to be as conservative as possible in resolving all uncertainties and questions which arose during the course of this review in favor of the Respondent. KPMG did not conduct a financial audit of the Respondent, but did prepare a management report based upon its review of Respondent's operations during the audit period. Data used by KPMG in its methodology in calculating the amount paid by Medicaid to the Respondent, the unit price of drugs dispensed, and the quantity claimed by Respondent for payment by Medicaid, was derived from computer based information provided by the Petitioner's fiscal agent. During the period of time being reviewed in this case, Electronic Data Systems (EDS) was the Petitioner's fiscal agent, while Consultec was the Petitioner's fiscal agent during the period when the KPMG review was actually being performed. When Consultec was selected as the Petitioner's fiscal agent and replaced EDS on January 1, 1989, EDS turned over its computer records to the new agent by copying all of its magnetic, computer files, along with supporting microfiche documentation, which it then provided to Consultec under the supervision of the Petitioner. Upon receipt of these magnetic tapes, Consultec placed them in a controlled environment vault, and then later converted the information on these tapes to a new format used by Consultec. It was established by competent substantial evidence that in this process, no data was added, deleted or changed in any manner. The "units claimed" data was subsequently provided by computer download from the Consultec claims data base directly to the Petitioner's Office of Program Integrity. It was established by competent substantial evidence that data regarding claims which originated with EDS passed through Consultec to the Petitioner's Office of Program Integrity unchanged. Specific information regarding Respondent, including the claimed quantity of drugs dispensed and amounts paid, was accessed by staff in the Office of Program Integrity, randomly verified, and then made available to KPMG. Both Consultec and EDS are nationally recognized data processing and management companies. Competent substantial evidence established that the claims processing function utilized by the Petitioner in the Medicaid program during the period at issue was subject to several quality control checks to insure that claims were properly processed and appropriate payments were made. On occasion claim adjustments were made, but these were reasonable and for good cause, such as a substantiated underpayment. The computer hardware utilized in this process was reliable and properly maintained. In order to verify the data used by KPMG concerning the dollar amount of claims paid and the quantity of units of medication claimed, an "audit trail" was performed using 140 randomly selected sample claims by tracing each claim from its claim reference number to its associated remittance voucher and cancelled checks, where available. This audit trail verified that the data used as the basis for quantity claimed and total dollars paid was valid and reliable. The KPMG review was not limited to the top 100 drugs, by volume claimed, during the audit period, but included each drug dispensed by the Respondent to Medicaid recipients during the audit period. In its report dated November 20, 1989, KPMG calculated a total Medicaid overpayment to Respondent of $30,452.59, and based thereon, the Petitioner notified the Respondent that it was seeking recoupment of this amount, as well as an administrative fine of $2,000 and termination from the Medicaid program for at least two years. Subsequently, however, the Petitioner and KPMG reviewed and considered additional invoices documenting additional purchases of drugs in question by the Respondent during the audit period, and prepared a revised report dated August 30, 1990. Based upon this revised report, the Petitioner sought recoupment of a revised, reduced overpayment calculated to be $21,939.93, as well as a $2,000 administrative fine and a minimum two year termination from the program, and it was on this basis that this matter proceeded to final hearing. The Top 100 Drugs Subsequent to the final hearing, the Petitioner issued an amended recoupment letter dated October 17, 1990, which limited the recoupment it is seeking in this matter to the top 100 drugs, by dollar volume of claims, plus their generic equivalents. This resulted in the elimination of many individual drugs with relatively small overpayments from the list of overpayments, and left only five instances among these top 100 drugs where the difference between the quantity available, adjusted for standard error, and the quantity claimed is less than 100 units. In many instances the difference is well in excess of 1,000 units. The sanctions being sought in this amended recoupment letter further reduced the recoupment being sought to $12,643.11, reduced the administrative fine to $1,400, and reduced the period of exclusion from the program that is being sought to 16 months. However, due to an error in calculating the top 100 drugs and equivalents, the Petitioner issued a second amended recoupment letter dated October 26, 1990, further reducing the administrative fine sought to $1,200 and reducing the period of exclusion to 14 months. Inventory Analysis In performing its review, KPMG obtained information concerning the quantities of drugs purchased during the review period by the Respondent directly from the pharmacy's wholesalers and from a review of invoices retained by the Respondent for a period that included one month prior to the review period through one month after the review period (February 1, 1987, to January 31, 1988). The