Findings Of Fact On November 19, 1981, the Florida Real Estate Commission, then Board of Real Estate, received the application of Kay M. Harvey, Petitioner, asking that she be licensed to practice real estate as a salesperson. A copy of that application form may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 2, admitted into evidence. Following the review, and by correspondence dated February 19, 1982, the application for licensure was denied. A copy of that denial statement may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence. The basis for denial was as set forth in the Issues Statement to this Recommended Order, with the exception of the assertion that the answer to Question No. 6 was incomplete. That assertion was first offered at the final hearing in this cause. In keeping with the opportunity expressed in the letter of denial, Petitioner requested a formal Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, hearing. The Director of the Division of Administrative Hearings was then requested to assign a Hearing Officer and the case was considered through the process of a formal hearing conducted on July 30, 1982. Petitioner is a resident of Jacksonville, Florida, residing at 2612 Sandra Lane. She has lived in Jacksonville for the period of her life. She is now twenty-nine (29) years old and is employed by State Farm Mutual Insurance Company. She has held employment with that organization for ten and one half (10 1/2) years. During that time, she has held various clerical positions and at present is a rate clerk. In that capacity she calculates insurance premium rates and informs customers of their premium rates. Her position includes making decisions on the question of premium adjustment refunds for the benefit of customers. This responsibility includes a determination on the part of Petitioner on the subject of proper refund; however, Petitioner does not prepare the refund draft nor mail the refund check. Petitioner does not handle cash money in other facets of her employment. On the topic of the answer to Question No. 6, which is the focus of the dispute between the parties, when asked to describe her understanding of the instructions given to an applicant who was answering Question No. 6, she stated, "I feel that it is asking me whether I've ever been arrested, and if I have, what it was for, and whether I was on parole or not." On July 1, 1981, Petitioner was arrested for obtaining property by the issuance of a worthless check. The arrest occurred in Duval County, Florida, for an offense committed in that county. The amount of the check was two hundred eighty-eight dollars ($288.00), constituting a felony offense. Petitioner pled guilty to the offense and was placed on probation. The probation was successfully concluded on July 8, 1982, following restitution by Petitioner. This pertained to the circuit court case, Docket No. 81-5065CFR, Duval County, Florida. In connection with the offense involved with the issuance of the two hundred eighty-eight dollar ($288.00) check, Petitioner purchased carpet from a merchant in Duval County, The Carpet Barn. When the check was processed, Petitioner was informed that she did not have sufficient funds to honor the check. This information was provided by an employee of the merchant. The check was then processed a second time and again Petitioner was informed that there was insufficient money in the account to allow the check to be negotiated. Petitioner was again told by the employee of The Carpet Barn that there were insufficient funds. Petitioner also received notice from her bank that there was insufficient money to honor the claim for a two hundred eighty-eight dollar ($288.00) payment. The check was not suitable on the first occasion due to the Petitioner's failure to deduct certain service charges from her bank account, which service charges had the effect of reducing the amount of available funds to be spent for other purposes. The check was not honored on a second occasion due the submittal of another check issued by the Petitioner, which had been outstanding, causing the reduction of available monies in the Petitioner's checking account, such that there were insufficient funds to honor the two hundred eighty-eight dollar ($208.00) check when it was processed on the second occasion. In the face of the shortages, Petitioner was requested to provide money to balance the checking account and allow payment of the two hundred eighty-eight dollar ($288.00) check. This was not done. Petitioner then requested that she be given a month to place sufficient funds in the account to honor the claims by The Carpet Barn, and was granted that opportunity. Following the second submission for payment, an employee of The Carpet Barn contacted the personnel office where Petitioner worked and spoke with the Personnel Manager about the subject of the outstanding check. Petitioner was disturbed by this contact and called the employee of The Carpet Barn and entered into an argument on the subjects of the check and that employee's contact with Petitioner's employer. The employee of The Carpet Barn indicated that the matter would be turned over to the local State Attorney for prosecution. Petitioner then contacted The Carpet Barn