Findings Of Fact On or about January 26, 1990, the Respondent sought competitive bids through Invitation to Bid Number 590:2123 for the lease of certain office space in Plant City, Florida. The bid opening occurred on March 1, 1990, and Intervenor was determined to have submitted the lowest responsive bid. In addition to Intervenor's bid, bids were received from Petitioner and Walden Investment Company, which is not a party in this case. On or about May 8, 1990, the Respondent notified all bidders of its intent to award this lease to Intervenor, and on May 10, 1990, the Petitioner filed its notice of protest concerning this award claiming that Intervenor's bid was not responsive to the parking requirements in the Invitation to Bid. Section 15 of the Invitation to Bid requires that a minimum of 65 parking spaces be provided, and that a minimum of 15 of these spaces must be full size and a minimum of 5 must meet ANSI standards for handicapped parking spaces. No definition or specification for full size parking spaces is provided in the Invitation to Bid. Petitioner did not establish that there is a commonly accepted standard for full size parking spaces in the construction or development industry, or that the Respondent uniformly requires all full size parking spaces to be of certain dimensions. The Intervenor certified in its bid that it would meet the parking space requirement of the Invitation to Bid. The Respondent does not require detailed site plans which would depict actual dimensions for each parking space to be submitted with each bid. Rather, Section 10(d) of the Invitation to Bid requires only a line drawing "drawn roughly to scale", and specifies that final site layout will be a "joint effort between the department and the lessor so as to best meet the needs of the department". The Intervenor did submit a rough line drawing with its bid which depicts 71 parking spaces. The Respondent routinely accepts a bidder's certification that it will meet the parking requirements in an Invitation to Bid, and if those requirements ultimately are not met, the Respondent may proceed against the performance bond which the successful bidder is required to post. The Petitioner presented evidence that there is not enough room on Intervenor's site to provide 15 full size parking spaces measuring 10 feet wide by 20 feet long. However, there is nothing in the Invitation to Bid, or in the City of Plant City's Code which requires full size parking spaces of this dimension. Based upon its certification and the inclusion of a rough line drawing showing space for parking in excess of the requirements in the Invitation to Bid on this site,, it is found that Intervenor was responsive to the parking requirements in this Invitation to Bid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Respondent enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's protest and awarding Lease Number 590:2123 to Intervenor. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of August, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack Farley, Esquire District 6 Legal Office 4000 West Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Blvd. 5th Floor, Room 520 Tampa, FL 33614-9990 Alan Taylor P. O. Box 7077 Winter Haven, FL 33883-7077 Richard C. Langford, Esquire P. O. Box 3706 St. Petersburg, FL 33731-3706 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk 1323 Winewood Blvd. Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 John Miller, General Counsel 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Respondent Versailles Plaza Condo Association, Inc., ("Respondent") failed to provide reasonable accommodations for Petitioner Marcella Zambrano's disability in violation of Florida's Fair Housing Act, and, if so, the relief that is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Marcella Zambrano ("Marcella") is a 28-year- old-female, who is mentally retarded and suffers from cerebral palsy. Marcella weighs 260 pounds, has the mental age of a two-year-old, cannot speak, has difficulty walking, and frequently falls down when she attempts to walk. Marcella attended the final hearing in a wheelchair, and she has obvious physical and cognitive impairments. Marcella requires the use of a wheelchair due to her very limited mobility. She cannot be left alone for very long, and she is unable to wheel herself in a wheelchair. Petitioner Liliana Zambrano is Marcella's mother and primary caregiver. Liliana Zambrano weighs 135 pounds, and pushes Marcella in the wheelchair. The wheelchair weighs approximately forty pounds, and it is difficult for Liliana Zambrano to transport Marcella in the wheelchair. Petitioners reside in a third-floor unit at the Versailles Plaza Condominium in Miami, Florida. Respondent is the condominium association for the condominium complex. Petitioner Liliana Zambrano has two assigned parking spots for her unit within the complex's resident parking lot. Petitioners reside in the last unit on the far-east side of the residential building in which their unit is located. There is only one entrance from the parking lot into the condominium building in which Petitioners' unit is located. The entrance to the building is located in the middle of the building. The distance from Petitioners' assigned parking spot to the entrance of the building is approximately 50 yards. The distance from the entrance of the building to Petitioners' unit