effect of seasonal variations in pharmacy sales and ordering patterns was also taken into account, and balanced, by extending this period to a full twelve months. All documentation concerning drug acquisitions was requested from Respondent, and the information received and considered by KPMG and the Petitioner was checked for reasonableness by a consultant pharmacist and cross validated by two reviewers. It was stipulated by the parties that the Respondent's main wholesaler, Gulf Distribution, Inc., had and maintained accurate information and records regarding its sales to the Respondent, and that it properly transferred that information to computer disks which were provided to KPMG. Subsequent thereto, additional invoices were discovered and were also made available to KPMG. The Petitioner stipulated that these additional invoices from Gulf did not reduce the number of drug units purchased by, and invoiced to, Respondent. Pharmacies in Florida which choose to participate in the Medicaid program are required to maintain complete and accurate patient and fiscal records which fully substantiate the extent of services rendered and billings made for a period of five years from the date of billing or service, and are also required to retain all invoices from wholesalers, or from the transfer or receipt of drugs through barter or exchange, for a period of five years. (a) Actual beginning and ending inventories of the top 100 drugs reviewed by KPMG for which the Petitioner now seeks recoupment in the amount of $12,643.11 were not determined. Rather, an estimate of inventory on hand was derived by counting invoices of all drug acquisitions through purchase, transfer or exchange made by the Respondent during the review period, as well as invoices of acquisitions made one month prior to and one month after the review period. Additionally, all documentation provided by the Respondent of bulk, or large, acquisitions made during or prior to the review period was also considered and included in the Petitioner's estimate of inventory. It was established by competent substantial evidence that pharmacies generally keep a drug inventory consisting of a two to two-and-a-half week supply on hand, and acquire drugs in anticipation of future sales rather than as a replacement of inventory depletion from past sales. Therefore, a basic assumption of the KPMG methodology, relied upon and accepted by the Petitioner, that Respondent had only those drugs available for dispensing which were obtained by invoiced purchase from wholesalers, or through transfer or exchange, between February 1, 1987 and January 31, 1988, as well as documented invoiced bulk purchases prior to this time period, is reasonable. At hearing, the Respondent established that a significant quantity of nine specific drugs were purchased during the review period from suppliers other than Gulf that were not considered by KPMG. These drugs include Xanax (.5 mg.), Inderal (10 mg.), Tagamet (300 mg.), Nitrostat (.4 mg.), Trental (400 mg.), Motrin (400 mg.), Motrin (600 mg.), Quinamm (260 mg.), and Quinidine Sulfate (200 mg.). It is, therefore, found that the overpayment of $2,902.19 calculated by KPMG and relied upon by the Petitioner for these particular drugs has not been supported by competent substantial evidence. Frances Larin, Respondent's owner and operator, testified that she did not follow the generally accepted practice of retaining only a two to two-and-a- half week supply of drugs on hand. Rather, she testified that for a significant number of the top 100 drugs at issue in this proceeding, she would purchase large quantites in bulk, and was thus able to draw down on these inventories without making additional purchases of particular drugs for over a year. The Respondent sought to establish that due to very large beginning inventories of particular drugs at issue, it was able to legitimately dispense more units during the review period than it purchased during the same time. However, the Respondent did not produce evidence in support of its position, such as invoices for bulk purchases which KPMG or the Petitioner did not consider, or complete records of bartering or transfers which had not been considered, and which would have supported its claim of a significantly larger beginning inventory for these particular drugs than would be the generally accepted practice. To the contrary, competent substantial evidence in the record, as well as the demeanor of Larin while testifying, establishes that Respondent's claim is unreasonable and lacks credibility. The deposition testimony of JoAnn Padell is outweighed by the testimony of Deborah Launer, Susan McCleod, and Robert Peirce. A review of the Respondent's purchasing patterns clearly shows that Respondent generally and routinely kept low inventories of drugs on hand, placing daily orders with Gulf to obtain drugs on an as-needed basis. Recoupment Based upon the foregoing, it is found that competent substantial evidence establishes that the Respondent overbilled the Medicaid program during the review period at issue in this case in the amount of $9,740.92 ($12,643.11 claimed in the second amended recoupment letter minus the $2,902.19 claim associated with the nine specific drugs for which significant purchases were omitted from the KPMG review, as found above at Finding 13). Petitioner is authorized to recoup the established overpayment of $9,740.92 from the Respondent. Sanctions (a) In determining the sanctions stated in the second amended recoupment letter which Petitioner seeks to impose upon the Respondent, the Petitioner considered the provisions of Section 409.266(13), Florida Statutes, as well as the impact which sanctioning