The Issue Whether Petitioners were denied access by Respondent to a public accommodation so as to render Respondent liable for any claims pursuant to Article VI of the Gainesville City Municipal Code.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners Gloria Jean Mitchell and Arnold Mitchell are husband and wife. They are African-American. Sunil and Gira Patel are husband and wife. They are not African-American. There was no testimony as to their race. By observation, it appears that they are Caucasians originating in the Indian sub-continent. They own Respondent facility EZ Food Mart/Chevron, which qualifies as a "place of public accommodation." EZ Food Mart/Chevron is a combination gas station and convenience store, with a unisex restroom, which is open for business from 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. each day. Mr. and Mrs. Sunil Patel employ one female clerk and one male clerk, Jay Patel.1/ Jay Patel’s race was not testified- to, but his race appears to be the same as Mr. and Mrs. Sunil Patel’s race. Jay Patel speaks English with some confusion, sometimes using "he" for "it", and does not understand everything that is said to him in English. However, having observed his candor and demeanor while testifying, it is found that Jay Patel has, to a degree, selective understanding, so that he comprehends more questions that permit generally exculpatory answers, than questions about particular events on the days at issue herein. Despite Jay Patel’s testimony that he had been employed at the store only since April 2006, Mr. and Mrs. Sunil Patel and Dale Warren place Jay Patel’s commencement of employment at the EZ Food Mart/Chevron approximately two years earlier, when Mrs. Patel ceased to go into the store as regularly as she had before. Their dating of Jay Patel’s arrival is supported by other parts of Jay Patel’s testimony and is accepted as more accurate than Jay Patel’s first stated date of April 2006. The majority of the residents of the neighborhood in which EZ Food Mart/Chevron is located are African-American. The majority of Respondent's clients are African-American. Mrs. Mitchell frequently purchases gas at EZ Food Mart/Chevron. On April 26, 2006, she filled her car's gas tank at the pump and entered the convenience store to pay for the gas. When she got to the cash register operated by Jay Patel, she asked to use the restroom. He told her, "No, you can't use it. It's out of order." Mrs. Mitchell had no trouble understanding Jay Patel and had observed on many trips to the EZ Food Mart/Chevron that he understood others speaking English. On her way out, she observed a blonde Caucasian man rush in and ask to use the restroom and further observed that the blonde Caucasian man was handed a key. Mrs. Mitchell's testimony did not specify which clerk handed the key to the blonde, Caucasian man. The blonde Caucasian man was not a customer. Mrs. Mitchell did not see the condition of the restroom that day and assumed there was one restroom for women and one restroom for men. There is no clear evidence as to what time of day this all occurred or which clerk handed the key to the blonde Caucasian man, but it was a very busy time of day with many customers standing in line at the cash registers. There is no evidence of the actual condition of the restroom on April 26, 2006. On April 28, 2006, Arnold Mitchell was accompanying his wife on errands. After their car gas tank was filled, Mr. Mitchell went into Respondent's convenience store to pay for the gas. Mr. Mitchell has a medical condition involving the need to urinate frequently and urgently. When he paid Jay Patel for the gas, Mr. Mitchell explained his medical condition and requested to use the restroom. Jay Patel refused to let him use the restroom, saying something to the effect that, "It's out of order. Because you live in the neighborhood, you can go home and use the restroom." There also was another clerk working in the store at that time. On April 28, 2006, Mr. Mitchell went out and told his wife what had happened. At that point, Mrs. Mitchell realized Respondent's facility only had one unisex restroom and assumed that she had been discriminated against on the basis of her African-American race on April 26, 2006, by receiving inferior treatment than had the Caucasian male who had been permitted to use the restroom after she had been denied. Mr. and Mrs. Mitchell did not see Respondent's unisex restroom on April 28, 2006. They had no idea what condition it was in at that time. There is no clear evidence of the condition of Respondent’s restroom on April 28, 2006. No one connected with Respondent on either April 26, 2006, or April 28, 2006, made any racial comment to either Petitioner. No racial or discriminatory comment was made in their presence at any time by anyone connected with Respondent. However, both Petitioners were hurt, humiliated, and embarrassed by what they perceived on April 28, 2006, to be discriminatory disparate treatment on April 26, and April 28, 2006. The Mitchells live two miles or five minutes' drive away from the EZ Food Mart/Chevron, but on April 28, 2006, they chose not to go home so that Mr. Mitchell could use the restroom. As a result, Mr. Mitchell suffered some bladder pain. They wanted to get to their dry cleaner before that business closed, and they got there in time. This evidence puts the incident at Respondent's establishment on April 28, 2006, at close to the end of the average business day, between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. Mr. Mitchell urinated on himself. The evidence is not clear as to why he did not use the dry cleaner's restroom, but it may have been out of order. The next place Petitioners stopped also had a restroom that was out of order, so he could not use it. The third stop, a bus station, let Mr. Mitchell use its restroom. Mr. Mitchell suffered stress and embarrassment from this chain of events.2/ On May 2, 2006, Mr. and Mrs. Mitchell returned to Respondent's store with a TV20 news crew and camera. First, Mr. Mitchell went into the store, bought something, and asked a female clerk if he could use the restroom. She told him he could not. He then asked the male clerk, Jay Patel, who also told Mr. Mitchell he could not use the restroom. There was no reference to race by anyone. There was a reference by Jay Patel to Mr. Mitchell living in the neighborhood, but exactly what was said about neighborhood residence is unclear. Mr. Mitchell returned to the parking lot and conferred with the TV20 people. Ten to 15 minutes later, TV20 sent a Caucasian female into the store. When she asked to use the restroom, she was given the key immediately by store personnel. The TV20 Caucasian female telecaster returned outside a little while later. Then the whole TV20 news crew and the Mitchells returned inside and confronted Jay Patel.3/ There is no clear evidence concerning the actual condition of the restroom on May 2, 2006. There is no credible evidence that the restroom was cleaned or was not cleaned during the 10-15 minutes that elapsed between the time Mr. Mitchell was denied access to the restroom on May 2, 2006, and the time the Caucasian telecaster was granted access. Photographs in evidence document that at some time the store's restroom was unsanitary. "Filthy" would not be too strong a descriptive adjective. The photographs were purportedly taken at least two days, and possibly a week, before May 2, 2007. This places the restroom’s documented filthy condition as being sometime between April 26 and April 30, 2006. However, Respondent provided no explanation as to why the photographs of the restroom had been taken before the first date of alleged discrimination ever presented any reason to make a photographic record. Dale Warren, an African-American male, is a uniformed Alachua County Deputy Sheriff. He lives next door to the EZ Food Mart/Chevron. He testified that on one occasion, apparently quite some time before April 26, 2006, he had asked to use the restroom and Jay Patel told him he could not. Mr. Warren asked why he could not use the restroom. Jay Patel told him to go look at it. There is no evidence that Mr. Warren had to unlock the restroom at that time. Mr. Warren has no trouble understanding Jay Patel, and apparently, Jay Patel is able to understand Mr. Warren’s English. Mr. Warren observed the restroom to "have a whole bunch of toilet tissue and like paper napkins and it was filthy and he [referring to Jay Patel] said he needed to clean it and get some work done.” At that time, Mr. Warren gently warned Jay Patel to get the restroom fixed or someone in that African-American neighborhood would file a discrimination suit. Jay Patel let Mr. Warren use the clean restroom on a later day. Mr. Warren further claimed that a young man comes each day, in the afternoons, between 4:30 and 7:30 p.m. and cleans the restroom on a routine basis for Jay Patel. Jay Patel did not mention in his testimony that anyone else had ever come in to clean the EZ Food Mart/Chevron restroom. Rather, Jay Patel’s testimony and that of Mr. and Mrs. Sunil Patel suggested that Jay Patel cleaned it himself. Jay Patel did testify that on May 2, 2006, he had locked the restroom door from 6:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. and that at other times he had locked the restroom door and told people who wanted to use the restroom that they could not use it. The times Jay Patel claimed to have locked the restroom and prohibited everyone, regardless of race, from using it were when the restroom was clean but the store was very busy, like during “rush hour,” which he defined as between 6:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m., or when the restroom was already filthy.4/ When neither Mr. or Mrs. Sunil Patel was on the premises, they left the entire running of the store to Jay Patel. Shortly before April 26, 2006, Sunil Patel had a conversation with Jay Patel to the effect that the entire running of the store was in Jay Patel’s hands, including getting the messy restroom "under control." At all times material, Mr. and Mrs. Sunil Patel had no clear anti-discrimination policy in place and none was posted for the benefit of employees or patrons. The events of May 2, 2006, led to a demonstration with picketers marching in front of the EZ Food Mart/Chevron. Gira Patel arrived on the scene and inquired of Mr. Mitchell how she could make the picketers stop. He asked that she terminate Jay Patel's employment. She refused. At some unspecified time thereafter, Mr. and Mrs. Patel did terminate Jay Patel as a result of this situation. However, based on observation at hearing, it is found that the three remain in contact and are on cordial terms. In his testimony, Jay Patel continued to refer to Sunil Patel as “my employer” in the present tense. The Patels stated they saw nothing wrong with Jay Patel’s actions. All three Patels denied any racial animus or aversion to persons of any race. Mrs. Mitchell conceded that in the past she had been waited-upon by Mrs. Patel in other stores with no hint of racial discrimination and that no one at the EZ Food Mart/Chevron had ever made any racial or derogatory statements or reference to her. Mr. Mitchell agreed that no overt racial comments or observations had ever been made to, or about, him at the EZ Food Mart/Chevron. Annie Pickens, an African-American female, who has lived in the neighborhood of the EZ Food Mart/Chevron for 30 years, testified that on one occasion in March 2006, she had requested to use the store’s restroom and was denied access by Mrs. Patel. Although Mrs. Patel denied that she was working in the EZ Food Mart/Chevron in March 2006, Jay Patel testified that when Mrs. Patel did work in the store, it was from 1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. It is also possible that Ms. Pickens confused Mrs. Patel with a female clerk. In any case, the female behind the counter told Ms. Pickens in March 2006, that the restroom was out of order. Ms. Pickens had no personal knowledge whether or not the restroom was soiled, out of order, or just fine on the date her request was denied. The time of day she made her request is not in evidence. Beverly Craig, an African-American female, who does not live in the neighborhood, testified that she has used Respondent's restroom numerous times. Ms. Craig has known Mr. and Mrs. Patel and has patronized the EZ Food Mart/Chevron for eight years. At hearing, all three Patels testified that neither race nor neighborhood residence governed whom they let use the store restroom. All three Patels testified they had no reason to deny Petitioners access to their restroom based on any prior problems with Petitioners. Jay Patel testified that he did not keep a list of persons who soiled the restroom so as to preclude them from using the restroom again.5/ At all times material, Mr. Mitchell has been totally disabled and unemployed. There is no evidence of Mrs. Mitchell being employed at any time material. There was no evidence of any actual damages incurred by either Petitioner. There was no evidence concerning lost wages, psychiatric or physical disability, medical bills, or any other resultant expenses, and no evidence of any inability to enjoy life that resulted from the April 26, April 28, or May 2, 2006, incidents. Respondent denied any liability, but the parties stipulated that a reasonable attorney's fee would be $250.00, per hour and that Petitioner's attorney had worked 32.9 hours up to the commencement of the three and a half-hour hearing, and that Respondent's attorney had worked 21 hours up to that point. The Transcript reveals that the hearing herein lasted three and a half hours. No evidence of costs incurred was offered in evidence by either party and no party requested that the record be left open for that type of evidence. There was considerable indecisiveness, speculation, lack of memory, and vacillation within the testimony of all the principals herein. Indeed, in some instances, witnesses contradicted themselves as well as other witnesses. This sort of immaterial “human error” occurs in every case, and is not necessarily indicative of untruthfulness. It is a common occurrence to be considered and weighed by the finder of fact, who is in the best position to reconcile testimony as much as possible and to assess the credibility of all witnesses. However, where there are major and material discrepancies among witnesses’ respective testimonies, the credibility issue is more important. In making the foregoing Findings of Fact 1-29, the undersigned has made every effort to reconcile testimony and exhibits so that each witness may be found to speak the truth. However, where major and material conflicts existed, the credibility issue has been resolved on the characteristics listed in the Florida Civil Jury Instructions. Generally, where the foregoing Findings of Fact diverge from the construction of events related by any particular witness(es), it is because that witness or those witnesses were not found entirely credible and no further discussion of those credibility factors beyond the discussion incorporated here and/or within those Findings of Fact is necessary. On the other hand, certain elements of the testimony/evidence are clearly incredible, unreliable, less reliable than other evidence, or otherwise undermine a party’s theory of the case, and those specific elements are discussed with regard to the shifting burden(s) of proof within the following Conclusions of Law.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the City of Gainesville Human Rights Board enter a final order that: Finds Respondent discriminated against Gloria Mitchell based on her race (African-American); Finds Respondent discriminated against Arnold Mitchell based on his race (African-American); Orders Respondent to post and display a printed anti- discrimination policy that accords with the language employed at Article IV, Section 8-67 of the City of Gainesville Ordinance and which provides an address and telephone number where the owners or their agent can be reached to report any alleged discrimination on their premises; Authorizes the Gainesville City Attorney to apply to a Circuit Court for an injunction that prohibits any further discrimination in accommodation by the Respondent; and Awards from Respondent to Petitioners' attorney $9,100.00, in fees. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of May, 2007.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was terminated from her position with Respondent as a picker/stock keeper on or about September 26, 2001, on the basis of her race (African-American) and/or gender (female), in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2001).
