The Issue The legal issues are: Whether the Respondent violated Section 475.624(2), Florida Statutes, by culpable negligence or breach of trust in a business transaction; Whether the Respondent violated Section 475.624(14), Florida Statutes, by violating standards for the development or communication of a real estate appraisal or other provision of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice; Whether the Respondent violated Section 475.624(15), Florida Statutes, by having failed to exercise reasonable diligence in the developing or preparing an appraisal.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state agency charged with regulation of real estate appraisers. Respondent is a licensed state-certified general real estate appraiser holding license number 0479378 issued by the Petitioner. Her most recent business address is 416 Oleander Avenue, Daytona Beach, Florida 32118-4034. In July 1991, Neil A. Braley and Charlene J. Johnson engaged Lawrence Johnson and Associates, Inc. to make an appraisal of a business and real property located at 729 Broadway, Daytona Beach, Florida. Mr. Braley specifically asked for an investment value on the property for the purpose of dissolving the partnership which operated the business to be appraised. TX-74, line 10. Harold Rose, the owner and president of Lawrence Johnson and Associates, Inc., (hereafter "Johnson Associates") contracted with the Respondent to "work up the numbers for an income approach of what the business, land, and improvements which belonged to the partnership." The Respondent was charged to work up what that partnership had invested in that property; business, land, and improvements. See TX-75, line 16. Johnson Associates prepared the appraisal and Rose reviewed the finished product. Because of the demands for completion by Braley, Rose did not carefully review the appraisal, which was the first one prepared by the Respondent. Rose failed to catch the fact that the appraisal stated that it was based on "market value" rather than investment value. Braley received the appraisal, and was pleased, thanking Rose for the job. See TX 80, line 10. The appraisal states under the "Assumptions and Limiting Conditions" that "no right is given to publish this report, or any part of it, without written consent of the maker." No request for release of the appraisal was ever received by Rose. The appraisal which the Respondent worked up, and which she signed, states that the fair market value of the subject property is $570,000. It should have stated that the investment value of the business was $570,000. In December 1991, Raymond H. Heffington and Mark A. Carper did another appraisal of 729 Broadway and determined that the fair market value of the real property was $220,000. At the time of the appraisal, the business was in the process of closing out. In Heffington's opinion, Respondent's appraisal was deficient in required analysis, documentation, and presentation based upon the Respondent's reliance on the income approach for the basis of her evaluation of the real property. TX-28, line 22. Clifford E. Fisher, an expert in real estate appraisal, opined that the Respondent's appraisal report did not make it clear what interests were being appraised, and went beyond appraising the fee simple interest, i.e., appraised more than the real property. Fisher stated that both failings were a violation of uniform standards. The Respondent admitted that she failed to catch the statement in the appraisal report, which she signed, that stated that it was an appraisal of the fair market value.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent be fined $500. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of May, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 1994. APPENDIX CASE NO. 93-3987 Both parties submitted proposed findings which were read and considered. The following states which of those findings were adopted, and which were rejected, and why: Petitioner's Findings Action Taken Paragraphs 1-9 Adopted. Respondent's Findings Action Taken/Why Paragraph 1 First portion adopted; second portion irrelevant. Paragraph 2 First portion irrelevant; second portion adopted; lending institution's losses are irrelevant because the report on its face should have only been provided upon written permission of the report's maker. Paragraph 3 Adopted. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900 Arthur M. Ossinsky, Esquire 500 North Oleander Avenue Daytona Beach, FL 32118 Darlene F. Keller, Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900 Jack McRay, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
The Issue Should Respondent's license as a real estate broker be revoked, suspended or otherwise disciplined?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The Department is the agency charged with the responsibility of investigating and enforcing the provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, issued license number 0152815 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Robert L. Purlee and Doris A. Purlee (Purlees) conveyed certain real property located at Unit 1303-A, Jamestown Condominiums, within Pinellas County, Florida, to Ralph F. Marotte and Eve K. Marotte (Marottes), on June 18, 1993, for an agreed upon sum of $15,000, with installments due over a period of 120 months, at the rate of $181,99 per month, beginning July 15, 1993. Since there was no express language in the deed to express a contrary intent, the conveyance to the Marottes created an estate by the entirety which was not available to answer for the individual debts of either of the tenants. The Marottes executed a mortgage and ad promissory note creating a lien against the property in favor of the Purlees, to secure the timely payment of the sum owed by the Marottes. At the time the Marottes purchased the property in question from the Purlees, there were no other liens or encumbrances against the property. At the time the deed was recorded, there was two personal judgments filed of record against Ralph F. Marotte, individually, but no personal judgments filed of record against Ralph F. Marotte and Eve K. Marotte, jointly or as husband and wife, or Eve K. Marotte, individually. Since no copies of these judgments, certified or otherwise, were introduced as evidence, and David Eaton appeared to be confused about these judgments, this finding is based on the testimony of Eve K. Marotte which I find credible. On November 10, 1993, the Marottes authored and caused to be delivered to the Purlees a letter which provides in pertinent part: We are unable to financially own this unit, therefore, we wish to deed it back to you and your wife, and record it in the courthouse. Rather than go thru foreclosure proceedings and lawyer’s fees etc., thought the simplest best way for both of us is to just return the property back to you both, and have the tenant send her rent payment directly to you. We have prepared the deed - and after it is recorded - have the courthouse send it to you directly. (Emphasis Supplied) * * * On December 8, 1993, the Marottes authored and caused to be delivered to the Purlees a letter which provides in pertinent part: Attached is a copy of the Quit Claim Deed - which is being recorded and will be mailed to you directly. (Emphasis Supplied) * * * On January 6, 1994, the Marottes authored and caused to be delivered to the Purlees a letter which provides in pertinent part: We went to the courthouse to record the deed, and realized that we did not take the mortgage off, so we are enclosing a satisfaction of mortgage, so that we can turn the property back to you- and you will then own it free and clear as you did before. As soon