this Medicaid provider would have upon Medicaid recipients. Competent substantial evidence establishes that there are eight pharmacies which accept Medicaid within a one mile radius from the Respondent's location, and twenty-six such pharmacies within a two mile radius. Medicaid recipients are issued new cards each month and may transfer pharmacies at the beginning of each month. Therefore, it is found that Medicaid recipients would not be substantially affected by the imposition of sanctions upon the Respondent. The parties stipulated that the sanction matrix set forth in Rule10C- 7.063, Florida Administrative Code, was not applied by the Petitioner against the Respondent in this case because it was not in effect at the time of this review. The sanctions which the Petitioner seeks to impose against the Respondent, therefore, are based upon non-rule policy which must be explicated in this proceeding. In seeking to explicate its non-rule policy upon which the sanctions set forth in the second amended recoupment letter are based, the Petitioner established that it was concerned that sanctions imposed in prior cases, as well as in the original recoupment letter which had been sent to the Respondent in this case, had been too lenient in view of the seriousness of Medicaid violations. The Petitioner developed its non-rule sanctions policy after the KPMG review had been completed, and based its proposal upon the maximum sanctions set forth in state and federal statutes and rules. Specifically, Section 409.266(12), Florida Statutes, provides for a maximum fine of $10,000; the maximum exclusion period applied in previous cases by the Office of Program Integrity is ten years, and the minimum exclusionary period imposed by the federal government has been five years for the failure to supply payment information. At hearing, the Petitioner explained that it first determined the percent of Respondent's total Medicaid payments that the overpayment represented, and then applied that percentage to these maximum sanctions allowed under law and existing policy. The overpayment of $12,643.11 claimed by the Petitioner in its second amended letter of recoupment is 12% of the total payment of $100,397.88 made by the Petitioner to Respondent for the review period, and 12% of the maximum fine and exclusion period is $1,200 and 14 months, respectively. While the Petitioner explained the manner by which this exclusionary period and fine were calculated, it did not explicate its non-rule policy by establishing a reasonable, rational basis for applying the percentage of Medicaid overbillings to the maximum fine and exclusionary period. Certainly, the arithmetic calculation used to arrive at these proposed sanctions is clear, but there was no explication through competent substantial evidence which would establish that there is a basis in fact or logic for this calculation. Therefore, it is found that the Petitioner's non-rule policy used to propose these sanctions is arbitrary and capricious. Due to the lack of any evidentiary basis in the record which would support the imposition of the sanctions of an administrative fine or a period of exclusion from the Medicaid program, the Petitioner is not authorized to impose sanctions on the Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Petitioner enter a Final Order which requires that Respondent to repay the Petitioner for Medicaid overbillings in the amount of $9,704.92, but which does not impose sanctions consisting of either an administrative fine or period of exclusion. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of January, 1991 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Rulings on the Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding 1. Adopted in Finding 2. Adopted in Finding 3. Adopted in Finding 1. Adopted in Finding 4. Adopted in Findings 4 and 5. 7-10. Adopted in Findings 6 and 7, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 11-17. Rejected as unnecessary. 18-20. Adopted in Findings 6 and 7. 21-24. Adopted in Finding 12. 25. Adopted in Finding 2. 26-28. This is a conclusion of law and not a proposed finding. 29-30. Adopted in Finding 8. 31-32. Adopted in Findings 7 and 10. Adopted in Finding 6. Rejected as unnecessary. 35-39. Adopted in Finding 7. 40-47. Adopted in Finding 7, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 48. Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial 49-51. Adopted in Finding 7, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 52-53. Rejected as unnecessary. 54-63. Adopted in Finding 12, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding 8. Adopted in Finding 9. 66-67. Adopted in Finding 8, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 68-69. Adopted in Finding 9. 70-78. Adopted in Finding 8, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 79-82. Adopted in Finding 8. 83-85. Rejected as unnecessary. 86-93. Adopted in Finding 13, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 94-97. Adopted in Finding 14, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 98-103. Adopted in Finding 14. 104-105 Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. 106-107 Adopted in Finding 12. 108. Adopted in Findings 12 and 13. 109-112 Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. 113-115 Adopted in Finding 13, but otherwise Rejected as immaterial. This is a conclusion of law and not a proposed finding. Adopted in Finding 11. 118-119 Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial 120-122 Adopted in Finding 11. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding 6. 125-128 Rejected as unnecessary. 129. Adopted in Finding 6. 130-132 Adopted in Finding 9. Adopted in Finding 11. This is a conclusion of law and not a proposed finding. 