is approximately another 50 yards. Thus, the total distance from the assigned resident parking spot to Petitioners' unit is approximately 100 yards. Marcella attends a day program at the Association for Retarded Citizens ("ARC") from 9:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m., three days a week. In order to get to the program, a bus arrives at the front of the condominium complex to pick her up. A gate is located at the front of the condominium complex. The bus stops to pick Marcella up just outside the gate. In order to get Marcella to the bus in the mornings, Liliana Zambrano must push her in the wheelchair from their apartment through the entrance of the building, then from the entrance of the building through the parking lot, and then from the parking lot through the front gate. Once Petitioners reach the gate, Liliana Zambrano must activate a hand-held remote-controlled device for the gate to open. When the gate opens, Liliana Zambrano must then push Marcella's wheelchair to get her out of the complex and to the bus. No ramp is located in the vicinity of the gate. This mode of transporting Marcella is repeated in the opposite direction in the afternoons when the bus returns to the complex to drop Marcella off from the ARC program. Petitioners requested that Respondent provide them a reasonable accommodation due to Marcella's handicap by re-assigning at least one of their parking spots closer to the entrance of the building. Petitioners further requested that Respondent provide them a reasonable accommodation for Marcella's handicap by allowing the ARC bus to enter the building's drive-way to drop her off in the afternoons. Respondent offered Petitioners a new parking spot outside the fenced-in condominium parking lot in an area typically reserved for visitors of the complex. In order to transport Marcella to and from the parking space proposed by Respondent as an accommodation, Liliana Zambrano would be required to push Marcella's wheelchair through a spring-loaded gate that will not open or close automatically. Moreover, Petitioners would have to negotiate two curbs, which are each five to six inches high. Furthermore, the space is in a high traffic area directly in front of a fire hydrant. As to the request regarding access for the bus, Respondent refused to allow the bus to enter the complex through the gate. The evidence adduced at the final hearing established that Marcella is a handicapped person because she has physical and mental impairments which substantially limit one or more life activities, and she has developmental disabilities. The evidence adduced at the hearing established that Respondent knew of Marcella's handicap, that reasonable accommodations were requested and are necessary to afford Petitioners an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling and facilities, and that Respondent refused to provide the reasonable accommodations for Marcella's disability by failing to assign Liliana Zambrano a designated accessible parking spot closer to the entrance of the building and by failing to allow the ARC bus to enter the complex. Respondent failed to articulate legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by FCHR requiring that Respondent: provide Petitioners with an accessible parking space closer to the entrance of the building; allow the ARC bus to enter the complex through the gate; and award Petitioners' counsel their reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in bringing this action. If there is a dispute regarding the amount of attorneys' fees and costs, remand this matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the purpose of determining the amount of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of June, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 2014.
The Issue Whether Somerset Park Condominium Association, Inc.; Wise Property Management, Inc.; and Thomas Kelleher (collectively referred to as Respondents) discriminated against Lusheryl Walden (Ms. Walden or Petitioner), on the basis of Ms. Walden’s disability; and, if so, the relief to which Ms. Walden is entitled.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Walden is a 49-year-old woman. She has a muscle disorder which causes her to need the assistance of a medical walker. She also uses a cane and electronic wheelchair. Ms. Walden lives in a rented condominium unit at Somerset Park Condominiums (Somerset Park), which is located at 2866 Somerset Park Drive, Unit 103, Tampa, Florida. She has lived in unit 103 since March 2018. Unit 103 is privately owned, but is managed, along with the other condominium units at Somerset Park, by Wise Property Management, Inc. Mr. Kelleher is employed by Wise Property Management, Inc., as the property manager for Somerset Park. Somerset Park was created by, and continues to be governed by, a Declaration of Condominium of Somerset Park, A Condominium (Declaration), which instrument was recorded in 2006, in the public records of Hillsborough County, Florida. The Declaration describes parking spaces as follows: (c) Parking Spaces. Parking for the Condominium is part of the Common Elements of the Condominium on the Condominium Property. The parking spaces shown on Exhibit 2 of the Declaration may be assigned to a Unit (which assignment need not be recorded in the public records of the County) by the Developer (for so long as the