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an employer as that term is defined under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a temporary employee to perform the job of picker/stock keeper at its Parts Distribution Center in Orlando, Florida, during the time period from September 12, 2001, to September 26, 2001, the date she was terminated. Petitioner worked a total of 14 days for Respondent. Petitioner is an African-American female, a member of a protected class. The Parts Distribution Center for Respondent in Orlando, Florida, is a facility that holds automotive parts that are then shipped to dealerships. All temporary employees at Respondent are at-will employees. Temporary employees are told during their orientation that they are at-will employees who can be terminated at any time, for any reason. Temporary employees at Respondent are only eligible to work 119 days. Most temporary employees are not offered full time permanent employment. There is no guarantee that a temporary employee will receive an offer to work as a permanent employee. Petitioner was hired to perform the job of picker/stock keeper. A picker/stock keeper takes parts off of shelves to be shipped to dealerships. Petitioner participated in an orientation, and Petitioner received the same training as every other temporary employee. Petitioner worked the night shift. Respondent maintains written Standards of Conduct to which all employees must adhere. The Standards of Conduct apply to both temporary and permanent employees. The Standards of Conduct were in effect in September 2001, when Petitioner worked as a temporary employee. All employees are given a copy of the Standards of Conduct when they are hired. Petitioner received a copy of the Standards of Conduct when she was hired, and the Standards of Conduct are posted throughout the plant. The Standards of Conduct provide that an employee's "[f]ailure or refusal to follow the instructions of supervision" is grounds for "disciplinary action up to and including discharge." The supervisors who worked at Respondent's Distribution Center during Petitioner's employment were Richard Alvarez ("Alvarez") (Hispanic male), Lenier Sweeting ("Sweeting") (Black male), and Joe Bromley (White male). Alvarez was temporary supervisor for the night shift from June 2001 until December 2001. Alvarez was Petitioner's direct supervisor. Sweeting was a supervisor in September 2001. Sweeting was chosen to become a supervisor by Hal McDougle, a Black male. Sweeting was the supervisor on the day shift when Petitioner worked at the Distribution Center. His shift ended at 3:30 p.m. but he stayed in the building to help with the transition to the night shift. Alvarez would normally walk Sweeting to the front door to discuss what had occurred during the day shift. On September 25, 2001, Sweeting was walking past the bathroom with Alvarez and heard two women talking and laughing in the bathroom. Alvarez recognized one of the voices to be that of Petitioner. Alvarez had heard rumors that Petitioner had been taking a lot of extended breaks and told Sweeting about the complaints he had been receiving. Alvarez received at least two complaints, and possibly four or five, from Petitioner's co- workers that she was taking extended breaks and not on the floor working. Alvarez wanted to wait and see how long Petitioner remained in the bathroom. Sweeting and Alvarez waited outside the bathroom until they saw Petitioner exit the bathroom with Maria Dejesus. Alvarez believes that he and Sweeting waited outside the bathroom for approximately ten to 15 minutes. Alvarez told Petitioner that she had been taking an extensive break and needed to go back to work. Sweeting witnessed Alvarez tell Petitioner to go back to work in a professional tone. Alvarez also told Petitioner that he had heard rumors that she was taking extended breaks. He told her that since he saw it first hand, he wanted to mention it to her and let her know it would not be tolerated. Petitioner asked Alvarez which bathroom she could use in a very sarcastic tone. Sweeting observed Petitioner ask this question. Alvarez told Petitioner that he did not care which bathroom she used, as long as she did not abuse the break period. Petitioner proceeded to ask Alvarez in a sarcastic tone which bathroom she could use several times throughout the night. Despite Petitioner's sarcastic tone, Alvarez answered her questions professionally. Alvarez never asked Petitioner how old she was, whether she was married or how many children she had. Sweeting asked Maria Dejesus to go back to work as well. Sweeting and Alvarez have told other employees to go back to work when they have observed employees taking extended breaks. They have spoken to employees of both genders and all racial groups. On September 26, 2001, Alvarez assigned Petitioner to the "fast rack" area. Petitioner had never previously worked in the fast rack area. Alvarez personally instructed Petitioner in how to perform the assignment. Alvarez told Petitioner to pick the parts and put them on a rack float. After Alvarez gave Petitioner her instructions, Petitioner began her assignment. Petitioner never asked Alvarez any questions about her assignment or expressed that she was having difficulty with the job. Wanda Carithers ("Carithers") saw Petitioner using the wrong equipment to complete her assignment. Petitioner was using a bin cart instead of a float to pick the items. Alvarez noticed that Petitioner's assignment was running late. Alvarez walked over to the fast rack area and asked Petitioner two questions. Alvarez asked Petitioner whether she was going to be able to pick the whole assignment using the bin cart that she was using. Petitioner did not respond to or acknowledge Alvarez. Alvarez then asked Petitioner if she was almost done with her assignment. Petitioner rolled her eyes and said, "Your first question, yes, second question, no." Alvarez was very uncomfortable with Petitioner's response and demeanor. Alvarez told Petitioner that perhaps they had gotten off on the wrong foot. Petitioner asked Alvarez something about her union rights. Alvarez saw Petitioner's co-worker, Carithers, who was a union representative, driving by. Alvarez asked Carithers to explain to Petitioner her union rights as a temporary employee. During this conversation, Alvarez tried repeatedly to talk to Petitioner and on each occasion, Petitioner cut Alvarez off and would not let him speak. When Alvarez realized that he was not making any progress with Petitioner, he asked her to go to the warehouse office so that they could talk to a senior supervisor, Al White ("White") (Black male). Alvarez hoped that they could work out their differences with White's help. Alvarez started to walk approximately ten steps. He turned back and realized that Petitioner was not moving towards the office. Alvarez walked back to Petitioner and asked her a second time to go to the office. Once again, Petitioner did not move. Alvarez told Petitioner, "This is your last chance; go to the warehouse office." Once again, Petitioner did not move. Alvarez, after asking Petitioner to go to the office three times with no response, told Petitioner that her services were no longer needed, that she should gather up her things, and that she was terminated. Alvarez terminated Petitioner for her failure to follow a direct order of her supervisor in violation of Respondent's Standards of Conduct No. 6. Petitioner refused to move even after she was terminated. Petitioner asked Alvarez to reconsider, and he said that he had made up his mind. Alvarez started to walk away. When he saw that Petitioner was still not moving, he told her that he could call law enforcement to escort Petitioner off the property. Alvarez, and ultimately Petitioner, walked to the office. White asked Petitioner if she knew why she was terminated. Petitioner never asked to have someone from the union with her in the office until after she was terminated. At that time, Alvarez and White complied with her request and paged Rodney Witt, a union official, to come to the office. Carithers observed Petitioner fail to follow Alvarez's instruction to go to the office. Carithers recalls that