The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of acts and omissions to justify the revocation of his license to operate a family foster home, pursuant to Section 409.175(8), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner licensed Respondent to operate a family foster home from June 22, 2000, until May 15, 2001, at which time Petitioner revoked Respondent's license. The only foster children placed with Petitioner were Ju. K. (Ju.) and J. K. (J.), who are brothers. During the majority of the period in question, Ju. was 16 years old and J. was 17 years old. The boys were adopted at infancy. However, their adoptive mother died when they were young. The adoptive father remarried, but died a few years later, in January 1999. The stepmother never adopted the children, and, shortly after the death of their adoptive father, she turned over the two children to foster care. Respondent had been a friend of the stepmother since the mid-1980s and, through her, had met the adoptive father. Respondent became close with the couple and their children, whom he often visited on holidays. Learning that at least one of the boys had had problems in foster care, Respondent decided to qualify to become their foster father. At the time, Respondent was 40 years old and single and had not raised any other children. However, Respondent took the training courses required for licensing as a foster parent. After Respondent obtained his foster parent license, Project Teamwork for Kids, which is the private entity in Brevard County that recruits, trains, and licenses foster parents and places foster children with these parents, placed Ju. and J. with Respondent. J. began to live with Respondent in January 2000, and Ju. joined him in June 2000. During the summer of 2000, relations among Respondent, J., and Ju. were good. They took vacations and settled into their new lives during a period relatively free of stressful demands. Respondent asked Project Teamwork 4 Kids representatives not to start any family therapy during the summer and, once school started, asked that they again defer the initiation of such services. Respondent was aware that Ju. had been diagnosed with dissociative personality disorder, but believed that a normal home life would ameliorate this condition. During the summer, Respondent was concerned with the high school to which Ju. had been assigned for ninth grade. Respondent convinced school officials to reassign Ju. to a different high school, but school officials warned Respondent that, due to the reassignment, they would not tolerate disruptive behavior from Ju. Respondent was satisfied with J.'s assignment for tenth grade because it was the same school from which he had earlier dropped out. At the start of the school year, Respondent required weekly progress reports from J.'s teachers. However, as J.'s grades improved, Respondent dropped this requirement. During the period covered by this case, Respondent's relationship with J. was better than Respondent's relationship with Ju. Respondent and J. had a major disagreement arise at the end of October when J. returned home drunk from a homecoming celebration. A day or two later, after giving the matter considerable thought, Respondent discussed the matter with J. and imposed the punishment that Respondent would not provide his written consent for J. to obtain his driving learner's permit for six months, although Respondent would reconsider at three months. When J. learned of his punishment, he became irate and telephoned his case manager with Project Teamwork 4 Kids, Karen McCalla. He demanded that she remove him from Respondent's home. Ms. McCalla visited the home and spoke with J. alone for several hours, then Respondent, and then J. again alone. This home visit provides an early, but typical, example of the difference in perspectives of Respondent and Petitioner's witnesses. According to Respondent, Ms. McCalla arrived at the home, spoke with J. alone for several hours, spoke with Respondent, and then spoke with J. alone again. She then announced that Respondent should sign for J.'s learner's permit, but not allow him to drive for three months. Although he disagreed with the recommendation and felt that Ms. McCalla's recommendation had undercut his authority, Respondent complied with the request. Ms. McCalla's version is considerably different. Agreeing that J. was demanding that she remove him from Respondent's home, Ms. McCalla noted that J. complained generally that Respondent was "overbearing, overpowering and does not give [J.] any privacy." Focusing on the larger issues than merely the proper punishment for J.'s recent misbehavior, Ms. McCalla recommended that the family undergo family therapy. Ms. McCalla's version is credited. By Respondent's own account, Ms. McCalla spent "several hours" speaking with J. initially. Although underage drinking is a serious matter that may necessitate serious discussions, it is unlikely that Ms. McCalla and J. could have spent "several hours" on this single transgression. It is more likely that J. broadened his complaints in the manner described by Ms. McCalla. Respondent's contrary version either undermines his credibility as a witness or, if sincere, his competence as a foster parent. During the fall, Respondent's relationship with Ju. deteriorated. In general, Respondent's nascent parental skills were insufficient to meet the needs of Ju. When a conventional menu of incentives and disincentives failed to produce the desired results, Respondent grew increasingly frustrated, but declined to take advantage of the support resources available to him through Project Teamwork 4 Kids and its contractors. Instead, Respondent, alone, proceeded with his own disciplinary scheme, intensifying his disciplinary measures each time that less intense measures failed. Eventually, conflict between Respondent and Ju. escalated, and the domestic situation became unbearable for both of them. For instance, at school, Respondent was legitimately concerned that Ju. not jeopardize his placement at the high school to which he had been assigned due to Respondent's efforts. Worried about Ju.'s associations at school, especially due to Ju.'s poor school associations in the past, Respondent required Ju. to sign into the library immediately after eating lunch, so he would not have the chance to socialize with his peers. If Ju. failed to sign in, a teacher was to telephone Respondent, who would go to school to find Ju. By Respondent's admission, he enforced this arrangement for four to six weeks. Respondent was adamant that Ju. not date until he was 16 years old. This was a legitimate concern due to sexual behaviors that Ju. had displayed prior to his arrival in Respondent's home. Early in the school year, while Ju. was still 15 years old, Respondent overheard him speaking on the telephone with a girl from school. Respondent interrupted the conversation and asked Ju. to ask the girl if her mother were home. Finding that she was, Respondent asked to speak to the mother. Explaining to the mother that Ju. was not allowed to go on one-on-one dates until he reached 16 years of age, Respondent, by his own testimony, managed to agitate and offend the mother. Respondent admitted that Ju. became upset because he had considered the girl his girlfriend. On another occasion, Respondent required that Ju. end a relationship with a girl at school. Without detailing any concerns about sexual activity, Respondent explained his intervention by noting that Ju. had taken another boy's girlfriend, who seems to have not been suitable for Ju.--in Respondent's opinion. At home, numerous times Respondent employed more intense strategies when conventional disciplinary interventions failed to produce the desired results. For instance, when Ju. persisted in viewing sexually unsuitable material on the television in his room, Respondent removed the bedroom door, thus depriving Ju. of all privacy. Also, when Ju. persisted in abusing and overusing the telephone, even after being placed on telephone restriction, Respondent removed the handsets when he left the home, leaving the boy without telephone service in the home, although he could walk outside the apartment to a neighbor or a pay phone. Gradually, frustration erupted into physical confrontations. Twice, Respondent ripped T-shirts off the back of the boy during angry exchanges. Once, Respondent lightly slapped the boy on the mouth when he swore at Respondent. Twice, Respondent intentionally damaged audio equipment used by Ju. For each of these actions, Respondent devised transparent stories to cover up his failure to handle Ju.'s transgressions in a positive, effective manner. As the above incidents suggest, Respondent sought to impose a level of control over Ju. that was unsuitable for Ju.'s age and the circumstances of the relationship that existed between Respondent and Ju. Lacking both experience and maturity, Respondent obstinately dug in deeper each time his discipline failed to produce the desired result. Never lacking in good motives, Respondent lacked the resources needed for the difficult parenting task that Ju. presented, and Respondent exacerbated the situation by refusing to accept the assistance of professionals who might have been able to help him with Ju. Over time, even Respondent's innocuous behavior- modification techniques became counterproductive. For instance, Respondent routinely insisted that he and a child not go to sleep without first resolving any conflicts that may have arisen. Although a salutary policy, if applied with discretion, Respondent's overbearing implementation of this policy intensified hostilities, rather than defused them. An example of the injudicious use of this policy took place in early February 2001 when Respondent and Ju. got into an argument over an uncompleted homework assignment. Respondent warned Ju. that Petitioner lacked sufficient beds to accommodate Ju. at the time and that, if Ju. did not compose himself, Respondent would call the police to have Ju. removed from Respondent's home. This was especially hurtful to a child who had already known the pain of abandonment and abuse. Trying to defuse the confrontation, Ju. demanded time to step outside and cool off, but Respondent, insistent on a resolution on his terms, ordered Ju. to remain inside until Respondent had finished talking to him. By March 2001, Project Teamwork 4 Kids representatives had tried to intervene on at least two occasions in recent weeks, but Respondent had become increasingly resistant to what he viewed as interference from caseworkers with Ju. and J. By this time, Ju. wanted out of the home, and Respondent wanted him out of the home. On March 28, 2001, Project Teamwork 4 Kids removed Ju. from Respondent's home. About six weeks later, Project Teamwork 4 Kids also removed J. from Respondent's home. Petitioner proved some of its specific allegations and failed to prove others, but, as the Administrative Law Judge noted at the final hearing, the basic issue in this case is whether Petitioner can prove that Respondent has committed an intentional or negligent act materially affected the health or safety of children in his home. Petitioner has met its burden with respect to Ju. Ju. would have been a considerable challenge to a person with considerable parenting experience and skills. Respondent lacked both, but, knowing Ju.'s special needs, nonetheless sought the responsibility of serving as Ju.'s foster father. As the situation worsened, Respondent lacked the insight to avail himself of the resources offered to him and Ju. Instead, Respondent resorted to ineffective disciplinary strategies that eventually deteriorated into angry outbursts, culminating in Respondent's angry and desperate threat to end the placement itself--a most injurious act, given Ju.'s circumstances and dissociative personality disorder. Although it is clear that Respondent assumed a very difficult undertaking, his incompetent discharge of these responsibilities, coupled with his obstinate refusal to accept readily available help from others with greater training and experience, justifies the revocation of his family foster home license.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order revoking Respondent's family foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of January, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathleen A. Kearney, Secretary Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 1, Room 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Peggy Sanford, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Deborah Guller Department of Children and Family Services 201 West Broward Boulevard, Suite 502 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Samuel D. Lopez Samuel D. Lopez, P.A. 629 Southeast Fifth Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Alan Siegel 500 Northwest 34th Street, Apartment #105 Pompano Beach, Florida 33064