as we received this paper from you, will turn over everything, to you, that is, keys, etc. (Inventory remains the same). (Emphasis Supplied) * * * From the notation on the quit claim deed it appears that the Marottes attempted to record the deed at the courthouse but changed their mind as indicated in the letter. The Purlees executed the satisfaction of mortgage and posted it with the United States Postal Service for delivery to the Marottes. Subsequently, the Purlees discussed the matter with their attorney, David A. Eaton, who advised the Purlees to have the satisfaction of mortgage retrieved from the postal service. This was accomplished, and the Marottes did not receive the satisfaction of mortgage. Therefore, the Marottes did not record the quit claim deed transferring title back to the Purlees. Based on the testimony of Eve K. Marotte which I find credible, Eve K. Marotte continued in her effort to deed the property back to the Purlees, and even discussed the possibility of satisfying the personal judgments against Ralph F. Marotte in the process. In fact, Respondent even arranged for the sale of the property but that did not prove fruitful either. At the time the Marottes attempted to deed the property back to the Purlees, the Marottes did not advise the Purlees of the personal judgments against Ralph F. Marotte, individually. Since the conveyance of the property to the Marottes created an estate by the entirety, the property would not have been subject to any judgments against Ralph F. Marotte, individually upon the Marottes deeding the property back to the Purlees. There was no intent on the part of the Respondent to “saddle” the Purlees with Ralph F. Marotte’s personal judgments. Likewise, there was no intent on the part of Respondent to mislead or misrepresent the circumstances surrounding the attempt to “deed back” the property or to induce the Purlees to execute a satisfaction of mortgage so that the Marottes could record such satisfaction or mortgage without recording the quit claim deed and thereby have the property free and clear of the mortgage. Although the Marottes did make some of the mortgage payments, they did not make all of the payments as contemplated by the mortgage and promissory note. Their failure to make mortgage payments was due to their financial condition and not that the Marottes were intentionally attempting to deprive the Purlees of the property without paying for the property. The Marottes collected some rent from the property but apparently did not apply this money toward the mortgage payment. However, there was no evidence, other than the requirement of making the mortgage payments, that the Marottes were required to pay the rent over to the Purlees. On or about November 6. 1995, the Purlees filed a complaint with the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida, in and for Pinellas County, against the Marottes alleging, inter alia, that Respondent committed fraud and dishonest dealing in a real estate transaction. On a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Purlees, the court entered a Final Judgment Against Licensed Real Estate Broker, Eve K. Marotte, for Monetary Damages Arising Out of Fraudulent Conduct in a Real Estate Brokerage Transaction on March 1, 1996. Additionally, the court entered a Final Judgment Against Eve K. Marotte and Ralph F. Marotte for the total sum of $95, 454.95 which included $22, 284.54 in actual damages, $66,853.62 in trouble damages pursuant to Section 772.11, Florida Statutes, $5,250.00 in attorney’s fees, and $1,066.79 in taxable costs. Because of this judgment and other financial and personal circumstances surrounding the Respondent’s life at that time, the Respondent filed for bankruptcy which eventually “wiped out” this judgment. Subsequently, the Purlees filed a separate proceeding for foreclosure of the mortgage, and obtained title to the property by foreclosure sale on or about August 1997. Between the time of the initiation of the foreclosure proceeding and gaining title to the property, the Purlees had a receiver appointed to receive the rent on the property. Although David Eaton testified that the Marottes failed to turn over rents during this period, there is insufficient evidence to show that the Marottes received any rent during this period or that the property was rented at all times during this period. Clearly, after engaging an attorney and obtaining the large judgment, the Purlees were not interested in taking the property back without the judgment being satisfied. Likewise, it is equally clear that Respondent was not financially able to pay the judgment. Respondent did not intentionally or otherwise misrepresent the facts in order to induce the Purlees to accept the deed back and release her from her obligation, or act in a fraudulent manner in order to convince the Purlees to release Respondent from her obligation, or act dishonestly in her dealings with the Purlees.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing both Count I and Count II of the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Henry M. Solares Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Geofrrey T. Kirk, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Suite N-308 Orlando, Florida 32801 Eve K. Marotte, pro se 2616 46th Terrace North St. Petersburg, Florida 33714
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the matters involved herein; Petitioner held Florida real estate salesman's license number 0403224. Her license was listed with Century 21 ACR Equities; Inc., 4222 W. Fairfield Drive, Pensacola; on May 25; 1983. On March 4, 1985, Respondent listed her license with Century 21; Five Flags Properties; Inc., in Pensacola, without terminating her listing with ACR Equities. On March 22, 1985, Five Flags terminated her listing with that firm and on April 30; 1985, ACR Equities terminated her listing with that firm. On May 14; 1985; Respondent applied for a change of status to list her license with Old South Properties; Inc., in Pensacola. That firm terminated the association on July 9, 1985. On March 19; 1985; Emmison Lewis and his wife; Lillie Mae signed a handwritten sales agreement prepared by Respondent for the purchase of a piece of property located in Escambia County; for $33,000.00. The Lewises gave her a deposit of $500.00 by check made payable to Respondent and which bears her endorsement on the back. This check was made payable to Respondent because she asked that it be made that way. Several days later; Respondent came back to the Lewises and asked for an additional $1,500.00 deposit. This was given her, along with a rental payment of $310.00; in a $2,000.00 check on March 29, 1985. Respondent gave the Lewises the balance back in cash along with a receipt reflecting the payment of the $1,500.00. On that same date; Respondent had the Lewises sign a typed copy of the sales agreement which reflected that both the $500.00 deposit and the additional $1,500.00 were due on closing. This typed copy was backdated to March 19; 1985. Both the handwritten and typed copies of the sales agreement bear the signature of the Respondent as a witness. The sale was never closed and the Lewises have never received any of the $2;000.00 deposit back. On about four different occasions, Mr. Lewis contacted Respondent requesting that she refund their money and she promised to do so, but never did. They did, however, receive the $310.00 rent payment back in cash approximately two weeks later. On April 26, 1985, James E. Webster and his wife Pearlie signed a sales agreement as the purchasers of real estate with Respondent. This property had a purchase price of $31,900.00. At the time of signing, Mr. Webster