135-147 Adopted in Finding 16, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. 148. Adopted in Finding 11. 149-150 Adopted in Finding 16, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 151-152 Rejected as unnecessary. 153. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Rulings on the Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1. Adopted in Finding 4. 2-3. Adopted in Finding 5, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary and not based on competent substantial evidence. 4-5. Adopted in Findings 3, 6 and 7. 6-7. Adopted in Finding 10, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. 8-9. Adopted in Finding 11. 10-11. Adopted in Finding 3, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding 6. Rejected as immaterial and unnecessary. 14-15. Rejected as argument on the evidence rather than a proposed finding, and otherwise as not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding 7, but otherwise Rejected as argument on the evidence rather than a proposed finding. Rejected as repetitive and otherwise as immaterial. Adopted in Finding 13, but Rejected in Finding 14 and otherwise as argument on the evidence rather than a proposed finding and as not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected in Finding 14, as immaterial, speculative, and as not based on competent substantial evidence. 20-21. Rejected in Finding 6, as immaterial, and as not based on competent substantial evidence. 22-23. Rejected in Findings 13 and 14, and otherwise as immaterial and not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected as repetitive and otherwise as argument on the evidence rather than a proposed finding. Rejected in Findings 13 and 14. 26-30. Rejected as a statement of the Respondent's position and not a proposed finding, as speculative and contrary to competent substantial evidence, and as totally without citation to authority in the record as required by Rule 22I-6.031(3), Florida Administrative Code. 31-35. Rejected in Finding 6, and as not based on competent substantial evidence and as unnecessary. 36-38. Adopted in Findings 12 and 13. 39-41. Adopted in Finding 8. 42. Rejected as immaterial. 43-44. Rejected in Finding 9. 45. Rejected as simply a summation of testimony and not a proposed finding. 46-48. Rejected in Finding 9, and otherwise as immaterial and not based on competent substantial evidence. 49-50. Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. 51. Adopted in Finding 16, but otherwise Rejected as immaterial. 52-53. Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted and Rejected in part in Finding 16. 56-57. Adopted in Finding 16. 58-61. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. 62. Adopted and Rejected in part in Finding 15. COPIES FURNISHED: David G. Pius, Esquire Building Six, Room 233 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 James J. Breen, Esquire Michael P. Scian, Esquire 900 Sun Bank Building 777 Brickell Avenue Miami, FL 33131 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Linda Harris, Acting General Counsel 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Robert B. Williams, Acting Secretary 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a pharmacist doing business as Dyal's Pharmacy in Daytona Beach, Florida. Petitioner is a Medicaid provider under the rules of the Respondent, operating under Provider No. 1018147. Respondent is a department of the State of Florida, with its principal office in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Respondent is designated as the state agency responsible for the administration of Medicaid funds, and is authorized to provide payments for medical services, pursuant to Section 409.266, Florida Statutes. Pursuant to his responsibilities as a Medicaid provider and a pharmacist, Petitioner has, during the period of March, 1982, through August, 1983, filled 43 prescriptions for nonsteroidal anti-arthritic drugs other than buffered aspirin, which did not have the words "medically necessary" written on the prescription form by the prescribing physician in his own handwriting. Petitioner filed claims with Respondent with regard to the aforementioned prescriptions, and Respondent paid $854.44 to Petitioner as reimbursement. By letter received by Petitioner on December 27, 1983, Respondent has notified Petitioner of its intention to seek repayment of that amount pursuant to Rule 10C- 7.42(4)(b), Florida Administrative Cede. Rule 10C-7.42, Florida Administrative Code, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (4) Covered Benefits * * * (b) All prescriptions for buffered or enteric coated aspirin must indicate that an arthritic condition is being treated and dispensed in quantities no less than 200. Any nonsteroidal anti-arthritic drug, other than buffered aspirin, must have `medically necessary' written on the prescription by the practioner in his own handwriting. Noncompliance will warrant recoupment. Petitioner has sought an informal hearing regarding Respondent's attempt to recoup amounts previously paid to Petitioner, but in light of the provisions of the challenged rule it is unlikely that he can prevail. The existence of Rule 10C- 7.42(4)(b) is the only basis upon which repayment could be demanded by Respondent from Petitioner. The Florida Medicaid Program is administered through Respondent. In order to receive federal matching funds, Respondent must implement certain mandatory services for indigent. Other services which may qualify for federal funds are optional, and the state may cheese not to implement those programs. The pharmacy program, which this rule purports to regulate, is one such optional service