The Issue The issue for determination is whether the Commercial Motor Vehicle Review Board's decision in this matter is proper; a determination that necessarily requires a finding of whether Respondent is liable for payment of a civil penalty for commission of the infraction of falsifying the log book of a commercial motor vehicle.
Findings Of Fact On February 4, 1992, Jimmy R. Holton was driving on State Road (SR) 76 in a commercial vehicle bearing Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) 1F4Y05YB8LH385086. The vehicle was owned by Respondent, Herbert W. Allen d/b/a Allen Transit. At 10:42 a.m., on that date the vehicle was stopped for inspection by Michael Roberts, a Motor Carrier Compliance Officer employed by Petitioner. Roberts examined the driver's log book and discovered the driver had pre-logged a future activity. The log reflected that the entry was made at the not yet existing time of 11:30 a.m. The officer completed his inspection and issued a Safety Report and Field Receipt which reflected his action of assessing a civil penalty of $100 for the false entry in the log book and putting the driver out of service for eight hours. The penalty was paid at that time. The vehicle was transporting automobile parts, non- hazardous material, from Jacksonville, Florida. The vehicle had left Delray Beach, Florida headed for Stuart, Florida when stopped for inspection. The vehicle's travel had occurred inside the State of Florida. The driver was maintaining a log book in compliance with legal requirements of Section 316.302(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1991), because the intrastate distance for the contemplated trip exceeded a radius of 200 air miles from Jacksonville, Florida.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered rescinding the previous imposition of the $100 civil penalty administratively imposed by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of November, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W.DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Fl 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of November, 1992. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Respondent's Proposed Findings None submitted. Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1.-2. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Herbert W. Allen P.O. Box 742 Hiawassee, GA 30546 Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esq. Assistant General Counsel 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Thorton Williams, Esq. General Counsel Department of Transportation Rm 562, Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to the facts set forth in paragraphs 1-5, below. Stipulated Facts James Phillips is the president and sole shareholder of the Respondent, Sunshine Auto Sales, Inc. The Respondent's place of business is located at 2050 North West 36 Street, Miami, Florida 33142. The Respondent was issued motor vehicle dealer license number 7VI- 005928 on May 1, 1987. The Petitioner's order summarily suspending Respondent's license was dated September 17, 1987, and was served on Respondent on or about November 9, 1987. On December 22, 1987, the Circuit Court for the 11th Judicial Circuit, in and for Dade County, Florida, entered an emergency injunction against enforcement of Petitioner's Order of Summary Suspension, contingent upon the posting of a $2500 bond by Respondent. The bond was posted on March 31, 1988. Other Facts On November 17, 1976, Respondent's president and sole shareholder, James Phillips, executed a sworn affidavit as part of the application for a motor vehicle dealer license. In that affidavit, he stated that no partner or corporate officer of the Respondent had ever been arrested or convicted of a felony. In subsequent annual renewal applications for the years 1977-84, Phillips stated that all terms and conditions as set forth in the original application were correct. In actuality, Phillips was arrested for breaking and entering, theft and rape in 1956. In 1960, he was arrested for aggravated assault. In 1972, he was arrested for possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Grand larceny was the subject of his arrest in 1976. In 1982, he was arrested for aggravated battery. Phillips' statement that he interpreted this language on the application and renewal forms to be applicable only to the corporation itself is not credited due to his demeanor while testifying and the clarity of the statement on the application requiring such disclosure. The Petitioner's policy is not to deny or revoke licenses simply on the basis of an arrest record of the applicant or licensee. Instead, when the information is correctly provided by applicants or licensees, a further investigation is made by the Petitioner to determine if there has been a conviction of a crime meriting suspension or denial of a license. When Petitioner becomes aware that an applicant or licensee has falsely answered an application regarding previous arrests, the policy of Petitioner is to deny the application for licensure or institute revocation action against a licensee on the theory that such falsification shows a lack of honesty in the applicant or