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COLUMBIA/JFK MEDICAL CENTER LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, D/B/A JFK MEDICAL CENTER vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION AND BETHESDA HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, INC., D/B/A WEST BOYNTON COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, 03-002829CON (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 31, 2003 Number: 03-002829CON Latest Update: Mar. 11, 2005

The Issue The issue is whether the Agency should approve the Certificate of Need applications filed by Bethesda and/or JFK, each of which proposes to establish an 80-bed satellite hospital in the West Boynton area of Acute Care Subdistrict 9-5.

Findings Of Fact The Parties (1) Bethesda Bethesda operates Bethesda Memorial, which is a 362-bed not-for-profit hospital in Boynton Beach. Bethesda also operates Bethesda Health City, which is a “medical mall” located in the West Boynton area of South Palm Beach County. As a not-for-profit community-based health care organization, Bethesda’s mission is to provide quality health care services to the residents of South Palm Beach County that it serves regardless of their ability to pay. Bethesda Memorial opened in 1959 as a public hospital under the ownership of Palm Beach County’s former hospital taxing district. Bethesda Memorial was reorganized in 1984 as a private not-for-profit hospital owned by Bethesda. Bethesda Memorial provides tertiary-level care. Bethesda Memorial’s 362 licensed beds include 347 general medical-surgical (med-surg) acute care beds and a 15-bed Level II and Level III neonatal intensive care unit (NICU). A 28-bed comprehensive medical rehabilitation (CMR) unit will open at Bethesda Memorial in 2005, increasing the hospital’s licensed capacity to 390 beds. Not all of Bethesda Memorial’s licensed beds are available for general patient use; 14 of the beds are leased to a hospice program and 14 of the beds are operated under contract as a special care unit (SCU). The hospice lease and the SCU contract run through 2005. Even though the hospice lease and SCU contract have been profitable ventures for Bethesda, several Bethesda witnesses testified that those agreements would not be renewed if Bethesda Memorial needs those 28 beds to accommodate its general patients after its capacity is reduced through the transfer of 80 beds to its proposed satellite hospital; however, as of the date of the hearing, Bethesda had not taken any formal steps to terminate those agreements. It is unclear how the patients that are currently being served in the hospice unit and SCU would be served in the community if Bethesda terminates the agreements. Bethesda Memorial also has a 10-bed “VIP” unit that is generally available only to patients that have contributed at least $50,000 to Bethesda’s charitable foundation and are willing to pay an up-front $750.00 per day charge for the room; however, the beds in the VIP unit can be and have been utilized by other patients when all of the other beds in the hospital are full. Bethesda Memorial has a high-volume obstetrics (OB) program and an active emergency department (ED). Bethesda Memorial also offers a number of specialized programs including a comprehensive cancer program, a pediatrics program, a diagnostic cardiac catheterization program, and a wide variety of outpatient services. Bethesda Memorial is a well-utilized facility; its overall occupancy rate was 73.25 percent from July 2001 though June 2002. Bethesda Memorial does not currently offer interventional cardiology services or open heart surgery, but it has been attempting to get CON or legislative approval to offer those services for the past several years because of their profitable nature. Bethesda Memorial has designated, shelled-in space in its hospital for those services if it ever gets the necessary approvals. The evidence was not persuasive that there are physical or other constraints that would preclude further incremental bed expansions at Bethesda Memorial or that would make such expansions cost-prohibitive. Bethesda recently purchased property adjacent to Bethesda Memorial and was able to get that property rezoned from residential to hospital use. It is unclear how large that property is and what use, if any, Bethesda has planned for that property. Bethesda also owns 1.4 acres of vacant property that is several blocks from Bethesda Memorial. The property is not currently zoned for hospital use, and because it is somewhat isolated from Bethesda Memorial, Bethesda intends to sell the property rather than develop it. Bethesda Memorial is accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO). Bethesda Health City is a 135,000 square foot “medical mall” or “hospital without beds” that opened in 1995. The facility is located in the West Boynton area at the intersection of Hagan Ranch Road and Boynton Beach Boulevard, just east of the Florida Turnpike. Bethesda Health City offers services such as diagnostic imaging, outpatient rehabilitation, radiation therapy, and a woman’s center. The facility has offices for approximately 20 physician groups, and it also provides community outreach services targeted to the large senior population in the West Boynton area. Bethesda Health City was established to help Bethesda Memorial capture patients from the growing West Boynton area, and it has done so. There is capacity to add an additional 30,000 to 40,000 square feet of space to Bethesda Health City, and Bethesda intends to expand the facility whether or not its proposed satellite hospital is approved. Bethesda Health City provides Bethesda a significant physical presence in the West Boynton area. The facility has contributed to Bethesda Memorial’s significant and stable market share in the West Boynton area. In addition to Bethesda Memorial and Bethesda Health City, Bethesda administers a charitable foundation whose primary purpose is to fund Bethesda Memorial’s capital acquisitions and improvements. The foundation has considerable assets and is in the midst of a $100 million capital campaign through which it has already raised approximately $37 million. Bethesda Memorial experienced considerable and constant growth in its admissions and patient days between 1997 and 2003; its admissions grew by 45 percent and its patients days grew by 44 percent over that period. Bethesda Memorial is financially sound. It has substantial cash reserves and it is well-rated by the financial markets. The evidence was not persuasive that Bethesda’s current or long-term financial situation is distressed. Unlike other not-for-profit hospitals in District 9, Bethesda Memorial is a profitable hospital. Between 1997 and 2002, Bethesda Memorial’s operating income averaged approximately $5.5 million and in 2003, its operating income was approximately $7 million. In each of those years, the hospital also had significant non-operating revenues such that its total revenues over expenses during that period averaged approximately $10 million. The Bethesda system as a whole is also profitable. It had operating income of $2.4 million in 2002 and $2.1 million in 2001. Bethesda Memorial and the Bethesda system did not perform as well financially as JFK, Delray, or Wellington between 1997 and 2002; each of those hospitals had higher returns on assets, returns on equity, and total margin over that period than did Bethesda Memorial and Bethesda, and JFK and Delray had considerably more operating income over that period than did Bethesda Memorial. Bethesda Memorial’s CMR unit is projected to have a positive financial impact on Bethesda starting in 2005, and if approved, Bethesda Memorial’s open heart surgery program is also projected to have a positive impact on Bethesda’s long-term financial condition. (2) JFK JFK is owned by HCA, Inc. (HCA). HCA is nationwide, for-profit hospital chain. JFK is a 424-bed for-profit hospital in Atlantis, which is a small municipality in the Lake Worth area. JFK provides tertiary-level care. JFK is the most highly utilized hospital in District 9, and one of the most highly utilized hospitals in the state. JFK’s annual occupancy rate was 89.96 percent between July 2001 and June 2002, JFK is one of thee HCA hospitals in Palm Beach County. The others are Columbia and Palms West, both of which are in North Palm Beach County, Subdistrict 9-4. JFK operated as a not-for-profit hospital for approximately 30 years until it was purchased by HCA in 1996. Approximately $120 million of the purchase price paid by HCA was used to establish a charitable foundation, the Quantum Foundation, which funds a variety of health-related projects in the South Palm Beach County area. The services provided at JFK include orthopedics, cancer services, interventional cardiology and open heart surgery, neurologic services, and internal medicine. JFK does not offer pediatric or OB services. HCA has made significant capital improvements at JFK since it acquired the hospital. The community image of the hospital and the morale of its employees has significantly improved since the acquisition by HCA. JFK is accredited by JCAHO. JFK recently received a CON to add 36 beds, which will increase its licensed capacity to 460 beds. The beds will be located in shelled-in space on the fifth floor of JFK’s south tower, but they have not yet been brought on-line. JFK’s recently-constructed northwest tower was engineered so that an additional two floors can be added to that tower in the future, which would allow JFK to add 36 more beds. The evidence was not persuasive that there are physical or other constraints that would preclude further incremental bed expansions at JFK beyond the 72 beds identified above. JFK is attempting to acquire a long-term lease for 19 acres across the street from its hospital that would be used for parking and medical office buildings. If that property is leased and developed, JFK may be able to free-up additional space for future bed expansions; however, the record does not establish the likelihood of the lease being consummated, the amount of space that might be freed-up if that property was developed, or any of the costs associated therewith. JFK recently constructed a medical office building in the West Boynton area that includes a wound care center and a diabetes center. That facility is on Jog Road, north of Boynton Beach Boulevard. Aside from the medical office building, JFK had not formally targeted the West Boynton area for expansion; its most recent strategic plan did not mention the prospect of locating a satellite hospital in that area. (3) Delray Delray is owned by Tenet Healthcare Corporation (Tenet). Tenet is a nationwide, for-profit hospital chain. Tenet operates four hospitals in Palm Beach County in addition to Delray, including West Boca Medical Center (West Boca) in South Palm Beach County, and Good Samaritan, St. Mary’s, and Palm Beach Gardens in North Palm Beach County. Delray is a 372-bed for-profit hospital in Delray Beach. Delray is located approximately 2.5 miles south of Atlantic Boulevard. Delray is in zip code 33484, but it is near the eastern boundary of zip code 33446. Delray opened in 1982, and is accredited by JACHO. Delray provides tertiary-level care. Delray is located on a “campus” that includes the hospital building, a 53-bed in-patient psychiatric facility known as Fair Oaks Pavillion (Fair Oaks), and a 90-bed CMR facility known as Pinecrest Rehabilitation Hospital. There is a separately-licensed 120-bed nursing home located adjacent to the campus. Delray’s 372 licensed beds include the 53 in-patient psychiatric beds at Fair Oaks, which is approximately 200 yards from Delray’s main hospital. Delray has added 108 beds to its hospital since 1996. Even with those bed additions, Delray remains a very highly utilized facility; its annual occupancy rate between July 2001 and June 2002 was 82.32 percent. Delray shelled-in space for an additional 31 beds as part of a recent expansion of its ED and ambulatory care unit. Delray intends to put those beds into service as soon as it can. Delray has the ability to further expand its hospital beyond the 31 beds planned for the shelled-in space. It already has local government approval for a total of 616 beds on its campus. The services provided at Delray include general medical and surgery services, trauma, interventional cardiology, open heart surgery, in-patient psychiatric services, orthopedics, and neurosurgery, with a special focus on chronically-ill elderly patients. Delray does not provide OB services. Delray has been the only provider of in-patient psychiatric services in South Palm Beach County since October 2001 when Bethesda Memorial discontinued its program. Delray has been a state-designated Level II trauma center since 1991, which requires it to have a neurosurgeon, trauma surgeon, and other specialists and specialized equipment available at all times. Delray receives funding from the local health district to help offset a large portion of the costs associated with providing its trauma services. Delray leases space in a medical office building in the West Boynton area where it provides diagnostic imaging, mammography, and laboratory services. Delray’s service area includes zip codes 33437, 33446, and 33467, which are being targeted by Bethesda and JFK with their proposed satellite hospitals. Delray is currently, and historically has been a very profitable hospital. It reported a “total margin” of approximately $32.9 million on its May 2002 “Prior Year Report” filed with the Agency,4 and it reported operating income of $40.5 million in its audited financial statements for fiscal year 2003. (4) Wellington Wellington is owned by Universal Health System (Universal). Universal is a nationwide, for-profit hospital chain. Wellington is a 121-bed for-profit hospital in the northwestern portion of South Palm Beach County. Wellington is located in zip code 33414, approximately 2.5 miles south of Southern Boulevard at the intersection of State Road 7 (also known as U.S. Highway 441) and Forest Hill Boulevard. Wellington opened in 1986 as an osteopathic hospital, and approximately 25 percent of its current medical staff is osteopathic physicians. Wellington is accredited by JCAHO and the American Osteopathic Association. Wellington provides tertiary-level care. Wellington is easily accessible from Forest Hill Boulevard and State Road 7, and the hospital is served by the Palm Beach County bus system, which has a stop in Wellington’s parking lot. Wellington has made substantial capital improvements to its hospital over the past five years. Those improvements were designed to enhance the hospital’s efficiency in serving its current patients and also to anticipate future patient demand. Wellington owns 29 acres of property adjacent to the 26-acre site on which the hospital is located. The adjacent property is currently undeveloped and it is available for future expansions of Wellington. Wellington’s chief executive officer (CEO) testified that Wellington has a site plan approved for its undeveloped property and that it has “vested concurrency” for the future development of that property; however, that testimony was not corroborated (as was the case with Delray’s approved master plan) and therefore is not persuasive. The services at Wellington include an ED, an OB program, general medical and surgical care, an orthopedic unit, a comprehensive cancer center, a wound care center, a cardiology program with a dedicated cardiovascular intensive care unit, and an outpatient diagnostic center. Wellington’s OB program includes 18 labor rooms, 19 post-partum rooms and a 10-bed Level II NICU. Wellington delivers approximately six babies per day and has the capacity to deliver up to 15 babies per day. Wellington’s utilization has steadily grown over the years, but it is still one of the lowest utilized facilities in South Palm Beach County; its annual occupancy rate was 64.27 percent between July 2001 and June 2002. Wellington derives approximately 90 percent of its patients from a geographic area bounded by Military Trail on the east, the Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge on the west, Okeechobee Boulevard to the north, and Boynton Beach Boulevard to the south. That area includes zip codes 33414, 33437, 33463, and 33467, which are being targeted by Bethesda and JFK with their proposed satellite hospitals. Wellington has teaching and training programs for physician assistants and certified nurse anesthetists under contracts with Florida International University and Florida Atlantic University. Wellington also has a family practice residency/internship teaching program for osteopathic doctors that is affiliated with Lake Erie School of Osteopathic Medicine, and a three-year dermatology teaching program. When Wellington was established in 1986, there was very little population in the western portion of South Palm Beach County to support the hospital. As a result, the hospital was unprofitable in its early years, and by 2000, it had accumulated a deficit of $22 million. Wellington’s financial performance has improved significantly in the past several years, but it still has a large accumulated deficit. Wellington is relying on its ability to retain or increase its market share in the growing West Boynton area in order to remain profitable and eliminate its accumulated deficit. (5) Agency The Agency is the state agency responsible for administering the CON program and licensing hospitals and other health care facilities. Application Submittal and Review and Preliminary Agency Action Bethesda and JFK each filed CON applications with the Agency in the first “hospital beds and facilities” batching cycle of 2003. Each application sought to establish a new 80- bed satellite hospital in the West Boynton area of South Palm Beach County, Subdistrict 9-5. The fixed need pool published by the Agency for the applicable batching cycle identified a need for zero acute care beds in Subdistrict 9-5. There were no challenges to the published fixed need pool. The letters of intent and CON applications filed by Bethesda and JFK for their respective satellite hospitals were timely filed and complied with all of the technical submittal requirements in the governing statutes and rules. JFK’s letter of intent was filed within the “grace period” (see Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.008(1)(d)2.) in direct response to Bethesda’s earlier-filed letter of intent. There is nothing inherently improper about a “grace period” letter of intent, and very little significance has been given to the responsive nature of JFK’s proposal in the comparative evaluation of the CON applications. A public hearing was held on the applications by the local health council on April 24, 2003.5 Presentations were made at the public hearing in support of and in opposition to the applications. The opposition came primarily from a representative of Delray; the support came from representatives of Bethesda and JFK and several residents of the West Boynton area. The reasons offered by the speakers for their opposition or support of the applications were essentially the same as those presented at the hearing, and no independent significance has been given to the testimony and “evidence” presented at the public hearing. Bethesda’s and JFK’s applications were comparatively reviewed by the Agency in accordance with the Agency’s rules and standard procedures. On June 13, 2003, the Agency issued its State Agency Action Report (SAAR) based upon its comparative review of the applications. The SAAR recommended approval of Bethesda’s application and denial of JFK’s application. The Agency’s published notice of intent to approve Bethesda’s application and to deny JFK’s application in the June 27, 2003, edition of the Florida Administrative Weekly as required by statute and Agency rule. The Agency reaffirmed its preliminary decisions on the applications through the hearing testimony of Jeffrey Gregg, the Bureau Chief of the Agency’s CON program. The petitions for administrative hearing challenging the Agency’s preliminary decisions on the CON applications at issue in this proceeding were all timely filed. Acute Care Subdistricts 9-4 and 9-5 The Agency calculates the inventory of acute care beds on a subdistrict basis, and it considers CON applications for additional acute care beds on a subdistrict basis. Palm Beach County is in District 9, which is divided into five subdistricts. Only two of the subdistricts, 9-4 and 9-5, are relevant in this case. Subdistrict 9-4 is North Palm Beach County, and Subdistrict 9-5 is South Palm Beach County. The dividing line between the two subdistricts is Southern Boulevard. There are six existing acute care hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5: Bethesda Memorial, JFK, Delray, Wellington, West Boca, and Boca Raton Community Hospital (Boca Community). Boca Community and Bethesda are the only not-for- profit hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5; the others are for-profit hospitals. The service area of Palms West, which is located on Southern Boulevard in Subdistrict 9-4, includes portions of Subdistrict 9-5 and the West Boynton area. The utilization of hospital services in Subdistrict 9- 5 has historically been higher than the utilization of hospital services in Subdistrict 9-4. In calendar year 2002, for example, the average occupancy rate of the Subdistrict 9-5 hospitals was 78.2 percent as compared to 55.6 percent for the Subdistrict 9-4 hospitals; and during the “peak season” of January through March 2002, the average occupancy rates were 88.4 percent in Subdistrict 9-5 and 62 percent in Subdistrict 9-4. The West Boynton Area The West Boynton area is an unincorporated area of South Palm Beach County. Its approximate boundaries are Congress avenue on the east, the Loxahatchee National Wildlife Reserve on the west, the L-30 canal (which is several miles north of Atlantic Avenue) on the south, and Hypoluxo Road on the north. The West Boynton area roughly corresponds to the geographic area that is included in zip codes 33436, 33437, 33463, and 33467. The Florida Turnpike, which runs north-south, roughly bisects the West Boynton area. The Turnpike is not a geographic barrier between the east and west portions of the West Boynton area, but it served as the de facto boundary of the urban service area until approximately 10 years ago when significant amounts of development began to “jump” the Turnpike. Boynton Beach Boulevard is the primary east-west road in the West Boynton area, although there are several other east- west arterial roads within the area including Lantana Road and Hypoluxo Road. Other major east-west roads in close proximity to the West Boynton area are Forest Hill Boulevard, Lake Worth Road, and Atlantic Avenue. There are several major north-south roads in the West Boynton area in addition to the Turnpike, including Jog Road, Hagen Ranch Road, and State Road 7. State Road 7 is the westernmost major north-south road in South Palm Beach County. As a result of local zoning restrictions, very little development in the West Boynton area is or will be west of State Road 7. The 2002 population of the West Boynton area, as defined by the four zip codes identified above, was approximately 156,000. There are seasonal variations in the population, but they are not as significant as the seasonal variations in the population of the more easterly portions of Palm Beach County. The population of the West Boynton area is projected to grow to approximately 181,000 by 2007, which corresponds to an annual growth rate of approximately 3.1 percent per year. That growth rate is higher than the annual growth rate projected over that period for the state as a whole (1.6 percent), Palm Beach County (two percent), and District 9 (1.9 percent). Approximately 89 percent of the 2003 population of the West Boynton area was located to the east of the Turnpike. The portion of the West Boynton area to the west of the Turnpike is projected to grow at a considerably faster rate through 2008 than the area to the east of the Turnpike, which is consistent with the extensive amount of residential development that is underway or approved in the West Boynton area west of the Turnpike. In 2002, approximately 28.6 percent of the residents of the West Boynton area were in the age 65 and older (“65+”) age cohort. That percentage is higher than the percentages in that age cohort for the state as a whole (17.5 percent), Palm Beach County (22.5 percent), or District 9 (22.5 percent). The 65+ age cohort is projected to remain the largest segment of the West Boynton area population through 2008. A large number of the existing residential communities and the communities under development in the West Boynton area are retirement communities that are deed-restricted to persons over the age of 55, which contributes to the higher percentage of the population in the 65+ age cohort currently and projected in the future. The West Boynton area is more affluent than and offers a better payer-mix than the existing service areas of Bethesda Memorial and JFK. As compared to the existing service areas of those hospitals, the West Boynton area has a lower percentage of uninsured residents, a higher percentage of Medicare and insured residents, a lower percentage of households with annual incomes below $20,000, and a higher percentage of households with annual incomes above $60,000. There is currently healthy competition in the West Boynton area for acute care services. That competition includes each of the four hospital parties in this case as well as several other hospitals. JFK, Bethesda, Wellington, and Delray, collectively accounted for approximately 72 percent of the discharges from the West Boynton area in calendar years 2000, 2001, and 2002. The percentage of the West Boynton area discharges attributable to each of those hospitals or, stated another way, the hospitals' market shares in the West Boynton area over that period are as follows6: JFK Bethesda Delray Wellington 2000 31.7% 23.2% 10.6% 6.1% 2001 30.1% 24.0% 11.2% 6.9% 2002 28.8% 23.9% 11.4% 7.7% There is no credible evidence that there will be any significant changes in those relative market shares over the five-year planning horizon applicable to the applications at issue in this case if a new hospital is not approved in the West Boynton area. Stated another way, the competitive balance that currently exists in the West Boynton market is expected to continue unless something disrupts that balance, such as the approval of a new hospital in the area. As discussed below, if either of the proposed satellite hospitals are approved, the market share of the approved hospital will increase to the detriment of the other hospitals. There is considerable community support for a new hospital in the West Boynton area from the residents of that area, as reflected in the letters of support included in the CON applications, the testimony at the local public hearing on the applications, and the deposition testimony from area residents and the related exhibits introduced at the hearing. The community support is not, on balance, directed to the approval of Bethesda's proposed satellite hospital over JFK’s proposed satellite hospital, or vice versa; it is simply for the expeditious approval of a hospital. Need for OB Services in the South Palm Beach County and/or the West Boynton Area There are currently four OB programs in Subdistrict 9-5. The programs are at Bethesda Memorial, Wellington, West Boca, and Boca Community. The evidence is not persuasive that an additional OB program is needed in Subdistrict 9-5. Indeed, Dr. Samuel Kaufman, an OB/GYN who has practiced in the area for many years, testified credibly that the four existing OB programs in the subdistrict are just now beginning to do enough deliveries to be efficient. There was no persuasive evidence that there are accessibility problems at the existing OB programs because of their utilization rates. Indeed, the OB unit at Wellington has the capacity to handle up to an additional nine deliveries per day. Each of the existing OB programs offers Level II and/or Level III NICU services, which is typically referred to as “NICU backup.” It is not feasible to provide NICU backup at a low-volume OB program such as the 10-bed OB unit proposed in JFK’s satellite hospital. It is important to have NICU backup because it is not uncommon for high-risk OB patients to unexpectedly present to the hospital and, in such circumstances, it is better for the child to have NICU services at the hospital where he or she is delivered rather than having to be transferred to another hospital. The standard of care in South Palm Beach County requires NICU backup and, based upon malpractice liability concerns, some OB/GYNs will not deliver babies at a hospital that does not have NICU backup. OB is among the top ten discharges in the proposed service area of JFK’s satellite hospital, which is not uncommon around the state; however, because of the lower average length of stay (ALOS) associated with an OB admission, the high number of discharges does not correlate to a large number of patient days in the service area. The population group that is most likely to utilize OB services is females between the ages of 15 and 44 (hereafter “the Female 15-44 age cohort”). Only 16 percent of the 2002 population of the West Boynton area was in the Female 15-44 age cohort, and that cohort is projected to grow at a slower annual rate (2.3 percent) than the population of the West Boynton area as a whole (3.1 percent) through 2007.7 The relatively small portion of the population in the Female 15-44 age cohort is consistent with the data showing the highest percentage of the population in the West Boynton area in the 65+ age cohort. It is also consistent with the testimony and evidence regarding the number of existing and planned deed- restricted retirement communities in the West Boynton area. The logic of including an OB unit in the proposed JFK satellite hospital is undercut by the recent closure of the OB unit at Columbia. According to Columbia’s CEO, Columbia’s OB unit was closed in 2002 because it “was a small unit” with a low volume, because the service area from which Columbia was drawing its patients was predominately elderly, and because there were several other hospitals within close proximity to Columbia that had larger OB units with NICU backup. Based upon those factors, Columbia’s CEO concluded that “there was no real community need to do OB” and that “it just didn’t make sense” to do OB. The same factors exist in the West Boynton area and, as a result, the comments of Columbia’s CEO are equally applicable to the inclusion of an OB unit in the proposed JFK satellite hospital. The Proposed Satellite Hospitals (1) Bethesda West Bethesda’s application, CON 9659, proposes to establish an 80-bed satellite hospital in the West Boynton area by de-licensing 80 beds at Bethesda Memorial and then transferring those beds to the proposed satellite hospital. The transfer of beds proposed in Bethesda’s application will not increase the inventory of acute care beds in either District 9 or Subdistrict 9-5. The 80-bed increase at Bethesda West will be offset by the 80-bed decrease at Bethesda Memorial, both of which are in Subdistrict 9-5. The beds transferred to Bethesda West will come from double-occupancy rooms, thereby allowing Bethesda Memorial to convert those rooms to private rooms. The conversion to private rooms will create efficiencies at Bethesda Memorial by eliminating gender-based or disease-based conflicts between patients that often arise with double-occupancy rooms. The transfer of 80 beds to Bethesda West will reduce Bethesda Memorial’s licensed capacity to 282 beds. That figure includes the 15 NICU beds, the 14 hospice beds, and the 14-bed SCU; therefore, after the bed transfer, Bethesda Memorial will have only 239 beds available for general patient use. Bethesda Memorial is projected to have 80,630 patient days (excluding NICU and CMR patient days) in Bethesda West’s second year of operation.8 That equates to an ADC of 221 patients and an occupancy rate of 92.4 percent for the 239 beds available for general patient use. If the hospice lease and the SCU contract are not renewed in 2005, then Bethesda Memorial would have 267 beds available for general patient use and its occupancy rate would be 82.7 percent. The non-renewal of the hospice lease and the SCU contract would not add new acute care beds to Subdistrict 9- 5 because those beds are still considered to be acute care beds for purposes of the Agency's bed inventory for the subdistrict, even though they are currently designated for specific purposes. With an annual occupancy rate of 92.4 percent or even 82.7 percent, there would likely be days on which Bethesda Memorial’s occupancy rate would exceed 100 percent. This is not an uncommon occurrence at the hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5, particularly during the “peak season” of January through March. Bethesda Memorial could operate efficiently and provide high quality care with an occupancy rate of 82.7 percent or 92.4 percent without adding new beds. Indeed, JFK and Delray each have similar occupancy rates (and even higher occupancy rates during the “peak season”), and it is undisputed that they provide high quality care. Because the addition of new acute care beds at an existing hospital is no longer linked to the hospital’s occupancy rate, Bethesda Memorial (like any other existing hospital) is free to add new acute care beds whenever it chooses to do so; however, the evidence was not persuasive that Bethesda will, in fact, add new beds at Bethesda Memorial after the bed transfer to Bethesda West notwithstanding the resulting high utilization rate at Bethesda Memorial.9 Bethesda West will include 68 general med-surg beds, 12 critical care beds, a full service ED, and related ambulatory and outpatient services. All of the beds at Bethesda West will be in private rooms. Bethesda West will not offer OB services or dedicated pediatric services, and it will not include a cardiac catheterization lab. Bethesda West will be in a new 190,130 square foot building. The space plan for Bethesda West is reasonable, and its design complies with all applicable building and construction codes. The projected timetable for construction and completion of Bethesda West is also reasonable. Bethesda West will be located at the intersection of Boynton Beach Boulevard and State Road 7, which is approximately two miles west of the Turnpike. That location is three miles from Bethesda Health City, eight to nine miles from Wellington, and ten to 11 miles from Delray, JFK, and Bethesda Memorial. Bethesda West could not be collocated with Bethesda Health City because there is not enough property at that location to construct a satellite hospital with the necessary parking facilities. Bethesda has contracted to purchase 54 acres of property at the intersection of Boynton Beach Boulevard and State Road 7 known as the “Amestoy Property.” The purchase price of the Amestoy Property was $110,000 per acre. Bethesda intends to develop Bethesda West on approximately 30 acres of the Amestoy Property and then lease or sell the remainder of the property for the development of medical office buildings. A 30-acre site is adequate for the proposed 80-bed satellite hospital, although it may inhibit future expansion. Bethesda West intends to utilize the same medical staff as Bethesda Memorial; however, Bethesda has not discussed the issue with its medical staff as a whole10 nor has it developed specific plans to implement its dual-staffing approach. Bethesda West will share management and administrative support services with Bethesda Memorial rather than duplicating those services. The total cost of Bethesda West is $73.8 million. The primary service area (PSA) for Bethesda West consists of zip codes 33436, 33437, 33463, and 33467, which roughly correspond to the boundaries of the West Boynton area. The hospital’s secondary service area (SSA) includes zip codes 33414 and 33446. There is significant overlap in the proposed service area of Bethesda West and the current service area of Bethesda Memorial; four of the six zip codes in Bethesda West’s service area are in Bethesda Memorial’s service area. There is also significant overlap between the proposed service area of Bethesda West and the service areas of Delray, Wellington, and JFK; each of the zip codes in Bethesda West’s proposed service area is also within the service area of at least two of those hospitals. Bethesda West is projected to have 10,430 patient days in its first year of operation and 14,570 patient days in its second year of operation. Those patient days equate to ADCs of 29 and 40, and occupancy rates of 35.7 percent and 49.9 percent in the first and second years of operations. By the fourth year of operation, Bethesda West is projected to have an ADC of 56, which equates to an occupancy rate of 65.2 percent. These occupancy rates are reasonable, as is the “ramp up” concept on which they are based. The projected utilization at Bethesda West is based upon an ALOS of 4.6 days. That ALOS was derived from information in the Agency’s in-patient database for residents of the West Boynton area who received in-patient services of the kind that would be offered at Bethesda West. It is a reasonable ALOS.11 The projected utilization assumes that Bethesda West will have an overall market share of 7.5 percent in its service area in the first year of operation, and that Bethesda West’s overall market share will increase to 13.5 percent by its fourth year of operation. Bethesda West is not projected to have a market share of greater than 15 percent in any individual zip code until its third year of operation. The utilization and market shares projected for Bethesda West are reasonable and attainable based upon the demographics and projected population growth in the West Boynton area. Bethesda West is projected to take patients from the hospitals that currently serve the West Boynton area, including Bethesda Memorial. Bethesda's application projects that 3,040 patients from Bethesda Memorial will be “redistributed” to, or “cannibalized” by Bethesda West in Bethesda West’s first year of operation and that the number will increase to 4,530 patients in Bethesda West's second year of operation. The remainder of Bethesda West’s projected patient days – 7,390 in its first year of operation and 10,040 in its second year of operation – will come from patients who are currently being served by an existing hospital or from growth in the service area. In addition to these projected in-patient admissions, Bethesda West is projected to have outpatient registrations ranging from 22,440 (first year of operation) to 46,310 (fourth year of operation) and ED visits ranging from 8,990 (first year of operation) to 19,720 (fourth year of operation). The projected outpatient registrations and ED visits are reasonable and attainable. Some of the outpatient registrations at Bethesda West will come at the expense of Bethesda Health City because it is currently providing some of the same outpatient services that are proposed for Bethesda West. There is no persuasive evidence quantifying the number of Bethesda West’s outpatient registrations that would have otherwise gone to Bethesda Health City, nor is there any persuasive evidence quantifying the financial impact of the redistribution of those outpatients. (2) Proposed JFK Satellite Hospital JFK’s application, CON 9660, proposes to establish an 80-bed satellite hospital in the West Boynton area by de- licensing 80 beds at Columbia and then transferring those beds to the proposed JFK satellite hospital. Columbia is located in Subdistrict 9-4 and, like JFK, it is an HCA hospital. The bed transfer proposed by JFK will increase the inventory of acute care beds in Subdistrict 9-5 by 80 beds, but the bed inventory in District 9 will remain the same; the 80-bed increase in Subdistrict 9-5 at JFK’s proposed satellite hospital will be offset by an 80-bed decrease in Subdistrict 9-4 at Columbia. Columbia has 250 licensed beds, of which 150 are acute care beds, 12 are skilled nursing beds, and 88 are psychiatric beds. Columbia’s acute care beds include a 20-bed intensive care unit/critical care unit (ICU/CCU), but only 10 of those beds are currently being used. The 12-bed skilled nursing unit is not currently being used. The acute care beds at Columbia are not well- utilized. In calendar year 2002, the utilization rate for Columbia’s 150 acute care beds was only 40 percent and during the “peak season” in 2002, the utilization rate of those beds was only 47.6 percent. The proposed bed transfer would enable Columbia to convert its existing semi-private rooms to private rooms, but according to Columbia’s CEO, to do so Columbia would also need to convert its 12 skilled nursing beds to acute care beds. JFK’s CON application did not make reference to that necessary bed conversion. The conversion of the 12 skilled nursing beds to acute care beds may require Agency approval, which Columbia had not requested as of the date of the hearing. If the bed conversions described by Columbia’s CEO did not occur, the utilization rate of the 70 remaining acute care beds at Columbia after the transfer will likely exceed 80 percent on an annual basis and, during the “peak season,” the occupancy rate will likely exceed 100 percent. Indeed, applying the number of patient days at Columbia in calendar year 2002 to 70 beds results in an annual occupancy rate of 85.7 percent and an occupancy rate of 102 percent in the “peak season.” Under the pre-2004 law, those occupancy rates would allow Columbia to add beds without CON review, and Columbia’s CEO testified that she would take steps to add beds at Columbia if necessary based upon the facility’s occupancy rates after the bed transfer. There is no credible evidence that JFK planned to construct a satellite hospital in the West Boynton area prior to February 2003. The proposal was not included in any of JFK’s strategic or business plans prior to that date. There is also no credible evidence that the Columbia planned to de-license any beds at its facility prior to the CON application at issue in this proceeding; Columbia’s long-term business plan includes the beds that are being transferred to JFK’s proposed satellite hospital. The decision to de-license and transfer 80 beds from Columbia was made by HCA officials, not Columbia’s management team. The proposed JFK satellite hospital will include 60 general med-surg beds, a 10-bed OB unit, a 10-bed ICU/CCU, a full-service ED, and surgical suites. The hospital will provide radiation oncology services, diagnostic cardiac catheterization services, and outpatient psychiatric services, and all of its beds will be in private rooms. In addition to the 80 beds described above, the proposed JFK satellite hospital will have a 12 “observation” beds in private rooms. The observation beds will be sized and equipped in the same manner as the general med-surg beds. As a result, the proposed JFK satellite hospital will effectively have 92 beds even though it will only be licensed for 80 beds. The proposed JFK satellite hospital will be in a new 195,195 square foot building. The space plan for the hospital is reasonable, and its design complies with all applicable building and construction codes. The projected timetable for construction and completion of the hospital is also reasonable. The proposed JFK satellite hospital will be located at the intersection of Boynton Beach Boulevard and the Turnpike on a 50-plus acre site known as the “Mazzoni Property.” That location is eight to nine miles from Delray and Bethesda Memorial, and 11 to 12 miles from Wellington and JFK. JFK has offered to purchase the Mazzoni Property for $130,000 per acre, but as of the date of the hearing, it had not entered into a contract to purchase the property. Bethesda had been in negotiations for the purchase of the Mazzoni Property at a similar price before it settled on, and entered into a contract to purchase the Amestoy Property. Like Bethesda, JFK intends to develop medical office buildings on its site in addition to the proposed satellite hospital. The size of the Mazzoni Property is adequate for those purposes. JFK intends to utilize its medical staff to cover the proposed satellite hospital; however, there is no credible evidence in the record detailing how the dual-staffing would work. The proposed JFK satellite hospital will share some of its management and administrative support services with JFK, but not to the same extent as those services are shared between Bethesda West and Bethesda Memorial. Indeed, the proposed JFK satellite hospital was planned and staffed as a “stand alone economic entity.” The total cost of the proposed JFK satellite hospital is approximately $109.8 million. The service area of JFK’s proposed satellite hospital is considerably larger than the service are of Bethesda West. The PSA consists of zip codes 33437, 33467, 33446, and 33484; the SSA consists of zip codes 33436, 33463, 33414, 33413, 33445, 33496, and 33498. There is significant overlap between the service area of the proposed JFK satellite hospital and the existing service areas of Bethesda, Delray, Wellington, and JFK; each of the zip codes in the proposed service area is within the service area of at least two of those hospitals. Zip codes 33437 and 33467 are expected to generate over 92 percent of the patients for the proposed JFK satellite hospital. The inordinately high number of patients that these two zip codes are expected to generate calls into question the reasonableness of service area defined by JFK, or at least the relevance of the SSA. The proposed JFK satellite hospital is projected to have 20,851 patient days in its first year of operation and 21,576 patient days in its second year of operation, which equate to ADCs of 57 and 59 and occupancy rates of 71.4 percent and 73.7 percent. By the fifth year of operation, the proposed JFK satellite hospital is projected to have an occupancy rate of percent. The projected utilization of the proposed JFK satellite hospital was based on an ALOS of 3.9 days. That figure is reasonable. See Endnote 11. To achieve the projected utilization, the proposed JFK satellite hospital will have to immediately achieve inordinately high market shares in its two primary zip codes, 33437 and 33467. Indeed, the CON application projects that the proposed JFK satellite hospital will have a 27 percent market share in zip code 33437 and a 24 percent market share in zip code 33467. It is unreasonable to expect that a new, start-up hospital will be able achieve the market share or utilization rates projected by JFK for its proposed satellite hospital even though it will be affiliated with JFK, which has an established market reputation in the area. Instead, similar to other new hospitals, the proposed JFK satellite hospital will likely have a “ramp up” period before it achieves its target market penetration and/or utilization. The 10-bed OB unit at the proposed JFK satellite hospital is projected to have an ADC of 6 in each of the first two years of operation, and approximately one half of the admissions are projected to come from zip code 33467. That zip code has fewer residents in the Female 15-44 age cohort than does zip code 33463, which is in the West Boynton area but is in the SSA of the proposed JFK satellite hospital. The utilization of the OB unit assumes market shares of 65 percent in zip code 33437, which is the zip code where the proposed JFK satellite hospital will be located (i.e., its “home zip code”), and 60 percent in the adjacent zip code 33467. Those market shares are not inherently unreasonable for OB services since OB patients are more likely to utilize a facility closer to their home; however, the market shares are materially higher than the market shares that the established programs at Palms West (45 percent) and Wellington (41 percent) have in their home zip codes. The market shares proposed for the other zip codes in the proposed JFK satellite hospital’s service area are also somewhat higher than would be expected, particularly for a start-up OB program, but they are not inherently unreasonable. Even though the OB market shares assumed by JFK are not inherently unreasonable, they are unrealistic under the circumstances of this case because the OB unit at the proposed JFK satellite hospital will not have NICU backup, which is the standard of care in South Palm Beach County, and it is unlikely that obstetricians will refer their patients to the proposed satellite hospital when other hospitals with NICU backup (e.g., Wellington and Bethesda Memorial) are available in close proximity to the West Boynton area. The patient days for the OB unit were projected based upon a population-based use rate rather than based upon a fertility rate applied to the Female 15-44 age cohort. Because the Female 15-44 age cohort is growing at a slower rate than the population as a whole, JFK’s methodology had the effect of overstating the OB patient days and the ADC of the OB unit. The fertility rate methodology is a more reasonable approach under the circumstances of this case. That methodology results in an ADC of only two to four patients in the OB unit at the proposed JFK satellite hospital, which is a more reasonable projection and is more consistent with the largely elderly demographic of the West Boynton area. In sum, the projected utilization of the proposed JFK satellite hospital is overstated, particularly in the first two years of operation, as a result of the unrealistic market shares projected for the hospital’s two primary zip codes and the overstated projection of OB patient days in the West Boynton area. The proposed JFK satellite hospital is projected to take patients from the hospitals that currently serve the West Boynton area, including JFK. JFK projects that approximately 40 percent of its patients will be “cannibalized” by the proposed JFK satellite hospital, which is a materially higher percentage than that projected for Bethesda West in its first (29.1 percent) and second (31.1 percent) years of operation. The remainder of the proposed JFK satellite hospital’s admissions will come from patients who are currently being served by an existing hospital or from growth in the service area. In addition to the projected in-patient admissions discussed above, the proposed JFK satellite hospital is expected to have outpatient registrations and ED visits; however, the number of registrations and visits is not expressly projected in the application. Accordingly, it cannot be determined whether those projections are reasonable or not.12 Institution-specific Justifications for the Proposed Satellite Hospitals Other than the prospect of enhancing access to acute care services for residents of the West Boynton area (see Part I(1)(b) below), the primary justifications offered by Bethesda and JFK for their respective satellite hospitals were institution-specific. The primary justification offered by Bethesda for the establishment of Bethesda West was its need to maintain or increase its market share of the favorable payer-mix in the West Boynton area in order to ensure its long-term financial viability. Although the evidence establishes that the West Boynton area has a more favorable payer-mix than Bethesda Memorial’s current service area, the evidence was not persuasive that Bethesda’s long-term financial viability is at risk or that it is at risk of losing market share in the West Boynton area if it is not allowed to construct Bethesda West. Bethesda also presented evidence regarding its inability to add new beds at Bethesda Memorial because of physical and/or cost constraints, but that evidence was not persuasive. The primary justification offered by JFK for the establishment of its proposed satellite hospital was its inability to expand its current facility to accommodate patients coming from the West Boynton area or elsewhere; however, the preponderance of the evidence fails to support that claim because, as of the date of the hearing, JFK still had the ability to add at least 72 more beds to its existing facility, including 36 beds without any additional construction. Impact of the Proposed Satellite Hospitals on the Existing Hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5 The evidence is not persuasive that Bethesda West or the proposed JFK satellite hospital can achieve their in-patient utilization projections through population growth in their projected service areas alone. Instead, the evidence establishes that the proposed satellite hospitals will achieve their projected utilization primarily by taking patients who are currently being served by, or would otherwise be served by one of the existing hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5. Bethesda West and the proposed JFK satellite hospital are each projected to “cannibalize” patients from Bethesda Memorial and JFK, respectively; however, they will also take patients “out of the hide” of Delray, Wellington, and each other. The projected growth in the West Boynton area will result in the existing hospitals having more patient days in the future than they currently have, whether or not either of the satellite hospitals is approved; however, the approval of either of the proposed satellite hospitals will result in the existing hospitals losing some of the growth-related admissions that they would have otherwise captured. It is appropriate to consider the loss of those growth-related admissions as part of the impact analysis because the market shares in the West Boynton area and the service areas of the proposed satellite hospitals have been relatively stable over the past several years, and it is reasonable to expect that absent a significant change of circumstances (such as the approval of a satellite hospital in the area) the existing hospitals would continue to maintain their respective market shares into the future.13 The most persuasive analysis of the impact on the existing providers of the approval of the proposed satellite hospitals is that prepared by Wellington’s health planner, Thomas Davidson (Exhibit W-4). Based upon Mr. Davidson’s analysis, the number of admissions that the existing providers would lose because of Bethesda West in its first two years of operation are as follows: Year 1 Year 2 Delray 377 512 Wellington 138 187 JFK 554 752 Based upon Mr. Davidson’s analysis, the number of patient days that the existing providers would lose because of the proposed JFK satellite hospital in its first two years of operation are as follows: Year 1 Year 2 Delray 1,035 663 Wellington 735 615 Bethesda 1,638 1,178 These lost admissions and patient days constitute a substantial adverse impact on the existing hospitals, as does the loss of income resulting from the lost admissions and patient days. The proposed JFK satellite hospital will have a slightly greater adverse financial impact on Wellington than will Bethesda West, primarily because of the OB program and larger service proposed for the JFK satellite hospital; the proposed JFK satellite hospital and Bethesda West will have materially similar adverse financial impacts on Delray. The overall effect of the lost admissions, patient days, and the resulting loss of income is greater on Wellington than it is on any of the other hospitals because Wellington has historically been less profitable than the other hospitals. There are other adverse impacts on the existing providers, including the increases in costs and/or potential impacts to quality of care resulting from the exacerbation of the emergency room (ER) call shortage of specialty physicians discussed below; however, there is no persuasive evidence quantifying those impacts. Comparative Evaluation of the CON Applications Based Upon the Applicable Statutory and Rule Criteria There is no credible evidence to justify the approval of two 80-bed hospitals in the West Boynton area. As a result, if either of the proposed satellite hospitals is to be approved, it should be the one that best satisfies the applicable statutory and rule criteria. Statutory Criteria – Section 408.035, Florida Statutes (2003)14 Subsection (1): Need in Relation to the District Health Plan15 The applicable provisions of the Local Health Plan for District 9 are as follows: Priority shall be given to area hospitals, which can show a commitment to, or historical record of service to Medicaid/indigent, handicapped and underserved population groups. Priority shall be given to applicants who can document cost containment practices in their facilities. Cost containment practices, such as sharing services with other area hospitals, enhances efficient resource utilization and assists in avoiding duplication of services. Priority shall be given to an applicant who proposes to use existing space rather than new construction, including space created by previous voluntary de- licensure of underutilized or unused beds and/or through transfer of beds within a subdistrict. As more fully discussed below in connection with Section 408.035(11), Florida Statutes, the first preference weighs in favor of Bethesda based upon its historical record of service to Medicaid and charity patients, which is marginally better than JFK’s record, and its commitment to provide five percent of the patient days at Bethesda West to Medicaid and charity patients, which is more realistic than JFK’s 10 percent commitment; however, the weight associated with this preference is minimal in light of the demographics of the West Boynton area, which is generally more wealthy and, hence, less likely to generate significant Medicaid or charity care patient days. As to the second preference, the record does not “document” any material cost containment practices at JFK or Bethesda Memorial. JFK and Bethesda each intend to use their existing medical staffs to cover their proposed satellite hospitals as a cost-containment effort; however, Bethesda has proposed a greater degree of integration (and, hence, less duplication) in the administrative functions at Bethesda West and Bethesda Memorial than did JFK at is proposed satellite hospital. Thus, the second preference also marginally weighs in favor of Bethesda. As to the third preference, both applicants are proposing new construction rather than the use of existing space. Although JFK is proposing the de-licensure of underutilized beds at Columbia, it is not using the space created by those beds for its proposed satellite hospital as the rule preference contemplates. The beds that Bethesda is transferring to Bethesda West are not underutilized and they are being transferred to a new to-be-constructed facility rather than to existing space. In sum, the local health plan preferences marginally weigh in favor of the approval of Bethesda’s application over JFK’s application. Subsections (2) and (7): Availability, Quality of Care, etc. of Existing Facilities and Enhancing Access The primary justification offered by the applicants for their respective proposed satellite hospitals (other than the hospital-specific issues discussed above) is that the facility will "enhance access" to acute care services for residents of the West Boynton area. More specifically, the applicants contend that the establishment of a new hospital in the West Boynton area will address an “access” problem that exists or soon will exist in the area. As discussed below, this contention is not supported by the preponderance of the evidence. In the CON context, “access” is typically evaluated from the vantage points of programmatic, financial, cultural, and geographic access. “Programmatic access” refers to the adequacy of the programs and services provided at existing facilities in relation to the specific health care needs of the persons served by those facilities. Programmatic access concerns arise when specific programs or services are not available for patients that need them, or when the quality of care provided in the existing programs is inadequate. The evidence was not persuasive that there are any programmatic access problems in Subdistrict 9-5 and, in any event, neither of the proposed satellite hospitals would enhance programmatic access in the subdistrict because they will not offer any programs or services that are not already offered at one or more of the tertiary hospitals in the subdistrict that currently serve the West Boynton area. Indeed, the proposed satellite hospitals will offer a more narrow range of services than the existing tertiary hospitals presently serving the area. This is significant because the elderly, who make of a large portion of the West Boynton area and who are more likely to have co-morbidities or more complex medical needs, are generally better served in a hospital offering tertiary services and more complete care. Similarly, it is reasonable to expect that many physicians will continue to admit their patients to the larger tertiary hospitals rather than shifting those patients to a satellite hospital that provides a more narrow range of services. “Financial access” refers to the extent to which persons have access to health care services without regard to their ability to pay. The evidence was not persuasive that there are any financial access problems in Subdistrict 9-5 or the West Boynton area that the proposed satellite hospitals will address. None of the existing hospitals that serve the West Boynton area have policies or practices that discourage indigent patients from seeking care at their facilities and, in any event, the low- income population makes up a relatively small portion of the West Boynton area. Cultural access” refers to the extent to which certain persons cannot or do not access the existing facilities due to cultural factors such as race, ethnicity, and national origin. Cultural access was not advanced by Bethesda or JFK as a basis for the approval or their respective applications. “Geographic access” refers to the physical accessibility of the existing facilities or services in a subdistrict taking into account population density, distance and time of travel, and geographic barriers or other impediments to access. Geographic access has been referred to as a “foundation of health planning.” Bethesda and JFK focus primarily on the projected growth of the West Boynton area and the road congestion that comes with that growth as the basis for their contention that there is, or soon will be a access problem for residents of the West Boynton area; Bethesda states in its PRO (at page 29) that "[g]eographic access is at the heart of [its] proposal." A reasonable geographic access standard for persons living in an urban area is a drive time of 30 to 40 minutes to an acute care hospital. Under that standard, there is currently no geographic access problem for residents of the West Boynton area. Indeed, there are as many as 12 hospitals within a 30-minute drive of the West Boynton area, and a “fair number” of residents have access to four hospitals -– Bethesda, JFK, Wellington, and Delray -- within a 15 to 20-minute drive time.16 All of the hospitals within the 30-minute drive time offer tertiary-level care, and a number of them offer OB services. There are no physical geographic barriers that limit access to the existing hospitals by residents of the West Boynton area. Indeed, there are a number of different major north-south and east-west roads that residents have to chose from when accessing the existing hospitals, and most of those roads have at least four lanes. The major roads in the West Boynton area have expanded along with growth of the population in the area, and they are expected to continue to do so. The infrastructure plan adopted by Palm Beach County includes continued road expansions and improvements over the planning horizon applicable to this case, and developers are often required to widen or otherwise improve the roads as a condition of the approval of new development. There is insufficient evidence that the current travel times are significantly different for the elderly population in the area. The anecdotal testimony offered by various Bethesda witnesses was not persuasive. The evidence was not persuasive that the travel times will be materially higher over the applicable five-year planning horizon. The analysis and opinion presented by Bethesda’s traffic engineer on this issue was not persuasive.17 The concurrency analysis performed by Bethesda’s traffic engineer only assessed Boynton Beach Boulevard; it did not assess any of the other major roads between the West Boynton area and the existing hospitals. Moreover, the analysis focused on the level of service (LOS) on various segments of Boynton Beach Boulevard, as measured by the projected number of trips on those segments in 2007; it did not quantify the increase in travel time along that road, if any, resulting from the reduction in the LOS which the analysis showed. The hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5 are some of the most highly-utilized hospitals in the state; however, the evidence was not persuasive that the high utilization at these hospitals has caused any access problems for residents of the West Boynton area, either for general acute care services or for OB services. The existing hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5 have been able to meet the needs of the subdistrict by incrementally expanding their facilities when the need arises. An additional 67 beds can be added to the bed inventory of Subdistrict 9-5 without any additional construction; JFK has shelled-in space for 36 new beds and Delray has shelled-in space for 31 new beds. Additionally, Delray has a master plan that has been approved by Palm Beach County that will allow it to add as many as 123 more beds on its current campus as needed, and Wellington also has plenty of space on the undeveloped property adjacent to its hospital to add more beds as needed. Having a hospital in the West Boynton area might be more convenient for residents of that area west of the Turnpike, at least in those instances where the patient is able to receive all of the necessary care at that hospital; however, convenience alone is not valid basis for the approval of a new hospital, particularly where there are as many as 12 tertiary-level hospitals within a 30-minute drive of the West Boynton area. In sum and on balance, the criteria in Subsections 408.035(2) and (7), Florida Statutes, weigh strongly against approval of either application. Indeed, despite the relatively high utilization rates at the existing hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5, the preponderance of the evidence fails to establish that there currently are, or that over the applicable planning horizon there will be any material deficiencies in the availability, quality of care, or accessibility of the existing hospitals in the subdistrict that would warrant the approval of a new hospital in the West Boynton area at this time. Subsection (3): Ability of Applicant to Provide Quality of Care The parties do not dispute the quality of care provided at any of the existing hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5, and the evidence affirmatively demonstrates that a high quality of care is currently provided at Bethesda Memorial, JFK, Delray, and Wellington. Bethesda and JFK each intend to rely on their existing medical staff, at least in part, to staff their respective satellite hospitals. As a result, the quality of care provided at the satellite hospitals will also be good, but it will be less than ideal in several respects. First, neither satellite hospital will offer interventional cardiology services, which is, or is becoming the standard of care for treating heart attack patients that present to the hospital’s ED. Second, JFK’s proposed satellite will offer OB services without NICU backup, which is below the standard of care in South Palm Beach County. Accordingly, the criterion in Section 408.035(3), Florida Statutes, weighs against the approval of either application. Subsection (4): Special Health Care Services The parties stipulated that this criterion is inapplicable, and in any event, the criterion was deleted by Chapter 2004-383, Laws of Florida, effective July 1, 2004. Subsection (5): Educational Facilities and Training Programs18 Neither JFK nor Bethesda Memorial is a teaching hospital, and neither is proposing educational or training programs at its proposed satellite hospital. The evidence was not persuasive that Wellington’s teaching programs will be adversely affected by the approval of either of the proposed satellite hospitals. The criterion in Section 408.035(5), Florida Statutes, does not materially weigh in favor of or against the approval of either of the applications. Subsection (6): Availability of Resources and Personnel for Operations The parties stipulated that Bethesda and JFK each have the ability to fund the capital and operating expenditures for their proposed satellite hospitals. The reasonableness of the financing-related costs proposed by Bethesda and JFK in their respective applications is also not in dispute. Delray and Wellington argue that neither Bethesda nor JFK will be able to adequately staff their proposed satellite hospitals due to physician and nurse shortages in South Palm Beach County and/or that the staffing of the proposed satellite hospitals will make it more difficult and costly for the existing hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5 to staff certain programs. Bethesda and JFK challenge the adequacy of each other’s staffing projections. As more fully discussed below, the evidence is not persuasive that the staffing projected for either of the proposed satellite programs is inadequate; however, the evidence establishes that the approval of either program would exacerbate physician shortages in Subdistrict 9-5 in certain specialties. Bethesda West’s staffing projections include 242.8 full-time equivalents (FTEs) in the first year of operation and 294.5 FTEs in the second year of operation. The staffing projections for the proposed JFK satellite hospital include FTEs in the first year of operation and 448.5 FTEs in the second year of operation. The disparity in the staffing levels primarily results from the higher occupancy rate projected at the proposed JFK satellite hospital, which is projected to be 71.4 percent in the first year of operation. By contrast, the occupancy rate at Bethesda West is projected be 35.7 percent in the first year of operation and then “ramp up” to approximately 69 percent by the fourth year of operation. The staffing levels at each of the proposed satellite hospitals are reasonable based upon the ADCs projected and the services to be provided at each hospital. Indeed, the staffing levels are comparable when viewed as a ratio of staff to projected ADC; the ratios at Bethesda West are 8.37 and 7.36 in the first two years of operation, and the ratios at the proposed JFK satellite hospital for its first two years of operation are 7.74 and 7.60. The evidence is not persuasive that Bethesda West’s staffing projections are understated or that they fail to include nursing and other positions necessary to ensure high quality care is provided. Nor is the evidence persuasive that the salaries projected for Bethesda West’s staff are understated. The evidence is not persuasive that the staffing projections for the proposed JFK satellite hospital are inherently unreliable based upon the manner in which they were prepared or as a result of the proxy that was used as a basis of the projections. There is a nursing shortage statewide and in South Palm Beach County, but it is not as severe as it has been in the past. Indeed, it is significant that despite the large number of beds added over the past five years at the various hospitals in South Palm Beach County, those beds have been adequately staffed with nurses and ancillary clinical personnel. JFK and Bethesda Memorial have each been successful in recruiting nursing staff despite the nursing shortage. They each have implemented innovative programs to aid in their recruiting efforts and to reduce their turnover and vacancy rates, and those programs are expected to be utilized at the proposed satellite hospitals. JFK and Bethesda Memorial each use “traveler” and per-diem nurses to supplement their full time nursing staffs, which is not uncommon in South Palm Beach County. Typically, a physician who has privileges at a hospital is required to be on ER call on a rotational basis. Many physicians have privileges at more than one hospital in South Palm Beach County, which means that they are responsible for providing ER call coverage at more than one hospital. Because of malpractice and other concerns, it is becoming increasingly difficult for hospitals to attract physicians who are willing to take ER calls. The Palm Beach County Medical Society and the CEOs of the existing hospitals in the county met as recently as December 2003 to discuss the problems related to ER call coverage; however, as of the date of the hearing, the problem still existed and was severe. It is possible for a physician to be providing ER calls to more than one hospital at the same time. This can become a serious problem if the physician is attending to a patient at one hospital when he or she is called to the ER at another hospital. The problem of ER call coverage is most significant in specialties such as neurosurgery, hand surgery, urology, OB, and ear/nose/throat. Several of the hospitals in South Palm Beach County, including Wellington and Delray, have begun to pay physicians, and particularly specialty physicians to take ER call. Adding a new hospital in South Palm Beach County will exacerbate this problem in several respects. First, it will add another hospital to the ER call rotations of the physicians who chose to obtain privileges at the satellite hospitals, thereby increasing the prospect of a physician being on call at more than one hospital at the same time. Second, it will make it even more difficult or costly for existing hospitals to obtain call coverage by the specialty physicians that are already in short supply. It is unlikely that OB/GYNs will admit their patients to the small OB unit at the proposed JFK satellite hospital. OB/GYNs typically try to keep all of their patients in one hospital because it makes it easier on them to do rounds and to respond quickly to emergency situations, and because the OB unit at the proposed JFK satellite hospital will not have NICU backup, it is unlikely that many OB/GYNs will choose that hospital as the one where they admit the bulk of their patients. In sum, the staffing levels for each of the proposed satellite hospitals are reasonable and appropriate for the services being offered at the hospitals, the projected staffing costs at each of the proposed satellite hospitals are also reasonable and appropriate, and JFK and Bethesda will be able to staff their respective satellite hospitals at the levels projected; however, the proposed satellite hospitals will exacerbate the shortage of specialty physicians in South Palm Beach County and will make it more difficult for the existing hospitals to get specialty physicians for ER call coverage. Accordingly, the criterion in Section 408.035(6), Florida Statutes, weighs against the approval of either application, and between the competing applications, this criterion does not materially weigh in favor of either application over the other. Subsection (8): Financial Feasibility The parties did not seriously contest the short-term financial feasibility of either of the proposed satellite hospitals, and the preponderance of the evidence establishes that both of the proposed satellite hospitals are financially feasible in the short-term; both applicants have the ability to fund the construction and initial capital needs of their respective projects in conjunction with the other capital projects listed on Schedule 2 of their respective CON applications. The long-term financial feasibility of each of the proposed satellite hospitals is in dispute. The general rule for assessing the long-term financial feasibility of a CON project is if the project will at least break even by the end of the second year of operation, then the project is financially feasible in the long-term; if, however, the project continues to show a loss in the second year of operations and it is not demonstrated that the project will reach a break-even point within a reasonable period of time, then the project is not financially feasible in the long-term. As more fully discussed below, Bethesda West is financially feasible in the long-term, but the proposed JFK satellite hospital is not. Accordingly, the criterion in Section 408.035(8), Florida Statutes, weighs in favor of approval of Bethesda’s application over JFK’s application. Bethesda West Schedule 8A of Bethesda's application projects that Bethesda West will generate a net loss of $3.7 million in its first year of operation and a net profit of $1.7 million in its second year of operation. The financial projections for Bethesda West were based upon conservative utilization projections, which leads a reasonable projection of operating income. The financial projections for Bethesda West are not defective based upon an overstatement of the “other operating revenue” or an understatement of the depreciation expense projected by Bethesda. The testimony of Bethesda’s expert financial witnesses is accepted over the testimony of the other financial experts on these issues. The financial projections for Bethesda West are not defective based upon understatements in land costs, construction costs, equipment costs of staffing projections. The testimony of Bethesda’s experts related to these issues is accepted over the testimony of the other experts. As discussed above, Bethesda West will “cannibalize” 3,040 and 4,530 patient days from Bethesda Memorial in its first and second years of operation. The financial impact of this “cannibalization” on Bethesda Memorial is a loss of $1.4 million and $2.1 million in the first and second years of Bethesda West’s operation. The income loss from “cannibalization” is not accounted for on Schedule 8A. Although the patient days used to calculate the “per patient day” figures in the middle two columns of that schedule take into account the “cannibalized” patient days, the dollar amounts shown in those columns do not. On this issue, the testimony of Delray’s financial expert is more logical and persuasive than the testimony of Bethesda’s financial expert. When the losses from “cannibalization” are taken into account, the approval of Bethesda West will have a negative impact on the Bethesda system of $5.1 million in its first year of operation and $400,000 in its second year of operation, which are consistent with the figures shown in Exhibit B-2 (pages 48 and 54). Even so, the system will show a net income of $300,000 and $5.6 million in the first two years of Bethesda West’s operation. The impact of the “cannibalization” on Bethesda Memorial is projected to decrease as Bethesda West becomes more established. At the same time, the profitability of Bethesda West is projected to increase as its census grows. Thus, by the third year of its operation, Bethesda West is projected to have a positive impact on the Bethesda system of $2.2 million (i.e., $4.1 million in net income at Bethesda West less $1.9 million in “cannibalization” from Bethesda Memorial). Bethesda West will not have a negative impact on Bethesda’s cash flow after its first year of operation. On this issue, the testimony of Bethesda’s expert is more persuasive than the testimony of the other financial experts. Accordingly, Bethesda West is financially feasible in the long-term. Proposed JFK Satellite Hospital Schedule 8A of JFK's application projects that its proposed satellite hospital would generate a net loss of $1.2 million in its first year of operation and a net loss of $392,000 in its second year of operation. Over the next three years, however, JFK projects its satellite hospital to generate net income from operations of $509,000, $1.5 million, and $2.5 million. The financial projections in JFK’s application were based upon overly-aggressive occupancy rates, both in the facility as a whole and in the small OB unit without NICU backup. As a result, the resulting financial projections are not reasonable. JFK’s application does not include any analysis of the financial impact on Columbia of the transfer of 80 beds to the satellite hospital, nor does it include any analysis of the impact of the “cannibalization” of JFK’s patient days that would necessarily occur if JFK’s proposed satellite was approved. As a result, the financial impact of JFK’s proposed satellite hospital, in the words of one of JFK’s financial experts, is “probably incomplete.” As a result of the unreasonable utilization projections and the incomplete presentation of the financial impact of the “cannibalization” of JFK’s patient days, JFK failed to establish that its proposed satellite hospital is financially feasible in the long-term. Subsection (9): Fostering Competition that Promotes Cost-effectiveness Neither of the proposed satellite hospitals will foster competition that proposes cost-effectiveness. The West Boynton market currently has healthy competition for the acute services proposed for the satellite hospitals, and there is no dominant provider of those services. Locating a new hospital in the West Boynton area will have the long-term effect of increasing the market share of the provider that operates the new hospital to the detriment of the other providers that are currently competing in that market. In this regard, the approval of a new hospital in the West Boynton area would adversely affect the competitive balance that currently exists in that area and which is projected to continue over the planning horizon. The approval of either of the proposed satellite hospitals would also adversely affect cost-effectiveness by exacerbating the shortage of specialty physicians and other qualified staff in the subdistrict, which in turn would require existing hospitals to raise salaries, benefits and other expenses in order to remain competitive. The approval of Bethesda West would have less of an adverse impact on competition and cost-effectiveness than would the approval of JFK’s proposed satellite hospital for several reasons. First, Bethesda West does not duplicate as many administrative services as does JFK’s proposed satellite hospital. Second, JFK currently has a higher market share in the West Boynton area than does Bethesda or any other hospital, which means that the competitive balance would be tipped to a greater extent if JFK’s satellite hospital was approved. Third, the approval of the JFK satellite would give HCA four hospitals in Palm Beach County and increase its leverage in physician and staff recruitment and the negotiation of HMO contracts. Accordingly, the criterion in Section 408.035(9), Florida Statutes, weights against the approval of either application; however, on balance between the two applications, this criterion favor’s Bethesda’s application over JFK’s application. Subsection (10): Costs and Methods of Construction The costs and methods of energy provision at the proposed satellite hospitals is not in dispute. Although the proposed satellite hospitals are similar in size, the total project costs included in the CON applications are significantly different. The $73.8 million total project cost for Bethesda West equates to a cost of $922,700 per bed. The $109.8 million total project cost for JFK’s proposed satellite hospital equates to a cost of $1.37 million per bed. The portion of the total project costs for each of the proposed satellite hospitals attributable directly to “construction” is materially similar. Bethesda West’s construction costs are approximately $34.2 million, or $180 per square foot; the construction costs for the proposed JFK satellite hospital are $40.9 million, or $210 per square foot. The estimated construction costs for each of the proposed satellite hospitals are within the range of reasonableness that can be gleaned from the testimony of the various hospital construction experts. JFK’s cost is towards the higher end of the range, and Bethesda’s cost is towards the lower end of the range. The primary differences in the total project costs are in the land purchase prices, the site preparation costs, and the equipment costs. The land purchase price included in Bethesda’s application was $4.2 million, which was based upon a 30 to 40- acre site. The land purchase price included in JFK’s application was $8 million, which was based upon a 50-acre site. Bethesda acquired the 54-acre Amestoy Property for $110,000 per acre. At $110,000 per acre, the $4.2 million attributed by Bethesda to land purchase price would be sufficient to acquire 38.2 acres, which is more than adequate for the 80-bed Bethesda West facility. Consistent with the estimate in the CON application, JFK has made an offer to purchase the 50-plus acre Mazzoni Property for $130,000 per acre. The total land purchase price in each application, and the actual cost-per-acre of the Amestoy and Mazzoni Properties are reasonable. The site development costs included in Bethesda’s application were $3.75 million, or $125,000 per acre for the 30 acres on which Bethesda West will be located. The site development costs included in JFK’s application were $6.5 million, or $150,000 per acre for the 50 acres on which JFK’s proposed satellite hospital will be located. The site development costs for each project include on-site and off-site utility (e.g., water and sewer) and roadway work, geotechnical and environmental remediation costs, stormwater retention, landscaping, and concurrency impact fees. Each of the proposed sites is relatively flat and was formerly agricultural property and, as a result, there are not expected to be any unusual costs associated with the development of either site. Bethesda West will be located further west than the proposed JFK satellite hospital and, as a result, its “radius of influence” includes fewer congested roadway links than does the proposed JFK satellite hospital; but, the Amestoy Property where Bethesda West will be located is farther away from the existing utility lines than the Mazzoni Property where the proposed JFK satellite hospital will be located. Thus, even though the cost of running utilities to Bethesda West will likely be higher than the cost of running utilities to the proposed JFK satellite hospital, the currency impact fees for Bethesda West will likely be lower than the currency impact fees for the proposed JFK satellite hospital; and, on balance, the overall per-acre and total site development costs included in each of the applications are reasonable. Bethesda’s application included equipment costs of approximately $16 million, all of which was attributable to movable equipment. The cost of fixed equipment was included in the estimated construction costs as part of the building contract. JFK’s application included total equipment costs of approximately $34.2 million. That amount was broken into fixed equipment not in the building contract ($13.9 million), movable equipment ($17.8 million), and information systems ($2.4 million). Some, but not all of the difference between the equipment cost estimates are attributable to the additional services –- e.g., OB and diagnostic cardiac catheterization –- that will be provided at the proposed JFK satellite hospital but not at Bethesda West. Additionally, some of the difference are attributable to the 12 "observation" rooms at the proposed JFK satellite hospital that are being equipped in the same manner as the hospital’s general med-surg beds. When compared on an “apples to apples” basis, the total equipment costs for Bethesda West are not materially different than the total equipment costs for the proposed JFK satellite hospital. JFK is proposing to provide more specialized equipment than Bethesda in areas such as the surgical suites and the ICU/CCU and more information technology (IT) equipment; however, the evidence is not persuasive that such specialized equipment or the IT equipment is necessary to provide high quality care or that the absence of such equipment will adversely affect the quality of care at Bethesda West. The $16 million in equipment costs at Bethesda West, which equates to approximately $200,700 per bed, is reasonable for the level and type of services that will be provided at Bethesda West. The evidence is not persuasive that Bethesda’s equipment costs are understated even though its costs are considerably less than the equipment costs proposed by JFK. If anything, JFK has over-equipped its proposed satellite hospital with specialized equipment resulting in the higher equipment costs included in JFK’s CON application.19 Although the more expensive proposed JFK satellite hospital offers some benefits, such as a larger site to facilitate future expansions and more specialized equipment in some areas, those benefits are outweighed by the additional $35 million costs associated with that facility as compared to Bethesda West. This cost saving is particularly significant since each of the proposed facilities is supposed to be a satellite of a larger, tertiary hospital rather than a stand- alone community hospital. The evidence was not persuasive that Bethesda Memorial and JFK have physical constraints that will limit their ability to add beds at their existing facilities in a cost- efficient manner. Even if the construction of a satellite hospital were the most cost-efficient way for Bethesda Memorial and JFK to add beds, the evidence was not persuasive that it is the most cost-efficient way to add beds from the perspective of the entire health care system of Subdistrict 9-5. Indeed, there are less costly methods of adding new beds to the subdistrict than the construction of a new 80-bed hospital for $73.8 million or $109.8 million. For example, 36 additional beds can be added at JFK and 31 additional beds can be added at Delray in shelled-in space that has already been constructed. The incremental cost of constructing space for additional bed expansions at Delray and Wellington would also be less than the construction costs of the proposed satellite hospitals. In sum, because there are less costly ways to add beds to the subdistrict than the construction of a new hospital, the criterion in Section 408.035(10), Florida Statutes, weighs against the approval of either application; however, between the two applications, this criterion weighs in favor of the approval of Bethesda’s application over JFK’s application since its proposed satellite hospital will cost approximately $35 million less and will provide effectively the same services in similar physical space. Subsection (11): Medicaid and Indigent Care Bethesda characterizes itself as a “safety net” hospital because its Medicaid and charity care percentages typically exceed the averages for Subdistrict 9-5 and District 9 as a whole, and because Bethesda Memorial provides the largest percentage of the Medicaid and charity care provided by all of the hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5. There is no statutory or rule provision that would support Bethesda’s designation of itself as a “safety net” provider. Moreover, the significance of Bethesda’s characterization of itself as a “safety net” hospital is diminished by the fact that the Palm Beach County Health Care District (District) reimburses all hospitals in the county through an indigent care subsidy for care provided to patients that meet the District’s indigency standards. The subsidy helps to ensure that indigent patients are able to receive medical care from any hospital in the county and, to that end, provides a county-wide “safety net” for such patients. The subsidies paid by the District do not cover the full cost of indigent care provided by the hospital, nor does the total amount of subsidies received by a hospital directly correlate to the total amount of indigent care provided by the hospital. Thus, it is not dispositive that JFK received the largest amount of subsidies from the District over the past several years or that JFK received approximately $1.6 million more in subsidies from the District in 2003 than did Bethesda. JFK recently qualified as a “disproportionate share provider,” which means that at least 15 percent of its patient days are attributed to Medicaid or supplemental security income patients. As a disproportionate share provider, JFK receives incrementally larger reimbursements from Medicaid for the provision of indigent care. Bethesda is not currently a disproportionate share provider although it has been in the past. None of the hospitals in South Palm Beach County have policies or practices that discourage Medicaid or uninsured patients. Bethesda Memorial, JFK, Wellington, and Delray each accept patients without regard to their ability to pay. Bethesda and JFK conditioned the approval of their respective CON applications on the provision of a specified percentage of patient days to Medicaid and charity patients. The percentage committed to by JFK (10 percent) is higher than the percentage committed to by Bethesda (five percent). The percentages of Medicaid and charity care committed to by the applicants may be difficult to achieve as a result of the demographics of the West Boynton area. Indeed, the more favorable payer-mix in the West Boynton area was a significant factor, and in Bethesda’s case it was the primary motivating factor for the establishment a new hospital in that area. Bethesda Memorial and JFK each have a history of providing significant levels of Medicaid and charity care at their existing hospitals. The hospitals are each located in areas with large indigent populations, which significantly contribute to the high level of indigent care that they provide. Bethesda Memorial has historically provided a larger amount of Medicaid care than has JFK in terms of a percentage of patient days, e.g., 16.1 percent verses 7.3 percent in 2001. Those percentages each exceed the Subdistrict 9-5 average of 6.3 percent. Bethesda Memorial has also historically provided a larger amount of charity care than has JFK in terms of dollars (e.g., $16.2 million verses $5.2 million in 2002) and in terms of a percentage of charges (e.g., 3.7 percent verses 0.4 percent in 2001 and 2.9 percent verses 0.6 percent in 2002). The Subdistrict 9-5 average for 2001 was 1.4 percent. These comparisons are somewhat skewed because a large portion of Bethesda’s indigent care is attributable to Bethesda Memorial’s high-volume, well-established OB and neonatal programs which tend to be “magnets” for uninsured patients. When only like-services are considered, the utilization of JFK and Bethesda Memorial by Medicaid and indigent patients is similar. JFK provides a significant amount of care to “self- pay” patients (e.g., $43.5 million in 2002), which JFK attempted to equate to charity care. Although there is often overlap between self-pay and charity care patients, the evidence was not persuasive that there is a direct correlation urged by JFK in this case. For example, JFK’s internal definitions of self-pay and charity care patients are markedly different and considerably more liberal than the Agency’s definition of charity care patients for reporting purposes. Bethesda makes a $1 million per year “contribution” to the District to help fund the District’s indigent care program. That contribution was required as part of the settlement of litigation arising out of Bethesda’s conversion from a public hospital to a private not-for-profit hospital and, as a result, it cannot be fairly characterized as additional evidence of Bethesda’s commitment to serving indigent patients. Even though both applicants demonstrated a history of and commitment to serving Medicaid and indigent patients, the criterion in Section 408.035(11), Florida Statutes, weighs in favor of Bethesda because the level of Medicaid and charity care historically provided by Bethesda Memorial is higher than that provided by JFK. On balance with the other statutory and rule criteria, the criterion in Section 408.035(11), Florida Statutes, is not given significant weight because Bethesda has committed to providing a lower percentage of Medicaid and charity care patient days at Bethesda West than JFK committed to at its proposed satellite hospital, and because the demographics of the West Boynton area make it unlikely that a significant level of indigent care will be provided at either of the proposed satellite hospitals. Subsection (12): Designation as a Gold Seal Nursing Facility The parties stipulated that this criterion is inapplicable because neither applicant is proposing additional nursing home beds. (2) Rule Criteria – Florida Administrative Code Rules 59C-1.030(2) and 59C-1.038(6) The criteria in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C- 1.030(2) are subsumed in the statutory criteria discussed above related to the accessibility (or not) of existing acute care services in Subdistrict 9-5 and the need (or not) for new acute care beds in the West Boynton area. For the same reasons that the CON applications do not satisfy those statutory criteria, they do not satisfy the related criteria in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.030(2). Under Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C- 1.038(6)(a), priority is given to applicants with “a documented history of providing services to medically indigent patients or a commitment to do so.” This priority weighs in favor of Bethesda for the reasons discussed above in connection with Section 408.035(11), Florida Statutes. Under Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C- 1.038(6)(b), priority is given to applications that “meet the need for additional acute care beds in a particular service through the conversion of existing underutilized beds.” This priority does not materially weigh in favor either application over the other; the underutilized beds at Columbia that JFK proposes to transfer to its satellite hospital are in a different subdistrict, and the beds that Bethesda proposes to transfer from Bethesda Memorial to its proposed satellite hospital are not underutilized beds in light of the historical occupancy rate at Bethesda Memorial.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency issue a final order denying Bethesda’s CON application No. 9659 and also denying JFK’s CON application No. 9660. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 2004.