Petitioner told Alvarez that Petitioner did not have to listen to Alvarez. Amber McPherson heard Alvarez call Petitioner to the office several times. Petitioner did not respond to Alvarez's requests. Sweeting has never experienced discrimination from management while working for Respondent for over seven years. Sweeting has never heard Alvarez make any gender or race-related comments or slurs. Sweeting has never heard any management employee at Respondent make a gender or race related comment or slur. Alvarez did not consider Petitioner's gender or race when he made the decision to terminate Petitioner. In addition, Petitioner lied on her application to Respondent and failed to indicate that she had been terminated from a prior employment. Petitioner had been terminated from Walt Disney World Company for theft. If Respondent had known that Petitioner had lied on her application or had been terminated for theft from a prior employer, it would not have hired her. Had Respondent learned that she had lied on her application after she was hired, she would have been terminated. Petitioner had no idea why she thinks she was treated differently based upon her gender or race. She just had a "feeling" or a "hunch." Petitioner had no evidence or information that her termination was based on her gender or race. Petitioner had no idea why she was terminated. She did not believe that it was because she failed to follow a command. Petitioner had no idea whether her supervisor, Alvarez, considered her gender or race when he terminated her employment with Respondent. Petitioner bases her claims that Respondent discriminated against her on the fact that there is general racism and sexism in society. Petitioner checked the "sex" and "race" box on her FCHR Charge of Discrimination simply because she is female and African-American. Petitioner felt as though she was harassed but cannot articulate a reason for it.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order which DENIES the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of April, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of April, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephanie L. Adler, Esquire Susan K. McKenna, Esquire Jackson Lewis LLP 390 North Orange Avenue, Suite 1285 Orlando, Florida 32801 Dorothy J. McCrimmon 5361 Commander Drive Number 304 Orlando, Florida 32822 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has been a registered plumbing contractor, holding license number RF 0049725. He was first licensed in October, 1985, and has practiced plumbing contracting continuously since that time. Respondent has not previously been disciplined. In early 1989, Respondent entered into a subcontract with A-1 Properties to provide various plumbing labor and materials in connection with a residential construction job on which A-1 Properties served as general contractor. The total price of the subcontract was $5100. In general, Respondent performed his work in a timely and competent manner. A minor problem arose involving gas lines that Respondent installed in the kitchen. When a representative of the gas company inspected them during construction, he objected to certain fittings. After giving Respondent a few days to change the fittings, the owner authorized the gas company to make the changes when Respondent failed to do so. The record does not disclose what, if anything, the gas company charged the owner for the work. However, the work was not extensive, and the owner withheld from Respondent only $165 to cover the anticipated invoice from the gas company. In the course of performing the plumbing work, Respondent purchased, at a cost of $2117.77, materials from Shamrock Plumbing. The dates of the invoices reflecting these purchases and the amounts of the invoices are: August 2, 1989- - $1066.57; August 12, 1989--$37.77; August 25, 1989--$814.86; and August 25, 1989--$198.57. Respondent never paid Shamrock Plumbing for these materials. The owner and A-1 Properties timely paid Respondent for all of his work. As a result of change orders, the price for the job increased by $1355.45 to a total of $6455.45. In August, as Respondent's work drew to a close, the owner and A-1 Properties paid Respondent $2337 as follows: August 25, 1989-- $700; August 29, 1989--$500; and August 30, 1989--$1137. These payments total $2337. In making the final payment to Respondent, the representative of A-1 Properties was aware that Shamrock Plumbing had sent to a Notice to Owner for the plumbing materials that Respondent had purchased. Except possibly for the $165, item, Respondent and the general contractor were in agreement, when the final payments were made in August, that Respondent had been paid substantially in full and that he would pay Shamrock Plumbing. When Respondent failed to pay Shamrock Plumbing, it recorded a Claim of Lien on September 28, 1989, against the real property and initiated an action to foreclose the lien. The owner was required to retain the services of an attorney to defend the foreclosure action, pay Shamrock: Plumbing's legal costs, and obtain a release of lien. In so doing, the owner expended a total of $3984.19, as follows: his attorney--$456; Shamrock Plumbing's attorney--$1410.42; Shamrock Plumbing's invoice--$2117.77. The owner paid his attorney by checks dated January 16 and July 31, 1990. The check to pay Shamrock Plumbing and its attorney was dated February 26, 1990. On March 12, 1990, Shamrock Plumbing executed a Release of Lien, which was recorded on April 10, 1990. Respondent has not since reimbursed the owner for his expenditure of $3984.19 because Respondent lacks the money. He applied the August, 1989, payments received for the present job to satisfy obligations arising out of other jobs. Respondent testified that his money problems began when he was not paid for work he performed on other jobs, but they were unrelated to the job involved in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Construction Industry Licensing Board enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 489.129(1)(h), assessing Respondent for the costs of the investigation and prosecution up to a maximum of $1000; placing Respondent on probation for two years; requiring Respondent to pay the owner $3984.19, plus interest at the legal rate, in restitution; and, if at the end of the two-year probation Respondent has failed to pay the owner in full, imposing an administrative fine of $1500 and suspending Respondent's license for one year. ENTERED this 20 day of May, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20 day of May, 1991. APPENDIX Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of Petitioner 1-8 (first sentence): adopted or adopted in substance. 8 (remainder) : rejected as irrelevant. 9-12 (first sentence): adopted or adopted in substance. 12 (second sentence): adopted that Respondent accepted the final payments. Rejected as unnecessary that Respondent did-not protest the $165 retainage. 13: rejected as unnecessary. 14: first clause rejected as unnecessary. Second clause adopted. 15: rejected as unnecessary. 16-17 and 22: rejected as subordinate. 18-20: adopted or adopted in substance. 21: rejected as unnecessary. 23-24: adopted or adopted in substance. Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of Respondent first page: adopted or adopted in substance. second page, first incomplete paragraph: rejected as irrelevant, unnecessary, and not finding of fact. second page, first complete paragraph: rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. second page, second complete paragraph: rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack McCray, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Daniel O'Brien, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, FL 32202 Attorney William S. Cummins Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe St., Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399 James E. Todd, pro se 1621 Truman Rd. Orlando, FL 32807
The Issue Whether Petitioner was terminated from her position with the Respondent as a Certified Nurses Assistant (CNA) on or about July 1, 1995, on the basis of her race (white), in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1995).
