Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein the Respondent, Linda H. Abraham, was licensed by the State of Florida as a real estate broker under license number 0323486. During the months of February and March 1983 Martha L. Tew owned a parcel of waterfront property located in Panama City Beach which was identified as being for sale by a sign on the property reflecting her husband's real estate company. Her husband was Ronald Eugene Tew and Mrs. Tew also held a salesman's license. Mr. Tew was contacted by Gregory A. Peaden, a contractor and developer in the Panama City Beach area on several occasions prior to March 1983 with offers to purchase the Tew property. The contacts with Mr. Peaden subsequently culminated in a contract dated March 8, 1983, between Greg Peaden, Inc., and the Tews in the amount of, initially, $180,000.00. During the negotiations for the property, Mr. Peaden had introduced the Respondent to the Tews as his broker. When, at the time of Use contract, Mr. Peaden advised the Tews he wanted Respondent to get a commission for the sale, Mr. Tew refused to pay any commission indicating that Respondent had performed no service for him; that he, Tew, was a broker himself; and that he had no intention of paying any commission to the Respondent or to anyone, for that matter. After some further negotiation, a second contract was prepared and agreed upon wherein the contract price was raised to $189,000.00 and the Respondent's commission was to be paid with the additional money from Mr. Peaden. The contract in question executed by the parties on March 8, 1983, reflected that the sum of $5,000.00 deposit was paid to Linda Abraham, Inc., by check. Mr. Tew contends that at this point he was led to believe that Respondent had the $5,000.00 check and, he contends, he would not have signed the contract if he had known that the check had not been delivered and placed in Respondent's escrow account. The actual signing of the contract took place in Respondent's office, a mobile home which she shared with Mr. Peaden's business. This trailer home was described as having Mr. Peaden's office on one end, and Respondent's on the other, with the living-kitchen area in the middle used as a reception area for both businesses. Mr. Peaden contends that once the contract was signed by the Tews, he gave a check drawn on one of his business accounts, that of Peaden and Guerino, a property management company he owned, to his secretary, Judy White, to deposit in Respondent's escrow account and thereafter promptly forgot about the matter until the date scheduled for closing, two months in the future. Ms. white, on the other hand, contends that Mr. Peaden at no time gave her a check for $5,000.00 to deposit to Respondent's escrow account. It is her contention that when she received the contract after it was signed, she, on her own, inserted the receipt portion on the bottom of the second page and signed as having received it merely to complete the contract. At the time, she contends, she did not know if the deposit was received from Peaden or not. She has never signed a contract like this before without a deposit and cannot give any other reason why she did it on this occasion. She is certain, however, that at no time did Mr. Peaden ever give her a $5,000.00 check or tell her to draw one for his signature on March 8, 1983, or, for that matter, at any time thereafter. What is more, neither Mr. Peaden nor the Respondent, at any time after the signing of the contract and prior to her departure under less than friendly circumstances approximately a week or so later, ever asked her whether she had made the escrow deposit or discussed it with her at all. Ms. white contends that she left Mr. Peaden's employ because he expected her to perform certain functions she was unwilling to do. When she left his employ, she did not feel there was any unfinished business that needed her immediate attention. To the best of her recollection, there were no sales contracts or deposits left in or on her desk - only bills. According to Respondent, the $5,000.00 deposit by Mr. Peaden was to stay in her escrow account. She understood Mr. Peaden was going to arrange with the bank to borrow the entire cash payment called for under the contract, including the deposit, and when that was done, it was her intention to give him back his $5,000.00 check. Under these circumstances, the amount in escrow would never be paid to the sellers but would be returned to Mr. Peaden and the Tews would receive the entire cash amount called for by the contract from the proceeds of the bank loan. Respondent also indicated that this procedure had been followed at least once, in a prior transaction. Under the circumstances, it is clear that no deposit was ever received from Mr. Peaden nor was it placed in Respondent's escrow account. Therefore, the contract, dated on March 8, 1983, was false in that it represented a $5,000.00 deposit had been received. The check for $5,000.00 dated March 8, 1983, payable to Linda Abraham, Inc. and drawn by Mr. Peaden on the Peaden and Guerino account with the stub admitted to show the date of issuance, does not establish that it was written on March 8, 1983, as contended. This check, number 1349, comes after two other checks, 1347 and 1348, which bear dates of April 4 and September 7, 1983 respectively. Mr. Peaden's explanation that the checks were drafted out of sequence is non-persuasive. Of greater probative value is the fact that neither Mr. Peaden nor Respondent bothered to review their bank statements on a regular basis. The check in question was drawn on an account not related to the construction and development business of Greg Peaden, Inc. Further, examination of Respondent's escrow account reflects that there were approximately eleven transactions over a three year period even though, according to her, she handled numerous other closings as well as this. Her explanation is that in most cases the attorney handling the closing served as escrow agent even though she was the sales broker. Her explanation is not credible. This appears to be a classic situation of movement of accounts to satisfy a particular end. The contract called for closing of the sale to be held on or before May 8, 1983, in the office of Panama Title Company. May 8, 1983, fell on a Sunday. As a result, the closing would not have been held that day, but it was not held the following day, Monday, May 9, 1983 either. Mr. Peaden admits that he had not checked with Panama Title prior to May 9 to see if everything was prepared for the closing. Instead, he contacted the title company for the first time at approximately noon on May 9. Apparently he received disquieting information because he thereafter called his attorney, Mr. Hutto, and asked him to check with the title company to see if and when the closing would be held. Mr. Hutto's inquiry reflected that the title insurance binder was ready but the closing statement and the package were not because the title company required a copy of the contract. At this point Mr. Peaden immediately had a copy of the contract delivered to the title company but later that day was advised that the closing still could not be held because of the failure to provide a survey. Mr. Hutto indicates that the reason given was that the release clauses called for in the contract required the survey to be furnished though he did not necessarily agree with that. In any event, closing was not held on May 9. At this time both Mr. Peaden and Respondent allegedly became concerned about the $5,000.00 deposit. Admittedly, neither had concerned themselves with it from the time of the signing of the contract. At this point, Mr. Peaden indicates that he examined his bank records which failed to show the deposit being made and his subsequent search of Ms. White's desk finally revealed the check, undeposited, still there. On May 11, 1983, a $5,000.00 deposit was made to the account on which the deposit check was drawn and on the same day, May 11, 1983 check number 1349, in the amount of $5,000.00 was