gave Respondent $150.00 in cash and a check drawn by his wife on their joint account for $400.00. Due to Mrs. Webster's change of mind, the Websters did not close on the property. They requested a refund of their deposit and Respondent gave the Websters a check for $400.00 which was subsequently dishonored by the bank because of insufficient funds. The Websters called Respondent at home several times, but she was always out. Calls to the broker with whom her license was placed were unsuccessful. Finally, however, Respondent refunded the $400.00 to the Websters in cash. Respondent had listed her license with ACR Equities in May, 1983. At no time while Respondent had her license with Mr. Bickel's firm did she ever turn over to him as broker either the $2.000.00 she received from the Lewises or the $550.00 she received from the Websters. Mr. Bickel, the broker, was not aware of these contracts and did not question her about them. He terminated the placement of her license with his firm because he found out that in early March 1985, she had placed her license with another firm., Both sales agreements for the Lewises and that for the Websters had the firm name of ACR Equities printed on them as broker.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law; it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent's license as a real estate salesman in Florida be revoked. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of May, 1986, in Tallahassee; Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Esquire p. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Ralph Armstead; Esquire P. O. Box 2629 Orlando; Florida 32802
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, George Sherbon, was a licensed real estate broker having been issued broker's license number 0348688 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Division). When the events herein occurred, respondent was employed as a salesman for V. P. Stone, Inc., a real estate firm located at 5905 Gulf Boulevard, St. Petersburg Beach, Florida. On April 1, 1987, Paul D. and Anna Martin entered into a listing agreement with Century 21 Spinning Wheel Ent., Inc. (Century 21) to sell their home at 2543 58th Terrace South, St. Petersburg, Florida. The listing agent was Cheryl Coudry, now known as Cheryl Hutton, a licensed salesperson with Century 21. On September 11, 1987 respondent solicited and obtained a contract for sale on the Martin property executed by Frank Dicenzo, a resident of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, who had a daughter living in the St. Petersburg area. Dicenzo had responded to an advertisement run by Sherbon in a Pittsburgh newspaper. After a week or so of negotiations, the parties eventually agreed to a sales price of $92,500, and the final contract was executed on September 20, 1987. The contract called for Dicenzo to make an initial $100 deposit when the contract was executed and an additional deposit of $19,900 by September 25, 1987, or a total deposit of $20,000. Dicenzo gave respondent the initial $100 which was deposited into the escrow account of V. P. Stone, Inc. The contract provided further that the sale would be contingent on Dicenzo obtaining a $72,500 first mortgage. Finally, in accordance with Dicenzo's request, the contract provided that Dicenzo could take occupancy of the premises four weeks after the loan was approved. It is noted that Dicenzo initially asked for occupancy by October 16, 1987. On September 18, Sherbon introduced Dicenzo to Tony Black, a loan officer at Savings of America, a local lending institution, for the purpose of Dicenzo making a loan application. On September 24, or the day before the additional deposit was due, Dicenzo became ill with what he described as a bleeding ulcer and decided to return to Pittsburgh and stay at his mother's home. Before he left, Dicenzo did not make the additional deposit as required by the contract. According to Dicenzo, he placed no great significance on the September 25 due date and felt that if the deposit was made "within a reasonable time," it would be okay. Respondent was aware of the September 25 deadline and attempted to get a check for the $19,900 deposit from Dicenzo's daughter but was unsuccessful. Respondent contends he kept trying to contact Dicenzo in Pittsburgh during the next five week period but was unable to reach him. Dicenzo acknowledged he knew that Sherbon was trying to contact him but still made no effort to talk to Sherbon. Instead, he simply told his daughter he would take care of the matter when he returned to Florida in late October. Whether this message was conveyed to Sherbon is not of record. Sherbon prepared contemporaneous notes concerning the transaction and used these to refresh his recollection at hearing. He pointed out that such notes were kept on all real estate transactions. According to his notes, he telephoned Coudry and Black on September 24 concerning Dicenzo's illness and the fact that he was having difficulty obtaining the additional deposit from Dicenzo. Although Black recalled talking with Sherbon, he denied that Sherbon told him that there was no deposit and said such information was a material item that would have prompted him to stop processing the application until the deposit could be verified. Likewise, Coudry, who could not recall many aspects of the transaction, did recall speaking with Sherbon but remembered Sherbon simply telling her that he was in the process of showing Dicenzo various commercial properties and would be obtaining the deposit at that time. Their testimony is deemed to be more credible and persuasive and is hereby accepted. Coudry assumed that Sherbon had received the additional deposit since she was never specifically told otherwise by Sherbon. Accordingly, she did not contact the Martins until several weeks after the September 25 due date. Coudry did not learn that no deposit had been collected until mid-January 1988 when Anna Martin disclosed to her this fact. In the meantime, although the Martins knew the contract was contingent on Dicenzo obtaining a loan, they nonetheless assumed that Dicenzo would have no problem securing a loan and that such a loan would be approved in a week or so. Also, they knew the contract called for possession of the property by Dicenzo four weeks after the loan was approved. Because of these assumptions, and having received no advice from Coudry that the full deposit had not been made on September 25 as required by the contract, the Martins made application around September 28 to buy another home in a nearby modular home park and asked that the application be expedited. Unfortunately for the Martins, they were far more successful than Dicenzo in securing prompt approval of their loan application. Once approved, and after a closing was held, the Martins had the utilities hooked up, erected a storage shed, and incurred other expenses. Also, they began making mortgage payments on the second house. On October 24, 1987 the Martins telephoned Sherbon and told him their listing with Century 21 had expired. During the conversation, Sherbon did not mention that Dicenzo had failed to make the $19,900 deposit. Dicenzo's application with Savings of America was denied on October 30, 1987 because of Dicenzo's "ratio of ... expenses to ... total income." By this time, Dicenzo had returned to Florida and had spoken with Sherbon. At respondent's urging, Dicenzo reapplied to the same institution and was turned down a second time on November 12, 1987. In addition, at Coudry's suggestion, Dicenzo had already visited another lender in October but refused to pay a $250 application fee and consequently did not file an application. Also, through