The Issue The issue to be decided in this case is whether the Petitioner's, Clemintine Lyons, foster home relicensure application should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Clemintine Lyons was first licensed as a foster home in 1988. The licensing staff had several concerns at that time. These concerns included the fact that Ms. Lyons had no prior parenting experience and was taking medication for depression. However, those concerns were addressed and Ms. Lyons was licensed. During the initial licensing period, the Department had difficulty with Ms. Lyons regarding her willingness to work cooperatively with the Department regarding the children in her care and to contact the Department before she made major decisions regarding the children in her care, such as parental visitation. For example, against the wishes of HRS and as a form of punishment for Dorinda, Ms. Lyons kept Dorinda from attending an HRS picnic for prospective adoptees to meet adoptive parents. The HRS staff was concerned about this incident because they were trying to arrange an adoption for Dorinda and the picnic was an important step in that process. Ms. Lyons was also unhappy about HRS counselors trying to have private conversations with Dorinda. Further, on one occasion, Ms. Lyons left the HRS district where she and Dorinda lived to take Dorinda to Dorinda's mother's home in another district to retrieve some clothing given to Dorinda by Ms. Lyons which had been left at the mother's home. Ms. Lyons made the trip because Dorinda was short of clothing. Ms. Lyons took Dorinda to her mother's home without notifying any HRS counselors. When Ms. Lyons was ready to leave, Dorinda refused to get in the car, so Ms. Lyons called the police to assist her in taking Dorinda back to her house. The incident was of concern because Ms. Lyons unilateral action could have potentially placed Dorinda in a dangerous situation, given the fact that the abusive parent was still in the home. In short, both incidents involving Dorinda Small demonstrated very poor judgment on the part of Ms. Lyons regarding the care and protection of a child in her care. Department personnel also testified about another incident which occurred during initial licensure of Ms. Lyons regarding two brothers, a six- year old and an eight-year old, she had just received as foster children in her home. The same day that they were brought to the home, they called a taxi while Ms. Lyons was taking a nap and had themselves driven to their aunt and uncle's home. However, the evidence regarding the elopement of these two boys was very vague and cannot be used to infer a lack of ability to care for foster children on the part of Ms. Lyons, especially since foster children come to foster care with a lot of problems including disciplinary and emotional problems. Additionally, in 1989, Ms. Lyons applied to the Department to become an adoptive parent. While going through the training and background checks, the Department, for the first time, discovered an incident involving a foster child who had been placed in Ms. Lyons' home. Clara Mitchell, a neighbor and friend of Ms. Lyons, informed the Department that she had invited Ms. Lyons and Dorinda Small, a foster child living in Ms. Lyons' home, to her home for Thanksgiving. Before eating, Ms. Lyons fixed a plate of food for Dorinda. When Dorinda noticed that tomatoes had been placed on her plate, she told Ms. Lyons that she did not like them and would not eat them although she had eaten tomatoes before. Ms. Lyons became upset and hit Dorinda across the face and told her to go home. Dorinda left Ms. Mitchell's home, but had to wait outside for Ms. Lyons because Ms. Lyons' door was locked. Ms. Lyons stayed at Mrs. Mitchell's home for about 45 minutes to an hour before going back home and letting Dorinda come inside. Once the Department learned of this incident, the Department made it very clear to Ms. Lyons that the Department's policy prohibited the use of any corporal punishment on a foster child. Ms. Lyons admitted she was aware of this policy and that she understood she was not to use corporal punishment on a foster child again. However, despite the problems with Dorinda Small and the two boys, Ms. Lyons was relicensed on the recommendation of a licensed counselor who felt that because of the desperate need for foster parents, Ms. Lyons with more training and closer supervision, would learn to grow into the role of a foster parent. Towards that end, Ms. Lyons voluntarily agreed to go through additional training known as the Model Approach to Partnerships and Parenting. The model approach program was a thirty-hour training seminar. One of the topics specifically addressed was role identification, specifically the role of a foster parent in relation to HRS, the foster child and the biological family. This training was in addition to the training that Ms. Lyons went through before her initial licensure. In addition, Ms. Lyons was sent information on several different occasions which outlined Ms. Lyons' duties and roles in interacting with HRS, the foster child and the biological family. One of the primary duties of the foster parent is to provide a caring environment for the foster child as well as consult with either HRS or the biological parent before making any major decisions regarding the foster children. It quickly became apparent that the additional training had not improved Ms. Lyons' ability as a foster parent. From July 17 through August 28, 1991, three foster children were placed in Ms. Lyons' home. The children's mother, Robin Williams, had requested foster care assistance for her six children, while Ms. Williams went through voluntary drug rehabilitation. The three oldest, Rasheen, age ten, Shykimma, age eight, and Raheem, age seven, were placed with Ms. Lyons The voluntary aspects of Ms. Williams' decision meant that she was under no court restrictions as to visitation or telephone contact and could remove her children at any time from foster care. Problems with the foster arrangement arose almost immediately. The protective services worker for the Williams', Kathy Perkins Guy, began receiving complaints about Ms. Lyons from Ms. Williams, the Williams children and counselors working with Ms. Williams in her drug treatment. One complaint by the Williams family against Ms. Lyons was that she was not permitting visitation as often as the Williams and HRS felt should be permitted. However, after complaints by Ms. Williams, the Williams' were satisfied with the frequency of visitation. On the other hand, HRS tried to show continued lack of cooperation by Ms. Lyons when Kathy Perkins Guy, the Williams' case worker, tried to arrange visitation on one particular Saturday, but Ms. Lyons told her that she had too many errands to run and it was not convenient. The inconvenience was legitimate because Ms. Lyons sister had died and she was taking care of the funeral arrangements. However, Ms. Lyons never communicated these facts to the HRS caseworker. It is important to note that Ms. Guy did not require Ms. Lyons to facilitate visitation in this instance. Ms. Guy only asked if Ms. Lyons would. Such "asking" by HRS leaves the clear impression that the licensee may decline the request without adverse impact on that person's foster license or future licensure. The incident does demonstrate poor communication by both HRS and Ms. Lyons. Additionally, Ms. Lyons also did not make arrangements for the Williams children to call their mother on a daily basis, but restricted them to one phone call two times a week. Ms. Williams deposition testimony indicated that the frequency of telephone calls was sufficient. Again, Ms. Guy had requested more frequent telephone contact. Ms. Lyons declined because getting through to the mother at the addiction center was difficult to arrange because of the center's restrictions on the mother. Again, HRS only asked for more frequent telephone contact. HRS did not require it. The clear impression to the licensee was that she could decline the request. Ms. Williams also complained that Ms. Lyons had cut her daughter Shykimma's hair without first consulting her. Such consultation with the parent is normally required by the Department. The children complained that they were not permitted to wear underwear while they slept at night and were not being allowed to sleep on pillows or use blankets. When questioned, Ms. Lyons stated that the children were placed in her home with very few clothes, and that she did not want to have to wash clothes every day. However, a foster parent is instructed to have spare clothing on hand or to be prepared to supply spare clothing. The Williams' felt they had adequate clothing but that their clothes often smelled bad the second day. As to the lack of pillows and blankets, she said that the kids did not need blankets because it was summer and the children did have sheets. She also said she did not want the children messing up her pillow shams but that they had other pillows to sleep with. The Williams' depositions demonstrated they had other pillows which they could use. The evidence also demonstrated that the children were dressed appropriately for bed since they slept in pajamas. In addition, Ms. Lyons made the children recite Bible verses as a punishment even though they were Muslim. On one occasion, Ms. Lyons had Rasheen recite a verse to Ms. Guy, which he interpreted to Ms. Guy to mean that he had to obey Ms. Lyons. Again the evidence regarding these incidents was vague and seemed to be engendered more by the Williams children's dislike of Ms. Lyons and anything she did, as well as a biological mother who was frantic over her children. Additionally, the evidence regarding the Bible verses was equivocal as to the appropriateness of such an action given the historical nature of the Muslim and Christian religions' roots in the Old Testament. Ms. Lyons also brought the children to work with her. At that time she was employed cleaning offices after hours, and she put the children to work cleaning toilets, sinks and vacuuming the floor. However, there was no convincing evidence that these activities were inappropriate in any way. On the other hand, Ms. Lyons called Rasheen "stupid." One of these name-callings escalated into an argument with Rasheen, which Ms. Lyons ended by calling a policeman friend of hers to talk to him about showing respect. Ms. Lyons did not intend this name to be abusive, but it was readily apparent that the children took the names as derogatory. The use of such references demonstrates poor judgment in caring for foster children. Ms. Lyons also had punished Shykimma for bedwetting by making her stay in her room for the rest of the day, which violates the disciplinary code for foster parents. Such punishment is a clear violation of HRS's disciplinary code for foster parents. Finally, Ms. Lyons spanked Rasheen with a flip-flop shoe for spilling rice on the floor. Again Ms. Lyons knew such discipline violated the HRS disciplinary code for foster parents. Additionally, Ms. Lyons had been warned earlier about using corporal punishment on a foster child when HRS had learned about Ms. Lyons slapping Dorinda Small. The Williams children were removed from Ms. Lyons home in August 1991. At that time, Sue Brown, supervisor of the foster care licensing unit went to Ms. Lyons' home to discuss with her the problems with the Williams' placement. During the discussion, Ms. Lyons admitted to punishing Shykimma for wetting the bed by making her stay in her room for 35 minutes. Ms. Brown pointed out that children are not to be punished for bedwetting problems, but Ms. Lyons had no response. Ms. Brown spoke to the Williams children after meeting with Ms. Lyons, and they expressed near hatred for Ms. Lyons. They said she was very demanding and that they never wanted to go back there. In this case, it is fairly apparent that HRS is tired of trying to work with Ms. Lyons as a foster parent and that in its attempt not to relicense her the Department listed every perceived "affront" of Ms. Lyons towards HRS. Most of these complaints were spurious and could not form the basis for an adverse licensure decision. However, HRS did succeed in demonstrating that Ms. Lyons committed at least three willful violations of the rules governing foster care parents. Those violations were punishment for bedwetting, name calling and two incidents of administering corporal punishment. Moreover, because these violations were willful and in disregard of the disciplinary rules of HRS of which Ms. Lyons had knowledge, Ms. Lyons is not qualified for licensure.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is therefore RECOMMENDED: that the Department deny Petitioner's application for relicensure as a foster home. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of October, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANNE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 1994. APPENDIX 93-5975 The facts contained in paragraphs 1, 4, 8 and 22, of Petitioner's Findings of Fact are adopted in substance, insofar as material. The facts contained in paragraphs 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21 of Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact are subordinate. The facts contained in paragraphs 9 and 14 of Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact were not shown by the evidence. The facts contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are adopted in substance, in so far as material. The facts contained in paragraphs 3, 4, 8 and 11 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are subordinate. COPIES FURNISHED: Ann Corya Curvin, Esquire Assistant District Legal Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 160 Governmental Center Pensacola, Florida 32501 Fredrick Gant, Esquire Allbritton & Gant 322 West Cervantes Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Robert L. Powell, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Kim Tucker General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue is this case is whether revocation of Respondent's Foster Care license privilege for his past and present conduct, determined by the Department of Children and Family Services (hereinafter Agency) to be inappropriate, was proper under Section 409.175, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Under Section 409.175, Florida Statutes, the Department of Children and Family Services is the State Agency responsible for evaluating, qualifying, licensing, and regulating family foster care homes. On or about November 5, 1999, the Agency, after Mr. Thibodeau's successful completion of the Agency's evaluation and qualifying procedures, determined Mr. Thibodeau to be of good moral character. At all times material to the application process, Mr. Thibodeau answered completely and truthfully each question contained on each standard application form and other documents presented to him by the Agency during the foster care home application process. Based upon its determination, the Agency granted Provisional Certificate of License, No. 1999-110-002, for Substitute Family Home care privilege to Mr. Thibodeau. Thereafter, the Agency placed three minor children in Mr. Thibodeau's home: two teenaged brothers, David M. and Daniel M., and seven-year-old Steve. After an unspecified period of time together, bonding began to develop between the brothers, Daniel and David, and Mr. Thibodeau. As a result of a mutual agreement, Mr. Thibodeau submitted an adoption application to the Agency to become the adoptive parent of the brothers David M. and Daniel M. At all times pertinent hereto, Mr. Thibodeau answered completely and truthfully each question contained in the standard application forms and other documents presented to him by the Agency during the adoption application process. Ms. Georgia Alezras, trainer for the Model Approach to Partnership in Parenting (MAPP) classes and Mr. Kelvin Birdsell, family therapist and continuity specialist, made a home-study visit to the Thibodeau residence at some time between early July and August 15, 2000. Mr. Birdsell testified that he confined his conversations to the brothers, David M. and Daniel M. during the visit. Mr. Birdsell further testified that his conversations with the brothers were separate and away from the presence and hearing of Ms. Alezras and Mr. Thibodeau, who conversed privately. On July 26, 2000, after Mr. Thibodeau submitted his adoption application, and after the home study visit by Ms. Alezras, the Agency received a confidential telephonic abuse report, Petitioner's exhibit number one.1 The abuse report contains an interpolation of the private conversation between Ms. Alezras and Mr. Thibodeau during the earlier home-study visit. Ms. Carolyn Olsen, Family Counselor Supervisor, testified that Ms. Georgia Alezras reported her private conversation with Mr. Thibodeau to her Agency supervisors. The Agency's interpolation of the Alezras-Thibodeau conversation formed the factual allegations contained in the Agency's August 18, 2000, revocation letter. Sergeant Hagerty, Pasco County Sheriff's Office, testified that she and Sergeant O'Conner investigated the abuse allegations, consisting solely of the Agency's interpolation of Ms. Alezras' earlier and prior conversation with Mr. Thibodeau, by checking with authorities in Washington and checking with the National Criminal Information Center (NCIC) with negative results. The removal of the children from Mr. Thibodeau's home was based upon a joint decision to be safe and take a preventative approach in this matter. Petitioner's exhibit number two, a composite of eight letters, contained a "Closing of Foster Home For Children" report form, with a "foster home closing date" of August 18, 2000, and the caseworker and supervisor's signature on the date of August 22, 2000. The report, under "reason for closing" heading, contains the following comments: [H]is license was revoked because he recently divulged information about his past, that, had we known these facts prior to licensing, would have disqualified him to act as a foster parent---namely, he stated that some years ago he left the state of Washington with an unrelated male child without parental or state permission and lived with him for years under false identification. Ms. Georgia Alezras did not testify. Mr. Thibodeau's testimony is the only evidence of the private conversation with Ms. Alezras. Mr. Thibodeau's recollection of his responses to Ms. Alezras' questions was: [I]n 1975 he moved to the State of Washington; in 1976-77 he met Daniel L.; in 1976-77 he left the State of Washington and moved with Daniel to Pennsylvania where Daniel enrolled in school using his Washington school records; Daniel's mother visited them in Pennsylvania and maintained contact by telephone; Daniel, at age nineteen returned to Washington. He used a friend's birth certificate to secure his Pennsylvania driver's license. His video business2 considerations were subsequently dismissed and he advised the Agency of his decision by letter to his caseworker. Ms. Carolyn Olsen, Agency Representative, testified that one member of every MAPP team always asks a general, catchall question of every [foster care parent] applicant: "Is there anything else we need to know [about you], please tell us, [because] we will probably find out?" Ms. Olsen's candor and purpose comes into question on this point. She was not present during the Alezras-Thibodeau private conversation. Ms. Olsen does not know the identity of the team member who would have asked her catchall question nor does she know of a rule, guideline, or checklist requiring that specific question to be asked of every foster care license applicant, and there was no corroboration of her testimony. The Agency presented no evidence in support of its allegation that during the application process, its failure to inquire and Mr. Thibodeau's failure to disclose activities 20 years earlier in his life resulted from negligence or from the malicious intent of Mr. Thibodeau, and materially affect the health and safety of the minor children in his foster care. The Agency has failed to establish that Mr. Thibodeau left Washington with an unrelated minor child without parental consent and obtained false identification for the child. While it is true that Mr. Thibodeau "left Washington with an unrelated minor child," the Agency produced no evidence that his leaving was "without [minor child's] parental consent." Agency's investigators were unable to make contact with either the child or his mother. No investigation was made of the State of Washington's Motor Vehicle Department. No contact was made with the Pennsylvania authorities. Assuming argunendo, the Agency intended upon establishing this element by "an admission by Mr. Thibodeau"; they presented no evidence Mr. Thibodeau, in fact, uttered words to the effect of or acknowledged the comment "without parental consent." The undisputed evidence is Mr. Thibodeau's testimony that the minor child's mother not only approved of the child leaving Washington with him, but she also visited them in Pennsylvania and had telephone conversations with her child during his stay there. On this issue the Agency failed to carry its burden by clear and convincing evidence. Mr. Thibodeau admitted his use of another's birth certificate to secure a Pennsylvania driver's license more than 20 years ago. Since that time, Mr. Thibodeau's conduct, foster care parenting skills, helping problem young boys, and good moral conduct has been, as testified by the several witnesses, exemplary.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order reinstating to Stanley Thibodeau his foster care home license privilege. DONE AND ENTERED 21st day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 2001.
The Issue The issue presented herein is whether or not Petitioner is eligible to be assigned foster children.
Findings Of Fact Based on the Hearing Officer's observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received, and the entire record complied herein, I make the following relevant factual findings: Petitioner, Johnnie Mae Smith, was licensed as a foster parent on July 1, 1987, for one (1) female foster child (Certificate No. 787-48-1). Thereafter, Petitioner requested that foster children be placed in her home and she was denied. Specifically, by letter dated December 4, 1987, Gloria P. Simmons, District Operations Manager, Children Youth and Family (CYF) Services, advised Petitioner that "we are not placing any foster children in your home for the following reasons: Insufficient income to provide adequate cash flow to support additional expenses incurred. Lack of integrity in reporting income while receiving AFDC 1/ payments. "Your provocative, overbearing, abrasive, and implusive (sic) behavior." Petitioner was advised of her right to appeal Respondent's denial of placement of foster children in her home and she timely appealed that denial. Gene Majure, (Majure hereafter) Senior CYF Counselor, has been employed by Respondent in excess of 16 years. Majure is presently assigned to making license recommendations for foster home applicants in Dade County. Majure was assigned Petitioner's foster home applicants license application for review. During October 1986, Petitioner received pre-service training as a foster parent at which time she made application for licensure as a foster parent. Petitioner's initial foster home study was conducted by Gene Majure, who rejected it primarily on the basis of "insufficient income." Petitioner protested her initial foster home application rejection and instead of being processed through normal appeal channels, she was informed by Leonard Helfand, District Legal Counsel, that she would be reinvited to pre- service training and she could reapply. Petitioner reattended the second part of pre-service training on May 21, 1987, and she officially reapplied. Lois Rossman, (hereafter Rossman) Senior Youth and Family Counselor, and Peggy Ann Siegal, Children Youth and Family Supervisor, visited Petitioner in her home on June 12, 1987. Their interview of Petitioner revealed that Petitioner shared her three-bedroom home in Opa Locka with her two daughters, Chantrell (15) and Latrise (14). Petitioner is separated from her husband for approximately one year and his specific whereabouts is unknown. Majure again visited Petitioner during January 1987. At that time, Majure inquired as to Petitioner's financial income and Petitioner responded verbally, and in writing, on October 9, 1986, and again on June 12, 1987, that she has $400 per month earned income which income is derived from a laundry service which she has operated for the past 5 years. On the other hand, Petitioner signed a monthly income statement with AFDC indicating that she has no earned income. To the extent that Petitioner has earned income, she incorrectly reported her income to AFDC since October 1986, which may result in either an overpayment or fraudulent involvement in her income reporting. (Respondent's exhibit 3). Rossman was also assigned Petitioner's case to determine her eligibility to be assigned foster children. Rossman was present on the June 12, 1987, visit to Petitioner's residence at which time Petitioner again related that she had earned income of approximately $400 per month which income statement was contrasted with the available records that Respondent's employees had obtained from the AFDC office wherein Petitioner indicated that she had no earned income. To the extent that Petitioner does not have earned income, she has indicated a total income of $264 per month and stated expenses of approximately $400-$605 per month which creates cause for concern as to her ability to maintain a stable and secure family environment for foster children. Rossman also became involved in circumstances wherein Petitioner repeatedly called the CYF counselor's office demanding to speak with supervisory employees wherein she demanded that she be assigned foster children since she was licensed. When secretarial employees advised Petitioner that her message would be relayed and that as soon as a supervisor or other placement official became available, they would return her call, Petitioner would again call using an alias to attempt to get through. This problem persisted for several months following the time that Petitioner's foster home application was approved in July 1987. Respondent's secretarial employees who answer the phone and greet clients in person have been trained to deal with irate and abusive clients, however Petitioner's unrelentless calling became so problematic that employees felt harassed and one employee broke down and starting crying based on Petitioner's persistence about seeing or talking to certain supervisory employees at certain times. Prior to the time that Petitioner's foster home license application was approved, she was much more pleasant in her conversations with employees in the CYF office. (Testimony of Peggy Siegal and Ellie Roman). Petitioner also keeps three large dogs in her yard, one of which is a Pit Bull and two are large German Shepherds who made threatening postures at Respondent's employees when they visited Petitioner's home for inspections. Although Petitioner maintains that the two German Shepherds do not belong to her, they were at her home on each occasion when she was visited by licensing staff and Respondent's sanitation inspector. Petitioner keeps the dogs, which roam at will around the fenced area her home, at bay by swinging a rubber hose at them. The fact that Petitioner is receiving welfare benefits is not an automatic disqualification which prevents her from being assigned foster children. Petitioner encountered problems with her spouse which culminated in a separation and she was, therefore, left with insufficient income to maintain herself and she applied for and is receiving welfare benefits. Petitioner plans to begin employment at Jackson Memorial Hospital shortly.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, enter a final order finding that Petitioner is not eligible to be assigned foster children. 2/ DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 13th day of October, 1988. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of October, 1988.