presented against the account. When on May 10, 1983, Mr. Peaden and Respondent went to Mr. Hutto's office the primary reason for the visit was because Mr. Peaden had heard that the Tews were planning to sell the property in question to someone else at a price much higher than that agreed upon for the sale to Peaden. At this point Mr. Hutto indicated that if Peaden so desired, Hutto could "fix up the contract to jam up the works" until he could do something about it. His examination of the contract revealed that it was not recorded or acknowledged and under the laws of Florida, acknowledgment is required in order for a contract to be recorded. Hutto asked the Respondent if she had seen the parties sign the contract and when she said that she had, he had his secretary prepare a jurat. Unfortunately, his secretary prepared an affidavit type notary jurat rather than an acknowledgment and Hutto quickly admits that he did not look at it when it was given back to him. He says that if he had, he would have had it changed but in any event, without looking at what was given him, he gave it to the Respondent with the implication, at least, that she should notarize it and have the contract recorded. According to Hutto, Peaden, and the Respondent, the sole purpose for notarization and recordation was to preserve the status quo to protect Mr. Peaden's interest in the property so that the matter could be adjudicated in a lawsuit which was soon to be filed. Respondent contends she never intended any misconduct throughout this transaction nor did she do any of the things alleged in the Administrative Complaint. She contends she never saw the check which Mr. Peaden allegedly gave to his secretary for deposit to her escrow account. She merely assumed that it was given and never checked to insure that it had been placed in her account. She does not know why Mr. Peaden did not give her the check. When she took the contract to the Tews, she was operating under the assumption that the check had been received but did not verify this to insure that it had. She contends that since she represented the buyer, her duties were limited to insuring that he performed and this made it simple. She did not check on him because she had had so much experience with him, him being by far her largest account, if he said something, she believed him and when the contract was executed, she merely instructed the secretary, Judy White, to make the file and did not check on it again. As to the recordation and the notarization after the fact, she acted upon the advice of counsel, she states, and did what was suggested to her by Mr. Hutto. It should be noted, however, that Mr. Hutto did not represent her but instead represented Mr. Peaden and while because of her long-standing relationship with him and Mr. Hutto, she may have felt safe in relying on his advice, the fact remains that Hutto was not her attorney.
Recommendation On the basis of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Respondent's license as a registered real estate broker in Florida be suspended for six months and that she pay an administrative fine of $2,000.00. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of June, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur Shell, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 John D. O'Brien, Esquire P. O. Box 1218 Panama City, Florida 32402 Harold Huff Executive Director Division of Real Estate P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, Joseph E. Stalls, Jr., committed the violations alleged in an Administrative Complaint issued by the Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, on July 19, 2000, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is the state agency charged the duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to Section 20.125, and Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes (2000). At the times material to this proceeding, Joseph E. Stalls, Jr., was a licensed Florida real estate salesperson. Mr. Stalls license number is 0125262. For his last issued license, Mr. Stalls was an active salesperson c/o Jim See Realty, Inc., located at 206 North 6th Avenue, Wauchula, Florida 33873. Prior to 1999, Mr. Stalls was actively engaged in growing, harvesting, and selling citrus. Mr. Stalls engaged in this business through a corporation, Stalls Fruit Co., Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Stalls Fruit"). Mr. Stalls owned half of the stock of Stalls Fruit and was its president. Stalls Fruit elected coverage for its workers' compensation insurance through the Florida Fruit & Vegetable Association Self-Insurers' Fund (hereinafter referred to as the "Fund"). On or about August 21, 1998, an Information was issued in the Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit in and for Orange County, Florida, charging Mr. Stalls with engaging in a scheme to defraud the Fund "to-wit: workers' compensation coverage from Florida Fruit & Vegetable Association Self- Insurer's Fund pursuant to policy number 840-8844-01, as valued by the diminution in premium payments resulting from said fraud or fraudulent pretenses or representations, with an aggregate value of $50,000 or more, in violation of Florida Statute 817.034(4)(a)." On or about February 17, 1999, Mr. Stalls pled guilty to the charge of the Information, which constitutes a felony. The court, upon the entry of Mr. Stalls' plea, withheld adjudication, ordered Mr. Stalls to serve one day in the Orange County Jail, with credit for a day already served, placed Mr. Stalls on Community Control for one year, followed by ten years of supervised probation, ordered Mr. Stalls to perform 500 hours of community service within a three-year period, and ordered that he make restitution in the amount of $738,566.00. The requirement that Mr. Stalls make restitution has placed an extreme financial hardship on him. Mr. Stalls, unaware that he was required to inform the Florida Real Estate Commission of his plea, and based upon his incorrect understanding of the consequences of adjudication being withheld, failed to report these events to the Florida Real Estate Commission.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the a final order be entered finding that Joseph E. Stalls, Jr., violated Section 475.25(1)(f) and (p), Florida Statutes (1999), and that his salesperson license be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of May, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Donna K. Ryan, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Hurston North Tower 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N308 Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 Joseph E. Stalls, Jr. 1165 36th Avenue Vero Beach, Florida 32960 Jack Hisey, Deputy Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-22202
The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether the Respondents violated Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by inducing a seller to enter in a contract for sale of real estate, based on a $50,000.00 earnest money deposit that was never made.