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is an employer as that term is defined under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a CNA at Park Lake Nursing and Rehabilitation Center during the relevant period of time from April through July, 1995. Petitioner is a white female and a licensed CNA. Kay Vermette (“Vermette”), a white female, was the Director of Nursing at Park Lake and the department head over the entire nursing staff during Petitioner’s tenure. Vermette hired Petitioner as a CNA on April 18, 1995. Petitioner worked as a CNA at Park Lake for less than ninety (90) days when she was terminated by Vermette for verbal abuse of a resident on July 1, 1995. Joyce Donahue (“Donahue”), Assistant Director of Nursing at Lake Park during Petitioner’s tenure, was the second in charge of the entire nursing staff. Donahue, a white female, has been a Registered Nurse (RN) since April, 1990. On June 29, 1995, Mary Taylor (“Taylor”), a Licensed Practical Nurse, reported to Donahue she heard a loud voice and crying coming from the room of resident Matteye Samuels (“Samuels”). Taylor is black. Samuels was a black female and an elderly resident at Park Lake who needed assistance to perform all normal activities of daily living (ADL) and could not walk without assistance. As Donahue and Taylor approached Samuels’ room, they overheard a loud voice which they recognized as Petitioner’s and loud crying coming from another person. When Donahue and Taylor entered the room, they heard the resident crying in the bathroom area, where she sat on the toilet with only a robe draped over her, crying and trembling. Petitioner was very excited and pacing and was talking in a rapid, jarring, and incoherent fashion. Donahue and Taylor dressed Samuels and took her to the nurses’ station. Petitioner told Donahue that Samuels had thrown her around the room. Petitioner yelled at Samuels, “[y]ou are not a Nigger. I am not a Honky. Those aren’t really Jews. Those aren’t irate Indians,” while in Samuels’ room. When Donahue entered, Petitioner was pacing back and forth by the bed saying, “Nigger, Honky, Jews . . . this is enough of this.” Donahue told Petitioner to leave the room and wait in the employee break room. Donahue reported this incident to her superior, Vermette. Due to the severe nature of the incident, it was investigated immediately. Petitioner was placed on administrative leave, pending the investigation’s outcome. During the investigation, several witnesses came forward with information confirming the verbal abuse. Each witness provided a statement concerning her recollection. As an eyewitness to the verbal abuse of Samuels by Petitioner, Taylor and Sterling Brown, CNA, provided a written statement detailing her knowledge of the events. Donahue reported her findings to her supervisor, Vermette, both verbally and in writing. Vermette prepared a three-page, hand-written report which included the findings of her investigation, all of which confirmed the verbal abuse of Samuels by Petitioner. Verbal harassment of a resident is a Category I violation of Respondent’s disciplinary code. It subjects an employee to immediate suspension, followed by investigation. When an investigation confirms that a Beverly employee commits a Category I offense, the employee is subject to immediate termination. Petitioner received and signed the June 29, 1995, Associate Memorandum, which reflects that she was suspended while Respondent investigated the verbal abuse claims. The allegations of verbal abuse were investigated by Donahue, a white female, among others. The findings of the investigation and the proposed discipline (termination) were approved by Malley, the white female administrator. Petitioner was terminated by Vermette, a white female, who was the person who had, in fact, hired her. The three individuals who investigated the allegations of verbal abuse are white, as Petitioner. Petitioner’s statement regarding her treatment prior to the incident on June 29, 1995, and her version of the events that occurred on June 29, 1995, are not credible.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order which DENIES the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of August, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 COPIES FURNISHED: Jayne E. Griffith, pro se 2018 Gairloch Street Orlando, Florida 32817 Deborah Gibson, Esquire Jackson Lewis 390 North Orange Avenue Suite 1285 Orlando, Florida 32801 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1997. Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 249 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 249 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The administrative complaint alleges that J. E. Patterson is licensed as a registered plumbing contractor and as a registered air conditioning contractor, and that he committed these violations of Chapter 489, Florida Statutes: that he did business in a name not included on his license, that he failed to properly update his address with the Board, and that he failed to properly supervise the activity of the firm which undertook construction work under his name. The issue for disposition is whether the violations occurred, and if so, what discipline is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact The records of the Department of Professional Regulation (DPR) reveal that J. E. Patterson has three active licenses, issued pursuant to Chapter 489, Florida Statutes, governing contractors: an electrical contractor's license (ER 0010700), a plumbing contractor's license (RF 005243), and an air conditioning contractor's license (RA 0052424). None of these licenses has ever qualified a firm named "Pro-Mech". The addresses on the licenses are Merritt Island and Titusville, Florida, in Brevard County. Bobby J. Hunter, Sr. is an Investigator Specialist II for DPR who has investigated construction industry license complaints for approximately fourteen years. After receiving a complaint from a building official, Mr. Hunter conducted an investigation of Mr. Patterson and a firm called "Pro-Mech". The investigation included a telephone interview and a personal contact with J. E. Patterson. Patterson admitted to Mr. Hunter that he had done contracting business as "Pro- Mech", and that he did not send change of status forms or apply to have the firm qualified because the firm had become insolvent. Patterson did not admit the other violations. No prior disciplinary actions against this licensee were alleged or proven.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: that J.E. Patterson be found guilty of violating Sections 489.129(1)(g) and 489.119, Florida Statutes and that a letter of guidance be issued. DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of November, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: David Bryant, Esquire 1107 E. Jackson, Suite 104 Tampa, Florida 33602 J. E. Patterson Post Office Box 2505 Umatilla, Florida 32784 Bruce D. Lamb, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Lawrence A. Gonzalez Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Fred Seely Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32201
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practice alleged in the employment discrimination complaint Petitioner filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a software engineer with almost 30 years of experience in the industry. From 2001 until August of 2006, Petitioner was employed by ITT Industries (ITT). Petitioner's employment with ITT came to an end when he was involuntarily terminated. Following his termination, Petitioner filed an employment discrimination complaint with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that ITT had discriminated against him because he suffered from Tourette's syndrome (which caused him to have vocal tics and to stutter). Petitioner did not take any action to pursue these allegations of employment discrimination beyond filing this complaint against ITT with the EEOC. Petitioner has been unable to obtain a "permanent job" as a software engineer since his termination by ITT. Respondent is a defense contractor that "make[s] [military] simulation and training equipment." In early 2008, Respondent was looking to fill a temporary software engineer position. Edge Dynamics was one of the outside employment agencies that Respondent used to assist it in the hiring process. On January 9, 2008, Edge Dynamics provided Petitioner's resume to Edward Kaprocki, a senior principal software engineer with Respondent. Mr. Kaprocki was responsible for interviewing applicants for the position and making hiring/rejection recommendations. After reviewing Petitioner's resume, Mr. Kaprocki "thought [it] looked interesting enough where it would worth talking to [Petitioner]," and he so advised Sandra Asavedo, his "point of contact" at Edge Dynamics. Ms. Asavedo made the necessary arrangements to set up a face-to-face interview between Mr. Kaprocki and Petitioner. The interview took place in Mr. Kaprocki's office on January 14, 2008. It lasted about 45 minutes to an hour. Petitioner seemed to Mr. Kaprocki to be "a little bit nervous," but Petitioner did not do or say anything to cause Mr. Kaprocki to believe that Petitioner suffered from any disability. During the course of the interview, Petitioner showed Mr. Kaprocki his personal website, which contained information about and pictures of "some of the projects that [Petitioner] had worked on." Based on the interview, Mr. Kaprocki determined that Petitioner did not have the skill-set that was needed for the position Respondent was seeking to fill. Immediately following the interview, Mr. Kaprocki went to his supervisor, Steve Preston, whose office was "right down the hall," and recommended that Petitioner not be hired to fill the position. Mr. Kaprocki then telephoned Ms. Asavedo to let her know that Petitioner was not going to be hired so that she could inform Petitioner. Mr. Kaprocki's decision to recommend against hiring Petitioner had nothing to do with Petitioner's suffering from Tourette's syndrome or his having filed an EEOC complaint against ITT. Indeed, at the time he made his decision, Mr. Kaprocki did not even know that Petitioner had Tourette's syndrome or had filed an EEOC complaint against ITT. Mr. Kaprocki first learned of these matters only after Petitioner had filed his Complaint in the instant case. After being told that he would not be hired for the position, Petitioner telephoned Mr. Kaprocki several times, pleading with Mr. Kaprocki to "reconsider hiring him." Mr. Kaprocki told Petitioner "that the decision had been made" and would not be reconsidered. Mr. Kaprocki felt that Petitioner, by making these telephone calls, was "badgering and harassing him." To satisfy his own personal curiosity (and for no other reason), Mr. Kaprocki looked online to find out more about the person who was subjecting him to this "badgering and harass[ment]."2 Mr. Kaprocki did not discover, as a result of his online search, that Petitioner had Tourette's syndrome or that Petitioner had filed an EEOC complaint against ITT. His search, however, did reveal certain comments Petitioner had made in an online forum that Mr. Kaprocki considered to be "extremely unprofessional." After reading these comments, Mr. Kaprocki was even more confident than he had been before he began his search that he had made the right decision in not recommending Petitioner for employment. Petitioner was never offered a position with Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR issue a final order finding Respondent not guilty of any unlawful employment practice alleged by Petitioner and dismissing Petitioner's employment discrimination complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of May, 2009.