The Issue Whether denial of Respondent's re-licensure application as a Foster Care Home for the reasons stated in the Department's denial letter of October 30, 2000, was appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary materials received in evidence and the entire record complied herein, the following relevant facts are found: Under Section 409.175, Florida Statutes (2001), the Department of Children and Family Services is the State Agency responsible for evaluating, qualifying, licensing, and regulating family foster care homes. Petitioner, a single male, previously employed with an abused children agency in Broward County, Florida, was granted a foster care parent license by the DCF's Foster Care Licensing unit effective August 10, 1999, through November 10, 1999. A second child specific foster home license for G.K. was issued to Petitioner, effective from March 3, 2000, through August 10, 2000. DCF takes the position that Petitioner is not eligible for re-licensure as a family foster home primarily because he exhibited "poor judgment" relative to a single medical treatment, taking the temperature of an eleven-year-old male foster child through his rectum during the month of August 2000. DCF further alleges that Petitioner has willfully violated specific statutes and rules relating to the conduct and maintenance of the foster home. Those alleged violations are specified in the licensure denial letter dated October 30, 2000, from the DCF to Petitioner. Nicara Daniels is a foster care licensing unit worker with the DCF since November 1999. Ms. Daniels had on-the-job- training and some Professional Development Center Training for new employees. In the licensing unit, Ms. Daniels had training in physical abuse, sexual abuse, drug abuse, and emotional abuse toward children. The DCF used Ms. Daniels to provide testimony regarding each violation as they appeared in the letter of denial. Herein below the allegations are chronologically addressed. Medication and cooking wines in Petitioner's bathroom. On or about July 31, 2000, a period when Petitioner was licensed, Ms. Daniels, Child Protection Investigator assigned Petitioner, made an unannounced visit to Petitioner's home during a period when Petitioner was medicating himself. During her walk through Petitioner's bedroom she entered his bathroom and saw Petitioner's medication for his diabetes on the bathroom shelf along with several bottles of cooking wines. Ms. Daniels acknowledged that she observed the cooking wines in the bathroom. Along with bottles of medication she also observed the lock box in which Petitioner kept his medications and cooking wines when not in use. The door to Petitioner's bedroom and bathroom each had operative locks on them. Ms. Daniels knew that Petitioner took medication for his diabetic condition prior to this inspection and she acknowledged having no experience with the use of cooking wines. Rule 65C-13.011(14)(a) and (b), Florida Administrative Code, requires all medication, poisonous chemicals, and cleaning materials to be in a locked place and inaccessible to children, and that alcoholic beverages should be stored out of the reach of small children; with the recommendation that these beverages be kept in a locked place. Ms. Daniels admitted that for the children, all of whom were 11 years or older, to have access to the medication or cooking wines, they must enter the bedroom, go into the bathroom and open the lock box. There is no evidence presented of any foster care child having access to Petitioner's bedroom, bathroom or the locked medicine box at any time. In making the foregoing finding, I have considered Ms. Daniel's testimony that she knew Petitioner was on medication. Ms. Daniels, however, never questioned the children whether they entered or attempted to enter Petitioner's bedroom at any time when he was not present. I find the mere presence of medications and cooking wines in Petitioner's bathroom, absent other evidence, is not a violation of the cited rule. John Snider in Petitioner's Foster Care home. Ms. Daniels testified that during an early morning visit on an unspecified date in July of 2000, she observed a young man, John Snider, in Petitioner's home. After she advised Mr. Snider had to be screened, Petitioner followed the DCF's process and a screening application for Mr. Snider was submitted to the Department. The Department screened and cleared Mr. Snider and advised Petitioner and Mr. Snider by letter on August 21, 2000. Rule 65C-13.010(4)(g), Florida Administrative Code, requires that the foster care parent notify the department of the presence of such person. Rule 65C-13.007(1), Florida Administrative Code, requires screening for "all persons that provide respite care in the . . . home on an overnight basis must be screened." Rule 65C-13.009(6)(a)5., Florida Administrative Code, requires a criminal records check for "all persons 18 years and older residing in the . . . home." Petitioner, during a telephone conversation with Ms. Daniels on July 31, 2000, informed her that Broward Juvenile Justice placed Mr. Snider in his home on July 27, 2000. It is Ms. Daniels' opinion that a four-day period between entry and notifying DCF is not reasonable notification. This "unreasonable" delay formed the basis for violation of the cited rule, notwithstanding the particular circumstances. Rule 65C-13.007(1), Florida Administrative Code, which requires "all persons that provide respite care . . . must be screened.” I find Ms. Daniels' opinion that four days is not "reasonable" notification not based upon any protocol, policy or rule of the DCF. In making the foregoing finding, I have considered the following. Petitioner informed Ms. Daniels by telephone that there were matters to discuss; however, the discussion took place four days later when Ms. Daniels was available. The Department of Juvenile Justice for Broward County placed Mr. Snider in Petitioner's home. After submitting an application, Mr. Snider was screened and cleared by the DCF. Considering the evidence as a whole, I find Mr. Snider's presence in Petitioner's home, under authority of the Broward County Juvenile Justice unit, and with telephonic notice to the DCF's licensing unit worker four days after entry into the home is not unreasonable, under the circumstances. Home Department's placing of T.J. in Petitioner's Foster Sometime during the first week of August 2000, Robert Mistretta, Department's child protection investigator and T.J.'s initial case worker, removed T.J. from his family and sought overnight foster care for him. Mr. Mistretta, aware of T.J.'s family situation, his medical, physical, emotional, and sexually abusive history sought a foster care home with those factors in mind. The Department's placement unit instructed him to take T.J. to Petitioner's home for an overnight stay. Mr. Mistretta took T.J. to Petitioner's home with the intention of an overnight stay and reassessment of the situation the following morning. After discussion with Petitioner of T.J.'s need for an overnight stay, Petitioner agreed. Mr. Mistretta chose not to provide Petitioner with information regarding T.J.'s medical, social, physical, emotional, or abusive family history. However, Mistretta gave Petitioner the DCF's emergency pager phone number [570-3081] for use during non-working hours and for emergencies should the need arise. Rectal Temperature Taking What had begun as an overnight stay resulted in a permanent placement and on or about August 6 or 7, 2000, T.J. became ill. His illness began during the day and continuing into the night. According to Petitioner, T.J. exhibited symptoms of a cold or flu, including fever, chills and headache. During the night, he was restless, tossing and turning in his sleep. Petitioner, having no medical history on T.J., became concerned about T.J.'s condition. He made several calls to the Department's emergency pager number [570-3081] provided him by Bob Mistretta, without success. Petitioner then attempted to contact Dr. Stuart Grant, a pediatrician, to no avail. Petitioner thereafter attempted to use his MAPP training first aid guide provided by the Department, but found those instructions unclear. Petitioner then sought information concerning fever and temperature taking from the internet. During the night while T.J. was asleep, Petitioner used a rectal thermometer to take T.J.'s temperature, causing him to awaken suddenly, somewhat startled. Petitioner talked with T.J., explained his concerns with his condition and the reason for taking T.J.'s temperature in that fashion. T.J. responded in a positive manner and went back to sleep. The following morning, Petitioner contacted Mistretta and explained what had happened with T.J. the night before. Mistretta took T.J. aside and privately inquired if he understood "good" touching from and "bad" touching. T.J. stated he understood the difference. When asked about Petitioner's manner of touching him while taking his temperature during the night, T.J. affirmed that Petitioner's touching was a "good" touch and not a "bad" touch. Mistretta, based upon his experience working with children who had suffered abuse, accepted T.J.'s response as true. Satisfied that no "bad" touching occurred during the rectal temperature taking process, Mistretta reported the incident to his supervisor, including his conclusion that nothing sexually or abusive had occurred and concluded his report in part as follows: "This case is closed with no indicators. There is no maltreatment that addressed a bad choice of judgment by a caretaker. There are licensing [unit] concerns regarding Mr. Marlowe's choice to use a rectal thermometer on an 11 year old child." (Emphasis Added) Mr. Mistretta testified that his understanding of the sequence of events the night T.J. was ill were: T.J. was running a high fever and had trouble falling asleep. Petitioner tried cold cloths to reduce the fever that, according to Petitioner's monitoring, was getting too high. Since T.J. was having trouble sleeping and once he did sleep, Petitioner thought a rectal thermometer would be best to try not to awaken him, Petitioner chose to use that form of temperature taking. T.J. reacted with a little bit of pain. Based on Petitioner's history of dealing with sexually abused kids, that reaction is not normal. When Petitioner talked with him about what happened, T.J. disclosed his history to Petitioner. In the process of making the decision as to the appropriate treatment, Petitioner consulted with a Johnson and Johnson book and several medical web sites. The documents from the medical web sites were subsequently provided by Petitioner. I find Mr. Mistretta's testimony credible regarding his conversation with Petitioner immediately after the T.J.'s incident. Following the above, Ms. Mistretta, in addition to his duty as T.J.'s caseworker, was also assigned by his supervisor to investigate a hotline abuse report. Mr. Mistretta investigated the alleged abuse narrative report and found no indication of maltreatment. He recommended the hotline abuse report be closed. Upon being presented with the hotline abuse report narrative with suggestions and allegations of sexual abuse, Mr. Mistretta testified: "The information generated in this narrative in the reporter page that has reporter information states that the CPI, Robert Mistretta, told reporter about allegations. So the source of this report is me. The reporters made their own clarifications, answered their own questions regarding some things instead of calling me back to clarity, talked amongst themselves, found out that they didn't like what happened, and some of the narrative is not true. It is blown out of the water, if you would. The narrative was started by a report. When Mr. Marlowe talked to me, I talked to somebody who talked to somebody, who talked to somebody. The next thing you know we have sexual abuse. The narrative is not true. I did not agree with the removal of T.J. (Emphasis Added) I find Mr. Mistretta's testimony on this issue to be consistent and credible. In making the foregoing finding, I have considered the testimony of the DCF's other witnesses, none of whom had personal knowledge of the abuse report contents. However, Mr. Mistretta is the only witness with personal knowledge of events acquired in his positions as T.J.'s initial caseworker, his placement agent, the interviewer of T.J. and Petitioner, and the originator of the initial report. I have considered the fact that this incident occurred during the week of August 6-12, 2000. Petitioner's license expired on August 10, 2000. However, the DCF did not remove T.J. from Petitioner's home until September 6, 2000, almost a month later. I have also considered Ms. Daniels' testimony that during Petitioner's unlicensed period, DCF's placement unit continued to place children in Petitioner's home. I have also considered the deposition of Dr. Patricia Buck, M.D., pediatrician and Child Protection Team member for District 14 [Polk, Highland and Hardee counties], who was qualified as an expert in pediatrics and child abuse. After her review of documents provided by DCF and given the circumstances by DCF's counsel and Petitioner, Dr. Buck opined that use of a rectal thermometer would not have been her recommendation, had she been the care provider. According to Dr. Buck, anal temperature taking as a medical procedure is not abuse. Adding that the more medical history one has on a patient, the less likely a mistake in patient treatment. The evidence as a whole, including Mistretta's testimony and Dr. Buck's opinion, is persuasive as it relates to the issue of the circumstances and the "appropriateness" of the rectal temperature taking procedure. Accordingly, the testimony of Ms. Daniels, the licensing unit informs placement and other Department units of those parents who were licensed, parents who were not licensed or parents whose licenses had expired. She recalled attending the staffing meeting regarding the T.J. temperature incident and recalled informing staff that Petitioner was not a licensed foster care home after August 10, 2000. According to Ms. Daniels, placing children in a non-licensed home is not permissible. However, its her testimony that in this case, DCF's placement unit placed children in Petitioner's home during a period of time he was not licensed, and during the time T.J. was in Petitioner's home because of [DCF] "it being in a crisis situation with the number of homes we had." In making this finding, I have considered both the DCF's need for foster care beds and its concern for the safety of foster care children. I have also considered the DCF's use of Petitioner's home when they were "in a crisis situation with the number of homes we had." Screening of Ms. Scott Regarding the screening of Ms. Scott, Ms. Daniels testified Petitioner informed her that the screening application papers for Ms. Scott were submitted to the Department and had apparently come up missing. Ms. Daniels acknowledged that she had no evidence to support her conclusion that Ms. Scott was a respite sitter for Petitioner's foster care children; that she had never