Developer offers a Unit for sale in the Condominium and thereafter by the Association), whereupon it shall become Limited Common Elements of the Unit to which it is assigned. Any consideration paid for the assignment of the parking spaces shall belong to the Developer. A Unit Owner may assign the Limited Common Element parking space appurtenant to his Unit to another Unit by written instrument delivered to (and to be held by) the Association; provided however that no Unit may be left without one Limited Common Element parking space. Upon making such assignment, the Limited Common Element so assigned shall become an appurtenance to the Unit(s) and shall pass with the title thereto regardless of whether or not specifically referenced in the deed or other instrument of conveyance of the Unit. According to the Declaration, parking spaces at Somerset Park are considered “limited common elements” after they are assigned to a unit. Generally speaking, limited common elements consist of properties, equipment, or structures whose use is reserved to a particular unit to the exclusion of other units. Units at Somerset Park are individually owned. When a unit is sold by Somerset Park, the unit comes with its own parking space, which is considered a limited common element “appurtenant thereto.” Other types of limited common elements include patios, balconies, and terraces, as well as air conditioning compressors and water heaters that are located outside of the condominium unit. When Ms. Walden moved into unit 103 in 2018, she was notified that she was assigned to parking space number 409. Parking space number 409 is the limited common element attached to unit 103. In March 2020, Ms. Walden made a verbal request to Mr. Kelleher to be reassigned a parking space closer to her unit. Mr. Kelleher told Ms. Walden that he could not reassign a parking space, but that she was welcomed to reach out to her neighbors to find someone willing to switch. The Declaration specifically sets forth the means by which an assigned parking space may be reassigned. It provides that a “unit owner may assign the limited common element parking space appurtenant to his unit to another unit by written instrument delivered to [Somerset Park.]” For a parking space assigned to a unit that is still owned by Somerset Park, Somerset Park may reassign such parking space to another unit. Ms. Walden’s assigned parking space—parking space number 409—is four parking spaces away from her unit. Ms. Walden has an informal agreement with the resident assigned to parking space number 408 (which is three spaces away from her unit), who allows her to park in that space. There are six parking spaces closer to Ms. Walden’s unit than her assigned space—three to the left and three to the right of the walkway to her unit. All six parking spaces are assigned as limited common elements to condominium units not owned by Somerset Park. All six are outside the control of Respondents who have no authority to force the owners to switch spaces with Ms. Walden. Ultimate Findings of Fact Petitioner failed to prove that there was any reasonable accommodation Respondents could have given her that would have enabled her to park closer to her unit. Respondents offered a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for denying Petitioner’s request for a parking space closer to her unit. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondents intentionally discriminated against Petitioner because of her disability.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Petition for Relief. 1 Fairway Villas was vacated through settlement agreement during the pendency of an appeal. 2 Somerset Park has unassigned parking spaces that are not reserved as limited common elements. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of March, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk S JODI-ANN V. LIVINGSTONE Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of March, 2021. Joseph G. Riopelle, Esquire Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Lusheryl Walden 2866 Somerset Park Drive, #103 Tampa, Florida 33613 Boyd, Richards, Parker and Colonnelli, P.L. 400 North Ashley Drive, Suite 1150 Tampa, Florida 33602 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue Whether Appellants were wrongfully denied a variance of 16-17 parking spaces that could allow an existing 2170 square foot restaurant to transfer and use its 2-COP State alcoholic beverage license at 201 South Gulfview Boulevard on Clearwater Beach, in the City of Clearwater.
Findings Of Fact Appellants own real property on the north corner of South Gulfview Boulevard and First Street on Clearwater Beach. The property is in a zoning district designated as CR-28 (Resort Commercial District/Commercial Tourist Facilities), and is primarily used by Appellants to operate a motel business. The surrounding land uses to the north, south and east are primarily motel. To the west is a public parking lot and the beaches. In May 1990, Appellants leased a portion of the ground floor to James B. Mayes so that he could operate a restaurant known as Britt's Beachside Cafe at that location. In order to build a restaurant on premises, 2170 square feet of gross floor area was improved by the lessee. Pursuant to code, 11 parking spaces were needed for the restaurant to meet parking space requirements for an eating establishment at this