Findings Of Fact James Paleveda, one of the Petitioners, took the examination for a plumbing contractor's license on February 10 and 11, 1983, and failed the examination. He was the only witness to testify on behalf of the Petitioners. Some of the other Petitioners took a different examination on different dates than the examination complained of in these proceedings, but no evidence was presented identifying those Petitioners and no evidence was presented relative to those exams. Petitioners presented no evidence that any or all of them gave incorrect answers to the questions complained of, and, but for those incorrect answers, they would have passed the examination. The sum and substance of the testimony presented by the Petitioner Paleveda was that, in his opinion, most of the questions in Exhibit 1, the examination Paleveda took, were not appropriate to determine if the applicant is qualified to be a plumbing contractor. Paleveda has never been a plumbing contractor and has little experience in the contracting field. He is also nearly 57 years old and, although fit, conceded the long examination for a man his age and background was much more tiring than it would be for a younger man fresh out of school. Questions 1 through 27 of Exhibit 1 deal with social security taxes withheld and paid by employers for their employees; federal income taxes withheld; Florida mechanics lien law; workers' compensation law; unemployment compensation law; Florida Construction Industry Licensing law; accounting and cost-keeping procedures; and general contract provisions. Petitioners contend that although some knowledge of these subjects is desirable, a contractor can always hire accountants and lawyers to handle these problems. Respondent, on the other hand, presented the testimony of plumbing contractors who have been in the business for many years who testified that knowledge of the cost of social security, workers' compensation and unemployment insurance, contract provisions, and all costs associated with the performance of plumbing contracts are essential if a plumbing contractor is to remain solvent. This latter testimony is deemed more credible and is factually accepted. Questions 28 through 93 generally involve questions form the Plumbers Handbook and Mathematics for Plumbers and Pipe Fitters. Petitioner's primary objections to these questions are that in some cases the answers from the Plumbers Handbook is different from the local codes. Respondent presented evidence that there are some differences throughout the state in the plumbing codes and this is the principal reason for utilizing a standard that can be applicable to all candidates. The candidates are told that the correct answers to those questions are those given in the Plumbers Handbook and the examinees are allowed to have this book in the examination room. Questions 94 through 100 are taken from the Solar Water and Pool Heating Manual and Petitioners contend these questions are too hard. Petitioners further contend that any plumber should check with the manufacturer for specific instructions before installing a solar water heating system. All plumbing contractors are authorized to install a solar water hearing system and each should be required to demonstrate a rudimentary knowledge of such a system before being so licensed. Accordingly, Petitioner's objections to these questions are without merit. The first 27 questions to which the Petitioners object are very similar to the questions given to all building contractors for a statewide license. Those questions cover areas that a contractor must know to remain financially solvent. Most contractors initially starting a business do not have sufficient capital to hire attorneys and accountants to advise each time a question arises regarding these fields. A contractor can hardly afford to hire an attorney to file a $200 mechanics lien.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the COMPLAINT and other contentions of Petitioners regarding the unfairness of the February 11 and 12, 1983 examination for plumbing contractors be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of July 1984 at Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of July 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael Steinberg, Esquire 2055 Dale Mabry Tampa, Florida 33609 Drucilla E. Bell, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 W. Douglas Moody, Esquire 199 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James Linnan, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Fred M. Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent Department of Corrections (Respondent or the Department) violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, sections 760.01–760.11 and 509.092, Florida Statutes,1/ by discharging Petitioner Theresa Williams (Petitioner) in retaliation for her participation as a witness during the investigation of an alleged discrimination claim brought by another employee.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Corrections is a state agency as defined in chapter 110, Florida Statutes, and an employer as that term is defined in section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. At all times material, Petitioner was employed as a nurse at the Department's Lake Correctional Institution (“the Institution”) in Clermont, Florida. She was hired by the Department as a Licensed Practical Nurse effective July 12, 2007. Petitioner was terminated from her position with the Institution in May 2013. At the time of Petitioner's termination, her official title was “Senior Licensed Practical Nurse.” Prior to her termination, the Department provided Petitioner with a letter dated April 16, 2013, advising her of her proposed dismissal and scheduling a meeting (“termination conference”) with the Institution's Warden to discuss the reasons why Petitioner was being considered for termination. The letter was excluded from evidence because it was not timely disclosed as an exhibit by the Department as required in the Order of Prehearing Instructions in this case. Nevertheless, Respondent testified that she attended the termination conference and that, during the termination conference, she was provided, and they discussed, three incident reports against her that she had previously seen. The termination conference was attended by the Institution's Warden, the Assistant Warden, and Dr. Virginia Mesa, the Institution's Chief Health Operator. The incident reports discussed at Petitioner's termination conference included Petitioner's alleged violation on February 8, 2013, of the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) for which Dr. Mesa recommended Petitioner’s dismissal; Petitioner's alleged failure on February 8, 2013, to carry out an assignment to log walking canes provided to inmates; and an alleged argument on February 18, 2013, with a supervisor regarding Petitioner's reassignment to process transferred inmates known as "new gains." There is no indication that the termination conference changed the Department's proposed decision to terminate Petitioner. At the final hearing, Petitioner testified and presented evidence designed to prove that the incidents outlined above did not occur. However, following her termination in 2013, Petitioner timely filed a career service system appeal with the State of Florida, Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC), contesting her termination. Following an evidentiary hearing and a PERC hearing officer's recommended order in that proceeding, PERC entered a final order on November 6, 2013, providing in its pertinent part: The relevant facts found by the hearing officer relate three separate incidents that led to [Theresa] Williams' dismissal. On February 8, 2013, Dr. Virginia Mesa observed Williams showing Captain Reed, who was the security officer-in-charge of the shift, something in a green file. A green file is the type of medical file kept for each inmate. The green file was open in Williams' hand and Reed and Williams were looking into it. Mesa observed Williams flipping through the file with Reed in the public hallway. The Agency's policy and federal law strictly prohibit prison medical personnel from allowing non-medical staff to see inmate medical records. That same day, Debra Elder, who was a senior health services administrator and new manager, asked Williams to record various information about canes that were issued to inmates and to label each cane with an identifying mark. Williams turned to a co- worker and told her to do it. Elder considered Williams' attitude insubordinate and wrote an incident report as soon as she returned to her office. On February 18, Williams was assigned to be the "sick call" nurse when she reported for her shift at 6:45 a.m. However, she was informed that, if the prison received a significant number of "new gains," she would be re-assigned to assist the two nurses doing that work. "New gains" is the Agency's term for the processing of