to try to arrange for the payment of the check and was told that they expected total payment and no settlement was arrived at, in view of the fact that Petitioner was suggesting payment of a lesser amount. The Petitioner and the merchant being unable to resolve their differences, Petitioner was prosecuted. She retained the carpet she had purchased and an amount of two hundred sixty or seventy dollars ($260.00 or $270.00) in her checking account, which represented the difference between the initial cost of the carpet and the charges in her account which had been deducted, causing the disallowance of the payment of the full amount of the two hundred eighty-eight dollar ($288.00) check. At the time of the incident involving the check, Petitioner was making an annual salary of twelve to thirteen thousand dollars ($12,000.00-$13,000.00) and the merchant was repaid the amount of two hundred eighty-eight dollars ($288.00), in keeping with the terms of Respondent's probation. The repayment was made through installments over a period of eleven (11) months. The other conditions of probation related to maintenance of her position in employment with the State Farm Mutual Insurance Company and submission of periodic reports were compiled with. In 1975 or 1976, Petitioner, while married, wrote a check at a time when the bank upon which the funds were drawn did not believe that she had check writing privileges, in that the bank was not aware that a signature card had been executed by Petitioner, thereby entitling her to write checks on a joint account with her husband. Prior to being notified by Respondent that it wished to inquire about the event of 1975 or 1976, Petitioner did not feel that any crime had been committed or that any criminal law investigative record of the events involving this particular check existed. At hearing, Petitioner did acknowledge that she had been charged with the offense in 1975 or 1976, related to checks or worthless checks, in the sense that she received a court summons about the check. Petitioner, by her explanation, was taken "downtown" and signed papers and was fingerprinted. The signature card had in fact been signed and filed with the bank, but the bank, not being cognizant of that signature at the time the check was written, refused to accept it. On the date of court appearance, under summons, an official of the bank accompanied Petitioner to that proceeding and the matter was dismissed. If Petitioner were licensed, one Terry Baker, licensed broker in Florida, has indicated that he might employ Petitioner. Petitioner indicated that to guard against problems of the type which occurred with the check incidents, that she would be more careful in her calculations in protecting the interests of her clients as a real estate salesperson.
The Issue Whether GMD Carpet, Inc., failed to comply with coverage requirements of the workers’ compensation law, Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for enforcing provisions of Florida law, specifically Chapter 440 of the Florida Statutes, which require that employers secure workers’ compensation coverage for their employees. Respondent, whose principal is Emmanuel Simone, Jr. (Mr. Simone), is in the business of providing carpet installation services. At all times material to this case, Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 440.02(16)(a), Florida Statutes. At all times material to this case, Respondent was legally obligated to provide workers' compensation insurance in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, for Mr. Simone and four other individuals employed by GMD. On or about May 21, 2004, Petitioner became aware that Mr. Simone and another GMD employee were working a carpet installation job in Broward County, Florida. Upon inquiry, Petitioner accurately determined that GMD had not furnished the required coverage, and that there was no valid exemption from the coverage requirement. Accordingly, on May 21, 2004, a Stop Work and Penalty Assessment Order was properly entered. Thereafter, Petitioner reviewed Respondent's payroll records, which revealed that GMD employed three other individuals under circumstances which obliged Respondent to provide workers’ compensation for these employees. Based upon Respondent's payroll records, Petitioner recalculated the penalty assessment to be imposed in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 440, and issued an Amended Order in the amount of $1,916.65 on May 25, 2004. Respondent did not intend to violate the law. Rather, he mistakenly believed that he held a valid exemption; that his wife was not an employee, but rather a helper; and that the three other carpet installers were subcontractors to whom he had no insurance-related obligations. It is undisputed that Petitioner correctly calculated the penalty prescribed by law in the amount of $1,916.65 based upon Respondent's records and applicable law.