The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent committed the violation of Section 475.25(1)(m), Florida Statutes, alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against her.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (the "Department"), is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, including Chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Maureen Teresa Mobley, is a licensed real estate salesperson in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0647773. On or about January 22, 1997, Respondent filed an application with the Department for licensure as a real estate salesperson. Pertinent to this case, item 9 on the application required that Respondent answer "Yes" or "No" to the following question: Have you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld? This question applies to any violation of the laws of any municipality, county, state or nation, including traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection, or traffic signal violations), without regard to whether you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, paroled, or pardoned. If you intend to answer "NO" because you believe those records have been expunged or sealed by court order pursuant to Section 943.058, Florida Statutes, or applicable law of another state, you are responsible for verifying the expungement or sealing prior to answering "NO." If you answered "Yes," attach the details including dates and outcome, including any sentence and conditions imposed, in full on a separate sheet of paper. Your answer to this question will be checked against local, state and federal records. Failure to answer this question accurately could cause denial of licensure. If you do not fully understand this question, consult with an attorney or the Division of Real Estate. Respondent answered item 9 by checking the box marked "No." The application concluded with an "Affidavit of Applicant," which was acknowledged before a Notary Public of the State of Florida, as follows: The above named, and undersigned, applicant for licensure as a real estate salesperson under the provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, as amended, upon being duly sworn, deposes and says that (s)(he) is the person so applying, that (s)(he) has carefully read the application, answers, and the attached statements, if any, and that all such answers and statements are true and correct, and are as complete as his/her knowledge, information and records permit, without any evasions or mental reservations whatsoever; that (s)(he) knows of no reason why this application should be denied; and (s)(he) further extends this affidavit to cover all amendments to this application or further statements to the Division or its representatives, by him/her in response to inquiries concerning his/her qualifications. (Emphasis added.) On March 3, 1997, Respondent passed the salesperson examination and was issued license number 0647773. From March 15, 1997, through April 7, 1997, Respondent was an inactive salesperson. From April 8, 1997, through the present, Respondent has been an active salesperson associated with Betty K. Woolridge, an individual broker trading as B. K. Woolridge and Associates, currently in Tampa, Florida. Steve Pence, Investigative Supervisor for the Department, investigated Respondent’s criminal history. He discovered that Respondent had "a problem" with a worthless check charge. Mr. Pence obtained a Certificate of Disposition from the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County, Florida. The Certificate indicated that on November 4, 1992, Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to a misdemeanor charge of obtaining property with a worthless check, an offense that occurred on July 25, 1991. The Certificate further indicates that adjudication was withheld. After Mr. Pence concluded his investigation, the Department filed the Administrative Complaint at issue in this proceeding which, based on Respondent's failure to disclose the aforesaid criminal disposition, charged that "Respondent has obtained a license by means of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment in violation of [Section] 475.25(1)(m), Florida Statutes" and sought to take disciplinary action against her license. According to the complaint, the disciplinary action sought . . . may range from a reprimand; an administrative fine not to exceed $5,000.00 per violation; probation; suspension of license, registration or permit for a period not to exceed ten (10) years; revocation of the license, registration or permit; and any one or all of the above penalties. . . . At the hearing, Respondent testified that six or seven years ago, she wrote a check for $19.00 that was not cleared at her bank. She had moved during this period, and for some reason the notification did not reach her. When she found out the check had not been paid, she went directly to the intended payee and made the payment. A year later, she was stopped for a minor traffic violation and was arrested on an outstanding warrant for her arrest on the worthless check charge. At the time, she thought the matter had been taken care of and had no idea there was warrant out for her arrest. Respondent testified that she went before the judge, who noted that she had made good on the check more than a year before her arrest. Respondent admitted pleading no contest to the charge. However, Respondent’s understanding of "adjudication withheld" was that the judge had dismissed the charge, provided she pay the court costs. She never saw the Certificate of Disposition until Mr. Pence brought it to her attention several years later. Respondent's explanation for her failure to disclose the worthless check charge on her application is credited. It is found that, at the time she submitted her application, Respondent did not intend to mislead or deceive those who would be reviewing her application. In so finding, it is observed that Respondent's testimony was candid and her understanding of the disposition of the matter was reasonable, given the passage of time since the events in question, the minor nature of the underlying charge, and the fact that the judge acknowledged she had long since made good on the $19.00 check at issue.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be rendered dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel Villazon, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Leonard H. Johnson, Esquire Schrader, Johnson, Auvil and Brock, P.A. Post Office Box 2337 37837 Meridian Avenue Dade City, Florida 33526-2337 William Woodyard Acting General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 James Kimbler Acting Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32302-1900