inmates transferred to the institution from another facility. Around 8:00 a.m., Williams' supervisor, Joyce Isagba, arrived at work. Isagba reviewed the assignments and directed a subordinate to assign Williams to new gains that day. Williams believed Isagba, a relatively new supervisor, had a pattern of changing her assignment from sick call nurse to new gains and did not like it. Williams approached Isagba and questioned why she was being reassigned. Williams and Isagba became loud and argumentative. Other nurses were present in the room. The conversation lasted some time and Williams repeatedly stated that the change of her assignment was unfair and repeatedly wanted to know why she was being reassigned. Isagba told her she was more qualified to do that work and that she did not have to give her reason for her decisions. The dispute lasted several minutes and Williams reluctantly assisted with new gains. Later that day, Williams was sent to sick call to finish that duty. Isagba considered Williams to have been insubordinate and wrote an incident report. Based on these factual findings, the hearing officer concluded that the Agency had grounds to discipline Williams for poor performance, violating the Agency's medical information privacy, and insubordination in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 60L-36.005. He recommended that [PERC] adopt his recommended order and dismiss Williams' appeal. * * * Upon review of the complete record, including the transcript, we conclude that all of the hearing officer's facts are supported by competent substantial evidence received in a proceeding that satisfied the essential requirements of law. Therefore, we adopt the hearing officer's findings. § 120.57(1)(l), Fla. Stat. Furthermore, we agree with the hearing officer's legal analysis of the disputed legal issues, his conclusions of law, and his recommendation. Accordingly, the hearing officer's recommendation is incorporated herein and Williams' appeal is DISMISSED. The hearing officer's Recommendation and PERC's Final Order in the PERC Proceeding, Williams v. DOC, 28 FCSR 284 (2013), were submitted by both parties and received into evidence without objection in this case as Exhibits P-4 and P-5, respectively, and Exhibits R-B and R-C, respectively. The PERC Proceeding involved the same parties as in this case and the allegations in the incident reports discussed at Petitioner's termination conference were actually litigated and determined in the PERC Proceeding. In other words, whether the incidents outlined in those incident reports occurred and are sufficient to support the Department's decision to terminate Petitioner's employment has already been determined.2/ Moreover, Petitioner failed to show, in this case, that the incidents did not occur. Although Petitioner testified that she did not show Captain Reed the inmate's medical chart in violation of HIPAA and introduced Captain Reed's written statement stating that Petitioner did not show him the chart, the evidence adduced at the final hearing showed that when she met with Captain Reed during the incident, she was flipping through papers with the medical chart in her hand. As found in the PERC hearing officer's Recommended Order: Williams violated the Agency's privacy policy when she held an open inmate medical file so a security staff officer could see the inmate's writing and signature. This was not a reasonable procedure to accomplish the task of notifying the officer of a potential security threat to other inmates. There was a real possibility that the sick call slip had been forged. It was unnecessary to show Captain Reed an inmate's medical file to determine if the slip was forged. Williams could have done that herself with the same accuracy as Reed, since neither is a handwriting expert. Williams v. DOC, 28 FCSR 284 (Recommended Order, 08/26/13). Dr. Mesa's testimony in this case was consistent with the hearing officer's finding and is credited. Regarding the other two incident reports, while Petitioner denied asking another to perform her assigned task of logging inmates' canes, she admitted that she delayed performing the task. Petitioner also admitted that she questioned her supervisor, Ms. Insagba, as to why she was being assigned "new gains," that during the incident Ms. Insagba raised her voice, and that they "were both talking at the same time and I guess she was trying to get a point across and I was just trying to ask her why." In addition to the incidents addressed in the three incident reports, during cross examination in this case, Petitioner revealed that she was also disciplined twice in 2012. In August 2012, Petitioner received a record of counseling for insubordination. And in December 2012, Petitioner received a written reprimand for failure to follow instructions. In sum, the record supports a finding that, by May 2013, the Department had cause to terminate Petitioner. Although it has been determined that the Department had cause to terminate Petitioner's employment at the Institution, in this case Petitioner asserts that the real reason for her dismissal was her participation as a witness in a discrimination charge brought by another employee against the Department and Dr. Mesa. The disciplinary incidents supporting Petitioner's dismissal occurred in February 2013, and before. The investigation in which Petitioner participated began in March of 2013 and Petitioner provided testimony in that investigation on April 23, 2013, after Dr. Mesa had already recommended Petitioner’s dismissal and after Petitioner had been notified by the Department that she was being considered for dismissal. Petitioner was dismissed in May 2013. In finding probable cause, the Commission stated in its summary of the Investigative Memorandum: Complainant did not demonstrate that she was harassed or disciplined because of participation in the internal investigation. Complainant provided no evidence of harassment, and she was not disciplined after her protected activity occurred. Respondent admitted that Complainant was disciplined for the alleged HIPAA violation, but this occurred prior to her protected activity. Based on the information received during the investigation, it does appear that Complainant was terminated in retaliation for her participation in the internal investigation. If the alleged HIPAA violation was a true terminable offense, Complainant should have been terminated in February of 2013 when it occurred. Instead, Respondent waited nearly three months to terminate her, which was about three weeks after her protected activity. Additionally, Respondent has a progressive disciplinary policy which it did not follow. The alleged HIPAA violation is Complainant's only documented incident. Respondent also claimed that Complainant was terminated after she was disciplined several times prior to the HIPAA event, yet it could provide no evidence that she had a disciplinary record prior to February of 2013. Unlike the limited information available to the Commission in its probable cause determination, the evidence in the de novo proceeding conducted in this case demonstrated that Petitioner had a number of disciplinary offenses in February that were found by PERC to support her dismissal, and that Petitioner had been written up for two other disciplinary infractions in 2012. Moreover, the showing necessary for a probable cause determination is less than Petitioner's burden to prove discrimination. While there was a delay in Petitioner's termination, the evidence showed that Dr. Mesa recommended Petitioner for dismissal when she wrote up the incident report for the HIPAA violation in February 2013. Although it is evident that management, including the Warden and Dr. Mesa, was generally aware that Petitioner had participated as a witness in another employee's discrimination claim in April of 2013, Petitioner did not show that she was terminated because of that participation. And, while the Department's delay in dismissing Petitioner remained unexplained at the final hearing,3/ that delay, in light of the other facts and circumstances of this case, including Petitioner's numerous disciplinary infractions outlined above, is an insufficient basis to support a finding that Petitioner was terminated in retaliation for her participation in a protected activity.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Complaint of Discrimination and Petition for Relief consistent with the terms of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSotoBuilding 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida32399-3060 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2015.