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a final order confirming the Stop Work Order and imposing a penalty in the amount of $1,916.65, as set forth in the Amended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of October, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Colin M. Roopnarine, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Workers’ Compensation 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 Emmanuel Simone, Jr. Debra Simone GMD Carpet, Inc. 717 North 31st Avenue Hollywood, Florida 33021 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florid a 32399-0300 Pete Dunbar, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was first employed by the. Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee, Florida in 1968 and since March, 1971 has been evaluated by his supervisors as conditional or unsatisfactory in dependability. These low marks in dependability stem directly from his absenteeism rather than from his calibre of work when on duty. Petitioner is employed as a psychiatric aide. On October 31, 1972 Petitioner received his first written reprimand for excessive absenteeism. On March 22, 1973 a second written reprimand was received by Petitioner for excessive absenteeism. From August 1974 to May 1975 Petitioner was granted leave of absence to attend a vocational school. Upon his return to work at the hospital he was assigned to the 3:00 P.M. to 11:30 P.M. shift. In August 1975 Petitioner was assigned to night duty at his own request and over the objection of the night duty supervisor whose objections were based solely on Petitioner's prior record of absenteeism. Between the months of September 1975 to August 1976 Petitioner was absent a total of 64 1/2 days of the days he was required to be on duty. On July 13, 1976 Petitioner was given a third written reprimand for excessive absenteeism. On each of the occasions Petitioner was absent he would call in one or two hours prior to the time he was scheduled to report for duty to advise that he or a member of his family was sick. At this time of night it was often impossible for the hospital to get a replacement for him, and, as a result, the ward was short of attendants. Following the July 13, 1976 written reprimand Petitioner called in sick on July 25, July 31, and August 1, 1976. In approximately 95 percent of the cases Petitioner's absences occurred the day prior or subsequent to his scheduled off-duty days. During the six months period prior to his suspension from duty for three days without pay the ward to which Petitioner was assigned was a surgical ward where most patients required more intensive care than on non-surgical wards. While on duty Petitioner is an effective and capable employee and his efficiency reports so indicate. HRS Employee Handbook (Exhibit 1) provides penalties for various offenses. For the first offense of excessive absenteeism oral to written reprimand is recommended. For a second such offense penalty of written reprimand to three days suspension is recommended. For a third such offense three days suspension to dismissal is recommended. For a fourth such offense dismissal is recommended. Testifying in his own behalf Petitioner acknowledged excessive absenteeism and gave as a reason that he was subject to headaches, and, that when he didn't feel good he would stay home rather than come to work and have to listen to the complaints of his fellow workers. During the past year Petitioner has been employed by Gadsden County School Board as a bus driver. While so employed he missed only one day due to sickness.
The Issue Whether the Respondent discriminated against Ruby D. Johnson on the basis of a handicap in violation of the Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended?
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner began employment with the Respondent at its Lake City, Florida, plant during 1977 or 1978. The Respondent manufactures metal parts for automobiles. The Petitioner was employed by the Respondent as a parts assembly worker. At the time the Petitioner began employment with the Respondent, she informed the Respondent that she did not have any handicap. On June 28, 1984, the Petitioner was accidently struck on the head with a broom by another employee while at work. She was struck with the straw end of the broom. The Petitioner did not return to her job for approximately two months after being struck on the head. The Petitioner was treated by George G. Feussner, M.D. When Dr. Feussner authorized the Petitioner's return to work, he recommended that she not be required to perform any work requiring standing or leaning, climbing or operation of dangerous equipment for approximately three to four weeks. In September, 1985, the Petitioner experienced dizziness and fell while at work. In a letter dated October 2, 1985, Dr. Feussner informed the Respondent of the following: Despite and [sic] extensive evaluation of this lady, I cannot find objective findings to go along with her symptoms. I believe that she should be able to return to work at her regular job, but I still think that it would be dangerous considering her emotional dedication to her symptoms she is likely to injure herself if she works around dangerous equipment or at heights. She should therefore find a job that does not involve these activities... The Petitioner, when she tried to return to work, was not allowed to work because she had filed a workmen's compensation claim as a result of her alleged condition. This claim was being disputed by the Respondent's workmen compensation insurance