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of obtaining his real estate salesperson's license by fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(m), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Seeking to become a licensed real estate salesperson, Respondent submitted to Petitioner an application on December 16, 1996. One of the questions on the application form asks: Have you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld? . . . [Bold] If you answered "Yes," attach the details including dates and outcome, including any sentence and conditions imposed, in full on a separate sheet of paper. [End Bold] Respondent checked "yes," but failed to attach the details or otherwise describe them on the form. As alleged, Respondent pleaded no contest to driving under the influence in July 1991, and he was adjudicated guilty. He was placed on supervised probation for one year and lost his driving privileges for six months. As alleged, Respondent pleaded no contest to the traffic misdemeanor of reckless driving and misdemeanor possession of under 20 grams of marijuana in June 1995. He was adjudicated guilty of reckless driving, and adjudication was withheld as to possession of marijuana. He was fined $630 and court costs for reckless driving. In completing the application, Respondent realized that he would have to supply the details of the criminal offenses, of which he admitted when he checked the "yes" box. However, he set aside the application for a week or two, and, when he picked it up again to finish, he forgot about the need to attach a supplement. He thus sent it in incomplete and with a personal attestation that it was complete. Despite the obvious omission from the application, Petitioner issued Respondent a real estate salesperson's license without requesting further information concerning the criminal offenses. Respondent took the licensing examination on February 17, 1997. Passing the examination, he received his license shortly after it was issued on March 24, 1997. The next contact between the parties was when Respondent received a letter, dated February 25, 1998, from Petitioner noting that the Florida Department of Law Enforcement had informed Petitioner of an arrest for the latter criminal offenses. The letter states: "To clear any ambiguity regarding your 'YES' response to the relevant application question, we request additional information." The letter also requests an explanation regarding Respondent's failure to disclose this information on his application form. The letter concludes that Respondent's application would be held in abeyance until receipt of the requested information. By letter dated March 9, 1998, Respondent explained the circumstances surrounding the latter offenses, saying that he had not disclosed the information on the original application due to embarrassment. The letter does not mention the earlier criminal offense of driving under the influence. Respondent testified at the hearing that he claimed embarrassment because he did not think that it would sound as good to say that he had forgotten about the need to add the supplement to his application. This testimony is credited. It is impossible to infer an affirmative misrepresentation or attempt to conceal in the initial application. Respondent disclosed a criminal offense, and it was abundantly clear on the face of the short application form that he had failed to describe the disclosure, as requested to do so. Perhaps Petitioner's employees missed the box checked "yes" or, finding it, forgot to follow up on the matter. Clearly, though, Respondent sufficiently disclosed the matter to preclude a finding, on these facts, of any misrepresentation or intent to conceal. Respondent's March 9 response to the February 25 letter is a different matter. Although the February 25 letter focuses its inquiry upon the latter criminal offenses and does not request a comprehensive response to the question of criminal offenses, Respondent could have also mentioned the earlier offense. This would have negated any inference whatsoever of an affirmative misrepresentation or intent to conceal in the application or at this later stage. However, even considering the shortcoming of the February 25 response, the facts still do not support the finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent intentionally concealed the criminal offenses in his application. As to the omission from the February 25 letter as a basis for discipline in itself, the Administrative Complaint does not charge Respondent with anything arising directly out of the contents of his February 25 letter. Likewise, Petitioner's proposed recommended order does not even mention Respondent's February 25 response.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of November, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of November, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Ghunise Coaxum, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Warren Keith Babb, pro se 2310 Southwest 53rd Street Cape Coral, Florida 33914 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 James Kimbler, Acting Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Department), is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged, inter alia, with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, including Chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Karen Akinbiyi, is a licensed real estate salesperson in the State of Florida, having been issued license number SL-0642172. On June 14, 1996, Respondent filed an application (dated May 1996) with the Department for licensure as a real estate salesperson. Pertinent to this case, item 9 on the application required that Respondent answer "Yes" or "No" to the following question: Have you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld? This question applies to any violation of the laws of any municipality, county, state or nation, including traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection, or traffic signal violations), without regard to whether you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, paroled, or pardoned. If you intend to answer "NO" because you believe those records have been expunged or sealed by court order pursuant to Section 943.058, Florida Statutes, or applicable law of another state, you are responsible for verifying the expungement or sealing prior to answering "NO." If you answered "Yes," attach the details including dates and outcome, including any sentence and conditions imposed, in full on a separate sheet of paper. Your answer to this question will be checked against local, state and federal records. Failure to answer this question accurately could cause denial of licensure. If you do not fully understand this question, consult with an attorney or the Division of Real