site. The parking space calculation was made according to the formula of one space per 100 square feet of gross floor area, the general parking formula for restaurants, with a 50 percent reduction allowed for Clearwater Beach locations. Prior to the opening of the business, only 9 off-street parking spaces were allocated to Britt's Beachside Cafe. During May 1990, a variance of 2 parking spaces was requested by Appellants and granted by the Development Code Adjustment Board. At that time, Britt's Beachside Cafe was involved with food and non-alcoholic beverage sales. With the approved variance, the restaurant was granted an occupational license and a certificate of occupancy for the operation of the restaurant at this location. Previously, Mr. Mayes operated his restaurant in a larger motel with a smaller parking lot and fewer parking spaces approximately 60 feet north of the subject property for almost four years. The former restaurant had 120 seats for patrons as opposed to the current 84 seats. Beer and wine was sold in the restaurant under a 2-COP State alcohol beverage license. The beverage license was acquired because this location was exempt from the current city parking requirements under a grandfathering provision of the Clearwater Code. In addition, Mr. Mayes' restaurant was exempt from the code requirement that 51 percent of sales had to be from food and non-alcoholic beverages because the business existed before the ordinance went into effect. When the restaurant moved, the exemption from current parking space requirements remained with the original location, and the exemption from the 51 percent sales from food and non-alcoholic beverages for the business was removed. The 2-COP State alcohol beverage license for Britt's Beachside Cafe, however, was attached to the business and could easily transfer to the new location if local zoning laws permitted its use there. In order to have the alcoholic beverage license transferred to the new business location, the state requires the business to continue with its compliance with local zoning and development laws. To accomplish this, the restaurant is required to have one parking space per 40 square feet of gross floor area, with the 50 percent reduction formulated and allowed for a Clearwater Beach location. As Britt's Beachside Cafe is currently operating under the 11 parking space requirement, 16-17 more parking spaces are needed for the business to transfer the beverage license to the new business location. The actual number of parking spaces for the restaurant on location is During site review prior to the granting of the certificate of occupancy, city staff improperly counted four illegal parking spaces along First Street as legitimate, non-conforming off-street parking spaces. The restaurant caters primarily to persons walking to the restaurant either from adjacent motels or the beach. Few automobiles are driven and parked at Britt's Beachside Cafe. Even when the business was located in the other motel with more seating and fewer parking spaces, parking was never a problem in the area. There is considerable public parking immediately adjacent to Appellant's property, both across the street, and approximately one block to the north. When restaurant patrons are unable to use the parking spaces on location, they park in these convenient public spaces. Since Mr. Mayes relocated his restaurant, he has served beer and wine on premises, without charge. It has always been his intent to transfer his 2- COP State alcoholic beverage license to this new location if permitted to do so through a parking space variance. The City's requirement that the restaurant acquire more off-street parking spaces is factually unnecessary if the sole purpose of the ordinance is to provide parking for the restaurant patrons. At the old location, parking was never a problem. Likewise, no problems exist at the new location. As the restaurant no longer seeks to expand, the major differences a parking variance would make are that Mr. Mayes could charge for the beer and wine served and use his 2-COP license. When Appellants proceeded through the first phase of the approval process to obtain a decision from the Planning and Zoning Board, their conditional use application met with approval. It was determined, however, that the preliminary approval would be subject to the obtainment of a parking space variance, which needed to be decided by the Development Code Adjustment Board. Accordingly, the application proceeded to the second phase. If granted in the second phase, Appellants would go to the City Commission for a variance from the separation requirement. The application for a variance that removes the requirement for 16-17 additional parking spaces to enable the sale of beer and wine on premises was denied by the Development Code Adjustment Board and this appeal followed. The appeal was filed based upon the allegation that the decision of the Development Code Adjustment Board departs from the essential requirements of law. The Code of Ordinances of the City of Clearwater requires additional parking for establishments with alcoholic beverage licenses, which by nature of their license only, can be converted from restaurants to taverns or night clubs. Mr. Mayes' restaurant, which is subject to the additional parking space requirement because of the type of alcoholic beverage license he seeks to transfer, is