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.5717.001408.035408.0361408.0397.367.60
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HCA WEST FLORIDA REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 88-001983 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-001983 Latest Update: Mar. 30, 1989

Findings Of Fact The Application West Florida Regional Medical Center is a 400-bed acute care hospital in Pensacola, Escambia County, Florida. The hospital is located in a subdistrict which has the greatest population aged 65 and over who are living in poverty. That group constitutes the population qualified for Medicare. Some 17 percent of Escambia County's population falls into the medicare category. Prior to October, 1987, HRS had determined that there was a fixed pool need in the Escambia County area for 120 nursing home or extended care beds. Several hospitals in the Escambia County area applied for the 120 nursing home beds. Those beds were granted to Advocare (60 beds) and Baptist Manor (60 beds). The award of the 120 beds to Baptist Manor and Advocare is not being challenged in this action. West Florida, likewise, filed an application for an award of nursing home beds in the same batch as Advocare and Baptist Manor. However, Petitioner's application sought to convert 8 acute care beds to nursing home or extended care beds. West Florida's claim to these beds was not based on the 120 bed need established under the fixed need pool formula. West Florida's application was based on the unavailability of appropriately designated bed space for patients who no longer required acute care, but who continued to require a high skill level of care and/or medicare patients. The whole purpose behind West Florida's CON application stems from the fact that the federal Medicare system will not reimburse a hospital beyond the amount established for acute care needs as long as that bed space is designated as acute care. However, if the patient no longer requires acute care the patient may be re-designated to a skilled care category which includes nursing home or extended care beds. If the patient is appropriately reclassified to a skilled care category, the hospital can receive additional reimbursement from Medicare above its acute care reimbursement as long as a designated ECF bed is available for the patient. Designation or re-designation of beds in a facility requires a Certificate of Need. Petitioner's application for the 8 beds was denied. When the application at issue in this proceeding was filed Petitioner's 13-bed ECF unit had been approved but not yet opened. At the time the State Agency Action Report was written, the unit had just opened. Therefore, historical data on the 13 bed unit was not available at the time the application was filed. Reasons given for denying West Florida's application was that there was low occupancy at Baptist Hospital's ECF unit, that Sacred Heart Hospital had 10 approved ECF beds and that there was no historical utilization of West Florida 13 beds. At the hearing the HRS witness, Elizabeth Dudek stated that it was assumed that Baptist Hospital and Sacred Heart Hospital beds were available for West Florida patients. In 1985 West Florida applied for a CON to establish a 21-bed ECF unit. HRS granted West Florida 13 of those 21 beds. The 8 beds being sought by West Florida in CON 5319 are the remaining beds which were not granted to West Florida in its 1985 CON application. In order to support its 1985 CON application the hospital conducted a survey of its patient records to determine an estimate of the number of patients and patient days which were non acute but still occupied acute care beds. The hospital utilized its regularly kept records of Medicare patients whose length of stay or charges exceeded the Medicare averages by at least two standard deviations for reimbursement and records of Medicare patients whose charges exceed Medicare reimbursement by at least $5,000. These excess days or charges are known as cost outliers and, if the charge exceeds the Medicare reimbursement by $5000 or more, the excess charge is additionally known as a contractual adjustment. The survey conducted by the hospital consisted of the above records for the calendar year 1986. The hospital assumed that if the charges or length of stay for patients were excessive, then there was a probability that the patient was difficult to place. The above inference is reasonable since, under the Medicare system, a hospital's records are regularly reviewed by the Professional Review Organization to determine if appropriate care is rendered. If a patient does not meet criteria for acute care, but remains in the hospital, the hospital is required to document efforts to place the patient in a nursing home. Sanctions are imposed if a hospital misuses resources by keeping patients who did not need acute care in acute care bed spaces even if the amount of reimbursement is not at issue. The hospital, therefore goes to extraordinary lengths to place patients in nursing home facilities outside the hospital. Additionally, the inference is reasonable since the review of hospital records did not capture all non-acute patient days. Only Medicare records were used. Medicare only constitutes about half of all of West Florida's admissions. Therefore, it is likely that the number of excess patient days or charges was underestimated in 1986 for the 1985 CON application. The review of the hospital's records was completed in March, 1987, and showed that 485 patients experienced an average of 10.8 excess non-acute days at the hospital for a total of 5,259 patient days. The hospital was not receiving reimbursement from Medicare for those excess days. West Florida maintained that the above numbers demonstrated a "not normal need" for 21 additional ECF beds at West Florida. However as indicated earlier, HRS agreed to certify only 13 of those beds. The 13 beds were certified in 1987. The 13-bed unit opened in February, 1988. Since West Florida had planned for 21 beds, all renovations necessary to obtain the 8-bed certification were accomplished when the 13- bed unit was certified in 1987. Therefore, no capital expenditures will be required for the additional 8 beds under review here. The space and beds are already available. The same study was submitted with the application for the additional eight beds at issue in these proceedings. In the present application it was assumed that the average length of stay in the extended care unit would be 14 days. However, since the 13 bed unit opened, the average length of stay experienced by the 13-bed unit has been approximately 15 days and corroborates the data found in the earlier records survey. Such corroboration would indicate that the study's data and assumptions are still valid in reference to the problem placements. However, the 15- day figure reflects only those patients who were appropriately placed in West Florida's ECF unit. The 15-day figure does not shed any light on those patients who have not been appropriately placed and remain in acute care beds. That light comes from two additional factors: The problems West Florida experiences in placing sub-acute, high skill, medicare patients; and the fact that West Florida continues to have a waiting list for its 13 bed unit. Problem Placements Problem placements particularly occur with Medicare patients who require a high skill level of care but who no longer require an acute level of care. The problem is created by the fact that Medicare does not reimburse medical facilities based on the costs of a particular patients level of care. Generally, the higher the level of care a patient requires the more costs a facility will incur on behalf of that patient. The higher costs in and of themselves limit some facilities in the services that facility can or is willing to offer from a profitability standpoint. Medicare exacerbates the problem since its reimbursement does not cover the cost of care. The profitability of a facility is even more affected by the number of high skill Medicare patients resident at the facility. Therefore, availability of particular services at a facility and patient mix of Medicare to other private payors becomes important considerations on whether other facilities will accept West Florida' s patients. As indicated earlier, the hospital goes to extraordinary lengths to place non- acute patients in area nursing homes, including providing nurses and covering costs at area nursing homes. Discharge planning is thorough at West Florida and begins when the patient is admitted. Only area nursing homes are used as referrals. West Florida's has attempted to place patients at Bluff's and Bay Breeze nursing homes operated by Advocare. Patients have regularly been refused admission to those facilities due to acuity level or patient mix. West Florida also has attempted to place patients at Baptist Manor and Baptist Specialty Care operated by Baptist Hospital. Patients have also been refused admission to those facilities due to acuity level and patient mix. 16 The beds originally rented to Sacred Heart Hospital have been relinquished by that hospital and apparently will not come on line. Moreover the evidence showed that these screening practices would continue into the future in regard to the 120 beds granted to Advocare and Baptist Manor. The president of Advocare testified that his new facility would accept some acute patients. However, his policies on screening would not change. Moreover, Advocare's CON proposes an 85 percent medicaid level which will not allow for reimbursement of much skilled care. The staffing ratio and charges proposed by Advocare are not at levels at which more severe sub-acute care can be provided. Baptist Manor likewise screens for acuity and does not provide treatment for extensive decubitus ulcers, or new tracheostomies, or IV feeding or therapy seven days a week. Its policies would not change with the possible exception of ventilated patients, but then, only if additional funding can be obtained. There is no requirement imposed by HRS that these applicants accept the sub-acute-patients which West Florida is unable to place. These efforts have continued subsequent to the 13-bed unit's opening. However, the evidence showed that certain types of patients could not be placed in area nursing homes. The difficulty was with those who need central lines (subclavian) for hyperalimentation; whirlpool therapy such as a Hubbard tank; physical therapy dither twice a day or seven days a week; respiratory or ventilator care; frequent suctioning for a recent tracheostomy; skeletal traction; or a Clinitron bed, either due to severe dicubiti or a recent skin graft. The 13-bed unit was used only when a patient could not be placed outside the hospital. The skill or care level in the unit at West Florida is considerably higher than that found at a nursing home. This is reflected in the staffing level and cost of operating the unit. Finally, both Advocare and Baptist Manor involve new construction and will take approximately two years to open. West Florida's special need is current and will carry into the future. The Waiting List Because of such placement problems, West Florida currently has a waiting list of approximately five patients, who are no longer acute care but who cannot be placed in a community nursing home. The 13-bed unit has operated at full occupancy for the last several months and is the placement of last resort. The evidence showed that the patients on the waiting list are actually subacute patients awaiting an ECF bed. The historical screening for acuity and patient mix along with the waiting list demonstrates that currently at least five patients currently have needs which are unmet by other facilities even though those facilities may have empty beds. West Florida has therefore demonstrated a special unmet need for five ECF beds. Moreover, the appropriate designation and placement of patients as to care level is considered by HRS to be a desirable goal when considering CON applications because the level of care provided in an ECF unit is less intense than the level of care required in an acute care unit. Thus, theoretically, better skill level placement results in more efficient bed use which results in greater cost savings to the hospital. In this case, Petitioner offers a multi-disciplinary approach to care in its ECF unit. The approach concentrates on rehabilitation and independence which is more appropriate for patients at a sub-acute level of care. For the patients on the awaiting proper placement on the waiting list quality of care would be improved by the expansion of the ECF unit by five beds. Finally, there are no capital costs associated with the conversion of these five beds and no increase in licensed bed capacity. There are approximately five patients on any given day who could be better served in an ECF unit, but who are forced to remain in an acute care unit because no space is available for them. This misallocation of resources will cost nothing to correct.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services issue a CON to Petitioner for five ECF beds. DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 1989. APPENDIX The facts contained in paragraph 1-29 of Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact are adopted in substance, insofar as material. The facts contained in paragraph 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 12, 15, 16, 20, 27, 28, 29, 31 and 33 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are subordinate. The first sentence of paragraph 7 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact was not shown to be the evidence. Strict compliance with the local health plan was not shown to be an absolute requirement for CON certification. The remainder of paragraph 7 is subordinate. The facts contained in paragraph 9, 10, 11 and 30 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact were not shown by the evidence. The first part of the first sentence of paragraph 13 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact before the semicolon is adopted. The remainder of the sentence and paragraph is rejected. The first sentence of paragraph 14 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact was not shown by the evidence. The remainder of the paragraph is subordinate. The facts contained in paragraph 17, 26 and 32 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are adopted in substance, insofar as material. The acts contained in paragraph 18 are rejected as supportive of the conclusion contained therein. The first (4) sentences of paragraph 19 are subordinate. The remainder of the paragraph was not shown by the evidence. The first (2) sentences of paragraph 21 are adopted. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected. The facts contained in paragraph 22 of Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are irrelevant. The first sentence of paragraph 23 is adopted. The remainder of paragraph 23 is subordinate. The first sentence of paragraph 24 is rejected. The second, third, and fourth sentences are subordinate. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected. The first sentence of paragraph 25 is subordinate. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected. COPIES FURNISHED: Lesley Mendelson, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Donna H. Stinson, Esquire MOYLE, FLANIGAN, KATZ, FITZGERALD & SHEEHAN, P.A. The Perkins House - Suite 100 118 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 =================================================================

Florida Laws (2) 120.5790.956
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SOUTH BROWARD HOSPITAL DISTRICT, D/B/A MEMORIAL REGIONAL HOSPITAL vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 93-006859CON (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Dec. 01, 1993 Number: 93-006859CON Latest Update: Nov. 16, 1994

Findings Of Fact Status of the case South Broward Hospital District (SBHD) is a special taxing district created in 1947 by a special act of the Florida Legislature to provide health services to the residents of South Broward County and surrounding areas. SBHD is a designated disproportionate share provider of medical services to the indigent, and currently operates two Class I General Hospitals in Broward County, to wit: Memorial Hospital, located in Hollywood, and Memorial Hospital West, located in Pembroke Pines. Pertinent to this case, SBHD was authorized to establish Memorial Hospital West by Certificate of Need (CON) number 4019 issued by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (the predecessor to respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration) on December 21, 1988. The certificate's project description read as follows: Construction of a new 100 bed satellite hospital facility, which will be composed of 92 medical surgical and 8 intensive care beds, in southwestern Broward County, HRS District 10, via the transfer of 100 beds from an existing facility, Memorial Hospital, Hollywood, and retiring an additional 25 medical/surgical beds from the existing facility upon the opening of the satellite facility . . . . By letter of June 3, 1992, respondent forwarded to SBHD License No. 3288, effective May 12, 1992, which authorized it to operate Memorial Hospital West as a Class I General hospital with 100 acute care beds. Contemporaneously, respondent forwarded to SBHD License No. 3289, effective May 12, 1992, which reduced Memorial Hospital's licensed acute care beds to 489, "reflecting the transfer of 100 acute beds to Memorial Hospital West, and the delicensure of 25 additional acute care beds," "[p]ursuant to Certificate of Need Number 4019." SBHD filed a timely petition challenging the respondent's issuance of License No. 3289, and, more particularly, the provision in such license reflecting "the delicensure of 25 additional acute care beds." It was SBHD's position that the provision of CON 4019 which required the retirement of the additional 25 beds upon the opening of Memorial Hospital West was invalid or, alternatively, that the CON should be modified to delete such requirement. Respondent disagreed with SBHD's assertion that the provision of the CON requiring retirement of the additional 25 beds was invalid and contended that SBHD's request for modification could not be accommodated under the modification provisions of Rule 59C-1.019, Florida Administrative Code, but required certificate of need review. Accordingly, these formal proceedings to review, de novo, the agency's decision were commenced at SBHD's request. The quest for CON 4019 The quest by SBHD to construct a satellite hospital in southwest Broward County had its genesis in January 1984 when the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) evidenced its intention to deny SBHD's application for CON 2834 and SBHD requested a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. That matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) for the assignment of a Hearing Officer and designated DOAH Case No. 84-0235. Thereafter, in 1985, SBHD filed another application with HRS, designated as CON application No. 4019, for authorization to develop and operate a 100-bed satellite hospital in southwest Broward County by transferring 100 beds from Memorial Hospital. After HRS's initial denial of that application, SBHD requested a formal hearing and the matter was referred to DOAH. That case was assigned DOAH Case No. 85-3940, and was consolidated with the other application of SBHD, DOAH Case No. 84-0235. On April 11, 1986, SBHD updated its two applications to construct the satellite hospital, by proposing to transfer 100 beds from Memorial Hospital to the new facility, which would be composed of 92 medical/surgical beds and 8 intensive care beds. Subsequently, SBHD agreed to the retirement of 25 additional medical/surgical beds from Memorial Hospital upon the opening of its satellite facility, HRS agreed to support such project, and SBHD's application was duly updated. Accordingly, when the final hearing was held in DOAH Case Nos. 84-0235 and 85-3940 on September 12-16, 1986, October 22, 1986, and December 1, 1986, the issue was: . . . whether South Broward Hospital District's (District) application for a certificate of need to build and operate a satellite facility in southwest Broward County by transferring 100 beds and retiring 25 medical/surgical beds from its existing facility should be granted. On August 4, 1987 a recommended order was rendered in DOAH Case Nos. 84-0235 and 85-3940, which recommended that SBHD's application be denied. While recommending denial, such order ultimately metamorphosed into a final order, discussed infra, granting SBHD's application, and adopting a number of the findings of fact set forth in the recommended order. Those findings adopted included the recognition of the agency's evolving policy relating to bed transfers and relocation, as well as its consideration of a reduction of excess capacity within the district as affecting its decision to support such transfer. Specifically, the order noted: The Department has formulated a draft policy with respect to standards for evaluating applications to transfer beds or convert facilities. This policy was first written on August 7, 1986, and is based on the agency's prior experience in health planning. The Department's general policy for transfers and conversions is to try to "work off" any overbedding in a service district when approving transfers by requiring bed retirement as a condition to the approval of transfers. This strategy is the Department's attempt to reduce the excess of licensed and approved medical/surgical beds. The Department does not believe it possesses statutory authority to delicense acute care beds or retire acute care beds. Voluntary reduction of surplus beds in conjunction with applications to transfer beds or convert facilities provides one means for reduction of the number of beds in a service district. While the hearing officer observed that the agency did not believe it possessed the statutory authority to require the retirement or delicensure of acute care beds as a precondition for approval of a CON application, such observation, considering other findings of the hearing officer and the proof in this case, does not suggest that a proposed reduction in beds was not a legitimate factor for the agency to consider when evaluating an application and deciding whether it does or does not, on balance, satisfy relevant statutory and rule criteria. 1/ Indeed, one criteria to be considered in evaluating a CON application is its consistency with the State and Local Health Plan. At the time SBHD's application was reviewed, the State Health Plan set an appropriate ratio of medical/surgical beds to the population as a ratio of 4.11 to 1,000. Broward County (District X) was significantly overbedded at the time, with a medical/surgical bed ratio of approximately 5.1 to 1,000 and the Local Health Plan encouraged a reduction of licensed beds to achieve a ratio of 4.5 to 1,000 by 1988. Moreover, a proposed reduction in beds could also influence other criteria, such as, access, efficiency, and utilization. Following rendition of the recommended order on August 4, 1987, SBHD's pursuit of CON 4019 to final order took a tortuous route. In this regard, a final order of the agency dated August 18, 1988 observed: A prior invalid order of October 7, 1987, was vacated by order of February 29, 1988. After the order of February 29 was submitted to the First District Court of Appeal pursuant to relinquishment of its jurisdiction, the appeal of the final order was dismissed. Petitioner [SBHD] then moved for entry of a new final order. By order of June 27, 1988, the case was then remanded to the Division of Administrative Hearings for reevaluation of the merits of the application and additional findings based on the existing record, consistent with the rulings on exceptions by the Department contained in the Order of Remand. The Division of Administrative Hearings, by order of July 26, 1988, declined remand and ordered that the record be returned to the Department for entry of final order. The order then proceeded to adopt, except as specifically noted, the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth in the recommended order, and granted SBHD's application for CON 4019. SBHD's pursuit of its CON had not, however, met fruition. The final order of August 18, 1988, "was quashed on procedural grounds by the First District Court of Appeal in an Order dated September 15, 1988". Subsequently, by "order dated December 13, 1988, the District Court dismissed [the case] on the basis of a voluntary dismissal by the parties". The agency then observed that "it is now time for the disposition of the application for CON 4019." Accordingly, by final order rendered December 21, 1988, the agency resolved: . . . I conclude that CON 4019 should be approved for the reasons set forth in the Order rendered August 18, 1988. Therefore, the Order rendered August 18, 1988, is incorporated by reference. Based on the foregoing, it is ADJUDGED that the application of South Broward Hospital District for certificate of need number 4019 to construct a satellite facility in south- western Broward County be APPROVED. Consistent with that final order, CON 4019, dated December 29, 1988, with an issue date of December 21, 1988, was granted to SBHD. As heretofore noted, the certificate, consistent with SBHD's updated application, included the requirement that an additional 25 medical/surgical beds would be retired at Memorial Hospital upon the opening of Memorial Hospital West. The validity of the provision of CON 4019 requiring retirement of 25 medical/surgical beds. Here, SBHD has challenged the propriety of respondent's delicensure of 25 medical/surgical beds at Memorial Hospital based on the contention that the provision of CON 4019, which provided for the retirement of 25 medical/surgical beds upon the opening of Memorial Hospital West, was invalid. SBHD's contention, as well as the proof offered to support it, is unpersuasive. In support of its contention, SBHD offered proof a hearing that it was HRS that initiated the proposal to retire beds, and that HRS did not have the unilateral authority to "require" the retirement or delicensure of beds as a prerequisite or condition for approval of a CON application. 2/ Accepting that HRS initiated the dialogue, as well as the fact that HRS could not unilaterally require SBHD to retire beds, does not, however, compel the conclusion that the provision for the retirement of beds was invalid. To the contrary, as heretofore discussed, overbedding in District X was of legitimate concern to HRS, a reduction of beds was an appropriate consideration in the course of CON review, and SBHD elected to update/amend its application to include such a reduction and thereby garner HRS support in the face of opposition from other competitors. Accordingly, that HRS could not "require" SBHD to retire beds is irrelevant. SBHD updated/amended its application and affirmatively proposed, as part of its project, a reduction of beds. Such reduction was an integral part of the project reviewed and ultimately approved, and was a factor appropriately considered by the agency in evaluating the application. Finally, to support its contention that the provision of CON 4019 requiring the retirement of 25 beds was invalid, SBHD suggests, essentially, that the update/amendment of its application to include such a proposal was inappropriate or contrary to law. Such contention, as well as the proof offered to support it, is likewise unpersuasive. Rather, the credible proof demonstrates that, at all times material to the subject application, HRS had no policy and there existed no rule or statute, that precluded an update or an amendment to an application for a CON during the course of an administrative proceeding. Accordingly, the amendment by SBHD of its application to include a provision for the retirement of 25 medical/surgical beds was not improper, and such provision can hardly be characterized as invalid. 3/ The request to modify CON 4019 to delete the requirement that 25 medical/surgical beds be retired. Accepting the validity of the provision of CON 4019 requiring the retirement of 25 medical/surgical beds, and therefore the propriety of the agency's decision to delicense those beds, SBHD has requested that the CON be modified to delete such requirement due to changed circumstances since its issuance. The agency opposes SBHD's request, contending that the change in bed capacity requires CON review. Pertinent to this case, Rule 59C-1.019, Florida Administrative Code, establishes the procedure and the circumstances under which a certificate of need holder may seek a "modification" of a certificate of need. For purposes of the rule, "modification" is defined as: . . . an alteration to an issued, valid certificate of need or to the condition or conditions on the face of a certificate of need for which a license has been issued, where such an alteration does not result in a project subject to review as specified in . . . subsection 408.036(1) . . . Florida Statutes. Rule 59C-1.019(1), Florida Administrative Code. Subsection 408.036(1), Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part: . . . all health-care-related projects, as described in paragraphs (a)-(n), are subject to review and must file an application for a certificate of need with the department. The department is exclusively responsible for determining whether a health-care- related project is subject to review under ss. 381.701-381.715. * * * (e) Any change in licensed bed capacity. In this case, the agency contends that the CON cannot be modified to delete the 25-bed retirement provision because such alteration would result in a "change in licensed bed capacity," and therefore a project subject to CON review. Contrasted with the agency's position, SBHD contends that it timely challenged the agency's decision to delicense the 25 beds, based on its contention that the provision requiring the retirement of beds was invalid, and "there can be no actual change in licensed bed capacity at Memorial Hospital prior to final resolution of . . . this proceeding." [SBHD proposed recommended order, at p.17]. As stated by SBHD, Rather than seeking to change its licensed bed capacity, SBHD is opposing a change in its licensed bed capacity in order to maintain the status quo. [SBHD proposed recommended order, at p. 17]. Considering the provisions of law and analysis, as discussed in the conclusions of law infra, it is concluded that the agency's position is founded upon a reasonable interpretation of law and is, therefor, accorded deference. 4/

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered dismissing SBHD's protest to the delicensure of 25 acute care beds at Memorial Hospital, and denying SBHD's request to modify certificate of need number 4019 to delete the requirement that 25 acute care beds be retired. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 23rd day of September 1994. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September 1994.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.60408.034408.036 Florida Administrative Code (2) 59C-1.01959C-1.020
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HOLMES REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC. vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 04-002810CON (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 11, 2004 Number: 04-002810CON Latest Update: May 23, 2007

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner’s application for a Certificate of Need to establish a new 84-bed acute care hospital in Viera should be approved.