Estate. Respondent responded to the question by checking the box marked "No." The application concluded with an "Affidavit of Applicant," which was acknowledged before a Notary Public of the State of Florida, as follows: The above named, and undersigned, applicant for licensure as a real estate salesperson under the provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, as amended, upon being duly sworn, deposes and says that (s)(he) is the person so applying, that (s)(he) has carefully read the application, answers, and the attached statements, if any, and that all such answers and statements are true and correct, and are as complete as his/her knowledge, information and records permit, without any evasions or mental reservations whatsoever; that (s)(he) knows of no reason why this application should be denied; and (s)(he) further extends this affidavit to cover all amendments to this application or further statements to the Division or its representatives, by him/her in response to inquiries concerning his/her qualifications. (Emphasis added.) On September 30, 1996, Respondent passed the salesperson examination and she was issued license number SL-0642172 as an inactive salesperson. From December 30, 1996, through June 4, 1997, Respondent was an active salesperson associated with Home Realty Corporation, a broker corporation trading as ERA Homeland Realty and located at 6051 Miramar Parkway, Miramar, Florida. From June 5, 1997, through the date of hearing, Respondent was "not . . . in compliance to operate in an active status due to no employing broker." (Petitioner's Exhibit 1.) Following approval of Respondent's application, and her licensure as a real estate salesperson, the Department discovered that Respondent had been involved in a criminal incident that was not revealed on her application. According to the proof (Petitioner's Exhibit 3), Respondent was arrested on August 16, 1990, and charged, inter alia, with the purchase of marijuana (cannabis), under 10 grams, in violation of Section 893.13(2)(a)2, Florida Statutes, a felony of the third degree. On August 28, 1990, an Information was filed, predicated on such offense, and on September 6, 1990, Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere. By order of the same date, the court noted that Respondent had been found guilty of the charge, but withheld adjudication of guilt. Respondent was sentenced to (accorded credit for) time served (one day), ordered to pay various costs totaling $225.00, and fingerprinted pursuant to Section 921.241(1), Florida Statutes. Based on such incident, the Department filed the Administrative Complaint at issue in this proceeding which, based on Respondent's failure to disclose the criminal incident on her application, charged that "Respondent has obtained a license by means of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment in violation of [Section] 475.25(1)(m), Fla. Stat." (Count I), and that "Respondent has failed to disclose arrest or conviction of a crime as required by . . . [Rule 61J2-2.027(2), Florida Administrative Code] and, therefore, is in violation of [Section] 475.25(1)(e), Fla. Stat." (Count II). According to the complaint, the disciplinary action sought for such violations was stated to be as follows: . . . The penalty for each count or separate offense may range from a reprimand; an administrative fine not to exceed $5,000.00 per violation; probation; suspension of license, registration or permit for a period not to exceed ten (10) years; revocation of the license, registration or permit; and any one or all of the above penalties. 1 At hearing, Respondent offered the following explanation regarding the criminal incident and her failure to disclose it on her application for licensure: DIRECT EXAMINATION * * * Q. . . . Ms. Akinbiyi, do you recall being arrested for unlawful purchase of cannabis? A. Yes, I do. * * * Q. And what happened after the arrest? A. After the arrest I was let go. I went to the phone book, looked up an attorney, talked to him over the phone, briefly told him what it is I wanted him to do. He told me to come to his office. I went to his office. He told me what he was going to do. He told me that he needed $300 to do it. I gave it to him. He gave me a receipt. He gave me a rubber stamp on the receipt, and I left. Q. Okay, and when he said he was going to take care of it, what did you believe that to mean? A. Well, I believed it to mean that it had been dismissed, and he was going to just erase it off my record, period, expunge it, take it away. Q. Okay, after that day did you have any more contact with this attorney? A. No, I didn't have any need to, because I paid him to do a job I thought he did. Q. Okay, when was the first time that this arrest was brought up again? A. When I got the letter from the Real Estate Commission, telling me that they see that I've been arrested, and I didn't answer properly to the application. . . . * * * Q. . . . when you answered the question on the application did you believe that you had been -- did you know what a withhold of adjudication was at the time? A. At the time, no. I just knew that I paid this lawyer, and everything was supposed to be okay. Q. Okay, at the time that you answered the question did you believe your criminal charge had been dismissed? A. Yes, I did. Q. . . . at any time when you were responding to the question regarding, have you ever been convicted or pled no contest to a crime, were you intending to conceal or misrepresent this crime? A. No, I was not. * * * CROSS EXAMINATION * * * Q. Ms. Akinbiyi -- A. Uh-huh (positive response.) Q. -- you testified that when you were filling out the application for your real estate license that you believed that your record have been sealed or expunged by your attorney, correct? A. Exactly. Q. Do you recall reading the last paragraph to Question Number 9, which reads, "if you intend to answer no because those records have been expunged or sealed by the Court, you are responsible for verifying expungement or sealing prior to answering no"? A. Well, it wasn't a problem, because I knew where the attorney's office was, and if I needed him I could just go back there and say, remember me, I paid you. This is my case number, and he can go ahead and look it up. Q. So did you ever actually verify that your records were sealed or expunged before answering that? A. No, I did not. No, I did not, but I just assumed it was since I paid him. Q. At the time that you were filling out this application you did have a recollection of this criminal charge? A. Yes, I did. * * * THE COURT: Let me ask you a question. You were in jail for one evening; is that correct? THE WITNESS: That's correct. THE COURT: Okay, and when you were released the next morning is when you called the lawyer? THE WITNESS: Yes, it is. THE COURT: And you went to see him the same day? THE WITNESS: Yes, I did. THE COURT: And at that time you paid him $300, and he gave you a receipt for the money? THE WITNESS: Yes, he did, that's correct. * * * THE COURT: Did you ever see the lawyer again after that date? THE WITNESS: No, I didn't. THE COURT: Did you ever appear in Court? THE WITNESS: No. THE COURT: Did you ever have any contact with the criminal justice system after your release from jail on this charge? THE WITNESS: No, sir. * * * [RE-CROSS EXAMINATION] Q. Do you remember going to court and entering a plea of no contest to this charge. . . A. I really don't . . . After I went to -- after I just spent the night, I believe the next day we did go to court. I don't know, because it was like a whole group of us. Everybody, they just said their name, and it wasn't like a one person deal. It was everybody collectively standing up going to court. So I could have. To be honest with you, I can't remember. Q. Do you remember talking to the judge? A. I remember I was in a courtroom, and then they said time served, and I said okay. And I went home, I called my husband, looked in the phone book, got an attorney and went straight to his office. Q. Do you remember being fingerprinted when you were in court? A. . . . not in court. When I got arrested I got fingerprinted. Q. Okay, but you weren't fingerprinted in court again? A. No, I wasn't. Q. Okay. Just one more question. Do you remember having to pay any costs to the Court for this charge? A. No. . . . I don't recall any charges that I had to pay myself. Having carefully considered Respondent's testimony at hearing, and having reflected further on her explanation for failing to disclose the criminal incident on her application (that she employed an attorney to expunge or seal her record, and she assumed he had done so when completing the application), it must be resolved that Respondent's explanation was lacking in sincerity or genuiness, as well as substance, and must be rejected as unpersuasive. In so concluding, it is initially observed that Respondent's version of her exposure to the criminal justice system does not conform with the objective proof of record. (Petitioner's Exhibit 3.) Notably, Respondent avers that she employed an attorney to expunge or seal her record on August 17, 1990 (the day she was released from jail, and the day after her arrest), and that she had no further contact with her lawyer or the criminal justice system after that date; however, the objective proof demonstrates that the Information did not issue until August 28, 1990, and that it was not until September 6, 1990, that Respondent, accompanied by her attorney, entered a plea of nolo contendere. The objective proof further reflects that on the same date (September 6, 1990) the court noted her guilty of the charge, but withheld adjudication of guilt and sentenced her to time served, ordered her to pay various costs totaling $225.00, and oversaw that she was fingerprinted in open court. Clearly, Respondent's version of the event does not comport with the objective proof, and it is most unlikely that a person would confuse or forget an appearance in court on a felony charge, the entry of a plea to a felony charge, or being fingerprinted in open court. Moreover, it is most unlikely that Respondent would engage an attorney the day after her arrest, and before the Information had been filed or resolved, to expunge or seal her record. Finally, had she made such a request of her attorney at anytime, it is most improbable that she would not contact or inquire further of her attorney to ascertain whether her record had been successfully expunged or sealed. In sum, Respondent's testimony that her response to item 9 on the application was, at the time, an accurate reflection of her understanding of the status of the criminal incident (that the record had been expunged or sealed) is improbable and unworthy of belief. Consequently, it must be resolved that Respondent's failure to disclose the incident was intentional.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered which finds Respondent guilty of violating Subsections 475.25(1)(e) and (m), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint. It is further RECOMMENDED that for such violations, the final order revoke Respondent's license. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of May, 1999.
The Issue Should Petitioner, Ariella Rubinger's, application for a real estate sales associate license be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is an applicant for licensure as a real estate sales associate. Her application was filed on December 5, 2007. Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing real estate professionals in the State of Florida and has the statutory authority to approve or deny Petitioner's application. On July 25, 2007, the Broward County, Florida Circuit Court, returned a four-count information charging Petitioner with DUI Manslaughter and Vehicular Homicide. The charges are still pending in Broward County. On May 7, 2008, Respondent denied Petitioner's application for real estate sales associate licensure. The stated reasons listed in the Notice of Intent to Deny are "Unpersuasive Testimony" and "Crimes Recent." In addition, it indicates that the "[a]pplicant is currently facing charges of DUI Manslaughter and Vehicular Homicide in the Broward County Circuit Court."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Ariella Rubinger's, application for licensure be held in abeyance until the prosecution of the crimes pending in Broward County Circuit Court is resolved. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of October, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of October, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Barnhart, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Kerey Carpenter, Esquire 1551 Sandspur Road Maitland, Florida 32751 S.W. Ellis, Chairman Florida Real Estate Commission Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 801N Orlando, Florida 32801 Ned Luczynski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issues in this case are: Did the Respondent, Alix Aldonis (Mr. Aldonis), commit fraud; misrepresentation; concealment; false promises; false pretense; dishonest dealings by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence; or breach of trust in a business transaction by: (a) misrepresenting the sales price of real estate in a sale and purchase contract, (b) misrepresenting a commission amount in a sales and purchase contract, and (c) misrepresenting receipt by an escrow agent of a $5,000 deposit? Did Mr. Aldonis fail to obtain and retain written confirmation from the escrow agent of delivery of the Buyer's funds for purchase of the property?