already prevented from converting to a tavern or a night club by virtue of the restaurant's location in the CR-28 zoning district. In the CR-28 zoning district, all alcoholic beverage sales for consumption on premises shall be located only within a hotel or motel in conjunction with a 4-COP license or within a restaurant deriving 51 percent or more of its gross revenue from the sale of food and non-alcoholic beverages. The restrictive requirement that a 2-COP license be used solely to accompany a restaurant business, as opposed to a tavern or night club in the special CR-28 zoning district, is balanced by the Clearwater Code provision that reduces the required number of parking spaces by 50 percent for Clearwater Beach locations and the opportunity to have a business that sells alcoholic beverages in a resort commercial district. The 2-COP license was acquired prior to the restaurant's move to its current location. If Appellants request for a parking space variance is denied, Mr. Mayes' application for transfer of his beverage license to a new location will likely be denied by the state, pursuant to Section 561.331, Florida Statutes. The request for the variance is based primarily on Mr. Mayes' desire for greater financial return on his business and to keep his 2-COP license attached to the restaurant. The Development Code Adjustment Board has granted parking variances to other 2-COP restaurants before and after Appellants' application in the same zoning district. These variances were based on applications and evidence presented at Board hearings.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in violation of the Fair Housing Act by failing to make reasonable accommodations for Petitioner's handicap.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Botero has a Ph.D. in engineering. Due to a medical mishap, involving the administration of anesthesia, Mr. Botero suffers from narcolepsy. His narcolepsy is controlled by medication. Narcolepsy is a medical disorder which causes Mr. Botero to have sudden and uncontrollable, though brief, attacks of deep sleep, and he becomes unintelligible and unable to move. His condition gives him a warning before an attack occurs, and he has a small window period of time, approximately five to seven minutes, of reaction time. A narcolepsy attack for him lasts approximately three to four minutes. Mr. Botero is handicapped. Even though Mr. Botero suffers from narcolepsy, he has been licensed by the State of Florida to drive a vehicle and has a handicap parking permit. If his disorder presents itself when he is operating a vehicle, the small window period of reaction time allows him to maneuver his vehicle to a safe spot and park before the narcolepsy attack occurs.1 If he is not driving, but is parked when his disorder presents itself, Mr. Botero needs additional space to exit his vehicle or for someone to remove him from his vehicle. Calusa Club was constructed in 1980 and consists of several condominium buildings. Each condominium building has a homeowner’s association and is also referred to as a community. The developer of Calusa Club assigned reserved parking spaces for each condominium unit. As a result, each condominium owner is assigned a reserved parking space. Some handicap parking spaces are reserved and some are available on a first- come, first-serve basis. Only testimony, not written documentation, was presented at hearing evidencing the assignment of reserved parking spaces. The undersigned finds this testimony credible. Calusa Club is managed by Miami Management, Inc. Miami Management does not have the authority to change the reserved parking spaces assigned to condominium units, including reserved handicapped parking spaces, or to add additional reserved parking spaces for a condominium unit. Only testimony, not written documentation, was presented at hearing evidencing the assignment of reserved parking spaces. The undersigned finds this testimony credible. In 1997, Mr. Botero purchased a condominium unit at Calusa Club, unit number E-201. Mr. Botero's condominium association is Calusa Club Condominium D North Association, Inc. His assigned reserved parking space was number 9 (Reserved Space Number 9). At that time, he informed Miami Management, through its property manager for Calusa Club, Kathie Roder,2 that he was handicapped and needed a handicapped parking space close to his community. No reserved handicapped parking spaces were located at Mr. Botero's community. Ms. Roder informed Mr. Botero that no reserved handicapped parking space was available in his community; however, she gave Mr. Botero a non-reserved parking space in his community. Based on the testimony of the Miami Management's current assistant property manager for Calusa Club, Michelle Lopez, which is found to be credible, an inference is made that the parking space given to Mr. Botero by Ms. Roder was a guest parking space. To Mr. Botero, the parking space given to him was too small dimensionally to accommodate his condition. When he opened the door on the driver's side of his vehicle, Mr. Botero was unable to open the door fully and, therefore, the parking space given to him failed to provide sufficient space dimensionally for him to exit his vehicle or for someone to remove him from his vehicle. He subsequently requested another parking space.3 Mr. Botero was given another non-reserved parking