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Fred Marberry, Jr. is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker-salesman in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0369879 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent Bernon Earl Thomas is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate salesman in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0433736 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. During the relevant time, from July through September 1985, Fred Marberry was President of Marberry and Mack Development, Inc., and maintained an office in Altamonte Springs, Florida. James Mack was the Vice-president, Secretary and Treasurer of the company. During the relevant time, from July through September 1985, Bernon Thomas was a real estate salesman with General Realty Management Corporation. His office was in Kissimmee, Florida. In 1985, the two Respondents had worked together on the potential sale and development of a multi-family project in Kissimmee. Thomas was aware of the availability of some commercial property in Kissimmee known as Cross Creek that he felt would be a good deal and shared that information with Marberry. Thomas got his information on Cross Creek from Larry Heninger, who was working with the owner, R. S. Futch, in putting together a development package to present to potential buyers and developers. Heninger had expended considerable effort in working with an engineer and permit agencies and had made contacts with a number of businesses interested in locating on the property. The engineering reports, correspondence and figures supplied to Marberry by Thomas indicated that the parcel comprised 14.75 usable acres. There were letters from the City saying that sewage capacity, utilities and similar public services would be based on this amount. Marberry told Thomas that the development package looked good and to continue working on it. Some time in mid-July 1985, Larry Heninger informed Thomas that some third parties were also interested in the Cross Creek property and that if Marberry and Mack, Inc., wanted to present an offer, they would need to do so immediately as Mr. Futch was leaving on a vacation for several weeks. Thomas called Marberry to relay this information. The details of the conversation are in dispute, but it is uncontroverted that Thomas was made a Vice-president of Marberry and Mack, Inc., for the sole purpose of executing a sales contract immediately. Arrangements were made for Thomas to draw up the contract/offer and have it taken to the Orlando airport where R. S. Futch was either leaving or was en route on his vacation. Marberry and Thomas disagree on what was discussed with regard to an escrow deposit. Thomas contends that Marberry authorized him to provide for a $50,000.00 escrow deposit to be held by Fred Marberry, licensed real estate broker upon acceptance of contract. Marberry denies this and claims that he never maintained an escrow account, that escrow funds were always handled by his (Marberry's) attorney. Marberry claims that the day after signing, when he actually saw the contract, he said something to Thomas about his failure to delete the escrow language on the contract form. Thomas denies this. Both Marberry and Thomas agree that all parties should have known that the deposit could not be escrowed upon acceptance, since Marberry was not there for the signing. The contract was prepared and signed by Thomas in Thomas' Kissimmee office and was taken to the Orlando airport. The contract, prepared on the standard Florida Bar and Association of Realtors approved form, provided a purchase price of $1,600,000.00, the $50,000.00 escrow deposit, and closing on August 25, 1985. The contract provided that closing could be extended by the buyer for 30 days with an additional $50,000.00 deposit. The contract contained the following special clauses: Contingent upon financing. Above described property of [sic] being viable to building Comm. Prop. with all necessary zoning and available utilities. [Pet. Ex. #5] At the airport, R. S. Futch accepted the offer by Marberry and Mack, made a few changes on the contract, initialled them and signed the contract; the changes were also initialled by Bernon Thomas. Later Thomas called Marberry and told him about the changes. The morning after the contract was signed, Marberry and Thomas visited Heninger's engineer to review the project. They reviewed the engineering plans and learned that the property was in a floodplain. Drainage was a problem and parking was a problem and it appeared that only 4.3 acres was actually buildable. On leaving the engineer's office Marberry told Thomas that there was no way the project could work; they could never get financing for a $1.6 million parcel of 14.75 acres, with only 4.3 buildable acres. Marberry felt the contingencies in the contract could not be met and the contract was off. Thomas still believed in the project, and since he had already put so much time and effort in it, he wanted to keep working on pulling it together. Marberry did not dissuade him, but said only to keep him informed on what was going on. Thomas told Heninger that Marberry didn't want the contract. Heninger said he wanted the contract to stay intact and encouraged Thomas to keep working on it. He also tried to get Thomas to do the deal himself, but Thomas told him he did not have the funds. Thomas claims that Heninger told him not to worry about the $50,000.00; Heninger denies this. Nothing was communicated in writing regarding the contract being terminated. The $50,000.00 deposit was never made. The deadline for closing passed, and sometime in September 1985, Larry Heninger arranged a meeting between R. S. Futch and Fred Marberry in a motel in Orlando. The purpose of the meeting was to either extend the contract entered in July (according to R. S. Futch), or to negotiate a new contract for the property (according to Fred Marberry). During the meeting Futch was told that no $50,000.00 deposit had been made on the original contract. The meeting apparently terminated and shortly later Futch filed suit for the $50,000.00. The testimony of the principal witnesses in this case: Marberry, Thomas, Futch and Heninger, establish a picture of lack of communication, misunderstanding, bungling, and unprofessionalism. It is impossible to determine from the rambling and disjointed stories of these witnesses, that either Fred Marberry or Bernon Thomas, individually or together, engaged in "fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence, and breach of trust..."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint against both Fred Marberry and Bernon Thomas, be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 11th day of August, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: James R. Mitchell, Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Robert D. Gatton, Esquire Maitland Center 1051 Winderley Place Maitland, Florida 32751 Bernon Earl Thomas 4226 Match Point Drive Augusta, Georgia 30909 Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Joseph A. Sole, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue The issue posed for decision herein is whether or not the Respondent, Department of Revenue's refusal to eliminate the Petitioner's assessment for penalties based on the subject assessment of Petitioner's books and records during the audit period was proper. Secondly, the remaining issue is whether or not the Respondent's imposition of interest for the subject assessment during the period in which the assessment was questioned by Petitioner was proper. Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the arguments of counsel, the memoranda submitted and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following:
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Bill Rivers Corporation, is a Florida corporation engaged principally in the sale of motor vehicles to large corporations, most of which are based out of state. Petitioner's books and records were audited by agents of the Department of Revenue during August of 1978 for the audit period August 1, 1975 through July 31, 1978. The original audit resulted in an assessment dated September 15, 1978 in the amount of $112,434.09 in taxes, penalties and interest. Petitioner contested that assessment and based upon Petitioner's submission of requested substantiating documentation concerning the sale of motor vehicles to out-of-state purchasers for use and registrations in such other states, the assessment was revised downward to $69,637.49. 