Findings Of Fact Parties Holmes and the Health First System Holmes, the applicant for the CON at issue in this case, is a not-for-profit corporation that operates two acute care hospitals in Brevard County: Holmes Regional Medical Center (HRMC) in Melbourne and Palm Bay Community Hospital (PBCH) in Palm Bay. HRMC opened in 1962. It is a 514-bed acute care hospital, with 504 acute care beds and 10 Level II neonatal intensive care (NICU) beds. HRMC provides tertiary-level services, including adult open-heart surgery, and it is the designated trauma center for Brevard County. HRMC has been recognized as one of the top 100 cardiovascular hospitals in the country, and it has received other recognitions for the high quality of care that it provides. PBCH opened in 1992. It is a 60-bed acute care hospital. PBCH does not provide tertiary-level services, and it does not provide obstetrical (OB) services. Holmes’ parent company is Health First, Inc. (Health First), which is a not-for-profit corporation formed in 1995 upon the merger of Holmes and the organization that operated Cape Canaveral Hospital (Cape Hospital). Cape Hospital is a 150-bed not-for-profit acute care hospital in Cocoa Beach. The range of services that Cape Hospital provides is broader than range of services provided at PBCH, but not as broad as the range of services provided at HRMC. For example, Cape Hospital provides OB services, but it does not have any NICU beds. All of the Health First hospitals are accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO). Health First provides a broad range of health care services in Brevard County in addition to the hospital services provided at HRMC, PBCH, and Cape Hospital. For example, it operates a hospice program, surgical center, outpatient facilities, and fitness centers. Health First also administers the Health First Health Plan (HFHP), which is the largest managed care plan in Brevard County. All of the Health First hospitals serve patients without regard to their ability to pay, and as more fully discussed in Part F(1)(g) below, Holmes provides a significant amount of care to Medicaid and charity patients at HRMC and PBCH. Holmes also provides health care services to the medically underserved through a program known as HOPE, which stands for Health, Outreach, Prevention, and Education. HOPE was established in the early 1990’s to provide free health care for at-risk children as well as free clinics (both fixed-site and mobile) for medically underserved patients throughout Brevard County. At the time of the final hearing, the free clinics operated by HOPE were being transitioned into a federally- qualified health center, the Brevard Health Alliance (BHA). After the transition, Holmes will no longer operate the clinics; however, Holmes is obligated to provide $1.3 million per year in funding to BHA and it will continue to provide services to at- risk children through the HOPE program. Health First administers a charitable foundation that raises money to support initiatives such as the cancer center at HRMC, the construction of a hospice house, and an Alzheimer’s support center. The foundation has raised approximately $7 million since its inception in October 2001. Wuesthoff Wuesthoff operates two not-for-profit acute care hospitals in Brevard County: Wuesthoff-Rockledge and Wuesthoff- Melbourne. Like Health First, Wuesthoff provides a broad range of health care services in Brevard County in addition to its acute care hospitals. The services include a nursing home, assisted living facility, clinical laboratory, hospice program, home health agency, diagnostic center, and fitness centers. Wuesthoff-Rockledge opened in 1941. It has 245 beds, including 218 acute care beds, 10 Level II NICU beds, and 17 adult inpatient psychiatric beds. Wuesthoff-Rockledge provides tertiary-level services, including adult open-heart surgery, and it is the only acute care hospital in Brevard County designated as a Baker Act receiving facility. Wuesthoff-Rockledge is in the process of adding 44 more beds, including a new 24-bed intensive care unit (ICU) that is projected to open in 2006 and 20 acute care beds. After those beds are added, Wuesthoff-Rockledge will have 289 beds. Currently, approximately 57 percent of Wuesthoff- Rockledge’s beds are in semi-private rooms and 43 percent of the beds are in private rooms. After the addition of the 44 new beds, the percentages will be 69 percent in semi-private rooms and 31 percent in private rooms. Wuesthoff-Melbourne opened in December 2002. It originally received CON approval for 50 beds in November 2000. Before it opened, it received CON approval for an additional 50 beds, which increased its licensed capacity to 100 beds. Wuesthoff-Melbourne opened with 65 beds, all of which are in private rooms. At the time of the hearing, Wuesthoff- Melbourne had that same number of beds and an occupancy rate of approximately 80 percent. In December 2004, Wuesthoff-Melbourne added an additional 50 beds. Wuesthoff was awaiting final licensure approval from the Agency for those beds at the time of the hearing. The approval will increase Wuesthoff-Melbourne’s licensed capacity to 115 beds, all of which are in private rooms. The additional 15 beds (beyond the 100 previously licensed) were added pursuant to the 2004 amendments to the CON law, which permit bed expansions at existing hospitals without CON approval. Wuesthoff-Melbourne was designed and engineered for approximately 200 beds, and it expects to have 134 beds in service in the near future. The space for the additional 19 beds (to expand from 115 to 134) has been shelled-in, and the bed expansion will likely be completed in late-2005 or early- 2006. All of those beds will be in private rooms. The expansion of Wuesthoff-Melbourne to 134 beds will occur notwithstanding the outcome of this proceeding, but the expansion of the facility to 200 beds depends in large part on the outcome of this proceeding. Wuesthoff-Melbourne provides all of the basic acute care services, including OB services. It does not provide tertiary-level services. The Wuesthoff hospitals are accredited by JCAHO. Wuesthoff has been recognized as one of the “100 Most Wired” hospitals by Hospitals & Health Networks magazine for the comprehensive information technology (IT) systems in place at its hospitals. The Wuesthoff hospitals serve all patients without regard to their ability to pay, and as discussed in Part F(1)(g) below, the Wuesthoff hospitals provide a significant amount of care to Medicaid and charity patients. Wuesthoff also provides health care services to the medically underserved through a free health clinic in Cocoa and a mobile unit that serves patients throughout Brevard County. Like Health First, Wuesthoff administers a charitable foundation that funds initiatives at the Wuesthoff hospitals and in the community. (3) Agency The Agency is the state agency that administers the CON program and is responsible for reviewing and taking final agency action on CON applications. Application Submittal and Preliminary Agency Action Holmes filed a letter of intent and a CON application in the first batching cycle of 2004 for hospital beds and facilities. Holmes’ letter of intent and CON application were timely and properly filed. Holmes application, CON 9759, proposes the establishment of a new 84-bed acute care hospital in the Viera area of Brevard County. The proposed hospital will be known as Viera Medical Center (VMC). The fixed need pool published by the Agency for the applicable batching cycle identified a need for zero new acute care beds in Subdistrict 7-1, which is Brevard County. There were no challenges to the published fixed need pool. The Agency comparatively reviewed Holmes’ application with the CON applications filed by Wuesthoff to add 34 beds at Wuesthoff-Melbourne (CON 9760) and to add 44 beds at Wuesthoff- Rockledge (CON 9761). On June 10, 2004, the Agency issued its State Agency Action Report (SAAR), which summarized the Agency’s findings and conclusions based upon its comparative review of the applications. The SAAR recommended denial of Holmes’ application and both of Wuesthoff's applications. After the Agency published notice of its intent to deny the applications in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Holmes timely petitioned the Agency for an administrative hearing on the denial of its application. Wuesthoff did not pursue an administrative hearing on the denial of its applications as a result of the 2004 amendments to the CON law, which became effective July 1, 2004. Under the new law, a CON is not needed to add acute care beds at an existing hospital and, as indicated above, the Wuesthoff hospitals are already in the process of adding the beds that they were seeking through CON 9760 and CON 9761. The Agency reaffirmed its opposition to Holmes’ application at the hearing through the testimony of Jeffrey Gregg, the Bureau Chief for the Agency’s CON program. Acute Care Subdistrict 7-1 / Brevard County The Agency uses a five-year planning horizon in determining the need for new acute care beds, and it calculates the inventory of acute care beds and considers CON applications for new acute care beds on a subdistrict basis. Brevard County is in Subdistrict 7-1. There are no other counties in the subdistrict. There are six existing acute care hospitals in Brevard County, all of which are not-for-profit hospitals: Parrish Medical Center (Parrish) in Titusville, Cape Hosptial, Wuesthoff-Rockledge, Wuesthoff-Melbourne, HRMC, and PBCH. Brevard County is a long, narrow county. It stretches approximately 70 miles north to south, but averages only 20 miles east to west. The county is bordered on the north by Volusia County, on the west by the St. Johns River and Osceola County, on the south by Indian River County, and on the east by the Atlantic Ocean. The major north-south arterial roads in the county are Interstate 95 (I-95) and U.S. Highway 1 (US 1). The Intracoastal Waterway also runs north and south through the eastern portion of the county. Other arterial roads in the south/central portion of the county are Murrell Road, Eau Gallie Boulevard and Wickham Road. Because of the county’s long and narrow geography, three recognized market areas for hospital services have developed in the county, i.e., northern, central, and southern. The northern area of the county, which includes the Titusville area, had approximately 63,000 residents in 2003. It is primarily served by one hospital: Parrish. The central area of the county, which includes the Rockledge and Cocoa areas, had approximately 163,000 residents in 2003. It is primarily served by two hospitals: Wuesthoff- Rockledge and Cape Hospital. The southern area of the county, which includes the Melbourne and Palm Bay areas, had approximately 276,000 residents in 2003. It is primarily served by three hospitals: HRMC, Wuesthoff-Melbourne, and Palm Bay. The Viera area, discussed below, overlaps the central and southern market areas and is primarily served by Wuesthoff- Rockledge, Wuesthoff-Melbourne, and HRMC. According to the data in Table 28 of the CON application, those hospitals together accounted for 90 percent of the patients from zip code 32940, which is the “main” Viera zip code. The evidence was not persuasive that the three market areas in Brevard County equate to “antitrust markets” from an economist’s standpoint, but it was clear that the hospitals and physicians in the county recognize the existence of the market areas. For example, there is very little overlap in the medical staffs of the hospitals in different market areas, but there is significant overlap in the medical staffs of the hospitals in the same market area, and the opening of Wuesthoff-Melbourne in south Brevard County impacted HRMC and PBCH, but had little impact on the hospitals in central Brevard County. Additionally, there is very little out-migration of patients from one area of the county to hospitals in another area. The data in Tables 18 and 19 of the CON application shows that in 2003, for example, 83.6 percent of south Brevard County adult medical/surgical patients were admitted to one of the three south Brevard County hospitals, and 79.5 percent adult medical/surgical patients in central Brevard County were admitted to one of the two hospitals in that area of the county. Viera Viera is an unincorporated area in south/central Brevard County that is being developed by The Viera Company (TVC). TVC is a for-profit land development company owned by A. Duda & Sons, Inc. (Duda). The Viera DRI Viera is being developed pursuant to a development of regional impact (DRI) development order that was first adopted by Brevard County in 1990. The original DRI included 3,000 acres east of I-95, which was developed primarily as residential subdivisions. In 1995, an additional 6,000 acres were added to the DRI west of I- 95, which is being developed as a mixed-use community. The portion of the DRI east of I-95 has effectively been built-out. The build-out date for the remainder of the DRI is 2020. The master plan for the DRI includes approximately 19,000 residential units, 3.7 million square feet (SF) of office space, 2.9 million SF of commercial space, a governmental center, six schools, parks, open space, and a 7,500-seat baseball stadium and practice facility used by the Florida Marlins. As of October 2004, over 5,800 homes and approximately 2 million SF of commercial and office space have been developed west of I-95 in addition to the governmental center, several schools, and the Florida Marlins’ facilities. There are approximately 12,000 acres of undeveloped, agricultural property adjacent to and to the west of the DRI that are owned by Duda and that, according to the chief operating officer of TVC, will likely be added to the DRI in the near future. The record does not reflect what type of uses will be developed on that property or when that development will begin. The DRI development order includes authorization for up to 470 hospital beds, with vested traffic concurrency for 150 beds. The master site plan for the DRI designates an area west of I-95 on the southwest corner of the Wickham Road/Lake Andrew Drive intersection as the “Proposed Viera Medical Park.” VMC is proposed for that location. The DRI development order provides all of the local government land use approvals, including traffic concurrency, that are necessary for VMC. TVC is developing Viera for and marketing it to retirees and younger persons, including families with children. The DRI includes age-restricted subdivisions, but it also includes amenities such as three elementary schools and a large regional park with ball fields and playgrounds. (2) Negotiations for a Hospital in Viera TVC has long wanted a hospital in Viera. Wuesthoff identified the Viera area as future growth area in the 1990’s and began establishing health care facilities in the area at that time. Wuesthoff has a diagnostic center, a lab facility, and a rehabilitation facility in the Suntree area, which is just to the east of the Viera DRI. Wuesthoff expressed interest in building a hospital in Viera in 1993 and, more recently, in 2003. In August 1993, Wuesthoff and TVC entered into an agreement that gave Wuesthoff a 10-year exclusive right to develop a hospital in Viera if certain conditions were met. However, Wuesthoff ultimately built Wuesthoff-Melborune in Melbourne (rather than in Viera), and the exclusivity provision in the August 1993 contract never went into effect. In July 2003, Wuesthoff sent a letter to TVC expressing its interest in obtaining an option to purchase 25 to acres within the Viera DRI to construct a hospital. In the letter, Wuesthoff stated that it would construct the hospital “within 10 years or when the population of Viera exceeds 40,000, whichever first occurs”; that the hospital would be “constructed similar to Wuesthoff Medical Center-Melbourne which currently encompasses 65 licensed beds in a 150,000 sq. ft. facility”; that it wanted the “sole right to build a hospital or hospital like facility in Viera . . . until 5 years after the opening of the hospital” and that it wanted TVC to “consider selling the desired land to Wuesthoff at a reduced price.” Wuesthoff’s July 2003 offer was not seriously considered by TVC because, by that time, TVC was in the process of finalizing its agreement for the sale of 50 acres to Health First for VMC. Additionally, the Health First agreement was more appealing to TVC because Health First was offering to purchase more property at a higher price than was Wuesthoff, and Health First was committed to building a hospital sooner than was Wuestoff. The contract between Health First and TVC was executed on August 5, 2003, and Health First has since closed on the purchase of the 50 acres at a cost of approximately $9 million. The Health First/TVC contract includes an exclusivity provision that prohibits the development of another hospital within the Viera DRI or on any of the lands owned by Duda until 2029 if Holmes constructs at least 70 percent of Phase I of the Viera Medical Park by August 31, 2006, and begins construction on a hospital with at least 80 beds by August 31, 2010. The contract also includes exclusivity provisions relating to the other uses being developed as part of the Viera Medical Park, but the exclusivity on those uses expires in 2010, at the latest. The exclusivity provision will be included in restrictive covenants that are recorded in the public records of Brevard County. The restrictive covenants will run with the land and will bind future purchasers of property from TVC and Duda. Exclusivity provisions are not uncommon in land- purchase contracts for large commercial projects or new hospitals. The August 1993 agreement between Wuesthoff and TVC included such a provision as did Wuestoff’s July 2003 offer. However, the length of the hospital exclusivity provision in the Health First/TVC contract and the fact that it applies to the land owned by Duda outside of the Viera DRI goes beyond what is reasonably necessary to allow the new hospital to become stabilized and has the potential to stifle competition for acute care hospital services in the Viera area for the next 25 years. Viera Medical Center (1) Generally Holmes conditioned the approval of its CON application on VMC being located at the "[i]ntersection of Lake Andrew Drive and Wickham Road, Viera, Florida." VMC was projected to open in 2008 as part of the Viera Medical Park that Health First is building on the 50 acres that it purchased from TVC at that location. VMC will be located in zip code 32940, which is the “main” Viera zip code. VMC will be built on 20 of the 50 acres purchased by Health First. The remaining 30 acres will be developed with the other health care facilities that will make up the Viera Medical Park. The development of the Viera Medical Park will be done in three phases. Phase I will include a fitness center; a medical office building; and outpatient facilities such as an urgent care center, an ambulatory surgical center, and a diagnostic imaging and rehabilitation center. Phase II will include VMC. Phase III may include a nursing home and/or assisted living facility as well as “multi-family retirement units.” VMC will be a 213,000 SF facility with 84 licensed beds, 16 “observation” beds, and a full emergency room (ER). The 84 licensed beds will consist of 72 acute care beds and a 12-bed critical care unit/ICU. All of the beds will be in private rooms. The total project cost for VMC is approximately $106 million, which will be funded primarily by tax-free bonds issued by Holmes. VMC will have a cardiac catheterization lab, but it will not provide interventional cardiology services such as angioplasty. VMC will not provide any tertiary-level services or OB services, and it will not have a dedicated pediatric unit. VMC will share management and administrative support services with HRMC so as to minimize duplication of those services and to reduce overhead costs. VMC will have an integrated IT system that will utilize electronic medical records and a computerized physician order entry system, as well as an electronic ICU (e-ICU). The e-ICU is an innovative critical care management system based upon a telemedicine platform that is in use at the existing Health First hospitals in Brevard County. Except for the e-ICU, which the Wuesthoff hospitals do not have, the IT systems at VMC will be materially the same as Wuesthoff’s award-winning IT systems. VMC will have a helipad without any weight restrictions and, as discussed in Part F(1)(a)(iv) below, VMC has been designed with hurricanes and other “contingency events” (e.g., bioterrorism) in mind. Demographics of VMC’s Proposed Service Area The primary service area (PSA) for VMC consists of zip codes 32934, 32935/36, 32940, and 32955/56; the secondary service area (SSA) consists of zip codes 32901/02/41, 32904, 32922/23/24, 32926/59, and 32927. Neither Wuesthoff nor the Agency contested the reasonableness of the PSA or the SSA. All of the zip codes targeted by VMC are within the primary service area of one or more of the existing hospitals, and there are three hospitals physically located within those zip codes. Wuesthoff-Melbourne and Wuestoff-Rockledge are located in VMC’s PSA, and HRMC is in VMC’s SSA. The 2003 population of the PSA was 108,436. In 2010, which would be VMC’s third year of operation, the PSA’s population is projected to be 128,498. The 65+ age cohort, which is the group that most heavily utilizes hospital services, is projected to make up 21.5 percent of the PSA’s population in 2010. That is a lower percentage than the projected populations of the 18-44 age cohort (29.1 percent) and the 45-65 age cohort (29.7 percent) in the PSA. VMC’s PSA has a more favorable payor-mix than the county as a whole. It has a lower percentage of Medicaid patients and a higher percentage of insured patients --i.e., commercial, HMO, PPO, workers comp, and Champus/VA patients -- than the county as a whole. Except for zip code 32935/36, each of the zip codes in VMC’s PSA has a higher median household income than Brevard County as a whole. Zip code 32935/36 is the zip code in which Wuesthoff-Melbourne is located. The zip code in which VMC will be located, 32940, has the highest median household income in Brevard County. The median household income in that zip code for 2004 was $67,000 as compared to the county-wide average of $44,000. Utilization Projections VMC was projected to open in January 2008, and Holmes' CON application contains utilization and financial projections for VMC's first three years of operation, i.e., 2008, 2009, and 2010. The utilization projections are based upon an average length of stay (ALOS) of 3.69 days, which is reasonable. The utilization projections are also based upon the assumption that by VMC’s third year of operation, it will have 26.9 percent market share in its PSA and a 7.4 percent market share in its SSA. VMC's projected market share in zip code 32940, which is its “home” zip code and the “main” Viera zip code, is projected to be 35 percent. The market share assumptions are reasonable and attainable. The utilization projections include a “ramp-up” period for VMC. Its annual occupancy rate in its first year of operation is projected to be 45.6 percent; its annual occupancy rate in its second year of operation is projected to be 65.7 percent; and in its third year of operation (2010), VMC is expected to have an annual occupancy rate of 76 percent with 6,313 discharges and 23,298 patient days. The occupancy rates, and the discharges and patient days upon which they are based, are reasonable and attainable.2 The application projects that VMC will redirect or “cannibalize” a significant percentage of its patients from the other Health First hospitals. The percentage of patients that VMC will cannibalize from the other Health First hospitals in each zip code varies from 75 percent to 45 percent, depending upon the proximity of the zip code to VMC. Overall, approximately 69.4 percent of VMC’s patients will be cannibalized patients, i.e., patients that would have otherwise gone to HRMC (66.2 percent), Cape Hosptial (3.2 percent), or PBCH (less than 0.1 percent). The remaining 30.6 percent of VMC’s patients will be patients that would have otherwise gone to Wuesthoff-Rockledge (15.8 percent) or Wuesthoff-Melbourne (14.8 percent). The record does not reflect the outpatient volume projected for VMC, but Holmes’ health planner conceded at the hearing that the projected outpatient revenues for VMC did not take into account the outpatient services that will be included in Phase I of the Viera Medical Park. As a result, the volume on which the outpatient revenues were based is overstated to some degree, but there was no credible evidence regarding the extent of the overstatement. VMC is projected to treat 15,851 patients in its ER in its first year of operation (2008), and by its third year of operation (2010), VMC is expected to treat 27,780 patients in its ER. The record does not reflect how those figures were calculated, nor does it reflect what percentage of those patients would have otherwise been treated in the ERs at HRMC, PBCH, or the Wuesthoff hospitals. However, the reasonableness of those figures was not contested by Wuesthoff or the Agency. Statutory and Rule Criteria Statutory Criteria -- Section 408.035, Florida Statutes (2004)3 Subsections (1), (2) and (5) -– Need for Proposed Services; Accessibility of Existing Services; and Enhancing Access According to the CON application (page 14), the need for VMC is justified based upon: The large population base and significant population growth projected for the [Viera] area. The need to improve access and reduce travel times for this significant population for both critical care and inpatient services. The projected need for additional acute care beds at HRMC and the benefits of delivering non-tertiary services away from [HRMC’s] campus. Additionally, the CON application (page 15) asserts that the approval of VMC will: Significantly enhance the area’s Homeland Security and disaster planning and preparedness. Enhance the quality of care delivered to area residents as a result of key design and information technology innovations planned for [VMC]. Provide access to cost-effective, quality of care for all residents of the service area, including the uninsured. In its PRO (page 19), Holmes identifies those same six issues as the “not normal” circumstances that justify approval of VMC. Holmes’ health planner conceded at the hearing that the VMC project is not intended to address any cultural, programmatic, or financial access problems, and that those potential “not normal” circumstances were not advanced in the CON application as bases for approval of VMC. Population of and Growth in the Viera Area There has been considerable growth in Viera over the past 15 years, and the demand for new homes in the Viera DRI remains strong. The projected population of the Viera DRI is expected to exceed 40,000 when the DRI is built-out in 2020, and that figure does not include the population of the Suntree area, which is outside of the Viera DRI and has a number of large residential subdivisions. Zip code 32940, which is the “main” Viera zip code, had a population of 22,940 in 2003. By 2010, that zip code is projected to have a population of 31,862. That is an increase of 38.9 percent, but only 9,000 persons. As stated above, the population of VMC's PSA is projected to increase from 108,436 (in 2003) to 128,489 (in 2010). That is an increase of 18.5 percent, but only 20,000 persons. The population of VMC’s PSA is projected to grow at a faster rate than Brevard County as a whole. Over the seven-year period used in the application (2003 to 2010), the annual growth rate for VMC’s PSA is projected to be 2.64 percent while the annual growth rate of Brevard County as a whole is projected to be 1.74 percent.4 Population growth in Florida is normal and, indeed, is expected. There is nothing extraordinary about the growth projected for zip code 32940 and/or VMC’s PSA. Accordingly, the population growth projected in the Viera area does not, in and of itself, justify the approval of VMC. Enhanced Access There are two main components to Holmes’ argument that VMC will enhance access. First, Holmes contends that VMC will reduce travel times for Viera residents and thereby enhance their access to hospital services. Second, Holmes contends that the approval of VMC will relieve pressure on the overcrowded ERs at the existing hospitals in Brevard County thereby enhancing access to ER services countywide. For Viera Residents VMC will provide more convenient access to hospital services for Viera residents (at least those in need of the basic, non-OB services that will be offered at VMC), and to that extent, VMC will enhance access for Viera residents. VMC will also provide more convenient ER access for Viera residents. Quicker access to an ER is generally beneficial to the patient, although certain heart-attack patients may benefit more by going to the ER of a hospital that can do an immediate angioplasty, such as Wuesthoff-Rockledge or HRMC. VMC will not necessarily enhance access for other residents of the PSA and SSA targeted by VMC (e.g., those outside of the Viera area) because many of those residents are closer to an existing hospital. Indeed, some of those residents would have to pass an existing hospital to get to VMC, which seems particularly unlikely for emergency patients. VMC will also not enhance access for patients in need of OB services or tertiary services that will not be offered at VMC. Convenience alone is not a basis for approving a new hospital, particularly where (as here) the evidence establishes that the residents of the area to be served by the new hospital currently have reasonable access to hospital services. VMC will be located approximately 10 miles south of Wuesthoff-Rockledge, and approximately 11 miles north of Wuesthoff-Melbourne. VMC will be approximately 15 miles northwest of HRMC. There are multiple routes from the Viera area to the Wuesthoff hospitals and HRMC. The routes are along major arterial roads, including I-95, US 1, Wickham Road, Murrell Road, Fiske Boulevard, and Eau Gallie Boulevard. All of those roads are at least four lanes wide. The travel-time studies presented by Wuesthoff show that it takes less than 15 minutes to drive from either of the Wuesthoff hospitals to the VMC site. There was anecdotal testimony suggesting longer travel times, particularly from the VMC site to Wuesthoff-Melbourne,5 but that testimony was not as persuasive as Wuesthoff’s travel-time studies. The travel-time studies presented by Wuesthoff were not without flaws. For example, the travel times were calculated by driving away from the Wuesthoff hospitals, rather than driving towards the hospitals as a potential patient from Viera would be doing. Holmes did not present its own travel- time studies, and notwithstanding the directional issue and the other unpersuasive criticisms of the study by Holmes’ traffic engineer, Wuesthoff’s studies are found to be credible and persuasive. Indeed, Holmes’ traffic engineer estimated that it would take 15 to 20 minutes to get from VMC to Wuesthoff- Melbourne using the most direct route (Transcript, at 668), which is consistent with Wuesthoff’s travel-time studies. It takes longer to drive from Viera to HRMC than it does to drive from Viera to either of the Wuesthoff hospitals. The travel-time studies did not directly address the issue, but the anecdotal testimony suggests that the travel times from Viera to HRMC are between 25 and 45 minutes depending upon the time of day and traffic conditions.6 There are several road segments on the routes between Viera and the Wuesthoff hospitals whose “v/c ratios”7 currently exceeds 1.0, which is an indication of an over-capacity road. However, there are roadway improvements planned or underway that will expand the capacity of those road segments by 2010. Indeed, a comparison of the 2003 (Exhibit H-23) and 2010 (Exhibit W-50) v/c ratios for the road segments on the routes between Viera and the Wuesthoff hospitals shows only marginal increases in the ratios, with many of the 2010 ratios projected to be lower than 0.8, which according to Holmes’ traffic engineer, indicates that the “roadway that is probably operating well within its ability to carry that traffic volume.” Holmes’ traffic engineer did not attempt to quantify the extent to which travel times would increase due to the marginal increases in the v/c ratios. Thus, his opinion that travel times would “increase significantly” and be “significantly greater” in the future is not persuasive. TVC is required to mitigate for the off-site traffic impacts generated by the development of the Viera DRI. In this regard, road improvements (e.g., additional lanes, traffic signals, etc.) will be made in the future as necessary to accommodate the additional population in the Viera DRI. In fact, there are significant road improvements currently underway that are being funded, at least in part, by TVC pursuant to the Viera DRI development order, including the six-laning of I-95 through the Viera area. In sum, the evidence establishes that persons in the PSA and SSA targeted by VMC, including residents of the Viera area, currently have reasonable access to acute care services, and the evidence was not persuasive that there will be access problems over the applicable five-year planning horizon such that a new hospital in Viera is necessary to enhance access. For ER Services in Central and South Brevard County The Brevard County government is the emergency medical services (EMS) provider for the county. Brevard County EMS responds to emergency calls throughout the county and its ambulances transport emergency patients to hospital ERs. Overcrowded ERs can adversely affect the EMS system in several ways. First, if the ER is overcrowded it can take longer for ambulances to off-load patients to the ER staff, which results a longer period of time that the ambulance is “out of service.” Second, if the closest hospital is on “diversion status” because of an overcrowded ER, ambulances will have to transport patients to a more distant hospital, which also results in the ambulance being out of service for a longer period of time. Longer out-of-service periods can, on a cumulative basis, strain the EMS system because an out-of-service ambulance is not able to respond to emergency calls in its service area and the EMS provider may have to shift other ambulances to cover the area at the risk of increasing response times for emergency calls. Brevard County EMS protocol requires ambulances to take patients to the closest hospital, unless the patient is a trauma patient or the closest hospital is on diversion status. Trauma patients are taken to HRMC, which is the designated trauma center for the county. A hospital requests diversion status from EMS when it is unable to accept additional emergency patients because its ER is overcrowded. The most common reasons that an ER is overcrowded is that it had a large number of emergency patients arrive at the same time or that there is a “bottleneck” in the ER caused by a lack of inpatient beds to move patients from the ER that need to be admitted to the hospital. If diversion status is granted, EMS will take emergency patients to another hospital, even if it is further away than the hospital on diversion. As noted above, this strains the EMS system and can result in longer response times for emergency calls, which in turn, can negatively impact patient care. If diversion status is denied, the hospital is required to continue to accept emergency patients. This can create a less than optimal setting for patient care because the hospital may not have adequate space or resources to treat the patient in a timely manner. Until recently, Brevard County EMS would not grant diversion status to a hospital in south Brevard County if either of the other two hospitals in that area of the county informed EMS that they could not take the patients. That policy recently changed, and EMS will now grant diversion status to a hospital in south Brevard County if either of the other two hospitals in that area of the county informs EMS that it can take the patients. The new EMS policy change makes it easier for hospitals in south Brevard County to be placed in diversion status. For example, under the old policy, diversion status would not be granted to HRMC if either Wuestoff-Melbourne or PBCH informed EMS that they could not take HRMC’s emergency patients, but under the new policy, diversion status will be denied to HRMC only if Wuesthoff-Melbourne and PBCH both inform EMS that they cannot take HRMC’s emergency patients. In Brevard County, having a hospital on diversion was “pretty rare” until 2002. Diversion requests have become more frequent since then, and they are no longer a seasonal phenomenon caused by the influx of “snowbirds” into the county. Diversion is a more frequent problem in south Brevard County than it is in central Brevard County, and in south Brevard County, the diversion requests have come primarily from HRMC. The evidence was not persuasive that ER overcrowding is a significant problem for the Wuesthoff hospitals or PBCH. Wuesthoff-Melbourne has not requested to go on diversion, and only one occasion was identified where HRMC’s diversion request was denied because Wuesthoff-Melbourne was unable to handle HRMC's diverted patients. That occasion occurred when Wuesthoff-Melbourne had only 65 beds and, hence, less ability than it currently has to move patients out of the ER to accommodate additional emergency patients. According to Holmes, VMC will enhance access to ER services in central and south Brevard County because it will increase the area-wide ER capacity and reduce the frequency of diversion requests, which in turn, will reduce strains on the EMS system and benefit patients. The "North Expansion" underway at HRMC (discussed below) will include a new ER that is expected to help address the overcrowding issues that have required HRMC to request diversion in the past. The new ER is designed with shelled-in space to facilitate future ER expansions as needed. In any event, the evidence was not persuasive that VMC will materially reduce the ER volume at HRMC. The record does not reflect what percentage of VMC’s projected ER patients would have otherwise been served at HRMC as compared to the Wuesthoff hospitals. Moreover, it is not likely that non-trauma emergency patients from the Viera area are contributing to the overcrowding in the ER at HRMC because, under EMS protocol, those patients currently are being taken to Wuesthoff-Melbourne or Wuesthoff-Rockledge, which are closer to Viera than is HRMC. Need to “Decompress” HRMC Holmes contends that VMC will help to “decompress” HRMC and that it is the only viable option for doing so. HRMC is a well-utilized facility. According to the SAAR, its annual occupancy rate for the 12-month period ending June 2003 was 81.22 percent. HRMC's occupancy rate tends to stay above 80 percent, and at times it is as high as 115 percent. If VMC is not approved, HRMC’s annual occupancy rate for 2008 is projected to be 83.9 percent, and by 2010, its occupancy rate is projected to increase to 90 percent. Even if VMC is approved, HRMC’s annual occupancy rate is projected to be 81.7 percent in 2010. Those figures assume that HRMC will maintain its current bed capacity and they do not take into account the impact of the expansion of the Wuesthoff hospitals. HRMC currently includes approximately 612,000 SF. It is located on 18 acres of property that is bounded by streets and developed properties. Holmes owns several parcels of land adjacent to HRMC, and it is continuing to acquire parcels as they come available. Much of the adjacent land owned by Holmes is used for parking, and notwithstanding a 500-space parking garage on the south side of HRMC, there is still a shortage of parking at HRMC. Some of its staff parks at a nearby shopping center and take a shuttle to the hospital. There is an area on the north side of HRMC identified as the site of a "future parking garage," but there are no current plans to construct that structure. The original portion of the hospital, which is referred to as the “core” area, was built in the 1960’s. The remainder of the hospital has been added over the years, which has resulted in a less than ideal facility layout and has created operating inefficiencies. Some of the hospital’s support functions and administrative offices are located off- site. HRMC has undertaken a series of construction projects in recent years to reduce inefficiencies and congestion at the hospital and to increase the percentage of private rooms at the hospital. Those projects include the construction of a new OB unit and, most significantly, the $100 million “North Expansion.” The North Expansion is an eight-story, 337,000 SF addition to the hospital that is expected to be completed by the end of 2006. It will include 144 patient rooms, a new ER with a number of new observation beds, and it will allow all of the hospital’s cardiology services to be located in contiguous space. The 144 patient rooms will include 14 cardiovascular ICU beds, 22 ICU beds, and 108 acute care beds. All of the beds will be in private rooms. The 144 beds added as part of the North Expansion will not increase the bed capacity at Holmes. The same number of existing licensed beds will be eliminated, either through the conversion of existing semi-private rooms to private rooms or because the rooms are located in space that will be demolished to construct the North Expansion. The North Expansion has been designed and engineered to withstand 200-mile per hour winds, which exceeds the applicable building code requirements for hurricane protection. The North Expansion has also been designed and engineered to accommodate future expansion at HRMC in several respects. First, it includes shelled-in space on the eighth floor for an additional 36 private patient rooms. Second, it is engineered (but not shelled-in) to allow the fourth through eighth floors to be further expanded to include up to 180 additional private patient rooms in what was referred to at the hearing as a “mirror image” of the tower being built as part of the North Expansion. Third, the ER includes shelled-in space for future expansions as well as adjacent open space into which the ER could be further expanded in the future. There is no current plan to finish the shelled-in space on the eighth floor, but Holmes’ facility manger testified that he expected that to occur as soon as funding is available, and perhaps prior to the completion of the North Expansion. The beds added on the eighth floor will not increase the licensed capacity at Holmes, but rather they will come from the conversion of 36 additional existing semi-private rooms to private rooms. There is also no current plan to construct the “mirror image” side of the fourth through eighth floors of the North Expansion. That construction will be done in conjunction with the renovation of the core area of the hospital and will initially be used to locate the services from the core area that are displaced by the renovation. After the renovation of the core area, however, the "mirror image" will be used for patient rooms. In conjunction with the construction of the North Expansion, HRMC expects to relocate some of its ancillary and support services from the core area into the space where the existing ER is located, which in turn will open up space in the core area for other purposes. The space created by the construction of the new OB unit will also be available for other uses after it is no longer needed as "swing space" during the construction of the North Expansion. Additionally, Holmes recently purchased a building directly behind HRMC into which it will likely locate other ancillary and support services. Currently, less than 40 percent of HRMC’s general acute care beds are in private rooms. After the North Expansion, almost 80 percent of those beds will be in private rooms. Ultimately, Holmes wants all of the beds at HRMC to be in private rooms. Private rooms are beneficial because they offer the patients and their families more privacy and a more restful environment, and they can also help reduce the spread of infections. However, private rooms can also create operational inefficiencies for nurses who have to visit more rooms (often on longer hallways) than they would to serve the same number of patients in semi-private rooms. High quality care can be provided in semi-private rooms, and HRMC and Wuesthoff-Rockledge each do so. Although patients may prefer private rooms and most new hospitals are being designed with only private rooms, private rooms are still best characterized as an amenity, not a necessity. As a result, and Holmes’ desire to convert all of HRMC’s semi-private rooms to private rooms does not justify the building a new hospital based upon alleged capacity constraints at HRMC. Indeed, if Holmes chose to do so, it could increase the bed capacity at HRMC with little or no additional cost by adding the 36 beds in the shelled-in eighth floor of the North Expansion and/or by not converting as many semi-private rooms into private rooms. Moreover, after the North Expansion, HRMC will have approximately 50 observation beds (as compared to 20 currently) in private rooms that can be used for inpatients as needed. Indeed, as a result of the 2004 amendments to the CON law, some of those beds could be converted to licensed acute care beds at any time without CON review. Even if the beds are not converted to licensed beds, they will still help to decompress HRMC because observation patients will not need to be placed in inpatient rooms while they are being observed and evaluated for possible admission to the hospital. Several Holmes’ witnesses testified that even if Holmes wanted to add bed capacity to HRMC by converting fewer semi-private rooms to private rooms or other means, it could not do so because of limitations on the space available to provide the support services necessary for those additional rooms. That testimony was not persuasive because the witnesses conceded that Holmes has not undertaken a thorough analysis of what it intends to do with the space created in the existing building by the relocation of services as part of the North Expansion, which as noted above, will free up additional space for support services in the core area. The evidence was also not persuasive that the alternative presented in the CON application for adding 84 beds to HRMC is realistic. That alternative, the cost of which is presented in Table 23 of the CON application, was prepared after the decision was made to seek approval of a CON for VMC; it was not an alternative actually considered by Holmes and, indeed, it was characterized by the Holmes’ witness who prepared the cost estimate as a “theoretical solution” and not a viable solution to adding beds. The cost estimate in Table 23 is based upon a plan that would require the acquisition of additional land across the street from HRMC and the construction of a new bed tower on that land and an adjacent parcel on which Holmes currently owns a medical office building. The bed tower would be connected to HRMC by a two-story bridge over the street. The plan also includes the construction of a new parking garage and an office building to replace the existing medical office building. The land and building costs of the plan were approximately $86.2 million, which is approximately $18.3 million more than the land and building costs of VMC. When the equipment costs are added, the total cost of the plan is approximately $120 million. Not only was the plan not a viable solution, its cost was clearly overstated. For example, the $450/SF cost of the new bed tower was irreconcilably higher than the $278/SF cost of VMC and the $2.5 million that Holmes represented to the Agency in October 2003 that it would cost to add 50 beds to HRMC. In sum, the evidence fails to support Holmes’ claim that the only way to add bed capacity to HRMC is through the $120 million plan presented in Table 23 of the CON application. The evidence also fails to support Holmes’ claim that VMC is the only viable option to decompress HRMC. Indeed, the evidence establishes that HRMC could be decompressed if PBCH was better utilized. Holmes contends that PBCH is too far away from Viera to be a viable alternative to HRMC for patients from the Viera area. The evidence supports that claim, but that claim ignores the fact that better utilization of PBCH by Palm Bay patients will help to decompress HRMC. PBCH is currently an underutilized facility, and it has been ever since it opened in 1992. According to the SAAR, PBCH's annual occupancy rate for the 12-month period ending June 2003 was only 51.5 percent. Its annual occupancy rate is projected to be only 60.1 percent in 2008 and 65.4 percent in 2010, which are well below the 75 to 80 percent optimum utilization level. Approximately 25 to 30 percent of HRMC’s patient volume comes from the Palm Bay zip codes. If those patients were redirected to PBCH, the utilization rate at HRMC would go down and the utilization rate at PBCH would go up. Redirecting Palm Bay patients to PBCH has the potential to decompress HRMC more than redirecting Viera patients to VMC because HRMC has approximately 7,000 admissions from the Palm Bay area, as compared to approximately 6,000 admissions from the Viera area. Holmes did not present any persuasive evidence as to why patients from the Palm Bay zip codes could not be redirected to PBCH as a means of decompressing HRMC. On this issue, there was credible evidence presented by Wuesthoff that virtually no elective cases are being done at PBCH and that PBCH is essentially being used as a triage facility for HRMC. Finally, the expansion of the Wuesthoff hospitals (particularly Wuesthoff-Melbourne) will help to decompress HRMC because the Wuesthoff hospitals will be able to serve more patients. As the Wuestoff hospitals' market share grows, HRMC’s market share (and patient volume) will decline.8 Enhanced Homeland Security and Disaster Planning Brevard County is susceptible to hurricanes because of its location on the east coast of Florida and the length of its coastline. The evidence was not persuasive that Brevard County is more susceptible to hurricanes than are the other counties on the east coast. The three major storms that affected the county in the summer of 2004 were not the norm. Brevard County has a comprehensive emergency management plan to prepare for and respond to hurricanes, as do all of the existing hospitals in the county. Those plans were tested in the summer of 2004 when the county was directly impacted by three of the four major storms that hit the state Florida. The hospitals’ hurricane plans include securing the building, discharging as many patients as possible prior to the arrival of the storm, and canceling elective surgeries scheduled around the time the storm is expected to hit the area. The plans also provide for the evacuation of some of the hospitals during particularly strong storms, i.e., Category 3 or above. Cape Hospital is particularly prone to evacuation when a strong hurricane threatens the area because it is located close to the ocean on a peninsula in the middle of the Intracoastal Waterway. Cape Hospital was evacuated twice during the summer of 2004. None of the hospitals in Brevard County were evacuated during the first storm, Hurricane Charley. Cape Hospital and Wuesthoff-Rockledge were evacuated prior to the second storm, Hurricane Francis. That was the first time that Wuesthoff-Rockledge was evacuated since it opened in 1941, and its ER remained open and staffed even though the remainder of the hospital was evacuated. Cape Hosptial’s patients were taken to HRMC, and Wuesthoff-Rockledge patients were taken to Wuesthoff-Melbourne. The evacuated patients were accompanied by physicians and nurses and were transported to the receiving hospitals by ambulance. The evacuation of Cape Hospital and Wuesthoff- Rockledge placed strains on the receiving hospitals and their staffs. At one point during the evacuation, HRMC had more than 700 patients in its 514-bed facility and Wuesthoff-Rockledge had 156 patients in its 65-bed facility. By all accounts, despite the strains placed on the receiving hospitals, the evacuations went smoothly and there were no adverse patient outcomes attributable to the evacuation. Indeed, the director of Brevard County’s Health Department testified that all of the hospitals in the county responded and performed “great” during the hurricanes, and that sentiment was echoed by physicians and administrators affiliated with both of the hospital systems involved in this case. Cape Hospital was evacuated again prior to the third storm, Hurricane Jeanne. Wuesthoff-Rockledge was not evacuated during that storm, and approximately 15 of Cape Hospital’s patients were taken to Wuesthoff-Rockledge. None of the Health First or Wuesthoff hospitals suffered any significant damage from the hurricanes. The approval of VMC will not eliminate the possibility that Cape Hospital, Wuesthoff-Rockledge, or some other hospital in Brevard County may have to evacuate during a future hurricane. VMC may provide a more convenient (or at least an additional) place to evacuate some of the patients from Cape Hospital during a future hurricane because VMC is closer to Cape Hospital than is HRMC. VMC will also be more inland than HRMC and it will be designed to withstand 165 mile per hour winds. Holmes conditioned the approval of its CON application on the inclusion of a "suitable parcel, fully equipped and designed to support temporary staging of Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT)" at VMC. A DMAT is essentially a mobile emergency room set up by the federal government after a natural disaster to help serve the medical needs of those affected by the disaster. The DMAT staging area at VMC will be an open field adjacent to the hospital that is “pre-plumbed” with water, electricity, and communication lines. In some situations, it is beneficial for a DMAT to be set up proximate to a hospital, and in that regard, VMC’s inland location and proximity to I-95 may make it an attractive location to set up a DMAT in the future. It is not necessary, however, for a DMAT to be set up proximate to a hospital. DMATs are fully self-sustaining and they can be set up anywhere, including a Wal-Mart parking lot. Indeed, in some situations, it is more beneficial for the DMAT to be located closer to the persons in need of its services than to a hospital. For example, after Hurricane Jeanne, a DMAT was set up near the Barefoot Bay community in southern Brevard County, which is miles from the closest hospital. VMC’s central-county location and proximity to I-95 would also make it a good point-of-dispensing (POD) for vaccines and medicines in the case of a severe biological emergency. However, like DMATs, PODs can be set up anywhere and it is not critical for a POD to be proximate to a hospital even though proximity might allow for greater medical oversight of the dispensing process. There are high-profile, “Tier 1” terrorist targets located in Brevard County, including Kennedy Space Center, Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Patrick Air Force Base, and Port Canaveral. There is also a nuclear power plant in Indian River County, just south of the Brevard County line. The nature of these targets is somewhat unique because they involve the country's space program, but the presence of multiple “Tier 1” terrorist targets is not unique to Brevard County and is not, in and of itself, a special circumstance that justifies approval of a new hospital. Brevard County has developed emergency management plans in conjunction with the state and federal governments to prepare for and respond to terrorist attacks on those targets. Those plans have been in place for many years, but they have been significantly strengthened since September 11, 2001. VMC will include decontamination areas and other design features to facilitate the treatment of victims of bio- terrorism. The existing hospitals in Brevard County have similar design features as well as comprehensive plans for dealing with bio-terrorism. The evidence was not persuasive that VMC, as an 84- bed, non-tertiary satellite hospital, will materially enhance County’s ability to deal with a large-scale terrorist attack, whether biological or otherwise. Similarly, the evidence was not persuasive that Brevard County’s emergency management plans for hurricanes and/or terrorism are deficient in any way or that the approval of VMC would result in material enhancements to those plans. Any enhancements attributable to VMC would be marginal, at best. The DMAT staging area and other design elements included at VMC to facilitate the hospital’s participation in the Brevard County’s response to hurricanes, terrorist attacks, or other contingencies are positive attributes. Inclusion of those features in VMC (or any new hospital for that matter) is reasonable despite the infrequency of those contingencies, but it does not follow that VMC should be approved simply because it will include those features. IT Innovations and Design Features The evidence was not persuasive that VMC will provide a higher quality of care than is currently being provided at the existing hospitals serving central and south Brevard County as a result of the “innovative” IT systems and the other design features that will be incorporated into VMC. See Part F(1)(b) below. Accordingly, the approval of VMC is not justified on that basis. Enhanced Access to Care for the Uninsured Holmes’ contention that VMC will enhance access for the uninsured implicates the issue of “financial access.” Financial access concerns arise when there is evidence that necessary services are being denied to patients based upon their inability to pay or their uninsured status. Holmes’ health planner acknowledged at the hearing that VMC was not intended to address any financial access concerns for patients in the Viera area and, indeed, there was no credible evidence of any financial access concerns in PSA and SSA targeted by VMC. As discussed in Part E(2) above, VMC’s PSA include a higher percentage of insured patients than Brevard County as a whole, and as discussed in Part F(1)(g) below, the existing hospitals are adequately serving the medically indigent patients in central and south Brevard County, both at the hospital and through outreach efforts such as the Holmes’ HOPE program and Wuesthoff’s free clinics. Accordingly, the evidence failed to establish that VMC will enhance access to care for the uninsured, and approval of VMC is not justified on that basis. Subsection (3) -- Applicant’s Quality of Care Holmes, the applicant, provides a high quality of care at HRMC and PBCH, and it is reasonable to expect that it will provide the same high quality of care at VMC. The Wuesthoff hospitals also provide a high quality of care, and Holmes' witnesses acknowledged that VMC was not proposed to address any problem with quality of care in central or south Brevard County. The evidence was not persuasive that the quality of care at VMC will be materially better (or worse) than that provided at Wuesthoff-Melbourne, which has a similar range of services that will be provided at VMC. The award-winning IT systems in place at the Wuesthoff hospitals are materially the same as those proposed for VMC except for e-ICU at VMC. The evidence was not persuasive that the e-ICU significantly enhances quality of care, and because the e-ICU is being used at the existing Health First hospitals in Brevard County, VMC will not be providing any new technology or service that is not already available to physicians and patients in the county. Thus, the "innovative" IT systems proposed for VMC do not provide an independent basis for approving the CON application. The evidence was not persuasive that VMC would exacerbate nursing or physician shortages in Brevard County thereby negatively affecting quality of care in the county. See Part F(1)(c) below. Subsection (4) -- Availability of Personnel and Resources for Operations Holmes and Health First have the management resources necessary to establish and operate VMC. Holmes’ CON application projects that VMC will have 241.4 full-time equivalents (FTEs) in its first year of operation, and that by its third year of operation, it will have 355.7 FTEs. Nursing positions -- registered nurses, licensed practical nurses, nursing aides, and nursing directors -- account for 123.1 of the FTEs in the first year of operation, and 189.2 of the FTEs in the third year of operation. According to the CON application, a significant number of the initial FTEs at VMC are expected to be filled by persons who transfer from Holmes’ existing campuses, HRMC and PBCH. The parties stipulated that the projected number of FTEs needed by position and the projected salaries contained in Holmes’ CON application are reasonable for the census projected at VMC. However, Wuesthoff disputed whether Holmes will be able to adequately staff VMC due to nurse and physician shortages in Brevard County and/or that VMC will exacerbate those shortages and make it more difficult to staff the existing hospitals in the county. There is a nursing shortage in Brevard County, as there is around Florida and across the nation, but the situation in Brevard County is improving. Wuesthoff was able to fully staff Wuesthoff-Melbourne prior to its opening in December 2002, even though the nursing shortage was more severe at that time. Additionally, Wuesthoff is currently in the process of adding beds at Wuestoff-Melbourne and Wuesthoff-Rockledge, and it expects to be able to recruit and retain the nurses necessary to staff those additional beds despite the current state of the nursing shortage. Holmes received “magnet designation” from the American Nurses Credentialing Center, which is a recognition of its excellence in nursing. No other hospital in Brevard County has magnet designation, and that designation helps Holmes attract and retain nurses. The evidence establishes that Holmes will be able to recruit and retain the nursing and other staff needed for VMC, and the evidence was not persuasive that the staffing of VMC will exacerbate the nursing shortage or otherwise significantly impact Wuesthoff. There is a shortage of physicians in Brevard County with certain specialties, including neurosurgery, neurology, orthopedics, dermatology, and gastroenterology. Like the nursing shortage, this problem is not unique to Brevard County and it is not as severe in Brevard County as it is elsewhere in the state. The shortage of physician specialists in Brevard County is to some extent hospital-specific. For example, there is only one neurosurgeon covering Wuesthoff-Rockledge and Cape Hospital, and Wuesthoff-Melbourne only has part-time coverage neurosurgical coverage, but Holmes has several neurosurgeons. Holmes has recently had success in recruiting new physicians to Brevard County, including specialists. One of the largest multi-specialty physician groups in Brevard County, whose physicians are on staff at Holmes’ and Wuestoff's hospitals, has also been successful recently in recruiting new physicians to the area. That group, Melbourne Internal Medicine Associates, will be adding more physicians whether or not VMC is approved. The evidence establishes that Holmes will be able to attract the necessary physician staff for VMC, just as Wuesthoff-Melbourne was able to do when it opened. Indeed there are a number of physicians who have offices in the Viera area that are closer to VMC than the existing hospitals where they have privileges. Holmes and Wuesthoff require physicians with privileges at their hospitals to provide coverage for ER calls on a rotational basis. Physicians with privileges at more than one of the hospitals are required to provide ER call coverage at multiple hospitals, which can create a problem if the physician is on-call at two (or more) hospitals at the same time. Physicians who choose obtain privileges at VMC will be required to provide ER call coverage at VMC. ER call coverage is a problem in Brevard County, but the evidence was not persuasive that the problem is as significant in Brevard County as it is elsewhere in the state or that VMC would seriously exacerbate the problem. More specifically, the evidence was not persuasive regarding the extent to which VMC would cause physicians to be on call at more than one hospital at the same time. Nor was the evidence persuasive regarding the likelihood that physicians would relinquish privileges at other hospitals in Brevard County to obtain privileges at VMC in such numbers that ER call coverage problems would be created for the other hospitals. Subsection (6) -- Financial Feasibility The parties stipulated that VMC is financially feasible in the short-term and that Holmes has sufficient availability of funds for VMC's capital and operating expenses. The long-term financial feasibility of VMC is in dispute. Generally, if a CON project will at least break even in the second year of operation, it is financially feasible in the long-term. If, however, the project continues to show a loss in the second year of operation it is not financially feasible in the long-term unless it is nearing break-even and it is demonstrated that the hospital will break even within a reasonable period of time. Agency precedent (e.g., Wellington, supra, at 73-74) and the evidence in this case (e.g., Exhibit W-57, at 22) establish that in the context of a satellite hospital project that is expected to “cannibalize” patients from the applicant’s existing hospital, it is important to consider the impact of the project on the entire hospital system in evaluating the long- term financial feasibility of the project. The net operating revenue projected on Schedule 7A of the CON application, which is the starting point for the net income/loss projected on Schedule 8A, is reasonable.9 On Schedule 8A of the CON application, in the column titled “VMC only,” Holmes projects that VMC will generate a net loss of $5.71 million in its first year of operation, but that it will generate net profits of $1.48 million and $5.11 million in its second and third years of operation. Thus, as a stand-alone entity, VMC is financially feasible in the long-term. However, the “VMC only” figures do not provide the complete picture of the financial feasibility of the VMC project because of the significant percentage of its patients that will be cannibalized from HRMC and PBCH. In evaluating the long-term financial feasibility of the VMC project, it is also important to consider the “incremental difference” column in Schedule 8A. That column reflects VMC’s net financial benefit (or burden) to Holmes after taking into account the patients that VMC is cannibalizing from HRMC and PBCH. The “incremental difference” column in Schedule 8A shows a net loss of $695,000 in the VMC’s first year of operation, and net profits of $605,000 and $983,000 in the second and third years of VMC’s operation. The incremental figures presented in the CON application identify the profit/loss that will be generated by the patients treated at VMC that are new to the Holmes’ system, but they do not take into account the fact that the patients treated at VMC that were cannibalized from the other Holmes’ hospitals would have generated a different profit/loss for the Holmes’ system if they were treated at one of the other Holmes’ hospitals. When incremental profit/loss associated with treating the cannibalized patients at VMC rather than HRMC or PBCH is factored in, the “incremental difference” generated by VMC will be net profits of $498,000 (year one); $720,000 (year two); and $252,000 (year three). Included in the “incremental difference” column on Schedule 8A (and embedded in the revised figures in the preceding paragraph) are negative figures on the “depreciation and amortization” line and the “interest” line. Those figures are intended to reflect the depreciation, amortization, and interest expenses that Holmes will “save” by building VMC rather than by adding 84 beds at HRMC. A critical assumption underlying the “savings” shown on those lines is that it would cost $120 million to add 84 beds to HRMC. To the extent that cost is overstated, then the depreciation, amortization, and interest expense “savings” on Schedule 8A are also overstated, as is the incremental net profit of the VMC project. The extent to which the net profit is overstated depends upon the extent to which the $120 million cost is overstated. For example, if the cost of adding 84 beds to HRMC is the same as the cost of VMC (i.e., $106 million rather than $120 million), then the depreciation, amortization, and interest expense shown in the “incremental difference” column on Schedule 8A would be $0 (rather than a negative number) because the depreciation, amortization, and interest expenses in the “with this project” and “without this project” columns would be the same. If, on the other hand, there was no cost associated with the addition of 84 beds at HRMC, then the depreciation, amortization, and interest expense shown in the “without this project” column would be $10.662 million lower in 2010 (see Endnote 10) and that amount would appear as a positive number -- i.e., expense -- rather than a negative number -- i.e., “savings” -- in the “incremental difference” column. The evidence was not persuasive that it will cost $120 million to add beds to HRMC, which is the amount underlying the projected “savings” in depreciation, amortization, and interest expense shown on Schedule 8A. Indeed, as discussed in Part F(1)(a)(iii) above, the evidence establishes that the alternative that gave rise to the $120 million cost estimate was not a viable option and that Holmes could add 84 beds at HRMC with little or no cost if it chose to do so by reducing the number of semi-private rooms that it converts to private rooms as part of the North Expansion and/or by finishing the shelled- in space on the eighth floor of the North Expansion. Accordingly, the “savings” embedded in Schedule 8A are grossly overstated as is the incremental net profit shown in that schedule. Specifically, in the third year of operation, when VMC is at a near-optimal occupancy level of 76 percent, the incremental net profit generated by VMC will be no more than $234,000 and, more likely, will be a net loss between $497,000 and $10.41 million.10 A net profit of $234,000 is a very marginal return on the $106 million cost of VMC, and is well below the three percent return that Holmes' seeks to achieve for its capital projects. However, according to Holmes' chief financial officer, the return generated by a project is not Holmes' paramount concern as a not-for profit organization, and at that level, the project would be considered financially feasible in the long-term. A $497,000 to $10.41 million incremental net loss would mean that the project is not financially feasible in the long-term. The “including this project” column on Schedule 8A projects that Holmes will have net income of approximately $31.1 million in 2010. Thus, even if VMC actually generated an incremental net loss in the range of $497,000 to $10.41 million in 2010, the Holmes' system would still be profitable. Subsection (7) -- Fostering Competition that Promotes Cost-Effectiveness Generally, competition for hospital services benefits consumers because it leads to lower prices and it creates incentives for hospitals to lower costs. It is not necessary for hospitals to be equal in size to compete, but the beneficial effects of competition will be greater if the hospitals are more equal. As explained by Dr. David Eisenstadt, Wuesthoff’s expert economist, “competitive constraints are a matter of degree” and “while it is true that a small hospital can pose some competitive constraint, it’s not correct that a small hospital can impose the same competitive constraint . . . as a large hospital could.” (Transcript at 1571-72). Holmes is, and historically has been, the dominant provider of hospital services in south Brevard County, with market shares exceeding 80 percent prior to the opening of Wuesthoff-Melbourne. Holmes still has a market share in excess of 70 percent in south Brevard County. A dominant hospital has the ability to set prices above competitive levels by commanding higher prices in negotiations with commercial payors. Holmes has done so in the past and, based upon the comparison of the commercial average net inpatient revenues reported by the Health First hospitals and the Wuesthoff hospitals in 2003 and 2004, it continues to do so. Holmes ability to set prices above competitive levels is enhanced by the fact that the largest managed care plan in Brevard County, HFHP, is operated by Health First. The original approval of the CON for Wuesthoff- Melbourne was based upon the Agency’s determinations that there was at that time a “compelling” need for competition for hospital services in south Brevard County; that the entry of a new, non-Health First provider into the market would give commercial payors and, ultimately, patients an alternative to Holmes, which because of its relationship with HFHP, had no incentive to negotiate competitive rates with other providers; and that competition would have the effect of reducing prices paid by the commercial payors to the hospitals and, ultimately, the premiums paid by patients. Wuesthoff-Melbourne’s entry into the market in December 2002 has not yet resulted in any material price reductions. Indeed, notwithstanding Wuesthoff-Melbourne’s presence in the market, HRMC increased its charges by 15 percent in 2003-04 and by an additional five percent in 2004-05. A hospital’s charges do not necessarily correspond to the prices that the hospital negotiates with commercial payors. However, in this case, there appears to be a correlation because Holmes had an 11.6 percent increase in net revenue per admission between 2003 and 2004 and it also had significant increases in the commercial average inpatient revenues per admission at HRMC and PBCH between 2003 and 2004. Moreover, the significant increase in charges at Holmes over the past two years is a strong indication that Holmes is not feeling any significant competitive pressure as a result of Wuesthoff-Melbourne’s presence in the market. Wuesthoff-Melbourne will be able to exert more competitive pressure on Holmes as its market share increases, particularly if Holmes’ market share continues to decline at the same time as is projected. As a result, Wuesthoff-Melbourne’s ability to expand and increase (or at least maintain) its market share in the growing Viera market is particularly significant to achieving price reductions (and/or minimizing price increases) in Brevard County.11 Holmes contends that even if VMC is approved, there will be sufficient competition in Viera because, according to Table 33 in the CON application, in 2010 the Health First hospitals will have a 50.5 percent market share of the PSA targeted by VMC and the Wuesthoff hospitals will have a 44.3 percent market share of the PSA. However, the approval of the VMC will have the effect of dramatically slowing the upward trend in Wuesthoff’s market share and corresponding downward trend of Health First’s market share in the PSA targeted by VMC because according to Tables 28 and 33 of the CON application, without VMC, the market share of the Wuesthoff hospitals in the PSA is projected to increase from 43.3 percent (in 2003) to 52.3 percent (in 2010), and the market share of the Health First Hospitals in the PSA is expected to decline from 51.2 percent (in 2003) to 42.5 percent (in 2010). Moreover, if VMC is approved, it is less likely that there will be sufficient need for additional acute care beds in the area to justify expanding Wuesthoff-Melbourne beyond 134 beds. That, in turn, will limit the competitive pressure that Wuesthoff-Melbourne will be able to exert on Holmes in the future. The evidence was not persuasive regarding the extent of the competitive pressure and/or price reductions that would result from the expansion of Wuesthoff-Melbourne rather than the approval of VMC.12 However, the fact remains that VMC will strengthen Holmes’ market position in central and south Brevard County, which will not foster competition that promotes cost effectiveness. Not only will the approval of VMC negatively affect the evolution of competition in south Brevard County, but it will effectively preclude the construction of another hospital in the Viera area until 2029 when the exclusivity provisions and restrictive covenants discussed in Part D(2) above expire. The evidence was not persuasive that there was an anticompetitive motivation underlying Holmes’ decision to propose VMC, but the evidence does establish that the approval of VMC will have anticompetitive effects. As a result, the criteria in Section 408.035(7), Florida Statutes, strongly weigh against the approval of Holmes’ CON application. Subsection (8) -- Costs and Methods of Construction The parties stipulated that the costs (including equipment costs), methods of construction, and energy provision for VMC are reasonable; that the architectural drawings for the VMC satisfy the applicable code requirements; and that the construction schedule for VMC is reasonable. Thus, VMC satisfies the criteria in Section 408.035(8), Florida Statutes. Subsection (9) -- Medicaid and Charity Care Holmes conditioned the approval of its application on VMC providing the following levels of Medicaid and charity care: At least 3.0 percent of inpatients at [VMC] will be covered by Medicaid and/or Medicaid HMOs. At least 2.3 percent of the gross revenues of [VMC] will be attributable to patients who meet the guidelines for charity care. The Medicaid and charity commitments are lower than the averages for Brevard County, but they are reasonable and attainable in light of the demographics of the area that will be served by VMC. Holmes has a history of providing considerable services to Medicaid and charity patients, both at its existing facilities and through community programs such as HOPE. Wuesthoff also has a history of providing considerable services to Medicaid and charity patients at its existing facilities and through community programs such as its free clinic in Cocoa. Wuesthoff-Rockledge is a Medicaid disproportionate share provider, which entitles it to a higher Medicaid reimbursement rate from the State as a “reward” for serving more than its fair share of Medicaid patients. Holmes' hospitals and Wuesthoff-Melbourne are not Medicaid disproportionate share providers. Wuesthoff-Melbourne has not been open long enough to qualify. The Wuesthoff hospitals have a contract with Well Care, which is the only Medicaid HMO in Brevard County. Holmes' hospitals do not have a contract with Well Care. On a dollar-amount basis, Holmes provides considerably more Medicaid and charity care than any other hospital in Brevard County, including the Wuesthoff hospitals. In fiscal year 2003, for example, Holmes’ Medicaid gross revenues were $53.7 million (as compared to $39.7 million for the Wuesthoff hospitals) and its charity care gross revenues were $27.8 million (as compared to $10.9 million for the Wuesthoff hospitals). The larger dollar-amount of Medicaid and charity care provided by Holmes is due, at least in part, to Holmes being almost twice the size of the Wuesthoff hospitals. On a percentage basis, Holmes provides approximately the same level of charity care as Wuesthoff-Rockledge, but it provides less Medicaid care than Wuesthoff-Rockledge. In fiscal year 2003, for example, 2.8 percent of Holmes’ gross revenue was charity care (as compared to 2.5 percent for Wuesthoff- Rockledge) and seven percent of Holmes’ patient days were attributable to Medicaid patients (as compared to 10.9 percent for Wuesthoff-Rockledge). According to Mr. Gregg, the Agency gives more weight to the percentage of Medicaid and charity care provided by a hospital than it does to the dollar amount of such services. However, Mr. Gregg acknowledged that Holmes satisfies the criteria in Section 408.035(9), Florida Statutes, based upon its history of providing services to the medically indigent and its Medicaid and charity commitments at VMC. Holmes' satisfaction of the criteria in Section 408.035(9), Florida Statutes, is not given great weight in this proceeding because the medically indigent in central and south Brevard County are currently being adequately served by the existing facilities and, more significantly, zip code 32940, in which VMC will be located and from which it is projected to draw the largest percentage of its patients, has a lower percentage of Medicaid/charity patients and a higher median household income than Brevard County as a whole. Subsection (10) -- Designation as a Gold Seal Nursing Homes The parties stipulated that Section 408.035(10), Florida Statutes, is not applicable because Holmes is not proposing the addition of any nursing home beds. Rule Criteria The Agency rules implicated in this case -- Florida Administrative Code Rules 59C-1.030(2) and 59C-1.038 -- do not contain any review criteria that are distinct from the statutory criteria discussed above. The “health care access criteria” and “priority considerations” in those rules focus primarily on the impact of the proposed facility on the medically indigent and other underserved population groups, as well as the applicant’s history of and/or commitment to serving those groups. Holmes satisfies those rule criteria, but they are not given great weight for the reasons discussed in Part F(1)(g) above. Impact of VMC on the Wuesthoff Hospitals As discussed above, VMC is projected to take patients that are currently being served by, or would otherwise be served by one of the existing hospitals in central or south Brevard County. Approximately 30 percent of VMC’s patient volume will come at the expense of the Wuesthoff hospitals. As a result of the projected population growth in central and south Brevard County over the planning horizon, the Wuesthoff hospitals are projected to have more admissions in 2010 than they currently have, whether or not VMC is approved. However, if VMC is approved, the Wuesthoff hospitals will have fewer admissions in 2010 than they would have had without VMC. The health planners who testified at the hearing agreed that in determining the impact of VMC on the Wuesthoff hospitals it is appropriate to focus on the number of admissions that the Wuesthoff hospitals would have received but for the approval of VMC. The Agency’s precedent is in accord. See Wellington, supra, at 54, 109 n.13. Holmes’ health planner projected in the CON application that the approval of VMC will result in the Wuesthoff hospitals having 1,932 fewer admissions in 2010 than they would have had without VMC, 998 at Wuesthoff-Rockledge and 934 at Wuesthoff-Melborune. Wuesthoff’s health planner projected that the approval of VMC will result in the Wuesthoff hospitals having 2,399 fewer admissions in 2010 than they would have had without VMC, 1,541 at Wuestoff-Rockledge and 858 at Wuesthoff-Melborune. The projections of Wuesthoff’s health planner are more reasonable because they are based upon more current market share data and, as to Wuesthoff-Melbourne, the projections may even be understated because its market share is still growing in the areas targeted by VMC. On a contribution-margin basis, the lost admissions projected by Wuesthoff’s health planner translate into a loss of approximately $3.9 million of income at Wuesthoff-Rocklege and a loss of approximately $2 million of income at Wuesthoff- Melbourne. Using the lost admissions projected by Holmes’ health planner, the lost income at Wuesthoff-Rockledge would be $2.51 million and the lost income at Wuesthoff-Melbourne would be $2.15 million. Thus, impact of VMC on the Wuesthoff system would be a lost income of at least $4.66 million and, more likely, $5.9 million. A loss of income in that range would be significant and adverse to the Wuesthoff hospitals, both individually and collectively. Even though the Wuesthoff system has a net worth of approximately $70.95 million, its net income (i.e., “excess of revenues over expenses”) was only $971,000 in 2003 and $1.1 million in 2004. The system is still recovering from a “devastating” financial year in 1999 when it reported a loss of almost $12 million. Wuesthoff-Melbourne reported a $4.1 million net loss in 2003, and as of June 2004, it had yet to show a profit. The significance of the projected lost income at the Wuesthoff hospitals is tempered somewhat by the increased patient volume that the hospitals are projected to have in 2010 even if VMC is approved. However, the evidence was not persuasive that the increased patient volumes will necessarily result in greater profits at the Wuesthoff hospitals in 2010.13 The approval of VMC will also likely result in a loss of outpatient volume at the Wuesthoff hospitals. However, there is no credible evidence regarding the amount of outpatient volume that would be lost or the financial impact of the lost outpatient volume on Wuesthoff.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency issue a final order denying Holmes’ application, CON 9759. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of June, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 2005.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569408.035408.039
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BETHESDA HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, INC., D/B/A WEST BOYNTON COMMUNITY HOSPITAL vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION AND COLUMBIA/JFK MEDICAL CENTER LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, D/B/A JFK MEDICAL CENTER, 03-002952CON (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 14, 2003 Number: 03-002952CON Latest Update: Mar. 11, 2005

The Issue The issue is whether the Agency should approve the Certificate of Need applications filed by Bethesda and/or JFK, each of which proposes to establish an 80-bed satellite hospital in the West Boynton area of Acute Care Subdistrict 9-5.