which the State of Florida has chosen to implement. Funds utilized in the Medicaid Program are controlled by the legislature through funding of Respondent's budget. To regulate its budget, Respondent regularly reviews utilization and implements cost containment in various program. In 1981, Respondent was required to reduce its budget, and approximately $2 million of that reduction was required to be made in the Medicaid Program. In considering various options to reduce the Medicaid budget by this amount, the Department reviewed the pharmacy program budget which is the third largest in the Medicaid Program. Options such as limiting the number of prescriptions and requiring full payment were considered since these options had been implemented in other states. Such restrictions were not initiated, however, because Respondent felt that the large elderly population in Florida would forego taking necessary medication and endanger their health. Specific medications which were being paid for through the prescribed drug program were reviewed and certain drugs were eliminated from reimbursement under the program when prescribed for specified reasons, and other drugs were eliminated completely. These categories eliminated were chosen which would have the least detrimental effect on recipients. Additionally, Respondent, in consultation with physicians and pharmacists, considered the use of nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs for the treatment of arthritis. While the drug of choice for treatment of arthritis is aspirin, because it is more effective than most nonsteroidal anti-arthritics, these nonsteroidal anti-arthritic drugs may be necessary for some patients who can't take aspirin. The number of persons who require such drugs instead of aspirin is small, however, and would not justify the large percentage of prescriptions for the nonsteroidal anti-arthritics which Respondent had observed through administering the pharmacy program. Because of their relatively high cost, nonsteroidal anti-arthritic drugs were accounting for 9.6 percent of the pharmacy program budget. Instead of eliminating the entire category of nonsteroidal anti- arthritic drugs from reimbursement under the program, which some states have implemented, Respondent opted to add aspirin to the list of covered benefits when prescribed for arthritis, and to require that the term "medically necessary" be written by the physician on the prescription form for nonsteroidal anti- arthritic drugs in order to be eligible for Medicaid reimbursement. This procedure was initiated in an effort to direct physicians' attention to the cost differential between the two types of drugs to ensure that a physician was making a conscious decision when prescribing the more expensive nonsteroidal anti-arthritic medication. The term "medically necessary" was chosen because physicians were familiar with that phrase through its use under the Florida Generic Drug statute. In response to an inquiry from the Florida Medical Association concerning the use of the term "medically necessary, Respondent indicated to that group that the term "drug of choice" would be an acceptable alternative. The challenged rule had not been amended at the time of final hearing in this cause to reflect this alternative term, nor was there any indication of record that any group other than the Florida Medical Association had been notified of Respondent's policy choice in this regard.
Findings Of Fact On August 23, 1995, the undersigned entered a Recommended Order in DOAH Case 94-1365. The Petitioner in that proceeding was Billy Beeks, M.D., and the Respondent was the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA). At issue in that proceeding was whether Dr. Beeks had been overpaid by the Medicaid program. The Recommended Order contained extensive findings of fact, including findings as to the appropriate levels at which certain services should have been billed to the Medicaid program by Dr. Beeks. It was concluded that because certain of his services were billed at levels higher than justified by Medicaid protocol, Dr. Beeks had been overpaid by the Medicaid program. Because the calculation of such overpayments are done by computer, it was recommended that the overpayment be recalculated based on the findings of fact contained in the Recommended Order. On October 19, 1995, Douglas M. Cook, Director of AHCA, entered a Final Order in DOAH Case 94-1365. That Final Order adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the Recommended Order and provided, in pertinent part, as follows: The dollar amount of the overpayment liability shall be calculated based on the findings and conclusions made by the hearing officer. The amount of the overpayment claimed by AHCA at the beginning of the hearing in DOAH Case 94-1365 was $50,852.56. An overpayment to Medicaid is calculated by computer using a statistical analysis of a sampling of the provider's billings to Medicaid. AHCA asserted that the level at which Dr. Beeks had billed Medicaid for certain of these services in the sample was excessive. It was found in that underlying proceeding that while Dr. Beeks had billed certain of his services at excessive levels as asserted by AHCA, some of the challenged billings were not excessive and others were not as excessive as asserted by AHCA. Logically, one would expect that the recalculation of overpayment would result in a smaller figure than that claimed prior to the hearing. Following the entry of the Final Order, Vickie Givens, an employee of AHCA, made a detailed analysis of the evidence presented at the formal hearing, including the deposition of Joni Leterman, M.D.. Ms. Givens compared her analysis with the findings of fact contained in the Recommended Order and discovered certain billings by Dr. Beeks that she believed should have been included in the Recommended Order as being excessive. 