carrier. On October 31, 1985, the Respondent laid off several employees with seniority equal to or greater than the Petitioner's seniority. Employees were laid off because of a lack of work. The Petitioner would have been laid off also, but was not because of the disputed claim over workmen's compensation. In November, 1985, the Petitioner's workmen compensation claim was denied. At that time the Petitioner was informed that she was also being laid off. In October, 1986, the Respondent began recalling the employees it had laid off in November, 1985. The Petitioner was not recalled, however, because of the restrictions on the Petitioner's ability to work. The Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice with the Commission in October, 1986. On November 13, 1987, the Commission issued a Notice of Determination: No Cause.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Human Relations enter a final order denying the Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of September, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of September, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Ruby D. Johnson 1802 North Georgia Street Lake City, Florida 32055 William B. Hatfield Supervisor of Human Relations ITT Thompson Industries - Metal Division Post Office Box 928 Valdosta, Georgia 31603-0928 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Commission On Human Relations, Florida 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird General Counsel Commission On Human Relations, Florida 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1025 =================================================================
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent violated Sections 440.10 and 440.38, Florida Statutes (1997), by not securing workers' compensation insurance for its Florida employees; and if so, whether Petitioner properly issued a Stop Work Order and assessed civil penalties pursuant to Sections 440.107(5) and 440.107(7), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency that is charged with the responsibility of enforcing the statutory requirements for employers to provide their employees with workers' compensation coverage. Respondent is a business, located in Savannah, Georgia, that supplies workers on a temporary basis to client businesses. The services that Respondent provides to its client businesses include the payment of payroll, taxes, and workers' compensation insurance for the temporary employees. American Interstate Insurance Company (AIIC) provided Eastern Personnel Services II, Federal Employers Identification Number (FEIN) 58-2340211, with workers' compensation insurance from November 18, 1997, through November 18, 1998, in the state of Georgia. AIIC's policy number 97WAGA1109996 did not provide coverage for any of Respondent's workers in Florida. AIIC is not authorized in Florida to write insurance for an employer with Respondent's assigned risk classification. Safeco Insurance Company of America (SICA) provided Respondent, FEIN 58-2340211, with workers' compensation insurance from December 29, 1998, through December 29, 1999, in the states of Georgia and South Carolina only. SICA's policy number WC7260735 as originally drafted, and as it existed on March 2, 1999, did not provide coverage for any workers in Florida. Paul Day is Respondent's president and sole officer and shareholder. He is also the owner of Eastern Personnel Services II, a sole proprietorship. According to AIIC's and SICA's insurance policies, both entities have the same FEIN. The record here indicates that there is no substantive difference between Respondent and Eastern Personnel Services II. Respondent's testimony to the contrary is not persuasive. 1/ For all practical purposes, Respondent and Eastern Personnel Services II were under the exclusive management and control of Mr. Day at all relevant times. Beginning as early as August 28, 1997 and continuing through March 2, 1999, Respondent provided employees to Foley & Associates Construction Co., Inc. (Foley) at one or more work sites on Amelia Island, Florida. Respondent did not secure workers' compensation insurance for these workers. Stanley Benner was one of the first of Respondent's employees to begin working at Foley's Amelia Island job site. On November 9, 1998, Mr. Benner was injured while working for Respondent. Mr. Benner filed a workers' compensation claim against Respondent and AIIC seeking compensation for his injuries. He subsequently learned that AIIC did not provide workers' compensation insurance for Respondent in Florida. Mr. Benner has received no compensation from Respondent or any insurance carrier for his work-related injury. On March 2, 1999, Mr. Benner's attorney filed a complaint with Petitioner regarding Respondent's lack of workers' compensation coverage. Robert Lambert, Petitioner's investigator immediately went to Foley's job site to investigate the complaint. Upon his arrival at the construction site, Mr. Lambert learned that Respondent had 21 employees performing general contract labor for Foley that day. Foley's office manager informed Mr. Lambert that Respondent had provided Foley with between 15 and 20 laborers per day for one year. Next, Mr. Lambert called