Findings Of Fact The Parties (1) Bethesda Bethesda operates Bethesda Memorial, which is a 362-bed not-for-profit hospital in Boynton Beach. Bethesda also operates Bethesda Health City, which is a “medical mall” located in the West Boynton area of South Palm Beach County. As a not-for-profit community-based health care organization, Bethesda’s mission is to provide quality health care services to the residents of South Palm Beach County that it serves regardless of their ability to pay. Bethesda Memorial opened in 1959 as a public hospital under the ownership of Palm Beach County’s former hospital taxing district. Bethesda Memorial was reorganized in 1984 as a private not-for-profit hospital owned by Bethesda. Bethesda Memorial provides tertiary-level care. Bethesda Memorial’s 362 licensed beds include 347 general medical-surgical (med-surg) acute care beds and a 15-bed Level II and Level III neonatal intensive care unit (NICU). A 28-bed comprehensive medical rehabilitation (CMR) unit will open at Bethesda Memorial in 2005, increasing the hospital’s licensed capacity to 390 beds. Not all of Bethesda Memorial’s licensed beds are available for general patient use; 14 of the beds are leased to a hospice program and 14 of the beds are operated under contract as a special care unit (SCU). The hospice lease and the SCU contract run through 2005. Even though the hospice lease and SCU contract have been profitable ventures for Bethesda, several Bethesda witnesses testified that those agreements would not be renewed if Bethesda Memorial needs those 28 beds to accommodate its general patients after its capacity is reduced through the transfer of 80 beds to its proposed satellite hospital; however, as of the date of the hearing, Bethesda had not taken any formal steps to terminate those agreements. It is unclear how the patients that are currently being served in the hospice unit and SCU would be served in the community if Bethesda terminates the agreements. Bethesda Memorial also has a 10-bed “VIP” unit that is generally available only to patients that have contributed at least $50,000 to Bethesda’s charitable foundation and are willing to pay an up-front $750.00 per day charge for the room; however, the beds in the VIP unit can be and have been utilized by other patients when all of the other beds in the hospital are full. Bethesda Memorial has a high-volume obstetrics (OB) program and an active emergency department (ED). Bethesda Memorial also offers a number of specialized programs including a comprehensive cancer program, a pediatrics program, a diagnostic cardiac catheterization program, and a wide variety of outpatient services. Bethesda Memorial is a well-utilized facility; its overall occupancy rate was 73.25 percent from July 2001 though June 2002. Bethesda Memorial does not currently offer interventional cardiology services or open heart surgery, but it has been attempting to get CON or legislative approval to offer those services for the past several years because of their profitable nature. Bethesda Memorial has designated, shelled-in space in its hospital for those services if it ever gets the necessary approvals. The evidence was not persuasive that there are physical or other constraints that would preclude further incremental bed expansions at Bethesda Memorial or that would make such expansions cost-prohibitive. Bethesda recently purchased property adjacent to Bethesda Memorial and was able to get that property rezoned from residential to hospital use. It is unclear how large that property is and what use, if any, Bethesda has planned for that property. Bethesda also owns 1.4 acres of vacant property that is several blocks from Bethesda Memorial. The property is not currently zoned for hospital use, and because it is somewhat isolated from Bethesda Memorial, Bethesda intends to sell the property rather than develop it. Bethesda Memorial is accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO). Bethesda Health City is a 135,000 square foot “medical mall” or “hospital without beds” that opened in 1995. The facility is located in the West Boynton area at the intersection of Hagan Ranch Road and Boynton Beach Boulevard, just east of the Florida Turnpike. Bethesda Health City offers services such as diagnostic imaging, outpatient rehabilitation, radiation therapy, and a woman’s center. The facility has offices for approximately 20 physician groups, and it also provides community outreach services targeted to the large senior population in the West Boynton area. Bethesda Health City was established to help Bethesda Memorial capture patients from the growing West Boynton area, and it has done so. There is capacity to add an additional 30,000 to 40,000 square feet of space to Bethesda Health City, and Bethesda intends to expand the facility whether or not its proposed satellite hospital is approved. Bethesda Health City provides Bethesda a significant physical presence in the West Boynton area. The facility has contributed to Bethesda Memorial’s significant and stable market share in the West Boynton area. In addition to Bethesda Memorial and Bethesda Health City, Bethesda administers a charitable foundation whose primary purpose is to fund Bethesda Memorial’s capital acquisitions and improvements. The foundation has considerable assets and is in the midst of a $100 million capital campaign through which it has already raised approximately $37 million. Bethesda Memorial experienced considerable and constant growth in its admissions and patient days between 1997 and 2003; its admissions grew by 45 percent and its patients days grew by 44 percent over that period. Bethesda Memorial is financially sound. It has substantial cash reserves and it is well-rated by the financial markets. The evidence was not persuasive that Bethesda’s current or long-term financial situation is distressed. Unlike other not-for-profit hospitals in District 9, Bethesda Memorial is a profitable hospital. Between 1997 and 2002, Bethesda Memorial’s operating income averaged approximately $5.5 million and in 2003, its operating income was approximately $7 million. In each of those years, the hospital also had significant non-operating revenues such that its total revenues over expenses during that period averaged approximately $10 million. The Bethesda system as a whole is also profitable. It had operating income of $2.4 million in 2002 and $2.1 million in 2001. Bethesda Memorial and the Bethesda system did not perform as well financially as JFK, Delray, or Wellington between 1997 and 2002; each of those hospitals had higher returns on assets, returns on equity, and total margin over that period than did Bethesda Memorial and Bethesda, and JFK and Delray had considerably more operating income over that period than did Bethesda Memorial. Bethesda Memorial’s CMR unit is projected to have a positive financial impact on Bethesda starting in 2005, and if approved, Bethesda Memorial’s open heart surgery program is also projected to have a positive impact on Bethesda’s long-term financial condition. (2) JFK JFK is owned by HCA, Inc. (HCA). HCA is nationwide, for-profit hospital chain. JFK is a 424-bed for-profit hospital in Atlantis, which is a small municipality in the Lake Worth area. JFK provides tertiary-level care. JFK is the most highly utilized hospital in District 9, and one of the most highly utilized hospitals in the state. JFK’s annual occupancy rate was 89.96 percent between July 2001 and June 2002, JFK is one of thee HCA hospitals in Palm Beach County. The others are Columbia and Palms West, both of which are in North Palm Beach County, Subdistrict 9-4. JFK operated as a not-for-profit hospital for approximately 30 years until it was purchased by HCA in 1996. Approximately $120 million of the purchase price paid by HCA was used to establish a charitable foundation, the Quantum Foundation, which funds a variety of health-related projects in the South Palm Beach County area. The services provided at JFK include orthopedics, cancer services, interventional cardiology and open heart surgery, neurologic services, and internal medicine. JFK does not offer pediatric or OB services. HCA has made significant capital improvements at JFK since it acquired the hospital. The community image of the hospital and the morale of its employees has significantly improved since the acquisition by HCA. JFK is accredited by JCAHO. JFK recently received a CON to add 36 beds, which will increase its licensed capacity to 460 beds. The beds will be located in shelled-in space on the fifth floor of JFK’s south tower, but they have not yet been brought on-line. JFK’s recently-constructed northwest tower was engineered so that an additional two floors can be added to that tower in the future, which would allow JFK to add 36 more beds. The evidence was not persuasive that there are physical or other constraints that would preclude further incremental bed expansions at JFK beyond the 72 beds identified above. JFK is attempting to acquire a long-term lease for 19 acres across the street from its hospital that would be used for parking and medical office buildings. If that property is leased and developed, JFK may be able to free-up additional space for future bed expansions; however, the record does not establish the likelihood of the lease being consummated, the amount of space that might be freed-up if that property was developed, or any of the costs associated therewith. JFK recently constructed a medical office building in the West Boynton area that includes a wound care center and a diabetes center. That facility is on Jog Road, north of Boynton Beach Boulevard. Aside from the medical office building, JFK had not formally targeted the West Boynton area for expansion; its most recent strategic plan did not mention the prospect of locating a satellite hospital in that area. (3) Delray Delray is owned by Tenet Healthcare Corporation (Tenet). Tenet is a nationwide, for-profit hospital chain. Tenet operates four hospitals in Palm Beach County in addition to Delray, including West Boca Medical Center (West Boca) in South Palm Beach County, and Good Samaritan, St. Mary’s, and Palm Beach Gardens in North Palm Beach County. Delray is a 372-bed for-profit hospital in Delray Beach. Delray is located approximately 2.5 miles south of Atlantic Boulevard. Delray is in zip code 33484, but it is near the eastern boundary of zip code 33446. Delray opened in 1982, and is accredited by JACHO. Delray provides tertiary-level care. Delray is located on a “campus” that includes the hospital building, a 53-bed in-patient psychiatric facility known as Fair Oaks Pavillion (Fair Oaks), and a 90-bed CMR facility known as Pinecrest Rehabilitation Hospital. There is a separately-licensed 120-bed nursing home located adjacent to the campus. Delray’s 372 licensed beds include the 53 in-patient psychiatric beds at Fair Oaks, which is approximately 200 yards from Delray’s main hospital. Delray has added 108 beds to its hospital since 1996. Even with those bed additions, Delray remains a very highly utilized facility; its annual occupancy rate between July 2001 and June 2002 was 82.32 percent. Delray shelled-in space for an additional 31 beds as part of a recent expansion of its ED and ambulatory care unit. Delray intends to put those beds into service as soon as it can. Delray has the ability to further expand its hospital beyond the 31 beds planned for the shelled-in space. It already has local government approval for a total of 616 beds on its campus. The services provided at Delray include general medical and surgery services, trauma, interventional cardiology, open heart surgery, in-patient psychiatric services, orthopedics, and neurosurgery, with a special focus on chronically-ill elderly patients. Delray does not provide OB services. Delray has been the only provider of in-patient psychiatric services in South Palm Beach County since October 2001 when Bethesda Memorial discontinued its program. Delray has been a state-designated Level II trauma center since 1991, which requires it to have a neurosurgeon, trauma surgeon, and other specialists and specialized equipment available at all times. Delray receives funding from the local health district to help offset a large portion of the costs associated with providing its trauma services. Delray leases space in a medical office building in the West Boynton area where it provides diagnostic imaging, mammography, and laboratory services. Delray’s service area includes zip codes 33437, 33446, and 33467, which are being targeted by Bethesda and JFK with their proposed satellite hospitals. Delray is currently, and historically has been a very profitable hospital. It reported a “total margin” of approximately $32.9 million on its May 2002 “Prior Year Report” filed with the Agency,4 and it reported operating income of $40.5 million in its audited financial statements for fiscal year 2003. (4) Wellington Wellington is owned by Universal Health System (Universal). Universal is a nationwide, for-profit hospital chain. Wellington is a 121-bed for-profit hospital in the northwestern portion of South Palm Beach County. Wellington is located in zip code 33414, approximately 2.5 miles south of Southern Boulevard at the intersection of State Road 7 (also known as U.S. Highway 441) and Forest Hill Boulevard. Wellington opened in 1986 as an osteopathic hospital, and approximately 25 percent of its current medical staff is osteopathic physicians. Wellington is accredited by JCAHO and the American Osteopathic Association. Wellington provides tertiary-level care. Wellington is easily accessible from Forest Hill Boulevard and State Road 7, and the hospital is served by the Palm Beach County bus system, which has a stop in Wellington’s parking lot. Wellington has made substantial capital improvements to its hospital over the past five years. Those improvements were designed to enhance the hospital’s efficiency in serving its current patients and also to anticipate future patient demand. Wellington owns 29 acres of property adjacent to the 26-acre site on which the hospital is located. The adjacent property is currently undeveloped and it is available for future expansions of Wellington. Wellington’s chief executive officer (CEO) testified that Wellington has a site plan approved for its undeveloped property and that it has “vested concurrency” for the future development of that property; however, that testimony was not corroborated (as was the case with Delray’s approved master plan) and therefore is not persuasive. The services at Wellington include an ED, an OB program, general medical and surgical care, an orthopedic unit, a comprehensive cancer center, a wound care center, a cardiology program with a dedicated cardiovascular intensive care unit, and an outpatient diagnostic center. Wellington’s OB program includes 18 labor rooms, 19 post-partum rooms and a 10-bed Level II NICU. Wellington delivers approximately six babies per day and has the capacity to deliver up to 15 babies per day. Wellington’s utilization has steadily grown over the years, but it is still one of the lowest utilized facilities in South Palm Beach County; its annual occupancy rate was 64.27 percent between July 2001 and June 2002. Wellington derives approximately 90 percent of its patients from a geographic area bounded by Military Trail on the east, the Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge on the west, Okeechobee Boulevard to the north, and Boynton Beach Boulevard to the south. That area includes zip codes 33414, 33437, 33463, and 33467, which are being targeted by Bethesda and JFK with their proposed satellite hospitals. Wellington has teaching and training programs for physician assistants and certified nurse anesthetists under contracts with Florida International University and Florida Atlantic University. Wellington also has a family practice residency/internship teaching program for osteopathic doctors that is affiliated with Lake Erie School of Osteopathic Medicine, and a three-year dermatology teaching program. When Wellington was established in 1986, there was very little population in the western portion of South Palm Beach County to support the hospital. As a result, the hospital was unprofitable in its early years, and by 2000, it had accumulated a deficit of $22 million. Wellington’s financial performance has improved significantly in the past several years, but it still has a large accumulated deficit. Wellington is relying on its ability to retain or increase its market share in the growing West Boynton area in order to remain profitable and eliminate its accumulated deficit. (5) Agency The Agency is the state agency responsible for administering the CON program and licensing hospitals and other health care facilities. Application Submittal and Review and Preliminary Agency Action Bethesda and JFK each filed CON applications with the Agency in the first “hospital beds and facilities” batching cycle of 2003. Each application sought to establish a new 80- bed satellite hospital in the West Boynton area of South Palm Beach County, Subdistrict 9-5. The fixed need pool published by the Agency for the applicable batching cycle identified a need for zero acute care beds in Subdistrict 9-5. There were no challenges to the published fixed need pool. The letters of intent and CON applications filed by Bethesda and JFK for their respective satellite hospitals were timely filed and complied with all of the technical submittal requirements in the governing statutes and rules. JFK’s letter of intent was filed within the “grace period” (see Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.008(1)(d)2.) in direct response to Bethesda’s earlier-filed letter of intent. There is nothing inherently improper about a “grace period” letter of intent, and very little significance has been given to the responsive nature of JFK’s proposal in the comparative evaluation of the CON applications. A public hearing was held on the applications by the local health council on April 24, 2003.5 Presentations were made at the public hearing in support of and in opposition to the applications. The opposition came primarily from a representative of Delray; the support came from representatives of Bethesda and JFK and several residents of the West Boynton area. The reasons offered by the speakers for their opposition or support of the applications were essentially the same as those presented at the hearing, and no independent significance has been given to the testimony and “evidence” presented at the public hearing. Bethesda’s and JFK’s applications were comparatively reviewed by the Agency in accordance with the Agency’s rules and standard procedures. On June 13, 2003, the Agency issued its State Agency Action Report (SAAR) based upon its comparative review of the applications. The SAAR recommended approval of Bethesda’s application and denial of JFK’s application. The Agency’s published notice of intent to approve Bethesda’s application and to deny JFK’s application in the June 27, 2003, edition of the Florida Administrative Weekly as required by statute and Agency rule. The Agency reaffirmed its preliminary decisions on the applications through the hearing testimony of Jeffrey Gregg, the Bureau Chief of the Agency’s CON program. The petitions for administrative hearing challenging the Agency’s preliminary decisions on the CON applications at issue in this proceeding were all timely filed. Acute Care Subdistricts 9-4 and 9-5 The Agency calculates the inventory of acute care beds on a subdistrict basis, and it considers CON applications for additional acute care beds on a subdistrict basis. Palm Beach County is in District 9, which is divided into five subdistricts. Only two of the subdistricts, 9-4 and 9-5, are relevant in this case. Subdistrict 9-4 is North Palm Beach County, and Subdistrict 9-5 is South Palm Beach County. The dividing line between the two subdistricts is Southern Boulevard. There are six existing acute care hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5: Bethesda Memorial, JFK, Delray, Wellington, West Boca, and Boca Raton Community Hospital (Boca Community). Boca Community and Bethesda are the only not-for- profit hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5; the others are for-profit hospitals. The service area of Palms West, which is located on Southern Boulevard in Subdistrict 9-4, includes portions of Subdistrict 9-5 and the West Boynton area. The utilization of hospital services in Subdistrict 9- 5 has historically been higher than the utilization of hospital services in Subdistrict 9-4. In calendar year 2002, for example, the average occupancy rate of the Subdistrict 9-5 hospitals was 78.2 percent as compared to 55.6 percent for the Subdistrict 9-4 hospitals; and during the “peak season” of January through March 2002, the average occupancy rates were 88.4 percent in Subdistrict 9-5 and 62 percent in Subdistrict 9-4. The West Boynton Area The West Boynton area is an unincorporated area of South Palm Beach County. Its approximate boundaries are Congress avenue on the east, the Loxahatchee National Wildlife Reserve on the west, the L-30 canal (which is several miles north of Atlantic Avenue) on the south, and Hypoluxo Road on the north. The West Boynton area roughly corresponds to the geographic area that is included in zip codes 33436, 33437, 33463, and 33467. The Florida Turnpike, which runs north-south, roughly bisects the West Boynton area. The Turnpike is not a geographic barrier between the east and west portions of the West Boynton area, but it served as the de facto boundary of the urban service area until approximately 10 years ago when significant amounts of development began to “jump” the Turnpike. Boynton Beach Boulevard is the primary east-west road in the West Boynton area, although there are several other east- west arterial roads within the area including Lantana Road and Hypoluxo Road. Other major east-west roads in close proximity to the West Boynton area are Forest Hill Boulevard, Lake Worth Road, and Atlantic Avenue. There are several major north-south roads in the West Boynton area in addition to the Turnpike, including Jog Road, Hagen Ranch Road, and State Road 7. State Road 7 is the westernmost major north-south road in South Palm Beach County. As a result of local zoning restrictions, very little development in the West Boynton area is or will be west of State Road 7. The 2002 population of the West Boynton area, as defined by the four zip codes identified above, was approximately 156,000. There are seasonal variations in the population, but they are not as significant as the seasonal variations in the population of the more easterly portions of Palm Beach County. The population of the West Boynton area is projected to grow to approximately 181,000 by 2007, which corresponds to an annual growth rate of approximately 3.1 percent per year. That growth rate is higher than the annual growth rate projected over that period for the state as a whole (1.6 percent), Palm Beach County (two percent), and District 9 (1.9 percent). Approximately 89 percent of the 2003 population of the West Boynton area was located to the east of the Turnpike. The portion of the West Boynton area to the west of the Turnpike is projected to grow at a considerably faster rate through 2008 than the area to the east of the Turnpike, which is consistent with the extensive amount of residential development that is underway or approved in the West Boynton area west of the Turnpike. In 2002, approximately 28.6 percent of the residents of the West Boynton area were in the age 65 and older (“65+”) age cohort. That percentage is higher than the percentages in that age cohort for the state as a whole (17.5 percent), Palm Beach County (22.5 percent), or District 9 (22.5 percent). The 65+ age cohort is projected to remain the largest segment of the West Boynton area population through 2008. A large number of the existing residential communities and the communities under development in the West Boynton area are retirement communities that are deed-restricted to persons over the age of 55, which contributes to the higher percentage of the population in the 65+ age cohort currently and projected in the future. The West Boynton area is more affluent than and offers a better payer-mix than the existing service areas of Bethesda Memorial and JFK. As compared to the existing service areas of those hospitals, the West Boynton area has a lower percentage of uninsured residents, a higher percentage of Medicare and insured residents, a lower percentage of households with annual incomes below $20,000, and a higher percentage of households with annual incomes above $60,000. There is currently healthy competition in the West Boynton area for acute care services. That competition includes each of the four hospital parties in this case as well as several other hospitals. JFK, Bethesda, Wellington, and Delray, collectively accounted for approximately 72 percent of the discharges from the West Boynton area in calendar years 2000, 2001, and 2002. The percentage of the West Boynton area discharges attributable to each of those hospitals or, stated another way, the hospitals' market shares in the West Boynton area over that period are as follows6: JFK Bethesda Delray Wellington 2000 31.7% 23.2% 10.6% 6.1% 2001 30.1% 24.0% 11.2% 6.9% 2002 28.8% 23.9% 11.4% 7.7% There is no credible evidence that there will be any significant changes in those relative market shares over the five-year planning horizon applicable to the applications at issue in this case if a new hospital is not approved in the West Boynton area. Stated another way, the competitive balance that currently exists in the West Boynton market is expected to continue unless something disrupts that balance, such as the approval of a new hospital in the area. As discussed below, if either of the proposed satellite hospitals are approved, the market share of the approved hospital will increase to the detriment of the other hospitals. There is considerable community support for a new hospital in the West Boynton area from the residents of that area, as reflected in the letters of support included in the CON applications, the testimony at the local public hearing on the applications, and the deposition testimony from area residents and the related exhibits introduced at the hearing. The community support is not, on balance, directed to the approval of Bethesda's proposed satellite hospital over JFK’s proposed satellite hospital, or vice versa; it is simply for the expeditious approval of a hospital. Need for OB Services in the South Palm Beach County and/or the West Boynton Area There are currently four OB programs in Subdistrict 9-5. The programs are at Bethesda Memorial, Wellington, West Boca, and Boca Community. The evidence is not persuasive that an additional OB program is needed in Subdistrict 9-5. Indeed, Dr. Samuel Kaufman, an OB/GYN who has practiced in the area for many years, testified credibly that the four existing OB programs in the subdistrict are just now beginning to do enough deliveries to be efficient. There was no persuasive evidence that there are accessibility problems at the existing OB programs because of their utilization rates. Indeed, the OB unit at Wellington has the capacity to handle up to an additional nine deliveries per day. Each of the existing OB programs offers Level II and/or Level III NICU services, which is typically referred to as “NICU backup.” It is not feasible to provide NICU backup at a low-volume OB program such as the 10-bed OB unit proposed in JFK’s satellite hospital. It is important to have NICU backup because it is not uncommon for high-risk OB patients to unexpectedly present to the hospital and, in such circumstances, it is better for the child to have NICU services at the hospital where he or she is delivered rather than having to be transferred to another hospital. The standard of care in South Palm Beach County requires NICU backup and, based upon malpractice liability concerns, some OB/GYNs will not deliver babies at a hospital that does not have NICU backup. OB is among the top ten discharges in the proposed service area of JFK’s satellite hospital, which is not uncommon around the state; however, because of the lower average length of stay (ALOS) associated with an OB admission, the high number of discharges does not correlate to a large number of patient days in the service area. The population group that is most likely to utilize OB services is females between the ages of 15 and 44 (hereafter “the Female 15-44 age cohort”). Only 16 percent of the 2002 population of the West Boynton area was in the Female 15-44 age cohort, and that cohort is projected to grow at a slower annual rate (2.3 percent) than the population of the West Boynton area as a whole (3.1 percent) through 2007.7 The relatively small portion of the population in the Female 15-44 age cohort is consistent with the data showing the highest percentage of the population in the West Boynton area in the 65+ age cohort. It is also consistent with the testimony and evidence regarding the number of existing and planned deed- restricted retirement communities in the West Boynton area. The logic of including an OB unit in the proposed JFK satellite hospital is undercut by the recent closure of the OB unit at Columbia. According to Columbia’s CEO, Columbia’s OB unit was closed in 2002 because it “was a small unit” with a low volume, because the service area from which Columbia was drawing its patients was predominately elderly, and because there were several other hospitals within close proximity to Columbia that had larger OB units with NICU backup. Based upon those factors, Columbia’s CEO concluded that “there was no real community need to do OB” and that “it just didn’t make sense” to do OB. The same factors exist in the West Boynton area and, as a result, the comments of Columbia’s CEO are equally applicable to the inclusion of an OB unit in the proposed JFK satellite hospital. The Proposed Satellite Hospitals (1) Bethesda West Bethesda’s application, CON 9659, proposes to establish an 80-bed satellite hospital in the West Boynton area by de-licensing 80 beds at Bethesda Memorial and then transferring those beds to the proposed satellite hospital. The transfer of beds proposed in Bethesda’s application will not increase the inventory of acute care beds in either District 9 or Subdistrict 9-5. The 80-bed increase at Bethesda West will be offset by the 80-bed decrease at Bethesda Memorial, both of which are in Subdistrict 9-5. The beds transferred to Bethesda West will come from double-occupancy rooms, thereby allowing Bethesda Memorial to convert those rooms to private rooms. The conversion to private rooms will create efficiencies at Bethesda Memorial by eliminating gender-based or disease-based conflicts between patients that often arise with double-occupancy rooms. The transfer of 80 beds to Bethesda West will reduce Bethesda Memorial’s licensed capacity to 282 beds. That figure includes the 15 NICU beds, the 14 hospice beds, and the 14-bed SCU; therefore, after the bed transfer, Bethesda Memorial will have only 239 beds available for general patient use. Bethesda Memorial is projected to have 80,630 patient days (excluding NICU and CMR patient days) in Bethesda West’s second year of operation.8 That equates to an ADC of 221 patients and an occupancy rate of 92.4 percent for the 239 beds available for general patient use. If the hospice lease and the SCU contract are not renewed in 2005, then Bethesda Memorial would have 267 beds available for general patient use and its occupancy rate would be 82.7 percent. The non-renewal of the hospice lease and the SCU contract would not add new acute care beds to Subdistrict 9- 5 because those beds are still considered to be acute care beds for purposes of the Agency's bed inventory for the subdistrict, even though they are currently designated for specific purposes. With an annual occupancy rate of 92.4 percent or even 82.7 percent, there would likely be days on which Bethesda Memorial’s occupancy rate would exceed 100 percent. This is not an uncommon occurrence at the hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5, particularly during the “peak season” of January through March. Bethesda Memorial could operate efficiently and provide high quality care with an occupancy rate of 82.7 percent or 92.4 percent without adding new beds. Indeed, JFK and Delray each have similar occupancy rates (and even higher occupancy rates during the “peak season”), and it is undisputed that they provide high quality care. Because the addition of new acute care beds at an existing hospital is no longer linked to the hospital’s occupancy rate, Bethesda Memorial (like any other existing hospital) is free to add new acute care beds whenever it chooses to do so; however, the evidence was not persuasive that Bethesda will, in fact, add new beds at Bethesda Memorial after the bed transfer to Bethesda West notwithstanding the resulting high utilization rate at Bethesda Memorial.9 Bethesda West will include 68 general med-surg beds, 12 critical care beds, a full service ED, and related ambulatory and outpatient services. All of the beds at Bethesda West will be in private rooms. Bethesda West will not offer OB services or dedicated pediatric services, and it will not include a cardiac catheterization lab. Bethesda West will be in a new 190,130 square foot building. The space plan for Bethesda West is reasonable, and its design complies with all applicable building and construction codes. The projected timetable for construction and completion of Bethesda West is also reasonable. Bethesda West will be located at the intersection of Boynton Beach Boulevard and State Road 7, which is approximately two miles west of the Turnpike. That location is three miles from Bethesda Health City, eight to nine miles from Wellington, and ten to 11 miles from Delray, JFK, and Bethesda Memorial. Bethesda West could not be collocated with Bethesda Health City because there is not enough property at that location to construct a satellite hospital with the necessary parking facilities. Bethesda has contracted to purchase 54 acres of property at the intersection of Boynton Beach Boulevard and State Road 7 known as the “Amestoy Property.” The purchase price of the Amestoy Property was $110,000 per acre. Bethesda intends to develop Bethesda West on approximately 30 acres of the Amestoy Property and then lease or sell the remainder of the property for the development of medical office buildings. A 30-acre site is adequate for the proposed 80-bed satellite hospital, although it may inhibit future expansion. Bethesda West intends to utilize the same medical staff as Bethesda Memorial; however, Bethesda has not discussed the issue with its medical staff as a whole10 nor has it developed specific plans to implement its dual-staffing approach. Bethesda West will share management and administrative support services with Bethesda Memorial rather than duplicating those services. The total cost of Bethesda West is $73.8 million. The primary service area (PSA) for Bethesda West consists of zip codes 33436, 33437, 33463, and 33467, which roughly correspond to the boundaries of the West Boynton area. The hospital’s secondary service area (SSA) includes zip codes 33414 and 33446. There is significant overlap in the proposed service area of Bethesda West and the current service area of Bethesda Memorial; four of the six zip codes in Bethesda West’s service area are in Bethesda Memorial’s service area. There is also significant overlap between the proposed service area of Bethesda West and the service areas of Delray, Wellington, and JFK; each of the zip codes in Bethesda West’s proposed service area is also within the service area of at least two of those hospitals. Bethesda West is projected to have 10,430 patient days in its first year of operation and 14,570 patient days in its second year of operation. Those patient days equate to ADCs of 29 and 40, and occupancy rates of 35.7 percent and 49.9 percent in the first and second years of operations. By the fourth year of operation, Bethesda West is projected to have an ADC of 56, which equates to an occupancy rate of 65.2 percent. These occupancy rates are reasonable, as is the “ramp up” concept on which they are based. The projected utilization at Bethesda West is based upon an ALOS of 4.6 days. That ALOS was derived from information in the Agency’s in-patient database for residents of the West Boynton area who received in-patient services of the kind that would be offered at Bethesda West. It is a reasonable ALOS.11 The projected utilization assumes that Bethesda West will have an overall market share of 7.5 percent in its service area in the first year of operation, and that Bethesda West’s overall market share will increase to 13.5 percent by its fourth year of operation. Bethesda West is not projected to have a market share of greater than 15 percent in any individual zip code until its third year of operation. The utilization and market shares projected for Bethesda West are reasonable and attainable based upon the demographics and projected population growth in the West Boynton area. Bethesda West is projected to take patients from the hospitals that currently serve the West Boynton area, including Bethesda Memorial. Bethesda's application projects that 3,040 patients from Bethesda Memorial will be “redistributed” to, or “cannibalized” by Bethesda West in Bethesda West’s first year of operation and that the number will increase to 4,530 patients in Bethesda West's second year of operation. The remainder of Bethesda West’s projected patient days – 7,390 in its first year of operation and 10,040 in its second year of operation – will come from patients who are currently being served by an existing hospital or from growth in the service area. In addition to these projected in-patient admissions, Bethesda West is projected to have outpatient registrations ranging from 22,440 (first year of operation) to 46,310 (fourth year of operation) and ED visits ranging from 8,990 (first year of operation) to 19,720 (fourth year of operation). The projected outpatient registrations and ED visits are reasonable and attainable. Some of the outpatient registrations at Bethesda West will come at the expense of Bethesda Health City because it is currently providing some of the same outpatient services that are proposed for Bethesda West. There is no persuasive evidence quantifying the number of Bethesda West’s outpatient registrations that would have otherwise gone to Bethesda Health City, nor is there any persuasive evidence quantifying the financial impact of the redistribution of those outpatients. (2) Proposed JFK Satellite Hospital JFK’s application, CON 9660, proposes to establish an 80-bed satellite hospital in the West Boynton area by de- licensing 80 beds at Columbia and then transferring those beds to the proposed JFK satellite hospital. Columbia is located in Subdistrict 9-4 and, like JFK, it is an HCA hospital. The bed transfer proposed by JFK will increase the inventory of acute care beds in Subdistrict 9-5 by 80 beds, but the bed inventory in District 9 will remain the same; the 80-bed increase in Subdistrict 9-5 at JFK’s proposed satellite hospital will be offset by an 80-bed decrease in Subdistrict 9-4 at Columbia. Columbia has 250 licensed beds, of which 150 are acute care beds, 12 are skilled nursing beds, and 88 are psychiatric beds. Columbia’s acute care beds include a 20-bed intensive care unit/critical care unit (ICU/CCU), but only 10 of those beds are currently being used. The 12-bed skilled nursing unit is not currently being used. The acute care beds at Columbia are not well- utilized. In calendar year 2002, the utilization rate for Columbia’s 150 acute care beds was only 40 percent and during the “peak season” in 2002, the utilization rate of those beds was only 47.6 percent. The proposed bed transfer would enable Columbia to convert its existing semi-private rooms to private rooms, but according to Columbia’s CEO, to do so Columbia would also need to convert its 12 skilled nursing beds to acute care beds. JFK’s CON application did not make reference to that necessary bed conversion. The conversion of the 12 skilled nursing beds to acute care beds may require Agency approval, which Columbia had not requested as of the date of the hearing. If the bed conversions described by Columbia’s CEO did not occur, the utilization rate of the 70 remaining acute care beds at Columbia after the transfer will likely exceed 80 percent on an annual basis and, during the “peak season,” the occupancy rate will likely exceed 100 percent. Indeed, applying the number of patient days at Columbia in calendar year 2002 to 70 beds results in an annual occupancy rate of 85.7 percent and an occupancy rate of 102 percent in the “peak season.” Under the pre-2004 law, those occupancy rates would allow Columbia to add beds without CON review, and Columbia’s CEO testified that she would take steps to add beds at Columbia if necessary based upon the facility’s occupancy rates after the bed transfer. There is no credible evidence that JFK planned to construct a satellite hospital in the West Boynton area prior to February 2003. The proposal was not included in any of JFK’s strategic or business plans prior to that date. There is also no credible evidence that the Columbia planned to de-license any beds at its facility prior to the CON application at issue in this proceeding; Columbia’s long-term business plan includes the beds that are being transferred to JFK’s proposed satellite hospital. The decision to de-license and transfer 80 beds from Columbia was made by HCA officials, not Columbia’s management team. The proposed JFK satellite hospital will include 60 general med-surg beds, a 10-bed OB unit, a 10-bed ICU/CCU, a full-service ED, and surgical suites. The hospital will provide radiation oncology services, diagnostic cardiac catheterization services, and outpatient psychiatric services, and all of its beds will be in private rooms. In addition to the 80 beds described above, the proposed JFK satellite hospital will have a 12 “observation” beds in private rooms. The observation beds will be sized and equipped in the same manner as the general med-surg beds. As a result, the proposed JFK satellite hospital will effectively have 92 beds even though it will only be licensed for 80 beds. The proposed JFK satellite hospital will be in a new 195,195 square foot building. The space plan for the hospital is reasonable, and its design complies with all applicable building and construction codes. The projected timetable for construction and completion of the hospital is also reasonable. The proposed JFK satellite hospital will be located at the intersection of Boynton Beach Boulevard and the Turnpike on a 50-plus acre site known as the “Mazzoni Property.” That location is eight to nine miles from Delray and Bethesda Memorial, and 11 to 12 miles from Wellington and JFK. JFK has offered to purchase the Mazzoni Property for $130,000 per acre, but as of the date of the hearing, it had not entered into a contract to purchase the property. Bethesda had been in negotiations for the purchase of the Mazzoni Property at a similar price before it settled on, and entered into a contract to purchase the Amestoy Property. Like Bethesda, JFK intends to develop medical office buildings on its site in addition to the proposed satellite hospital. The size of the Mazzoni Property is adequate for those purposes. JFK intends to utilize its medical staff to cover the proposed satellite hospital; however, there is no credible evidence in the record detailing how the dual-staffing would work. The proposed JFK satellite hospital will share some of its management and administrative support services with JFK, but not to the same extent as those services are shared between Bethesda West and Bethesda Memorial. Indeed, the proposed JFK satellite hospital was planned and staffed as a “stand alone economic entity.” The total cost of the proposed JFK satellite hospital is approximately $109.8 million. The service area of JFK’s proposed satellite hospital is considerably larger than the service are of Bethesda West. The PSA consists of zip codes 33437, 33467, 33446, and 33484; the SSA consists of zip codes 33436, 33463, 33414, 33413, 33445, 33496, and 33498. There is significant overlap between the service area of the proposed JFK satellite hospital and the existing service areas of Bethesda, Delray, Wellington, and JFK; each of the zip codes in the proposed service area is within the service area of at least two of those hospitals. Zip codes 33437 and 33467 are expected to generate over 92 percent of the patients for the proposed JFK satellite hospital. The inordinately high number of patients that these two zip codes are expected to generate calls into question the reasonableness of service area defined by JFK, or at least the relevance of the SSA. The proposed JFK satellite hospital is projected to have 20,851 patient days in its first year of operation and 21,576 patient days in its second year of operation, which equate to ADCs of 57 and 59 and occupancy rates of 71.4 percent and 73.7 percent. By the fifth year of operation, the proposed JFK satellite hospital is projected to have an occupancy rate of percent. The projected utilization of the proposed JFK satellite hospital was based on an ALOS of 3.9 days. That figure is reasonable. See Endnote 11. To achieve the projected utilization, the proposed JFK satellite hospital will have to immediately achieve inordinately high market shares in its two primary zip codes, 33437 and 33467. Indeed, the CON application projects that the proposed JFK satellite hospital will have a 27 percent market share in zip code 33437 and a 24 percent market share in zip code 33467. It is unreasonable to expect that a new, start-up hospital will be able achieve the market share or utilization rates projected by JFK for its proposed satellite hospital even though it will be affiliated with JFK, which has an established market reputation in the area. Instead, similar to other new hospitals, the proposed JFK satellite hospital will likely have a “ramp up” period before it achieves its target market penetration and/or utilization. The 10-bed OB unit at the proposed JFK satellite hospital is projected to have an ADC of 6 in each of the first two years of operation, and approximately one half of the admissions are projected to come from zip code 33467. That zip code has fewer residents in the Female 15-44 age cohort than does zip code 33463, which is in the West Boynton area but is in the SSA of the proposed JFK satellite hospital. The utilization of the OB unit assumes market shares of 65 percent in zip code 33437, which is the zip code where the proposed JFK satellite hospital will be located (i.e., its “home zip code”), and 60 percent in the adjacent zip code 33467. Those market shares are not inherently unreasonable for OB services since OB patients are more likely to utilize a facility closer to their home; however, the market shares are materially higher than the market shares that the established programs at Palms West (45 percent) and Wellington (41 percent) have in their home zip codes. The market shares proposed for the other zip codes in the proposed JFK satellite hospital’s service area are also somewhat higher than would be expected, particularly for a start-up OB program, but they are not inherently unreasonable. Even though the OB market shares assumed by JFK are not inherently unreasonable, they are unrealistic under the circumstances of this case because the OB unit at the proposed JFK satellite hospital will not have NICU backup, which is the standard of care in South Palm Beach County, and it is unlikely that obstetricians will refer their patients to the proposed satellite hospital when other hospitals with NICU backup (e.g., Wellington and Bethesda Memorial) are available in close proximity to the West Boynton area. The patient days for the OB unit were projected based upon a population-based use rate rather than based upon a fertility rate applied to the Female 15-44 age cohort. Because the Female 15-44 age cohort is growing at a slower rate than the population as a whole, JFK’s methodology had the effect of overstating the OB patient days and the ADC of the OB unit. The fertility rate methodology is a more reasonable approach under the circumstances of this case. That methodology results in an ADC of only two to four patients in the OB unit at the proposed JFK satellite hospital, which is a more reasonable projection and is more consistent with the largely elderly demographic of the West Boynton area. In sum, the projected utilization of the proposed JFK satellite hospital is overstated, particularly in the first two years of operation, as a result of the unrealistic market shares projected for the hospital’s two primary zip codes and the overstated projection of OB patient days in the West Boynton area. The proposed JFK satellite hospital is projected to take patients from the hospitals that currently serve the West Boynton area, including JFK. JFK projects that approximately 40 percent of its patients will be “cannibalized” by the proposed JFK satellite hospital, which is a materially higher percentage than that projected for Bethesda West in its first (29.1 percent) and second (31.1 percent) years of operation. The remainder of the proposed JFK satellite hospital’s admissions will come from patients who are currently being served by an existing hospital or from growth in the service area. In addition to the projected in-patient admissions discussed above, the proposed JFK satellite hospital is expected to have outpatient registrations and ED visits; however, the number of registrations and visits is not expressly projected in the application. Accordingly, it cannot be determined whether those projections are reasonable or not.12 Institution-specific Justifications for the Proposed Satellite Hospitals Other than the prospect of enhancing access to acute care services for residents of the West Boynton area (see Part I(1)(b) below), the primary justifications offered by Bethesda and JFK for their respective satellite hospitals were institution-specific. The primary justification offered by Bethesda for the establishment of Bethesda West was its need to maintain or increase its market share of the favorable payer-mix in the West Boynton area in order to ensure its long-term financial viability. Although the evidence establishes that the West Boynton area has a more favorable payer-mix than Bethesda Memorial’s current service area, the evidence was not persuasive that Bethesda’s long-term financial viability is at risk or that it is at risk of losing market share in the West Boynton area if it is not allowed to construct Bethesda West. Bethesda also presented evidence regarding its inability to add new beds at Bethesda Memorial because of physical and/or cost constraints, but that evidence was not persuasive. The primary justification offered by JFK for the establishment of its proposed satellite hospital was its inability to expand its current facility to accommodate patients coming from the West Boynton area or elsewhere; however, the preponderance of the evidence fails to support that claim because, as of the date of the hearing, JFK still had the ability to add at least 72 more beds to its existing facility, including 36 beds without any additional construction. Impact of the Proposed Satellite Hospitals on the Existing Hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5 The evidence is not persuasive that Bethesda West or the proposed JFK satellite hospital can achieve their in-patient utilization projections through population growth in their projected service areas alone. Instead, the evidence establishes that the proposed satellite hospitals will achieve their projected utilization primarily by taking patients who are currently being served by, or would otherwise be served by one of the existing hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5. Bethesda West and the proposed JFK satellite hospital are each projected to “cannibalize” patients from Bethesda Memorial and JFK, respectively; however, they will also take patients “out of the hide” of Delray, Wellington, and each other. The projected growth in the West Boynton area will result in the existing hospitals having more patient days in the future than they currently have, whether or not either of the satellite hospitals is approved; however, the approval of either of the proposed satellite hospitals will result in the existing hospitals losing some of the growth-related admissions that they would have otherwise captured. It is appropriate to consider the loss of those growth-related admissions as part of the impact analysis because the market shares in the West Boynton area and the service areas of the proposed satellite hospitals have been relatively stable over the past several years, and it is reasonable to expect that absent a significant change of circumstances (such as the approval of a satellite hospital in the area) the existing hospitals would continue to maintain their respective market shares into the future.13 The most persuasive analysis of the impact on the existing providers of the approval of the proposed satellite hospitals is that prepared by Wellington’s health planner, Thomas Davidson (Exhibit W-4). Based upon Mr. Davidson’s analysis, the number of admissions that the existing providers would lose because of Bethesda West in its first two years of operation are as follows: Year 1 Year 2 Delray 377 512 Wellington 138 187 JFK 554 752 Based upon Mr. Davidson’s analysis, the number of patient days that the existing providers would lose because of the proposed JFK satellite hospital in its first two years of operation are as follows: Year 1 Year 2 Delray 1,035 663 Wellington 735 615 Bethesda 1,638 1,178 These lost admissions and patient days constitute a substantial adverse impact on the existing hospitals, as does the loss of income resulting from the lost admissions and patient days. The proposed JFK satellite hospital will have a slightly greater adverse financial impact on Wellington than will Bethesda West, primarily because of the OB program and larger service proposed for the JFK satellite hospital; the proposed JFK satellite hospital and Bethesda West will have materially similar adverse financial impacts on Delray. The overall effect of the lost admissions, patient days, and the resulting loss of income is greater on Wellington than it is on any of the other hospitals because Wellington has historically been less profitable than the other hospitals. There are other adverse impacts on the existing providers, including the increases in costs and/or potential impacts to quality of care resulting from the exacerbation of the emergency room (ER) call shortage of specialty physicians discussed below; however, there is no persuasive evidence quantifying those impacts. Comparative Evaluation of the CON Applications Based Upon the Applicable Statutory and Rule Criteria There is no credible evidence to justify the approval of two 80-bed hospitals in the West Boynton area. As a result, if either of the proposed satellite hospitals is to be approved, it should be the one that best satisfies the applicable statutory and rule criteria. Statutory Criteria – Section 408.035, Florida Statutes (2003)14 Subsection (1): Need in Relation to the District Health Plan15 The applicable provisions of the Local Health Plan for District 9 are as follows: Priority shall be given to area hospitals, which can show a commitment to, or historical record of service to Medicaid/indigent, handicapped and underserved population groups. Priority shall be given to applicants who can document cost containment practices in their facilities. Cost containment practices, such as sharing services with other area hospitals, enhances efficient resource utilization and assists in avoiding duplication of services. Priority shall be given to an applicant who proposes to use existing space rather than new construction, including space created by previous voluntary de- licensure of underutilized or unused beds and/or through transfer of beds within a subdistrict. As more fully discussed below in connection with Section 408.035(11), Florida Statutes, the first preference weighs in favor of Bethesda based upon its historical record of service to Medicaid and charity patients, which is marginally better than JFK’s record, and its commitment to provide five percent of the patient days at Bethesda West to Medicaid and charity patients, which is more realistic than JFK’s 10 percent commitment; however, the weight associated with this preference is minimal in light of the demographics of the West Boynton area, which is generally more wealthy and, hence, less likely to generate significant Medicaid or charity care patient days. As to the second preference, the record does not “document” any material cost containment practices at JFK or Bethesda Memorial. JFK and Bethesda each intend to use their existing medical staffs to cover their proposed satellite hospitals as a cost-containment effort; however, Bethesda has proposed a greater degree of integration (and, hence, less duplication) in the administrative functions at Bethesda West and Bethesda Memorial than did JFK at is proposed satellite hospital. Thus, the second preference also marginally weighs in favor of Bethesda. As to the third preference, both applicants are proposing new construction rather than the use of existing space. Although JFK is proposing the de-licensure of underutilized beds at Columbia, it is not using the space created by those beds for its proposed satellite hospital as the rule preference contemplates. The beds that Bethesda is transferring to Bethesda West are not underutilized and they are being transferred to a new to-be-constructed facility rather than to existing space. In sum, the local health plan preferences marginally weigh in favor of the approval of Bethesda’s application over JFK’s application. Subsections (2) and (7): Availability, Quality of Care, etc. of Existing Facilities and Enhancing Access The primary justification offered by the applicants for their respective proposed satellite hospitals (other than the hospital-specific issues discussed above) is that the facility will "enhance access" to acute care services for residents of the West Boynton area. More specifically, the applicants contend that the establishment of a new hospital in the West Boynton area will address an “access” problem that exists or soon will exist in the area. As discussed below, this contention is not supported by the preponderance of the evidence. In the CON context, “access” is typically evaluated from the vantage points of programmatic, financial, cultural, and geographic access. “Programmatic access” refers to the adequacy of the programs and services provided at existing facilities in relation to the specific health care needs of the persons served by those facilities. Programmatic access concerns arise when specific programs or services are not available for patients that need them, or when the quality of care provided in the existing programs is inadequate. The evidence was not persuasive that there are any programmatic access problems in Subdistrict 9-5 and, in any event, neither of the proposed satellite hospitals would enhance programmatic access in the subdistrict because they will not offer any programs or services that are not already offered at one or more of the tertiary hospitals in the subdistrict that currently serve the West Boynton area. Indeed, the proposed satellite hospitals will offer a more narrow range of services than the existing tertiary hospitals presently serving the area. This is significant because the elderly, who make of a large portion of the West Boynton area and who are more likely to have co-morbidities or more complex medical needs, are generally better served in a hospital offering tertiary services and more complete care. Similarly, it is reasonable to expect that many physicians will continue to admit their patients to the larger tertiary hospitals rather than shifting those patients to a satellite hospital that provides a more narrow range of services. “Financial access” refers to the extent to which persons have access to health care services without regard to their ability to pay. The evidence was not persuasive that there are any financial access problems in Subdistrict 9-5 or the West Boynton area that the proposed satellite hospitals will address. None of the existing hospitals that serve the West Boynton area have policies or practices that discourage indigent patients from seeking care at their facilities and, in any event, the low- income population makes up a relatively small portion of the West Boynton area. Cultural access” refers to the extent to which certain persons cannot or do not access the existing facilities due to cultural factors such as race, ethnicity, and national origin. Cultural access was not advanced by Bethesda or JFK as a basis for the approval or their respective applications. “Geographic access” refers to the physical accessibility of the existing facilities or services in a subdistrict taking into account population density, distance and time of travel, and geographic barriers or other impediments to access. Geographic access has been referred to as a “foundation of health planning.” Bethesda and JFK focus primarily on the projected growth of the West Boynton area and the road congestion that comes with that growth as the basis for their contention that there is, or soon will be a access problem for residents of the West Boynton area; Bethesda states in its PRO (at page 29) that "[g]eographic access is at the heart of [its] proposal." A reasonable geographic access standard for persons living in an urban area is a drive time of 30 to 40 minutes to an acute care hospital. Under that standard, there is currently no geographic access problem for residents of the West Boynton area. Indeed, there are as many as 12 hospitals within a 30-minute drive of the West Boynton area, and a “fair number” of residents have access to four hospitals -– Bethesda, JFK, Wellington, and Delray -- within a 15 to 20-minute drive time.16 All of the hospitals within the 30-minute drive time offer tertiary-level care, and a number of them offer OB services. There are no physical geographic barriers that limit access to the existing hospitals by residents of the West Boynton area. Indeed, there are a number of different major north-south and east-west roads that residents have to chose from when accessing the existing hospitals, and most of those roads have at least four lanes. The major roads in the West Boynton area have expanded along with growth of the population in the area, and they are expected to continue to do so. The infrastructure plan adopted by Palm Beach County includes continued road expansions and improvements over the planning horizon applicable to this case, and developers are often required to widen or otherwise improve the roads as a condition of the approval of new development. There is insufficient evidence that the current travel times are significantly different for the elderly population in the area. The anecdotal testimony offered by various Bethesda witnesses was not persuasive. The evidence was not persuasive that the travel times will be materially higher over the applicable five-year planning horizon. The analysis and opinion presented by Bethesda’s traffic engineer on this issue was not persuasive.17 The concurrency analysis performed by Bethesda’s traffic engineer only assessed Boynton Beach Boulevard; it did not assess any of the other major roads between the West Boynton area and the existing hospitals. Moreover, the analysis focused on the level of service (LOS) on various segments of Boynton Beach Boulevard, as measured by the projected number of trips on those segments in 2007; it did not quantify the increase in travel time along that road, if any, resulting from the reduction in the LOS which the analysis showed. The hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5 are some of the most highly-utilized hospitals in the state; however, the evidence was not persuasive that the high utilization at these hospitals has caused any access problems for residents of the West Boynton area, either for general acute care services or for OB services. The existing hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5 have been able to meet the needs of the subdistrict by incrementally expanding their facilities when the need arises. An additional 67 beds can be added to the bed inventory of Subdistrict 9-5 without any additional construction; JFK has shelled-in space for 36 new beds and Delray has shelled-in space for 31 new beds. Additionally, Delray has a master plan that has been approved by Palm Beach County that will allow it to add as many as 123 more beds on its current campus as needed, and Wellington also has plenty of space on the undeveloped property adjacent to its hospital to add more beds as needed. Having a hospital in the West Boynton area might be more convenient for residents of that area west of the Turnpike, at least in those instances where the patient is able to receive all of the necessary care at that hospital; however, convenience alone is not valid basis for the approval of a new hospital, particularly where there are as many as 12 tertiary-level hospitals within a 30-minute drive of the West Boynton area. In sum and on balance, the criteria in Subsections 408.035(2) and (7), Florida Statutes, weigh strongly against approval of either application. Indeed, despite the relatively high utilization rates at the existing hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5, the preponderance of the evidence fails to establish that there currently are, or that over the applicable planning horizon there will be any material deficiencies in the availability, quality of care, or accessibility of the existing hospitals in the subdistrict that would warrant the approval of a new hospital in the West Boynton area at this time. Subsection (3): Ability of Applicant to Provide Quality of Care The parties do not dispute the quality of care provided at any of the existing hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5, and the evidence affirmatively demonstrates that a high quality of care is currently provided at Bethesda Memorial, JFK, Delray, and Wellington. Bethesda and JFK each intend to rely on their existing medical staff, at least in part, to staff their respective satellite hospitals. As a result, the quality of care provided at the satellite hospitals will also be good, but it will be less than ideal in several respects. First, neither satellite hospital will offer interventional cardiology services, which is, or is becoming the standard of care for treating heart attack patients that present to the hospital’s ED. Second, JFK’s proposed satellite will offer OB services without NICU backup, which is below the standard of care in South Palm Beach County. Accordingly, the criterion in Section 408.035(3), Florida Statutes, weighs against the approval of either application. Subsection (4): Special Health Care Services The parties stipulated that this criterion is inapplicable, and in any event, the criterion was deleted by Chapter 2004-383, Laws of Florida, effective July 1, 2004. Subsection (5): Educational Facilities and Training Programs18 Neither JFK nor Bethesda Memorial is a teaching hospital, and neither is proposing educational or training programs at its proposed satellite hospital. The evidence was not persuasive that Wellington’s teaching programs will be adversely affected by the approval of either of the proposed satellite hospitals. The criterion in Section 408.035(5), Florida Statutes, does not materially weigh in favor of or against the approval of either of the applications. Subsection (6): Availability of Resources and Personnel for Operations The parties stipulated that Bethesda and JFK each have the ability to fund the capital and operating expenditures for their proposed satellite hospitals. The reasonableness of the financing-related costs proposed by Bethesda and JFK in their respective applications is also not in dispute. Delray and Wellington argue that neither Bethesda nor JFK will be able to adequately staff their proposed satellite hospitals due to physician and nurse shortages in South Palm Beach County and/or that the staffing of the proposed satellite hospitals will make it more difficult and costly for the existing hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5 to staff certain programs. Bethesda and JFK challenge the adequacy of each other’s staffing projections. As more fully discussed below, the evidence is not persuasive that the staffing projected for either of the proposed satellite programs is inadequate; however, the evidence establishes that the approval of either program would exacerbate physician shortages in Subdistrict 9-5 in certain specialties. Bethesda West’s staffing projections include 242.8 full-time equivalents (FTEs) in the first year of operation and 294.5 FTEs in the second year of operation. The staffing projections for the proposed JFK satellite hospital include FTEs in the first year of operation and 448.5 FTEs in the second year of operation. The disparity in the staffing levels primarily results from the higher occupancy rate projected at the proposed JFK satellite hospital, which is projected to be 71.4 percent in the first year of operation. By contrast, the occupancy rate at Bethesda West is projected be 35.7 percent in the first year of operation and then “ramp up” to approximately 69 percent by the fourth year of operation. The staffing levels at each of the proposed satellite hospitals are reasonable based upon the ADCs projected and the services to be provided at each hospital. Indeed, the staffing levels are comparable when viewed as a ratio of staff to projected ADC; the ratios at Bethesda West are 8.37 and 7.36 in the first two years of operation, and the ratios at the proposed JFK satellite hospital for its first two years of operation are 7.74 and 7.60. The evidence is not persuasive that Bethesda West’s staffing projections are understated or that they fail to include nursing and other positions necessary to ensure high quality care is provided. Nor is the evidence persuasive that the salaries projected for Bethesda West’s staff are understated. The evidence is not persuasive that the staffing projections for the proposed JFK satellite hospital are inherently unreliable based upon the manner in which they were prepared or as a result of the proxy that was used as a basis of the projections. There is a nursing shortage statewide and in South Palm Beach County, but it is not as severe as it has been in the past. Indeed, it is significant that despite the large number of beds added over the past five years at the various hospitals in South Palm Beach County, those beds have been adequately staffed with nurses and ancillary clinical personnel. JFK and Bethesda Memorial have each been successful in recruiting nursing staff despite the nursing shortage. They each have implemented innovative programs to aid in their recruiting efforts and to reduce their turnover and vacancy rates, and those programs are expected to be utilized at the proposed satellite hospitals. JFK and Bethesda Memorial each use “traveler” and per-diem nurses to supplement their full time nursing staffs, which is not uncommon in South Palm Beach County. Typically, a physician who has privileges at a hospital is required to be on ER call on a rotational basis. Many physicians have privileges at more than one hospital in South Palm Beach County, which means that they are responsible for providing ER call coverage at more than one hospital. Because of malpractice and other concerns, it is becoming increasingly difficult for hospitals to attract physicians who are willing to take ER calls. The Palm Beach County Medical Society and the CEOs of the existing hospitals in the county met as recently as December 2003 to discuss the problems related to ER call coverage; however, as of the date of the hearing, the problem still existed and was severe. It is possible for a physician to be providing ER calls to more than one hospital at the same time. This can become a serious problem if the physician is attending to a patient at one hospital when he or she is called to the ER at another hospital. The problem of ER call coverage is most significant in specialties such as neurosurgery, hand surgery, urology, OB, and ear/nose/throat. Several of the hospitals in South Palm Beach County, including Wellington and Delray, have begun to pay physicians, and particularly specialty physicians to take ER call. Adding a new hospital in South Palm Beach County will exacerbate this problem in several respects. First, it will add another hospital to the ER call rotations of the physicians who chose to obtain privileges at the satellite hospitals, thereby increasing the prospect of a physician being on call at more than one hospital at the same time. Second, it will make it even more difficult or costly for existing hospitals to obtain call coverage by the specialty physicians that are already in short supply. It is unlikely that OB/GYNs will admit their patients to the small OB unit at the proposed JFK satellite hospital. OB/GYNs typically try to keep all of their patients in one hospital because it makes it easier on them to do rounds and to respond quickly to emergency situations, and because the OB unit at the proposed JFK satellite hospital will not have NICU backup, it is unlikely that many OB/GYNs will choose that hospital as the one where they admit the bulk of their patients. In sum, the staffing levels for each of the proposed satellite hospitals are reasonable and appropriate for the services being offered at the hospitals, the projected staffing costs at each of the proposed satellite hospitals are also reasonable and appropriate, and JFK and Bethesda will be able to staff their respective satellite hospitals at the levels projected; however, the proposed satellite hospitals will exacerbate the shortage of specialty physicians in South Palm Beach County and will make it more difficult for the existing hospitals to get specialty physicians for ER call coverage. Accordingly, the criterion in Section 408.035(6), Florida Statutes, weighs against the approval of either application, and between the competing applications, this criterion does not materially weigh in favor of either application over the other. Subsection (8): Financial Feasibility The parties did not seriously contest the short-term financial feasibility of either of the proposed satellite hospitals, and the preponderance of the evidence establishes that both of the proposed satellite hospitals are financially feasible in the short-term; both applicants have the ability to fund the construction and initial capital needs of their respective projects in conjunction with the other capital projects listed on Schedule 2 of their respective CON applications. The long-term financial feasibility of each of the proposed satellite hospitals is in dispute. The general rule for assessing the long-term financial feasibility of a CON project is if the project will at least break even by the end of the second year of operation, then the project is financially feasible in the long-term; if, however, the project continues to show a loss in the second year of operations and it is not demonstrated that the project will reach a break-even point within a reasonable period of time, then the project is not financially feasible in the long-term. As more fully discussed below, Bethesda West is financially feasible in the long-term, but the proposed JFK satellite hospital is not. Accordingly, the criterion in Section 408.035(8), Florida Statutes, weighs in favor of approval of Bethesda’s application over JFK’s application. Bethesda West Schedule 8A of Bethesda's application projects that Bethesda West will generate a net loss of $3.7 million in its first year of operation and a net profit of $1.7 million in its second year of operation. The financial projections for Bethesda West were based upon conservative utilization projections, which leads a reasonable projection of operating income. The financial projections for Bethesda West are not defective based upon an overstatement of the “other operating revenue” or an understatement of the depreciation expense projected by Bethesda. The testimony of Bethesda’s expert financial witnesses is accepted over the testimony of the other financial experts on these issues. The financial projections for Bethesda West are not defective based upon understatements in land costs, construction costs, equipment costs of staffing projections. The testimony of Bethesda’s experts related to these issues is accepted over the testimony of the other experts. As discussed above, Bethesda West will “cannibalize” 3,040 and 4,530 patient days from Bethesda Memorial in its first and second years of operation. The financial impact of this “cannibalization” on Bethesda Memorial is a loss of $1.4 million and $2.1 million in the first and second years of Bethesda West’s operation. The income loss from “cannibalization” is not accounted for on Schedule 8A. Although the patient days used to calculate the “per patient day” figures in the middle two columns of that schedule take into account the “cannibalized” patient days, the dollar amounts shown in those columns do not. On this issue, the testimony of Delray’s financial expert is more logical and persuasive than the testimony of Bethesda’s financial expert. When the losses from “cannibalization” are taken into account, the approval of Bethesda West will have a negative impact on the Bethesda system of $5.1 million in its first year of operation and $400,000 in its second year of operation, which are consistent with the figures shown in Exhibit B-2 (pages 48 and 54). Even so, the system will show a net income of $300,000 and $5.6 million in the first two years of Bethesda West’s operation. The impact of the “cannibalization” on Bethesda Memorial is projected to decrease as Bethesda West becomes more established. At the same time, the profitability of Bethesda West is projected to increase as its census grows. Thus, by the third year of its operation, Bethesda West is projected to have a positive impact on the Bethesda system of $2.2 million (i.e., $4.1 million in net income at Bethesda West less $1.9 million in “cannibalization” from Bethesda Memorial). Bethesda West will not have a negative impact on Bethesda’s cash flow after its first year of operation. On this issue, the testimony of Bethesda’s expert is more persuasive than the testimony of the other financial experts. Accordingly, Bethesda West is financially feasible in the long-term. Proposed JFK Satellite Hospital Schedule 8A of JFK's application projects that its proposed satellite hospital would generate a net loss of $1.2 million in its first year of operation and a net loss of $392,000 in its second year of operation. Over the next three years, however, JFK projects its satellite hospital to generate net income from operations of $509,000, $1.5 million, and $2.5 million. The financial projections in JFK’s application were based upon overly-aggressive occupancy rates, both in the facility as a whole and in the small OB unit without NICU backup. As a result, the resulting financial projections are not reasonable. JFK’s application does not include any analysis of the financial impact on Columbia of the transfer of 80 beds to the satellite hospital, nor does it include any analysis of the impact of the “cannibalization” of JFK’s patient days that would necessarily occur if JFK’s proposed satellite was approved. As a result, the financial impact of JFK’s proposed satellite hospital, in the words of one of JFK’s financial experts, is “probably incomplete.” As a result of the unreasonable utilization projections and the incomplete presentation of the financial impact of the “cannibalization” of JFK’s patient days, JFK failed to establish that its proposed satellite hospital is financially feasible in the long-term. Subsection (9): Fostering Competition that Promotes Cost-effectiveness Neither of the proposed satellite hospitals will foster competition that proposes cost-effectiveness. The West Boynton market currently has healthy competition for the acute services proposed for the satellite hospitals, and there is no dominant provider of those services. Locating a new hospital in the West Boynton area will have the long-term effect of increasing the market share of the provider that operates the new hospital to the detriment of the other providers that are currently competing in that market. In this regard, the approval of a new hospital in the West Boynton area would adversely affect the competitive balance that currently exists in that area and which is projected to continue over the planning horizon. The approval of either of the proposed satellite hospitals would also adversely affect cost-effectiveness by exacerbating the shortage of specialty physicians and other qualified staff in the subdistrict, which in turn would require existing hospitals to raise salaries, benefits and other expenses in order to remain competitive. The approval of Bethesda West would have less of an adverse impact on competition and cost-effectiveness than would the approval of JFK’s proposed satellite hospital for several reasons. First, Bethesda West does not duplicate as many administrative services as does JFK’s proposed satellite hospital. Second, JFK currently has a higher market share in the West Boynton area than does Bethesda or any other hospital, which means that the competitive balance would be tipped to a greater extent if JFK’s satellite hospital was approved. Third, the approval of the JFK satellite would give HCA four hospitals in Palm Beach County and increase its leverage in physician and staff recruitment and the negotiation of HMO contracts. Accordingly, the criterion in Section 408.035(9), Florida Statutes, weights against the approval of either application; however, on balance between the two applications, this criterion favor’s Bethesda’s application over JFK’s application. Subsection (10): Costs and Methods of Construction The costs and methods of energy provision at the proposed satellite hospitals is not in dispute. Although the proposed satellite hospitals are similar in size, the total project costs included in the CON applications are significantly different. The $73.8 million total project cost for Bethesda West equates to a cost of $922,700 per bed. The $109.8 million total project cost for JFK’s proposed satellite hospital equates to a cost of $1.37 million per bed. The portion of the total project costs for each of the proposed satellite hospitals attributable directly to “construction” is materially similar. Bethesda West’s construction costs are approximately $34.2 million, or $180 per square foot; the construction costs for the proposed JFK satellite hospital are $40.9 million, or $210 per square foot. The estimated construction costs for each of the proposed satellite hospitals are within the range of reasonableness that can be gleaned from the testimony of the various hospital construction experts. JFK’s cost is towards the higher end of the range, and Bethesda’s cost is towards the lower end of the range. The primary differences in the total project costs are in the land purchase prices, the site preparation costs, and the equipment costs. The land purchase price included in Bethesda’s application was $4.2 million, which was based upon a 30 to 40- acre site. The land purchase price included in JFK’s application was $8 million, which was based upon a 50-acre site. Bethesda acquired the 54-acre Amestoy Property for $110,000 per acre. At $110,000 per acre, the $4.2 million attributed by Bethesda to land purchase price would be sufficient to acquire 38.2 acres, which is more than adequate for the 80-bed Bethesda West facility. Consistent with the estimate in the CON application, JFK has made an offer to purchase the 50-plus acre Mazzoni Property for $130,000 per acre. The total land purchase price in each application, and the actual cost-per-acre of the Amestoy and Mazzoni Properties are reasonable. The site development costs included in Bethesda’s application were $3.75 million, or $125,000 per acre for the 30 acres on which Bethesda West will be located. The site development costs included in JFK’s application were $6.5 million, or $150,000 per acre for the 50 acres on which JFK’s proposed satellite hospital will be located. The site development costs for each project include on-site and off-site utility (e.g., water and sewer) and roadway work, geotechnical and environmental remediation costs, stormwater retention, landscaping, and concurrency impact fees. Each of the proposed sites is relatively flat and was formerly agricultural property and, as a result, there are not expected to be any unusual costs associated with the development of either site. Bethesda West will be located further west than the proposed JFK satellite hospital and, as a result, its “radius of influence” includes fewer congested roadway links than does the proposed JFK satellite hospital; but, the Amestoy Property where Bethesda West will be located is farther away from the existing utility lines than the Mazzoni Property where the proposed JFK satellite hospital will be located. Thus, even though the cost of running utilities to Bethesda West will likely be higher than the cost of running utilities to the proposed JFK satellite hospital, the currency impact fees for Bethesda West will likely be lower than the currency impact fees for the proposed JFK satellite hospital; and, on balance, the overall per-acre and total site development costs included in each of the applications are reasonable. Bethesda’s application included equipment costs of approximately $16 million, all of which was attributable to movable equipment. The cost of fixed equipment was included in the estimated construction costs as part of the building contract. JFK’s application included total equipment costs of approximately $34.2 million. That amount was broken into fixed equipment not in the building contract ($13.9 million), movable equipment ($17.8 million), and information systems ($2.4 million). Some, but not all of the difference between the equipment cost estimates are attributable to the additional services –- e.g., OB and diagnostic cardiac catheterization –- that will be provided at the proposed JFK satellite hospital but not at Bethesda West. Additionally, some of the difference are attributable to the 12 "observation" rooms at the proposed JFK satellite hospital that are being equipped in the same manner as the hospital’s general med-surg beds. When compared on an “apples to apples” basis, the total equipment costs for Bethesda West are not materially different than the total equipment costs for the proposed JFK satellite hospital. JFK is proposing to provide more specialized equipment than Bethesda in areas such as the surgical suites and the ICU/CCU and more information technology (IT) equipment; however, the evidence is not persuasive that such specialized equipment or the IT equipment is necessary to provide high quality care or that the absence of such equipment will adversely affect the quality of care at Bethesda West. The $16 million in equipment costs at Bethesda West, which equates to approximately $200,700 per bed, is reasonable for the level and type of services that will be provided at Bethesda West. The evidence is not persuasive that Bethesda’s equipment costs are understated even though its costs are considerably less than the equipment costs proposed by JFK. If anything, JFK has over-equipped its proposed satellite hospital with specialized equipment resulting in the higher equipment costs included in JFK’s CON application.19 Although the more expensive proposed JFK satellite hospital offers some benefits, such as a larger site to facilitate future expansions and more specialized equipment in some areas, those benefits are outweighed by the additional $35 million costs associated with that facility as compared to Bethesda West. This cost saving is particularly significant since each of the proposed facilities is supposed to be a satellite of a larger, tertiary hospital rather than a stand- alone community hospital. The evidence was not persuasive that Bethesda Memorial and JFK have physical constraints that will limit their ability to add beds at their existing facilities in a cost- efficient manner. Even if the construction of a satellite hospital were the most cost-efficient way for Bethesda Memorial and JFK to add beds, the evidence was not persuasive that it is the most cost-efficient way to add beds from the perspective of the entire health care system of Subdistrict 9-5. Indeed, there are less costly methods of adding new beds to the subdistrict than the construction of a new 80-bed hospital for $73.8 million or $109.8 million. For example, 36 additional beds can be added at JFK and 31 additional beds can be added at Delray in shelled-in space that has already been constructed. The incremental cost of constructing space for additional bed expansions at Delray and Wellington would also be less than the construction costs of the proposed satellite hospitals. In sum, because there are less costly ways to add beds to the subdistrict than the construction of a new hospital, the criterion in Section 408.035(10), Florida Statutes, weighs against the approval of either application; however, between the two applications, this criterion weighs in favor of the approval of Bethesda’s application over JFK’s application since its proposed satellite hospital will cost approximately $35 million less and will provide effectively the same services in similar physical space. Subsection (11): Medicaid and Indigent Care Bethesda characterizes itself as a “safety net” hospital because its Medicaid and charity care percentages typically exceed the averages for Subdistrict 9-5 and District 9 as a whole, and because Bethesda Memorial provides the largest percentage of the Medicaid and charity care provided by all of the hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5. There is no statutory or rule provision that would support Bethesda’s designation of itself as a “safety net” provider. Moreover, the significance of Bethesda’s characterization of itself as a “safety net” hospital is diminished by the fact that the Palm Beach County Health Care District (District) reimburses all hospitals in the county through an indigent care subsidy for care provided to patients that meet the District’s indigency standards. The subsidy helps to ensure that indigent patients are able to receive medical care from any hospital in the county and, to that end, provides a county-wide “safety net” for such patients. The subsidies paid by the District do not cover the full cost of indigent care provided by the hospital, nor does the total amount of subsidies received by a hospital directly correlate to the total amount of indigent care provided by the hospital. Thus, it is not dispositive that JFK received the largest amount of subsidies from the District over the past several years or that JFK received approximately $1.6 million more in subsidies from the District in 2003 than did Bethesda. JFK recently qualified as a “disproportionate share provider,” which means that at least 15 percent of its patient days are attributed to Medicaid or supplemental security income patients. As a disproportionate share provider, JFK receives incrementally larger reimbursements from Medicaid for the provision of indigent care. Bethesda is not currently a disproportionate share provider although it has been in the past. None of the hospitals in South Palm Beach County have policies or practices that discourage Medicaid or uninsured patients. Bethesda Memorial, JFK, Wellington, and Delray each accept patients without regard to their ability to pay. Bethesda and JFK conditioned the approval of their respective CON applications on the provision of a specified percentage of patient days to Medicaid and charity patients. The percentage committed to by JFK (10 percent) is higher than the percentage committed to by Bethesda (five percent). The percentages of Medicaid and charity care committed to by the applicants may be difficult to achieve as a result of the demographics of the West Boynton area. Indeed, the more favorable payer-mix in the West Boynton area was a significant factor, and in Bethesda’s case it was the primary motivating factor for the establishment a new hospital in that area. Bethesda Memorial and JFK each have a history of providing significant levels of Medicaid and charity care at their existing hospitals. The hospitals are each located in areas with large indigent populations, which significantly contribute to the high level of indigent care that they provide. Bethesda Memorial has historically provided a larger amount of Medicaid care than has JFK in terms of a percentage of patient days, e.g., 16.1 percent verses 7.3 percent in 2001. Those percentages each exceed the Subdistrict 9-5 average of 6.3 percent. Bethesda Memorial has also historically provided a larger amount of charity care than has JFK in terms of dollars (e.g., $16.2 million verses $5.2 million in 2002) and in terms of a percentage of charges (e.g., 3.7 percent verses 0.4 percent in 2001 and 2.9 percent verses 0.6 percent in 2002). The Subdistrict 9-5 average for 2001 was 1.4 percent. These comparisons are somewhat skewed because a large portion of Bethesda’s indigent care is attributable to Bethesda Memorial’s high-volume, well-established OB and neonatal programs which tend to be “magnets” for uninsured patients. When only like-services are considered, the utilization of JFK and Bethesda Memorial by Medicaid and indigent patients is similar. JFK provides a significant amount of care to “self- pay” patients (e.g., $43.5 million in 2002), which JFK attempted to equate to charity care. Although there is often overlap between self-pay and charity care patients, the evidence was not persuasive that there is a direct correlation urged by JFK in this case. For example, JFK’s internal definitions of self-pay and charity care patients are markedly different and considerably more liberal than the Agency’s definition of charity care patients for reporting purposes. Bethesda makes a $1 million per year “contribution” to the District to help fund the District’s indigent care program. That contribution was required as part of the settlement of litigation arising out of Bethesda’s conversion from a public hospital to a private not-for-profit hospital and, as a result, it cannot be fairly characterized as additional evidence of Bethesda’s commitment to serving indigent patients. Even though both applicants demonstrated a history of and commitment to serving Medicaid and indigent patients, the criterion in Section 408.035(11), Florida Statutes, weighs in favor of Bethesda because the level of Medicaid and charity care historically provided by Bethesda Memorial is higher than that provided by JFK. On balance with the other statutory and rule criteria, the criterion in Section 408.035(11), Florida Statutes, is not given significant weight because Bethesda has committed to providing a lower percentage of Medicaid and charity care patient days at Bethesda West than JFK committed to at its proposed satellite hospital, and because the demographics of the West Boynton area make it unlikely that a significant level of indigent care will be provided at either of the proposed satellite hospitals. Subsection (12): Designation as a Gold Seal Nursing Facility The parties stipulated that this criterion is inapplicable because neither applicant is proposing additional nursing home beds. (2) Rule Criteria – Florida Administrative Code Rules 59C-1.030(2) and 59C-1.038(6) The criteria in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C- 1.030(2) are subsumed in the statutory criteria discussed above related to the accessibility (or not) of existing acute care services in Subdistrict 9-5 and the need (or not) for new acute care beds in the West Boynton area. For the same reasons that the CON applications do not satisfy those statutory criteria, they do not satisfy the related criteria in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.030(2). Under Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C- 1.038(6)(a), priority is given to applicants with “a documented history of providing services to medically indigent patients or a commitment to do so.” This priority weighs in favor of Bethesda for the reasons discussed above in connection with Section 408.035(11), Florida Statutes. Under Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C- 1.038(6)(b), priority is given to applications that “meet the need for additional acute care beds in a particular service through the conversion of existing underutilized beds.” This priority does not materially weigh in favor either application over the other; the underutilized beds at Columbia that JFK proposes to transfer to its satellite hospital are in a different subdistrict, and the beds that Bethesda proposes to transfer from Bethesda Memorial to its proposed satellite hospital are not underutilized beds in light of the historical occupancy rate at Bethesda Memorial.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency issue a final order denying Bethesda’s CON application No. 9659 and also denying JFK’s CON application No. 9660. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 2004.