checked with the DCF to ascertain whether or not Ms. Scott had been screened. Not inquiring whether Ms. Scott had been screened renders Ms. Daniels' testimony questionable. I find Ms. Daniel's testimony regarding Petitioner's failure to provide the Department with Ms. Scott's application for screening not credible. Unwillingness to Provide Information on Mary Poe At some unspecified date, Ms. Daniels recalled she had a conversation with Petitioner regarding his next door neighbor, Ms. Poe, someone who would "check" on the foster children from time to time when Petitioner was late returning from work. Ms. Daniels did not recall if Ms. Poe entered Petitioner's home or gave the key to the children to enter in the home on days he was late returning from work. Ms. Daniels recalled only that, Petitioner's attitude regarding screening Ms. Poe was "uncooperative" and "defiant." During cross-examination Ms. Daniels could not recall the conversation with Petitioner when she was informed that Petitioner's condominium covenants required the manager to have a key to his apartment in case of emergencies. She did recall that Petitioner told her Ms. Poe was the mother of the condominium manager. Ms. Daniels recalled when she voiced concern with the situation Petitioner retrieved his key from Ms. Poe and returned it to the condominium manager for pick up by the children when they returned from school. I find Ms. Daniel's testimony regarding Petitioner's unwillingness to provide information concerning Mary Poe evasive, inconsistent and not credible. In making the foregone finding, I have considered Ms. Daniel's inability to recall facts, dates, times, places, regarding the matter to which she testified. I have considered the fact that Petitioner, when Ms. Daniels voiced concern, corrected the situation by removing the key from Ms. Poe's possession, thereby removing the need for screening by the Department. I have also considered Ms. Daniels' inability to recall facts regarding an incident the DCF considered an intentional refusal by Petitioner to "cooperate" and "communicate" with Department's staff. Confidentiality in Keeping a Life Book on Foster Care Children Ms. Daniels testified that Petitioner informed her the foster care children had a computer life book (photo album) website. After being directed to the website by Petitioner and after viewing the website, Ms. Daniels concluded Petitioner had "released" the names and photos of the foster children on the websites. Without providing a rational basis, she testified that keeping required foster child life books in an electronic format is, in and of itself, inappropriate. She further testified that placing the names and photos on the web site violated DCF's rule of confidentiality. Rule 65C.010(1)(c)4., Florida Administrative Code, requires the foster care parent to maintain the children's records which ensures confidentiality for the child and the biological parents. Petitioner maintained that each child made an individual and personal decision to use the computers he made available in his home. To his knowledge each child placed his personal information, name, foster care status, photos, etc., on the web sites during chats and exchange of information with others users in various chat-room conversations. Ms. Daniels never inquired of the foster children whose names and status were found on the book of life web sites to ascertain whether they or Petitioner placed personal information on the web site. I find her testimony on this issue to be questionable, but reliable. In making the foregoing findings, I have considered Ms. Daniels' testimony and the absence of evidence in support thereof. I find Petitioner's testimony that he never divulged any confidential information on the web sites regarding foster children in his care credible, but not persuasive. As the custodial parent, Petitioner has the ultimate responsibility to maintain and protect the confidentiality of the children in his care and under his supervision. Permitting children of divulge personal/confidential and potentially endangering information on the web site is a breach of Petitioner's parental responsibility. Removal of G.K. from medication prescribed by a Doctor DCF alleged that Petitioner removed G.K. from prescribed medication in violation of Rule 65C-13.010(1)(b)7.a, Florida Administrative Code, which imposes on the foster parent the responsibility for dispensing the medication as prescribed by the physician and recording the exact amount prescribed. In support of this allegation, the Department offered the testimony of Ms. Daniels. Ms. Daniels, by her admission, had no personal knowledge regarding G.K. and Petitioner's actions with G.K.'s medication. Her testimony was based upon what she had previously read in the file prepared by Stephanie Gardner, DCF's Representative and Petitioner's caseworker before the case reassignment to Ms. Daniels. When Ms. Daniels initially inquired of Petitioner about G.K.'s medication, he informed her that before he discontinued G.K.'s medication, he consulted with a nurse who in turn consulted with the prescribing doctor about the matter. Based on the response received from this consultation he discontinued G.K.'s psychotropic medication. Ms. Daniels based her conclusion of unauthorized discontinuance of medication on her conversations with Ray Mallette, a Department mental health counselor. In his letter to Petitioner, Mr. Mallette stated, in pertinent part: "To my knowledge, G.K. was not taking any psychotropic medication while under my care. Treatment was terminated in June of 1999, by mutual agreement, as no further care needed." Ms. Daniels testified that during her conversations with Mr. Mallette she recalled his stating that he did not authorize discontinuation of G.K.'s medication. Ms. Daniels could not state with any certainty if Mr. Mallette's use of the term "medication" included psychotropic medications or other medications. Petitioner provided Ms. Daniels the name of the Broward County physician with whom Petitioner had conferred through his nurse and who authorized taking G.K. off medication. There is no evidence that Ms. Daniels attempted to verify whether the medical persons provided by Petitioner had given instructions to take G.K. off psychotropic medications. I find Ms. Daniels' testimony on the issue of G.K.'s medication to be incomplete, confused and, not creditable. In making the foregoing finding, I have considered Mr. Mallette's letter reflecting that he is not a medical doctor or dentist; therefore, he cannot prescribe nor discontinue a prescribed medication to a patient. I. Use of profanity and general unwillingness to work cooperatively with the Department Rule 65C-13.010(1)(c)1., Florida Administrative Code, requires foster care parents to "work" cooperatively with the counselor as a member of a treatment team in seeking counseling, participating in consultation, and preparing and implementing the performance agreement or permanent placement plan for each child. In support of the above allegations, the DCF offered only the testimony of Ms. Daniels who stated: ". . . [A]lso during a conversation Mr. Marlowe used profanity. As far as [sic] concerned as just being uncooperative and maybe someone being uncooperative meaning there's something else behind it as far as, you know, not one to follow the rules that are set by the Department." I find the above testimony of Ms. Daniels to be vague and questionable. In making the foregoing finding, I have taken into consideration the fact that Ms. Daniels could not recall the date, time, place, words, or the circumstances of her conversation with Petitioner in which the alleged profanity was uttered. I have also taken into consideration the testimony of Ms. Stephanie Gardner, regarding Petitioner's uncooperativeness. Ms. Gardner, acknowledging that she did not know, did not remember nor did she recall; then went on to state: " . . . that at some unknown time and date, Petitioner stated, mentioned or indicated some information about a child or foster child that he had parented before. I don't know if it was Gary or one of the children that were actually at the Broward County at the Outreach Broward facility where he worked, but it was some information, and it was kind of alarming." I find the testimony of Ms. Daniels and the testimony of Ms. Gardner regarding the alleged profanity and regarding alleged uncooperativeness of Petitioner with the DCF questionable. Excluding the foregone evidence, other testimony regarding Petitioner and his conduct addressing matters that are related to those specific issues raised in DCF's denial letter of October 30, 2000, is neither material nor relevant to issues under consideration in this cause and disregarded.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
The Issue Are Respondents entitled to have Petitioner renew their license to provide foster home care?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner licenses and re-licenses persons who provide residential care to children. This process is in accordance with Chapter 409, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 65C-13, Florida Administrative Code. Respondents have held a foster home license pursuant to those laws. On March 16, 1998, Petitioner advised Respondents that Respondents would not be re-licensed for the upcoming year for reason that: "A recent investigation of neglect resulted in a confirmed report against you." As was revealed at the hearing, the more specific basis for the denial was in accordance with Section 409.175(8)(b)1, Florida Statutes, in which Petitioner accused Respondents, in the person of Sherrie Rund, of a negligent act which materially affected the health and safety of a child in her home. That child is J.V., date of birth July 15, 1995. Moreover, the basis for non-renewal of the foster home license was premised upon the further allegation that Sherrie Rund was found by Petitioner's counselor to be unable to secure the "Abuse Registry" prior to issuance of a new foster home license, as provided in Rule 65C- 13.006(3), Florida Administrative Code. On January 6, 1998, Respondents were caring for three foster children in their home in Inverness, Florida. In addition to J.V. there was M.V., who was 3½ years old, and J.S., who was 12 months old. J.V. and M.V. are brothers. The day before Petitioner had asked Respondent, Sherrie Rund, to take two additional children into her home to receive foster care. On the day before, Mrs. Rund had also suffered a miscarriage. Mrs. Rund left her home on the morning of January 6, 1998, to run some errands and to eventually drive to Brooksville, Florida, to pick up the newest foster children. At some point in time in her travels on January 6, 1998, with J.V. and J.S. in her car, Mrs. Rund noticed a loud knocking sound in her car and decided to have an automobile mechanic with whom she was familiar check the status of her car, in anticipation of her trip to Brooksville. Upon arriving at the mechanic's shop, the mechanic told Mrs. Rund that she was not going anywhere in the car, and that something was not right with the car. The mechanic got into the car with Mrs. Rund and they made a test drive. When they returned to the mechanic's shop, the mechanic pointed out a block that was part of the suspension system, referred to as a lift kit in the area of the rear axle. That block had shifted over and the mechanic told Mrs. Rund that all that would be necessary to correct the problem was to adjust two bolts. When Mrs. Rund, the mechanic, and her children had returned to the shop, the children were asleep. As a consequence, Mrs. Rund asked the mechanic if it would be acceptable to leave the children in the car while the mechanic made repairs to the automobile. Apparently, the mechanic was not opposed to that arrangement. The mechanic told Mrs. Rund that it would only take a couple of minutes to tighten the parts that were causing the problem. With that assurance, Mrs. Rund allowed the mechanic to lift the car off the concrete floor in the shop by the use of a hydraulic lift. Once the car had been lifted, the distance from the car to the shop floor was approximately 3 to 4 feet. The mechanic began his work and noticed that threads in the bolts that were being tightened had become stripped. At that time Mrs. Rund was sitting on a stool by the car door. The mechanic summoned her and asked to show her what was wrong. As Mrs. Rund walked around the car she heard a slight noise. It was J.V. J.V. had been strapped in his car seat attached to the back seat of the automobile, but he had awakened from his nap in the back seat of the car, gone between the seats in the front of the car, opened the door and stepped out onto the platform that supported the car on the lift. Before anyone could intervene, J.V. fell from the platform to the floor of the shop fracturing his skull. The skull fracture was of the temporal bone. In addition, J.V. also suffered an abrasion of one ear and split his lip in the fall. The automobile in question was a Jeep vehicle with tinted windows, that created a condition in which Mrs. Rund could not see into the automobile while it was on the lift. After the accident Mrs. Rund immediately picked the child up and noted that he appeared "a little incoherent." She could not drive her car. But she knew that her father was about two miles away. Mrs. Rund's father immediately responded to her request for assistance. They drove J.V. to the emergency room at the Citrus Memorial Hospital in Inverness, Florida, for treatment. Later that day, J.V. was taken to Shands Hospital at the University of Florida, in Gainesville, Florida, for additional treatment. Mrs. Rund and her father managed to transport J.V. to the emergency room at Citrus Memorial Hospital within 10 minutes of the accident. Upon arrival Mrs. Rund attempted to advise Petitioner about the accident by contacting the case worker responsible for her foster children. Four of the people who were on the list of possible contacts were unavailable. Mrs. Rund also wanted to inquire about the status of the two new children who were going to be left in her care that day. Eventually, Mrs. Rund explained to a case worker the circumstances of J.V.'s accident. In answer to her question, the case worker told Mrs. Rund that the two additional children were going to be brought to Mrs. Rund's home in any event. The children were brought to Mrs. Rund's home on January 6, 1998, and were kept for the moment by Mrs. Rund's mother. The two additional children were siblings 2½ and 5 years old. Mrs. Rund spent about 6 to 7 hours at the Citrus Memorial Hospital attending J.V. and making certain of his care. Beyond that time, Mrs. Rund felt the need to return home and take a shower because of her miscarriage the day before and because she had blood on her shirt resulting from J.V.'s injuries. Mrs. Rund also had concern about the welfare of the two additional children that were being brought to her home. There had been some discussion between Mrs. Rund and a nurse at the Citrus Memorial Hospital, who insisted that Mrs. Rund should accompany