licensee. On February 24, 1986, and May 20, 1986, James Phillips received warning letters from the Department reminding him that failure to apply for title or to file for transfer of title within 20 days following delivery of a vehicle to a purchaser is a violation of Florida law. In June and July of 1987, an employee of Petitioner, Helen Wandell, made numerous attempts to obtain information from Respondent regarding a particular complaint against Respondent. Information was sought by Wandell regarding the identity of the vehicle which was the subject of the complaint. She telephoned Respondent's facilities on June 10, 11, 12, and 16, 1987, during regular business hours and received no answer. On June 17, 1987, Wandell went to the Respondent premises during regular business hours and found the facility closed. She left a note and James Phillips called her the following day. He gave her information concerning the subject vehicle which proved to be incorrect. Again, Wandell attempted to contact Respondent's establishment by telephone on June 22, and 23, 1987, but did not get an answer. She telephoned again on July 24, 1987, and spoke with Phillips. In the course of the conversation, he informed Wandell that he could not provide the vehicle identity information she sought. He further warned her not to call again, cursed her and threatened to kill her. Madeline Fils-Aime does not read or understand English very well. On April 8, 1987, she entered into a parol agreement to buy a 1981 Mercury automobile from Respondent. The agreed upon price, as established by testimony of Fils-Aime, was $750. This amount was to be paid in installments as the money became available to Fils-Aime. Until the total amount of $750 was paid, the car would continue to be owned by and remain in the Respondent's establishment. On April 8, 1987, Fils-Aime paid $160 to Robert Sayre, James Phillips' stepson, at Respondent's establishment toward the cost of the automobile. She received a receipt from Sayre. The receipt carried the notation "no refunds" and "sold as is." The receipt also carried a notation that the remainder of the funds would be due on April 15, 1987. Fils-Aime returned to Respondent's establishment on April 16, 1987, paid another $100, received another receipt signed by Sayre carrying a notation that the remainder would be due on April 26, 1987. This receipt also carried the notation "no refunds." Fils-Aime returned to the Respondent establishment again on April 21, 1987, and paid another $40 on the car. This time she received a receipt signed by Thomas Phillips, son of James Phillips, which carried the notation that the balance would be due on May 7, 1987. Another payment of $100 was made by Fils-Aime on May 4, 1987. Another receipt bearing the signature of Robert Sayre was received. A new balance due date of May 14, 1987, was shown on this receipt. Fils-Aime returned at a later date to make a subsequent payment, but the Respondent's establishment was closed. Approximately six weeks after the May 4, 1987, payment, Fils-Aime returned to Respondent's establishment to learn that the car for which she had been making payments was gone. Testimony of James Phillips establishes the sale of the vehicle to another person. Phillips also readily admitted knowledge of the payments made by Fils-Aime and the practice of granting extensions to her of the due date for the total balance at the time of each payment. Since his clientele is poor, he uses the "lay away" plan on occasion to sell vehicles to individuals like Fils-Aime. In spite of her demands, he did not return Fils- Aime's previous payments to her. At the time of the May 4, 1987, payment, Phillips gave Fils-Aime an envelope to use in the event the Respondent facility was closed on her return to make a future payment. He instructed her to leave the envelope with the body shop next to Respondent's establishment. A contractual document offered in evidence at hearing by Respondent to substantiate James Phillips version of the parol agreement with Fils-Aime is not credited with any probative value. The document appears unsigned by anyone and the portion of the page where Fils-Aime would have signed is conveniently torn off and missing. Additionally, Fils-Aime denied knowledge of the document. After receipt of a complaint by Fils-Aime, the Petitioner's employee was denied access to Respondent's premises to inspect Respondent's records on July 21, 1987. The request was made during reasonable business hours and within the business hours posted on the fence at Respondent's establishment. On August 31, 1987, Respondent sold a 1979 automobile to Gloria Little. Respondent did not apply for title for Ms. Little. She went to the tag agency herself because there was no one at Respondent's facility to go with her. She was unable to obtain the title transfer and contacted Petitioner's offices. A telephone call by Petitioner's employee resulted in an individual from Respondent's establishment being made available to assist and complete the title transaction on December 16, 1987. The Respondent did not apply for title transfer to a 1975 vehicle sold to Rafael Castillo on August 8, 1987. After being contacted by a Petitioner employee, Respondent applied for the title transfer on December 16, 1987. On December 29, 1987, Respondent sold a 1981 automobile to Kimberely DeNunzio. Title application to the vehicle was made in February, 1988, and issuance of the title to DeNunzio occurred February 24, 1988. The Petitioner's Order of Summary Suspension of Respondent's motor vehicle license was in effect at the time of this sale.