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.5717.001408.035408.0361408.0397.367.60
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FMC HOSPITAL, LTD. vs THE NORTH BROWARD HOSPITAL DISTRICT, D/B/A BROWARD GENERAL MEDICAL CENTER AND AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 96-004031CON (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 28, 1996 Number: 96-004031CON Latest Update: Jul. 06, 1998

The Issue Whether the certificate of need application to convert 30 acute care beds to 30 adult psychiatric beds at Broward General Medical Center meets the statutory and rule criteria for approval.

Findings Of Fact The North Broward Hospital District (NBHD) is a special taxing district established by the Florida Legislature in 1951 to provide health care services to residents of the northern two-thirds of Broward County. NBHD owns and operates four acute care hospitals: Coral Springs Medical Center, North Broward Medical Center, Imperial Point Medical Center (Imperial Point), and Broward General Medical Center (Broward General). NBHD also owns and/or operates primary care clinics, school clinics, urgent care centers, and a home health agency. FMC Hospital, Ltd., d/b/a Florida Medical Center (FMC) is a 459-bed hospital with 74 inpatient psychiatric beds, 51 for adults separated into a 25-bed adult unit and a 26-bed geriatric psychiatric unit, and 23 child/adolescent psychiatric beds. FMC is a public Baker Act receiving facility for children and adolescents and operates a mental health crisis stabilization unit (CSU) for children and adolescents. FMC also operates separately located facilities which include a partial hospitalization program, an adult day treatment program, and a community mental health center. At Florida Medical Center South, FMC operates another day treatment program and partial hospitalization program. The Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) is the state agency which administers the certificate of need (CON) program for health care services and facilities in Florida. The NBHD applied for CON Number 8425 to convert 30 acute care beds to 30 adult psychiatric beds at Broward General. Broward General operates approximately 550 of its total 744 licensed beds. It is a state Level II adult and pediatric trauma center and the tertiary referral center for the NBHD, offering Level II and III neonatal intensive care, pediatric intensive care, cardiac catheterization and open heart surgery services. Broward General has 68 adult psychiatric beds and is a public Baker Act receiving facility for adults. Public Baker Act receiving facilities have state contracts and receive state funds to hold involuntarily committed mental patients, regardless of their ability to pay, for psychiatric evaluation and short-term treatment. See Subsections 394.455(25) and (26), Florida Statutes. Although they serve different age groups, both FMC and Broward General are, by virtue of contracts with the state, public Baker Act facilities. When a Baker Act patient who is an indigent child or adolescent arrives at Broward General, the patient is transferred to FMC. FMC also typically transfers indigent Baker Act adults to Broward General. At Broward General, psychiatric patients are screened in a separate section of the emergency room by a staff which has significant experience with indigent mental health patients. If hospitalization is appropriate, depending on the patient's physical and mental condition, inpatient psychiatric services are provided in either a 38-bed unit on the sixth floor or a 30- bed unit on the fourth floor of Broward General. In July 1995, Broward General also started operating a 20-bed mental health CSU located on Northwest 19th Street in Fort Lauderdale. Prior to 1995, the County operated the 19th Street CSU and 60 CSU beds on the grounds of the South Florida State Hospital (SFSH), a state mental hospital. Following an investigation of mental health services in the County, a grand jury recommended closing the 60 CSU beds at SFSH because of "deplorable conditions." In addition, the grand jury recommended that the County transfer CSU operations to the NBHD and the South Broward Hospital District (SBHD). As a result, the SBHD assumed the responsibility for up to 20 CSU inpatients a day within its existing 100 adult psychiatric beds at Memorial Regional Hospital. The NBHD assumed the responsibility for up to 40 CSU inpatients a day, including 20 at the 19th Street location. The additional 20 were to be redirected to either the 68 adult psychiatric beds at Broward General or the 47 adult psychiatric beds at Imperial Point. CSU services for adult Medicaid and indigent patients in the NBHD service area were transferred pursuant to contracts between the NBHD and Broward County, and the NBHD and the State of Florida, Department of Children and Family Services (formerly, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services). Based on the agreements, the County leases the 19th Street building in which Broward General operates the CSU. The County also pays a flat rate of $1.6 million a year in monthly installments for the salaries of the staff which was transferred from the County mental health division to the NBHD. The County's contract with the NBHD lasts for five years, from December 1995 to September 2000. Either party may terminate the contract, without cause, upon 30 days notice. The State contract, unlike that of Broward County, does not provide a flat rate, but sets a per diem reimbursement rate of approximately $260 per patient per day offset by projected Medicaid revenues. The State contract is renewable annually, but last expired on June 30, 1997. The contract was being re-negotiated at the time of the hearing in November 1997. Based on actual experience with declining average lengths of stay for psychiatric inpatients, the contract was being re-negotiated to fund an average of 30, not a maximum of 40 patients a day. If CON 8425 is approved, NBHD intends to use the additional 30 adult psychiatric beds at Broward General to meet the requirements of the State and County contracts, while closing the 19th Street CSU and consolidating mental health screening and stabilization services at Broward General. NBHD proposes to condition the CON on the provision of 70 percent charity and 30 percent Medicaid patient days in the 30 new beds. By comparison, the condition applicable to the existing 68 beds requires the provision of 3 percent charity and 25 percent Medicaid. When averaged for a total of 98 beds, the overall condition would be 23.5 percent charity and 26.5 percent Medicaid, or a total of 51 or 52 percent. The proposed project will require the renovation of 10,297 gross square feet on the fourth floor of Broward General at a cost of approximately $450,000. The space is currently an unused section of Broward General which contains 42 medical/surgical beds. Twelve beds will be relocated to other areas of the hospital. The renovated space will include seclusion, group therapy, and social rooms, as well as 15 semi- private rooms. Twelve of the rooms will not have separate bathing/showering facilities, and seven of those will also not have toilets within the patients' rooms. Need in Relation to State and District Health Plans - Subsection 408.035(1)(a), Florida Statutes The District 10 allocation factors include a requirement that a CON applicant demonstrate continuously high levels of utilization. The applicant is given the following evidentiary guidelines: patients are routinely waiting for admissions to inpatient units; the facility provides significant services to indigent and Medicaid individuals; the facility arranges transfer for patients to other appropriate facilities; and the facility provides other medical services, if needed. Broward General does not demonstrate continuously high utilization by having patients routinely waiting for admission. Broward General does meet the other criteria required by allocation factor one. The second District 10 allocation factor, like criterion (b) of the first, favors an applicant who commits to serving State funded and indigent patients. Broward General is a disproportionate share Medicaid provider with a history of providing, and commitment to continue providing, significant services to Medicaid and indigent patients. In fact, the NBHD provides over 50 percent of both indigent and Medicaid services in District 10. See also Subsection 408.035(1)(n), Florida Statutes. Allocation factor three for substance abuse facilities is inapplicable to Broward General which does not have substance abuse inpatient services. Allocation factor 4 for an applicant with a full continuum of acute medical services is met by Broward General. See also Rule 59C-1.040(3)(h), Florida Administrative Code. Broward General complies with allocation factor 5 by participating in data collection activities of the regional health planning council. The state health plan includes preferences for (1) converting excess acute care beds; (2) serving the most seriously mentally ill patients; (3) serving indigent and Baker Act patients; (4) proposing to establish a continuum of mental health care; (5) serving Medicaid-eligible patients; and (6) providing a disproportionate share of Medicaid and charity care. Broward General meets the six state health plan preferences. See also Rule 59C-1.040(4)(e)2., Florida Administrative Code, and Subsection 408.035(1)(n), Florida Statutes. Broward General does not meet the preference for acute care hospitals if fewer than .15 psychiatric beds per 1000 people in the District are located in acute care hospitals. The current ratio in the District is .19 beds per 1,000 people. Rule 59C-1.040(4)(3)3, Florida Administrative Code, also requires that 40 percent of the psychiatric beds needed in a district should be allocated to general hospitals. Currently, approximately 51 percent, 266 of 517 licensed District 10 adult inpatient psychiatric beds are located in general acute care hospitals. On balance, the NBHD and Broward General meet the factors and preferences of the health plans which support the approval of the CON application. See also Rule 59C- 1.040(4)(e)1. and Rule 59C-1.030, Florida Administrative Code. Numeric Need The parties stipulated that the published fixed need pool indicated no numeric need for additional adult inpatient psychiatric hospital beds. In fact, the numeric need calculation shows a need for 434 beds in District 10, which has 517 beds, or 83 more than the projected numeric need. In 1994- 1995, the District utilization rate was approximately 58 percent. The NBHD asserts that the need arises from "not normal" circumstances, specifically certain benefits from closing the 19th Street CSU, especially the provision of better consolidated care in hospital-based psychiatric beds, and the establishment of a County mental health court. The NBHD acknowledges that AHCA does not regulate CSU beds through the CON program and that CSU beds are not intended to be included in the calculation of numeric need for adult psychiatric beds. However, due to the substantial similarity of services provided, NBHD contends that CSU beds are de facto inpatient psychiatric beds which affect the need for CON- regulated psychiatric beds. Therefore, according to the NBHD, the elimination of beds at SFSH and at the 19th Street CSU require an increase in the supply of adult psychiatric beds. The NBHD also notes that approval of its CON application will increase the total number of adult psychiatric hospital beds in Broward County, but will not affect the total number of adult mental health beds when CSU and adult psychiatric beds are combined. After the CSU beds at SFSH closed, the total number of adult mental health beds in the County has, in fact, been reduced. NBHD projected a need to add 30 adult psychiatric beds at Broward General by combining the 1995 average daily census (ADC) of 48 patients with its assumption that it can add up to 10, increasing the ADC to 58 patients a day in the existing 68 beds. Based on its contractual obligation to care for up to 40 CSU inpatients a day, the NBHD projects a need for an additional 30 beds. The projection assumed that the level of utilization of adult inpatient psychiatric services at Broward General would remain relatively constant. With 40 occupied beds added to the 48 ADC, NBHD predicted an ADC of 88 in the new total of 98 beds, or 90 percent occupancy. The assumption that the ADC would remain fairly constant is generally supported by the actual experience with ADCs of 48.1, 51.5, and 45.8 patients, respectively, in 1995, 1996, and the first seven months of 1997. NBHD's second assumption, that an ADC of 40 CSU patients will be added is not supported by the actual experience. Based on the terms of the State and County contracts, up to 20 CSU patients have already been absorbed into the existing beds at the Imperial Point or Broward General, which is one explanation for the temporary increase in ADC in 1996, while up to 20 more may receive services at the 19th Street location. In 1996 and 1997, the ADC in the 19th Street CSU beds was 15.3 and 14.2, respectively, with monthly ranges in 1997 from a high of 17 in April to a low of 12 in June. The relatively constant annual ADCs in psychiatric and CSU beds are a reflection of increasing admissions but declining average lengths of stay for psychiatric services. The NBHD also projects that it will receive referrals from the Broward County Mental Health Court, established in June 1997. The Court is intended to divert mentally ill defendants with minor criminal charges from the criminal justice system to the mental health system. Actual experience for only three months of operations showed 7 or 8 admissions a month with widely varying average lengths of stay, from 6 to 95 days. The effect of court referrals on the ADC at Broward General was statistically insignificant into the fall of 1997. Newspaper reports of the number of inmates with serious mental illnesses do not provide a reliable basis for projecting the effect of the mental health court on psychiatric admissions to Broward General, since it is not equipped to handle violent felons. One of Broward General's experts also compared national hospital discharge data to that of Broward County. The results indicate a lower use rate in Broward County in 1995 and a higher one in 1996. That finding was consistent with the expert's finding of a growth in admissions and bed turnover rate which measures the demand for each bed. The expert also considered the prevalence of mental illness and hospitalization rates. The data reflecting expected increases in admissions, however, was not compared to available capacity in the County nor correlated with declining lengths of stay. The District X: Comprehensive Health Plan 1994 includes an estimate of the need for 10 CSU beds per 100,000 people, or a total of 133 CSU beds needed for the District. FMC argues that the calculation is incorrect because only the adult population should be included. Using only adults, FMC determined that 116 CSU beds are needed which, when added to 434 adult psychiatric beds needed in the February 1996 projection, gives a bed need for all mental health beds of 550. That total is less than the actual combined total number of 567 mental health beds, 517 adult psychiatric beds plus 50 CSU beds in 1995. Whatever population group is appropriate, the projection of the need for CSU beds is not reliable based on the evidence that, since the end of 1995, CSU services have been and, according to NBHD, should continue to be absorbed into hospital- based adult psychiatric units. For the same reason, the increase in adult psychiatric bed admissions from 1995 to 1996 does not establish a trend towards increasing psychiatric utilization, but is more likely attributable to the closing of CSU beds at SFSH. FMC's expert's comparison of data from three selected months in two successive years is also not sufficient to establish a downward trend in utilization at the 19th Street CSU, neither is the evidence of a decline in ADC by one patient in one year. Utilization is relatively static based on ADCs in existing Broward County adult psychiatric beds and in CSU beds. FMC established Broward General's potential to decrease average lengths of stay by developing alternative non-inpatient services as FMC has done and Broward General proposes to do. See Finding of Fact 37. Based on local health council reports, FMC's data reflects a rise in the ADC at Broward General to 52.7 in 1996, and a return to 46 in the first seven months of 1997. Using a 14.2 ADC for the 19th Street CSU, FMC projects that Broward General will reach an ADC of approximately 60 in the first year of operations if the CON is approved, not 88 as projected. Broward General acknowledged its capacity to add 10 more patients to the ADC without stress on the system. Having already absorbed 20 of up to 40 CSU patients at Imperial Point and Broward General in 1996 and 1997 resulting in an ADC of 48, and given the capacity to absorb 10 more, the NBHD has demonstrated a need to accommodate an ADC of 10 more adult psychiatric patients at Broward General, or a total ADC of 68 patients. The need to add capacity to accommodate an additional 10 patient ADC was not shown to equate to a need for 30 additional beds, which would result in an ADC of 68 patients in 98 beds, or 69 or 70 percent occupancy. Special Circumstances - Rule 59C-1.040(4)(d) The psychiatric bed rule provides for approval of additional beds in the absence of fixed numeric need. The "special circumstance" provision applies to a facility with an existing unit with 85 percent or greater occupancy. During the applicable period, the occupancy at Broward General was 74.15 percent. However, occupancy rates have exceeded 95 percent in the CSU beds on 19th Street. If up to 20 patients on 19th Street are added to the 48 ADC at Broward General, the result is that the existing 68 beds will be full. A full unit is operationally not efficient or desirable and allows no response to fluctuations in demand. Therefore, the state has established a desirable standard of 75 percent occupancy for psychiatric units, a range which supports the addition of 10 to 15 psychiatric beds at Broward General. Available Alternatives - Subsection 408.035(1)(b) and (d), Florida Statutes, and Rule 59C-1.040(4)(e)4., Florida Administrative Code The psychiatric bed rule provides that additional beds will "not normally" be added if the district occupancy rate is below 75 percent. For the twelve months preceding the application filing, the occupancy rate in 517 adult psychiatric beds in District 10 was approximately 58 percent. FMC's expert noted that each day an average of 200 adult psychiatric beds were available in District 10. Broward General argues that the occupancy rate is misleading. Five of the nine facilities with psychiatric beds are freestanding, private facilities, which are ineligible for Medicaid participation. Historically, the freestanding hospitals have also provided little charity care. One facility, University Pavilion, is full. Of the four acute care hospitals with adult psychiatric beds, Memorial Hospital in the SBHD, is not available to patients in the NBHD service area. Imperial Point, the only other NBHD facility with adult psychiatric beds, is not available based on its occupancy rate for the first seven months of 1997 of approximately 81 percent, which left an average of 9 available beds in a relatively small 47-bed unit. That leaves only Broward General and FMC to care for Medicaid and indigent adult psychiatric patients. FMC is the only possible alternative provider of services, but Broward General was recommended by the grand jury and was the only contract applicant. The occupancy rate in FMC's 51 adult beds was approximately 80 percent in 1995, 73 percent in 1996, and 77 percent for the first seven months in 1997. FMC has reduced average lengths of stay by having patients "step down" to partial hospitalization, day treatment and other outpatient services of varying intensities. The same decline in average lengths of stay is reasonably expected when Broward General implements these alternatives. Adult psychiatric services are also accessible in District 10 applying the psychiatric bed rule access standard. That is, ninety percent of the population of District 10 has access to the service within a maximum driving time of forty- five minutes. The CSU license cannot be transferred to Broward General. Broward County holds the license for CSU beds which, by rule, must be located on the first floor of a building. Although Broward General may not legally hold the CSU license and provide CSU services on the fourth floor of the hospital, there is no apparent legal impediment to providing CSU services in psychiatric beds. Quality of Care - Subsection 408.035(1)(c), Florida Statutes and Rule 1.040(7), Florida Administrative Code Broward General is accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations. The parties stipulated that Broward General has a history of providing quality care. Broward General provides the services required by Rule 59C-1.040(3)(h), Florida Administrative Code. Services Not Accessible in Adjoining Areas; Research and Educational Facilities; Needs of HMOs; Services Provided to Individuals Beyond the District; Subsections 408.035(1)(f),(g),(j), and (k), Florida Statutes Broward General does not propose to provide services which are inaccessible in adjoining areas nor will it provide services to non-residents of the district. Broward General is not one of the six statutory teaching hospitals nor a health maintenance organization (HMO). Therefore, those criteria are of no value in determining whether this application should be approved. Economics and Improvements in Service from Joint Operation - Subsection 408.035(1)(e), Florida Statutes The consolidation of the psychiatric services at Broward General is reasonably expected to result in economies and improvements in the provision of coordinated services to the mentally ill indigent and Medicaid population. Broward General will eliminate the cost of meal deliveries and the transfer of medically ill patients, but that potential cost-saving was not quantified by Broward General. Staff and Other Resources - Subsection 408.035(1)(h), Florida Statutes The parties stipulated that NBHD has available the necessary resources, including health manpower, management personnel, and funds to implement the project. Financially Feasibility - Subsection 408.035(1)(h) and (i), Florida Statutes The parties stipulated that the proposed project is financially feasible in the immediate term. The estimated total project cost is $451,791, but NBHD has $500,000 in funds for capital improvements available from the County and $700,000 from the Florida Legislature. As stipulated by the parties, NBHD has sufficient cash on hand to fund the project. Regardless of the census, the County's contractual obligation to the NBHD remains fixed at $1.6 million. The State contract requires the prospective payment of costs offset by expected Medicaid dollars. If the number of Medicaid eligible patients decreases, then state funding increases proportionately. The state assumed that 20 percent of the patients would qualify for Medicaid, therefore it reimburses the per diem cost of care for 80 percent of the patients. One audit indicated that 30 percent of the patients qualified for Medicaid, so that State payments for that year were higher than needed. The State contract apparently makes no provision to recover excess payments. The application projects a net profit of $740,789 for the first year of operations, and a net profit of $664,489 for the second year. If the State contract with NBHD is renewed to contemplate an average of 30 patients per day as opposed to up to 40 patients per day, then annual revenue could be reduced up to $400,000. Projected net profit will, nevertheless, exceed expenses when variable expenses are reduced correspondingly. If 20 state funded patients are already in psychiatric beds, and 20 more could be transferred from 19th Street, the result is an ADC of 68. Based on the funding arrangements, there is no evidence that the operation of a total of 98 beds could not be profitable, even with an ADC of 68, although it would be wasteful to have 30 extra beds. Impact on Competition, Quality Assurance and Cost-Effectiveness - Subsection 408.035(1)(l), Florida Statutes With a maximum of 68 inpatients or more realistically, under the expected terms of a renegotiated State contract, 58 to 60 inpatients in 98 beds, Broward General will reasonably attempt to expand the demand for its inpatient psychiatric services. Within the NBHD's legal service area, one-third of adult psychiatric patients not admitted to Broward General are admitted to FMC. Assuming a proportionate impact on competitors, FMC's expert projected that one-third of approximately 30 unfilled beds at Broward General will be filled by patients who would otherwise have gone to FMC. The projection of a loss of 9 patients from the ADC of FMC is reasonably based on an analysis showing comparable patient severity in the most prevalent diagnostic category. Given the blended payor commitment of approximately 51 or 52 percent total for Medicaid and charity in 98 beds, Broward General will be able to take patients from every payor category accepted at FMC. The loss of 9 patients from its ADC can reduce revenues by $568,967 at FMC. The impact analysis is reasonably based on lost patient days since most payers use a per diem basis for compensating FMC. For example, although Medicare reimbursement is usually based on diagnosis regardless of length of stay, it is cost-based for the geriatric psychiatric unit. Net profit at FMC, for the year 1996-1997, was expected to be approximately $4.5 million. FMC will also experience increased costs in transporting indigent patients from FMC to Broward General for admission and treatment. Because of the additional distance, the cost to transfer indigent patients is $20 more per patient from FMC to Broward General than it is from FMC to the 19th Street CSU. FMC typically stabilizes indigent adult psychiatric inpatients, then transfers them to either the 19th Street CSU or Broward General. From March through September of 1997, FMC transported approximately 256 indigent patients from FMC to the 19th Street CSU. In terms of quality assurance, the consolidation of psychiatric services at Broward General will allow all patients better access to the full range of medical services available at Broward General. The NBHD's operation of the 19th Street CSU is profitable. Approval of the CON application should reasonably eliminate all costs associated with operation of the 19th Street facility, and shift more revenues from the State and County contracts to Broward General. Some savings are reasonably expected from not having meal deliveries to 19th Street or patient transfers for medical care. The NBHD did not quantify any expected savings. Costs and Methods of Construction - Subsection 408.035(1)(m), Florida Statutes Broward General will relocate 12 of 42 medical/surgical beds and convert 30 medical/surgical beds to 30 adult psychiatric beds on one wing of the fourth floor, which is currently unused. Fifteen semi-private medical/surgical patient rooms will be converted into semi-private adult psychiatric rooms. Existing wards will be converted to two social rooms, one noisy and one quiet. With the removal of the walls of some offices, the architect designed a group therapy room. An existing semi-private room will be used as a seclusion room. Of the fifteen semi-private rooms, twelve will not have bathing or showering facilities and seven will not have toilets within the patients' rooms. At the time the hospital was constructed, the state required only a lavatory/sink in each patient room. AHCA's architect agreed to allow Broward General to plan to use central bathing and toilet facilities to avoid additional costs and diminished patient room sizes. Because the plan intentionally avoids construction in the toilets, except to enlarge one to include a shower, there is no requirement to upgrade to Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) standards. Therefore, the $23,280 construction cost contingency for code compliance is adequate. Although the projected construction costs are reasonable and the applicable architectural code requirements are met, the design is not the most desirable in terms of current standards. Patient privacy is compromised by the lack of toilets for each patient room. Past and Proposed Provision of Services to Promote a Continuum of Care in a Multi-level System - Subsection 408.035(1)(o), Florida Statutes Broward General is a tertiary acute care facility which provides a broad continuum of care. Because it already operates the CSU and provides CSU services in adult psychiatric beds, the proposal to relocate patients maintains but does not further promote that continuum of care. Broward General's plan to establish more alternatives to inpatient psychiatric care does promote and enhance its continuum of care. Capital Expenditures for New Inpatient Services - Subsection 408.035(2), Florida Statutes Broward General is not proposing to establish a new health service for inpatients, rather it is seeking to relocate an existing service without new construction. The criteria in this Subsection are inapplicable. Factual Conclusions Broward General did not establish a "not normal" circumstance based on the grand jury's findings and recommendations. The grand jury did not recommend closing 19th Street facility. Broward General did generally establish not normal circumstances based on the desirability of consolidating mental health services at Broward General to provide a single point of entry and to improve the quality of care for the 19th Street facility patients. Broward General failed to establish the need to add 30 beds to accomplish the objective of closing the 19th Street facility. Although the existing beds at Broward General may reasonably be expected to be full as a result of the transfer of 19th Street patients, the addition of 30 beds without sufficient demand results in an occupancy rate of 69 or 70 percent, from an ADC of 68 patients in 98 beds. Broward General has requested approximately twice as many beds as it demonstrated it needs. Broward General's CON application on balance satisfies the local and state health plan preferences. In general, FMC is the only alternative facility in terms of available beds, but is not the tax-supported public facility which the grand jury favored to coordinate mental health services. Broward General meets the statutory criteria for quality of care, improvements from joint operations, financial feasibility, quality assurance, cost-effectiveness, and services to Medicaid and indigent patients. The proposal is not the most desirable architecturally considering current standards. More importantly, Broward General did not demonstrate that it can achieve its projected occupancy without an adverse impact on FMC. The NBHD proposal will add too many beds to meet the targeted state occupancy levels in relatively a static market. Broward General's application does not include a partial request for fewer additional beds which would have allowed the closing of 19th Street, while maintaining some empty beds for demand fluctuations and avoiding an adverse impact on FMC.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration deny the application of the North Broward Hospital District for Certificate of Need Number 8425 to convert 30 medical/surgical beds to 30 adult psychiatric beds at Broward General Medical Center. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of April, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of April, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Paul J. Martin, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Paul Vazquez, Esquire Agency For Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Stephen A. Ecenia, Esquire R. David Prescott, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Underwood, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0551 David C. Ashburn, Esquire Gunster, Yoakley, Valdes-Fauli & Stewart, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 830 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (4) 120.57394.455408.035408.039 Florida Administrative Code (2) 59C-1.03059C-1.040
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WELLINGTON REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC., D/B/A WELLINGTON REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION AND BETHESDA HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, INC., D/B/A WEST BOYNTON COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, 03-002701CON (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 23, 2003 Number: 03-002701CON Latest Update: Mar. 11, 2005

The Issue The issue is whether the Agency should approve the Certificate of Need applications filed by Bethesda and/or JFK, each of which proposes to establish an 80-bed satellite hospital in the West Boynton area of Acute Care Subdistrict 9-5.