2/ This revised assessment was issued February 27, 1979. It is the Petitioner's position that no penalty should be imposed as a result of the assessment entered against it based upon the taxability of sales of motor vehicles to a nonresident for use in another jurisdiction since the taxing statute was changed approximately three times during the 11-month period, creating a partial exemption that Petitioner was unable to intelligently determine with reasonable diligence. In this regard, Petitioner points to the fact that relying upon the advice of its controller, its attorney, and two accountants, it was unable to follow the guides of the taxing statutes due to the repeated changes during the above-referred 11-month period. Chapter 77-412, Laws of Florida. Petitioner argues that the Department of Revenue did not properly staff the subject audit review, which resulted in the initial "erroneous" assessment since all documentary records were available to Respondent's (Department of Revenue) agents for review. Based upon the fact that the original assessment was adjusted downward approximately 40 percent, Petitioner contends that it should not have been levied and, thus, forced to pay interest during the five-month period in which the assessment was being contested since the result ended in a downward adjustment. Additionally, Petitioner argues that although Respondent revised its penalty downward from 25 percent to 5 percent penalty, the entire penalty should be eliminated from the assessment. John M. McCrone, the Department of Revenue's Regional Audit Supervisor, became familiar with the audit of Petitioner's records after the audit was completed and reviewed by its auditor, W. R. Woodward, an auditor employed by the Department of Revenue for approximately eight years. Auditor Woodward analyzed all of Petitioner's sales records and numerous sales appeared taxable based on the absence of exemptions, resale certificates or other affidavits which would place them in an exempt category. For example, he noted that there was not on file in Petitioner's records resale certificates for the sale of out- of-state vehicles to one of Petitioner's largest customers, the Winn Dixie Corporation. During the informal conferences held at Petitioner's behest following the issuance of the original audit, extensions of time were granted by Respondent's agents to allow Petitioner an opportunity to obtain substantiating documentation respecting the taxability of numerous sales which ultimately resulted in a downward adjustment. (Testimony of Supervisor McCrone). Also, Auditor Woodward analyzed Petitioner's records during the period of approximately one month during which the audit was ongoing and was in regular consultation with his supervisor and other support personnel. Significantly, Petitioner's Controller and Vice President, Gerald Klansky, conceded that the documentation delineating the consigned parts inventory was unavailable for the Department during the original audit. This, according to the testimony of Petitioner's agents, impacted in part, the "high" original assessment issued which was, of course, based upon the available documentation for Respondent's agent. As initially issued, the assessment contained a penalty factor of 25 percent which was reduced downward to 5 percent following the informal conferences and the corrected assessment which issued on February 27, 1979. The Department's representatives compromised the penalty factor based upon the authority contained in Section 212.12(5), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue's revised assessment dated June 18, 1990 be UPHELD. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 1980.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated Section 475.25(1)(e) and (1)(m), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-2.027(2), and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is 58 years old. He is employed full-time as a real estate sales associate. Respondent holds an active real estate sales associate license. His license number is SL706350. The license was issued to Respondent based upon his sworn application for licensure submitted on or about March 14, 2001. Question No. 9 on the license application asked whether Respondent had “ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if [he] received a withhold of adjudication.” The following explanation is provided as part of the question: This question applies to any violation of the laws of any municipality, county, state or nation, including felony, misdemeanor and traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection, or traffic signal violations), without regard to whether you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, were paroled, or pardoned. If you intend to answer “NO” because you believe those records have been expunged or sealed by court order pursuant to Section 943.058, Florida Statutes, or applicable law of another state, you are responsible for verifying the expungement or sealing prior to answering “NO.” (Emphasis supplied) Immediately following Question No. 9 is the following statement in all capital letters: YOUR ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION WILL BE CHECKED AGAINST LOCAL, STATE AND FEDERAL RECORDS. FAILURE TO ANSWER THIS QUESTION ACCURATELY MAY RESULT IN THE REVOCATION OF YOUR LICENSE OR THE DENIAL OF A REAL ESTATE LICENSE. IF YOU DO NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND THIS QUESTION, CONSULT WITH AN ATTORNEY OR THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE. Respondent checked the box marked “NO” for Question No. 9 on the application that he submitted. Respondent’s negative answer to Question No. 9 was a material misstatement of his criminal record. On March 27, 1972, Respondent pled guilty to attempted robbery in the third degree in the Erie County Court in New York. The offense was a felony. On May 5, 1972, Respondent was sentenced to five years of probation for that offense. Respondent’s probation was revoked on January 14, 1974, and he was sentenced to “the care and custody of the NY State Narcotic Addiction Control Commission for an indefinite period of 60 months.” The latter sentence ran concurrently with a sentence imposed for another offense, the substance of which is not reflected in the record. On August 3, 1992, the Erie County Court issued a Certificate of Relief From Disabilities to Respondent, which relieved him of “all disabilities and bars to employment, excluding the right to be eligible for public office.” The certificate expressly states that it “shall NOT be deemed nor construed to be a pardon,” and it is limited to the “crime or offense specified [t]herein.” The Certificate of Relief From Disabilities makes no mention of expungement or sealing of the records related to the enumerated offense. The only offense enumerated in the Certificate of Relief From Disabilities is the third degree attempted robbery conviction with a sentence date of May 5, 1972. No other offenses are mentioned. On February 18, 1993, the New York Executive Department, Board of Parole, issued a Certificate of Good Conduct to Respondent. The certificate referenced three offenses: the third degree attempted robbery conviction discussed above; a second degree robbery conviction with a sentence date of May 8, 1975; and a federal distribution of heroine conviction with a sentence date of May 1, 1978. The purpose of the Certificate of Good Conduct was to “remove all legal bars and disabilities to employment, license and privilege except those pertaining to firearms . . . and except the right to be eligible for public office.” The certificate states that it “shall be considered permanent.” The Certificate of Good Conduct makes no mention of expungement or sealing of the records related to the enumerated offenses. Respondent testified that his negative answer to Question No. 9 was based upon his understanding of the legal effect of the Certificate of Relief from Disabilities and the Certificate of Good Conduct. Specifically, Respondent testified that although he understood that the certificates did not “remove” his criminal history or expunge his records, it was his understanding that the certificates provided him a “safe harbor” to answer “no” to Question No. 9 because all legal bars to employment had been removed by the certificates. Respondent’s understanding regarding the legal effect of the certificates and his obligation to disclose his prior offenses based upon the certificates was based, in part, on advice he received from an