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the licensing and regulation of the real estate industry in the State of Florida, under the authority of section 20.165, Florida Statutes (2010), and chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes (2010). At all times material to this proceeding, the Department licensed Mr. Aldonis as a State of Florida real estate sales associate. He holds License Number SL-3117116, which is in effect until March 31, 2011. At all times material to this proceeding, Total Stop, Inc., d/b/a Total Stop Real Estate (Total Stop Real Estate), contracted with Mr. Aldonis to affiliate with it as a sales associate. At all times material to this proceeding, Lawrence Ligonde, of Total Stop Real Estate, was the licensed real estate broker with whom Mr. Aldonis was affiliated. Mr. Ligonde did not employ Mr. Aldonis. Currently, Mr. Aldonis is affiliated with Tropical Springs Realty, Inc. The agreement between Mr. Aldonis and Total Stop Real Estate did not provide for Total Stop Real Estate or Mr. Ligonde's receiving a percentage commission based on the price of sales that Mr. Aldonis made. Mr. Aldonis paid a flat fee of $495 to be affiliated with Mr. Ligonde. In 2006, Joseph Phen and Cheryl Phen listed a home that they owned, located at 3500 S.W. Viceroy Street, Port St. Lucie, Florida, for sale. They listed the property for $330,000. Ms. Phen was a real estate sales broker. She was the listing agent for the property. Mr. Aldonis represented a buyer in the sale of the Viceroy Street property. The buyer, Manuela Celestin, signed a Residential Sale and Purchase Contract for the property on August 2, 2006. Mr. and Ms. Phen signed the contract on August 3, 2006. They also initialed each page. The contract set forth a purchase price of $272,000. The contract also indicated that the buyer was providing a $5,000 deposit. Mr. Aldonis sent Ms. Phen a copy of the contract and a copy of a deposit check by facsimile transmission. The record does not reveal the sequence of contract signing, contract transmission, check transmission, the date of the check transmission, or whether the contract was transmitted more than once to Ms. Phen. Due to conversations with Ms. Augustine at Premier Choice Title & Escrow, the escrow agent identified in the contract, Ms. Phen grew concerned about whether the deposit had been placed in escrow. She spoke to Ms. Augustine about her concerns. Ms. Phen also told Mr. Aldonis she was concerned that the deposit check may not have been deposited in an escrow account. After the conversation, Mr. Aldonis sent Ms. Phen a copy of a check payable to Total Stop Real Estate from Charassard & Associates, P.A., for $5,000. "Phen/Celestin" is written in the "Memo" section of the check. The check bears the date August 6, 2006. Persuasive evidence does not establish if this was a copy of a second check or another copy of the check Mr. Aldonis transmitted earlier. Ms. Phen requested and received a copy of the Residential Sale and Purchase contract from the title company. The first page of this copy listed the sale price as $330,000. Although Ms. Phen testified about two HUD closing statements, the Department did not offer a copy of a HUD closing statement into evidence. The sale of the property occurred. The closing sale price was $272,000. The Department entered a second copy of the contract signed by the Phens and Ms. Celestin into evidence. The first page of the second contract reflected a sales price of $330,000. The initials at the bottom of the first page are not the initials of the Phens. The rest of the contract is identical to the contract signed by the Phens on August 3, 2006. Nothing in either contract provides for a four percent commission to be paid to any person or entity. There is no persuasive evidence indicating who created the second contract or how the title company obtained it. Mr. Ligonde testified that the contract with the higher purchase price "looks like" the one Mr. Aldonis provided him. The contracts "look" the same. Only a very close examination would identify the differences in the initials on the first page. The difference in amounts is more obvious, but it still requires a reading of the contract, not just looking at it, to note the different amount. Mr. Ligonde did not testify that the second contract entered into evidence came from his files. He also did not provide any information about how files are maintained at his business or who has access to them. He did not know when the contract arrived at his office or how. In addition, Mr. Ligonde's statement that a document "looks like" one provided him by Mr. Aldonis does not equate to testimony that the document is in fact the document Mr. Aldonis provided. At some point in the transaction, the employees of Mr. Ligonde's office, the employees of a title insurance company, and the employees of a mortgage broker had possession and control of the sales contract or a copy of it. The Department did not present credible, persuasive evidence that ruled out any of those individuals having created the new page one with the $330,000 sales price.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of February, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S John D. C. Newton, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February, 2011.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device in any business transaction in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2008),1 and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for issuing real estate sales associate licenses and monitoring compliance with all statutes, rules, and regulations governing such licenses. Respondent was at all times relevant to this proceeding a licensed real estate sales associate in the State of Florida and held License No. 3115665. In March 2006, Respondent was introduced to Willie Belle Lewis (Lewis) by a mutual acquaintance. Lewis was interested in selling her house, and Respondent agreed to work for Lewis in that regard. On March 13, 2006, Lewis and Respondent entered into an Exclusive Right of Sale Listing Agreement (the "Agreement"). Under the Agreement, Respondent was to act as Lewis' sales agent for sale of the house. Pursuant to paragraph 7 of the Agreement, Respondent was to receive a commission of six percent of the purchase price. Respondent initially requested a seven percent commission which was the ordinary and customary