Sherbon, Dicenzo was given the name of a mortgage lender suggested by the Martins but, after three visits, decided not file an application. Information regarding the second Savings of America denial was conveyed to Coudry around mid-November but, for whatever reason, she did not contact Sherbon regarding the status of the contract. It is noteworthy that at that time Sherbon did not tell Coudry that Dicenzo had still failed to make an additional deposit as required by the contract. Despite the loan application denials, Sherbon encouraged Dicenzo to keep trying to arrange financing so that the deal could go through. Dicenzo agreed to do so but, as noted in the following finding of fact, at that point Dicenzo considered the contract to be "null and void." Sherbon's efforts to find financing continued until mid-January 1988. When the loan application was denied on November 12, Dicenzo construed the contract to be void since the financing contingency was not met. According to Dicenzo, he did not believe the property was tied up while his contract was pending, felt no obligation to make the $19,900 deposit because it meant he would have to transfer funds from a money market account he purportedly maintained in Pittsburgh, and felt no moral obligation to the Martins even though by then they had committed themselves to a second home. The Martins were advised by telephone on the evening of November 12 of the second turn down of Dicenzo's loan application. By then, however, they were already committed to the second purchase. They claimed they did not learn of Dicenzo's failure to make the $19,900 deposit until mid-January 1988 when Sherbon visited their home and disclosed this fact. This is also borne out by a letter from the Martins' attorney to Dicenzo on December 1, 1987 advising Dicenzo that the contract was void and a claim might be made on his deposit for damages. When the Martins learned that only $100 had been deposited, they filed a complaint with the Division. That prompted this proceeding. Because of the failed contract, the Martins were unable to maintain two mortgage payments and were ultimately forced to give up the second home at a substantial monetary loss. They have since returned to their first home. The evidence shows that in the real estate trade, it is not customary or proper for the buyer's realtor to personally contact the seller. Rather, the practice and custom is for the buyer's agent to advise the listing broker of all pertinent developments and the listing broker then relays any necessary information to the seller. Thus, Sherbon had no responsibility to personally advise the Martins of any information pertaining to the contract. Rather, this responsibility rested with Coudry. Respondent contended he kept Coudry abreast of all developments concerning Dicenzo and that he assumed Coudry would advise the Martins that no deposit had yet been collected. To the extent this version of events conflicts with previous findings, it is not accepted. Sherbon expressed sympathy for the Martins' plight but maintained he was not at fault. There is no evidence that Sherbon has been subjected to prior disciplinary action by the Division.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of violating Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1987) to the extent noted in the conclusions of law and that his broker's license be suspended for three months. All other charges should be dismissed. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 26th day of April, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-4688 Petitioner: 1-2. Covered in finding of fact l. Rejected as being unnecessary. Covered in finding of fact 2. 5-7. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 5. Covered in finding of fact 10. Covered in finding of fact 7. Rejected since respondent owed a duty to Coudry, and not the Martins, to keep her abreast of all pertinent matters. Covered in findings of fact 7 and 12. Covered in findings of fact 7 and 8. Covered in finding of fact 8. Covered in findings of fact 6 and 10. Rejected as being subordinate to other findings. Covered in finding of fact 11. 18-19. Covered in finding of fact 6. Respondent: Respondent's proposed order contains sections entitled "admitted facts", "unrebutted facts" and "uncontested facts". They are ruled upon in that order. Admitted facts: Covered in finding of fact l. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 2. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in background. Unrebutted facts: Covered in finding of fact 7. Covered in finding of fact 15. Covered in finding of fact 10. 4-6. Covered in finding of fact 6. 7-8. Covered in finding of fact 5. Covered in finding of fact 11. Covered in finding of fact 12. Rejected since Sherbon learned of the loan denial even though he did not receive a written copy of the turn-down letter. Covered in finding of fact 13. Covered in finding of fact 8. Rejected since the testimony of Anna Martin is accepted as being more credible on this factual issue. Uncontested facts: Rejected as being cumulative. Partially covered in findings of fact 6, 7 and 16. The remainder is rejected as being cumulative, argument of counsel or not supported by the more credible evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Daniel B. Schuh, Esquire 248 Mirror Drive St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Darlene Keller, Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 =================================================================
The Issue In this disciplinary proceeding, the issues are whether Respondents, who are licensed real estate brokers, committed acts of dishonest dealing or culpable negligence in a business transaction; failed to account for and deliver trust funds; failed to maintain trust funds in an escrow account as required; intermingled personal funds with trust funds; obstructed or hindered Petitioner's investigator in an official investigation; or committed any of these offenses, as alleged by Petitioner in its Administrative Complaint. If Petitioner proves one or more of the alleged violations, then an additional question will arise, namely whether disciplinary penalties should be imposed on Respondents, or either of them.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Respondent Marlene Montenegro Toirac ("Toirac") is a licensed real estate broker subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Florida Real Estate Commission ("Commission"). Respondent Home Center International Corp. ("HCIC") is and was at all times material hereto a corporation registered as a Florida real estate broker subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Commission. Toirac is an officer and principal of HCIC, and at all times relevant to this case she had substantial, if not exclusive, control of the corporation. Indeed, the evidence does not establish that HCIC engaged in any conduct distinct from Toirac's in connection with the transactions at issue. Therefore, Respondents will generally be referred to collectively as "Toirac" except when a need to distinguish between them arises. Petitioner Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, has jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings for the Commission. At the Commission's direction, Petitioner is authorized to prosecute administrative complaints against licensees within the Commission's jurisdiction. The Ramirez Transaction On or about September 9, 2003, Toirac, in her individual capacity, entered into a Sale and Purchase Contract (the "Contract") with Andres Ramirez ("Ramirez"), whereby Toirac agreed to sell, and Ramirez to buy, certain real estate then owned by Toirac. The Contract