Mr. Day who provided a certificate of insurance from SICA by facsimile transmission. However, the certificate listed Saxon and Associates, a business located in Georgia, as the certificate holder. It did not reference coverage for employees provided to Foley in Florida. Mr. Lambert then called Linda Burtchett of HGI, Inc. She is an insurance agent and the authorized representative of SICA. HGI, Inc. is the producer of SICA's policy number WC7260735. Ms. Burtchett informed Mr. Lambert that SICA's policy number WC7260735 did not cover Respondent's employees in the state of Florida. To her knowledge, Respondent had never reported any wages on a Florida payroll. Mr. Lambert issued a Stop Work Order dated March 2, 1999. The Stop Work Order required Respondent to immediately cease all work at the Foley construction site. It advised Respondent that a civil penalty in the amount of $100 would be assessed for each day that it failed to provide the required workers' compensation coverage. Later on March 2, 1999, Respondent requested HGI, Inc. to provide coverage for its Florida employees working at the Foley job site under SICA's policy number WC7260735. HGI, Inc. complied with Respondent's request. Accordingly, Petitioner correctly assessed Respondent with a civil penalty in the amount of $100 in conjunction with the Stop Work Order. Mr. Day testified that the endorsement to the SICA policy provided coverage for Respondent's Florida employees retroactive to September 29, 1998. He also testified that another of Respondent's Florida employees was injured at the Foley construction site on January 18, 1999, and received compensation under the SICA policy. Mr. Day's testimony is not credited in light of Ms. Burtchett's testimony. On March 2, 1999, Petitioner informally requested Respondent to provide business records to establish the value of its Florida payroll during the three years before Petitioner issued the Stop Work Order. Respondent refused to provide Petitioner with any payroll records. Petitioner obtained records maintained by Foley regarding Respondent's employment activities at the Amelia Island job site. Foley's records showed the number of employees that Respondent employed, the number of hours worked by each employee, and their hourly rate of pay. Respondent admitted and Foley's records confirmed that Respondent's payroll at the Foley construction site was $209,249.86 between January 5, 1998 and March 1, 1999. The National Council of Compensation Insurance (NCCI) classifies Respondent as a temporary labor service. According to the NCCI, the employment activities conducted by Respondent's employees at the Foley construction site have an assigned insurance premium rate in the conservative amount of $22.34 for each $100 of payroll. Therefore, Respondent's evaded insurance premium on a payroll of $209,249.86 is $46,746. The administrative penalty is twice the evaded premium of $46,746 or $93,492. On March 31, Petitioner properly issued a Notice and Penalty Assessment Order requiring Respondent to pay an administrative penalty in the amount of $93,492. Respondent's untimely discovery responses indicated that its Florida payroll was $196,701.62 in 1998 and $65,165.36 in 1999. Petitioner could have assessed Respondent with an administrative penalty in the amount of $115,743.26.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a final order affirming the Stop Work Order and Notice and Penalty Assessment Order with their associated penalties, plus any lawful interest. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of October, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of October, 1999.
The Issue The issue is whether Section 11B(3) of the Florida Workers' Compensation Reimbursement Manual for Hospitals, 2004 Second Edition, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact The petitions filed by FFVA and TIC challenge the validity of Section 11B(3) of the 2004 Manual,4/ which prior to October 1, 2007, was adopted by reference as part of Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.501(1). Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.501(1) was amended effective October 1, 2007, to adopt by reference the Florida Workers' Compensation Reimbursement Manual for Hospitals, 2006 Edition ("the 2006 Manual"). Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.501(1), as it existed when the petitions were filed and as it currently exists, adopts by reference the 2006 Manual, not the 2004 Manual. The 2004 Manual is no longer adopted by reference as part of Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.501, or any other rule. AHCA applied the 2004 Manual in the reimbursement dispute initiated by HRMC against FFVA under Section 440.13, Florida Statutes, as reflected in the determination letter issued by AHCA on October 24, 2007, which was attached to FFVA's petition. The reimbursement dispute is the subject of the pending DOAH Case No. 07-5414. AHCA applied the 2004 Manual in a reimbursement dispute involving TIC under Section 440.13, Florida Statutes, as reflected in the determination letter issued by AHCA on January 9, 2008, which was attached to TIC's petition. The reimbursement dispute is the subject of the pending DOAH Case No. 08-0703.