Findings Of Fact The Parties (1) Bethesda Bethesda operates Bethesda Memorial, which is a 362-bed not-for-profit hospital in Boynton Beach. Bethesda also operates Bethesda Health City, which is a “medical mall” located in the West Boynton area of South Palm Beach County. As a not-for-profit community-based health care organization, Bethesda’s mission is to provide quality health care services to the residents of South Palm Beach County that it serves regardless of their ability to pay. Bethesda Memorial opened in 1959 as a public hospital under the ownership of Palm Beach County’s former hospital taxing district. Bethesda Memorial was reorganized in 1984 as a private not-for-profit hospital owned by Bethesda. Bethesda Memorial provides tertiary-level care. Bethesda Memorial’s 362 licensed beds include 347 general medical-surgical (med-surg) acute care beds and a 15-bed Level II and Level III neonatal intensive care unit (NICU). A 28-bed comprehensive medical rehabilitation (CMR) unit will open at Bethesda Memorial in 2005, increasing the hospital’s licensed capacity to 390 beds. Not all of Bethesda Memorial’s licensed beds are available for general patient use; 14 of the beds are leased to a hospice program and 14 of the beds are operated under contract as a special care unit (SCU). The hospice lease and the SCU contract run through 2005. Even though the hospice lease and SCU contract have been profitable ventures for Bethesda, several Bethesda witnesses testified that those agreements would not be renewed if Bethesda Memorial needs those 28 beds to accommodate its general patients after its capacity is reduced through the transfer of 80 beds to its proposed satellite hospital; however, as of the date of the hearing, Bethesda had not taken any formal steps to terminate those agreements. It is unclear how the patients that are currently being served in the hospice unit and SCU would be served in the community if Bethesda terminates the agreements. Bethesda Memorial also has a 10-bed “VIP” unit that is generally available only to patients that have contributed at least $50,000 to Bethesda’s charitable foundation and are willing to pay an up-front $750.00 per day charge for the room; however, the beds in the VIP unit can be and have been utilized by other patients when all of the other beds in the hospital are full. Bethesda Memorial has a high-volume obstetrics (OB) program and an active emergency department (ED). Bethesda Memorial also offers a number of specialized programs including a comprehensive cancer program, a pediatrics program, a diagnostic cardiac catheterization program, and a wide variety of outpatient services. Bethesda Memorial is a well-utilized facility; its overall occupancy rate was 73.25 percent from July 2001 though June 2002. Bethesda Memorial does not currently offer interventional cardiology services or open heart surgery, but it has been attempting to get CON or legislative approval to offer those services for the past several years because of their profitable nature. Bethesda Memorial has designated, shelled-in space in its hospital for those services if it ever gets the necessary approvals. The evidence was not persuasive that there are physical or other constraints that would preclude further incremental bed expansions at Bethesda Memorial or that would make such expansions cost-prohibitive. Bethesda recently purchased property adjacent to Bethesda Memorial and was able to get that property rezoned from residential to hospital use. It is unclear how large that property is and what use, if any, Bethesda has planned for that property. Bethesda also owns 1.4 acres of vacant property that is several blocks from Bethesda Memorial. The property is not currently zoned for hospital use, and because it is somewhat isolated from Bethesda Memorial, Bethesda intends to sell the property rather than develop it. Bethesda Memorial is accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO). Bethesda Health City is a 135,000 square foot “medical mall” or “hospital without beds” that opened in 1995. The facility is located in the West Boynton area at the intersection of Hagan Ranch Road and Boynton Beach Boulevard, just east of the Florida Turnpike. Bethesda Health City offers services such as diagnostic imaging, outpatient rehabilitation, radiation therapy, and a woman’s center. The facility has offices for approximately 20 physician groups, and it also provides community outreach services targeted to the large senior population in the West Boynton area. Bethesda Health City was established to help Bethesda Memorial capture patients from the growing West Boynton area, and it has done so. There is capacity to add an additional 30,000 to 40,000 square feet of space to Bethesda Health City, and Bethesda intends to expand the facility whether or not its proposed satellite hospital is approved. Bethesda Health City provides Bethesda a significant physical presence in the West Boynton area. The facility has contributed to Bethesda Memorial’s significant and stable market share in the West Boynton area. In addition to Bethesda Memorial and Bethesda Health City, Bethesda administers a charitable foundation whose primary purpose is to fund Bethesda Memorial’s capital acquisitions and improvements. The foundation has considerable assets and is in the midst of a $100 million capital campaign through which it has already raised approximately $37 million. Bethesda Memorial experienced considerable and constant growth in its admissions and patient days between 1997 and 2003; its admissions grew by 45 percent and its patients days grew by 44 percent over that period. Bethesda Memorial is financially sound. It has substantial cash reserves and it is well-rated by the financial markets. The evidence was not persuasive that Bethesda’s current or long-term financial situation is distressed. Unlike other not-for-profit hospitals in District 9, Bethesda Memorial is a profitable hospital. Between 1997 and 2002, Bethesda Memorial’s operating income averaged approximately $5.5 million and in 2003, its operating income was approximately $7 million. In each of those years, the hospital also had significant non-operating revenues such that its total revenues over expenses during that period averaged approximately $10 million. The Bethesda system as a whole is also profitable. It had operating income of $2.4 million in 2002 and $2.1 million in 2001. Bethesda Memorial and the Bethesda system did not perform as well financially as JFK, Delray, or Wellington between 1997 and 2002; each of those hospitals had higher returns on assets, returns on equity, and total margin over that period than did Bethesda Memorial and Bethesda, and JFK and Delray had considerably more operating income over that period than did Bethesda Memorial. Bethesda Memorial’s CMR unit is projected to have a positive financial impact on Bethesda starting in 2005, and if approved, Bethesda Memorial’s open heart surgery program is also projected to have a positive impact on Bethesda’s long-term financial condition. (2) JFK JFK is owned by HCA, Inc. (HCA). HCA is nationwide, for-profit hospital chain. JFK is a 424-bed for-profit hospital in Atlantis, which is a small municipality in the Lake Worth area. JFK provides tertiary-level care. JFK is the most highly utilized hospital in District 9, and one of the most highly utilized hospitals in the state. JFK’s annual occupancy rate was 89.96 percent between July 2001 and June 2002, JFK is one of thee HCA hospitals in Palm Beach County. The others are Columbia and Palms West, both of which are in North Palm Beach County, Subdistrict 9-4. JFK operated as a not-for-profit hospital for approximately 30 years until it was purchased by HCA in 1996. Approximately $120 million of the purchase price paid by HCA was used to establish a charitable foundation, the Quantum Foundation, which funds a variety of health-related projects in the South Palm Beach County area. The services provided at JFK include orthopedics, cancer services, interventional cardiology and open heart surgery, neurologic services, and internal medicine. JFK does not offer pediatric or OB services. HCA has made significant capital improvements at JFK since it acquired the hospital. The community image of the hospital and the morale of its employees has significantly improved since the acquisition by HCA. JFK is accredited by JCAHO. JFK recently received a CON to add 36 beds, which will increase its licensed capacity to 460 beds. The beds will be located in shelled-in space on the fifth floor of JFK’s south tower, but they have not yet been brought on-line. JFK’s recently-constructed northwest tower was engineered so that an additional two floors can be added to that tower in the future, which would allow JFK to add 36 more beds. The evidence was not persuasive that there are physical or other constraints that would preclude further incremental bed expansions at JFK beyond the 72 beds identified above. JFK is attempting to acquire a long-term lease for 19 acres across the street from its hospital that would be used for parking and medical office buildings. If that property is leased and developed, JFK may be able to free-up additional space for future bed expansions; however, the record does not establish the likelihood of the lease being consummated, the amount of space that might be freed-up if that property was developed, or any of the costs associated therewith. JFK recently constructed a medical office building in the West Boynton area that includes a wound care center and a diabetes center. That facility is on Jog Road, north of Boynton Beach Boulevard. Aside from the medical office building, JFK had not formally targeted the West Boynton area for expansion; its most recent strategic plan did not mention the prospect of locating a satellite hospital in that area. (3) Delray Delray is owned by Tenet Healthcare Corporation (Tenet). Tenet is a nationwide, for-profit hospital chain. Tenet operates four hospitals in Palm Beach County in addition to Delray, including West Boca Medical Center (West Boca) in South Palm Beach County, and Good Samaritan, St. Mary’s, and Palm Beach Gardens in North Palm Beach County. Delray is a 372-bed for-profit hospital in Delray Beach. Delray is located approximately 2.5 miles south of Atlantic Boulevard. Delray is in zip code 33484, but it is near the eastern boundary of zip code 33446. Delray opened in 1982, and is accredited by JACHO. Delray provides tertiary-level care. Delray is located on a “campus” that includes the hospital building, a 53-bed in-patient psychiatric facility known as Fair Oaks Pavillion (Fair Oaks), and a 90-bed CMR facility known as Pinecrest Rehabilitation Hospital. There is a separately-licensed 120-bed nursing home located adjacent to the campus. Delray’s 372 licensed beds include the 53 in-patient psychiatric beds at Fair Oaks, which is approximately 200 yards from Delray’s main hospital. Delray has added 108 beds to its hospital since 1996. Even with those bed additions, Delray remains a very highly utilized facility; its annual occupancy rate between July 2001 and June 2002 was 82.32 percent. Delray shelled-in space for an additional 31 beds as part of a recent expansion of its ED and ambulatory care unit. Delray intends to put those beds into service as soon as it can. Delray has the ability to further expand its hospital beyond the 31 beds planned for the shelled-in space. It already has local government approval for a total of 616 beds on its campus. The services provided at Delray include general medical and surgery services, trauma, interventional cardiology, open heart surgery, in-patient psychiatric services, orthopedics, and neurosurgery, with a special focus on chronically-ill elderly patients. Delray does not provide OB services. Delray has been the only provider of in-patient psychiatric services in South Palm Beach County since October 2001 when Bethesda Memorial discontinued its program. Delray has been a state-designated Level II trauma center since 1991, which requires it to have a neurosurgeon, trauma surgeon, and other specialists and specialized equipment available at all times. Delray receives funding from the local health district to help offset a large portion of the costs associated with providing its trauma services. Delray leases space in a medical office building in the West Boynton area where it provides diagnostic imaging, mammography, and laboratory services. Delray’s service area includes zip codes 33437, 33446, and 33467, which are being targeted by Bethesda and JFK with their proposed satellite hospitals. Delray is currently, and historically has been a very profitable hospital. It reported a “total margin” of approximately $32.9 million on its May 2002 “Prior Year Report” filed with the Agency,4 and it reported operating income of $40.5 million in its audited financial statements for fiscal year 2003. (4) Wellington Wellington is owned by Universal Health System (Universal). Universal is a nationwide, for-profit hospital chain. Wellington is a 121-bed for-profit hospital in the northwestern portion of South Palm Beach County. Wellington is located in zip code 33414, approximately 2.5 miles south of Southern Boulevard at the intersection of State Road 7 (also known as U.S. Highway 441) and Forest Hill Boulevard. Wellington opened in 1986 as an osteopathic hospital, and approximately 25 percent of its current medical staff is osteopathic physicians. Wellington is accredited by JCAHO and the American Osteopathic Association. Wellington provides tertiary-level care. Wellington is easily accessible from Forest Hill Boulevard and State Road 7, and the hospital is served by the Palm Beach County bus system, which has a stop in Wellington’s parking lot. Wellington has made substantial capital improvements to its hospital over the past five years. Those improvements were designed to enhance the hospital’s efficiency in serving its current patients and also to anticipate future patient demand. Wellington owns 29 acres of property adjacent to the 26-acre site on which the hospital is located. The adjacent property is currently undeveloped and it is available for future expansions of Wellington. Wellington’s chief executive officer (CEO) testified that Wellington has a site plan approved for its undeveloped property and that it has “vested concurrency” for the future development of that property; however, that testimony was not corroborated (as was the case with Delray’s approved master plan) and therefore is not persuasive. The services at Wellington include an ED, an OB program, general medical and surgical care, an orthopedic unit, a comprehensive cancer center, a wound care center, a cardiology program with a dedicated cardiovascular intensive care unit, and an outpatient diagnostic center. Wellington’s OB program includes 18 labor rooms, 19 post-partum rooms and a 10-bed Level II NICU. Wellington delivers approximately six babies per day and has the capacity to deliver up to 15 babies per day. Wellington’s utilization has steadily grown over the years, but it is still one of the lowest utilized facilities in South Palm Beach County; its annual occupancy rate was 64.27 percent between July 2001 and June 2002. Wellington derives approximately 90 percent of its patients from a geographic area bounded by Military Trail on the east, the Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge on the west, Okeechobee Boulevard to the north, and Boynton Beach Boulevard to the south. That area includes zip codes 33414, 33437, 33463, and 33467, which are being targeted by Bethesda and JFK with their proposed satellite hospitals. Wellington has teaching and training programs for physician assistants and certified nurse anesthetists under contracts with Florida International University and Florida Atlantic University. Wellington also has a family practice residency/internship teaching program for osteopathic doctors that is affiliated with Lake Erie School of Osteopathic Medicine, and a three-year dermatology teaching program. When Wellington was established in 1986, there was very little population in the western portion of South Palm Beach County to support the hospital. As a result, the hospital was unprofitable in its early years, and by 2000, it had accumulated a deficit of $22 million. Wellington’s financial performance has improved significantly in the past several years, but it still has a large accumulated deficit. Wellington is relying on its ability to retain or increase its market share in the growing West Boynton area in order to remain profitable and eliminate its accumulated deficit. (5) Agency The Agency is the state agency responsible for administering the CON program and licensing hospitals and other health care facilities. Application Submittal and Review and Preliminary Agency Action Bethesda and JFK each filed CON applications with the Agency in the first “hospital beds and facilities” batching cycle of 2003. Each application sought to establish a new 80- bed satellite hospital in the West Boynton area of South Palm Beach County, Subdistrict 9-5. The fixed need pool published by the Agency for the applicable batching cycle identified a need for zero acute care beds in Subdistrict 9-5. There were no challenges to the published fixed need pool. The letters of intent and CON applications filed by Bethesda and JFK for their respective satellite hospitals were timely filed and complied with all of the technical submittal requirements in the governing statutes and rules. JFK’s letter of intent was filed within the “grace period” (see Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.008(1)(d)2.) in direct response to Bethesda’s earlier-filed letter of intent. There is nothing inherently improper about a “grace period” letter of intent, and very little significance has been given to the responsive nature of JFK’s proposal in the comparative evaluation of the CON applications. A public hearing was held on the applications by the local health council on April 24, 2003.5 Presentations were made at the public hearing in support of and in opposition to the applications. The opposition came primarily from a representative of Delray; the support came from representatives of Bethesda and JFK and several residents of the West Boynton area. The reasons offered by the speakers for their opposition or support of the applications were essentially the same as those presented at the hearing, and no independent significance has been given to the testimony and “evidence” presented at the public hearing. Bethesda’s and JFK’s applications were comparatively reviewed by the Agency in accordance with the Agency’s rules and standard procedures. On June 13, 2003, the Agency issued its State Agency Action Report (SAAR) based upon its comparative review of the applications. The SAAR recommended approval of Bethesda’s application and denial of JFK’s application. The Agency’s published notice of intent to approve Bethesda’s application and to deny JFK’s application in the June 27, 2003, edition of the Florida Administrative Weekly as required by statute and Agency rule. The Agency reaffirmed its preliminary decisions on the applications through the hearing testimony of Jeffrey Gregg, the Bureau Chief of the Agency’s CON program. The petitions for administrative hearing challenging the Agency’s preliminary decisions on the CON applications at issue in this proceeding were all timely filed. Acute Care Subdistricts 9-4 and 9-5 The Agency calculates the inventory of acute care beds on a subdistrict basis, and it considers CON applications for additional acute care beds on a subdistrict basis. Palm Beach County is in District 9, which is divided into five subdistricts. Only two of the subdistricts, 9-4 and 9-5, are relevant in this case. Subdistrict 9-4 is North Palm Beach County, and Subdistrict 9-5 is South Palm Beach County. The dividing line between the two subdistricts is Southern Boulevard. There are six existing acute care hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5: Bethesda Memorial, JFK, Delray, Wellington, West Boca, and Boca Raton Community Hospital (Boca Community). Boca Community and Bethesda are the only not-for- profit hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5; the others are for-profit hospitals. The service area of Palms West, which is located on Southern Boulevard in Subdistrict 9-4, includes portions of Subdistrict 9-5 and the West Boynton area. The utilization of hospital services in Subdistrict 9- 5 has historically been higher than the utilization of hospital services in Subdistrict 9-4. In calendar year 2002, for example, the average occupancy rate of the Subdistrict 9-5 hospitals was 78.2 percent as compared to 55.6 percent for the Subdistrict 9-4 hospitals; and during the “peak season” of January through March 2002, the average occupancy rates were 88.4 percent in Subdistrict 9-5 and 62 percent in Subdistrict 9-4. The West Boynton Area The West Boynton area is an unincorporated area of South Palm Beach County. Its approximate boundaries are Congress avenue on the east, the Loxahatchee National Wildlife Reserve on the west, the L-30 canal (which is several miles north of Atlantic Avenue) on the south, and Hypoluxo Road on the north. The West Boynton area roughly corresponds to the geographic area that is included in zip codes 33436, 33437, 33463, and 33467. The Florida Turnpike, which runs north-south, roughly bisects the West Boynton area. The Turnpike is not a geographic barrier between the east and west portions of the West Boynton area, but it served as the de facto boundary of the urban service area until approximately 10 years ago when significant amounts of development began to “jump” the Turnpike. Boynton Beach Boulevard is the primary east-west road in the West Boynton area, although there are several other east- west arterial roads within the area including Lantana Road and Hypoluxo Road. Other major east-west roads in close proximity to the West Boynton area are Forest Hill Boulevard, Lake Worth Road, and Atlantic Avenue. There are several major north-south roads in the West Boynton area in addition to the Turnpike, including Jog Road, Hagen Ranch Road, and State Road 7. State Road 7 is the westernmost major north-south road in South Palm Beach County. As a result of local zoning restrictions, very little development in the West Boynton area is or will be west of State Road 7. The 2002 population of the West Boynton area, as defined by the four zip codes identified above, was approximately 156,000. There are seasonal variations in the population, but they are not as significant as the seasonal variations in the population of the more easterly portions of Palm Beach County. The population of the West Boynton area is projected to grow to approximately 181,000 by 2007, which corresponds to an annual growth rate of approximately 3.1 percent per year. That growth rate is higher than the annual growth rate projected over that period for the state as a whole (1.6 percent), Palm Beach County (two percent), and District 9 (1.9 percent). Approximately 89 percent of the 2003 population of the West Boynton area was located to the east of the Turnpike. The portion of the West Boynton area to the west of the Turnpike is projected to grow at a considerably faster rate through 2008 than the area to the east of the Turnpike, which is consistent with the extensive amount of residential development that is underway or approved in the West Boynton area west of the Turnpike. In 2002, approximately 28.6 percent of the residents of the West Boynton area were in the age 65 and older (“65+”) age cohort. That percentage is higher than the percentages in that age cohort for the state as a whole (17.5 percent), Palm Beach County (22.5 percent), or District 9 (22.5 percent). The 65+ age cohort is projected to remain the largest segment of the West Boynton area population through 2008. A large number of the existing residential communities and the communities under development in the West Boynton area are retirement communities that are deed-restricted to persons over the age of 55, which contributes to the higher percentage of the population in the 65+ age cohort currently and projected in the future. The West Boynton area is more affluent than and offers a better payer-mix than the existing service areas of Bethesda Memorial and JFK. As compared to the existing service areas of those hospitals, the West Boynton area has a lower percentage of uninsured residents, a higher percentage of Medicare and insured residents, a lower percentage of households with annual incomes below $20,000, and a higher percentage of households with annual incomes above $60,000. There is currently healthy competition in the West Boynton area for acute care services. That competition includes each of the four hospital parties in this case as well as several other hospitals. JFK, Bethesda, Wellington, and Delray, collectively accounted for approximately 72 percent of the discharges from the West Boynton area in calendar years 2000, 2001, and 2002. The percentage of the West Boynton area discharges attributable to each of those hospitals or, stated another way, the hospitals' market shares in the West Boynton area over that period are as follows6: JFK Bethesda Delray Wellington 2000 31.7% 23.2% 10.6% 6.1% 2001 30.1% 24.0% 11.2% 6.9% 2002 28.8% 23.9% 11.4% 7.7% There is no credible evidence that there will be any significant changes in those relative market shares over the five-year planning horizon applicable to the applications at issue in this case if a new hospital is not approved in the West Boynton area. Stated another way, the competitive balance that currently exists in the West Boynton market is expected to continue unless something disrupts that balance, such as the approval of a new hospital in the area. As discussed below, if either of the proposed satellite hospitals are approved, the market share of the approved hospital will increase to the detriment of the other hospitals. There is considerable community support for a new hospital in the West Boynton area from the residents of that area, as reflected in the letters of support included in the CON applications, the testimony at the local public hearing on the applications, and the deposition testimony from area residents and the related exhibits introduced at the hearing. The community support is not, on balance, directed to the approval of Bethesda's proposed satellite hospital over JFK’s proposed satellite hospital, or vice versa; it is simply for the expeditious approval of a hospital. Need for OB Services in the South Palm Beach County and/or the West Boynton Area There are currently four OB programs in Subdistrict 9-5. The programs are at Bethesda Memorial, Wellington, West Boca, and Boca Community. The evidence is not persuasive that an additional OB program is needed in Subdistrict 9-5. Indeed, Dr. Samuel Kaufman, an OB/GYN who has practiced in the area for many years, testified credibly that the four existing OB programs in the subdistrict are just now beginning to do enough deliveries to be efficient. There was no persuasive evidence that there are accessibility problems at the existing OB programs because of their utilization rates. Indeed, the OB unit at Wellington has the capacity to handle up to an additional nine deliveries per day. Each of the existing OB programs offers Level II and/or Level III NICU services, which is typically referred to as “NICU backup.” It is not feasible to provide NICU backup at a low-volume OB program such as the 10-bed OB unit proposed in JFK’s satellite hospital. It is important to have NICU backup because it is not uncommon for high-risk OB patients to unexpectedly present to the hospital and, in such circumstances, it is better for the child to have NICU services at the hospital where he or she is delivered rather than having to be transferred to another hospital. The standard of care in South Palm Beach County requires NICU backup and, based upon malpractice liability concerns, some OB/GYNs will not deliver babies at a hospital that does not have NICU backup. OB is among the top ten discharges in the proposed service area of JFK’s satellite hospital, which is not uncommon around the state; however, because of the lower average length of stay (ALOS) associated with an OB admission, the high number of discharges does not correlate to a large number of patient days in the service area. The population group that is most likely to utilize OB services is females between the ages of 15 and 44 (hereafter “the Female 15-44 age cohort”). Only 16 percent of the 2002 population of the West Boynton area was in the Female 15-44 age cohort, and that cohort is projected to grow at a slower annual rate (2.3 percent) than the population of the West Boynton area as a whole (3.1 percent) through 2007.7 The relatively small portion of the population in the Female 15-44 age cohort is consistent with the data showing the highest percentage of the population in the West Boynton area in the 65+ age cohort. It is also consistent with the testimony and evidence regarding the number of existing and planned deed- restricted retirement communities in the West Boynton area. The logic of including an OB unit in the proposed JFK satellite hospital is undercut by the recent closure of the OB unit at Columbia. According to Columbia’s CEO, Columbia’s OB unit was closed in 2002 because it “was a small unit” with a low volume, because the service area from which Columbia was drawing its patients was predominately elderly, and because there were several other hospitals within close proximity to Columbia that had larger OB units with NICU backup. Based upon those factors, Columbia’s CEO concluded that “there was no real community need to do OB” and that “it just didn’t make sense” to do OB. The same factors exist in the West Boynton area and, as a result, the comments of Columbia’s CEO are equally applicable to the inclusion of an OB unit in the proposed JFK satellite hospital. The Proposed Satellite Hospitals (1) Bethesda West Bethesda’s application, CON 9659, proposes to establish an 80-bed satellite hospital in the West Boynton area by de-licensing 80 beds at Bethesda Memorial and then transferring those beds to the proposed satellite hospital. The transfer of beds proposed in Bethesda’s application will not increase the inventory of acute care beds in either District 9 or Subdistrict 9-5. The 80-bed increase at Bethesda West will be offset by the 80-bed decrease at Bethesda Memorial, both of which are in Subdistrict 9-5. The beds transferred to Bethesda West will come from double-occupancy rooms, thereby allowing Bethesda Memorial to convert those rooms to private rooms. The conversion to private rooms will create efficiencies at Bethesda Memorial by eliminating gender-based or disease-based conflicts between patients that often arise with double-occupancy rooms. The transfer of 80 beds to Bethesda West will reduce Bethesda Memorial’s licensed capacity to 282 beds. That figure includes the 15 NICU beds, the 14 hospice beds, and the 14-bed SCU; therefore, after the bed transfer, Bethesda Memorial will have only 239 beds available for general patient use. Bethesda Memorial is projected to have 80,630 patient days (excluding NICU and CMR patient days) in Bethesda West’s second year of operation.8 That equates to an ADC of 221 patients and an occupancy rate of 92.4 percent for the 239 beds available for general patient use. If the hospice lease and the SCU contract are not renewed in 2005, then Bethesda Memorial would have 267 beds available for general patient use and its occupancy rate would be 82.7 percent. The non-renewal of the hospice lease and the SCU contract would not add new acute care beds to Subdistrict 9- 5 because those beds are still considered to be acute care beds for purposes of the Agency's bed inventory for the subdistrict, even though they are currently designated for specific purposes. With an annual occupancy rate of 92.4 percent or even 82.7 percent, there would likely be days on which Bethesda Memorial’s occupancy rate would exceed 100 percent. This is not an uncommon occurrence at the hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5, particularly during the “peak season” of January through March. Bethesda Memorial could operate efficiently and provide high quality care with an occupancy rate of 82.7 percent or 92.4 percent without adding new beds. Indeed, JFK and Delray each have similar occupancy rates (and even higher occupancy rates during the “peak season”), and it is undisputed that they provide high quality care. Because the addition of new acute care beds at an existing hospital is no longer linked to the hospital’s occupancy rate, Bethesda Memorial (like any other existing hospital) is free to add new acute care beds whenever it chooses to do so; however, the evidence was not persuasive that Bethesda will, in fact, add new beds at Bethesda Memorial after the bed transfer to Bethesda West notwithstanding the resulting high utilization rate at Bethesda Memorial.9 Bethesda West will include 68 general med-surg beds, 12 critical care beds, a full service ED, and related ambulatory and outpatient services. All of the beds at Bethesda West will be in private rooms. Bethesda West will not offer OB services or dedicated pediatric services, and it will not include a cardiac catheterization lab. Bethesda West will be in a new 190,130 square foot building. The space plan for Bethesda West is reasonable, and its design complies with all applicable building and construction codes. The projected timetable for construction and completion of Bethesda West is also reasonable. Bethesda West will be located at the intersection of Boynton Beach Boulevard and State Road 7, which is approximately two miles west of the Turnpike. That location is three miles from Bethesda Health City, eight to nine miles from Wellington, and ten to 11 miles from Delray, JFK, and Bethesda Memorial. Bethesda West could not be collocated with Bethesda Health City because there is not enough property at that location to construct a satellite hospital with the necessary parking facilities. Bethesda has contracted to purchase 54 acres of property at the intersection of Boynton Beach Boulevard and State Road 7 known as the “Amestoy Property.” The purchase price of the Amestoy Property was $110,000 per acre. Bethesda intends to develop Bethesda West on approximately 30 acres of the Amestoy Property and then lease or sell the remainder of the property for the development of medical office buildings. A 30-acre site is adequate for the proposed 80-bed satellite hospital, although it may inhibit future expansion. Bethesda West intends to utilize the same medical staff as Bethesda Memorial; however, Bethesda has not discussed the issue with its medical staff as a whole10 nor has it developed specific plans to implement its dual-staffing approach. Bethesda West will share management and administrative support services with Bethesda Memorial rather than duplicating those services. The total cost of Bethesda West is $73.8 million. The primary service area (PSA) for Bethesda West consists of zip codes 33436, 33437, 33463, and 33467, which roughly correspond to the boundaries of the West Boynton area. The hospital’s secondary service area (SSA) includes zip codes 33414 and 33446. There is significant overlap in the proposed service area of Bethesda West and the current service area of Bethesda Memorial; four of the six zip codes in Bethesda West’s service area are in Bethesda Memorial’s service area. There is also significant overlap between the proposed service area of Bethesda West and the service areas of Delray, Wellington, and JFK; each of the zip codes in Bethesda West’s proposed service area is also within the service area of at least two of those hospitals. Bethesda West is projected to have 10,430 patient days in its first year of operation and 14,570 patient days in its second year of operation. Those patient days equate to ADCs of 29 and 40, and occupancy rates of 35.7 percent and 49.9 percent in the first and second years of operations. By the fourth year of operation, Bethesda West is projected to have an ADC of 56, which equates to an occupancy rate of 65.2 percent. These occupancy rates are reasonable, as is the “ramp up” concept on which they are based. The projected utilization at Bethesda West is based upon an ALOS of 4.6 days. That ALOS was derived from information in the Agency’s in-patient database for residents of the West Boynton area who received in-patient services of the kind that would be offered at Bethesda West. It is a reasonable ALOS.11 The projected utilization assumes that Bethesda West will have an overall market share of 7.5 percent in its service area in the first year of operation, and that Bethesda West’s overall market share will increase to 13.5 percent by its fourth year of operation. Bethesda West is not projected to have a market share of greater than 15 percent in any individual zip code until its third year of operation. The utilization and market shares projected for Bethesda West are reasonable and attainable based upon the demographics and projected population growth in the West Boynton area. Bethesda West is projected to take patients from the hospitals that currently serve the West Boynton area, including Bethesda Memorial. Bethesda's application projects that 3,040 patients from Bethesda Memorial will be “redistributed” to, or “cannibalized” by Bethesda West in Bethesda West’s first year of operation and that the number will increase to 4,530 patients in Bethesda West's second year of operation. The remainder of Bethesda West’s projected patient days – 7,390 in its first year of operation and 10,040 in its second year of operation – will come from patients who are currently being served by an existing hospital or from growth in the service area. In addition to these projected in-patient admissions, Bethesda West is projected to have outpatient registrations ranging from 22,440 (first year of operation) to 46,310 (fourth year of operation) and ED visits ranging from 8,990 (first year of operation) to 19,720 (fourth year of operation). The projected outpatient registrations and ED visits are reasonable and attainable. Some of the outpatient registrations at Bethesda West will come at the expense of Bethesda Health City because it is currently providing some of the same outpatient services that are proposed for Bethesda West. There is no persuasive evidence quantifying the number of Bethesda West’s outpatient registrations that would have otherwise gone to Bethesda Health City, nor is there any persuasive evidence quantifying the financial impact of the redistribution of those outpatients. (2) Proposed JFK Satellite Hospital JFK’s application, CON 9660, proposes to establish an 80-bed satellite hospital in the West Boynton area by de- licensing 80 beds at Columbia and then transferring those beds to the proposed JFK satellite hospital. Columbia is located in Subdistrict 9-4 and, like JFK, it is an HCA hospital. The bed transfer proposed by JFK will increase the inventory of acute care beds in Subdistrict 9-5 by 80 beds, but the bed inventory in District 9 will remain the same; the 80-bed increase in Subdistrict 9-5 at JFK’s proposed satellite hospital will be offset by an 80-bed decrease in Subdistrict 9-4 at Columbia. Columbia has 250 licensed beds, of which 150 are acute care beds, 12 are skilled nursing beds, and 88 are psychiatric beds. Columbia’s acute care beds include a 20-bed intensive care unit/critical care unit (ICU/CCU), but only 10 of those beds are currently being used. The 12-bed skilled nursing unit is not currently being used. The acute care beds at Columbia are not well- utilized. In calendar year 2002, the utilization rate for Columbia’s 150 acute care beds was only 40 percent and during the “peak season” in 2002, the utilization rate of those beds was only 47.6 percent. The proposed bed transfer would enable Columbia to convert its existing semi-private rooms to private rooms, but according to Columbia’s CEO, to do so Columbia would also need to convert its 12 skilled nursing beds to acute care beds. JFK’s CON application did not make reference to that necessary bed conversion. The conversion of the 12 skilled nursing beds to acute care beds may require Agency approval, which Columbia had not requested as of the date of the hearing. If the bed conversions described by Columbia’s CEO did not occur, the utilization rate of the 70 remaining acute care beds at Columbia after the transfer will likely exceed 80 percent on an annual basis and, during the “peak season,” the occupancy rate will likely exceed 100 percent. Indeed, applying the number of patient days at Columbia in calendar year 2002 to 70 beds results in an annual occupancy rate of 85.7 percent and an occupancy rate of 102 percent in the “peak season.” Under the pre-2004 law, those occupancy rates would allow Columbia to add beds without CON review, and Columbia’s CEO testified that she would take steps to add beds at Columbia if necessary based upon the facility’s occupancy rates after the bed transfer. There is no credible evidence that JFK planned to construct a satellite hospital in the West Boynton area prior to February 2003. The proposal was not included in any of JFK’s strategic or business plans prior to that date. There is also no credible evidence that the Columbia planned to de-license any beds at its facility prior to the CON application at issue in this proceeding; Columbia’s long-term business plan includes the beds that are being transferred to JFK’s proposed satellite hospital. The decision to de-license and transfer 80 beds from Columbia was made by HCA officials, not Columbia’s management team. The proposed JFK satellite hospital will include 60 general med-surg beds, a 10-bed OB unit, a 10-bed ICU/CCU, a full-service ED, and surgical suites. The hospital will provide radiation oncology services, diagnostic cardiac catheterization services, and outpatient psychiatric services, and all of its beds will be in private rooms. In addition to the 80 beds described above, the proposed JFK satellite hospital will have a 12 “observation” beds in private rooms. The observation beds will be sized and equipped in the same manner as the general med-surg beds. As a result, the proposed JFK satellite hospital will effectively have 92 beds even though it will only be licensed for 80 beds. The proposed JFK satellite hospital will be in a new 195,195 square foot building. The space plan for the hospital is reasonable, and its design complies with all applicable building and construction codes. The projected timetable for construction and completion of the hospital is also reasonable. The proposed JFK satellite hospital will be located at the intersection of Boynton Beach Boulevard and the Turnpike on a 50-plus acre site known as the “Mazzoni Property.” That location is eight to nine miles from Delray and Bethesda Memorial, and 11 to 12 miles from Wellington and JFK. JFK has offered to purchase the Mazzoni Property for $130,000 per acre, but as of the date of the hearing, it had not entered into a contract to purchase the property. Bethesda had been in negotiations for the purchase of the Mazzoni Property at a similar price before it settled on, and entered into a contract to purchase the Amestoy Property. Like Bethesda, JFK intends to develop medical office buildings on its site in addition to the proposed satellite hospital. The size of the Mazzoni Property is adequate for those purposes. JFK intends to utilize its medical staff to cover the proposed satellite hospital; however, there is no credible evidence in the record detailing how the dual-staffing would work. The proposed JFK satellite hospital will share some of its management and administrative support services with JFK, but not to the same extent as those services are shared between Bethesda West and Bethesda Memorial. Indeed, the proposed JFK satellite hospital was planned and staffed as a “stand alone economic entity.” The total cost of the proposed JFK satellite hospital is approximately $109.8 million. The service area of JFK’s proposed satellite hospital is considerably larger than the service are of Bethesda West. The PSA consists of zip codes 33437, 33467, 33446, and 33484; the SSA consists of zip codes 33436, 33463, 33414, 33413, 33445, 33496, and 33498. There is significant overlap between the service area of the proposed JFK satellite hospital and the existing service areas of Bethesda, Delray, Wellington, and JFK; each of the zip codes in the proposed service area is within the service area of at least two of those hospitals. Zip codes 33437 and 33467 are expected to generate over 92 percent of the patients for the proposed JFK satellite hospital. The inordinately high number of patients that these two zip codes are expected to generate calls into question the reasonableness of service area defined by JFK, or at least the relevance of the SSA. The proposed JFK satellite hospital is projected to have 20,851 patient days in its first year of operation and 21,576 patient days in its second year of operation, which equate to ADCs of 57 and 59 and occupancy rates of 71.4 percent and 73.7 percent. By the fifth year of operation, the proposed JFK satellite hospital is projected to have an occupancy rate of percent. The projected utilization of the proposed JFK satellite hospital was based on an ALOS of 3.9 days. That figure is reasonable. See Endnote 11. To achieve the projected utilization, the proposed JFK satellite hospital will have to immediately achieve inordinately high market shares in its two primary zip codes, 33437 and 33467. Indeed, the CON application projects that the proposed JFK satellite hospital will have a 27 percent market share in zip code 33437 and a 24 percent market share in zip code 33467. It is unreasonable to expect that a new, start-up hospital will be able achieve the market share or utilization rates projected by JFK for its proposed satellite hospital even though it will be affiliated with JFK, which has an established market reputation in the area. Instead, similar to other new hospitals, the proposed JFK satellite hospital will likely have a “ramp up” period before it achieves its target market penetration and/or utilization. The 10-bed OB unit at the proposed JFK satellite hospital is projected to have an ADC of 6 in each of the first two years of operation, and approximately one half of the admissions are projected to come from zip code 33467. That zip code has fewer residents in the Female 15-44 age cohort than does zip code 33463, which is in the West Boynton area but is in the SSA of the proposed JFK satellite hospital. The utilization of the OB unit assumes market shares of 65 percent in zip code 33437, which is the zip code where the proposed JFK satellite hospital will be located (i.e., its “home zip code”), and 60 percent in the adjacent zip code 33467. Those market shares are not inherently unreasonable for OB services since OB patients are more likely to utilize a facility closer to their home; however, the market shares are materially higher than the market shares that the established programs at Palms West (45 percent) and Wellington (41 percent) have in their home zip codes. The market shares proposed for the other zip codes in the proposed JFK satellite hospital’s service area are also somewhat higher than would be expected, particularly for a start-up OB program, but they are not inherently unreasonable. Even though the OB market shares assumed by JFK are not inherently unreasonable, they are unrealistic under the circumstances of this case because the OB unit at the proposed JFK satellite hospital will not have NICU backup, which is the standard of care in South Palm Beach County, and it is unlikely that obstetricians will refer their patients to the proposed satellite hospital when other hospitals with NICU backup (e.g., Wellington and Bethesda Memorial) are available in close proximity to the West Boynton area. The patient days for the OB unit were projected based upon a population-based use rate rather than based upon a fertility rate applied to the Female 15-44 age cohort. Because the Female 15-44 age cohort is growing at a slower rate than the population as a whole, JFK’s methodology had the effect of overstating the OB patient days and the ADC of the OB unit. The fertility rate methodology is a more reasonable approach under the circumstances of this case. That methodology results in an ADC of only two to four patients in the OB unit at the proposed JFK satellite hospital, which is a more reasonable projection and is more consistent with the largely elderly demographic of the West Boynton area. In sum, the projected utilization of the proposed JFK satellite hospital is overstated, particularly in the first two years of operation, as a result of the unrealistic market shares projected for the hospital’s two primary zip codes and the overstated projection of OB patient days in the West Boynton area. The proposed JFK satellite hospital is projected to take patients from the hospitals that currently serve the West Boynton area, including JFK. JFK projects that approximately 40 percent of its patients will be “cannibalized” by the proposed JFK satellite hospital, which is a materially higher percentage than that projected for Bethesda West in its first (29.1 percent) and second (31.1 percent) years of operation. The remainder of the proposed JFK satellite hospital’s admissions will come from patients who are currently being served by an existing hospital or from growth in the service area. In addition to the projected in-patient admissions discussed above, the proposed JFK satellite hospital is expected to have outpatient registrations and ED visits; however, the number of registrations and visits is not expressly projected in the application. Accordingly, it cannot be determined whether those projections are reasonable or not.12 Institution-specific Justifications for the Proposed Satellite Hospitals Other than the prospect of enhancing access to acute care services for residents of the West Boynton area (see Part I(1)(b) below), the primary justifications offered by Bethesda and JFK for their respective satellite hospitals were institution-specific. The primary justification offered by Bethesda for the establishment of Bethesda West was its need to maintain or increase its market share of the favorable payer-mix in the West Boynton area in order to ensure its long-term financial viability. Although the evidence establishes that the West Boynton area has a more favorable payer-mix than Bethesda Memorial’s current service area, the evidence was not persuasive that Bethesda’s long-term financial viability is at risk or that it is at risk of losing market share in the West Boynton area if it is not allowed to construct Bethesda West. Bethesda also presented evidence regarding its inability to add new beds at Bethesda Memorial because of physical and/or cost constraints, but that evidence was not persuasive. The primary justification offered by JFK for the establishment of its proposed satellite hospital was its inability to expand its current facility to accommodate patients coming from the West Boynton area or elsewhere; however, the preponderance of the evidence fails to support that claim because, as of the date of the hearing, JFK still had the ability to add at least 72 more beds to its existing facility, including 36 beds without any additional construction. Impact of the Proposed Satellite Hospitals on the Existing Hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5 The evidence is not persuasive that Bethesda West or the proposed JFK satellite hospital can achieve their in-patient utilization projections through population growth in their projected service areas alone. Instead, the evidence establishes that the proposed satellite hospitals will achieve their projected utilization primarily by taking patients who are currently being served by, or would otherwise be served by one of the existing hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5. Bethesda West and the proposed JFK satellite hospital are each projected to “cannibalize” patients from Bethesda Memorial and JFK, respectively; however, they will also take patients “out of the hide” of Delray, Wellington, and each other. The projected growth in the West Boynton area will result in the existing hospitals having more patient days in the future than they currently have, whether or not either of the satellite hospitals is approved; however, the approval of either of the proposed satellite hospitals will result in the existing hospitals losing some of the growth-related admissions that they would have otherwise captured. It is appropriate to consider the loss of those growth-related admissions as part of the impact analysis because the market shares in the West Boynton area and the service areas of the proposed satellite hospitals have been relatively stable over the past several years, and it is reasonable to expect that absent a significant change of circumstances (such as the approval of a satellite hospital in the area) the existing hospitals would continue to maintain their respective market shares into the future.13 The most persuasive analysis of the impact on the existing providers of the approval of the proposed satellite hospitals is that prepared by Wellington’s health planner, Thomas Davidson (Exhibit W-4). Based upon Mr. Davidson’s analysis, the number of admissions that the existing providers would lose because of Bethesda West in its first two years of operation are as follows: Year 1 Year 2 Delray 377 512 Wellington 138 187 JFK 554 752 Based upon Mr. Davidson’s analysis, the number of patient days that the existing providers would lose because of the proposed JFK satellite hospital in its first two years of operation are as follows: Year 1 Year 2 Delray 1,035 663 Wellington 735 615 Bethesda 1,638 1,178 These lost admissions and patient days constitute a substantial adverse impact on the existing hospitals, as does the loss of income resulting from the lost admissions and patient days. The proposed JFK satellite hospital will have a slightly greater adverse financial impact on Wellington than will Bethesda West, primarily because of the OB program and larger service proposed for the JFK satellite hospital; the proposed JFK satellite hospital and Bethesda West will have materially similar adverse financial impacts on Delray. The overall effect of the lost admissions, patient days, and the resulting loss of income is greater on Wellington than it is on any of the other hospitals because Wellington has historically been less profitable than the other hospitals. There are other adverse impacts on the existing providers, including the increases in costs and/or potential impacts to quality of care resulting from the exacerbation of the emergency room (ER) call shortage of specialty physicians discussed below; however, there is no persuasive evidence quantifying those impacts. Comparative Evaluation of the CON Applications Based Upon the Applicable Statutory and Rule Criteria There is no credible evidence to justify the approval of two 80-bed hospitals in the West Boynton area. As a result, if either of the proposed satellite hospitals is to be approved, it should be the one that best satisfies the applicable statutory and rule criteria. Statutory Criteria – Section 408.035, Florida Statutes (2003)14 Subsection (1): Need in Relation to the District Health Plan15 The applicable provisions of the Local Health Plan for District 9 are as follows: Priority shall be given to area hospitals, which can show a commitment to, or historical record of service to Medicaid/indigent, handicapped and underserved population groups. Priority shall be given to applicants who can document cost containment practices in their facilities. Cost containment practices, such as sharing services with other area hospitals, enhances efficient resource utilization and assists in avoiding duplication of services. Priority shall be given to an applicant who proposes to use existing space rather than new construction, including space created by previous voluntary de- licensure of underutilized or unused beds and/or through transfer of beds within a subdistrict. As more fully discussed below in connection with Section 408.035(11), Florida Statutes, the first preference weighs in favor of Bethesda based upon its historical record of service to Medicaid and charity patients, which is marginally better than JFK’s record, and its commitment to provide five percent of the patient days at Bethesda West to Medicaid and charity patients, which is more realistic than JFK’s 10 percent commitment; however, the weight associated with this preference is minimal in light of the demographics of the West Boynton area, which is generally more wealthy and, hence, less likely to generate significant Medicaid or charity care patient days. As to the second preference, the record does not “document” any material cost containment practices at JFK or Bethesda Memorial. JFK and Bethesda each intend to use their existing medical staffs to cover their proposed satellite hospitals as a cost-containment effort; however, Bethesda has proposed a greater degree of integration (and, hence, less duplication) in the administrative functions at Bethesda West and Bethesda Memorial than did JFK at is proposed satellite hospital. Thus, the second preference also marginally weighs in favor of Bethesda. As to the third preference, both applicants are proposing new construction rather than the use of existing space. Although JFK is proposing the de-licensure of underutilized beds at Columbia, it is not using the space created by those beds for its proposed satellite hospital as the rule preference contemplates. The beds that Bethesda is transferring to Bethesda West are not underutilized and they are being transferred to a new to-be-constructed facility rather than to existing space. In sum, the local health plan preferences marginally weigh in favor of the approval of Bethesda’s application over JFK’s application. Subsections (2) and (7): Availability, Quality of Care, etc. of Existing Facilities and Enhancing Access The primary justification offered by the applicants for their respective proposed satellite hospitals (other than the hospital-specific issues discussed above) is that the facility will "enhance access" to acute care services for residents of the West Boynton area. More specifically, the applicants contend that the establishment of a new hospital in the West Boynton area will address an “access” problem that exists or soon will exist in the area. As discussed below, this contention is not supported by the preponderance of the evidence. In the CON context, “access” is typically evaluated from the vantage points of programmatic, financial, cultural, and geographic access. “Programmatic access” refers to the adequacy of the programs and services provided at existing facilities in relation to the specific health care needs of the persons served by those facilities. Programmatic access concerns arise when specific programs or services are not available for patients that need them, or when the quality of care provided in the existing programs is inadequate. The evidence was not persuasive that there are any programmatic access problems in Subdistrict 9-5 and, in any event, neither of the proposed satellite hospitals would enhance programmatic access in the subdistrict because they will not offer any programs or services that are not already offered at one or more of the tertiary hospitals in the subdistrict that currently serve the West Boynton area. Indeed, the proposed satellite hospitals will offer a more narrow range of services than the existing tertiary hospitals presently serving the area. This is significant because the elderly, who make of a large portion of the West Boynton area and who are more likely to have co-morbidities or more complex medical needs, are generally better served in a hospital offering tertiary services and more complete care. Similarly, it is reasonable to expect that many physicians will continue to admit their patients to the larger tertiary hospitals rather than shifting those patients to a satellite hospital that provides a more narrow range of services. “Financial access” refers to the extent to which persons have access to health care services without regard to their ability to pay. The evidence was not persuasive that there are any financial access problems in Subdistrict 9-5 or the West Boynton area that the proposed satellite hospitals will address. None of the existing hospitals that serve the West Boynton area have policies or practices that discourage indigent patients from seeking care at their facilities and, in any event, the low- income population makes up a relatively small portion of the West Boynton area. Cultural access” refers to the extent to which certain persons cannot or do not access the existing facilities due to cultural factors such as race, ethnicity, and national origin. Cultural access was not advanced by Bethesda or JFK as a basis for the approval or their respective applications. “Geographic access” refers to the physical accessibility of the existing facilities or services in a subdistrict taking into account population density, distance and time of travel, and geographic barriers or other impediments to access. Geographic access has been referred to as a “foundation of health planning.” Bethesda and JFK focus primarily on the projected growth of the West Boynton area and the road congestion that comes with that growth as the basis for their contention that there is, or soon will be a access problem for residents of the West Boynton area; Bethesda states in its PRO (at page 29) that "[g]eographic access is at the heart of [its] proposal." A reasonable geographic access standard for persons living in an urban area is a drive time of 30 to 40 minutes to an acute care hospital. Under that standard, there is currently no geographic access problem for residents of the West Boynton area. Indeed, there are as many as 12 hospitals within a 30-minute drive of the West Boynton area, and a “fair number” of residents have access to four hospitals -– Bethesda, JFK, Wellington, and Delray -- within a 15 to 20-minute drive time.16 All of the hospitals within the 30-minute drive time offer tertiary-level care, and a number of them offer OB services. There are no physical geographic barriers that limit access to the existing hospitals by residents of the West Boynton area. Indeed, there are a number of different major north-south and east-west roads that residents have to chose from when accessing the existing hospitals, and most of those roads have at least four lanes. The major roads in the West Boynton area have expanded along with growth of the population in the area, and they are expected to continue to do so. The infrastructure plan adopted by Palm Beach County includes continued road expansions and improvements over the planning horizon applicable to this case, and developers are often required to widen or otherwise improve the roads as a condition of the approval of new development. There is insufficient evidence that the current travel times are significantly different for the elderly population in the area. The anecdotal testimony offered by various Bethesda witnesses was not persuasive. The evidence was not persuasive that the travel times will be materially higher over the applicable five-year planning horizon. The analysis and opinion presented by Bethesda’s traffic engineer on this issue was not persuasive.17 The concurrency analysis performed by Bethesda’s traffic engineer only assessed Boynton Beach Boulevard; it did not assess any of the other major roads between the West Boynton area and the existing hospitals. Moreover, the analysis focused on the level of service (LOS) on various segments of Boynton Beach Boulevard, as measured by the projected number of trips on those segments in 2007; it did not quantify the increase in travel time along that road, if any, resulting from the reduction in the LOS which the analysis showed. The hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5 are some of the most highly-utilized hospitals in the state; however, the evidence was not persuasive that the high utilization at these hospitals has caused any access problems for residents of the West Boynton area, either for general acute care services or for OB services. The existing hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5 have been able to meet the needs of the subdistrict by incrementally expanding their facilities when the need arises. An additional 67 beds can be added to the bed inventory of Subdistrict 9-5 without any additional construction; JFK has shelled-in space for 36 new beds and Delray has shelled-in space for 31 new beds. Additionally, Delray has a master plan that has been approved by Palm Beach County that will allow it to add as many as 123 more beds on its current campus as needed, and Wellington also has plenty of space on the undeveloped property adjacent to its hospital to add more beds as needed. Having a hospital in the West Boynton area might be more convenient for residents of that area west of the Turnpike, at least in those instances where the patient is able to receive all of the necessary care at that hospital; however, convenience alone is not valid basis for the approval of a new hospital, particularly where there are as many as 12 tertiary-level hospitals within a 30-minute drive of the West Boynton area. In sum and on balance, the criteria in Subsections 408.035(2) and (7), Florida Statutes, weigh strongly against approval of either application. Indeed, despite the relatively high utilization rates at the existing hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5, the preponderance of the evidence fails to establish that there currently are, or that over the applicable planning horizon there will be any material deficiencies in the availability, quality of care, or accessibility of the existing hospitals in the subdistrict that would warrant the approval of a new hospital in the West Boynton area at this time. Subsection (3): Ability of Applicant to Provide Quality of Care The parties do not dispute the quality of care provided at any of the existing hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5, and the evidence affirmatively demonstrates that a high quality of care is currently provided at Bethesda Memorial, JFK, Delray, and Wellington. Bethesda and JFK each intend to rely on their existing medical staff, at least in part, to staff their respective satellite hospitals. As a result, the quality of care provided at the satellite hospitals will also be good, but it will be less than ideal in several respects. First, neither satellite hospital will offer interventional cardiology services, which is, or is becoming the standard of care for treating heart attack patients that present to the hospital’s ED. Second, JFK’s proposed satellite will offer OB services without NICU backup, which is below the standard of care in South Palm Beach County. Accordingly, the criterion in Section 408.035(3), Florida Statutes, weighs against the approval of either application. Subsection (4): Special Health Care Services The parties stipulated that this criterion is inapplicable, and in any event, the criterion was deleted by Chapter 2004-383, Laws of Florida, effective July 1, 2004. Subsection (5): Educational Facilities and Training Programs18 Neither JFK nor Bethesda Memorial is a teaching hospital, and neither is proposing educational or training programs at its proposed satellite hospital. The evidence was not persuasive that Wellington’s teaching programs will be adversely affected by the approval of either of the proposed satellite hospitals. The criterion in Section 408.035(5), Florida Statutes, does not materially weigh in favor of or against the approval of either of the applications. Subsection (6): Availability of Resources and Personnel for Operations The parties stipulated that Bethesda and JFK each have the ability to fund the capital and operating expenditures for their proposed satellite hospitals. The reasonableness of the financing-related costs proposed by Bethesda and JFK in their respective applications is also not in dispute. Delray and Wellington argue that neither Bethesda nor JFK will be able to adequately staff their proposed satellite hospitals due to physician and nurse shortages in South Palm Beach County and/or that the staffing of the proposed satellite hospitals will make it more difficult and costly for the existing hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5 to staff certain programs. Bethesda and JFK challenge the adequacy of each other’s staffing projections. As more fully discussed below, the evidence is not persuasive that the staffing projected for either of the proposed satellite programs is inadequate; however, the evidence establishes that the approval of either program would exacerbate physician shortages in Subdistrict 9-5 in certain specialties. Bethesda West’s staffing projections include 242.8 full-time equivalents (FTEs) in the first year of operation and 294.5 FTEs in the second year of operation. The staffing projections for the proposed JFK satellite hospital include FTEs in the first year of operation and 448.5 FTEs in the second year of operation. The disparity in the staffing levels primarily results from the higher occupancy rate projected at the proposed JFK satellite hospital, which is projected to be 71.4 percent in the first year of operation. By contrast, the occupancy rate at Bethesda West is projected be 35.7 percent in the first year of operation and then “ramp up” to approximately 69 percent by the fourth year of operation. The staffing levels at each of the proposed satellite hospitals are reasonable based upon the ADCs projected and the services to be provided at each hospital. Indeed, the staffing levels are comparable when viewed as a ratio of staff to projected ADC; the ratios at Bethesda West are 8.37 and 7.36 in the first two years of operation, and the ratios at the proposed JFK satellite hospital for its first two years of operation are 7.74 and 7.60. The evidence is not persuasive that Bethesda West’s staffing projections are understated or that they fail to include nursing and other positions necessary to ensure high quality care is provided. Nor is the evidence persuasive that the salaries projected for Bethesda West’s staff are understated. The evidence is not persuasive that the staffing projections for the proposed JFK satellite hospital are inherently unreliable based upon the manner in which they were prepared or as a result of the proxy that was used as a basis of the projections. There is a nursing shortage statewide and in South Palm Beach County, but it is not as severe as it has been in the past. Indeed, it is significant that despite the large number of beds added over the past five years at the various hospitals in South Palm Beach County, those beds have been adequately staffed with nurses and ancillary clinical personnel. JFK and Bethesda Memorial have each been successful in recruiting nursing staff despite the nursing shortage. They each have implemented innovative programs to aid in their recruiting efforts and to reduce their turnover and vacancy rates, and those programs are expected to be utilized at the proposed satellite hospitals. JFK and Bethesda Memorial each use “traveler” and per-diem nurses to supplement their full time nursing staffs, which is not uncommon in South Palm Beach County. Typically, a physician who has privileges at a hospital is required to be on ER call on a rotational basis. Many physicians have privileges at more than one hospital in South Palm Beach County, which means that they are responsible for providing ER call coverage at more than one hospital. Because of malpractice and other concerns, it is becoming increasingly difficult for hospitals to attract physicians who are willing to take ER calls. The Palm Beach County Medical Society and the CEOs of the existing hospitals in the county met as recently as December 2003 to discuss the problems related to ER call coverage; however, as of the date of the hearing, the problem still existed and was severe. It is possible for a physician to be providing ER calls to more than one hospital at the same time. This can become a serious problem if the physician is attending to a patient at one hospital when he or she is called to the ER at another hospital. The problem of ER call coverage is most significant in specialties such as neurosurgery, hand surgery, urology, OB, and ear/nose/throat. Several of the hospitals in South Palm Beach County, including Wellington and Delray, have begun to pay physicians, and particularly specialty physicians to take ER call. Adding a new hospital in South Palm Beach County will exacerbate this problem in several respects. First, it will add another hospital to the ER call rotations of the physicians who chose to obtain privileges at the satellite hospitals, thereby increasing the prospect of a physician being on call at more than one hospital at the same time. Second, it will make it even more difficult or costly for existing hospitals to obtain call coverage by the specialty physicians that are already in short supply. It is unlikely that OB/GYNs will admit their patients to the small OB unit at the proposed JFK satellite hospital. OB/GYNs typically try to keep all of their patients in one hospital because it makes it easier on them to do rounds and to respond quickly to emergency situations, and because the OB unit at the proposed JFK satellite hospital will not have NICU backup, it is unlikely that many OB/GYNs will choose that hospital as the one where they admit the bulk of their patients. In sum, the staffing levels for each of the proposed satellite hospitals are reasonable and appropriate for the services being offered at the hospitals, the projected staffing costs at each of the proposed satellite hospitals are also reasonable and appropriate, and JFK and Bethesda will be able to staff their respective satellite hospitals at the levels projected; however, the proposed satellite hospitals will exacerbate the shortage of specialty physicians in South Palm Beach County and will make it more difficult for the existing hospitals to get specialty physicians for ER call coverage. Accordingly, the criterion in Section 408.035(6), Florida Statutes, weighs against the approval of either application, and between the competing applications, this criterion does not materially weigh in favor of either application over the other. Subsection (8): Financial Feasibility The parties did not seriously contest the short-term financial feasibility of either of the proposed satellite hospitals, and the preponderance of the evidence establishes that both of the proposed satellite hospitals are financially feasible in the short-term; both applicants have the ability to fund the construction and initial capital needs of their respective projects in conjunction with the other capital projects listed on Schedule 2 of their respective CON applications. The long-term financial feasibility of each of the proposed satellite hospitals is in dispute. The general rule for assessing the long-term financial feasibility of a CON project is if the project will at least break even by the end of the second year of operation, then the project is financially feasible in the long-term; if, however, the project continues to show a loss in the second year of operations and it is not demonstrated that the project will reach a break-even point within a reasonable period of time, then the project is not financially feasible in the long-term. As more fully discussed below, Bethesda West is financially feasible in the long-term, but the proposed JFK satellite hospital is not. Accordingly, the criterion in Section 408.035(8), Florida Statutes, weighs in favor of approval of Bethesda’s application over JFK’s application. Bethesda West Schedule 8A of Bethesda's application projects that Bethesda West will generate a net loss of $3.7 million in its first year of operation and a net profit of $1.7 million in its second year of operation. The financial projections for Bethesda West were based upon conservative utilization projections, which leads a reasonable projection of operating income. The financial projections for Bethesda West are not defective based upon an overstatement of the “other operating revenue” or an understatement of the depreciation expense projected by Bethesda. The testimony of Bethesda’s expert financial witnesses is accepted over the testimony of the other financial experts on these issues. The financial projections for Bethesda West are not defective based upon understatements in land costs, construction costs, equipment costs of staffing projections. The testimony of Bethesda’s experts related to these issues is accepted over the testimony of the other experts. As discussed above, Bethesda West will “cannibalize” 3,040 and 4,530 patient days from Bethesda Memorial in its first and second years of operation. The financial impact of this “cannibalization” on Bethesda Memorial is a loss of $1.4 million and $2.1 million in the first and second years of Bethesda West’s operation. The income loss from “cannibalization” is not accounted for on Schedule 8A. Although the patient days used to calculate the “per patient day” figures in the middle two columns of that schedule take into account the “cannibalized” patient days, the dollar amounts shown in those columns do not. On this issue, the testimony of Delray’s financial expert is more logical and persuasive than the testimony of Bethesda’s financial expert. When the losses from “cannibalization” are taken into account, the approval of Bethesda West will have a negative impact on the Bethesda system of $5.1 million in its first year of operation and $400,000 in its second year of operation, which are consistent with the figures shown in Exhibit B-2 (pages 48 and 54). Even so, the system will show a net income of $300,000 and $5.6 million in the first two years of Bethesda West’s operation. The impact of the “cannibalization” on Bethesda Memorial is projected to decrease as Bethesda West becomes more established. At the same time, the profitability of Bethesda West is projected to increase as its census grows. Thus, by the third year of its operation, Bethesda West is projected to have a positive impact on the Bethesda system of $2.2 million (i.e., $4.1 million in net income at Bethesda West less $1.9 million in “cannibalization” from Bethesda Memorial). Bethesda West will not have a negative impact on Bethesda’s cash flow after its first year of operation. On this issue, the testimony of Bethesda’s expert is more persuasive than the testimony of the other financial experts. Accordingly, Bethesda West is financially feasible in the long-term. Proposed JFK Satellite Hospital Schedule 8A of JFK's application projects that its proposed satellite hospital would generate a net loss of $1.2 million in its first year of operation and a net loss of $392,000 in its second year of operation. Over the next three years, however, JFK projects its satellite hospital to generate net income from operations of $509,000, $1.5 million, and $2.5 million. The financial projections in JFK’s application were based upon overly-aggressive occupancy rates, both in the facility as a whole and in the small OB unit without NICU backup. As a result, the resulting financial projections are not reasonable. JFK’s application does not include any analysis of the financial impact on Columbia of the transfer of 80 beds to the satellite hospital, nor does it include any analysis of the impact of the “cannibalization” of JFK’s patient days that would necessarily occur if JFK’s proposed satellite was approved. As a result, the financial impact of JFK’s proposed satellite hospital, in the words of one of JFK’s financial experts, is “probably incomplete.” As a result of the unreasonable utilization projections and the incomplete presentation of the financial impact of the “cannibalization” of JFK’s patient days, JFK failed to establish that its proposed satellite hospital is financially feasible in the long-term. Subsection (9): Fostering Competition that Promotes Cost-effectiveness Neither of the proposed satellite hospitals will foster competition that proposes cost-effectiveness. The West Boynton market currently has healthy competition for the acute services proposed for the satellite hospitals, and there is no dominant provider of those services. Locating a new hospital in the West Boynton area will have the long-term effect of increasing the market share of the provider that operates the new hospital to the detriment of the other providers that are currently competing in that market. In this regard, the approval of a new hospital in the West Boynton area would adversely affect the competitive balance that currently exists in that area and which is projected to continue over the planning horizon. The approval of either of the proposed satellite hospitals would also adversely affect cost-effectiveness by exacerbating the shortage of specialty physicians and other qualified staff in the subdistrict, which in turn would require existing hospitals to raise salaries, benefits and other expenses in order to remain competitive. The approval of Bethesda West would have less of an adverse impact on competition and cost-effectiveness than would the approval of JFK’s proposed satellite hospital for several reasons. First, Bethesda West does not duplicate as many administrative services as does JFK’s proposed satellite hospital. Second, JFK currently has a higher market share in the West Boynton area than does Bethesda or any other hospital, which means that the competitive balance would be tipped to a greater extent if JFK’s satellite hospital was approved. Third, the approval of the JFK satellite would give HCA four hospitals in Palm Beach County and increase its leverage in physician and staff recruitment and the negotiation of HMO contracts. Accordingly, the criterion in Section 408.035(9), Florida Statutes, weights against the approval of either application; however, on balance between the two applications, this criterion favor’s Bethesda’s application over JFK’s application. Subsection (10): Costs and Methods of Construction The costs and methods of energy provision at the proposed satellite hospitals is not in dispute. Although the proposed satellite hospitals are similar in size, the total project costs included in the CON applications are significantly different. The $73.8 million total project cost for Bethesda West equates to a cost of $922,700 per bed. The $109.8 million total project cost for JFK’s proposed satellite hospital equates to a cost of $1.37 million per bed. The portion of the total project costs for each of the proposed satellite hospitals attributable directly to “construction” is materially similar. Bethesda West’s construction costs are approximately $34.2 million, or $180 per square foot; the construction costs for the proposed JFK satellite hospital are $40.9 million, or $210 per square foot. The estimated construction costs for each of the proposed satellite hospitals are within the range of reasonableness that can be gleaned from the testimony of the various hospital construction experts. JFK’s cost is towards the higher end of the range, and Bethesda’s cost is towards the lower end of the range. The primary differences in the total project costs are in the land purchase prices, the site preparation costs, and the equipment costs. The land purchase price included in Bethesda’s application was $4.2 million, which was based upon a 30 to 40- acre site. The land purchase price included in JFK’s application was $8 million, which was based upon a 50-acre site. Bethesda acquired the 54-acre Amestoy Property for $110,000 per acre. At $110,000 per acre, the $4.2 million attributed by Bethesda to land purchase price would be sufficient to acquire 38.2 acres, which is more than adequate for the 80-bed Bethesda West facility. Consistent with the estimate in the CON application, JFK has made an offer to purchase the 50-plus acre Mazzoni Property for $130,000 per acre. The total land purchase price in each application, and the actual cost-per-acre of the Amestoy and Mazzoni Properties are reasonable. The site development costs included in Bethesda’s application were $3.75 million, or $125,000 per acre for the 30 acres on which Bethesda West will be located. The site development costs included in JFK’s application were $6.5 million, or $150,000 per acre for the 50 acres on which JFK’s proposed satellite hospital will be located. The site development costs for each project include on-site and off-site utility (e.g., water and sewer) and roadway work, geotechnical and environmental remediation costs, stormwater retention, landscaping, and concurrency impact fees. Each of the proposed sites is relatively flat and was formerly agricultural property and, as a result, there are not expected to be any unusual costs associated with the development of either site. Bethesda West will be located further west than the proposed JFK satellite hospital and, as a result, its “radius of influence” includes fewer congested roadway links than does the proposed JFK satellite hospital; but, the Amestoy Property where Bethesda West will be located is farther away from the existing utility lines than the Mazzoni Property where the proposed JFK satellite hospital will be located. Thus, even though the cost of running utilities to Bethesda West will likely be higher than the cost of running utilities to the proposed JFK satellite hospital, the currency impact fees for Bethesda West will likely be lower than the currency impact fees for the proposed JFK satellite hospital; and, on balance, the overall per-acre and total site development costs included in each of the applications are reasonable. Bethesda’s application included equipment costs of approximately $16 million, all of which was attributable to movable equipment. The cost of fixed equipment was included in the estimated construction costs as part of the building contract. JFK’s application included total equipment costs of approximately $34.2 million. That amount was broken into fixed equipment not in the building contract ($13.9 million), movable equipment ($17.8 million), and information systems ($2.4 million). Some, but not all of the difference between the equipment cost estimates are attributable to the additional services –- e.g., OB and diagnostic cardiac catheterization –- that will be provided at the proposed JFK satellite hospital but not at Bethesda West. Additionally, some of the difference are attributable to the 12 "observation" rooms at the proposed JFK satellite hospital that are being equipped in the same manner as the hospital’s general med-surg beds. When compared on an “apples to apples” basis, the total equipment costs for Bethesda West are not materially different than the total equipment costs for the proposed JFK satellite hospital. JFK is proposing to provide more specialized equipment than Bethesda in areas such as the surgical suites and the ICU/CCU and more information technology (IT) equipment; however, the evidence is not persuasive that such specialized equipment or the IT equipment is necessary to provide high quality care or that the absence of such equipment will adversely affect the quality of care at Bethesda West. The $16 million in equipment costs at Bethesda West, which equates to approximately $200,700 per bed, is reasonable for the level and type of services that will be provided at Bethesda West. The evidence is not persuasive that Bethesda’s equipment costs are understated even though its costs are considerably less than the equipment costs proposed by JFK. If anything, JFK has over-equipped its proposed satellite hospital with specialized equipment resulting in the higher equipment costs included in JFK’s CON application.19 Although the more expensive proposed JFK satellite hospital offers some benefits, such as a larger site to facilitate future expansions and more specialized equipment in some areas, those benefits are outweighed by the additional $35 million costs associated with that facility as compared to Bethesda West. This cost saving is particularly significant since each of the proposed facilities is supposed to be a satellite of a larger, tertiary hospital rather than a stand- alone community hospital. The evidence was not persuasive that Bethesda Memorial and JFK have physical constraints that will limit their ability to add beds at their existing facilities in a cost- efficient manner. Even if the construction of a satellite hospital were the most cost-efficient way for Bethesda Memorial and JFK to add beds, the evidence was not persuasive that it is the most cost-efficient way to add beds from the perspective of the entire health care system of Subdistrict 9-5. Indeed, there are less costly methods of adding new beds to the subdistrict than the construction of a new 80-bed hospital for $73.8 million or $109.8 million. For example, 36 additional beds can be added at JFK and 31 additional beds can be added at Delray in shelled-in space that has already been constructed. The incremental cost of constructing space for additional bed expansions at Delray and Wellington would also be less than the construction costs of the proposed satellite hospitals. In sum, because there are less costly ways to add beds to the subdistrict than the construction of a new hospital, the criterion in Section 408.035(10), Florida Statutes, weighs against the approval of either application; however, between the two applications, this criterion weighs in favor of the approval of Bethesda’s application over JFK’s application since its proposed satellite hospital will cost approximately $35 million less and will provide effectively the same services in similar physical space. Subsection (11): Medicaid and Indigent Care Bethesda characterizes itself as a “safety net” hospital because its Medicaid and charity care percentages typically exceed the averages for Subdistrict 9-5 and District 9 as a whole, and because Bethesda Memorial provides the largest percentage of the Medicaid and charity care provided by all of the hospitals in Subdistrict 9-5. There is no statutory or rule provision that would support Bethesda’s designation of itself as a “safety net” provider. Moreover, the significance of Bethesda’s characterization of itself as a “safety net” hospital is diminished by the fact that the Palm Beach County Health Care District (District) reimburses all hospitals in the county through an indigent care subsidy for care provided to patients that meet the District’s indigency standards. The subsidy helps to ensure that indigent patients are able to receive medical care from any hospital in the county and, to that end, provides a county-wide “safety net” for such patients. The subsidies paid by the District do not cover the full cost of indigent care provided by the hospital, nor does the total amount of subsidies received by a hospital directly correlate to the total amount of indigent care provided by the hospital. Thus, it is not dispositive that JFK received the largest amount of subsidies from the District over the past several years or that JFK received approximately $1.6 million more in subsidies from the District in 2003 than did Bethesda. JFK recently qualified as a “disproportionate share provider,” which means that at least 15 percent of its patient days are attributed to Medicaid or supplemental security income patients. As a disproportionate share provider, JFK receives incrementally larger reimbursements from Medicaid for the provision of indigent care. Bethesda is not currently a disproportionate share provider although it has been in the past. None of the hospitals in South Palm Beach County have policies or practices that discourage Medicaid or uninsured patients. Bethesda Memorial, JFK, Wellington, and Delray each accept patients without regard to their ability to pay. Bethesda and JFK conditioned the approval of their respective CON applications on the provision of a specified percentage of patient days to Medicaid and charity patients. The percentage committed to by JFK (10 percent) is higher than the percentage committed to by Bethesda (five percent). The percentages of Medicaid and charity care committed to by the applicants may be difficult to achieve as a result of the demographics of the West Boynton area. Indeed, the more favorable payer-mix in the West Boynton area was a significant factor, and in Bethesda’s case it was the primary motivating factor for the establishment a new hospital in that area. Bethesda Memorial and JFK each have a history of providing significant levels of Medicaid and charity care at their existing hospitals. The hospitals are each located in areas with large indigent populations, which significantly contribute to the high level of indigent care that they provide. Bethesda Memorial has historically provided a larger amount of Medicaid care than has JFK in terms of a percentage of patient days, e.g., 16.1 percent verses 7.3 percent in 2001. Those percentages each exceed the Subdistrict 9-5 average of 6.3 percent. Bethesda Memorial has also historically provided a larger amount of charity care than has JFK in terms of dollars (e.g., $16.2 million verses $5.2 million in 2002) and in terms of a percentage of charges (e.g., 3.7 percent verses 0.4 percent in 2001 and 2.9 percent verses 0.6 percent in 2002). The Subdistrict 9-5 average for 2001 was 1.4 percent. These comparisons are somewhat skewed because a large portion of Bethesda’s indigent care is attributable to Bethesda Memorial’s high-volume, well-established OB and neonatal programs which tend to be “magnets” for uninsured patients. When only like-services are considered, the utilization of JFK and Bethesda Memorial by Medicaid and indigent patients is similar. JFK provides a significant amount of care to “self- pay” patients (e.g., $43.5 million in 2002), which JFK attempted to equate to charity care. Although there is often overlap between self-pay and charity care patients, the evidence was not persuasive that there is a direct correlation urged by JFK in this case. For example, JFK’s internal definitions of self-pay and charity care patients are markedly different and considerably more liberal than the Agency’s definition of charity care patients for reporting purposes. Bethesda makes a $1 million per year “contribution” to the District to help fund the District’s indigent care program. That contribution was required as part of the settlement of litigation arising out of Bethesda’s conversion from a public hospital to a private not-for-profit hospital and, as a result, it cannot be fairly characterized as additional evidence of Bethesda’s commitment to serving indigent patients. Even though both applicants demonstrated a history of and commitment to serving Medicaid and indigent patients, the criterion in Section 408.035(11), Florida Statutes, weighs in favor of Bethesda because the level of Medicaid and charity care historically provided by Bethesda Memorial is higher than that provided by JFK. On balance with the other statutory and rule criteria, the criterion in Section 408.035(11), Florida Statutes, is not given significant weight because Bethesda has committed to providing a lower percentage of Medicaid and charity care patient days at Bethesda West than JFK committed to at its proposed satellite hospital, and because the demographics of the West Boynton area make it unlikely that a significant level of indigent care will be provided at either of the proposed satellite hospitals. Subsection (12): Designation as a Gold Seal Nursing Facility The parties stipulated that this criterion is inapplicable because neither applicant is proposing additional nursing home beds. (2) Rule Criteria – Florida Administrative Code Rules 59C-1.030(2) and 59C-1.038(6) The criteria in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C- 1.030(2) are subsumed in the statutory criteria discussed above related to the accessibility (or not) of existing acute care services in Subdistrict 9-5 and the need (or not) for new acute care beds in the West Boynton area. For the same reasons that the CON applications do not satisfy those statutory criteria, they do not satisfy the related criteria in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.030(2). Under Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C- 1.038(6)(a), priority is given to applicants with “a documented history of providing services to medically indigent patients or a commitment to do so.” This priority weighs in favor of Bethesda for the reasons discussed above in connection with Section 408.035(11), Florida Statutes. Under Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C- 1.038(6)(b), priority is given to applications that “meet the need for additional acute care beds in a particular service through the conversion of existing underutilized beds.” This priority does not materially weigh in favor either application over the other; the underutilized beds at Columbia that JFK proposes to transfer to its satellite hospital are in a different subdistrict, and the beds that Bethesda proposes to transfer from Bethesda Memorial to its proposed satellite hospital are not underutilized beds in light of the historical occupancy rate at Bethesda Memorial.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency issue a final order denying Bethesda’s CON application No. 9659 and also denying JFK’s CON application No. 9660. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 2004.