amount at that time, but agreed to six percent in deference to Lewis' request (and due to the fact that Lewis had recently lost her grandmother and Respondent empathized with her, having just lost her mother). In one version of the Agreement admitted into evidence, there is a notation that any cooperating real estate agent (presumably a buyer's agent) would receive a commission equal to three percent of the purchase price, i.e., one-half of Respondent's six percent commission. Another version of the Agreement admitted into evidence did not address sharing the commission with a cooperating agent. At some point in time (which was not clearly defined during testimony at final hearing) Lewis and Respondent re-negotiated the amount of Respondent's commission.2 Lewis maintains that the re-negotiated commission was three percent; Respondent says the re-negotiated commission was four percent. Respondent's testimony was more credible on this point. The amount of the new commission was not reduced to writing or indicated on either version of the Agreement. There is no indication, for example, what Respondent's commission would have been if a cooperating agent had been involved. It is highly unlikely that Respondent or any other agent would agree to a two percent commission, i.e., one-half of four percent (or 1.5 percent, one-half of three percent). Once the Agreement was signed, Respondent immediately began efforts to sell the Lewis house. Respondent invited Lewis to her (Respondent's) house and offered Lewis plants and flowers from Respondent's yard. Respondent and Lewis dug up various plants and transferred them to Lewis' yard to generate some "curb appeal," i.e., to dress it up for potential buyers. Within days, a potential buyer was found. A Contract for Sale and Purchase (the "Contract") was entered into between Lewis and Mrs. Bibi Khan. Respondent was listed as the seller's agent; no agent was indicated for the buyer. In fact, Respondent agreed to act as buyer's agent as well, performing services as both an agent and a broker. Again, there were two versions of the sales Contract admitted into evidence. On one version, Respondent's signature included only her first name; on the other it included her first and last name. On one version of the Contract, there appears to be "white-out" on Respondent's signature line. Contained and legible under the whited-out portion of the signature is the phrase "3%." Respondent admits she whited out the three percent figure, but that it was done after the closing occurred. The three percent figure appearing at that place in the Contract is confusing. It only makes sense if that was meant to represent Respondent's portion of a six percent commission split between a buyer's agent and a seller's agent. Respondent explained that she whited out the figure because it was not written in both places it was supposed to be. Rather than going through the process of re-doing the entire Contract and re-distributing it to all pertinent parties, she whited it out in one place. The explanation is plausible. However, it seems an unnecessary action inasmuch as the closing had already occurred. When the parties arrived at closing on April 17, 2006, the closing documents--including the HUD Settlement Statement-- indicated a six percent commission for Respondent (as originally stated on the Agreement). Lewis vehemently objected to the commission, saying that it should be three percent as verbally agreed to by her and Respondent.3 Respondent acquiesced at closing and, in front of witnesses, said the commission should be three percent. She asked that a letter be drafted by the closing agent reflecting a three percent commission. In effect, Respondent re-negotiated her commission at that time. She rues having done so and says she was confused, but she did so nonetheless. The closing was only the third closing Respondent had taken part in since becoming licensed. She was not very experienced with the process and seemed to be thinking she was getting a four percent commission, even when three percent was being discussed.4 It is clear, however, that Respondent did verbally agree to a three percent commission during the closing. The closing agent told Lewis to return on Monday and she would re-calculate the commission and provide Lewis with a final check in the appropriate amount. Meanwhile, Respondent attempted to contact Lewis over the weekend to discuss the discrepancy. Respondent wanted to remind Lewis they had agreed on four percent despite what she said at the closing. All attempts at communication with Lewis over the weekend were futile. When Lewis returned to the closing office on the following Monday, she found the check to still be in error as it reflected a four percent commission instead of a three percent commission. Apparently when Respondent advised the closing agent about her mistake regarding the amount of the commission, Respondent still maintained that the verbal agreement was for four percent. This was contrary to her statements during the closing and is not substantiated by any written documentation. Respondent directed the closing agent to issue a check reflecting a four percent commission, instead of the six percent commission reflected on the Agreement. Lewis ultimately, under protest, accepted her $74,264.92 check reflecting a four percent commission to Respondent. The check contained a shortage of $1,600, if a three percent commission had been applied. Lewis continued to seek repayment of the $1,600 she believed she was entitled to receive. Subsequently, Respondent discussed the entire dispute with her sales team and decided that the disputed amount ($1,600) was not worth fighting about. A check was then sent to Lewis in that amount.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, imposing a fine of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000) against Respondent, Marian Lemon Coaxum. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of November, 2009.
The Issue The primary issue in this disciplinary proceeding is whether Respondent, which operates a liquor store and sells alcoholic beverages on the premises under a license issued by Petitioner, sold beer to a person under the age of 21, in violation of the statutes governing holders of beverage licenses. If Petitioner proves the alleged violation, then it will be necessary to consider whether penalties should be imposed on Respondent.