called for Ramirez to make several deposits toward the purchase price. Accordingly, Ramirez tendered to Toirac a total of $14,000 in pre-closing payments. Toirac accepted these payments, which were deposited in HCIC's operating account. At some point, Toirac withdrew Ramirez's deposits from HCIC's operating account, taking the money in cash. She brought the $14,000 in cash to her attorney, Alix Montes, who agreed to hold the money in escrow pending the closing of the sale to Ramirez. Mr. Montes placed the cash in a safe located in his home. The sale to Ramirez fell through after Ramirez failed to obtain acceptable financing and exercised his right to cancel the Contract in consequence thereof. Ramirez requested that his deposits be returned. Within a short time (not more than about two weeks), Toirac gave Ramirez his money back——in cash. The parties dispute whether Toirac properly handled Ramirez's deposits. Petitioner asserts that the $14,000 should have been held in an escrow account maintained at a financial institution such as a bank or title company. Toirac responds that she complied with a "Financing and Deposit Addendum" (the "Addendum") to the Contract. The Addendum, which is part of the Contract that Petitioner offered into evidence (as Petitioner's Exhibit 4), provides in pertinent part as follows: Seller acknowledges that in the event that the Buyer is not approved for a mortgage loan or the terms and conditions of said mortgage loan are not acceptable to Seller, Seller within thirty (30) days from the date Seller receives Buyer's written request for the return of its deposit, shall refund Buyer's deposit in full. Upon Seller's refund of the deposit, this contract will terminate and all parties will be relieved from the obligations and liabilities. Buyer acknowledges that the Seller herein is a licensed Real Estate Broker in the state of Florida and That Home Center International Corp. will not be the "Escrow Agent" in this transaction nor will Home Center International Corp. or any of its affiliates, officers, directors, agents and/or employees will receive a Real Estate Brokerage fee in connection with this transaction. Buyer authorizes Home Center International Corp. to place any and all deposits herein in its operating account. Buyer further authorizes Home Center International Corp, at any time to withdraw and/or transfer Buyer's funds from the operating account. In the event a transfer of any and all funds is effected, such funds shall be held by Alix J. Montes, Esq., Attorney for the Seller. This Addendum supercedes the provisions of paragraph 2 (A)2(B)(1), 16(A)(B)(C), 17, 18, and 19 of the "As Is" Sale and Purchase Contract signed by all parties herein. (In the original, the text is written in all capital letters.) The Addendum is dated September 9, 2003, and bears the purported signatures of Ramirez and Toirac. Petitioner alleged in its Administrative Complaint that Ramirez had denied executing the Addendum. At hearing, however, Petitioner failed to offer any proof——such as Ramirez's testimony or the testimony of an expert disputing the authenticity of Ramirez's purported signature on the Addendum—— to establish this allegation. In contrast, Toirac testified that both she and Ramirez had, in fact, signed the Addendum. As a result, on this record, the undersigned is not clearly convinced that the Addendum is fraudulent. Moreover, the Addendum and Toirac's testimony, taken together, are sufficiently persuasive (in the absence of evidence to the contrary) to prevent the undersigned from being clearly convinced that Toirac mishandled Ramirez's deposits or otherwise dealt dishonestly or improperly with him. The January 2004 Audit On January 20, 2004, Tibizay Morales, who was then employed by Petitioner as an investigator, conducted an audit of Toirac's records. (The impetus for this audit was Petitioner's receipt of a complaint from Ramirez.) During the audit, Toirac reported to Ms. Morales that she no longer maintained an escrow account but instead relied upon her attorney to act as escrow agent for funds entrusted to her. Toirac also told Mr. Morales that Ramirez's deposits initially had been held in HCIC's operating account, before being handed over to Mr. Montes for safekeeping. Toirac was not able, at the time of the audit, to produce bank statements for HCIC's operating account, and apparently a listing agreement that should have been in the broker's file was not there. Toirac agreed to provide the missing documentation. By letter dated January 20, 2004, Toirac informed Ms. Morales that she would forward requested documentation within 10 days. For reasons unknown, Toirac failed to follow through with this, prompting the instant disciplinary action. The Charges In Counts I and VII, Petitioner alleges that Respondents are guilty of culpable negligence or breach of trust in any business transaction, either of which is a disciplinable offense under Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Petitioner's position is that Respondents mishandled Ramirez's deposits and misled him into believing that the money would be held in trust by HCIC as an escrow agent.1 In Counts II and VIII, Petitioner charges Respondents with failing to account for and deliver trust funds, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes. Petitioner's position is unclear. What is clear, however, is that Respondents returned Ramirez's deposit money within a reasonable time after his demand therefor. In Counts III and IX, Petitioner accuses Respondents of having failed to maintain trust funds in the real estate brokerage escrow account until disbursement was properly authorized, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes. In Counts IV and X of its Administrative Complaint, Petitioner accuses Respondents of having intermingled personal funds with funds being held in escrow. Petitioner's position is that by initially depositing Ramirez's deposits in HCIC's operating account, Respondents failed to comply with Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-14.008(2), and hence violated Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. In Counts V and XI, Petitioner asserts that Respondents obstructed or hindered the enforcement of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, in violation of Section 475.42(1)(i), Florida Statutes, and therefore in violation of Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. Petitioner's position is that Respondents willfully interfered with Morales's investigation by failing to provide documentation as promised.2 Ultimate Factual Determinations Toirac handled Ramirez's deposit money in accordance with the unambiguous terms of the Addendum. Petitioner failed to prove that the Addendum is fraudulent. Thus, the Addendum, when considered in conjunction with Toirac's unrebutted testimony that she and Ramirez signed the instrument, is fatal to Counts I, III, IV, VII, IX, and X of the Administrative Complaint. Respondents are not guilty of the offenses charged therein. Toirac did, in fact, return Ramirez's deposit money within a reasonable time after he demanded a refund. Respondents therefore are not guilty of the offenses charged in Counts II and VII of the Administrative Complaint. When Ms. Morales interviewed Toirac in January 2004 in response to Ramirez's complaint, Toirac admitted most, if not all, of the material facts pertaining to the circumstances under which Ramirez's deposits had been held. Further, the documents that Toirac neglected to provide Ms. Morales, i.e. HCIC's bank records and a listing agreement that had gone missing, were claimed by Toirac to be corroborative of her statements to the investigator. Toirac's failure to produce such documents cost Toirac an opportunity to bolster her credibility——and enabled Petitioner to draw adverse inferences against Toirac, e.g. that the questioned listing agreement did not exist after all.3 Given these facts, the undersigned is not convinced that Respondents obstructed or hindered Petitioner's investigation. Consequently, Respondents are not guilty of the charges set forth in Counts V and VI of the Administrative Complaint.