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.5717.001408.035408.0361408.0397.367.60
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FLORIDA HEALTH SCIENCES CENTER, INC., D/B/A TAMPA GENERAL HOSPITAL vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 08-000614CON (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Feb. 01, 2008 Number: 08-000614CON Latest Update: Dec. 08, 2011

The Issue Whether Certificate of Need (CON) Application No. 9992, filed by Sun City Hospital, Inc., d/b/a South Bay Hospital to establish a 112-bed replacement hospital in Riverview, Hillsborough County, Florida, satisfies, on balance, the applicable statutory and rule review criteria for approval.

Findings Of Fact The Parties A. South Bay South Bay is a 112-bed general acute care hospital located at 4016 Sun City Center Boulevard, Sun City Center, Florida. It has served south Hillsborough County from that location since its original construction in 1982. South Bay is a wholly-owned for-profit subsidiary of Hospital Corporation of America, Inc. (HCA), a for-profit corporation. South Bay's service area includes the immediate vicinity of Sun City Center, the communities of Ruskin and Wimauma (to the west and east of Sun City Center, respectively), and the communities of Riverview, Gibsonton, and Apollo Beach to the north. See FOF 68-72. South Bay is located on the western edge of Sun City Center. The Sun City Center area is comprised of the age- restricted communities of Sun City Center, Kings Point, Freedom Plaza, and numerous nearby senior living complexes, assisted- living facilities, and nursing homes. This area geographically comprises the developed area along the north side of State Road (SR) 674 between I–75 and U.S. Highway 301, north to 19th Avenue and south to the Little Manatee River. South Bay predominantly serves the residents of the Sun City Center area. In 2009, Sun City Center residents comprised approximately 57% of all discharges from SB. South Bay had approximately 72% market share in Sun City Center zip code 33573. (Approximately 32% of all market service area discharges came from zip code 33573.) South Bay provides educational programs at the hospital that are well–attended by community residents. South Bay provides comprehensive acute care services typical of a small to mid-sized community hospital, including emergency services, surgery, diagnostic imaging, non-invasive cardiology services, and endoscopy. It does not provide diagnostic or therapeutic cardiac catheterization or open-heart surgery. Patients requiring interventional cardiology services or open-heart surgery are taken directly by Hillsborough County Fire Rescue or other transport to a hospital providing those services, such as Brandon Regional Hospital (Brandon) or SJH, or are transferred from SB to one of those hospitals. South Bay has received a number of specialty accreditations, which include accreditation by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), specialty accreditation as an advanced primary stroke center, and specialty accreditation by the Society for Chest Pain. South Bay has also received recognition for its quality of care and, in particular, for surgical infection prevention and outstanding services relating to heart attack, heart failure, and pneumonia. South Bay's 112 licensed beds comprise 104 general medical-surgical beds and eight Intensive Care Unit (ICU) beds. Of the general medical-surgical beds, 64 are in semi-private rooms, where two patient beds are situated side-by-side, separated by a curtain. Forty-eight are in private rooms. Semi- private rooms present challenges in terms of infection control and patient privacy, and are no longer the standard of care in hospital design and construction. Over the years, SB has upgraded its hospital physical plant to accommodate new medical technology, including an MRI suite and state-of-the-art telemetry equipment. South Bay is implementing automated dispensing cabinets on patient floors for storage of medications and an electronic medication administration record system that provides an extra safety measure for dispensing medications. Since 2009, SB has implemented numerous programmatic initiatives that have improved the quality of care. South Bay is converting one wing of the hospital to an orthopedic unit. In 2001, South Bay completed a major expansion of its ED and support spaces, but has not added new beds. Patients presenting to the ED have received high quality of care and timely care. Since 2009, SB has improved its systems of care and triage of patients in the ED to improve patient flow and reduce ED wait times. Overall, South Bay has a reputation of providing high- quality care in a timely manner, notwithstanding problems with its physical plant and location. South Bay's utilization has been high historically. From 2006 to 2009, SB's average occupancy has been 79.5%, 80.3%, 77.2%, and 77.7%, respectively. Its number of patient discharges also increased in that time, from 6,190 in 2006 to 6,540 in 2009, at an average annual rate increase of 1.9%. (From late November until May, the seasonal months, utilization is very high, sometimes at 100% or greater.) Despite its relatively high utilization, SB has also had marginal financial results historically. It lost money in 2005 and 2007, with operating losses of $644,259 in 2005 and $1,151,496 in 2007 and bottom-line net losses of $447,957 (2005) and $698,305 (2007). The hospital had a significantly better year in 2009, with an operating gain of $3,365,113 and a bottom- line net profit of $2,144,292. However, this was achieved largely due to a reduction in bad debt from $11,927,320 in 2008 to $7,772,889 in 2009, an event the hospital does not expect to repeat, and a coincidence of high surgical volume. Its 2010 financial results were lagging behind those of 2009 at the time of the hearing. South Bay's 2009 results amount to an aberration, and it is likely that 2010 would be considerably less profitable. South Bay's marginal financial performance is due, in part, to its disproportionate share of Medicare patients and a disproportionate percentage of Medicare reimbursement in its payor mix. Medicare reimburses hospitals at a significantly lower rate than managed care payors. As noted, SB is organizationally a part of HCA's West Florida Division, and is one of two HCA-affiliated hospitals in Hillsborough County; Brandon is the other. (There are approximately 16 hospitals in this division.) Brandon has been able to add beds over the past several years, and its services include interventional cardiology and open-heart surgery. However, SB and Brandon combined still have fewer licensed beds than either St. Joseph's Hospital or Tampa General Hospital, and fewer than the BayCare Health System- affiliated hospitals in Hillsborough in total. South Bay's existing physical plant is undersized and outdated. See discussion below. Whether it has a meaningful opportunity for expansion and renovation at its 17.5-acre site is a question for this proceeding to resolve. South Bay proposes the replacement and relocation of its facility to the community of Riverview. In 2005, SB planned to establish an 80-bed satellite hospital in Riverview, on a parcel owned by HCA and located on the north side of Big Bend Road between I-75 and U.S. Highway 301. SB filed CON Application No. 9834 in the February 2005 batching cycle. The application was preliminarily denied by AHCA, and SB initially contested AHCA's determination. South Bay pursued the satellite hospital CON at that time because of limited availability of intercompany financing from HCA. By the time of the August 2007 batching cycle, intercompany financing had improved, allowing SB to pursue the bigger project of replacing and relocating the hospital. South Bay dismissed its petition for formal administrative hearing, allowing AHCA's preliminary denial of CON Application No. 9834 to become final, and filed CON Application No. 9992 to establish a replacement hospital facility on Big Bend Road in Riverview. St. Joseph's Hospital St. Joseph's Hospital was founded by the Franciscan Sisters of Allegany, New York, as a small hospital in a converted house in downtown Tampa in 1934. In 1967, SJH opened its existing main hospital facility on Martin Luther King Avenue in Tampa, Florida. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., a not-for-profit entity, is the licensee of St. Joseph's Hospital, an acute care hospital located at 3001 West Martin Luther King, Jr., Boulevard, Tampa, Florida. As a not-for-profit organization, SJH's mission is to improve the health care of the community by providing high- quality compassionate care. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., is a Medicaid disproportionate share provider and provided $145 million in charity and uncompensated care in 2009. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., is licensed to operate approximately 883 beds, including acute care beds; Level II and Level III neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) beds; and adult and child-adolescent psychiatric beds. The majority of beds are semi-private. Services include Level II and pediatric trauma services, angioplasty, and open-heart surgery. These beds and services are distributed among SJH's main campus; St. Joseph's Women's Hospital; St. Joseph's Hospital North, a newer satellite hospital in north Tampa; and St. Joseph's Children's Hospital. Except for St. Joseph's Hospital North, these facilities are land-locked. Nevertheless, SJH has continued to invest in its physical plant and to upgrade its medical technology and equipment. In February 2010, SJH opened St. Joseph's Hospital North, a state-of-the-art, 76-bed satellite hospital in Lutz, north Hillsborough County, at a cost of approximately $225 million. This facility is approximately 14 miles away from the main campus. This followed the award of CON No. 9610 to SJH for the establishment of St. Joseph's Hospital North, which was unsuccessfully opposed by University Community Hospital and Tampa General Hospital, two existing hospital providers in Tampa. Univ. Cmty. Hosp., Inc., d/b/a Univ. Cmty. Hosp. v. Agency for Health Care Admin., Case Nos. 03-0337CON and 03-0338CON. St. Joseph's Hospital North operates under the same license and under common management. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., is also the holder of CON No. 9833 for the establishment of a 90-bed state-of-the-art satellite hospital on Big Bend Road, Riverview, Hillsborough County. These all private beds include general medical-surgical beds, an ICU, and a 10-bed obstetrical unit. On October 21, 2009, the Agency revised CON No. 9833 with a termination date of October 21, 2012. This project was unsuccessfully opposed by TG, SB, and Brandon. St. Joseph's Hosp., Inc. v. Agency for Health Care Admin., Case No. 05-2754CON, supra. St. Joseph's Hospital anticipates construction beginning in October 2012 and opening the satellite hospital, to be known as St. Joseph's Hospital South, in early 2015. This hospital will be operating under SJH's existing license and Medicare and Medicaid provider numbers and will in all respects be an integral component of SJH. The implementation of St. Joseph's Hospital South is underway. SJH has contracted with consultants, engineers, architects, and contractors and has funded the first phase of the project with $6 million, a portion of which has been spent. The application for CON No. 9833 refers to "evidence- based design" and the construction of a state-of-the-art facility. (The design of St. Joseph's Hospital North also uses "evidence-based design.") St. Joseph's Hospital South will have all private rooms, general surgery operating rooms as well as endoscopy, and a 10-bed obstetrics unit. Although CON No. 9833 is for a project involving 228,810 square feet of new construction, SJH intends to build a much larger facility, approximately 400,000 square feet on approximately 70 acres. St. Joseph's Hospital Main's physical plant is 43 years old. The majority of the patient rooms are semi–private and about 35% of patients admitted at this hospital received private rooms. Notwithstanding the age of its physical plant and its semi–private bed configuration, SJH has a reputation of providing high quality of care and is a strong competitor in its market. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., has two facility expansions currently in progress at its main location in Tampa: a new five-story building that will house SJH neonatal intensive care unit, obstetrical, and gynecology services; and a separate, two-story addition with 52 private patient rooms. Of the 52 private patient rooms, 26 will be dedicated to patients recovering from orthopedic surgery, and will be large enough to allow physical therapy to be done in the patient room itself. The other 26 rooms will be new medical-surgical ICU beds at the hospital. At the same time that SJH expands its main location, it is pursuing a strategic plan whereby the main location is the "hub" of its system, with community hospitals and health facilities located in outlying communities. As proposed in CON Application No. 9610, St. Joseph's Hospital North was to be 240,000 square feet in size. Following the award of CON No. 9610, SJH requested that AHCA modify the CON to provide for construction of a larger facility. In its modification request, SJH requested to establish a large, state- of-the-art facility with all private patient rooms, and the desirability of private patient rooms as a matter of infection control and patient preference. AHCA granted the modification. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., thereafter planned to construct St. Joseph's Hospital North to be four stories in height. The plan was opposed. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., offered to construct a three-story building, large enough horizontally to accommodate the CON square footage modification. The offer was accepted. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., markets St. Joseph's Hospital North as "The Hospital of the Future, Today." The hospital was constructed using "evidence-based design" to maximize operational efficiencies and enhance the healing process of its residents –- recognizing, among other things, the role of the patient's family and friends. The facility's patient care units are all state-of-the-art and include, for example, obstetrical suites in which a visiting family member can spend the night. A spacious, sunlit atrium and a "healing garden" are also provided. The hospital's dining facility is frequented by community residents. In addition, SJH owns a physician group practice under HealthPoint Medical Group, a subsidiary of St. Joseph's Health Care Center, Inc. The group practice has approximately 19 different office locations, including several within the service area for the proposed hospital. The group includes approximately 106 physicians. However, most of the office locations are in Tampa, and the group does not have an office in Riverview, although there are plans to expand locations to include the Big Bend Road site. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., anticipates having to establish a new medical staff for St. Joseph's Hospital South, and will build a medical office building at the site for the purpose of attracting physicians. It further anticipates that some number of physicians on SB's existing medical staff will apply for privileges at St. Joseph's Hospital South. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., is the market leader among Hillsborough County hospitals and is currently doing well financially, as it has historically. For 2010, St. Joseph's Hospital Main's operating income was approximately $78 million. Organizationally, SJH has a parent organization, St. Joseph's Health Care Center, Inc., and is one of eight hospitals in the greater Tampa Bay area affiliated with BayCare. On behalf of its member hospitals, BayCare arranges financing for capital projects, provides support for various administrative functions, and negotiates managed care contracts that cover its members as a group. St. Joseph's Hospital characterizes fees paid for BayCare services as an allocation of expenses rather than a management fee for its services. In 2009, SJH paid BayCare approximately $42 million for services. St. Joseph's Hospital is one of three BayCare affiliates in Hillsborough County. The other two are St. Joseph's Hospital North and South Florida Baptist Hospital, a community hospital in Plant City. St. Joseph's Hospital South would be the fourth BayCare hospital in the county. Tampa General The Hillsborough County Hospital Authority, a public body appointed by the county, operated Tampa General Hospital until 1997. In that year, TG was leased to Florida Health Sciences Center, Inc., a non-profit corporation and the current hospital licensee. Tampa General is a 1,018-bed acute care hospital located at 2 Columbia Drive, Davis Island, Tampa, Florida. In addition to trauma surgery services, TG provides tertiary services, such as angioplasty, open-heart surgery, and organ transplantation. Tampa General operates the only burn center in the area. A rehabilitation hospital is connected to the main hospital, but there are plans to relocate this facility. Tampa General owns a medical office building. Tampa General is JCAHO accredited and has received numerous honors. Tampa General provides high-quality of care. Approximately half of the beds at TG are private rooms. Tampa General's service area for non-tertiary services includes all of Hillsborough County. Tampa General is also the teaching hospital for the University of South Florida's College of Medicine. As a statutory teaching hospital, TG has 550 residents and funds over 300 postgraduate physicians in training. Tampa General is the predominant provider of services to Medicaid recipients and the medically indigent of Hillsborough County. It is considered the only safety-net hospital in Hillsborough County. (A safety net hospital provides a disproportionate amount of care to indigent and underinsured patients in comparison to other hospitals.) A high volume of indigent (Medicaid and charity) patients are discharged from TG. In 2009, the costs TG incurred treating indigent patients exceeded reimbursement by $56.5 million. Approximately 33% of Tampa General's patients are Medicare patients and 25% commercial. Tampa General has grown in the past 10 years. It added 31 licensed acute care beds in 2004 and 82 more since SB's application was filed in 2007. In addition, the Bayshore Pavilion, a $300-million project, was recently completed. The project enlarged TG's ED, and added a new cardiovascular unit, a new neurosciences and trauma center, a new OB-GYN floor, and a new gastrointestinal unit. Facility improvements are generally ongoing. Tampa General's capital budget for 2011 is approximately $100 million. In 2010, TG's operating margin was approximately $43 million and a small operating margin in 2011. AHCA AHCA is the state agency that administers the CON law. Jeff Gregg testified that during his tenure, AHCA has never preliminarily denied a replacement hospital CON application or required consideration of alternatives to a replacement hospital. Mr. Gregg opined that the lack of alternatives or options is a relevant consideration when reviewing a replacement hospital CON application. T 468. The Agency's State Agency Action Report (SAAR) provides reasons for preliminarily approving SB's CON application. During the hearing, Mr. Gregg testified, in part, that the primary reasons for preliminary approval were issues related to quality of care "because the facility represents itself as being unable to expand or adapt significantly to the rapidly changing world of acute care. This is consistent with what [he has] heard about other replacement hospitals." T 413. Mr. Gregg also noted that SB focused on improving access "[a]nd as the years go by, it is reasonable to expect that the population outside of Sun City Center, the immediate Sun City Center area, will steadily increase and improve access for more people, and that's particularly true because this application includes both a freestanding emergency department and a shuttle service for the people in the immediate area. And that was intended to address their concerns based upon the fact that they have had this facility very conveniently located for them in the past at a time when there was little development in the general south Hillsborough area. But the applicant wants to position itself for the expected growth in the future, and we think has made an excellent effort to accommodate the immediate interests of Sun City Center residents with their promises to do the emergency, freestanding emergency department and the shuttle service so that the people will continue to have very comfortable access to the hospital." T 413-14. Mr. Gregg reiterated "that the improvements in quality outweigh any concerns that [the Agency] should have about the replacement and relocation of this facility; that if this facility were to be forced to remain where it is, over time it would be reasonable to expect that quality would diminish." T 435. For AHCA, replacement hospital applications receive the same level of scrutiny as any other acute care hospital applications. T 439-40. South Bay's existing facility and site South Bay is located on the north side of SR 674, an east-west thoroughfare in south Hillsborough County. The area around the hospital is "built out" with predominantly residential development. Sun City Center, an age-restricted (55 and older) retirement community, is located directly across SR 674 from the hospital as well as on the north side of SR 674 to the east of the hospital. Other residential development is immediately to the west of the hospital on the north side of SR 674. See FOF 3-6. Sun City Center is flanked by two north-south arterial roadways, I-75 to the west and U.S. Highway 301 to the east, both of which intersect with SR 674. The community of Ruskin is situated generally around the intersection of SR 674 and U.S. 41, west of I-75. The community of Wimauma is situated along SR 674 just east of U.S. Highway 301. South Bay is located in a three-story building that is well–maintained and in relatively good repair. The facility is well laid out in terms of design as a community hospital. Patients and staff at SB are satisfied with the quality of care and scope of acute care services provided at the hospital. Notwithstanding current space limitations, and problems in the ICU, see FOF 77-82, patients receive a high quality of care. One of the stated reasons for replacement is with respect to SB's request to have all private patient rooms in order to be more competitive with St. Joseph's Hospital South. South Bay's inpatient rooms are located within the original construction. The hospital is approximately 115,800 square feet, or a little over 1,000 square feet per inpatient bed. By comparison, small to mid-sized community hospitals built today are commonly 2,400 square feet per inpatient bed on average. All of SB's patient care units are undersized by today's standards, with the exception of the ED. ICU patients, often not ambulatory, require a higher level of care than other hospital patients. The ICU at SB is not adequate to meet the level of care required by the ICU patient. SB's ICU comprises eight rooms with one bed apiece. Eight beds are not enough. As Dr. Ksaibati put it at hearing: "Right now we have eight and we are always short . . . double . . . the number of beds, that's at least [the] minimum [t]hat I expect we are going to have if we go to a new facility." T 198-99 (emphasis added). The shortage of beds is not the only problem. The size of SB's ICU rooms is too small. (Problems with the ICU have existed at least since 2006.) Inadequate size prohibits separate, adjoining bathrooms. For patients able to leave their beds, therefore, portable bathroom equipment in the ICU room is required. Inadequate size, the presence of furniture, and the presence of equipment in the ICU room creates serious quality of care issues. When an EKG is conducted, the nurse cannot be present in the room. Otherwise, there would be no space for the EKG equipment. It is difficult to intubate a patient and, at times, "extremely dangerous." T 170. A major concern is when a life-threatening problem occurs that requires emergency treatment at the ICU patient's bedside. For example, when a cardiac arrest "code" is called, furniture and the portable bathroom equipment must be removed before emergency cardiac staff and equipment necessary to restore the function of the patient's heart can reach the patient for the commencement of treatment. Comparison to ICU rooms at other facilities underscores the inadequate size of SB's ICU rooms. Many of the ICU rooms at Brandon are much larger -- more than twice the size of SB's ICU rooms. Support spaces are inadequate in most areas, resulting in corridors (at times) being used for inappropriate storage. In addition, the hospital's general storage is inadequate, resulting in movable equipment being stored in mechanical and electrical rooms. Of the medical-surgical beds at SB, 48 are private and 64 are semi-private. The current standard in hospital design is for acute care hospitals to have private rooms exclusively. Private patient rooms are superior to semi-private rooms for infection control and patient well-being in general. The patient is spared the disruption and occasional unpleasantness that accompanies sharing a patient room –- for example, another patient's persistent cough or inability to use the toilet (many of SB's semi-private rooms have bedside commodes). Private rooms are generally recognized as promoting quality of care. South Bay's site is approximately 17.5 acres, bordered on all sides by parcels not owned by either SB or by HCA- affiliated entities. The facility is set back from SR 674 by a visitor parking lot. Proceeding clockwise around the facility from the visitor parking lot, there is a small service road on the western edge of the site; two large, adjacent ponds for stormwater retention; the rear parking lot for ED visitors and patients; and another small service road which connects the east side of the site to SR 674, and which is used by ambulances to access the ED. Dedicated parking for SB's employees is absent. A medical office building (MOB), which is not owned by SB, is located to the north of the ED parking lot. The MOB houses SB's Human Resources Department as well as medical offices. Most of SB's specialty physicians have either full or part-time offices in close proximity to SB. Employee parking is not available in the MOB parking lot. Some of SB's employees park in a hospital-owned parking lot to the north of the MOB, and then walk around the MOB to enter the hospital. South Bay's CEO and management employees park on a strip of a gravel lot, which is rented from the Methodist church to the northeast of the hospital's site. In 2007, as part of the CON application to relocate, SB commissioned a site and facility assessment (SFA) of the hospital. The SFA was prepared for the purpose of supporting SB's replacement hospital application and has not been updated since its preparation in 2007. The architects or engineers who prepared the SFA were not asked to evaluate proposed options for expansion or upgrade of SB on-site. However, the SFA concludes that the SB site has been built out to its maximum capacity. On the other hand, the SFA concluded that the existing building systems at SB met codes and standards in force when constructed and are in adequate condition and have the capacity to meet the current needs of the hospital. The report also stated that if SB wanted to substantially expand its physical plant to accommodate future growth, upgrades to some of the existing building systems likely would be required. Notwithstanding these reports and relative costs, expansion of SB at its existing site is not realistic or cost- effective as compared to a replacement hospital. Vertical expansion is complicated by two factors. First, the hospital's original construction in 1982 was done under the former Southern Standard Building Code, which did not contain the "wind-loading" requirements of the present-day Florida Building Code. Any vertical expansion of SB would not only require the new construction to meet current wind-loading requirements, but would also require the original construction to be retrofitted to meet current wind-loading requirements (assuming this was even possible as a structural matter). Second, if vertical expansion were to meet current standards for hospital square footage, the new floor or floors would "overhang" the smaller existing construction, complicating utility connections from the lower floor as well as the placement of structural columns to support the additional load. The alternative (assuming feasibility due to current wind-loading requirements) would be to vertically stack patient care units identical to SB's existing patient care units, thereby perpetuating its undersized and outdated design. Vertical expansion at SB has not been proposed by the Gould Turner Group (Gould Turner), which did a Master Facility Plan for SB in May 2010, but included a new patient bed tower, or by HBE Corporation (HBE). Horizontal expansion of SB is no less complicated. The hospital would more than double in size to meet the modern-day standard of 2,400 square feet per bed, and its site is too small for such expansion. It is apparent that such expansion would displace the visitor parking lot if located to the south of the existing building, and likely have to extend into SR 674 itself. South Bay's architectural consultant expert witness substantiated that replacing SB is justified as an architectural matter, and that the facility cannot be brought up to present-day standards at its existing location. According to Mr. Siconolfi, the overall building at SB is approximately half of the total size that would normally be in place for a new hospital meeting modern codes and industry standards. The more modest expansions offered by Gould Turner and HBE are still problematic, if feasible at all. Moreover, with either proposal, SB would ultimately remain on its existing 17.5-acre site, with few opportunities to expand further. Gould Turner's study was requested by SB's CEO in May 2010, to determine whether and to what extent SB would be able to expand on-site. (Gould Turner was involved with SB's recent ED expansion project area.) The resulting Master Facility Plan essentially proposes building a new patient tower in SB's existing visitor parking lot, to the left and right of the existing main entrance to SB. This would require construction of a new visitor parking lot in whatever space remained in between the new construction and SR 674. The Master Facility Plan contains no discussion of the new impervious area that would be added to the site and the consequential requirement of additional stormwater capacity, assuming the site can even accommodate additional stormwater capacity. This study also included a new 12-bed ICU and the existing ICU would be renovated into private patient rooms. For example, "[t]he second floor would be all telemetry beds while the third floor would be a combination of medical/surgical, PCU, and telemetry beds." In Gould Turner's drawings, the construction itself would be to the left and to the right of the hospital's existing main entrance. Two scenarios are proposed: in the first, the hospital's existing semi-private rooms would become private rooms and, with the new construction, the hospital would have 114 licensed beds (including two new beds), all private; in the second, some of the hospital's existing semi-private rooms would become private rooms and, with the new construction, the hospital would have 146 licensed beds (adding 34 beds), of which 32 would be semi-private. South Bay did not consider Gould Turner's alternative further or request additional, more detailed drawings or analysis, and instead determined to pursue the replacement hospital project, in part, because it was better not to "piecemeal" the hospital together. Mr. Miller, who is responsible for strategic decisions regarding SB, was aware of, but did not review the Master Facility Plan and believes that it is not economically feasible to expand the hospital. St. Joseph's Hospital presented testimony of an architect representing the hospital design/build firm of HBE, to evaluate SB's current condition, to provide options for expansion and upgrading on-site, and to provide a professional cost estimate for the expansion. Mr. Oliver personally inspected SB's site and facility in October 2010 and reviewed numerous reports regarding the facility and other documents. Mr. Oliver performed an analysis of SB's existing physical plant and land surrounding the hospital. HBE's analysis concluded that SB has the option to expand and upgrade on-site, including the construction of a modern surgical suite, a modern 10-bed ICU, additional elevators, and expansion and upgrading of the ancillary support spaces identified by SB as less than ideal. HBE's proposal involves the addition of 50,000 square feet of space to the hospital through the construction of a three-story patient tower at the south side of the hospital. The additional square footage included in the HBE proposal would allow the hospital to convert to an all-private bed configuration with either 126 private beds by building out both second and third floors of a new patient tower, or to 126 private beds if the hospital chose to "shell in" the third floor for future expansion. Under the HBE proposal, SB would have the option to increase its licensed bed capacity 158 beds by completing the second and third floors of the new patient tower (all private rooms) while maintaining the mix of semi-private and private patient rooms in the existing bed tower. The HBE proposal also provides for a phased renovation of the interior of SB to allow for an expanded post-anesthesia care unit, expanded laboratory, pharmacy, endoscopy, women's center, prep/hold/recovery areas, central sterile supply and distribution, expanded dining, and a new covered lobby entrance to the left side of the hospital. Phasing of the expansion would permit the hospital to remain in operation during expansion and renovation with minimal disruption. During construction the north entrance of the hospital would provide access through the waiting rooms that are currently part of the 2001 renovated area of the hospital with direct access to the circulation patterns of the hospital. The HBE proposal also provides for the addition of parking to bring the number of parking spaces on-site to 400. The HBE proposal includes additional stormwater retention/detention areas that could serve as attractive water features and, similar to the earlier civil engineering reports obtained by SB, proposes the construction of a parking garage at the rear of the facility should additional parking be needed in the future. However, HBE essentially proposes the alternative already rejected by SB: construction of a new patient tower in front of the existing hospital. Similar to Gould Turner, HBE proposes new construction to the left and right of the hospital's existing lobby entrance and the other changes described above. HBE's proposal recognizes the need for additional stormwater retention: the stand of trees that sets off the existing visitor parking lot from SR 674 would be uprooted; in their place, a retention pond would be constructed. Approval of the Southwest Florida Water Management District (SWFWMD) would be required for the proposal to be feasible. Assuming the SWFWMD approved the proposal, the retention pond would have to be enclosed by a fence. This would then be the "face" of the hospital to the public on SR 674. HBE's proposal poses significant problems. The first floor of the three-story component would be flush against the exterior wall of the hospital's administrative offices, where the CEO and others currently have windows with a vista of the front parking lot and SR 674. Since the three-story component would be constructed first in the "phased" construction, and since the hospital's administration has no other place to work in the existing facility, the CEO and other management team would have to work off-site until the new administrative offices (to the left of the existing hospital lobby entrance) were constructed. The existing main entrance to the hospital, which faces SR 674, would be relocated to the west side of the hospital once construction was completed in its entirety. In the interim, patients and visitors would have to enter the facility from the rear, as the existing main entrance would be inaccessible. This would be for a period of months, if not longer. For the second and third floors, HBE's proposal poses two scenarios. Under the first, SB would build the 24 general medical-surgical beds on the tower's second floor, but leave the third floor as "shelled" space. This would leave SB with a total of 106 licensed beds, six fewer than it has at present. Further, since HBE's proposal involves a second ICU at SB, 18 of the 106 beds are ICU beds, leaving 88 general medical-surgical beds. By comparison, SB currently has 104 general medical- surgical beds, meaning that it loses 16 general medical-surgical beds under HBE's first scenario. In the second scenario, SB would build 24 general medical-surgical beds on the third floor as well, and would have a total of 126 licensed beds. Since 18 of those beds would be ICU beds, SB would have 108 general medical-surgical beds, or only four more than it has at present. Further, the proposal does not make SB appreciably bigger. The second and third floors in HBE's proposal are designed in "elongated" fashion such that several rooms may be obscured from the nursing station's line of sight by a new elevator, which is undesirable as a matter of patient safety and security. Further, construction of the second and third floors would be against the existing second and third floors above the lobby entrance's east side. This would require 12 existing private patient rooms to be taken out of service due to loss of their vista windows. At the same time, the new second and third floors would be parallel to, but set back from, existing semi- private patient rooms and their vista windows along the southeast side of the hospital. This means that patients and visitors in the existing semi-private patient rooms and patients and visitors in the new private patient rooms on the north side of the new construction may be looking into each other's rooms. HBE's proposal also involves reorganization and renovation of SB's existing facility, and the demolition and disruption that goes with it. To accommodate patient circulation within the existing facility from the ED (at the north side of the hospital) to the new patient tower (at the south side of the hospital), two new corridors are proposed to be routed through and displace the existing departments of Data Processing and Medical Records. Thus, until the new administrative office space would be constructed, Data Processing and Medical Records (along with the management team) would have to be relocated off-site. Once the new first floor of the three-story component is completed, the hospital's four ORs and six PACU beds will be relocated there. In the existing vacated surgical space, HBE proposes to relocate SB's existing cardiology unit, thus requiring the vacated surgical space to be completely reconfigured (building a nursing station and support spaces that do not currently exist in that location). In the space vacated by the existing cardiology unit, HBE proposed expanding the hospital's clinical laboratory, meaning extensive demolition and reconfiguration in that area. The pharmacy is proposed to be relocated to where the existing PACU is located, requiring the building of a new pharmacy with a secure area for controlled substances, cabinets for other medications, and the like. The vacated existing pharmacy is in turn proposed to be dedicated to general storage, which involves still more construction and demolition, tearing out the old pharmacy to make the space suitable for general storage. HBE's proposal is described as a "substantial upgrade" of SB, but it was stated that a substantial upgrade could likewise be achieved by replacing the facility outright. This is SB's preference, which is not unreasonable. There have been documented problems with other hospital expansions, including patient infection due to construction dust. South Bay's proposal South Bay proposes to establish a 112-bed replacement hospital on a 39-acre parcel (acquired in 2005) located in the Riverview community, on the north side of Big Bend Road between I-75 and U.S. Highway 301. The hospital is designed to include 32 observation beds built to acute care occupancy standards, to be available for conversion to licensed acute care beds should the need arise. The original total project cost of $215,641,934, calculated when the application was filed in October 2007 has been revised to $192,967,399. The decrease in total project cost is largely due to the decrease in construction costs since 2007. The parties stipulated that SB's estimated construction costs are reasonable. The remainder of the project budget is likewise reasonable. The budgeted number for land, $9,400,000, is more than SB needs: the 39-acre parcel is held in its behalf by HCA Services of Florida, Inc., and was acquired in March 2005 for $7,823,100. An environmental study has been done, and the site has no environmental development issues. The original site preparation budgeted number of $5 million has been increased to $7 million to allow for possible impact fees, based on HCA's experience with similar projects. Building costs, other than construction cost, flow from the construction cost number as a matter of percentages and are reasonable. The equipment costs are reasonable. Construction period interest as revised from the original project budget is approximately $4 million less, commensurate with the revised project cost. Other smaller numbers in the budget, such as contingencies and start-up costs, were calculated in the usual and accepted manner for estimated project costs and are reasonable. South Bay's proposed service area (PSA) comprises six zip codes (33573 (Sun City Center), 33570 (Ruskin), 33569 (Riverview), 33598 (Wimauma), 33572 (Apollo Beach), and 33534 (Gibsonton)) in South Hillsborough County. These six zip codes accounted for 92.2% of SB's discharges in 2006. The first three zip codes, which include Riverview (33569), accounted for 76.1% of the discharges. Following the filing of the application in 2007, the U.S. Postal Service subdivided the former zip code 33569 into three zip codes: 33569, 33578, and 33579. (The proposed service area consists of eight zip codes.) The same geographic area comprises the three Riverview zip codes taken together as the former zip code 33569. In 2009, the three Riverview zip codes combined accounted for approximately 504 to 511/514 of SB's discharges, with 589 discharges in 2006 from the zip code 33569. Of SB's total discharges in 2009, approximately 8 to 9% originated from these three zip codes. In 2009, approximately 7,398 out of 14,424 market/service-area discharges, or approximately 51% of the total market discharges came from the three southern zip codes, 33573 (Sun City Center), 33570 (Ruskin), and 33598 (Wimauma). Also, approximately 81% of SB's discharges in 2009 originated from the same three zip codes. (The discharge numbers for SB for 2009 presented by St. Joseph's Hospital and SB are similar. See SB Ex. 9 at 11 and SJH Ex. 4 at 8-9. See also TG Ex. 4 at 3-4.) In 2009, SB and Brandon had an approximate 68% market share for the eight zip codes. See FOF 152-54 and 162-65 for additional demographic data. St. Joseph's Hospital had an approximate 5% market share within the service area and using 2009-2010 data, TG had approximately 6% market share in zip code 33573 and an overall market share in the three Riverview zip codes of approximately 19% and a market share of approximately 23% in zip code 33579. South Bay's application projects 37,292 patient days in year 1; 39,581 patient days in year 2; and 41,563 patient days in year 3 for the proposed replacement hospital. The projection was based on the January 2007 population for the service area as reflected in the application, and what was then a projected population growth rate of 20.8% for the five-year period 2007 to 2012. These projections were updated for the purposes of hearing. See FOF 246-7. The application also noted a downturn in the housing market, which began in 2007 and has continued since then. The application projected a five-year (2007-2012) change of 20.8% for the original five zip codes. At hearing, SB introduced updated utilization projections for 2010-2015, which show the service area population growing at 15.3% for that five-year period. South Bay's revised utilization projections for 2015- 2017 (projected years 1-3 of the replacement hospital) are 28,168 patient days in year 1; 28,569 patient days in year 2; and 29,582 patient days in year 3. The lesser utilization as compared with SB's original projections is partly due to slowed population growth, but predominantly due to SB's assumption that St. Joseph's Hospital will build its proposed satellite hospital in Riverview, and that SB will accordingly lose 20% of its market share. The revised utilization projections are conservative, reasonable, and achievable. With the relocation, SB will be more proximate to the entirety of its service area, and will be toward the center of population growth in south Hillsborough County. In addition, it will have a more viable and more sustainable hospital operation even with the reduced market share. Its financial projections reflect a better payor mix and profitability in the proposed location despite the projection of fewer patient days. Conversely, if SB remains in Sun City Center, it is subject to material operating losses even if its lost market share in that location is the same 20%, as compared to the 30 to 40% it estimates that it would lose in competition with St. Joseph's Hospital South. South Bay's medical staff and employees support the replacement facility, notwithstanding that their satisfaction with SB is very high. The proposal is also supported by various business organizations, including the Riverview Chamber of Commerce and Ruskin Chamber of Commerce. However, many of the residents of Sun City Center who testified opposed relocation of SB. See FOF 210-11. South Bay will accept several preconditions on approval of its CON application: (1) the location of SB on Big Bend Road in Riverview; (2) combined Medicaid and charity care equal to 7.0% of gross revenues; and (3) operating a free- standing ED at the Sun City location and providing a shuttle service between the Sun City location and the new hospital campus ("for patients and visitors"). SB Ex. 46, Schedule C. In its SAAR, the Agency preliminarily approved the application including the following: This approval includes, as a component of the proposal: the operation of a freestanding emergency department on a 24-hour, seven-day per week basis at the current Sun City location, the provision of extended hours shuttle service between the existing Sun City Center and the new campuses to transport patients and visitors between the facilities to locations; and the offering of primary care and diagnostic testing at the Sun City Center location. These components are required services to be provided by the replacement hospital as approved by the Agency. Mr. Gregg explained that the requirement for transport of patients and visitors was included based on his understanding of the concerns of the Sun City Center community for emergency as well as routine access to hospital services. Notwithstanding the Agency statement that the foregoing elements are required, the Agency did not condition approval on the described elements. See SB Ex. 12 at 39 and 67. Instead, the Agency only required SB, as a condition of approval, to provide a minimum of 7.0% of the hospital's patient days to Medicaid and charity care patients. (As noted above, SB's proposed condition says 7.0% of gross revenues.) Because conditions on approval of the CON are generally subject to modification, there would be no legal mechanism for monitoring or enforcement of the aspects of the project not made a condition of approval. If the Agency approves SB's CON application, the Agency should condition any approval based on the conditions referenced above, which SB set forth in its CON application. SB Ex. 12 at 39 and 67. See also T 450 ("[The Agency] can take any statement made in the application and turn that into a condition," although conditions may be modified.1 St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General are critical of SB's offer of a freestanding ED and proposed shuttle transportation services. Other than agreeing to condition its CON application by offering these services, SB has not evaluated the manner in which these services would be offered. South Bay envisions that the shuttle service (provided without charge) would be more for visitors than it would be for patients and for outpatients or patients that are ambulatory and able to ride by shuttle. Other patients would be expected to be transported by EMS or other medical transport. As of the date of hearing, Hillsborough County does not have a protocol to address the transport of patients to a freestanding ED. South Bay contacted Hillsborough County Fire Rescue prior to filing its CON application and was advised that they would support SB's establishment of a satellite hospital on Big Bend Road, but did not support the closure and relocation of SB, even with a freestanding ED left behind. See FOF 195-207. At hearing, SB representatives stated that SB would not be closed if the project is denied. Compliance with applicable statutory and rule criteria Section 408.035(1): The need for the health care facilities and health services being proposed The need for SB itself and at its current location is not an issue in this case. That need was demonstrated years ago, when SB was initially approved. For the Agency, consideration of a replacement hospital application "diminishes the concept of need in [the Agency's] weighing and balancing of criteria in this case." There is no express language in the CON law, as amended, which indicates that CON review of a replacement hospital application does not require consideration of other statutory review criteria, including "need," unless otherwise stipulated. Replacement hospital applicants, like SB, may advocate the need for replacement rather than expansion or renovation of the existing hospital, but a showing of "need" is still required. Nevertheless, institution-specific factors may be relevant when "need" is considered. The determination of "need" for SB's relocation involves an analysis of whether the relocation of the hospital as proposed will enhance access or quality of care, and whether the relocation may result in changes in the health care delivery system that may adversely impact the community, as well as options SB may have for expansion or upgrading on-site. In this case, the overall "need" for the project is resolved, in part, by considering, in conjunction with weighing and balancing other statutory criteria, including quality of care, whether the institution-specific needs of SB to replace the existing hospital are more reasonable than other alternatives, including renovation and whether, if replacement is recommended, the residents of the service area, including the Sun City Center area, will retain reasonable access to general acute care hospital services. The overall need for the project has not been proven. See COL 360-70 for ultimate conclusions of law regarding the need for this project. Section 408.035(2): The availability, quality of care, accessibility, and extent of utilization of existing health care facilities and health services in the service district of the applicant The "service district" in this case is acute care subdistrict 6-1, Hillsborough County. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-2.100. The acute care hospital services SB proposes to relocate to Big Bend Road are available to residents of SB's service area. Except as otherwise noted herein with respect to constraints at SB, there are no capacity constraints limiting access to acute care hospital services in the subdistrict. The availability of acute care services for residents of the service area, and specifically the Riverview area, will increase with the opening of St. Joseph's Hospital South. All existing providers serving the service area provide high quality of care. Within the service district as a whole, SB proposes to relocate the existing hospital approximately 5.7 linear miles north of its current location and approximately 7.7 miles using I-75, one exit north. South Bay would remain in south Hillsborough County, as well as the southernmost existing health care facility in Hillsborough County, along with St. Joseph's Hospital South when it is constructed. The eight zip codes of SB's proposed service area occupy a large area of south Hillsborough County south of Tampa (to the northwest) and Brandon (to the northeast). Included are the communities of Gibsonton, Riverview, Apollo Beach, Ruskin, Sun City Center, and Wimauma. The service area is still growing despite the housing downturn, with a forecast of 15.3% growth for the five-year period 2010 to 2015. The service area's population is projected to be 168,344 in 2015, increasing from 145,986 in 2010. The service area is currently served primarily by SB, which is the only existing provider in the service area, and Brandon. For non-tertiary, non-specialty discharges from the service area in 2009, SB had approximately 40% market share, including market share in the three Riverview zip codes of approximately 10% (33569), 6% (33578), and 16% (33579). Brandon had approximately 28% of the market in the service area, and a market share in the three Riverview zip codes of approximately 58% (33569), 46% (33578), and 40% (33579). Thus, SB and Brandon have approximately a 61% market share in the Riverview zip codes and approximately a 68% market share service area-wide. The persuasive evidence indicates that Riverview is the center of present and future population in the service area. It is the fastest-growing part of the service area overall and the fastest-growing part of the service area for patients age 65 and over. Of the projected 168,334 residents in 2015, the three Riverview zip codes account for 80,779 or nearly half the total population. With its proposed relocation to Riverview, SB will be situated in the most populous and fastest-growing part of south Hillsborough County. At the same time, it will be between seven and eight minutes farther away from Sun City Center. In conjunction with St. Joseph's Hospital South when constructed, SB's proposed relocation will enhance the availability and accessibility of existing health care facilities and health services in south Hillsborough County, especially for the Riverview-area residents. However, it is likely that access will be reduced for the elderly residents of the Sun City Center area needing general acute care hospital services. St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General contend that: (1) it would be problematic to locate two hospitals in close proximity in Riverview (those being St. Joseph's Hospital South and the relocated SB hospital) and (2) SB's relocation would deprive Sun City Center's elderly of reasonable access to hospital services. St. Joseph's Hospital seems to agree that the utilization projections for SB's replacement hospital are reasonable. Also, St. Joseph's Hospital expects St. Joseph's Hospital South to reach its utilization as projected in CON Application No. 9833, notwithstanding the decline in population growth and the proposed establishment of SB's proposed replacement hospital, although the achievement of projected utilization may be extended. There are examples of Florida hospitals operating successfully in close proximity. The evidence at hearing included examples where existing unaffiliated acute care hospitals in Florida operate within three miles of each another; in two of those, the two hospitals are less than one-half mile apart. These hospitals have been in operation for years. However, some or all of the examples preceded CON review. There are also demographic differences and other unique factors in the service areas in the five examples that could explain the close proximity of the hospitals. Also, in three of the five examples, at least one of the hospitals had an operating loss and most appeared underutilized. One such example, however, is pertinent in this case: Tallahassee Memorial Hospital and Capital Regional Medical Center (CRMC) in Tallahassee, which are approximately six minutes apart by car. CRMC was formerly Tallahassee Community Hospital (TCH), a struggling, older facility with a majority of semi-private patient rooms, similar to South Bay. Sharon Roush, SB's current CEO, became CEO at TCH in 1999. As she explained at hearing, HCA was able to successfully replace the facility outright on the same parcel of land. TCH was renamed CRMC and re-opened as a state-of-the-art hospital facility with all private rooms. The transformation improved the hospital's quality of care and its attractiveness to patients, better enabling it to compete with Tallahassee Memorial Hospital. St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General also contend that SB's relocation would deprive Sun City Center's elderly of reasonable access to hospital services. When the application was filed in 2007, Sun City Center residents in zip code 33573 accounted for approximately 52% of all acute care discharges to SB and SB had a 69% market share. By 2009, Sun City Center residents accounted for approximately 57% of all SB discharges and SB had approximately 72% market share. Approximately half of the age 65-plus residents in the service area reside within the Sun City Center area. This was true in 2010 and will continue to be true in 2015. The projected percentage of the total population in the Sun City Center zip code over 65 for 2009-2010 is approximately 87%. This percentage is expected to grow to approximately 91% by 2015. Sun City Center also has a high percentage of residents who are over the age of 75. Demand for acute care hospital services is largely driven by the age of the population. The age 65-plus population utilizes acute-care hospital services at a rate that is approximately two to three times that of the age 64 and younger population. South Bay plans to relocate its hospital from the Sun City Center zip code 33573 much closer to an area (Riverview covering three zip codes) that has a less elderly population. Elderly patients are known to have more transportation difficulties than other segments of the population, particularly with respect to night driving and congested traffic in busy areas. Appropriate transportation services for individuals who are transportation disadvantaged typically require door-to- door pickup, but may vary from community to community. At the time of preliminary approval of SB's proposed relocation, the Agency was not provided and did not take into consideration data reflecting the percentage of persons in Sun City Center area who are aged 65 or older or aged 75 and older. The Agency was not provided data reflecting the number of residents within the Sun City Center area who reside in nursing homes or assisted living facilities. In general, the 2010 median household incomes and median home values for the residents of Sun City Center, Ruskin, and Gibsonton are materially less than the income and home values for the residents from the other service areas. Freedom Village is located near Sun City Center and within walking distance to SB. Freedom Village is comprises a nursing home, assisted living, and senior independent living facilities, and includes approximately 120 skilled nursing facility beds, 90 assisted living beds, and 30 Alzheimer's beds. Freedom Village is home to approximately 1,500 people. There are additional skilled nursing and assisted living facilities within one to two miles of SB comprising approximately an additional 400 to 500 skilled nursing facility beds and approximately 1,500 to 2,000 residents in assistant or independent living facilities. Residents in skilled nursing facilities and assisted living facilities generally require a substantial level of acute- care services on an ongoing basis. Many patients 65 and older requiring admission to an acute-care facility have complex medical conditions and co-morbidities such that immediate access to inpatient acute care services is of prime importance. Area patients and caregivers travel to SB via a golf cart to access outpatient health care services and to obtain post-discharge follow-up care. Although there are some crossing points along SR 674, golf carts are not allowed on SR 674 itself, and the majority of Sun City Center residents who utilize SB in its existing location do not arrive by golf cart -– rather, they travel by automobile. The Sun City Center area has a long–established culture of volunteerism. Residents of Sun City Center provide a substantial number of man-hours of volunteer services to community organizations, including SB. Among the many services provided by community volunteers is the Sun City Center Emergency Squad, an emergency medical transport service that operates three ambulances and provides EMT and basic life support transport services in Sun City Center 24-hours a day, seven days a week. The Emergency Squad provides emergency services free of charge, but charges patients for transport which is deemed a non-emergency. Most patients transported by the Emergency Squad are taken to the SB ED. It is customary for specialists to locate their offices adjacent to an acute-care hospital. Most of the specialty physicians on the medical staff of SB have full-time or part-time offices adjacent to SB. The location of physician offices adjacent to the hospital facilitates access to care by patients in the provision of care on a timely basis by physicians. The relocation of SB may result in the relocation of physician offices currently operating adjacent to SB in Sun City Center, which may cause additional access problems for local residents. In 2009, the SB ED had approximately 22,000 patient visits. Approximately 25% of the patients that visit the South Bay ED are admitted for inpatient care. South Bay recently expanded its ED to accommodate approximately 34,000 patient visits annually. The average age of patients who visit the South Bay ED is approximately 70. Patients who travel by ambulance may or may not experience undue transportation difficulties as a result of the proposed relocation of SB; however, patients also arrive at the South Bay ED by private transportation. But, most patients are transported to the ED by automobile or emergency transport. In October 2010, the Board of Directors of the Sun City Center Association adopted a resolution on behalf of its 11,000 members opposing the closure of SB. The Board of Directors and membership of Federation of Kings Point passed a similar resolution on behalf of its members. Residents of the Sun City Center area currently enjoy easy access to SB in part because the roadways are low-volume, low-speed, accessible residential streets. SR 674 is the only east-west roadway connecting residents of the Sun City Center area to I-75 and U.S. Highway 301. The section of SR 674 between I-75 and U.S. Highway 301 is a four-lane divided roadway with a speed limit of 40-45 mph. To access Big Bend Road from the Sun City Center area, residents travel east on SR 674 then north on U.S. Highway 301 or west on SR 674 then north on I-75. U.S. Highway 301 is a two-lane undivided roadway from SR 674 north to Balm Road, with a speed limit of 55 mph and a number of driveways and intersections accessing the roadway. (Two lanes from Balm Road South, then widened to six lanes from Balm Road North.) U.S. Highway 301 is a busy and congested roadway, and there is a significant backup of traffic turning left from U.S. Highway 301 onto Big Bend Road. A portion of U.S. Highway 301 is being widened to six lanes, from Balm Road to Big Bend Road. The widening of this portion of U.S. Highway 301 is not likely to alleviate the backup of traffic at Big Bend Road. I-75 is the only other north-south alternative for residents of the Sun City Center area seeking access to Big Bend Road. I-75 is a busy four-lane interstate with a 70 mph speed limit. The exchange on I-75 and Big Bend Road is problematic not only because of traffic volume, but also because of the unusual design of the interchange, which offloads all traffic on the south side of Big Bend Road, rather than divide traffic to the north and south as is typically done in freeway design. The design of the interchange at I-75 in Big Bend Road creates additional backup and delays for traffic seeking to exit onto Big Bend Road. St. Joseph's Hospital commissioned a travel (drive) time study that compared travel times to SB's existing location and to its proposed location from three intersections within Sun City Center. This showed an increase of between seven and eight minutes' average travel time to get to the proposed location as compared to the existing location of SB. The study corroborated SB's travel time analysis, included in its CON application, which shows four minutes to get to SB from the "centroid" of zip code 33573 (Sun City Center) and 11 minutes to get to SB's proposed location from that centroid, or a difference of seven minutes. The St. Joseph's Hospital travel time study also sets forth the average travel times from the three Sun City Center intersections to Big Bend Road and Simmons Loop, as follows: Intersection Using I-75 Using U.S. 301 South Pebble Beach Blvd. and Weatherford Drive 12 min. 17 secs. 14 min. 19 secs. Kings Blvd. and Manchester Woods Drive 15 min. 44 secs. 20 min. 39 secs. North Pebble Beach Blvd. and Ft. Dusquesna Drive 13 min. 15 secs. 15 min. 41 secs. The average travel time from Wimauma (Center Street and Delia Street) to Big Bend Road and Simmons Loop was 15 minutes and 16 seconds using I-75 and 13 minutes and 52 seconds using U.S. Highway 301, an increase of more than six minutes to the proposed site. The average travel time from Ruskin (7th Street and 4th Avenue SW) to Big Bend Road and Simmons Loop was 15 minutes and 22 seconds using U.S. 41 and 14 minutes and 15 seconds using I-75, an increase of more than five minutes to the proposed site. Currently, the average travel time from Sun City Center to Big Bend Road using U.S. Highway 301 is approximately to 16 minutes. The average travel time to Big Bend Road via I-75 assuming travel with the flow of traffic is approximately 13 minutes. The incremental increase in travel time to the proposed site for SB for residents of the Sun City Center area, assuming travel with the flow of traffic, ranges from nine to 11 minutes. For residents who currently access SB in approximately five to 10 minutes, travel time to Big Bend Road is approximately 15 to 20 minutes. As the area develops, traffic is likely to continue to increase. There are no funded roadway improvements beyond the current widening of U.S. Highway 301 north of Balm Road. Most of the roadways serving Sun City Center, Ruskin, and Wimauma have a county-adopted Level of Service (LOS) of "D." LOS designations range from "A" to "F", with "F" considered gridlock. Currently, Big Bend Road from Simmons Loop Road (the approximate location of SB's propose replacement hospital) to I-75 is at LOS "F" with an average travel speed of less than mph. Based on a conservative analysis of the projected growth in traffic volume, SR 674 east of U.S. Highway 301 is projected to degrade from LOS "C" to "F" by 2015. By 2020, several additional links on SR 674 will have degraded to LOS "F." The LOS of I-75 is expected to drop to "D" in the entirety of Big Bend Road between U.S. Highway 301 and I-75 is projected to degrade to LOS "F" by 2020. The Hillsborough County Fire Rescue Department (Rescue Department) opposes the relocation of SB to Big Bend Road. The Rescue Department supports SB's establishment of a satellite hospital on Big Bend Road, but does not support the closure of SB in Sun City Center. The Rescue Department anticipates that the relocation of SB will result in a reduction in access to emergency services for patients and increased incident response times for the Rescue Department. The Rescue Department would support a freestanding ED should SB relocate. David Travis, formerly (until February 2010) the rescue division chief of the Rescue Department, testified against SB's proposal. The basis of his opposition is his concern that relocating the hospital from Sun City Center to Riverview would tend to increase response times for rescue units operating out of the Sun City Center Fire Station. The term response time refers to the time from dispatch of the rescue unit to its arrival on the scene for a given call. Mr. Travis noted that rescue units responding from the Sun City Center Fire Station would make a longer drive (perhaps seven to eight minutes) to the new location in Riverview to the extent that hospital services are needed, and during the time of transportation would necessarily be unavailable to respond to another call. However, Mr. Travis had not specifically quantified increases in response times for Sun City Center's rescue units in the event that SB relocates. Further, SB is not the sole destination for the Rescue Department's Sun City Center rescue units. While a majority of the patients were transported to SB, out of the total patient transports from the greater Sun City Center area in 2009, approximately one-third went to other hospitals other than SB, including St. Joseph's Hospital, Tampa General, and Brandon. The Rescue Department is the only advanced life support (ALS) ground transport service in the unincorporated areas of Hillsborough County responding to 911 calls. The ALS vehicles provide at least one certified paramedic on the vehicle, cardiac monitors, IV medications, advanced air way equipment, and other services. The Rescue Department has two rescue units in south Hillsborough County - Station 17 in Ruskin and Station 28 in Sun City Center. (Station 22 is in Wimauma, but does not have a rescue unit.) Stations 17 and 28 run the majority of their calls in and around the Sun City Center area, with the majority of transports to the South Bay ED. The Rescue Department had 3,643 transports from the Sun City Center area in 2009, with 54.5% transports to SB. If SB is relocated to Big Bend Road, the rescue units for Stations 17 and 28 are likely to experience longer out-of- service intervals and may not be as readily available for responding to calls in their primary service area. The Rescue Department seeks to place an individual on the scene within approximately seven minutes, 90% of the time (an ALS personnel goal) in the Sun City Center area. Relocation of SB out of Sun City Center may make it difficult for the Rescue Department to meet this response time, notwithstanding the proximity of I-75. A rapid response time is critical to providing quality care. The establishment of a freestanding ED in Sun City Center would not completely alleviate the Rescue Department's concerns, including a subset of patients who may need to be transported to a general acute care facility. There are other licensed emergency medical service providers in Hillsborough County, with at least one basic life support EMS provider in Sun City Center. The shuttle service proposed by SB may not alleviate the transportation difficulties experienced by the patients and caregivers of Sun City Center. Also, SB has not provided a plan for the scope or method of the provisional shuttle services. Six residents of Sun City Center testified against SB's proposed relocation to Riverview, including Ed Barnes, president of the Sun City Center Community Association. Mr. Barnes and two other Sun City Center residents (including Donald Schings, president of the Handicapped Club, Sun City Center) spoke in favor of St. Joseph's Hospital's proposed hospital in Riverview at a public land-use meeting in July 2010, thus demonstrating their willingness to travel to Riverview for hospital services. Mr. Barnes supported St. Joseph's Hospital's proposal for a hospital in Riverview since its inception in 2005, when St. Joseph's Hospital filed CON Application No. 9833 and thought that St. Joseph's Hospital South would serve the Sun City Center area. There are no public transportation services per se available within the Sun City Center area. Volunteer transportation services are provided. In part, the door-to-door services are provided under the auspices of the Samaritan Services, a non-profit organization supported by donations and staffed by Sun City Center volunteers. It is in doubt whether these services would continue if SB is relocated. There is a volunteer emergency squad using a few vehicles that responds to emergency calls within the Sun City Center area, with SB as the most frequent destination. Approval of SB's project will not necessarily enhance financial access to acute care services. The relocation of SB is more likely than not to create some access barriers for low- income residents of the service area. The relocation would also be farther away from communities such as Ruskin and Wimauma as there are no buses or other forms of public transportation available in Ruskin, Sun City Center, or Wimauma. However, it appears that the Sun City Center residents would travel not only to Riverview, but north of Riverview for hospital services following SB's relocation, notwithstanding the fact that Sun City Center residents are transportation- disadvantaged. The Hillsborough County Board of County Commissioners recently amended the Comprehensive Land-Use Plan and adopted the Greater Sun City Center Community Plan, which, in part, lists the retention of an acute care hospital in the Sun City Center area as the highest health care planning priority. For Sun City Center residents who may not want to drive to SB's new location, SB will provide a shuttle bus, which can convey both non-emergency patients and visitors. South Bay has made the provision of the shuttle bus a condition of its CON. As noted herein, the CON's other conditions are the establishment of the replacement hospital at the site in Riverview; combined Medicaid and charity care in the amount of 7.0% of gross revenues; and maintaining a freestanding ED at SB. SB Ex. 46, Schedule C. Section 408.035(3): The ability of the applicant to provide quality of care and the applicant's record of providing quality of care South Bay has a record of providing high quality of care at its existing hospital. It is accredited by JCAHO, and also accredited as a primary stroke center and chest pain center. In the first quarter of 2010, SB scored well on "core measures" used by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) as an indicator of the quality of patient safety. South Bay received recognition for its infection control programs and successfully implemented numerous other quality initiatives. Patient satisfaction is high at SB. AHCA's view of the need for a replacement hospital is not limited according to whether or not the existing hospital meets broad quality indicators, such as JCAHO accreditation. Rather, AHCA recognizes the degree to which quality would be improved by the proposed replacement hospital -– and largely on that basis has consistently approved CON applications for replacement hospitals since at least 1991. See FOF 64-66. South Bay would have a greater ability to provide quality of care in its proposed replacement hospital. Private patient rooms are superior in terms of infection control and the patient's general well-being. The conceptual design for the hospital, included in the CON application, is the same evidence- based design that HCA used for Methodist Stone Oak Hospital, an award-winning, state-of-the-art hospital in San Antonio, Texas. Some rooms at SB are small, but SB staff and physicians are able, for the most part, to function appropriately and provide high quality of care notwithstanding. (The ICU is the exception, although it was said that patients receive quality of care in the ICU. See FOF 77-82.) Most of the rooms in the ED "are good size." Some residents are willing to give up a private room in order to have better access of care and the convenience of care to family members at SB's existing facility. By comparison, the alternative suggested by St. Joseph's Hospital does not use evidence-based design and involves gutting and rearranging roughly one-third of SB's existing interior; depends upon erecting a new patient tower that would require parking and stormwater capacity that SB currently does not have; requires SB's administration to relocate off-site during an indeterminate construction period; and involves estimated project costs that its witnesses did not disclose the basis of, claiming that the information was proprietary. South Bay's physicians are likely to apply for privileges at St. Joseph's Hospital South. Moreover, if SB remains at its current site, it is reasonable to expect that some number of those physicians would do less business at SB or leave the medical staff. Many of SB's physicians have their primary medical offices in Brandon, or otherwise north of Sun City Center. Further, many of the specialists at SB are also on staff at Brandon. St. Joseph's Hospital South would be more convenient for those physicians, in addition to having the allure of a new, state-of-the-art hospital. South Bay is struggling with its nursing vacancy rate, which was 12.3% for 2010 at the time of the hearing and had increased from 9.9% in 2009. The jump in nursing vacancies in 2010 substantially returned the hospital to its 2008 rate, which was 12.4%. As with its physicians, SB's nurses generally do not reside in the Sun City Center area giving its age restrictions as a retirement community; instead, they live further north in south Hillsborough County. In October 2007 when the application was filed, SB had approximately 105 employees who lived in Riverview. It is reasonable to expect that SB's nurses will be attracted to St. Joseph's Hospital South, a new, state-of-the-art hospital closer to where they live. Thus, if it is denied the opportunity to replace and relocate its hospital, SB could also expect to lose nursing staff to St. Joseph's Hospital South, increasing its nursing vacancy rate. Section 408.035(4): The availability of resources, including health personnel, management personnel, and funds for capital and operating expenditures, for project accomplishment and operation The parties stipulated that Schedule 2 of SB's CON application was complete and required no proof at hearing. South Bay will not have to recruit nursing or physician staff for its proposed replacement hospital. Its existing medical and nursing staff would not change, and would effectively "travel" with the hospital to its new location. Conversely, the replacement hospital should enhance SB's ability to recruit specialty physicians, which is currently a challenge for SB in its existing facility. The parties stipulated to the reasonableness of SB's proposed staffing for the replacement hospital as set out in Schedule 6A, but SJH and TG contend that the staffing schedule should also include full-time equivalent positions (FTEs) for the freestanding ED that SB proposes to maintain at its existing hospital. This contention is addressed in the Conclusions of Law, concerning application completeness under section 408.037, at COL 356-57. South Bay has sufficient funds for capital and operating expenditures for project accomplishment and operation. The project cost will be underwritten by HCA, which has adequate cash flow and credit opportunities. It is reasonable that SB's project will be adequately funded if the CON is approved. Section 408.035(5): The extent to which the proposed services will enhance access to health care for residents of the service district The specific area that SB primarily serves, and would continue to serve, is the service area in south Hillsborough County as identified in its application and exhibits. The discussion in section IV.B., supra, is applicable to this criterion and incorporated herein. With its proposed relocation to Riverview, SB will be situated in the most populous and fastest-growing part of south Hillsborough County; will be available to serve Sun City Center, Ruskin, and Wimauma; and will be between seven and eight minutes farther away from Sun City Center than it is at present. However, while the relocated facility will be available to the elderly residents of the Sun City Center area, access for these future patients will be reduced from current levels given the increase in transportation time, whether it be by emergency vehicle or otherwise. Section 408.035(6): The immediate and long-term financial feasibility of the proposal Immediate or "short-term" financial feasibility is the ability of the applicant to secure the funds necessary to capitalize and operate the proposed project. The project cost for SB's proposed replacement hospital is approximately $200 million. The costs associated with the establishment and operation of the freestanding ED and other services were not included in the application, but for the reasons stated herein, were not required to be projected in SB's CON application. South Bay demonstrated the short-term financial feasibility of the proposal. The estimated project cost has declined since the filing of the application in 2007, meaning that SB will require less capital than originally forecast. While Mr. Miller stated that he does not have authority to bind HCA to a $200 million capital project, HCA has indicated that it will provide full financing for the project, and that it will go forward with the project if awarded the CON. Long-term financial feasibility refers to the ability of a proposed project to generate a profit in a reasonable period of time. AHCA has previously approved hospital proposals that showed a net profit in the third year of pro forma operation or later. See generally Cent. Fla. Reg. Hosp., Inc. v. Agency for Health Care Admin. & Oviedo HMA, Inc., Case No. 05-0296CON (Fla. DOAH Aug. 23, 2006; Fla. AHCA Jan. 1, 2007), aff'd, 973 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). To be conservative, SB's projections, updated for purposes of hearing, take into account the slower population growth in south Hillsborough County since the application was originally filed. South Bay also assumed that St. Joseph's Hospital South will be built and operational by 2015. The net effect, as accounted for in the updated projections, is that SB's replacement hospital will have 28,168 patient days in year 1 (2015); 28,569 patient days in year 2 (2016); and 29,582 patient days in year 3 (2017). That patient volume is reasonable and achievable. With the updated utilization forecast, SB projects a net profit for the replacement hospital of $711,610 in 2015; $960,693 in 2016; and $1,658,757 in 2017. The financial forecast was done, using revenue and expense projections appropriately based upon SB's own most recent (2009) financial data. Adjustments made were to the payor mix and the degree of outpatient services, each of which would change due to the relocation to Riverview. The revenue projections for the replacement hospital were tested for reasonableness against existing hospitals in SB's peer group, using actual financial data as reported to AHCA. St. Joseph's Hospital opposed SB's financial projections. St. Joseph's Hospital's expert did not take issue with SB's forecasted market growth. Rather, it was suggested that there was insufficient market growth to support the future patient utilization projections for St. Joseph's Hospital South and SB at its new location and, as a result, they would have a difficult time achieving their volume forecasts and/or they would need to draw patients from other hospitals, such as Brandon, in order to meet utilization projections. St. Joseph's Hospital's expert criticized the increase in SB's projected revenues in its proposed new location as compared to its revenues in its existing location. However, it appears that SB's payor mix is projected to change in the new location, with a greater percentage of commercial managed care, thus generating the greater revenue. South Bay's projected revenue in the commercial indemnity insurance classification was also criticized because SB's projected commercial indemnity revenues were materially overstated. That criticism was based upon the commercial indemnity insurance revenues of St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General, which were used as a basis to "adjust" SB's projected revenue downward. St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General's fiscal-year 2009 commercial indemnity net revenue was divided by their inpatient days, added an inflation factor, and then multiplied the result by SB's year 1 (2015) inpatient days to recast SB's projected commercial indemnity net revenue. The contention is effectively that SB's commercial indemnity net revenue would be the same as that of St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General. There is no similarity between the three hospitals in the commercial indemnity classification. The majority of SJH's and TG's commercial indemnity net revenue comes from inpatients rather than outpatient cases; whereas the majority of SB's commercial indemnity net revenue comes from outpatient cases rather than inpatients. This may explain why SB's total commercial indemnity net revenue is higher than SJH or TG, when divided by inpatient days. The application of the lower St. Joseph's Hospital-Tampa General per-patient-day number to project SB's experience does not appear justified. It is likely that SB's project will be financially feasible in the short and long-term. Section 408.035(7): The extent to which the proposal will foster competition that promotes quality and cost-effectiveness South Bay and Brandon are the dominant providers of health care services in SB's service area. This dominance is likely to be eroded once St. Joseph's Hospital South is operational in and around 2015 (on Big Bend Road) if SB's relocation project is not approved. The proposed relocation of SB's facility will not change the geography of SB's service area. However, it will change SB's draw of patients from within the zip codes in the service area. The relocation of SB is expected to increase SB's market share in the three northern Riverview zip codes. This increase can be expected to come at the expense of other providers in the market, including TG and SJH, and St. Joseph's Hospital South when operational. The potential impact to St. Joseph's Hospital may be approximately $1.6 million based on the projected redirection of patients from St. Joseph's Hospital Main to St. Joseph's Hospital South, population growth in the area, and the relocation of SB. Economic impacts to TG are of record. Tampa General estimates a material impact of $6.4 million if relocation is approved. Notwithstanding, addressing "provider-based competition," AHCA in its SAAR noted: Considering the current location is effectively built out at 112 beds (according to the applicant), this project will allow the applicant to increase its bed size as needed along with the growth in population (the applicant's schedules begin with 144 beds in year one of the project). This will shield the applicant from a loss in market share caused by capacity issues and allow the applicant and its affiliates the opportunity to maintain and/or increase its dominant market share. SB Ex. 12 at 55. AHCA's observation that replacement and relocation of SB "will shield the applicant from a loss in market share caused by capacity issues" has taken on a new dimension since the issuance of the SAAR. At that time, St. Joseph's Hospital did not have final approval of CON No. 9833 for the establishment of St. Joseph's Hospital South. It is likely that St. Joseph's Hospital South will be operational on Big Bend Road, and as a result, SB, at its existing location, will experience a diminished market share, especially from the Riverview zip codes. In 2015 (when St. Joseph's Hospital proposes to open St. Joseph's Hospital South), SB projects losing $2,669,335 if SB remains in Sun City Center with a 20% loss in market share. The losses are projected to increase to $3,434,113 in 2016 and $4,255,573 in 2017. It follows that the losses would be commensurately more severe at the 30% to 40% loss of market share that SB expects if it remains in Sun City Center. St. Joseph's Hospital criticized SB's projections for its existing hospital if it remains in Sun City Center with a 20% loss in market share; however, the criticism was not persuasively proven. It was assumed that SB's expenses would decrease commensurately with its projected fewer patient days, thus enabling it to turn a profit in calendar year 2015 despite substantially reduced patient service revenue. However, it was also stated that expenses such as hospital administration, pharmacy administration, and nursing administration, which the analysis assumed to be variable, in fact have a substantial "fixed" component that does not vary regardless of patient census. South Bay would not, therefore, pay roughly $5 million less in "Administration and Overhead" expenses in 2015 as calculated. To the contrary, its expenses for "Administration and Overhead" would most likely remain substantially the same, as calculated by Mr. Weiner, and would have to be paid, notwithstanding SB's reduced revenue. The only expenses that were recognized as fixed by SJH's expert, and held constant, were SB's calendar year 2009 depreciation ($3,410,001) and short-term interest ($762,738), shown in the exhibit as $4,172,739 both in 2009 and 2015. Other expenses in SJH's analysis are fixed, but were inappropriately assumed to be variable: for example, "Rent, Insurance, Other," which is shown as $1,865,839 in 2009, appears to decrease to $1,462,059 in 2015. The justification offered at hearing, that such expenses can be re-negotiated by a hospital in the middle of a binding contract, is not reasonable. St. Joseph's Hospital's expert opined that SB's estimate of a 30 to 40% loss of market share (if SB remained in Sun City Center concurrent with the operation of St. Joseph's Hospital South) was "much higher than it should be," asserting that the loss would not be that great even if all of SB's Riverview discharges went to St. Joseph's Hospital South. (Mr. Richardson believes the "10 to 20 percent level is likely reasonable," although he opines that a 5 to 10% impact will likely occur.) However, this criticism assumes that a majority of the patients that currently choose SB would remain at SB at its existing location. The record reflects that Sun City Center area residents actively supported the establishment of St. Joseph's Hospital South, thus suggesting that they might use the new facility. Further, SB's physicians are likely to join the medical staff of St. Joseph's Hospital South to facilitate that utilization or to potentially lose their patients to physicians with admitting privileges at St. Joseph's Hospital South. Tampa General's expert also asserted that SB would remain profitable if it remained in its current location, notwithstanding the establishment of St. Joseph's Hospital South. It was contended that SB's net operating revenues per adjusted patient day increased at an annual rate of 5.3% from 2005 to 2009, whereas the average annual increase from 2009 to 2017 in SB's existing hospital projections amounts to 1.8%. On that basis, he opined that SB should be profitable in 2017 at its existing location, notwithstanding a loss in market share to St. Joseph's Hospital South. However, the 5.3% average annual increase from 2005 to 2009 is not necessarily predictive of SB's future performance, and the evidence indicated the opposite. Tampa General's expert did not examine SB's performance year-by-year from 2005 to 2009, but rather compared 2005 and 2009 data to calculate the 5.3% average annual increase over the five-year period. This analysis overlooks the hospital's uneven performance during that time, which included operating losses (and overall net losses) in 2005 and 2007. Further, the evidence showed that the biggest increase in SB's net revenue during that five-year period took place from 2008 to 2009, and was largely due to a significant decrease in bad debt in 2009. SB Ex. 16 at 64. (Bad debt is accounted for as a deduction from gross revenue: thus, the greater the amount of bad debt, the less net revenue all else being equal; the lesser the amount of bad debt, the greater the amount of net revenue all else being equal.) The evidence further showed that the 2009 reduction in bad debt and the hospital's profitability that year, is unlikely to be repeated. Overall, approval of the project is more likely to increase competition in the service area between the three health care providers/systems. Denial of the project is more likely to have a negative effect on competition in the service area, although it will continue to make general acute care services available and accessible to the Sun City Center area elderly (and family and volunteer support). Approval of the project is likely to improve the quality of care and cost-effectiveness of the services provided by SB, but will reduce access for the elderly residents of the Sun City Center area needing general acute care hospital services who will be required to be transported by emergency vehicle or otherwise to one of the two Big Bend Road hospitals, unless needed services, such as open heart surgery, are only available elsewhere. For example, if a patient presents to SB needing balloon angioplasty or open heart surgery, the patient is transferred to an appropriate facility such as Brandon. The presence of an ED on the current SB site may alleviate the reduction in access somewhat for some acute care services, although the precise nature and extent of the proposed services were not explained with precision. If its application is denied, SB expects to remain operational so long as it remains financially viable. Section 408.035(8): The costs and methods of the proposed construction, including the costs and methods of energy provision and the availability of alternative, less costly, or more effective methods of construction The parties stipulated that the costs and methods of the proposed construction, including the costs and methods of energy provision, were reasonable. St. Joseph's Hospital and Tampa General did not stipulate concerning the availability of alternative, less costly, or more effective methods of construction, and take the position that SB should renovate and expand its existing facility rather than replace and relocate the facility. Whether section 408.035(8) requires consideration (weighing and balancing with other statutory criteria) of potential renovation costs as alternatives to relocation was hotly debated in this case. For the reasons stated herein, it is determined that this subsection, in conjunction with other statutory criteria, requires consideration of potential renovation versus replacement of an existing facility. St. Joseph's Hospital offered expert opinion that SB could expand and upgrade its existing facility for approximately $25 million. These projected costs include site work; site utilities; all construction, architectural, and engineering services; chiller; air handlers; interior design; retention basins; and required movable equipment. This cost is substantially less than the approximate $200 million cost of the proposed relocation. It was proven that there are alternatives to replacing SB. There is testimony that if SB were to undertake renovation and expansion as proposed by SJH, such upgrades would improve SB's competitive and financial position. But, the alternatives proposed by SJH and TG are disfavored by SB and are determined, on this record, not to be reasonable based on the institutional- specific needs of SB. Section 408.035(9): The applicant's past and proposed provision of health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent Approval of SB's application will not significantly enhance access to Medicaid, charity, or underserved population groups. South Bay currently provides approximately 4% of its patient days to Medicaid beneficiaries and about 1% to charity care. South Bay's historic provision of services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent is reasonable in view of its location in Sun City Center, which results in a disproportionate share of Medicare in its current payor mix. South Bay also does not offer obstetrics, a service which accounts for a significant degree of Medicaid patient days. South Bay proposes to provide 7% of its "gross patient revenue" to Medicaid and charity patients as part of its relocation. South Bay's proposed service percentage is reasonable. Section 408.035(10): The applicant's designation as a Gold Seal Program nursing facility pursuant to s. 400.235, when the applicant is requesting additional nursing home beds at that facility The parties stipulated that this criterion is not applicable.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying CON Application No. 9992. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of August, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES A. STAMPELOS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of August, 2011.