attorney in New York. Respondent knew that the Department would learn of his criminal history through the background check based upon the fingerprint card that he submitted with his license application, and he credibly testified that he did not intend to mislead the Department regarding his criminal history through his negative answer to Question No. 9. Respondent was unaware at the time he submitted his license application that the Department and/or the Florida Real Estate Commission (Commission) processed applications in which no criminal history was disclosed differently than applications in which a criminal history is disclosed.2 Respondent’s understanding regarding the legal effect of the certificates was erroneous. Respondent acknowledged as much in his testimony at the final hearing (Tr. 54) and in his PRO (at ¶29). The record does not establish precise legal effect of the certificates,3 but it is inferred that the certificates restore the civil rights that Respondent lost due to his felony convictions. It is also inferred that the reason that the Certificate of Good Conduct does not mention Respondent’s misdemeanor offenses (See Endnote 5) even though it was issued after those offenses is because misdemeanor convictions typically do not result is the loss of civil rights as is the case with felony convictions.4 Neither of the certificates expunge or seal any of Respondent’s criminal records and, contrary to his understanding at the time, the certificates did not excuse Respondent from disclosing his criminal offenses in response to Question No. 9 on the license application. The evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that Respondent was convicted of third degree attempted robbery, a felony, in 1972; that the offense was not sealed or expunged; and that Respondent failed to disclose that conviction on his license application when he answered “no” to Question No. 9.5 The evidence does not clearly and convincingly establish that Respondent intentionally misrepresented or fraudulently concealed his criminal history from the Department by answering “no” to Question No. 9.6 To contrary, the evidence establishes that Respondent’s negative answer to Question No. 9 was based upon his good faith, albeit erroneous belief, that he was not required to disclose his prior criminal offenses in light of the Certificate of Relief from Disabilities and/or the Certificate of Good Conduct. It has been 34 years since Respondent’s third degree attempted robbery conviction, which is the basis of the Administrative Complaint. It has been more than 18 years since Respondent’s last criminal offense, which was a misdemeanor petit larceny offense. All of Respondent’s criminal offenses occurred in the state of New York. He has remained out of trouble with the law since he came to Florida in 2000. Respondent has not been the subject of any disciplinary action, other than this proceeding, since receiving his license. Respondent did not present the testimony of any character witnesses, but he credibly testified that he has completely turned his life around since the time of his criminal offenses in New York. Respondent served in the U.S. Air Force Security Service in Viet Nam. He was honorably discharged. Respondent was licensed as a mental health counselor in New York and Virginia prior to coming to Florida and obtaining his real estate sales associate license. Respondent testified that he was required to disclose his criminal background and undergo a background check in order to obtain those licenses; that he did not disclose his criminal background on the license applications based upon his understanding of the certificates described above; that his criminal background was not an issue to the licensing agencies in New York and Virginia, even though it was not disclosed on his license applications; and that this experience (along with the advice he received from the attorney in New York) led him to believe that his criminal records were sealed and need not be disclosed. Respondent offered no evidence to corroborate this self-serving testimony, and it is given very little weight because it is unknown how, if at all, the disclosure requirements and licensure regimes for mental health counselors in New York and Virginia compare with the disclosure requirements and licensure regime for real estate sales associates in Florida.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order that: finds Respondent not guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(m), Florida Statutes (Count I of the Administrative Complaint); finds Respondent guilty of violating Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-2.027(2) and, hence, Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes (Count II of the Administrative Complaint); imposes an administrative fine of $1,000; suspends Respondent’s license for 30 days; places Respondent on probation for one year after the end of the suspension period; and imposes the costs related to the investigation and prosecution of this case, excluding costs associated with an attorney’s time. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of December, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st of December, 2006.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated Section 475.25(1)(e) and (1)(m), Florida Statutes (2003),1 and Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-2.027(2), and if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a licensed real estate sales associate. She was licensed in 2003. Her license number is 3061179. Respondent was working for Weichert Realty in the Orlando area at the time of the final hearing. She started working for that firm in October 2006, and prior to that, she “did not do a whole lot with [her] license as far as practicing real estate.” Respondent filled out and submitted her license application over the Internet. She submitted a signed notarized statement dated January 15, 2003, attesting that she answered the questions in the application “completely and truthfully to the best of [her] knowledge.” She also submitted a fingerprint card. The evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that there were at least three material misstatements and omissions in Respondent’s license application. First, Respondent did not provide a Social Security number (SSN) in her license application. The SSN that she subsequently provided to the Division, 378-72-0704, was incorrect. Respondent testified that her SSN is 378-62-0704. That is the SSN listed for Respondent in the driver’s license records maintained by the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV). There is evidence suggesting that Respondent’s SSN may actually be 380-80-3178, but the evidence is not clear and convincing on that point.3 The document on which Respondent provided the incorrect SSN was not offered into evidence by the Division. Respondent denied providing an incorrect SSN, and she testified that if she did provide an incorrect SSN, it must have been typographical error. Second, the only name listed for Respondent in her license application was Yolanda Orr, which was Respondent’s married name and her legal name at the time she submitted her application. Respondent answered “no” to the question that asked whether she has ever “used, been known as or called by another name (example - maiden name . . .) or alias other than the name singed to the application.” (Emphasis supplied.) Respondent’s maiden name is Yolanda Small. She used that name until July 1998, when she was married. She was divorced in February 2006, and she is again using her maiden name. Respondent currently has two valid forms of identification issued by DHSMV: a Florida driver’s license in the name of Yolanda D. Small (No. S540-964-67-7491) and a Florida identification card in the name of Yolanda D. Orr (No. O600-964-57-7490). The driver’s license was issued in March 2006,4 and expires in July 2010; the identification card was issued in August 2002, and expires in July 2007. The birth date listed on the driver’s license is July 