1/ These billings were not included in the Recommended Order and, consequently, were not incorporated by reference into the Final Order. Thereafter the overpayment was recalculated by an appropriately trained AHCA employee. As instructed, this employee included in the recalculation of the overpayment the additional billings for the services identified by Ms. Givens, but not included in the Recommended Order. AHCA staff recalculated the amount of the overpayment to Dr. Beeks to be $51,745.13, which is slightly higher than the amount claimed prior to the hearing in DOAH Case NO. 94-1365. The figure that resulted from this recalculation was higher than it would have been had these additional billings not been included.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein and that the Agency recalculate the total amount of the overpayment during the audit period based solely on the findings of fact contained in the Recommended Order in DOAH Case 94-1365. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of July, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of July, 1996.
The Issue The issue to be decided is the amount to be paid by Petitioner to Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency), out of her settlement proceeds, as reimbursement for past Medicaid expenditures pursuant to section 409.910, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On August 11, 2014, Amanda Baker, then 15 years old, was transferred from a medical center to a specialty pediatric hospital where she presented with complaints and symptoms of back pain, weakness, and paresthesia in her lower extremities. Over the next few days, she underwent examinations and assessments, but no steps were taken to prevent her development of blood clots/embolisms due to her immobility nor were signs and symptoms of her development of blood clots/embolisms recognized. On August 13, 2014, Amanda suffered two cardiac arrests due to blood clots/embolisms traveling to her heart and lungs. She was resuscitated, but due to a lack of oxygen to her brain, Amanda suffered a catastrophic hypoxic brain injury. She is now in a persistent vegetative state. The Agency provided $162,146.65 in Medicaid benefits associated with Amanda's injuries, all of which represent expenditures paid for her past medical expenses. Amanda's parents brought a medical malpractice action against the medical providers responsible for her care to recover all of the damages associated with her injuries, as well as their individual damages associated with their daughter's injuries. Seven defendants maintained insurance policies with a policy limit of $250,000. The medical malpractice action was settled for each of the insurance policy limits, resulting in a lump sum unallocated settlement of $1,750,000. This settlement was approved by the court. During the pendency of the malpractice action, the Agency was notified of the action. It asserted a $162,146.65 Medicaid lien against the Bakers' cause of action and settlement of that action. However, it did not institute, intervene in, or join in the action to enforce its rights, as provided in section 409.910(11), or participate in any aspect of the litigation. Application of the formula in section 409.910(11)(f) to Amanda's $1,750,000 settlement requires full payment of the Medicaid lien. Petitioner presented the testimony of Daniel Moody, Esquire, a Lakeland attorney with 30 years' experience in personal injury law, including medical malpractice. He represented Amanda and her family in the medical malpractice action. As a routine part of his practice, he makes assessments concerning the value of damages suffered by injured clients. He also stays abreast of jury verdicts in his area by reviewing jury verdict reporters and discussing cases with other trial attorneys. He has been accepted as an expert in valuation of damages. Based on his training and experience, Mr. Moody opined that the damages recoverable in Amanda's case had a conservative value of $30 million. Petitioner also presented the testimony of R. Vinson Barrett, Esquire, a Tallahassee trial attorney with more than 40 years' experience. His practice is dedicated to plaintiff's personal injury, as well as medical malpractice, medical products liability, and pharmaceutical products liability. He routinely makes assessments concerning the value of damages suffered by injured parties. He was accepted as an expert in the valuation of damages. Based on his training and experience, Mr. Barrett opined that Amanda's damages are "worth at a bare minimum – and we're talking very conservatively here -- $30,000,000." Both experts testified that using $30,000,000 as the value of all damages, Amanda only recovered 5.83 percent of the value of her damages. Accordingly, they opined that it would be reasonable, rational, and conservative to allocate 5.83 percent of the settlement, or $9,453.15, to past medical expenses paid by the Agency through the Medicaid program. The Agency did not call any witnesses, present any evidence as to the value of damages, propose a different valuation of the damages, or contest the methodology used to calculate the allocation to past medical expenses. In short, Petitioner's evidence was unrebutted. The testimony from Mr. Moody and Mr. Barrett is compelling and persuasive. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Petitioner has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that $9,453.15 of the settlement represents reimbursement for past medical expenses.