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered revoking Respondent's license and denying the application for renewal of same. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 22nd day of July, 1988. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 87-5616, 88-2528 The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS The Petitioner's proposed findings consisted of paragraphs erroneously numbered. Those paragraphs, 25 in number, have been properly numbered and are addressed as follows: 1-3. are included in findings 1-3, respectively. 4-7. are included in findings 12-18. 8-10. are included in finding 21. 11-13. included in finding 22. 14-16. included in finding 23. 17. included in finding 20. 18-19. included in finding 11. included in finding 6. included in finding 7. included in finding 8. 23-24. included in finding 9. 25. included in finding 10. RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS The Respondent's proposed findings were likewise erroneously numbered. Numbering has been corrected and the 36 paragraphs are addressed as follows. 1-3. included. 4-15. rejected, unnecessary to result reached. 16. included in finding 12. 17-18. included in finding 6. 19-27. rejected, unnecessary. 28-29. addressed in finding 5. rejected, on basis of credibility. included in finding 17. 32-36. rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Assistant General Counsel State of Florida, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Department of Legal Affairs Neil Kirkman Building Room A-432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504 Seril L. Grossfeld, Esquire 408 South Andrews Avenue Suite 101 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Charles J. Brantley Director, Division of Motor Vehicles Room B439 Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Enoch Jon Whitney, Esquire General Counsel Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: On November 16, 1987, the Respondent signed, under oath, an application for an independent motor vehicle dealer license for the business name of Southern Auto Sales which was submitted to the Department, and, based upon that application, the Department issued an independent motor vehicle dealer license, number 7VI-011359, to Respondent d/b/a Southern Auto Sales on November 30, 1987. In the application referred to above, Respondent answered no to the question, Has the applicant or any partner or corporate officer or director: Been arrested on a felony or equivalent charge anywhere?; Been convicted of a felony or equivalent anywhere? In 1988, 1989, and 1990, Respondent submitted to the Department a Short Form Application, commonly referred to as a renewal application, and the Department renewed license number 8VI-011359 in 1988, 9VI-011359 in 1989, and 0VI-011359 in 1990. The number before the prefix VI indicates the year of issuance. Respondent signed each of these renewal applications under oath wherein the affirmation stated " . . . the information contained in this application is true and correct and that nothing has occurred since I filed my last application for a license or application for renewal of said license, as the case may be, which would change the answers given in such previous application." Additionally, the instructions for the renewal application advised the applicant that the short form could be used if the applicant was currently licensed and, among other things, there were no changes in the applicant's personal background such a criminal conviction. Respondent, currently holds an independent motor vehicle dealer license, number 1VI-011359, issued by the Department on May 1, 1991. Respondent, using the name William J. Butler, was arrested and charged in December 1977 with uttering a forgery. The Respondent pled guilty to the charge of uttering a forgery in April 1978 before the Circuit Court, Harrison County, Mississippi and was sentenced to four years in the Mississippi Department of Corrections. In 1978, the Respondent, using the name William J. Butler, was arrested and charged with uttering a forgery. Respondent was subsequently convicted and sentenced by the Circuit Court, Jackson County, Mississippi to four years in the Mississippi Department of Corrections, said sentence to run concurrently with the sentence imposed by the Circuit Court, Harrison County, Mississippi. William J. Butler and Bernard J. Haney, the Respondent in this case, are one in the same person. On October 25, 1979, after serving only approximately 1 1/2 years of the two four-year sentences, Respondent was paroled by the Mississippi Parole Board with conditions for supervision made a part of the parole. In 1981 Respondent sought and received treatment for alcoholism, having been an alcoholic for a period of twenty years. After treatment, with the help of