J.V. to Shands Hospital. Mrs. Rund replied that she needed to check the situation at home and then she would go to Shands. Eventually, the nurse contacted someone from the Child Protective Service. Mrs. Rund spoke to that person and having decided that it would be acceptable for J.V. to ride to Shands unaccompanied by her, Mrs. Rund allowed J.V. to be transported to Shands Hospital without her. A short time later, Mrs. Rund's parents picked her up at the Citrus Memorial Hospital and took her home. By that time Christopher Rund, Mrs. Rund's husband, had arrived at their home and was available to take care of the other four children. After spending a little time with the children in her home and taking a shower, Mrs. Rund called Shands Hospital to check on the well-being of J.V. Mrs. Rund went to Shands Hospital the following day to see J.V. The two newest children were removed from Respondents' home. J.S., one of the original three children cared for by Respondents, was also removed from their home. The brothers J.V. and M.V. were returned to the Respondents on January 9, 1998, where they have remained. M.V. and J.V. were eventually adopted by the Respondents on May 22, 1998. As Mrs. Rund acknowledges, she momentarily neglected the needs of J.V. when he fell from her automobile to the floor of the mechanic's shop. Her response to his needs beyond that point was not neglectful given the circumstances that have been described. She immediately arranged for his care and treatment. The failure to accompany J.V. to Shands Hospital was not neglectful. Petitioner instituted an investigation identified as Abuse Report 98-001853, involving the incident on January 6, 1998, in which J.V. was injured when falling from the automobile to the floor of the repair shop. That report is referred to as institutional abuse-neglect, involving the conduct of Sherrie Rund and her foster home. Through the investigation, the report was verified for inadequate supervision or care pertaining to the accident, as well as the verification of other physical injuries associated with neglect. Richard V. Perrone, Adoptions and Related Services Counselor for Petitioner, worked with the Respondents from March of 1997 through May of 1998 as an adoption counselor. In correspondence for the record, he indicates that he has seen the family, and the children in their care on a monthly basis and that the home was always appropriate and the children well cared for. In particular, Mrs. Rund was observed by Mr. Perrone to be active with children's care and appropriate services. Mr. Perrone notes the adoption of the children that he visited.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That the foster home license held by Christopher Rund and Sherrie Rund be renewed. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of October, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph Sowell, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 220 Sumterville, Florida 33585 Christopher Rund Sherrie Rund 13059 East Shawnee Trail Inverness, Florida 34450 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioners should be issued a family foster home license.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony, exhibits, and stipulated facts in the Joint Stipulation, the following Findings of Fact are made: Parties and Process Petitioners, who are husband and wife, submitted an application for licensure as a family foster home. Although this was an application for initial licensure, Petitioners were previously licensed as a foster home from August 2013 to October 2019.1 The Department is the state agency responsible for licensing foster care parents and foster homes, pursuant to section 409.175, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 65C-45. Petitioners voluntarily relinquished their foster home license on or about October 28, 2019, around the time two female foster children, S.W. and H.C.S., were removed from their care. It is unclear whether the children were removed because of an abuse investigation related to H.C.S., or whether they were removed because Petitioners closed their home to foster children. Regardless, Mrs. Gilio testified that they let their license lapse because they needed a break after fostering H.C.S. The Department administers foster care licensing by contracting with third-party private entities. In Circuit 13, where Petitioners are located, the Department contracted with Eckerd Community Alternatives, doing business as Eckerd Connects (Eckerd), to be the agency responsible for facilitating foster care licensing. Eckerd has subcontracted with Children's Home Network (CHN) to facilitate foster care licensing. 1 Petitioners had previously been denied a foster care license in 2009. At the time relevant to Petitioners, the Department used the "attestation" model of foster home licensing. In this model, a private licensing agency with whom the Department has contracted will conduct a home study on the foster home applicants and attest to the applicants' fitness to be licensed. The Department does not have the discretion to deny the license once the licensing agency has attested to the appropriateness of the applicants, except if they have been named as caregivers in three or more abuse reports within five years. If there are such abuse reports, the Department is required to review those reports and make a final decision regarding the application. There is no requirement that the reports result in a finding of actual abuse for them to be reviewed by the Department.2 Although it is unclear when Petitioners submitted their application for the foster care license in this case, sometime in late 2019, CHN conducted and compiled a Unified Home Study (home study), which included Petitioners' background screening; previous reports of abuse, abandonment, or neglect involving the applicants, and references from all adult children. The home study was reviewed at a meeting on December 19, 2019, by Eckerd, through the Committee. The Committee considered the application, home study, and licensing packet and heard from various agency staff. Petitioners were also allowed to voice comments and concerns at this meeting. Had the Committee approved the application, it would have been sent to the Department along with an attestation that stated the foster home meets all requirements for licensure and a foster home license is issued by the Department. However, the Committee unanimously voted not to recommend approval of a foster home license to Petitioners. 2 The categories of findings for an abuse report are "no indicator," "not substantiated," and "verified." "No indicator" means there was no credible evidence to support a determination of abuse. "Not substantiated" means there is evidence, but it does not meet the standard of being a preponderance to support that a specific harm is the result of abuse. "Verified" means that there is a preponderance of credible evidence which results in a determination that a specific harm was a result of abuse. Frank Prado, Suncoast Regional Managing Director for the Department, ultimately decided to deny Petitioners' application for a family foster home license due to their prior parenting experiences, the multiple abuse reports regarding their home, and the recommendation of the Committee. Mr. Prado expressed concern about the nature of the abuse reports and Petitioners' admission that they used corporal punishment on a child they adopted from the foster care system in the presence of other foster children. Petitioners' Parenting History Petitioners have seven children: one is the biological son of Mr. Gilio; another is the biological son of Mrs. Gilio; and five were adopted through the foster care system in Florida. Of these seven children, six are now adults. Three of the adopted children, Jay, Sean, and Jameson, are biological brothers who Petitioners adopted in 2001. Shawna, who was adopted around 2003, is the only adopted daughter. The Petitioners' one minor child, H.G., is a nine-year-old boy and the only child who resides in their home. H.G. suffers from oppositional defiance disorder. Petitioners admitted they adopted Shawna after there had been allegations of inappropriate behavior made against Jay, by a young girl who lived next door to Petitioners. Later, while they were living with Petitioners, Jay, Sean, and Jameson were arrested for sexually abusing Shawna at different times. As a result, one or more of the sons were court-ordered to not be around Shawna, and the other brothers were required to undergo treatment and never returned to Petitioners' home. During the hearing, both Petitioners seem to blame Shawna, who was nine years old when the sexual abuse by Jay in their home allegedly began, for disrupting their home. They accused her of being "not remorseful" and "highly sexualized." Regarding the abuse by Sean and Jameson, which occurred when Shawna was approximately 12 years old, Mr. Gilio stated Shawna thought it was okay to have sex with boys, and it was "hard to watch every minute of the day if they're, you know, having sex." When Shawna was about 19 years old, she filed a "Petition for Injunction for Protection Against Domestic Violence" against Mr. Gilio in circuit court. The Petition outlined allegations of past sexual comments and inappropriate disciplinary behavior from 2007 to 2012, while she lived with Petitioners. Mr. Gilio denied at the hearing having any knowledge about the Petition against him, but admitted he made comments about Shawna's breasts. As part of the application and home study process, the CHN collected references from Petitioners' former foster children and adult children. Shawna (Petitioners' only adopted daughter) gave them a negative reference and specifically stated she would not want female foster children to live with Petitioners. Reports of Abuse Petitioners were involved in 24 abuse reports during their time of licensure between 2013 and 2019. During the past five years, Petitioners were named as either alleged perpetrators or caregivers responsible in eight reports that were made to the Florida Child Abuse Hotline (Hotline). Of those eight reports, five of them named Mr. Gilio as the alleged perpetrator causing a physical injury, one report named Mr. Gilio as the caregiver responsible for a burn on a foster child, and one report named Mr. Gilio as an alleged perpetrator of sexual abuse against a foster child. Mrs. Gilio was named as an alleged perpetrator of asphyxiation as to a foster child. Seven of the reports in the last five years against Petitioners were closed with no indicators of abuse. One of the abuse reports was closed with a "not substantiated" finding of physical injury. In this report, Mr. Gilio was the alleged perpetrator and the victim was H.G., Petitioners' minor adopted son. Additionally, after Petitioners let their foster license lapse in October 2019, a subsequent report was made against Mr. Gilio for improper contact with a former foster daughter. This incident was discussed at the Committee meeting, but it was unclear if this allegation was ever investigated. Corporal Punishment According to the Department's rules, discussed below, foster parents are forbidden to engage in corporal punishments of any kind. In 2019, there were two reports alleging Mr. Gilio of causing physical injury by corporal punishment on H.G. At the time, there were other foster children in the household. Technically, Mr. Gilio was allowed to use corporal punishment on H.G. because he was no longer a foster child and had been adopted from foster care. If a parent uses corporal punishment on a child, there can be no findings of abuse unless the child suffered temporary or permanent disfigurement. However, foster care providers are not permitted to use corporal punishment. More than one witness at the hearing had concerns about the use of corporal punishment against H.G. because of his operational defiance disorder and because other foster children (who may have been victims of physical abuse) were in the household. Brendale Perkins, who is a foster parent herself and serves on the Hillsborough County Family Partnership Alliance, an organization that supports licensed foster parents, testified she witnessed Mr. Gilio treating a foster child in his care roughly. At the time, she was concerned because this was not the way children in foster care (who may have previously been victims of abuse) should be treated. She did not, however, report it to any authorities. The Department established through testimony that the policy against using corporal punishment is taught to all potential foster families. Mr. Gilio, however, denied ever being instructed not to use corporal punishment against foster children or while foster children were in the home. He also claimed that H.G.'s therapist had never recommended any specific punishment techniques. The undersigned finds Mr. Gilio's testimony not credible. Cooperation with Fostering Partners The Department established that decisions regarding foster children are made within a "system of care" which includes input from case managers, guardian ad litem (GAL), and support service providers. The relationship between Petitioners and others working as part of this system during the time of fostering was not ideal; it was described by witnesses as "tense" and "disgruntled." One witness, a supervisor at CHN, testified Mr. Gilio was not receptive or flexible when partnering with other agencies, and was not always open to providing information when questioned. As an example, Petitioners fired a therapist without consulting with the CHN staff or the GAL for the child. At the final hearing, Mr. Gilio continued to claim he did nothing wrong by not consulting with others in the system regarding this decision. Kristin Edwardson, a child protection investigator for the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office, was tasked with investigating the reports of abuse and neglect against Petitioners that had been reported to the Hotline. She testified she was concerned with the level of cooperation they provided her and other investigators. Although they ultimately would cooperate, Petitioners made it difficult for the investigators and would often "push back" and make the situation more stressful. She described Mr. Gilio as being disrespectful, belittling, and dismissive of her. Licensing Review Committee On December 19, 2020, the Committee, made up of eight individuals, was convened to review Petitioners' application for a foster home license. When determining whether a family should receive a foster home license, the Committee is to evaluate the applicants' background, parenting experience, references from community partners, and the family's openness and willingness to partner. Sheila DelCastillo, a regional trainer with the GAL program, was a Committee member. She had prior knowledge of Petitioners from a report that a foster child's room in Petitioners' home smelled strongly of urine during a home visit and that GAL staff had found a prescription bottle beside the child’s bed that belonged to Mr. Gilio. With regards to Petitioners' application, she