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding Respondents not guilty of the offenses charged in the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of September, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of September, 2005.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a real estate broker having been issued License Number 19454. On or about the 30th day of November, 1979 a Final Judgment was entered in the cause of Brugh v. Alters, Case No. 79-324-SP in the County Court in and for Clay County in which the Plaintiff, Brugh, was awarded the sum of $929.05 plus costs of $34.00. On or about the 11th day of April, 1980 the Respondent, Peter O. Dalton, was served with a Writ of Garnishment on behalf of Vanguard Realty. On or about April 28, 1980 the Respondent, Peter O. Dalton, filed an Answer of Garnishee in which Dalton alleged that as of the 11th day of April, 1980, and to and including April 28, 1980 that Peter O. Dalton did not have any "goods, monies, chattels or effects of the Defendant, Patricia C. Alters in his possession." As a result of the Answer of Garnishee filed by Peter O. Dalton the County Court in and for Clay County entered a Final Judgment for the Garnishee, Peter O. Dalton and Vanguard Realty, and found that the Respondent Dalton did not hold any property of the Defendant Patricia Alters, and awarded Peter O. Dalton the sum of $10.00 costs and the sum of $10.00 attorney's fees. On or about March 5, 1980, a contract was entered into by and between Thomas C. Davis as purchaser and Nancy P. Smith as seller. At this time Peter O. Dalton, the Respondent, was the broker for Vanguard Realty, Inc. The contract was consummated by a closing on April 11, 1980 and Patricia Alters, the Defendant in the aforementioned civil suit filed in Clay County, was a licensed salesperson in the employ of Vanguard Realty, Inc., and Peter O. Dalton. As a result of this sale closing, Patricia Alters was to receive a commission in the amount of $1,445.49. The commission was received by the Respondent Dalton and Vanguard Realty, Inc., on April 11, 1980. The Respondent Dalton's Answer of Garnishee alleged to the Court in Clay County that he did not possess any money of Patricia Alters's. In fact, this was not so. The Respondent and Mr. Brugh, who caused the Writ of Garnishment to be served upon Respondent, had no business or other relationship except in connection with the garnishment matter. The two did not meet until approximately one week before the hearing. When he was served with the Writ of Garnishment, Respondent immediately contacted the attorney who had represented him in the past. This is not the same attorney who represented Respondent at the hearing in this matter. The Respondent advised his attorney as to Patricia Alters's commission. Respondent then forwarded the Writ of Garnishment to his attorney. The attorney prepared an "Answer of Garnishee" for Respondent's signature. The answer was forwarded to the Respondent, who signed it. The answer was then filed in the County Court for Clay County, Florida. In the answer Respondent denied that he had at any relevant time any goods, monies, chattels or effects of Patricia C. Alters. Relying on the advice he received from his attorney, the Respondent believed the answer to be legally correct. He did not deliberately misrepresent any facts, but rather relied on advice of his attorney as to the legal propriety of his answer. The County Court in Clay County, Florida, entered a final judgment in favor of the Respondent in the garnishment action. Patricia C. Alters had filed an "Affidavit of Exemption of Wages from Garnishment" with the court stating that she was the head of a family, and as such was exempt from garnishment. In its final judgment, the court held that the Respondent was not indebted to Alters because of her exemption from garnishment. Had the Respondent advised the court as to the commission that he held for Alters, Brugh would nonetheless have had no entitlement to recover any portion of that commission from Respondent because of Alters's exemption from garnishment.
The Issue The issues for determination in this proceeding are whether Respondent violated Sections 475.25(1)(b), (d), and (e), Florida Statutes, 1/ through culpable negligence or breach of trust in a business transaction; by failing to account or deliver trust funds; and by failing to timely notify the Florida Real Estate Commission of a deposit dispute or to implement remedial action; and, if so, what, if any, penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the governmental agency responsible for issuing licenses to practice real estate and for regulating licensees on behalf of the state. Respondent is a licensed real estate broker under license number 0037920. The last license issued to Respondent was issued as a broker at Heath Realty, 4864 S. Orange Avenue, Orlando, Florida. On May 18, 1993, Mr. Anthony Rodgers and Ms. Jill Rodgers (the "buyers") entered into a contract to purchase real property from Ms. Norma A. Cash (the "seller"). The buyers entrusted Respondent with a total earnest money deposit of $1,000. The transaction failed to close. On July 8, 1993, Respondent timely notified Petitioner in writing that there were conflicting demands for the earnest money deposit and a good faith doubt regarding the deposit. However, Respondent failed to institute one of the settlement procedures described in Section 475.25(1)(d)1. until legal proceedings between the buyer and seller were amicably settled approximately seven months later. Respondent failed to institute a prescribed settlement procedure in a timely manner even though Petitioner advised Respondent in letters dated July 26, 1993, and September 9, 1993, of the action Respondent should take. On February 9, 1994, Respondent finally requested an escrow disbursement order in accordance with Section 475.25(10(d)1. The escrow deposit was paid to the seller pursuant to the agreement of the parties.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent not guilty of violating Sections 475.25(1)(b), 475.25(1)(d)1., but guilty of violating Section 475.42(1)(e) and Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-10.032. It is further recommended that the Final Order place Respondent on probation for a period of one year and, during the period of probation, require Respondent to complete courses in broker management not to exceed eight credit hours. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of February, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL S. MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of February 1995.