Findings Of Fact Frank Bowder began his employment with Exports, Inc., under the tutelage of Kenneth L. Kellar, President and sole stockholder of Exports, Inc., at the office in Washington state approximately 20 years ago. He became very knowledgeable about the company's business, and approximately 15 years ago he was sent by Kellar to operate the company's Florida office. He was given the title of general manager of the Florida office and remained an excellent employee until his recent death. Kellar considered Frank Bowder to be an excellent manager of the product of Exports, Inc., but recognized that Frank Bowder had a large turnover of employees. His wife Mae Bowder was also an employee of Exports, Inc., and was considered by Kellar to be "the best cleaning woman there is." She was in charge of cleaning and maintenance duties at the Florida office. At some point Mae Bowder began representing to people that she was the office manager of the Florida office. That information was brought to Kellar's's attention on several occasions, and he corrected that information by explaining that she was simply in charge of maintenance. At some point Mae Bowder's son, Wayne Evans, became employed by the Bowders in the Florida office and was given the title of warehouse manager. Within the last several years, Frank Bowder allowed his wife to "become" the office manager. When Kellar found out, he fired her because he believed that she was "not office material." Approximately a year later Kellar found out that Mae Bowder was once again the office manager. He spoke to Frank about it, and Frank explained, essentially, that Mae was giving him so many problems at home about it that he had to hire her back. Kellar fired her once again. Sometime thereafter, Kellar found out that Frank was ill. He came to the Florida office and discovered Mae Bowder once again employed as "office manager." He again discussed the matter with Frank and determined the extent of Frank's illness, which was terminal. He told Frank that Frank was too ill to be running the office full time and told Frank that he should only come to the office a few hours a day. Frank responded that he did not know what to do about his wife. Kellar then went to Mae Bowder and discussed with her the fact that he only wanted Frank to be at the office a few hours a day and that it was too difficult for Frank to continue working full time. He also told Mae Bowder that she should be staying home and taking care of Frank because Frank was so sick. Mae Bowder specifically asked Kellar if he were firing her, and Kellar responded "no" but that she should be staying home to take care of her husband. Mae Bowder "got in a huff," threatened two of the female office personnel, and left. Kellar did not see her again until the final hearing in this cause. Kellar began investigating the operations of the Florida office at that point and began discussing with the other employees there how the office had been managed. He discovered problems. He was told that the Bowders gave highly preferential treatment to Wayne Evans in comparison to the other employees. He discovered that Mrs. Bowder did not like to hire black employees, and the black employees who were hired were not given keys to the office. There was a stated policy by Mrs. Bowder to not hire people with children. Specifically, one black employee did not tell Mrs. Bowder that she had a child when she was hired. When she later became pregnant, Mrs. Bowder was furious. The employee was given one month for unpaid maternity leave and when she called at the end of that month, Mrs. Bowder told her she had been laid off. When she called two months later, the time by which her baby who was sick could be left with someone else, Mrs. Bowder returned her call a week later telling her she could come back to work because another black employee had left. Lastly, the other employees reported that Mrs. Bowder would yell and curse at them, threaten to hit them with an upraised hand, and even pushed and shoved an employee on one occasion because that employee had made a mistake in her work. The employees had previously not made these complaints because they could have only complained to the general manager who was the husband of the person about whom they would be complaining. Kellar brought an employee from the Washington office down to the Florida office to assist Frank Bowder and continued to pay Frank Bower his salary until he died. No evidence was offered that Kellar would not have continued to pay Mae Bowder her salary if she had reduced her hours in order to take care of Frank rather than walking out when Kellar tried to discuss the matter with her. No one else was present when Kellar and Mae Bowder had their discussion at the time when Mae Bowder resigned. Later that day, according to her son, Kellar made a comment that the Bowders had been the last of the married couples working for the company. Such a statement, if it were made, is susceptible of many interpretations, including sadness for the end of an era. Kellar did not fire Mae Bowder.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Exports, Inc., not guilty of committing an unlawful employment practice and dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief filed in this cause. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 26th day of May, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of May, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: James R. McGlynn, Esquire 4633 10th Avenue North Lake Worth, Florida 33463 Kenneth L. Kellar President/Owner Exports, Inc. Post Office Box 449 Blaine, WA 98230 Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