Alcoholics' Anonymous, Respondent has maintained a life of sobriety. In November 1988 a Warrant for Retaking a Paroled Prisoner was issued against Respondent, and he was recommitted to the Mississippi Department of Corrections for "absconding supervision" of his parole. However, with the help of some "new" friends, gained after his treatment for alcoholism, Respondent was incarcerated for only a short period, and was "honorably discharged" from the Mississippi Department of Corrections on December 20, 1984. The Harrison County charge of uttering a forgery was in connection with a check for $169.92, and the Jackson County charge of uttering a forgery was in connection with a check for $139.36. There is nothing stated in the Discharge Certificate that should have led the Respondent to believe or understand that his criminal record had been expunged and his rights restored upon receiving his "honorable discharge" from the Mississippi Department of Corrections in December 1984. However, considering the circumstances surrounding his commitment in the first place, his recommitment in 1984 and his immediate release thereafter, Respondent's testimony that such was his belief and understanding is credible. There is insufficient evidence to show that at the time of his initial application for licensure in 1987 or at the time of his renewal applications in 1988, 1989 and 1990, that Respondent acted fraudulently or willfully misrepresented the facts when he answered no to the questions concerning any prior arrests or convictions for a felony. After the release in 1979 and up to the date of his initial application for licensure, the Respondent's criminal record is clear except for the arrest in 1984 where the charges were dropped but the arrest resulted in his recommitment. From the date of his initial application until the date of the hearing the Respondent's criminal record is clear except for an arrest in 1990 concerning charges of tampering with an odometer. Apparently, these charges have been dropped and the matter handled civilly through the Polk County Citizen Dispute Settlement Center.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a Final Order dismissing the administrative complaint filed herein. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of August, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of August, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in the case. Rulings on Proposed Finding of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner - 9. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5, 6, 7, 8, 1, 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. 10. Stated more as an argument than a finding of fact, otherwise rejected since there was no substantial competent evidence in the record to prove that there was fraudulent or willful misrepresentation of the facts in the application. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order is divided into three principal parts: (a) Proposed Findings of Fact; (b) Comments on Testimony and Evidence; and (c) Proposed Conclusions of Law. Only the Proposed Findings of Fact will be addressed to in this Appendix. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 1. - 3. Unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 1. - 7. Covered in Preliminary Statement. Conclusion of Law. Covered in the Preliminary Statement, otherwise unnecessary. Covered in the Preliminary Statement. - 12. Covered in the Preliminary Statement, otherwise unnecessary or not material or relevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Rm. A432 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0504 Charles R. Mayer, Esquire Post Office Box 267 Highland City, FL 33846 Leonard R. Mellon, Executive Director Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0500 Enoch Jon Whitney, General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0500 Charles J. Brantley, Director Division of Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0500
The Issue Whether the Respondent's suspension of Petitioner was in compliance with Chapter 110, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 22 A-10, Florida Administrative Code. Whether the Respondent's suspension of Petitioner should be sustained.
Findings Of Fact Louise M. McAdams was an Examiner II employed by Respondent, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles in Marianna, Florida. By letter dated February 11, 1975, Mrs. McAdams, the Petitioner, was notified that she was being suspended for three work days without pay by the Respondent, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Division of Drivers License, for: Third offense, rude and improper handling of a driver license applicant in willful violation of the Division of Driver Licenses' Disciplinary Policy, Section II, Pages 23-25 Examiner Manual (Appendix "A"). Mrs. McAdams appealed this suspension. Petitioner had previously received two written reprimands from Respondent, one dated April 5, 1975 and one dated April 12, 1975 involving similar charges. The two previous reprimands did not result in the suspension of Petitioner. The Department Respondent has presented documentary evidence that there were numerous complaints as