9, 1967, whereas the birth date listed on the identification card is July 9, 1957. Respondent testified that her middle name is Daniella, not Denise. She further testified that she has never used the name Yolanda Denise Orr. In response to a request to the state court in Michigan for records relating to Respondent, the Division was provided documentation of multiple traffic offenses committed in Flint, Michigan in 1999 and 2001 by Yolanda Denise Orr, as well as documentation of criminal offenses committed in Michigan by Yolanda Daniella Orr and Yolanda Danielle Orr. The traffic records do not list the defendant’s Social Security number, but the birth date listed in the records matches Respondent’s birth date. Respondent’s testimony that the traffic offenses did not involve her was not persuasive, nor was her claim there must be multiple Yolanda Orr’s in Flint, Michigan, with the same birth date as hers. Respondent admitted to being in Flint, Michigan at the time of the traffic offenses, and she admitted that she drove a Ford vehicle at the time of the ticket that was issued to Yolanda Denise Orr in October 2001 while driving a Ford. Moreover, the Michigan driver’s license number of Yolanda Denise Orr contained in the traffic records -- O600961139544 -- is identical (except for one number) to the Michigan driver’s license number -- O600961135544 -- that Respondent surrendered to DHSMV when she first applied for a Florida driver’s license. The evidence is clear and convincing that the Yolanda Denise Orr referred to in the traffic records is Respondent, and that Respondent failed to disclose that name (and her maiden name, Yolanda Small) in her license application. Third, Respondent only disclosed one criminal offense in response to the question in the application that asked whether she had “ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) . . . .” The criminal offense that Respondent disclosed was, according to the application, a 1987 offense in Louisiana which Respondent “used the wrong social security number” when “filling out [her] financial aid papers for the first time.” There is no evidence that Respondent was prosecuted for such an offense in Louisiana. Respondent was, however, prosecuted in federal court in Michigan in 1993 for using a false SSN on two separate student loan applications. Those offenses were prosecuted as part of an indictment that also included four counts of filing fraudulent tax returns with the Internal Revenue Service and two counts of using a false SSN on tax returns. In February 1995, Respondent pled guilty to one count of filing a fraudulent tax return, one count of using a false SSN on a tax return, and one count of using a false SSN on student loan applications. The other counts of the indictment were dismissed as part of her plea agreement. In September 1995, Respondent was adjudicated guilty of the offenses to which she pled guilty and was sentenced to six months in federal prison, followed by three years of probation. She was also required to pay restitution in the amount of $8,177 to the Internal Revenue Service and restitution in the amount of $2,761 to the U.S. Department of Education. Respondent testified that “the whole reason the [federal] case came about” was that she filed a tax return not knowing that one had already been filed on her behalf by H&R Block; that the investigation into the “double” filing of the tax return led to the charge involving the “student loan application that had the wrong social security number on it”; and that it was her understanding that the offenses related to the student loan application submitted to Grambling State University, not any colleges in Michigan. Respondent’s testimony regarding the circumstances giving rise to the federal offenses was not credible because, among other things, she was charged with filing false tax returns on three separate occasions -- in 1990, 1991, and 1992 - - not just one time. The background check conducted on Respondent based upon the fingerprint card that she submitted as part of her license application identified two additional criminal offenses that Respondent did not disclose in her application. The first undisclosed offense was a 1990 felony retail fraud offense prosecuted in state court in Michigan. Respondent pled guilty to the offense and was sentenced to one year of probation. The record does not reflect the circumstances surrounding the retail fraud offense, but Respondent described it as “basically a petty theft.” The second undisclosed offense was a 1991 bad check charge, which was also prosecuted in state court in Michigan. The case was not resolved until February 2001 because, according to Respondent, it involved a check she wrote prior to leaving for college and she was unaware that that a case was pending against her until she returned to Michigan after college. Respondent was required to disclose criminal traffic offenses in her license applications; she was not required to disclose traffic offenses such as “parking, speeding, inspection, or traffic signal violations.” The traffic records suggest that several of the offenses may have been criminal in nature (e.g., driving with a suspended license), but the evidence was not clear and convincing on that issue.5 Respondent testified that she did not disclose the state court offenses because she did not remember them at the time she submitted her license application. She testified that she considered the federal offenses to be related and that she thought that disclosing one of the offenses was adequate since the other offenses were related and prosecuted together. Respondent’s explanation as to why she did not disclose all of her federal offenses is not entirely unreasonable under the circumstances. The offenses were all prosecuted in a single criminal proceeding and, even though they involved offenses committed in Michigan between 1990 and 1992 (rather than in Louisiana in 1987), they did involve use of an incorrect SSN on a student loan application. Respondent’s explanation as to why she did not disclose the offenses prosecuted in state court was not plausible. It is understandable that Respondent might not recall all of the details of the retail fraud offense since it occurred more than 10 years before the date of her application, but her testimony that she did not even remember the existence of the offense at the time she filled out her application was not credible or reasonable. Respondent’s testimony that she did not remember the bad check offense at the time she filled out her license application was even less credible because the court records related to that offense reflect that the case was not finally resolved until February 2001, which only two years prior to the date of Respondent’s license application. Respondent testified that she was told by a Division employee that she did not need to disclose all of the counts of the federal case because the related offenses would be discovered as part of the background screening based upon the fingerprint card submitted by Respondent. Respondent offered no evidence to corroborate her unpersuasive, self-serving testimony on this point. Respondent testified that she was directed by the same Division employee to provide a supplemental letter to the Division explaining the federal offenses, and that she did so. However, there is no record of what, if anything, Respondent submitted to the Division. Respondent’s application did not go to the Florida Real Estate Commission (Commission) for approval even though a criminal history was disclosed in the application. The Commission policy in effect at the time authorized the Division to approve such applications on a case-by-case basis. The policy did not require an applicant such as Respondent to appear before the Commission, as is the case under current Commission policy. Respondent did not present any evidence of mitigation at the final hearing. However, in her post-hearing filing, she stated, “I am a single mother, and as such, I rely on my real estate business as my only source of income.”