Findings Of Fact At all relevant times, Respondent Holiday Liquors 2002, Inc., d/b/a Holiday Liquors ("Holiday"), has held a license to sell alcoholic beverages at retail. Consequently, Holiday is subject to the regulatory and disciplinary jurisdiction of Petitioner Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (the "Division"). On March 23, 2007, five agents of the Division placed under surveillance the liquor store that Holiday operates, covertly watching for sales to underage buyers. At around 10:45 p.m., Special Agent Eric Scarbrough observed a woman enter the store and purchase a six-pack of beer. To Agent Eric Scarbrough the woman appeared to be young——too young, perhaps, to purchase alcohol legally. Agent Scarbrough and his partner followed the woman's car as she drove away from the store's premises. Soon, they pulled her over, making a "traffic stop." The agents could see the six-pack in the car, in plain view. According to Agent Scarbrough, whose testimony in this regard the undersigned credits as true, the woman identified herself to him as Edith Rosario and produced her driver license, which showed November 6, 1986, as her date of birth. Agent Scarbrough confiscated the beer and issued the woman a Notice to Appear. Later that night, he also gave a Notice to Appear to the licensee's agent, Jakia Bergum, charging her with one count of selling alcohol to a person under the age of 21.1 Notwithstanding the foregoing, the undersigned is unable to find that the alleged underage buyer ("Ms. Rosario") was, in fact, under the age of 21 on March 23, 2007. This is because the Division did not offer any nonhearsay evidence in support of the woman's age. (Ms. Rosario did not testify at hearing.) The evidence being insufficient as to a material element of the Division's case (i.e. the age of the alleged underage buyer), it must be concluded, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Holiday is not guilty of selling alcoholic beverages to a person less than 21 years of age, as charged in the Administrative Action [Complaint].
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a final order finding Holiday not guilty of the instant charge. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of March, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.stae.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March, 2008.
The Issue Whether the Respondent engaged in a discriminatory employment practice contrary to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, by paying the Petitioner less that other similarly situated employees and by discharging the Petitioner based upon the Petitioner's race, national origin age and disability?
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a black male of Haitian extraction. His date of birth as given in his personnel records (Exhibit 7) is June 16, 1977. The Respondent is an employer within the statutory definition that engages in the rental of trailers, trucks, and moving supplies and sales and installation of equipment used in towing trailers. The Petitioner did not present any evidence regarding disability or age. The Petitioner was initially employed by the Respondent in 2002 as a customer service representative making $6.50/hour. Several month later, he received a raise to $7.00/hour, and before the end of the year, he received another raise to $7.50/hour. In the first half of 2003, the Petitioner was moved to the position of Assistant Moving Center Manager and his salary increased to $8.50/hour. In the fall, he received a raise to $9.25/hour and was given another raise to $11.50/hour before year's end. Testimony was received from Arthur Williams, who was the store manager and familiar with the operations of the company, although at the time of Petitioner's termination, he was new to the position and "in training." The pay for personnel employed by the Respondent is established nationwide and is based upon cost of living factors for an area. The wages paid to the Petitioner were slightly above the average for an area like Tallahassee, and reflected the Petitioner's hard work. His pay was in line with others doing similar work. The Petitioner alleged Clint Barrineau was paid more than he was paid. The evidence indicted that Barrineau had held in his career with the company, every position in its stores, including area manager. Barrineau had left the company for personal reasons, and upon his return in July 2003, was hired at $9.00/hour. Subsequently, he was promoted to the position of Hitch Professional at $11.50/hour. Notwithstanding Barrineau's prior experience, generally, it take less time for a person to be promoted as a hitch professional than as an assistant moving center manager reflecting hitch-related sales as an income center in the business. Both Barrineau and the Petitioner were making the same salary when the Petitioner was terminated. The Petitioner testified that he was denied promotion to store manager on two occasions. The Petitioner did not establish his qualifications for this position; however, evidence was received that the first person employed in that position was Henry Barnes a white male, and the second was Arthur Williams, a black male. Williams was brought in from outside the company; however, he had significant experience in retail sales management. The Petitioner's primary claim related to his discharge. The evidence presented indicated that on May 4, 2004, the Petitioner closed the store as the general manager on duty. As the manager on duty, it was his job to prepare the daily receipts for deposit in the bank, and retain a fixed amount for business operations on the next day. The Petitioner did this, and the bank deposit was made. On the following day, Arthur Williams, the store manager, arrived with Chuck Newell, the Field Relief Manager, who was helping to train Williams. The two men opened the store, which was duly locked, and Williams disarmed the alarm system. Williams opened the store safe, and counted the money. There was supposed to be $1000 kept in the safe for store operations. The count revealed only $800. Williams and Newell recounted and then search the safe and cash registers to ensure it had not been left in one of these places; however, the money was not present. Having assured themselves by checking and rechecking that the money was not present, they proceeded to open the store for business with the money on hand, and then check with the bank. They physically drove to the bank and checked the nightly deposit, which was correct, the deposit receipt having tallied with the money deposited. Williams and Newell returned to the store and called the alarm system center. This center is operated by U-Haul, and each authorized employee has his or her own code for disarming the alarm upon entering the store. If the code is not entered, or if the premise is broken into, the alarm goes off. The alarm center reported that there were no entries into the building after it was locked the previous night until Williams opened it o that morning. There was no evidence of the building being burgled. When the Petitioner reported to work on May 5, 2004, Williams confronted him about the missing money. The Petitioner did not have an explanation. As the manager closing the store, the Petitioner was solely and personally responsible for the deposit and for securing the money left on the premises. Although personnel were permitted to make up cash drawer shortages, the