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent violated Rule 62-532.500(2)(d)1., Florida Administrative Code, by failing to seat a well casing in a rock layer or other such consolidated formation, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is charged with the responsibility to conserve, protect, manage, and control water resources within its boundaries. Respondent's duties include the regulation of water wells and water well contractors. Respondent is a water well contractor. As such, he holds Water Well Contractor License No. 2215. On September 25, 1997, Petitioner issued Respondent Well Construction Permit No. 597679.01. The permit gave Petitioner permission to construct a water well, four-inches in diameter, on property owned by Rex Hobbs in Pasco County. Respondent subsequently constructed the water well on the property owned by Mr. Hobbs, using the cable tool construction method. Respondent completed construction of the well on or about October 20, 1997. After the well was constructed, Mr. Hobbs complained to Respondent on several occasions that the well was producing sand, rock, and other debris. Respondent made no attempt to repair the well. In May or June of 1998, Mr. Hobbs filed a complaint with Petitioner regarding the construction of the well on his property. Petitioner's subsequent field investigation did not reveal a significant amount of sediment in the well water. Mr. Hobbs filed a second complaint with Petitioner in the summer of 1998, insisting that the water from his well contained an excess amount of sediment. Petitioner's second field investigation revealed an abnormal amount of sediment in the well water. On July 9, 1998, Petitioner issued a Notice of Violation, advising Respondent that he had violated Rule 40D-3.037(1), Florida Administrative Code, by failing to seat the casing of the Hobbs well into a consolidated formation. Water from the Hobbs well contains sediments including sand, rock, and other debris. These sediments interfere with the operation of plumbing, appliances, and irrigation devices, which utilize water supplied by the well. The quality of the well water produced by the Hobbs water well is unacceptable. The total depth of the Hobbs well is 131 feet below land surface. The well is cased to 42 feet below land surface. The water pump is set at 84 or 86 feet below land surface. The static water level was 58.2 feet below the land surface. The geologic formation at the end of the casing of the well contains gray clay, yellow clay, limerock, and sand. The end of the casing is not seated in a layer of rock or other consolidated formation. There is no persuasive testimony to the contrary. The area in which the well is located is geologically unstable. Wells in that area generally require 84 feet of casing. Respondent admitted at the hearing that the well is producing sand and needs more "pipe." Failure to seat a well casing into a consolidated formation is a major violation under the Florida Department of Environmental Protection's Water Well Contractor Disciplinary Guidelines and Procedures Manual. Respondent has entered into three previous Consent Orders with Petitioner to resolve permitting and construction violations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a final order requiring Respondent to pay an administrative fine in the amount of $500 and assessing five points against his water well contractor's license. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of August, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Margaret M. Lytle, Esquire Southwest Florida Water Management District 2379 Broad Street Brooksville, Florida 34609-6899 Tony Holt 6145 Durant Road Durant, Florida 33530 E. D. Sonny Vegara, Executive Director Southwest Florida Water Management District 2379 Broad Street Brooksville, Florida 34609-6899
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Human Rights Act by maintaining racially segregated restroom facilities, as alleged by Petitioner; and, if so, the affirmative relief which should be granted.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, the COMPANY operated a business establishment located at Pompano Beach, Florida. BOYKIN a black male, was employed by the COMPANY during a one-week period in 1978. During BOYKIN'S employment, the COMPANY maintained separate restroom facilities, segregated on the basis of race. (Testimony of Boykin.) The COMPANY'S two restroom facilities were racially segregated by the use of signs affixed to the outside door of each restroom--one sign labeled "Colored," and the other, "White." (Testimony of Boykin.) The COMPANY'S maintenance of racially segregated restrooms was offensive to BOYKIN, and the other black employees. (Testimony of Boykin.) As of September 26, 1980, the offending signs by which the COMPANY racially segregated its restrooms were no longer affixed to the restroom doors. (Viewing by hearing officer, accompanied by parties.) The COMPANY presented no evidence controverting BOYKIN'S allegation that it maintained racially segregated restrooms during the time in question. Neither did it assert a legitimate, nondiscriminatory purpose for maintaining segregated restroom facilities. BOYKIN presented no evidence to establish that the COMPANY employed 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks during 1977 or 1978.
Conclusions Conclusions: Respondent company maintained racially segregated restrooms for Petitioner and its other employees. The signs, by which the restrooms were labeled, "Colored" and "White" were no longer affixed to the restrooms at the time of final hearing. However, Petitioner failed to prove an essential elements of his claim-- that Respondent is an "employer" within the meaning of the Human Rights Act. Recommendation: That the Petitioner for Relief be DISMISSED. Background: On November 27, 1978, Petitioner Michael C. Boykin ("BOYKIN") filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations a complaint of unlawful discrimination against Respondent H. L. Westberry Paving and Trucking Company ("COMPANY"). The gravamen of BOYKIN'S complaint was that he was subjected to an unlawful condition of employment by virtue of the COMPANY'S maintenance of racially segregated restroom facilities. After investigation, the Commission on Human Relations issued its determination that there was reasonable cause to believe that the COMPANY had engaged in an unlawful employment practice, as alleged, in violation of the Human Rights Act, Sections 23.161, et seq., Florida Statutes. After an unsuccessful effort to effect voluntary conciliation of the dispute, the Commission issued a Notice of Failure of Conciliation on June 11, 1980. Within the requisite 30-day period thereafter, BOYKIN filed a Petition for Relief from the alleged unlawful employment practice. Notwithstanding the COMPANY'S failure to file any pleading responding to BOYKIN'S Petition for Relief, or request a hearing thereon, the Commission forwarded it to the Division of Administrative Hearings on July 10, 1980, for the assignment of a hearing officer. By Notice of Hearing, final hearing was thereafter set for September 26, 1980. At final hearing, counsel for the COMPANY represented that on September 25, 1980, he received a telephone call from an unidentified employee of the Commission purporting to cancel the hearing scheduled for September 26, 1980. As a result, he asserted his witness was not present at final hearing; he then proffered that, if present, his witness could testify that signs indicating "Colored" and "White" were not now affixed to the doors of the separate restrooms located on the COMPANY'S premises. In order to avoid continuing the hearing, the parties agreed that the undersigned hearing officer should determine whether or not the described signs were present by conducting a viewing of the COMPANY'S premises. In light of this viewing, the COMPANY declined to request a continuance, and indicted that it wished to present no further evidence. The COMPANY also moved to dismiss the Petition for Relief, claiming that the Commission lacked jurisdiction based on: (1) federal preemption of the area by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and (2) failure of the Commission to complete its proceeding within 120 days from the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's deferral of this matter to the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Respondent's Exhibit 1 was offered, and received in support of the motion, after which the motion was denied. The only witness who testified at final hearing was BOYKIN. No other exhibits were offered by either party. The Florida Commission on Human Relations was not represented at final hearing; BOYKIN represented himself, in proper person, and without assistance by the Commission.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is Recommended: That the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner be DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of October 1980 in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of October 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael C. Boykin 801 Powerline road, #161 Pompano Beach, Florida 33060 Thomas P. Quinn, Esquire 2455 East Sunrise Boulevard Suite 605, International Building Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33404