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order that: finds Respondent guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(m), Florida Statutes (Count I of the Administrative Complaint); finds Respondent guilty of violating Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-2.027(2) and, hence, Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes (Count II of the Administrative Complaint); revokes Respondent’s license; and imposes an administrative fine of $1,000 or the Division’s investigative costs, whichever is less. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of February, 2007.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state governmental licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints relative to real estate transactions. (Official recognition of Florida Statutes, TR 6-7) Respondent is now and was at times material hereto, a licensed real estate broker in Florida, having been issued License No. 0149408. The last license to Respondent was as a broker, t/a Marathon Realty at Post Office Box 2386, Marathon Shores, Florida 33052. (Petitioner'S Exhibit 1) On or about May 2, 1985, Respondent solicited and obtained a sales contract entered into by Emily Cathy Cronnon, as purchaser, and W. J. and Delores Sarver , as sellers, for the purchase and sale of certain residential property (contract for sale). (Petitioner'S Exhibit 2) The sales transaction was scheduled to close on or about July 1, 1985, but the transaction did not close. On or about December 2, 1985, the purchaser and sellers terminated the sales contract. (Petitioner'S Exhibit 3) On or about May 13, 1985, the Respondent allowed Emily Cathy Cronnon and her live-in boyfriend, Billy Hull, to take possession and occupy the property with the knowledge and consent of seller W. J. Sarver. In this regard, W. J. Sarver denies giving permission to Ms. Cronnon to occupy the property prior to closing. However, it is found herein and the testimony of Billy Hull and Respondent substantiate the fact that Emily Cronnon and Billy Hull visited Respondent's office during early May, 1985, to find out whether they could move into the Sarver property with their furnishings prior to closing. Initially, Ms. Diabo advised Cannon and Hull that she was not at liberty to permit them to move in. However, she told them that if they liked, they could phone Mr. Server and get his permission. This was done and it is found that Mr. Sarver gave his permission to Respondent to allow Ms. Cronnon and Billy Hull to occupy the premises prior to closing, provided they turned the utilities off and then had the same turned on in their name. This was done, and the contract purchaser (Cronnon) and her boyfriend, Billy Hull, moved in prior to the time that the transaction closed. Respondent received a $500 rental payment from the purchaser on August 19, 1985. (Respondent's Exhibits 1 and 2) Respondent deposited said check in an appropriate bank account and waited eleven (11) days for that check to clear. On August 30, 1985, she wrote a $500 check to the Sarvers indicating that the same was rental payment to them for the use of their property by Cronnon and Hull. Respondent customarily waits at least ten (10) days for any check to clear before she writes a check drawn on those same funds.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint filed herein be DISMISSED. RECOMMENDED this 9th day of July, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1987. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's proposed findings: 1. Accepted as modified. 7. Rejected based on credible evidence herein which reveals that Emily Cathy Cronnon and her live-in boyfriend, Billy Hull, took possession and occupied the property with the prior knowledge and consent of seller, W. J. Sarver. Rejected based on credible evidence which reveals that Respondent did not conceal the rent payment, but rather deposited the rent payment until the funds cleared her bank and she immediately thereafter transmitted the proceeds to the Sarvers. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary to decide the issues posed. Rejected as a conclusion and not a finding of fact. Respondent's proposed findings and conclusions are largely a brief in the form of resolutions of credibility, conflicts, recommendations as to how those conflicts should be resolved, and conclusions in the form of ultimate findings of fact. As such, they are not specifically addressed in the Appendix, but were carefully considered and reviewed by the under signed in preparation of the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: JAMES H. GILLIS, ESQUIRE SENIOR ATTORNEY DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE POST OFFICE BOX 1900 ORLANDO, FLORIDA 32802 MICHAEL H. DAVIDSON, ESQUIRE WATSON & CLARK POST OFFICE BOX 11959 FORT LAUDERDALE, FLORIDA 33339 HAROLD HUFF, EXECUTIVE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE POST OFFICE BOX 1900 ORLANDO, FLORIDA 32502 HONORABLE VAN B. POOLE, SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750 JOSEPH A. SOLE, ESQUIRE GENERAL COUNSEL DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate sales associate should be approved.
Findings Of Fact In August 2004, the Petitioner filed an application for licensure by the State of Florida as a real estate sales associate. In an application section titled "Background Information" question No. 1 asked in relevant part, "[h]ave you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere . . ." to which the Petitioner responded in the affirmative. The question directed an applicant responding in the affirmative to disclose the full details of the incident(s) by completion of "form 0050-1." The Petitioner filed the information related to her criminal history on the proper forms, and disclosed 26 instances wherein legal charges had been brought against her. The Petitioner also collected and submitted available records related to her criminal history. By Notice of Denial dated December 1, 2004, the Commission denied the Petitioner's application and specifically referenced the Petitioner's criminal history as follows: Issuing Worthless Document, 05/86 Driving While License Suspended, 07/86 Attempted Fraudulent Use of a Credit Card, 08/86 Driving While License Suspended and Improper Equipment, 09/86 Traffic Citation/No Driver's License, 10/86 Uttering a Forgery, 02/88 Forgery, 04/88 Driving While License Suspended-amended to No Valid License, 06/88 Worthless Check, 12/88 Driving While License Suspended, 03/21/89 Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, 03/25/89 12. Theft, 08/02/89 Possession of Cocaine, 08/25/89 Driving While License Suspended, 1990 Resisting Officer w/o Violence, 1991 Retail Theft, 1992 Obtaining Property w/ Worthless Check, 04/0993 [sic] Driver's License Restriction, 05/02/93 Obtain Property w/ Worthless Check, 11/18/93 Uttering Forged Bill, 02/26/94 21. Theft, 04/08/94 22. Theft, 01/07/95 Retail Theft, 07/14/96 Petit Theft and Driving w/o License, 1997 The Petitioner is currently 51 years old and has been employed by the Ron Jon Caribe Resort for about seven years. In her work, she deals with the public and handles funds. Her employer is aware of her criminal history. At the hearing, the Petitioner testified that prior to the criminal charges, she was a cosmetologist. In the early 80's, she began religious counseling with a priest, went through a divorce, and began to remember instances of abuse that occurred during her childhood. The Petitioner testified that the emotional turmoil related to recalling her abusive childhood led initially to drug use, and then to drug addiction. The Petitioner opined that her criminal record was primarily the result of drug addiction. Many of the Petitioner's theft convictions were related to obtaining funds for drugs. In fact, the 1997 charges were related to a relapse into drug use that occurred after the Petitioner had already completed a substance abuse program. The Petitioner further testified that while incarcerated in 1997, she underwent a spiritual conversion, began to take renewed responsibility for her actions, and is currently living a sober life. The evidence establishes that since 1997, the Petitioner has made consistent progress towards recovery. At the hearing, several of the Petitioner's friends and supporters testified on her behalf. They believe her to be honest and trustworthy. A minister who worked with the Petitioner during her incarceration testified that the Petitioner had undergone a "complete transformation" during the incarceration.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent enter a final order denying the Petitioner's application for licensure as a real estate sales associate. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of September, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of September, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara Rockhill Edwards, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Daniel Villazon, Esquire Daniel Villazon, P.A. 419 West Vine Street Kissimmee, Florida 34741 Leon Biegalski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Nancy B. Hogan, Chairman Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 801N Orlando, Florida 32801
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the governmental agency responsible for issuing licenses to practice real estate and for regulating licensees on behalf of the state. Respondent is a licensed real estate sales person under license number 0466167. Respondent's real estate license was invalid during the dates at issue in this proceeding. The license expired on September 30, 1993, and was activated on February 1, 1994. The last license issued to Respondent was issued as a voluntary inactive sales person at 171C Springwood Boulevard, Longwood, Florida. On October 28, 1993, Mr. Frank Canty, terminated Respondent from employment at Frank G. Canty Realty ("Canty"). Mr. Canty notified Respondent of the termination by telephone on or about the same day and immediately filed the form required to notify the Florida Real Estate Commission (the "Commission") of Respondent's change in status. 2/ Mr. Robert Sirianni and Respondent are long time friends. Mr. Sirianni is the broker and owner for Bay Hill Realty, Inc ("Bay Hill"). Mr. Sirianni hired Respondent as a real estate sales person for Bay Hill on November 22, 1993. Mr. Sirianni signed the completed form required to notify the Commission that Respondent had placed his license with Bay Hill. Mr. Sirianni gave the completed form to Respondent to hand deliver to the Commission. However, Respondent failed to deliver the form to the Commission. On November 22, 1993, Respondent showed a condominium to prospective buyers. Respondent represented that he was an employee of Canty. Respondent delivered a written offer of $36,000 to Watson Realty Corporation ("Watson"), the listing office. Respondent used his Canty business card in the transaction. A representative of Watson contacted Mr. Canty to discuss some problems in the transaction. Mr. Canty informed the representative that Respondent was terminated from Canty on October 28, 1993. Watson caused a new contract to be executed between the buyers and sellers showing Watson Realty as the listing and selling office. The transaction closed on the new contract. On December 13, 1993, Mr. Sirianni faxed a memorandum to Watson claiming the sales commission purportedly earned by Respondent. Mr. Sirianni withdrew the demand after learning of the facts and circumstances surrounding the matter.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order: finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 475.25(1)(b), 475.25(1)(e), and 475.42(1)(b); authorizing the issuance of a written reprimand; placing Respondent on probation for one year; and imposing a fine of $1,000 to be paid in accordance with this Recommended Order. RECOMMENDED this 9th day of May, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of May 1995.