to the work of Petitioner; her absences from the office; and, the handling of the general public. The Respondent Department has proceeded properly under its policy and rules and the rules of the Career Service Commission and under the statutes of the State of Florida. Petitioner McAdams is am attractive personable woman but one who suffers from ill health. The routine pressures of the job of Examiner II and the general job pressure of state employment together with her physical condition is evidently responsible for her inability to satisfy the requirements of the job which is a job that requires a certain amount of job pressure and requires personnel to be at all times pleasant, smiling and courteous as well as consistently prompt in daily attendance. The Hearing Officer further finds: The Respondent has properly followed the rules and regulations and statutes relative to the suspension of employees. That the suspension of Petitioner, Louise McAdams, was proper. That just cause existed for the suspension of Petitioner.
The Issue Whether two policy statements issued by Respondent, TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18, are unadopted rules, as defined in section 120.52(20), Florida Statutes, that violate section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes.3/
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner is a co-trustee of the Sparkhill Trust (the "Trust"), which was created in July 2009. Opinicus Sentinel, LLC ("Opinicus Sentinel") currently is a co-trustee of the Trust, and has been a trustee of the Trust since its creation. Barbara Williams is the manager of Opinicus Sentinel, and has served in that capacity since its creation.8/ Petitioner was appointed as a trustee of the Trust on October 11, 2016.9/ The Trust owns a 2001 Porsche 996/911 Turbo motor vehicle (hereinafter, "Vehicle"). Solely for purposes of this proceeding,10/ the Vehicle Identification Number ("VIN") of the Vehicle is WP0ZZZ99Z1S682830, as alleged in the Amended Petition. As of the final hearing, the Vehicle was located in Germany. During all times relevant to this proceeding, the Vehicle was located in a foreign country. Respondent is the state agency responsible for, among other things, implementing and administering chapter 319, Florida Statutes, governing the issuance of certificates of title for motor vehicles. See § 319.17, Fla. Stat. Background and Events Giving Rise to This Proceeding On or about September 30, 2014, Opinicus Sentinel——at that time, the sole trustee of the Trust——submitted an application consisting of completed Form 8204011/ and supporting documentation to the Lee County Tax Collector ("Tax Collector")12/ on behalf of the Trust, requesting issuance of a certificate of title for the Vehicle in the name of the Trust. The application included a letter from a motor vehicle dealer in London, Ontario, Canada, stating that the dealer had inspected the Vehicle and that the Vehicle's VIN is WP0ZZZ99Z1S682830. On or about October 22, 2014, the Tax Collector sent a letter to Ms. Williams, as manager of Opinicus Sentinel, stating that the application for certificate of title could not be processed "because all used vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country must have the Vehicle Identification Number verified by a Division of Motorist Services Compliance Examiner." When asked for further explanation, the Tax Collector responded by electronic mail ("email"): The Lee County Tax Collector is a Constitutional Office that provides the services of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV). As such, we are bound by both statutory and department procedural guidance. Procedures often are entitled Technical Advisories. The technical advisory relied upon by this office indicates that all used vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country must have the VIN verified by a Division of Motorist Services Compliance Examiner as referenced in TL-10 in effect on the date the correspondence was drafted. Email from Tax Collector to Barbara Williams, dated October 27, 2014 (emphasis added). This email directed Ms. Williams to contact Respondent if the trustee wished to challenge the denial of the application for certificate of title for the Vehicle. On November 3, 2014, Ms. Williams contacted Respondent, asserting that the Tax Collector's denial of the application for a certificate of title violated section 319.23(3)(a)2, Florida Statutes. Also on that date, Ms. Williams filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing with Respondent on behalf of Opinicus Sentinel, challenging TL-10 as an invalid and unadopted rule pursuant to section 120.56(4).13/ On November 24, 2014, Respondent sent a letter to Ms. Williams, refusing to issue the requested certificate of title. The letter stated: After researching the issue identified in your letter, the Department stands by the decision made by . . . [the Lee County Tax Collector]. Section 319.23(a)(2), Florida Statutes, states that, '[a]n appropriate departmental form evidencing that a physical examination has been made of the motor vehicle by the owner and by a duly constituted law enforcement officer in any state, a licensed motor