money in question was "store" money, and the amount involved was more significant that typical cash drawer shortages. Having determined that there was in fact a cash shortage and that the Petitioner was the person responsible for the accountability and security of the funds, Williams made the determination to discharge the Petitioner. Williams, although in training, was the sole individual responsible for the decision to discharge the Petitioner. As mentioned above, Williams is a black male. Williams testified further regarding other persons whom he had discharged. Ms. B. Heaulskamp was discharged for refusal to work her assigned schedule. Mr. Zak White, a white male, was discharged for a shortage in his cash drawer. Heaulskamp was provided a letter of termination; however, this was Williams' first termination, and he was advised it was company policy not to provide termination paperwork. He did not provide the Petitioner or White with such paperwork. Williams hired the Petitioner's replacement, William Westry, who was a black male. Williams has hired two Haitians since the Petitioner's termination, both of whom were still employed at the store.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Florida Commission on Human Relations enter its final order dismissing the Petitioner's claims. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of May, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of May, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Gueslin Vincent Post Office Box 20123 Tallahassee, Florida 32316 Jeremy P. Hertz, Esquire For & Harrison LLP 300 South Orange Avenue, Suite 1300 Orlando, Florida 32801-3379 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Should Petitioner, Darius Jermaine Santiago's, application for a real estate sales associate license be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is an applicant for licensure as a real estate sales associate. He is 36 years old and has lived in Florida since June 2004. He works in a Subway restaurant. Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing real estate professionals in the State of Florida and has the statutory authority to approve or deny Petitioner's application. Petitioner’s application discloses the following criminal offenses: Indecent exposure [Exposed sexual organ to law enforcement officer] Volusia County, Florida Date of offense 7/28/2005 Pled no contest; adjudication withheld, 6 mos. probation, fined. Possession of cannabis, possession of narcotic paraphernalia, [Possession of cannabis not more than 20 grams] Volusia County, Florida Date of offense 2/9/2009 Completed a “Level I” program, charge Nolle Prosequi Trespassing of conveyance [Accused of entering a truck without permission] Volusia County, Florida Date of offense 5/12/2009 In February, 2010, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to the charge referenced in 3c. He has performed 15 of 25 hours of community service imposed by the Court. On October 2, 2009, Respondent denied Petitioner's application for real estate sales associate licensure. The stated reasons listed in the Notice of Intent to Deny are: C. Having engaged in conduct or practices which would have been grounds for revoking or suspending a real estate license. 475.17(1)(a), 475.181, F.S. Convicted or found guilty or entered a plea of nolo contendere to, regardless of adjudication, a crime which directly relates to activities of a licensed broker or sales associate or involves moral turpitude or fraudulent or dishonest dealing. 475.25(1)(f), 475.181, F.S. Applicant has not had sufficient lapse of time, without government supervision, to establish rehabilitation by being crime free. M. The Commission concludes that it would be a breach of its duty to protect the health, safety and welfare of the public to license this applicant and thereby provide him easy access to the homes, families or personal belongings of the citizens of Florida. 455.201, F.S.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, Florida Real Estate Commission, enter a final order denying Petitioner, Darius Jermaine Santiago’s application for licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of April, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Barnhart, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Darius Jermaine Santiago 1534 Dunlap Drive Deltona, Florida 32725 Thomas W. O’Bryant Jr., Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, N801 Orlando, Florida 32801 Roger P. Enzor, Chair Real Estate Commission 400 W. Robinson Street, N801 Orlando, Florida 32801 Reginald Dixon, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been a licensed real estate salesman in the state of Florida having been issued License No. 0341212. The last license issued to Respondent is delinquent, and Respondent's license is in an involuntary inactive status. On or about October 28, 1986, the Respondent, while holding a delinquent involuntary inactive license as a salesman in the employ of KSP Real Estate Corporation and Mortgage Services (hereinafter "KSP"), did prepare an offer to purchase (a sales contract) on behalf of Emma L. Brown, Mary L. Howard and Betty F. Howard, as purchasers, for certain real property which was listed for sale with Lucy Charles of Homes by Charles of South Florida. Respondent received in trust $500 as an earnest money deposit which was to be placed in the KSP escrow account. In connection therewith, Respondent represented in the sales contract that, as president of KSP, he was acting as an escrow agent and that the $500 was to be held in escrow pending the outcome of the transaction. KSP is not and has not been a corporation registered as a broker with the Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate. Although the contract called for a closing within 120 days from the delivery of the abstract, the transaction did not close. At no time was the $500 placed in a KSP escrow account as was represented in the sales contract Respondent prepared. Respondent expected to be paid all or part of $2,640 as compensation for his services, calculated as 3% of the sales price of $88,000, as reflected in the sales contract. Respondent prepared and presented the sales contract offer to Lucy Charles of Homes by Charles representing himself to be a real estate broker. The purchasers had previously submitted an offer on the same property through Rickenback Associates, Inc. That offer was not contingent on FHA financing and on the purchasers refinancing their current home. When they showed that offer to their long-time friend, the Respondent, he prepared the sales contract in question in an attempt to re-negotiate the purchasers' then- outstanding offer so they could obtain the terms they wanted which had not been included by Rickenback Associates, Inc.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of Counts I and II of the Administrative Complaint and suspending Respondent's real estate salesman license for a period of six (6) months. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 15th day of March, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of March, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene F. Keller, Executive Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Kenneth A. Ratliff 813 Northwest 107th Street Miami, Florida 33168 James H. Gillis, Esquire Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 William O'Neil, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