space, but he again complained that it too was too small dimensionally for the same reason as before. Based on the testimony of Ms. Lopez, which is found to be credible, an inference is made that the second parking space given to Mr. Botero by Ms. Roder was a guest parking space. After complaining a third time,4 Ms. Roder moved Mr. Botero's Reserved Space Number 9 next to the access walkway to his condominium building, which is the current space complained of. Reserved Space Number 9 measures 78 inches in width; immediately to its left is another reserved space assigned to another condominium unit; immediately to its right is the access walkway to Mr. Botero's condominium building; and immediately to the right of the access walkway is a guest parking space. The width of the Reserved Space Number 9 is the same width of the other parking spaces of his condominium building. Mr. Botero complains that Reserved Space Number 9, even though it is located next to the access walkway to his unit, is also too small dimensionally to accommodate his condition in that, if an attack occurs in the parking space and if a vehicle is in the parking space next to him, insufficient space exists for him to exit his vehicle or for someone to remove him from his vehicle. Furthermore, Mr. Botero is unable to back into Reserved Space Number 9 because he is fearful of hitting another vehicle, an object, or someone else if he has a narcolepsy attack while he is backing-up. If he could back-in, the position of his vehicle would give him sufficient space to exit his vehicle or for someone to remove him because the driver's side of his vehicle would be next to the access walkway. Moreover, Mr. Botero would back into Reserved Space Number 9 if it was larger dimensionally because he would then not be fearful of hitting another vehicle, an object, or someone else. After complaining to Ms. Roder, regarding the re- location of Reserved Space Number 9, she advised him in a letter dated May 5, 2004, among other things, that Calusa Club had provided him a reasonable accommodation and that nothing else could be done. The letter provided, in pertinent part, as follows: Please be advised that we have contacted our attorney regarding providing you with a Handicapped parking place. We are sorry to report that because our community was built in the early 1980's, we are only required to provide you with "reasonable accommodation". We have done so by moving your reserved space #9 next to your access walkway. We would not be able to place a handicapped space anywhere near that location. No evidence was presented to demonstrate that Calusa Club incurred any expense moving Reserved Space Number 9 to the guest parking space to the left of the access walkway. Therefore, an inference is drawn and a finding is made that Calusa Club incurred no expense moving Reserved Space Number 9 to the guest parking space to the left of the access walkway. No reserved handicapped parking space was or is available at Mr. Botero's community; they were and are all assigned. In order to widen Reserved Space Number 9, Miami Management would have to take away the reserved parking space assigned to the owner of another condominium unit. Ms. Lopez testified that Miami Management could not take away a reserved parking space assigned to the owner of another condominium unit. The undersigned finds her testimony to be credible. Ms. Lopez also testified that Miami Management could not "change" a reserved parking space assigned to the owner of a condominium unit. She later testified that Miami Management could not "take away" a reserved parking space assigned to the owner of a condominium unit. No documentation was presented at hearing evidencing Miami Management's lack of authority to "change" or to "take away" a reserved parking space. An inference is drawn and a finding is made that "change" and "take away" have identical meaning as used by Ms. Lopez. Mr. Botero has had narcolepsy attacks since residing at Calusa Club. His neighbors have had to remove him from his vehicle and park his vehicle in Reserved Space Number 9 for him. Around 2001, Mr. Botero deeded his condominium unit to his son, a college student. He and his son live together in the unit. Mr. Botero did not inform Calusa Club or his condominium association that he had deeded the condominium unit to his son. Mr. Botero continues to pay the maintenance and condominium association fees. Mr. Botero parks his vehicle in a guest space, while his son parks his (son's) vehicle in Reserved Space Number 9. Calusa Club learned of Mr. Botero's present arrangement with his son at hearing through Mr. Botero's testimony. Mr. Botero filed his complaint of discrimination under Florida's Fair Housing Act (Act) with the FCHR on about June 4, 2004.5
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order: Finding that Calusa Club Village, P.O.A., discriminated against Humberto Botero under Florida’s Fair Housing Act by failing and refusing to make a reasonable accommodation for his handicap; Ordering Calusa Club Village, P.O.A.,to cease the discriminatory practice; and Ordering Calusa Club Village, P.O.A., to move the reserved parking space of condominium unit number E-201 to the right of the access walkway of the condominium building. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of October, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 2005.