vehicle dealer, a license inspector as provided by s. 320.58, or a notary public commissioned by this state and that the vehicle identification number shown on such form is identical to the vehicle identification number shown on the motor vehicle. Letter from Respondent to Barbara Williams, dated November 24, 2014 (emphasis added). The letter further stated: However, section 319.23(11), Florida Statutes, states that, '[t]he Department shall use security procedures, processes, and materials in the preparation and issuance of each certificate of title to prohibit to the extent possible a person's ability to alter, counterfeit, duplicate, or modify the certificate of title.' In the case at bar, the Department is choosing to implement the language found in 319.23(11) to ensure that the certificate of title is issued correctly. The Department has the authority to require VIN verifications on vehicles entering the state of Florida from a foreign country before a title can be issued. In subsequent correspondence to Ms. Williams, dated December 18, 2014, Respondent stated: I can only again point you to s. 319.23(11). Since April of 2000 the Department's policy is to require all used vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country to have the VIN verified by a Motor Vehicle Field Office Compliance Examiner prior to being titled. * * * I have included a copy of the Department's Technical Advisory, TL 14-18, which explains the Department's policy in depth.[14/] On December 18, 2014, Respondent referred Opinicus Sentinel's Petition for Administrative Hearing to DOAH. The case was assigned DOAH Case No. 14-6005. On March 3, 2015, Opinicus Sentinel withdrew the petition, and the DOAH case file for Case No. 14-6005 was closed. Notwithstanding that Case No. 14-6005 was pending at DOAH, on February 25, 2015, Respondent sent Ms. Williams a letter dismissing the previously-filed petition for administrative hearing with leave to file an amended petition. The letter also asserted an additional basis15/ for Respondent's denial of the certificate of title for the Vehicle, specifically: Because the vehicle to be titled is not currently in Florida, clearly the vehicle will not be operated on the roads of Florida. Accordingly, the vehicle cannot be registered in Florida and the titling provisions of Chapter 319, Fla. Stat., do not apply. Therefore, the application for title you submitted to the Lee County Tax Collector pursuant to section 319.23, Fla. Stat. will not be approved. While DOAH Case No. 14-6005 was pending, Stephen J. Williams, as beneficiary of the Trust, filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing challenging both TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 as unadopted and invalid rules pursuant to section 120.56(4). That case was assigned DOAH Case No. 15-0484 and ultimately was dismissed by Final Order dated March 25, 2015.16/ As previously noted, on October 11, 2016, Petitioner was appointed as a co-trustee of the Trust. On October 17, 2016, Petitioner, as a trustee of the Trust, initiated this proceeding by filing a Petition for Administrative Hearing, again challenging both TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 as unadopted and invalid rules. As noted above, the scope of this proceeding subsequently was narrowed to eliminate the challenge to the substantive invalidity of TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18, so that the sole issue in this proceeding is whether TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 are unadopted rules that violate section 120.54(1)(a). The Challenged Statements: TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 TL-10, identified by the Tax Collector as the original basis for denial of issuance of the certification of title for the Vehicle, went into effect on April 30, 2014. The portion of TL-10 pertinent to this proceeding states: IV. MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION * * * B. Vehicle identification number (VIN) verifications are to be completed by the applicant. * * * 2. VIN verification may be done by one of the following: * * * c. Florida Division of Motorist Services (DMS) Compliance Examiner, DMS or tax collector employees. * * * NOTE: All USED vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country, including dealer transactions, MUST have the VIN verified by a DMS Compliance Examiner. Technical Advisory RS/TL 14-18 is titled "Motor Vehicles Coming Into Florida from a Foreign Country." It states in pertinent part: All used vehicles coming into Florida from a foreign country (including dealer transactions) must have the vehicle identification number verified by a Motor Vehicle Field Office Compliance Examiner prior to being titled. * * * The Regional Motor Vehicle Field Office staff will perform an inspection of the vehicle that includes verification of the public VIN, confidential VIN or secondary VIN, manufacturer’s label or letterhead letter that states compliance with US vehicle standards, computer checks of NMVTIS/NICB data-bases, and a review of documentation showing vehicle clearance through US Customs (if applicable). Copies of these documents, including a copy of the completed form