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Llera Realty, Inc., is a corporate real estate broker, and J.M. Llera is the active real estate broker in that corporation. Llera Realty, Inc., and J.M. Llera represented the buyers in the negotiations for purchase and sale of the subject real property. Coral Realty Corporation is a corporate real estate broker, and Alberto E. Trelles is the active real estate broker with that corporation. Coral Realty Corporation and Alberto Trelles represented the seller in the negotiations for purchasee and sale of the subject property. The property in question was owned by Saul Lerner, who was represented in these negotiations by Julius Friedman, attorney at law. The purchasers were Messrs. Delgado, Salazar and Espino, who are officers of Inter-America Housing Corp., said corporation eventually being the purchaser of the subject property. Lerner made an oral open listing on a piece of real property which included the subject property. Trelles, learning of the open listing, advertised the property to various brokers. Llera was made aware of the availability of the property through Trelles' ad and presented the property to Delgado, Salazar and Espino. Lengthy negotiations followed during which various offers were tendered by the buyers through Llera to Trelles to Friedman in Lerner's behalf. These offers were rejected. Eventually, negotiations centered on a segment of the property, and an offer was made by the buyers for $375,000 on this 7.5-acre tract. This offer was made through Llera to Trelles to Friedman, and was also rejected by Lerner. The buyers then asked to negotiate directly with the seller and agreed to pay a ten percent commission to the brokers in the event of a sale. The buyers then negotiated with the seller and eventually reached a sales price of $410,000 net to the seller for the 7.5 acres which had been the subject of the preceding offer. Buyers executed a Hold Harmless Agreement with the seller for any commission that might become due, agreeing to assume all responsibility for such commissions. The buyers through their corporation, Inter-America Housing Corp., purchased the property and refused to pay commissions on the sale and purchase. Thereafter, the Respondents brought suit against the buyers and their corporation. The Respondent's suit alleges the facts stated above in greater detail and asserts that the buyers took the Respondent's commission money to which they were entitled under the oral agreement with the buyers and used this money to purchase a portion of the property. The Respondents asked the court to declare them entitled to a commission and declare an equitable lien in their behalf on a portion of the subject property together with punitive damages. In conjunction with this suit, counsel for the Respondents filed a Notice of Lis Pendens. The Respondents questioned the propriety of this in light of Section 475.42(1)(j), Florida Statutes, and were advised by their counsel that the filing of Lis Pendens in this case was proper. The court subsequently struck the Lis Pendens on motion of the defendant buyers; however, the court refused to strike the portion of the complaint asserting the right to and requesting an equitable lien in behalf of the Respondents.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer recommends that no action be taken against the real estate licenses of the Respondents. DONE AND ORDERED this 29th day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Harold E. Scherr, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Peter M. Lopez, Esquire 202 Roberts Building 28 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130 ================================================================= DISTRICT COURT OPINION ================================================================= NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DISPOSED OF LLERA REALTY, INC., J. M. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL LLERA, CORAL REALTY CORP. OF FLORIDA and ALBERTO TRELLES, THIRD DISTRICT JANUARY TERM, A.D. 1980 Appellants, vs. BOARD OF REAL ESTATE (formerly Florida Real Estate Commission), Appellee. / Opinion filed July 1, 1980. An Appeal from the Board of Real Estate. Lopez & Harris and Peter M. Lopez, for appellants. Howard Hadley and Kenneth M. Meer and Salvatore A. Cappino, for appellee. Before NESBITT, PEARSON, DANIEL, JJ., and PEARSON, TILLMAN (Ret.), Associate Judge. PEARSON, TILLMAN, (Ret.), Associate Judge. This appeal by respondents Llera Realty, Inc., J.M. Llera, Coral Realty Corp. and Alberto Trelles is brought to review the administrative decision of the Florida Real Estate Commission (now known as the Board of Real Estate), which suspended the licenses of the respondents for thirty days. The complaint filed by the Commission charge that the respondents had violated Section 475.42(l)(j), Florida Statutes (1977), by filing a notice of lis pendens on real estate in a court action brought to recover a real estate commission. 1/ The hearing officer entered a recommended order finding that the respondents had, in fact, recorded a lis pendens on real estate in order to collect the commission, and concluding that as a matter of law, the cited section was unconstitutional as applied in this case because "[o]n its face and without such limitations, the statute has a chilling effect on the right of the broker or salesman to seek redress in the courts because persons subject to the statute may have their license revoked or suspended and be prosecuted criminally." The commission rejected that portion of the hearing officer's conclusions of law which held the application of the statute to the respondents to be unconstitutional and, accordingly, the respondents were found guilty and their licenses suspended for thirty days. We affirm. The only substantial question argued in this court is whether the classification by the statute of real estate brokers and salesmen as a class of person who may not use the filing of a lis pendens in connection with a civil lawsuit filed in order to collect a real estate commission is a classification so unreasonable because real estate brokers and salesmen are privileged by the statutory law of this state in the collection of commissions. Section 475.41, Florida Statutes (1977), in effect, provides that only a real estate broker who is properly registered". . . at the time the act or service was performed "may maintain a court action for the collection of a commission for the sale of real estate. As stated in Quinn v. Phipps, 93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419, 425 (1927), with regard to the real estate business, "No business known to modern society has a longer or more respectable history." In this regard, the statutory law of this state demands a high standard of those engaging in the real estate business. Section 475.17 et seq., Florida Statutes (1977), through the onus of revocation or suspension of registration, demands an exemplary level of behavior within the profession; Section 475.42, Florida Statutes (1977), enumerates various violations and the consequent penalties to be exacted against those who are not properly registered; and Sections 475.482 et seq., by creating the Florida Real Estate Recovery Fund to reimburse persons who have suffered monetary damages at the hands of those registered under this chapter, demonstrate this state's recognition of the sensitive and privileged position of those engaged in real estate to the public at large. Furthermore, it is well- established by the case law of this state that real estate brokers and salesmen occupy a position of confidence toward the public. See the discussion in Foulk v. Florida Real Estate Commission, 113 So. 2d 714, 717 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959). And see Gabel v. Kilgore, 157 Fla. 420, 26 So.2d 166 (1946); and Ahern v. Florida Real Estate Commission ex rel. O'Kelley, 149 Fla. 706, 6 So.2d 857 (1942). The work of real estate brokers and salesmen is intimately connected with the transfer of title to real estate. It is natural that their experience and knowledge in such matters should be greater than that of the people they serve in their profession. The denial to this privileged group of the availability of a lis pendens when used to collect a commission on the sale of the same real estate on which they have secured, or have attempted to secure, the transfer of title is not the denial of a right of access to the courts. It is simply the denial of a special tool which might be misused by some members of his privileged group to the disadvantage of the public. Finding no error, we affirm the administrative decision.