Findings Of Fact On September 19, 1974 Eleanor Van Treese, as agent for Futrell Company, obtained a listing on a residence located at 12250 S. W. 67th Avenue in Miami, Florida from Newton J. Mulford and Elizabeth N. Mulford, the record owners of said property. A copy of this sales management agreement was admitted into evidence as Exhibit number 1. Thereon was shown one existing mortgage with Coral Gables Federal, with a balance of approximately $47,500. At the time the Mulfords executed Exhibit number 1, a second mortgage in the amount of some $25,000 was also recorded against this property and foreclosure proceedings had been instituted. The holder of the second mortgage was James V. O'Connor. George Bender, a Miami attorney, was aware that foreclosure proceedings had been instituted against this property prior to the time that Futrell obtained the listing agreement. He called Mulford to inquire about purchasing the property, but apparently his offer was not high enough to interest Mulford. After the Futrell sign was placed in front of the house, Mrs. Capps met Mrs. George Bender at a social affair. When Mrs. Bender learned that Mrs. Capps was a real estate salesperson working for Futrell Company, she asked if she would show her the Mulford house. In late November or early December Mrs. Bender was shown the house and thereafter her husband also was shown the premises. On January 2, 1975 a final judgment of foreclosure was entered in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial District of Florida. Therein the court found that James V. O'Connor was the holder of a second mortgage on the premises in the principal sum of $25,000 together with interest accrued thereon from August 15, 1970 in the amount of $12,976.34. The court also awarded O'Connor $500 as a reasonable attorney's fee. The judgment further provided that the defendant, O'Connor, or any of the parties to the suit, may become bidders for purchase of the premises at the forthcoming sale thereof; and that the court would retain jurisdiction of the cause for the purpose of entertaining a Motion for Deficiency Judgment and "settle all other questions under the proceedings not settled by this order." O'Connor thereafter called Eleanor Van Treese to advise her that he had obtained the foreclosure order and that he would bid on the property when the judicial sale was held on the 15th of January. He further advised that he was anxious to turn over the property and get his money out of it. Mrs. Van Treese telephoned Mary Capps on January 10, 1975 to advise her of the information she had received from O'Connor. Not understanding the legal implication thereof Mrs. Capps decided that she should come to Mrs. Van Treese's house and the two of them talk to O'Connor regarding the property. This was done; and, with the two salespersons on the telephone with O'Connor, he read to them the judgment that he had obtained; advised them that he would be bidding on the property on January 15th and expected to purchase same; and that he would consider offers to purchase the property from him. Mrs. Capps, that same evening, called Mrs. Bender to advise that O'Connor was going to bid on the property on January 15th and was interested in selling the property. When Mr. Bender came home, Mrs. Bender and he discussed the purchase of the property and decided to submit an offer. Mrs. Bender so advised Mrs. Capps. The following morning, on Saturday, January 11th, Mr. and Mrs. Bender sent to the Futrell Company office and Mrs. Capps typed an offer to Purchase the property which the Benders executed. This was the deposit receipt and sales purchase agreement dated January 11, 1975 admitted into evidence as Exhibit number 2. While at the office Mr. Bender called another attorney, William A. Friedlander, who he considered to be more knowledgeable in real estate transactions than himself, for legal advice in the premises. Friedlander advised him that it was proper to submit an offer to O'Connor although O'Connor did not have present title and was therefore unable to execute a valid deed for the property until after he purchased the property at the foreclosure sale. Friedlander considered the contract would be based upon a condition subsequent, viz: the acquisition of title by O'Connor, and such contract would be enforceable. Friedlander was also aware that several judgments had been entered against Mulford and that Mulford would be unable to execute a contract and deliver clear title at the amount Bender was offering. This was so because the sum of first mortgage, second mortgage, real estate commission, and other judgments that had been entered against Mulford exceeded the amount Bender was offering to pay for the residence. He advised Bender that, if the foreclosure suit had joined all necessary parties, the deed obtained by O'Connor at the foreclosure sale would be good and O'Connor would be able to give a good and merchantable title. He further advised Bender that a contract with Mulford would have been futile due to the amount of the offer and unworkable due to the short period of time before the foreclosure sale in which to obtain the cash necessary to provide Mulford sufficient funds to pay off all his creditors and the mortgages. At the time the Benders executed the contract for the purchase of the residence in question it was their intention that the offer be presented only to O'Connor. Mary Capps presented this offer by the Benders (Exhibit 2) to O'Connor who accepted same on January 11, 1975. The $6,000 earnest money deposit was delivered by Mrs. Capps to the Secretary of the Futrell Company for deposit in the Futrell Escrow Account. No evidence was presented that the earnest money deposit has ever been refunded to the Benders or that they have requested this earnest money deposit to be refunded. Mr. and Mrs. Mulford were not advised of the existence of the offer to purchase dated January 11, 1975 until long after O'Connor purchased the property at the foreclosure sale.