HSMV 84044, will be maintained in the regional office. The VIN verification will be completed by the compliance examiner on a form HSMV 84044, in lieu of a form HSMV 82040 or HSMV 82042. The compliance examiner will give the customer the original required documentation (including the original complete form HSMV 84044). The customer must submit all documentation to a tax collector’s office or license plate agency in order for him/her to apply for a Florida Certificate of Title. The undisputed evidence establishes that neither TL-10 nor RS/TL 14-18 have been adopted as rules pursuant to the procedures prescribed in section 120.54. Respondent did not present any evidence showing that rulemaking was not practicable or feasible. Respondent's Position Respondent admitted, in its Amended Responses to Requests to Admissions served on Petitioner on November 21, 2016, that TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 are intended to be, and are, of general application; that TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy and/or describe the procedure or practice requirements of Respondent; and that TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 have not been, and are not published in the Florida Administrative Code. Additionally, Respondent acknowledges that neither TL-10 nor RS/TL 14-18 have been adopted as rules. Respondent takes the position that Petitioner lacks standing to challenge TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 as unadopted rules. Specifically, Respondent asserts that Petitioner has not suffered a "real or immediate injury in fact" for purposes of having standing because although the Tax Collector and Respondent referred the Trust to TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 as grounds for denial of the certificate of title, they were not the "ultimate grounds" on which the Trust was denied a certificate of title. On this basis, Respondent asserts that it did not apply TL-10 or RS/TL 14-18 to Petitioner, so Petitioner did not suffer injury as a result of application of these statements. Respondent further asserts that because Petitioner cannot meet the requirements in section 319.23 to be entitled to issuance of a certificate of title for the Vehicle, Petitioner's claimed injury in this proceeding is speculative and hypothetical. To this point, Respondent argues that Petitioner's alleged injury in this proceeding is speculative because the Trust has not satisfied the requirements of section 319.23 for purposes of being entitled to issuance of a certificate of title. Specifically, Respondent argues that because the Vehicle is not physically present in the state of Florida, it is not being operated on the roads of Florida, and because it is not being operated on the roads of Florida, it is not required to be registered or to obtain a certificate of title——and, indeed, cannot be registered and a certificate of title issued until it is physically present in Florida. Accordingly, Respondent reasons, until the Vehicle is physically present in Florida and thus subject to registration and licensure requirements, TL-10 and RS/TL 14-18 were not, and cannot be, applied to determine whether the certificate of title for the Vehicle should be issued. Also on this point, Respondent argues that Petitioner's alleged injury is speculative because Petitioner did not meet the requirement in section 319.23 that a physical examination of the Vehicle be made by the owner and a motor vehicle dealer licensed in the state of Florida. Respondent further asserts that Petitioner's alleged interest does not fall within the zone of interest of this proceeding. Specifically, Respondent argues that because the Vehicle is located in a foreign country, Petitioner is unable to establish that the Vehicle must be registered and a certificate of title issued in Florida. Respondent concludes: Because Petitioner cannot meet the burden of establishing that the motor vehicle in question is required to be licensed and registered in Florida, and because he failed to satisfy the application requirements of section 319.23(3)(a)(2), he cannot meet the burden of establishing that any interest in obtaining a certificate of title for the vehicle in question is within the 'zone of interests' to be protected and regulated.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact On May 23, 2005, Petitioner was hired by Respondent as a ready-mix concrete truck driver at Respondent’s Gainesville plant. Petitioner was a good employee. He had a clean driving record, and he did not have any disciplinary problems while working for Respondent. On or about July 27, 2007, Petitioner had a “mild” heart attack and was placed on medical leave by Respondent. In September 2007, Petitioner was released by his personal physician to return to work. Thereafter, Petitioner returned to work for a couple of days and began the process of being recertified for his driving duties. He reviewed safety materials and videos and did “ride- alongs” with other drivers. Before Petitioner could return to his driving duties, he was required by federal Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations to pass a physical and be certified as “physically