read the licensing review packet and home study that contained numerous abuse reports. Ms. DelCastillo was concerned about the 24 abuse reports Petitioners’ received during their time of licensure, the negative reference from Shawna, their use of corporal punishment on H.G., and Petitioners' downplaying of the events that led to multiple abuse reports. Michelle Costley, a licensing director with CHN in charge of level 2 traditional foster homes, also served on the Committee. Ms. Costley has 14 years of experience, with seven of those years spent in foster care licensing. As director of licensing, Ms. Costley was concerned about the number of abuse reports received regarding Petitioners; Mr. Gilio's inability to be open and flexible when working in partnership with other agencies; and the needs of Petitioners' child, H.G. She was also concerned about Petitioners' decision to fire a therapist of a foster child without consulting the GAL or the other individuals involved with that child. Regarding the alleged abuse, Ms. Costley was concerned that most of the reports regarding Petitioners involved allegations of physical abuse, inappropriate touch of a sexual nature, or sexual abuse, with most alleged victims being younger than eight years old. She explained that even though these reports could not be "verified," these types of allegations are harder to establish because testimony by children of that age often is unreliable and there usually must be evidence of physical injury, which no longer is present by the time the alleged abuse is investigated. Ms. Perkins also served on the Committee. Ms. Perkins served as a foster parent mentor, working with foster parents to help them build co- parenting strategies and navigate the system of care. She has been a licensed foster parent for 13 years and has adopted 11 children from foster care. As stated earlier, she was familiar with Petitioners from the Hillsborough County Family Partnership Alliance meetings. Ms. Perkins was concerned with the number of abuse reports with similar allegations, but different victims. She also discussed Petitioners' use of corporal punishment, noting that they could have been using verbal de-escalation methods instead of corporal punishment due to the traumatic histories of many foster care children. Ms. Edwardson also served on the Committee. In addition to her personal interactions with Petitioners, Ms. Edwardson was concerned about the totality of the information presented to the Committee regarding the abuse reports and Mr. Gilio's lack of cooperation. She noted that although they were not substantiated, the number and nature of the reports related to young children were of concern. Based on the Committee notes and transcript of the meeting, Petitioners were allowed to respond to the Committee's questions at the December 2019 meeting. They argued that none of the abuse reports were proven true and any injuries were not their fault. They seemed more concerned about who made the abuse reports and why the abuse reports were called in than whether the foster children were protected in their care. For example, although Mr. Gilio admitted to hitting H.G. with a stick twice as big as a pencil, he denied any bruising was caused by the stick. A report of a burn on another child was explained by Mr. Gilio as an accident that occurred while he was teaching her how to iron; he could not understand why this was reported as possible abuse. Ms. Gilio explained that H.C.S. was a very active child which resulted in her needing stitches and requiring restraint. After hearing from Petitioners, the Committee members discussed their concerns that Petitioners were not forthcoming about the various abuse incidents, and would not take responsibility for any of the injuries or issues raised by the abuse reports. All eight members voted to not move Petitioners' application forward.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Children and Families denying a family foster home license to Petitioners, Mary and James Gilio. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of November, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Anthony Duran, Esquire Tison Law Group 9312 North Armenia Avenue Tampa, Florida 33612 (eServed) Deanne Cherisse Fields, Esquire Department of Children and Families 9393 North Florida Avenue Tampa, Florida 33612 (eServed) Lacey Kantor, Esquire Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204Z 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 (eServed) Javier A. Enriquez, General Counsel Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204F 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 (eServed) Chad Poppell, Secretary Department of Children and Families Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Department is a state government licensing and regulatory agency. At all times material to the instant case, Petitioner and her husband, Keith Sterling, were licensed to operate a family foster home at their residence in Palm Beach County, Florida. On September 1, 1994, as part of the licensing process, the Sterlings signed an "Agreement to Provide Substitute Care for Dependent Children" (hereinafter referred to as the "Agreement"). In so doing, they agreed that they would, as licensed foster parents, among other things, "comply with all requirements for a licensed substitute care home as prescribed by the [D]epartment" and, "whenever possible, give the [D]epartment at least two weeks notice," if they wanted the Department to "remove a child from [their] home." In the spring of 1995, the Sterlings, on a fairly regular basis, "returned" foster children to the Department only a day or two after the children had been placed in their home without giving the Department the "two weeks notice" required by the Agreement. The Sterlings' actions created a further disruption in the lives of these foster children and ran counter to the Department's goal of providing foster children with a relatively "stable setting" until they are adopted or reunited with their birth family. Jo Ann Weisiger, a foster care licensing counselor working in the Department's District 9 foster care licensing and adoption office, visited the Sterlings' home in April of 1995 and expressed the Department's concerns about the Sterlings' practice of "returning" recently placed foster children to the Department. After Weisiger's visit, the practice continued. Weisiger therefore paid another visit to the Sterlings' home on May 15, 1995, to discuss the matter with the Sterlings. During Weisiger's May 15, 1995, visit, Petitioner requested that the Department not place any foster children in her home for three months. She explained that she needed "a break due to her health." The Department complied with Petitioner's request. On September 11, 1995, Weisiger telephoned the Sterlings' residence to find out from Petitioner whether she and her husband wanted to renew their foster family home license (which was due to expire on October 31, 1995). Petitioner was not at home. Weisiger therefore left a message to have Petitioner return the telephone call. The following morning (September 12, 1995), Weisiger received a telephone call from Petitioner. Petitioner told Weisiger that she and her husband wanted to renew their foster family home license, but she expressed an unwillingness to comply with Weisiger's request that she authorize the release of information and records concerning her medical condition. Weisiger advised Petitioner that the Department needed to have such medical information and records in order to determine whether to renew Petitioner's and her husband's license. Weisiger followed up her September 12, 1995, telephone conversation with Petitioner by sending to Petitioner, on September 13, 1995, a letter, which read as follows: Pursuant to your request in June [sic] 1995, to remove the foster children due to your health concerns and personal reasons, we are requesting that you sign a medical release. We will need to contact your physician to obtain a professional opinion on your capacity to parent and meet the needs of our children. We are unable to contact a physician without your permission and without this information, we will not be able to evaluate your home for relicensing. We are enclosing a medical release for your signature. Please return this at your earliest convenience in the enclosed envelope, as your license expires on 10/31/95. The "medical release" that Weisiger sent along with the letter "for [Petitioner's] signature" was the following "Authorization for Release of Health and Medical Information for Prospective Foster and Adoptive Parents" form (hereinafter referred to as the "Medical Release Form") that Weisiger's office uses in its efforts to obtain the necessary information to ascertain whether applicants seeking to become or remain foster or adoptive parents are able to care for children: I hereby request and Authorize (Name of Person) Health [and] Rehabilitative Services 1784 N. Congress Ave., Suite 102 West Palm Beach, FL 33409 To obtain from: (Name of Person or Agency Holding the Information) Address: PHYSICIANS: Please provide complete information The following: All Medical Information, Reports, and Records, including diagnoses, subsequent courses of treatment, and prognoses pertaining to current and future physical and mental health status. All Medical Information, Reports and Records pertaining to health history during the past two years. From the medical record of : (Print or type name of client [and] birth date) For the purpose of assessing the health of the prospective caretaker as it relates to the applicant's ability to provide long-term care of a child/children, including economic support. I understand that my signature authorizes full disclosure of my medical and health condition and thereby, includes HIV test results. All information I hereby authorize to be obtained from this agency will be held strictly confidential and cannot be released by the recipient without my written consent, except for the purpose of judicial review in adoption proceedings. I understand that I may withdraw my consent at any time, but to do so will stop further consideration of myself as an adoptive or foster parent. Date Signature of Applicant USE THIS SPACE ONLY IF APPLICANT WITHDRAWS CONSENT Date consent Signature of Applicant revoked by applicant On September 15, 1995, Petitioner telephoned Weisiger and informed Weisiger that she was not going to sign the Medical Release Form Weisiger had sent her inasmuch as, in her opinion, her "health was none of [the Department's] business." As of the date of the final hearing in this case, Petitioner had not signed the Medical Release Form. She did produce at the final hearing, a letter from her gynecologist, Stephen H. Livingston, M.D., dated October 13, 1995, which read as follows:: Peggy Sterling has been under my care since April 24, 1995. On April 27, 1995, she had a vaginal hysterectomy. She has been cleared to return to work. While Dr. Livingston's letter provides some information regarding Petitioner's health, the information is insufficient to enable the Department to determine whether Petitioner has any health-related problems that would impair her ability to care for, or would otherwise be injurious to, foster children placed in her and her husband's home. On October 31, 1995, the Department "closed" the Sterlings' family foster home "due to [the Department's] inability to determine capability of [the] foster mother [Petitioner] to parent, due to her recent physical problems." By letter dated November 2, 1995, the Department notified the Sterlings that "[s]ince [it had] failed to receive the Authorization for Medical Release [it had] requested from [Petitioner] several weeks [prior thereto], [the Sterlings'] Foster Home license expired on 10/31/95."
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order denying Petitioner's and her husband's application for the renewal of their family foster home license, without prejudice to Petitioner and her husband applying for a new license if, in conjunction therewith, they take the necessary measures to "share [Petitioner's] health history" with the Department, as required by Rule 10M- 6.025(8), Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29th day of March, 1996. STUART M. LERNER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 95-5974 The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on the findings of facts proposed by the Department in its proposed recommended order: 1. Rejected because it lacks sufficient evidentiary/record support. 2-3. Accepted as true and incorporated in substance, although not necessarily repeated verbatim, in this Recommended Order. First sentence: Accepted as true and incorporated in substance; Second sentence: Not incorporated in this Recommended Order because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. First sentence: Rejected as a finding of fact because it is more in the nature of a statement of the law than a finding of fact; Second and third sentences: Accepted as true and incorporated in substance. Accepted as true and incorporated in substance. Not incorporated in this Recommended Order because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. First sentence: Not incorporated in this Recommended Order because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer; Second sentence: To the extent that this proposed finding states that Petitioner told Weisiger "that she was not going to sign the authorization to release any of her medical records to Dept. HRS," it has been accepted as true and incorporated in substance. Otherwise, it has not been incorporated in this Recommended Order because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer; Third sentence: Accepted as true and incorporated in substance. To the extent that this proposed finding states that, during their September 15, 1995, telephone conversation, "Petitioner again refused to sign the authorization to release her medical records to the Dept. HRS," it has been accepted as true and incorporated in substance. Otherwise, it has not been incorporated in this Recommended Order because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. Accepted as true and incorporated in substance. Not incorporated in this Recommended Order because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. COPIES FURNISHED: Peggy Sterling 1626 West 17th Street Riviera Beach, Florida 33404 Karen M. Miller, Esquire District Legal Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 111 South Sapodilla Avenue West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Richard Doran, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sandy Coulter, Acting Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue May the Department of Children and Family Services (DCF) revoke Respondent's foster home license for violating Section 409.175 (8)(b) 1., Florida Statutes, in that Respondent intentionally or negligently committed acts that materially affected the health and safety of children, to-wit: inadequate supervision of a minor child entrusted to her care?