Findings Of Fact Vincent A. Riggio was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate salesperson in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0206262, effective in 1978, and as such was authorized to prepare real estate appraisals. Respondent completed basic real estate appraisal classes and attended seminars relating to property appraisal. Respondent was an associate with Grover H. Vass & Associates, Inc., 414 West Colonial Drive, Orlando, Florida from July 11, 1986 to December 21, 1988. Respondent's appraisal services were retained by United Mortgage Company on an ongoing basis for the purpose of granting second mortgage loans. In September, 1986, Respondent was requested by United Mortgage Company to prepare the subject appraisal for property located in Lake County, Florida, that was owned by Floyd Bush and his wife. The subject property consisted of land, a single family residential structure, and plant nursery structures and equipment. Pursuant to the request of United Mortgage Company, Respondent undertook the subject appraisal and performed reasonable and necessary investigations and reviews to prepare the same. Respondent had appraised the subject property once before and was aware of the property's unique character. Respondent visited and viewed the property. He observed the nursery business in operation at the time of the inspection. He also attempted to obtain comparable sales and market data but found that , due to the location and uniqueness of the property, he would be required to use, in part, an appraisal method based on the cost approach. Respondent determined the current market value of the property to be $136,800 and prepared his written appraisal report accordingly. The report was transmitted to United Mortgage Company as directed by and with the limitations imposed by them. Respondent had no financial interest in the real estate being appraised nor in any other aspect of the subject transaction. George Jeknavorian loaned $23,500 to Mr. and Mrs. Floyd Bush. The loan was secured by a second mortgage on the subject property, which was processed through United Mortgage Company in September, 1986. At the time of the loan, George Jeknavorian had neither seen the subject appraisal report nor the subject real estate. He relied on persons other than Respondent for his information relating to this loan transaction. The property was apparently encumbered by a first mortgage in the approximate amount of $64,800 at the time of the second mortgage which made a total debt on the property of approximately $88, 300. After two payments had been made subsequent to the closing of the second mortgage loan transaction, the Bushs defaulted on the required payments. Thereafter, Jeknavorian opted to accept a deed in lieu of foreclosure instead of proceeding forward with the foreclosure. Jeknavorian became the owner of the subject property in March of 1988. Jeknavorian listed the property for sale with Ms. Jean Williams, a licensed real estate salesperson. She determined the value of the property to be between $100,000 and $110,000, and with the concurrence of the new owner, she listed it for sale at $110,000. When she inspected the property in 1988, before listing it, Williams observed it to be in serious disrepair. The property as listed consisted of a house, land and plant nursery with all equipment, but with no inventory and no warranty as to the equipment. The price was reduced, but the property did not sell. In late 1988, the holder of the first mortgage took back the property. At that time, Jaknavorian had invested or was owed a total of $33,000. His losses consisted of the amounts due and owing on the second mortgage, payments to the holder of the first mortgage after he became the owner of the subject property and the costs of trash removal after he became the owner of the property in March, 1988. The most credible testimony indicates that the appraisal had several technical defects, but, as a whole, was acceptable to the requirements of United Mortgage Company for which it was prepared.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint against Respondent be DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of January, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 1990. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted: paragraphs 1,2 (in substance),3,4(in part),6 and 7(in substance) Rejected: paragraphs 5 and 4 (that portion of paragraph 4 which proposes that the complaining witness relied upon the appraisal to his detriment and also that the property was worth no more than $95,000 at the time of the appraisal) as unsupported by the weight of the evidence. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted: paragraphs 1,2 (in part) ,3,4 (in substance) ,5,7 (sentence 1), 8, 10, 11(in substance), 13(in substance), 14(in substance) Rejected: paragraphs 6(witness not credible),7(several sentences not relevant), 9 (argument). COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802 Robert L. Taylor, Esquire 225 E. Robinson Street Suite 445 Orlando, FL 32801 Darlene F. Keller Division Director 400 W. Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32801 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Respondents were licensed real estate brokers at all times relevant to this proceeding. Robert M. Hall, Respondent LaRossa's nephew, gave LaRossa an $18,000 bank draft around January 1, 1982, toward purchase of an apartment building. LaRossa was to acquire the property in partnership with Hall. The deal fell through and Hall sought return of his $18,000. However, Respondents had not placed the funds in a trust or escrow account but had diverted them to other uses. As a result, LaRossa was not able to return the funds on demand by Hall. Hall then accepted LaRossa's promissory note to be discharged by June 2, 1982. However, when the debt remained unpaid, Hall filed a civil suit in Dade County and obtained a judgment for $22,145 on March 23, 1983. LaRossa finally paid this amount plus interest to the satisfaction of Hall on May 1, 1984. Hall, who was the complaining witness in this proceeding, stated that he "had no trust arrangement" with LaRossa in his letter acknowledging receipt of the funds. However, Hall had turned over the $18,000 to LaRossa with an expectation of investment or return and was distressed at LaRossa's failure to return the funds on demand. Although Hall and LaRossa are related and planned to enter a joint business venture, Hall relied on LaRossa to arrange the purchase of the commercial property in his capacity as a broker. There was no legitimate reason for Respondents to divert Hall's deposit, which was held by them in a trust capacity.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a Final Order suspending the real estate brokers licenses held by Respondents for a period of 90 days. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of August, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of August, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Fred A. Langford, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 3202 Monroe Gelb, Esquire GELB and SPATZ 3400 Southwest 3rd Avenue Miami, Florida 33145 Mr. Harold Huff, Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Mr. Fred M. Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