qualified.” Recertification is required every 24 months and after an injury that impairs the driver’s ability to perform his/her normal duties, such as the heart attack suffered by Petitioner. Petitioner understood that he could not return to his job as a ready-mix concrete truck driver until he passed a physical and received his DOT certification. On September 12, 2007, Respondent sent Petitioner to a DOT-approved physician in Ocala for his physical. Petitioner did not pass the physical. The DOT-approved physician expressed concerns about Petitioner’s cardiac surgery, possible sleep apnea (based upon a questionnaire filled out by Petitioner), and blood pressure issues. There is no credible evidence that Respondent influenced the DOT-approved physician’s decision in any way. Petitioner’s suspicion that Respondent had something to do with the decision is unfounded. Petitioner’s personal physician disagreed with the concerns expressed by the DOT-approved physician, and after Petitioner underwent a series of tests, it was determined that he did not have sleep apnea. On November 9, 2007, Respondent laid Petitioner off based upon his “failure to meet job qualifications.” Petitioner was 48 years old at the time of the lay- off. There is no credible evidence that Petitioner’s age or medical condition played any role in Respondent’s decision to lay Petitioner off. Rather, the decision was based solely upon Petitioner’s failure to have the DOT certification that was required for him to drive a ready-mix concrete truck. Respondent gave Petitioner ample time to obtain his DOT certification before it laid him off. Approximately two months passed between the time that Petitioner was cleared to return to work by his personal physician and the time that he was laid off for not having his DOT certification. Petitioner did not obtain his DOT certification until some point in January 2008. Petitioner was treated no differently by Respondent than other drivers -- both older and younger than Petitioner -- who lost their DOT certification. Like Petitioner, those drivers were fired because they did not meet the applicable job qualifications. Petitioner testified that he was told that he would be rehired when he got his DOT certification. This testimony is corroborated by the comment on the Employee Separation Notice for Petitioner, which stated “Jesse has been unable to get his DOT card/when he does he will be rehired.” By the time Petitioner obtained his DOT certification in January 2008, Respondent’s business had declined due to the slow-down in the economy and the building industry, and it did not have any work for Petitioner. Respondent laid off three drivers at its Gainesville plant in December 2007, and it laid off an additional five drivers at the plant in February 2008 because of the decline in its business. Six of the eight drivers who were laid-off were younger than Petitioner. After these lay-offs, there were still three drivers employed at Respondent’s Gainesville plant who had less seniority than Petitioner, but in order to rehire Petitioner, Respondent would have had to fire one of those drivers. There were also a number of drivers still employed at Respondent’s Gainesville plant who were older and had more seniority than Petitioner. Respondent’s decision not to fire one of the other drivers in order to re-hire Petitioner was reasonable under the circumstances. And, more importantly, there is no credible evidence that this decision was motivated in any way by Petitioner’s age or a perceived disability based upon his heart attack. Respondent has not hired any drivers at its Gainesville plant since the lay-offs described above. Petitioner has not worked since he was laid off by Respondent. He testified that he has tried to find another truck-driving job, but that like Respondent, most companies are not hiring drivers because of the slow-down in the economy and the building industry. Petitioner would likely still be employed by Respondent if he had obtained his DOT certification before Respondent started laying off drivers because Petitioner was a good employee with more seniority than all but one of the drivers who were laid off in December 2007 and February 2008. Petitioner believes that Respondent could have put him to work in the warehouse or on the yard until he obtained his DOT certification and could return to driving duties. However, the record does not reflect whether any positions were available in the warehouse or on the yard or whether Petitioner was qualified for those positions. Petitioner testified that he was told by other employees that they overheard Respondent’s managers stating that they did not intend to return Petitioner to his driving duties because his heart attack made him a “high risk driver.” No evidence was presented to corroborate this hearsay-based testimony. Petitioner also testified that a supervisor made a critical comment to him regarding his use of a cane immediately after he returned to work. The supervisor denied making the comment, and even if the comment was made, there is no credible evidence that it was anything more than an isolated comment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 2009.