Findings Of Fact R.G. is the biological mother of the infant female, A.G., born out of wedlock. R.G. gave birth to a male child before A.G. That son was taken away from R.G. by DCF. Both A.G. and R.G., while R.G. was yet a minor under the age of 18 years, were adjudicated dependent children, subject to placement by DCF, pending DNA testing of A.G. and two putative fathers. R.G. had been placed with a licensed foster home other than Respondent's licensed foster home. That home requested R.G.'s removal because R.G. would not follow its rules. R.G. with A.G., was then placed in the licensed foster care home of Respondent. Although the placement of A.G. with Respondent raised Respondent's home population to one more live foster child than Respondent's licensed capacity, a situation to which Respondent objected, DCF personnel informed Respondent that the infant A.G. would be counted as part of R.G.'s placement. Therefore, despite A.G. and R.G. being two separate persons, DCF would not consider Respondent to have exceeded her license's capacity. It was not explained on the record how DCF intended to pay board to Respondent for care of A.G., if A.G. were not considered a whole person, but it is clear that DCF personnel resented Respondent's asking how she would be compensated for A.G.'s care. At all times material, R.G. and A.G. were subject to a Circuit Court Order which permitted only "unsupervised day visitation" by R.G. with A.G. (Emphasis in the original). By implication of the Circuit Court Order, and by her own understanding from instructions by DCF personnel, Respondent knew that R.G., the minor mother, was not permitted to have unsupervised night visitation with the dependent infant, A.G. DCF's and Respondent's understanding of the Circuit Court Order was that Respondent, R.G., and A.G. were required to be in Respondent's home after dark, but Respondent was not required to "eyeball" R.G. and A.G. all night, every night, while they were present in Respondent's foster home. Gracie Rager, DCF foster care worker, authorized Respondent to allow R.G. to take A.G. out of Respondent's foster home during the day for unsupervised visitation. Ms. Rager also authorized Respondent to allow R.G. to take A.G. to R.G.'s older natural sister's home to spend some nights, including weekends. R.G.'s older natural sister was married and licensed for foster care. Accordingly, DCF personnel, including Ms. Rager, presumed that the older sister was sufficiently responsible and qualified to provide supervision of R.G. and A.G. at night. DCF reasonably concluded that R.G.'s presence with A.G. in her sister's home at night would constitute supervised night visitation and comply with the Court's Order. Ms. Rager never authorized Respondent to allow R.G. to take A.G. out at night by herself, but Ms. Rager reasonably saw no impediment, including the Circuit Court Order, to R.G. taking A.G. with her anywhere she wanted to take the baby during the day. R.G. openly resented being placed with Respondent because Respondent is Black. R.G. wanted to return, with A.G., to a white foster home placement. As a result, R.G. was never cooperative with Respondent. When R.G. turned 18 years of age, she became openly defiant of Respondent. R.G. insisted that she alone, would do everything for A.G., who was still under two years old. R.G. refused all assistance from Respondent concerning A.G. Respondent asked DCF to remove R.G. and A.G. or at least A.G., from her foster home. DCF had no other placement for them and asked Respondent to keep them until another placement was found. R.G. had a part-time day job. To get there, she would "catch a ride" with others. She would not accept a ride from Respondent. Sometimes, R.G. would take A.G. with her to work and go directly from work, with A.G., to her older, licensed sister's home. On these occasions, R.G. and A.G. might be gone for a night or a weekend. When R.G. did not return to Respondent's foster home, Respondent sometimes called R.G.'s older, licensed sister's home to be sure that R.G. and A.G. had arrived there safely. Sometimes, Respondent asked this sister to call her when R.G. and A.G. arrived. However, Respondent did not always contact R.G.'s older, licensed sister or otherwise check-up on R.G.'s and A.G.'s whereabouts overnight or over a weekend. When R.G. and A.G. returned after a night or weekend away, Respondent did not always check up on where they had been. Respondent was under the impression that a different, adult sister of R.G.'s was also a suitable adult supervisor for after dark, even though that sister was not licensed for foster care. Indeed, there is nothing in the Circuit Court Order requiring that supervised night-time visitation of R.G. with A.G. could not be undertaken by any other adult, regardless of whether that person were licensed for foster care. Respondent never checked to see if R.G. and A.G. were with R.G.'s unlicensed sister. At no time did Respondent report to law enforcement or DCF that R.G. had gone off and failed to return or that R.G. was taking A.G. away on weekends. At some point, R.G.'s authorized and licensed older sister called Ms. Rager and said R.G. had taken A.G. out all night with R.G.'s boyfriend and had not returned. It is unclear from Ms. Rager's testimony whether R.G.'s and A.G.'s departure point for their night or weekend of unsupervised visitation was Respondent's home or R.G.'s licensed sister's home. On February 9, 2001, Ms. Page, a DCF protective investigator, responded to an abuse hotline call and met with Respondent in the lobby of a DCF facility. During her interview of Respondent, Ms. Page knew nothing of where either R.G. or A.G. had been picked up, or how long they had been unsupervised at night, but Ms. Page "understood" from Ms. Rager that R.G. and A.G. had been removed from Respondent's home and that Respondent had come to the DCF facility voluntarily. Ms. Page was particularly concerned because of a comment Respondent made in the course of this interview, to the effect that Respondent guessed she had "handled it all wrong" because she had only asked to have the baby, A.G., removed from her care instead of reporting R.G.'s rebelliousness. DCF Investigator Page testified that she "verified" in an abuse report that Respondent was guilty of neglect by failure to notify authorities of R.G.'s unsupervised night visitation with A.G. There is insufficient evidence to determine of Respondent ever had a chance to challenge the abuse report or if the report was ever "confirmed." There is no evidence R.G. or A.G. suffered harm as a result of this incident.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order dismissing charges against Respondent and restoring her foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of October, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: David West, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 390, Mail Stop 3 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Dr. James Brant, Qualified Representative 1140 Durkee Drive, North Jacksonville, Florida 32209 Cheryl Smith Post Office Box 1053 Lake City, Florida 32056 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact Respondents have cared for foster children for some twenty years. In November or December of 1975, they began with Christian Youth Care, Inc. (CYC), a foster home in Zephyrhills founded under the auspices of the First Baptist Church of Zephyrhills. Since then small groups of adolescent girls have lived with respondents and their teenage daughter, Dawn. In all, some 80 children have lived at CYC since respondents have had charge of the home. In July of 1977, petitioner placed June Holmes, who is deaf and dumb, with respondents. After June had been with the Houghs for two weeks or so, Lillian Parsons, a social worker in petitioner's employ, told Mrs. Hough that June should be wearing a hearing aid. June did not want to wear a hearing aid. She was also disappointed that Mrs. Hough would not take her to Daytona Beach; she became very upset, wielded a straightened safety pen and started knocking things off bureaus. When Mr. Hough served as a medical technician in the armed forces, unruly patients were sometimes wrapped in blankets. Perhaps remembering this experience, he enlisted Mrs. Hough in wrestling June to the floor, wrapping her in a blanket and securing the blanket with three belts. In the process, Mr. Hough said to June, "See how mad you can get." These events caused concern among the other children living in the home, who gathered to watch and, at respondents' suggestion, to say prayers. Mrs. Hough told June that she loved her. After June had lain bound in this fashion for 45 minutes, respondents released her. The following day Mrs. Hough called Mrs. Parsons to report the incident and to ask that June be placed in another home. Mrs. Parsons expressed no disapproval of respondents' method of restraining June nor did she tell them not to do it again. June remained with respondents until she left for boarding school in St. Augustine. When June returned to the Houghs from school on Easter vacation 1978, she wanted a new pair of shoes that cost $24.95. Respondents bought her a different pair instead. Easter morning June wanted to wear her old shoes, not her new shoes. This caused an argument. Mrs. Hough stayed home with June while Mr. Hough took the others to church. When Mrs. Hough began packing June's clothes into a suitcase, June was "worried that [respondents] would move [her] out." Deposition of June Holmes, p. 5. She walked outside and sat under a tree near the road. Mrs. Hough telephoned her husband and summoned him home from church. With the help of a deputy sheriff brandishing handcuffs, respondents coaxed June into their van and drove her up the driveway to their home. At first she refused to leave the van, so respondents went inside without her. When June eventually went inside, there was another confrontation. Mr. Hough wrestled June to the floor and sent Mrs. Hough for a blanket. After respondents wrapped June in the blanket and secured it with belts, Mr. Hough set off to retrieve the children he had left at church. After Mr. Hough returned with the other children, respondents unwrapped June and there was an Easter egg hunt. The next day Mrs. Hough called petitioner's offices in New Port Richey, then drove June to New Port Richey and left her there, because she wanted no more to do with her. When Mrs. Parsons learned that respondents had wrapped June in a blanket a second time, she asked to be relieved of responsibility for June. Eventually David J. Schultz, at the time a child welfare social worker in petitioner's employ, assumed responsibility for June; and June was again placed with respondents. Mr. and Mrs. Hough frequently communicated with guidance counselors and teachers at the schools children in their care attended. They made six visits to talk about Evelyn Ciacelli's progress with Ricky Rowell, guidance counselor at Woodland Elementary School in Zephryhills, and spoke to him on the telephone about Evelyn on several other occasions. Disappointed in Evelyn's progress with her homework one night, Mr. Hough picked her up and shook her. On another occasion, Evelyn and her roommate were wrestling in their room after they had been sent to bed. Mr. Hough heard them from the kitchen, walked into their bedroom with a spatula in his hand, and gave Evelyn, who was wearing a bathrobe over her nightgown, a swat on the rear with the spatula. On November 20, 1978, David J. Schultz left Petitioner's employ. He subsequently went to work for a corporation controlled by respondents and began living in their home. He lived there on December 13, 1978. On December 13, 1978, Bonnie Blair McKenzie, then employed by petitioner as a community youth leader, picked up Cindy Spickelmier at a shelter home in Dade City and drove her to respondents' home. Cindy, a 14 year old, was at the shelter home after having run away from another foster home, the Newmans'. She had lived with respondents previously and David Schultz also knew her. Shortly after Cindy's arrival, David Schultz was talking to her in the Houghs' living room, where she was sitting on a couch, crying. Also present were Mr. Hough, Ms. McKenzie, Nancy Newman, the foster mother who had previously had custody of Cindy, and Ed Springer, then the social worker in petitioner's employ responsible for Cindy's placement. Angry because Cindy was ignoring him, David Schultz grabbed the hair of her head, jerked her up into a standing position, had her bend over and lean against a desk for support, and struck her buttocks with a wooden paddle an inch thick. He administered the first blow with such force that Ms. Newman was frightened and Ms. McKenzie was "horrified and devastated." (T.52). Cindy fell to her knees, hysterical. Less forcefully, David Schultz struck her buttocks a second time. At the hearing Mr. Hough testified that: after Dave gave her the swats she sat back down and she was a new child. We were able to communicate with her and we thought we were really making good progress and being able to work with the child. That was the purpose of the new program and of course we were trying to set up parameters that would be beneficial to the child. (T.233). Notwithstanding this perceived improvement in Cindy's deportment, Ed Springer gave Cindy another spanking 30 or 45 minutes after David Schultz had finished. In the presence of Mr. and Mrs. Hough, and Mr. Schultz, Ed Springer struck Cindy five times on the buttocks with the same wooden paddle David Schultz had used, as punishment for running away from the Newmans' house. Later, on the evening of December 13, 1978, Cindy ran away from the Houghs'. She ended up at her mother's house where she spent the night. The next day her mother took her to the Pasco County Sheriff's Department. There Fay Wilbur an investigator for the Sheriff's Department, took photographs of Cindy's badly bruised buttocks. Petitioner's exhibits 3, 4 and 5. On the following day, December 15, 1978, Dr. Lena Ayala, a pediatrician, examined Cindy. She found large "[v]ery tender, painful" (T.55) hematomas covering the whole area of Cindy's buttocks. If she had seen a child in the custody of its natural parents in that condition, Dr. Ayala testified, she would have reported the matter to the child abuse registry. Petitioner discharged Ed Springer because of the beating he had administered to Cindy Spickelmier. Petitioner publishes a manual with a chapter entitled "Foster Family Group Homes for Dependent youth," Petitioner's exhibit No. 8. In part, the manual provides: 8.4.4 Unacceptable disciplinary approaches include: a. Corporal punishment--slapping, kicking, hitting, etc. * * * Humiliation, ridicule, sarcasm, shaming in front of the group or alone. Deprivation of essential needs such as food, sleep, or parental visits. Petitioner's exhibit No. 8, p.9. Although petitioner sometimes furnished foster group home licensees copies of its manuals, petitioner's files do not indicate that either Mr. or Mrs. Hough ever received a copy. Respondents wore unaware of the manual's contents on December 13, 1978; and David Schultz was also unaware of any policy against corporal punishment of foster group home children. Lorraine Cash, a foster mother in Pasco County, never spanked any foster child in her care over the age of eleven years. On the other hand, Henry Arnett, another foster parent in Pasco County, used corporal punishment in disciplining teen aged foster boys. He and his wife, Doris, were named foster parents of the year in 1978. On December 14, 1978, Joanne Wall telephoned respondents on behalf of petitioner and told Mr. Hough that David Schultz should be barred from their premises. When Mr. Hough protested that David Schultz lived on the premises, Ms. Wall asked Mr. Hough to keep David Schultz from working with the girls, which Mr. Hough agreed to do. On December 18, 1978, respondents submitted an application to petitioner for a child care center license, an application on which they had begun work considerably before December 13, 1978. Discouraged by the pace at which this application was being considered and by what respondents perceived as unfairness on the part of some of petitioner's personnel, Mr. Hough on February 15, 1979, told William Laing, a manager for petitioner, that he wanted all the foster children but two removed by five o'clock the following day, a Friday. Even though the agreement between petitioner and respondents called for two weeks' notice by the foster parents, petitioner's exhibit No. 6, Mr. Hough was unwilling to wait so long. Petitioner arranged to pick up all the foster children in respondents' care on the following day. Some of the children had not been told they would be leaving the Houghs' home. Respondents own improved real estate from which they derive rental income. In addition, CYC, funded by the First Baptist Church of Zephyrhills, paid respondents a salary. Occasionally, Mr. Hough worked outside the home. Pasco County contributed to the costs of caring for foster children. Respondents did not need moneys petitioner paid them on behalf of the children for their own personal purposes.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That, on the next anniversary of the date of respondents' original foster group home license, petitioner discontinue respondents' license for a period of one year. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of June, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara McPherson, Esquire Post Office Box 5046 Clearwater, Florida 33518 Robert L. Williams, Esquire Post Office Box 443 Dade City, Florida 33525