Florida Laws (9) 120.569120.57400.235408.031408.035408.036408.037408.039408.045
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UNIVERSITY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, INC., D/B/A UNIVERSITY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL AND UNIVERSITY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, INC., D/B/A UNIVERSITY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL AT CARROLLWOOD vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION AND ST. JOSEPH`S HOSPITAL, INC., D/B/A ST. JOSEPH`S HOSPITAL, 03-000337CON (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jan. 30, 2003 Number: 03-000337CON Latest Update: Dec. 06, 2004

The Issue Whether the Certificate of Need (CON) Application No. 9610, filed by St. Joseph's Hospital to establish a new 76-bed acute care satellite hospital in Hillsborough County, through the transfer of 76 acute care beds from the existing St. Joseph's Hospital, should be approved.

Findings Of Fact Agency for Health Care Administration AHCA is the single state agency responsible for administration of the CON program in Florida, pursuant to Section 408.034, Florida Statutes (2003). AHCA reviewed SJH's application to build a new, 76-bed, satellite hospital and preliminarily approved it. St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc. SJH is a Florida not-for-profit corporation, licensed to operate three existing hospitals on a single urban campus in District 6 including St. Joseph's Hospital, St. Joseph's Women's Hospital, and Tampa Children's Hospital. Although SJH has unused bed capacity, it is licensed to operate 883 beds distributed among its three hospitals and is one of Florida's largest acute care, safety-net providers. SJH has approximately 1,200 physicians on its active or senior active medical staff. The main adult SJH facility offers a full range of adult medical and surgical specialties and subspecialties, including adult open heart surgery, comprehensive oncology treatment and therapy, interventional radiology, inpatient psychiatric services, comprehensive neurological and orthopedic services, pulmonary rehabilitation, and hyper-baric services, including wound care. It is accredited by the Joint Commission of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO). St. Joseph's Women's Hospital is the only free-standing women's hospital in Florida, and is comprised of 234 acute care beds. It offers a comprehensive array of women's acute care medical and surgical services, including obstetrics, and Level II and Level III Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU) services. St. Joseph's Women's Hospital provides the highest number of births among all District 6 obstetrics providers, with over 6,000 births in 2001. Tampa Children's Hospital is comprised of 111 medical/surgical pediatric rooms, and offers comprehensive pediatric and pediatric specialty services, including pediatric intensive care and pediatric open heart surgery. Tampa Children's Hospital's medical staff includes over 80 pediatric specialists practicing in 20 specialties and sub-specialties. SJH is a member of BayCare Health System which operates seven independent, affiliated hospitals in the Tampa Bay area. BayCare Health System coordinates quality standards among its member hospitals, promotes community access to health care, and facilitates joint operating efficiencies through combined purchasing, economies of scale, and consolidation of duplicative, non-patient-care services, such as administration, human resources, information management, and financial services. SJH is affiliated with and jointly manages South Florida Baptist Hospital (SFBH), a 147-bed primary acute care hospital in Plant City, Florida, in eastern Hillsborough County. SFBH provides Level I obstetrics services. SJH and SFBH operate under a single chief medical officer and board of directors, and utilizes similar policies and procedures. SFBH is accredited by JCAHO with high standing, and is certified by the Medicare and Medicaid programs. University Community Hospital, Inc. University Community Hospital, Inc., is another hospital provider in District 6. It is a not-for-profit entity licensed to operate UCH Fletcher and UCH Carrollwood. UCH Fletcher is a 431-bed Class I general hospital that provides a full range of acute care hospital services, including open heart surgery, obstetrics, and Level II and Level III NICU services. It is located in the southeastern portion of the SJH satellite proposed service area and has unused bed capacity. UCH Carrollwood is a 120-bed primary acute care hospital located in North Tampa. It provides ICU and medical/surgical services, but not obstetrics. It too has unused bed capacity. Tampa General Hospital TGH is an 846-bed Class I general hospital located in South Tampa on Davis Island. It is a not-for-profit hospital that provides a comprehensive range of services, including general acute care, organ transplant, open heart surgery, and NICU care. It is a designated teaching hospital and a Level I trauma and burn treatment center. TGH is an important safety- net hospital and a large provider of Medicaid and indigent care. SJH Proposal SJH proposes to establish a 76-bed, acute care satellite hospital in North Hillsborough County on a site acquired twenty years ago. It seeks to transfer 76 acute care beds from the SJH Main urban campus to the new suburban hospital site. The proposed location is in an area of rapid population growth where SJH annually draws 8,000 admissions. The SJH satellite will be integrated with and function as a satellite of SJH Main. It will incorporate state-of-the art technology, including the Path Speed Picture Archive & Communications System (PACS) that is currently in use at SJH enabling physicians at the satellite facility to simultaneously review digital diagnostic images and medical records with physicians at SJH Main. The SJH satellite will be a primary acute care facility with obstetrics, and will not duplicate the tertiary or other specialized services provided at SJH Main. Since acquiring the site for the proposed satellite, SJH has established several outpatient, primary care, and home health services in the satellite proposed service area. HealthPoint Medical Group, a physician group affiliated with and managed by SJH, and comprised of approximately 56 physicians, currently has three offices in the proposed service area and plans to expand. SJH also operates two outpatient imaging centers in the area. The SJH proposal seeks to enhance access to acute care and emergency medical services for SJH's existing patients residing in the proposed service area and serve future population growth in the rapidly developing northwest Hillsborough County area. It seeks to alleviate some of the volume in the SJH Main ER, allow for conversion of semi-private rooms to private rooms, and mitigate parking congestion. Relevant Statutory Criteria Section 408.035(1), Florida Statutes (2003). The need for SJH proposed satellite hospital project in relation to the applicable district health plan. The review of SJH's proposal does not involve the traditional calculation and determination of need for the 76 beds proposed at the satellite since the applicant intends to transfer existing beds within the sub-district. The Agency's fixed need pool determination does not apply to SJH's proposal, nor is SJH required to demonstrate "not-normal" circumstances for approval. However, need is reviewed in relation to the local district health plan. The District 6 Local Health Plan (LHP) identifies six factors applicable to proposed bed transfers. First, the plan considers whether a transfer will help indigent patients. Although the transfer may slightly enhance access to the poor, there is minimal access problems for indigent patients. Second, the plan considers whether a bed transfer is needed so an existing hospital can meet licensure standards. SJH is not seeking to meet any new licensure standards. The third factor is whether a bed transfer includes a proposed reduction in excess bed capacity. SJH is reducing excess bed capacity in the downtown area of Tampa and transferring beds to a growing area with increasing demand. The fourth factor considered in the LHP is whether a bed transfer adversely impacts a disproportionate provider of Medicaid/indigent care by taking away paying patients. While the transfer may reduce, to some degree, paying patient volume at TGH, the transfer will increase the volume at SJH, another safety net provider. The fifth factor is whether the proposed bed transfer will improve the existing hospital's physical plant. SJH Main, and its patients will benefit from the ultimate renovation, increased space and single patient rooms. Finally, the plan considers whether the bed transfer is more cost-efficient than improving the existing hospital. The options are incomparable. SJH is seeking to construct a satellite hospital and expand its market area, not merely transfer beds to an existing facility. It is unknown and virtually incalculable whether the proposed satellite facility will be more cost-efficient than an improvement to the existing hospital. Section 408.035(2), Florida Statutes. The availability, quality of care, accessibility and extent of utilization of existing facilities and health services in the service district. Undoubtedly, health services exist and are available in the service district. In fact, nearly all of the residents of SJH's proposed service area live within 45 minutes of an existing hospital. However, Northwest Hillsborough County is experiencing rapid growth. Many of its major roads and arteries are already congested and overcapacity. The expected growth in the proposed service area will inevitably aggravate the problem. More importantly, despite the fact that virtually all of the residents in the proposed service area live within 45 minutes of an existing hospital, the population growth is affecting health care delivery. Hospital departments, including many of the emergency rooms, are experiencing similar congestion and acute care patients often wait several hours for treatment upon arrival. UCH is experiencing capacity constraints. The demand for general acute care and emergency room services in the area is high and reasonably expected to increase throughout the foreseeable future. UCH Fletcher has experienced significant growth in utilization since 1999, and UCH Carrollwood has experienced consistent gains over the same time period. During the first four months of 2003, UCH Fletcher operated near 75 percent capacity overall, and 85 percent capacity in its general medical/surgical beds. Moreover, the hospital ER was at or near capacity. UCH Fletcher's ER, which is comprised of 39 beds, experienced 65,000 patient visits in 2002 and exceeded 70,000 visits in 2003. During peak periods, Fletcher ER patients have often been required to wait in the ER six to eight hours for an inpatient bed. UCH's birth volume has also increased with the rapid population growth in the service area and is less affected by seasonal residents. In fact, UCH recently built a new women's center and expanded its obstetrics capacity to accommodate between 3,000 and 3,500 births annually and projects it will achieve 3,100 births by the end of 2004, and operate at 90 percent of capacity. SJH also experiences capacity issues. SJH Main is completely comprised of semi-private rooms. It's composition makes it less attractive and competitive in the market and less able to maximize its utilization of existing acute care beds. However, SJH Main experiences a huge demand for emergency services at its urban campus. The emergency department is one of the busiest in Florida and increasing each year. In 2002, SJH treated 104,000 ER patients, approximately 300 each day, and nearly 18,000 of those treated originated from the satellite hospital's proposed service area. SJH's emergency department is a large, urban ER with 58 beds. It is organized into separate patient treatment areas, including a 23-bed adult treatment area, an eight-bed pediatric treatment area with a separate ER entrance, a four-bed adult psychiatric emergency treatment area, a 13-bed First Care unit, and a ten-bed Clinical Decision Unit. While SJH historically has provided excellent quality of care in its ER, its increasing volumes often result in patients receiving or waiting for treatment in corridors while more critical patients occupy the ER treatment rooms. In peak season, hallways are temporarily used for patient care. SJH has actively sought to improve the delivery of emergency care. It invested substantial capital towards improvements and expansion of its existing ER. It established a unique service known as "First Care," that provides quick emergency care to less critical ER patients, such as patients with sore throats, sprains, and simple lacerations. It created a ten-bed Clinical Decision Unit to supplement the existing ER by converting hospital space adjacent to the ER into a permanent nursing unit. In addition, it increased ER staffing and physician coverage, and implemented protocols to improve the ER receiving and treatment processes. Despite its efforts, the SJH ER continues to experience difficulties with extremely high patient volume. In addition to the capacity constraints at UCH and in SJH's ER, ER bypass in Hillsborough County presents additional problems for emergency personnel, providers, and patients. Hospital bypass or diversion occurs when a hospital requests that emergency medical transport teams bypass the hospital's ER because the hospital lacks capacity to treat additional patients or categories of emergency patients. In response to the increasing problems associated with hospital ER bypass, the Hillsborough County Trauma Agency established a committee to analyze the situation, establish protocols, and recommend solutions. In addition, Hillsborough County implemented an Internet-based system whereby hospitals electronically place themselves on and off bypass without a dispatcher. Hospital ER bypass adversely impacts the availability and accessibility of acute care services, particularly emergency services in Northwest Hillsborough County. The credible evidence demonstrates that hospitals in Hillsborough County go on bypass as often as every day during peak season, and frequently several hospitals are concurrently on bypass. Of the hospitals in Northwest Hillsborough County, UCH Fletcher and UCH Carrollwood together had the highest incidence of hospital bypass in the first six months of 2003. In an effort to minimize the problems associated with transport, Hillsborough County Fire Rescue (HCFR) tracks all of its calls. It provides all Advanced Life Support emergency transport services in the county and responds to approximately 55,000 emergency calls annually, or about 4,300 calls each month. Approximately half, or 27,000 calls annually, originate in HCFR's Northwest Hillsborough County area and nearly 10,000 of those calls result in transport of a patient to an acute care facility. HCFR currently has 12 stations in Northwest Hillsborough County and is scheduled to open four additional stations in the northwest area in the near future. Hospital ER bypass is an obstacle for HCFR that causes delays in transport, emergency care, and return to service. The applicant's proposed satellite facility will improve access to patients in need of emergency services in Northwest Hillsborough County and alleviate some of the capacity problems at UCH and SJH, as well as problems caused by frequent or extended periods of hospital ER bypass. Section 408.035(3), Florida Statutes. The ability of SJH to provide quality of care and its record of quality of care. Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, SJH's record of providing quality of care at its existing hospital is applicable, but not in dispute. SJH's ability to provide quality of care at the proposed new satellite hospital is in dispute. In general, SJH has consistently provided excellent quality of care in the provision of a sophisticated range of services. It is accredited by JCAHO and certified by the Medicare and Medicaid programs. It has received consistent recognition for its provision of high quality of care and has been awarded the Consumer Choice Award in health care in Tampa for eight consecutive years. SJH's proposed satellite hospital will be able to provide excellent quality of care and serve the vast majority of patients seeking acute care and emergency services. SJH's proposed satellite hospital will enhance access and quality of care for residents of the Northwest Hillsborough County area. Although it will not provide tertiary services, emergency patients will receive immediate, high-quality care at the facility. In addition, the smaller subset of emergency patients requiring immediate tertiary-level services will continue to have access to the tertiary hospital providers. In fact, HCFR has developed sophisticated transport protocols designed to ensure that all patients are safely delivered to the appropriate facility as efficiently as possible, and HCFR paramedics are highly skilled and trained to assess the condition of each patient. In addition, the evidence indicates that SJH will provide high-quality Level I obstetrics services at its satellite facility. While the opponents assert that the proposed program will not match the quality or scope of obstetric services provided at SJH and UCH, the evidence indicates that the SJH obstetrical program will not be sub-par or beneath the standard of care in the area. While an on-site NICU program is clearly preferable, the need for quality Level I obstetric providers is not obviated. SJH will provide quality obstetrical care. Moreover, SJH's existing quality management policies, protocols, and processes will be instituted at the satellite hospital. It will be operated under the same quality management personnel team currently responsible for quality at SJH Main. Section 408.035(4), Florida Statutes. The need in the service district for special health care services reasonably and economically accessible in adjoining areas. AHCA and SJH demonstrated that that the proposed satellite does not intend to offer nor impact special health care services that may be reasonably and economically accessible in adjoining areas. The criterion is not applicable. Section 408.035(5), Florida Statutes. The needs of research and educational facilities, including, but not limited to, facilities with institutional training programs and community training programs of health care practitioners and for doctors of osteopathic medicine and medicine at the student, internship, and residency training levels. This criterion is not applicable. Section 408.035(6), Florida Statutes. The availability of resources, including health personnel, management personnel, and funds for capital and operating expenditures for project accomplishment and operation. The evidence demonstrates that SJH has the necessary resources and experience to provide quality health and management personnel to the satellite hospital. While there is some shortage of available nurses in Florida, including the Tampa area, the vacancy rate at SJH, including RNs and staff positions, is consistently below the state average. SJH has a well-developed nurse recruitment and retention program and has achieved steady increases in the retention rate of its RNs. Management has developed a flexible pool of employed nurses enabling it to maintain appropriate and cost-effective staffing based on patient day levels. In addition, SJH has successfully recruited and retained an enormous number of recent nurse graduates as well as experienced nurses without resorting to the use of agency or contract nurses. It is also working closely with several local colleges to increase nursing enrollment. SJH will develop, recruit, and retain necessary staff to implement its proposal. While SJH competes with other hospitals for nursing personnel, the proposed satellite will have little impact on competing hospitals. UCH and TGH have consistently been able to obtain sufficient nursing staff to provide high-quality care at their facilities. UCH and TGH have impressive R.N. retention rates and are well below the state and national averages. Finally, SJH has sufficient funds for capital and operating expenditures to complete and operate the proposed satellite hospital. SJH will provide half of the $75 million project cost and finance the balance through the BayCare system. Section 408.035(7), Florida Statutes. The extent to which the proposed services will enhance access to health care for residents of the service district. In many ways, the SJH satellite hospital will enhance access to acute care and emergency services for the vast majority of patients residing in its proposed service area. First, commuting time will significantly decrease. Annually, the satellite's proposed service area supplies SJH Main with over 8,000 admissions from residents who endure significant traffic congestion and lengthy delays. Commuting time from the residential neighborhoods in the proposed service area to SJH Main has nearly doubled over the past ten years and is currently 45 minutes to an hour. The reliable travel time evidence demonstrates that the SJH satellite will significantly reduce travel times to acute care services for residents in Northwest Hillsborough County, including those in the Cheval, Northdale, Ehrlich Road, Lutz, and Lake Magdelane residential areas. Second, SJH's satellite hospital will significantly enhance patient access to emergency care and relieve pressure on the UCH Fletcher and SJH Main ERs. The SJH Main ER annually treats nearly 18,000 patients who originate from the satellite's proposed service area. It is reasonable to expect many of those patients to be redirected to the SJH satellite. Third, the SJH satellite proposal will provide another point of delivery access to HCFR and facilitate faster service to ER patients and improve "back-in-service" times for HCFR. Fourth, the availability of another ER in Northwest Hillsborough County will minimize the adverse effects of hospital bypass, and likely reduce the frequency of bypass by diverting volume from existing ERs. Fifth, the relocation of 76 acute care beds from SJH Main to the satellite will enable SJH to convert many of its underutilized, semi-private rooms into more usable, attractive, private rooms. Finally, redirection of volume from the urban SJH Main campus to a satellite campus in a high-growth, suburban area will reduce traffic congestion, minimize parking problems, save time, and save lives. Section 408.035(8), Florida Statutes. The immediate and long-term financial feasibility of the proposal. With respect to the project's short-term financial feasibility, SJH demonstrated that it can immediately finance the construction and implementation of the proposed satellite hospital project and meet its existing capital obligations. The satellite proposal is immediately financially feasible. With respect to the satellite's long-term financial feasibility, while the opponents argue that SJH's projected volumes, revenues, and expenses are inaccurate and unreasonable, SJH, on balance, sufficiently proved that the proposed satellite is financially feasible. Specifically, SJH's utilization projections are reasonable. As its basis for the projections, SJH relied on the expected population growth in the proposed service area and its historic levels of similar service in that area. Without doubt, the satellite's proposed service area, located in the northwest sector of Hillsborough County, is a region of rapid population growth and development. The population in the proposed service area has increased by 35 percent over the past ten years and is projected to grow much faster over the next three years. The area is being invaded by young adults, and the demand for obstetric services is dramatically increasing. SJH's historic levels of similar service in the area are persuasive. According to the un-refuted evidence, nearly 8,000 patient admissions, or 20 percent of SJH's existing inpatient volume, originated from the SJH satellite proposed service area, and 18,000 ER patient visits, or 17 percent of the entire SJH Main ER volume, derived from the proposed service area in 2002. In addition, SJH's strong presence in the proposed service area has enabled it to capture 32 percent of the patient days originating in the proposed service area. Given the existing patient days and expected population growth in the area, after culling out the tertiary and dissimilar services that the satellite will not provide, it is reasonable to expect that there will be over 121,000 available patient days in the proposed service area in 2007. The evidence also demonstrates that it is reasonable to expect the new satellite hospital to capture 40 percent of the patient days otherwise served at SJH Main. Moreover, given its market position, it is not unreasonable to expect the satellite to capture 15 percent of the available pool of non- tertiary patient days in the proposed service area by the second year of operation. In addition, SJH can expect 7.5 percent of the satellite patient days to originate from outside the service area thereby providing it with a reasonable projected utilization of nearly 20,000 patient days. Although the opponents argue otherwise, the evidence demonstrates that SJH's projected revenues are also reasonable. Again, SJH based the satellite's projected revenues, with some minor errors, on historic revenues for non-tertiary, non- specialty patients at SJH Main and conservatively assumed that it will achieve 90 percent of the 19,688 patient day utilization projections, or 17,800 patient days. After multiplying the financial-class-specific patient revenue per patient day by the financial-class-specific incremental patient days at the satellite facility, and applying a three percent annual inflation factor, the satellite reasonably expects approximately $1,604 in net revenue per adjusted patient day. The figure is consistent with the projected net revenue per adjusted patient day of $1,832 at SJH Main, $1,672 at UCH Fletcher, $1,432 at UCH Carrollwood and $1,408 at SFBH. SJH's projected expenses for its satellite hospital are also reasonable. SJH modeled its projections on similar historical expenses and determined that it will incur fewer maintenance expenses at the new hospital facility. Its pro forma allowances for plant operations and non-labor expenses per adjusted patient day are reasonable and consistent with the actual experience of UCH, UCH Carrollwood, Helen Ellis, Suncoast, SFBH, and Tampa General hospitals. SJH's staffing projection for new FTEs is also reasonable. The redirection of patient volume from SJH Main to the satellite will enable SJH to transfer some of its experienced FTEs to the satellite. New FTEs will be hired at the 2001 area market average salary rate for new registered nurses annually inflated by three percent. With respect to the reasonableness and appropriateness of SJH's pro forma, the opponents also argue that SJH fatally failed to include financial projections for the satellite on a stand-alone basis and, thereby, made it impossible to determine its long-term financial feasibility. The opponents assertions, while interesting, are not persuasive. AHCA's CON application forms require applicants to demonstrate the financial impact of the proposed project on the CON applicant. Within Schedules 7a and 8a of its application, SJH reasonably demonstrated the satellite's effect on SJH. Specifically, the first presented set of Schedules 7a and 8a entitled "Main" demonstrates SJH without the satellite hospital and provides a clear current baseline financial position for SJH. The second presented set of Schedules 7a and 8a, entitled "Satellite Hospital," demonstrates the projected financial benefit to SJH and the incremental increase in patient days when the satellite hospital is operational. SJH appropriately demonstrated the incremental financial benefit of the proposed project to the applicant, SJH. Furthermore, SJH's pro forma illustrate that even with an immediate loss in revenues to SJH arising from the transfer of patient days from SJH Main to the satellite, the project will generate revenues in excess of expenses in the long term. Logically, and obviously understood in the application pro forma, had SJH included a third pro forma showing the positive financial gain to the satellite relating to the additional revenues from the cannibalized patient days, the overall project would have shown even greater profitability. SJH's pro forma include and account for all revenues and expenses associated with implementation and operation of the satellite hospital. Moreover, AHCA supports SJH's method of presentation of the financial pro forma information in its CON application, and argues that it meets the Agency's requirements and is consistent with the method employed by other approved CON applicants. In light of the evidence, SJH's proposed satellite hospital project will achieve long-term financial feasibility. Section 408.035(9), Florida Statutes. The extent to which the project will foster competition that promotes quality and cost effectiveness. SJH's proposed satellite hospital will foster competition that promotes quality and cost effectiveness without significantly adversely affecting existing providers. The evidence demonstrates that the opponents will remain strongly competitive. Specifically, TGH is financially secure and will not be placed at material risk by the satellite hospital. While TGH is a safety-net provider and relies, in-part, on government funding, it achieved a net profit of $10.8 million in 2001, $56.2 million in 2002, and $25.7 million through May 2003, annualized to approximately $40 million. It also increased its admissions 10 percent from 2000 to 2002 and expects further gains. Furthermore, TGH marginally serves the rapidly developing area where the satellite will draw most of its patients. In fact, TGH receives less than one percent of its non-tertiary admissions in six of the nine ZIP codes which comprise SJH's proposed service area. TGH's projected adverse impact by the satellite hospital is overstated and unreliable. It is based on a contribution margin of $5,997 per adjusted admission and is completely inconsistent with SJH's margin for 2001 of $2,664, UCH Fletcher's contribution margin of $2,367, and UCH Carrollwood's contribution margin of $2,622. Similarly, UCH will experience only minor adverse effect from the satellite. UCH is financially strong and has limited capacity to absorb the anticipated growth in demand for acute care services. Although UCH's net profit numbers have fluctuated from 2001 through the second quarter of 2002, UCH is expecting a net profit greater than $5 million in 2003 and a net profit of $7.3 million in 2004. In addition, its inpatient admissions increased seven percent from 2000 to 2002. UCH's loss projections are patently overstated. It erroneously used a 4.2 average length of stay and exaggerated its projected lost admissions by nearly 20 percent. It admitted that the satellite would have its lowest admissions in the service area in the ZIP codes proximate to UCH, yet argued the satellite would draw admissions equally from all zip codes in the proposed service area including those immediately adjacent to UCH. It admitted that its obstetrical program will remain near capacity when the satellite is actually constructed, but argued that the satellite will substantially drain obstetric patients away. Although the satellite will inevitably draw some admissions away from UCH and TGH, the projected growth in patient days in the service area will offset any potential material adverse impact. The satellite will foster healthy competition, promote cost effectiveness, and provide faster quality health care in the area. Section 408.035(10), Florida Statutes. The costs and methods of the proposed construction, including the costs and methods of energy provision and the availability of alternative, less costly, or more effective methods of construction. On balance, the proposed costs and methods of construction are reasonable. The construction of the proposed satellite facility is projected to cost $49,560,000, or $652,105 per bed, which includes a 15 percent construction contingency. The satellite is expected to cost $175 per gross square foot and is reasonable, given the existing range in the area. While the total per bed "project cost" is nearly $1 million, as shown in Schedule 9, Line S, the figure is misleading. It includes nearly $20 million in equipment and other expensive, non-construction cost items. SJH also plans to construct a medical office building and imaging center prior to construction of the hospital. Upon completion of the hospital, a portion of the square footage of the imaging center will be integrated with the hospital, at minimal cost, and serve as the inpatient radiology department. SJH has committed to construct the building and has obtained the necessary permits. Although it is not CON reviewable, the construction cost for the facility, approximately $155 per square foot, is reasonable. Finally, the proposed architectural design for the satellite hospital is reasonable and satisfies applicable building codes. It consists of three medical-surgical pods of 16 beds each, one 14-bed intensive care pod, one 14-bed obstetrics pod, and one 16-bed observation pod. While the non- integrated, designed facility is rather large given its bed capacity, approximately 211,000 gross square feet, the satellite will consist of all private rooms and allow for future addition of licensed beds without major expansion or new construction. The design provides easy access and convenient parking. Notwithstanding the reasonableness of the construction costs and design, the opponents argue that there are less costly alternatives. First, the project could be rejected and the community could resort to the status quo. Given the evidence, including emergency data, denial is unreasonable. Second, the applicant could build a freestanding ER and/or an additional non-urgent care facility and minimize some of the existing problems. Given the evidence, including population trends and existing providers, the limited approach is unreasonable. Third, the applicant could be approved to build a scaled down version of its proposal. Although the facility is appropriate and reasonable as proposed in the application, a scaled down facility is clearly a less costly method of construction. However, there is insufficient evidence to determine whether a smaller version is a reasonable alternative. Section 408.035(11), Florida Statutes. The applicant's past and proposed provision of health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. SJH has an impressive record of service to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. It has long been recognized as a "safety net" provider of acute care services. In 2002, nearly 19 percent of SJH's total patient days were rendered to Medicaid-eligible patients. SJH also provides $40 million each year in uncompensated services to the community. It is a voluntary participant in the Hillsborough County Health Plan that provides funding for medically indigent or uninsured patients who do not qualify for Medicaid benefits. Consistent with its commitment to the community, SJH has conditioned approval of its CON on providing at least 15.6 percent of the satellite patient days to Medicaid and charity patients. Section 408.035(12), Florida Statutes. The applicant's designation as a Gold Seal Program nursing facility pursuant to s. 400.235, when the applicant is requesting additional nursing home beds at that facility. This criterion is not applicable.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued to approve the application. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of July, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Lori C. Desnick, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building III, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 James C. Hauser, Esquire R. Terry Rigsby, Esquire Metz, Hauser & Husband, P.A. Post Office Box 10909 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Elizabeth McArthur, Esquire Radey, Thomas, Yon & Clark, P.A. 313 North Monroe Street, Second Floor Post Office Box 10967 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert A. Weiss, Esquire Karen A. Putnal, Esquire Parker, Hudson, Rainer & Dobbs, LLP The Perkins House, Suite 200 118 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Kenneth W. Gieseking, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Lealand McCharen, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3116 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Alan Levine, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57400.235408.034408.035408.039
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COLUMBIA HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF SOUTH BROWARD, D/B/A WESTSIDE REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 01-002891CON (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 23, 2001 Number: 01-002891CON Latest Update: Oct. 13, 2004

The Issue Whether the Certificate of Need application of the South Broward Hospital District (CON 9459) to establish a 100-bed hospital in Health Planning District 10, Broward County, should be granted by the Agency for Health Care Administration?

Findings Of Fact The Parties AHCA The Agency for Health Care Administration is the state agency with the authority to review and issue Certificates of Need in Florida. SBHD, the Applicant The applicant in this proceeding is South Broward Hospital District ("SBHD" or the "District"). Created by the Legislature in 1947 "at the request of voters to meet the healthcare needs of the South Broward community" (District No. 2, Vol. 1, pg. 7), SBHD is a special taxing district. The District receives tax revenues in order to support SBHD as the health care provider of last resort in South Broward County with a long demonstrated history of serving medically indigent patients. Id. From its inception in 1947 to today with the support of local tax revenue, the mission of SBHD has remained unchanged: to provide health care to all residents of the community regardless of ability to pay. There are three acute care hospitals in the "Memorial Health Care System" operated by SBHD: Memorial Regional, Memorial Pembroke Pines and Memorial West. These three hospitals make the District the dominant provider of health services in south Broward County. The District's market share of admissions to hospitals located in south Broward County is 85%. The other 15% of hospital admissions are to Hollywood Medical Center. (These percentages do not account for admissions of South Broward County residents to hospitals outside of the borders of SBHD.) Memorial Regional Hospital, a Medicaid disproportionate provider, is located 13.6 miles from the proposed Miramar hospital site. Without question, the predominant provider of care to indigent patients in south Broward County, Memorial Regional is licensed for 489 acute care beds. Memorial Regional had an acute care occupancy rate of 76.5% in 2000. From time-to-time in recent years, it has experienced unacceptably high occupancies particularly within individual units. It presently has patient care units that often operate above capacity, resulting in patient flow problems within the hospital. Memorial West Hospital, located 5.7 miles from the proposed Miramar site, is currently licensed for 164 acute care beds. It had an acute care occupancy rate of 88.9% in 2000. Memorial West currently operates 14 "labor-delivery- recovery" observation beds ("LDR" beds) that are not among the hospital's licensed beds. The hospital has recently received a CON for 36 additional beds to be utilized for acute care and further authorization via a CON exemption to add another 16 beds licensed for acute care provided certain occupancy levels are achieved. These additional 52 licensed beds are projected to become operational in 2002. Furthermore, Memorial West is adding 36 additional LDR beds and 20 acute care observation beds and doubling the size of its emergency room. When the expansion is complete, Memorial West will have 216 acute care beds, 20 acute care observation beds and 50 LDR beds. As matters stood at the time of hearing, peak occupancies in some departments at Memorial West such as obstetrics, routinely exceeded 100%. With the additional beds slated for opening in 2002, demand for acute care services in southwest Broward County will continue to produce high occupancy rates at Memorial West. It is reasonably projected that the growth in demand for acute care services in southwest Broward County with the additional beds will cause Memorial West to operate at 87% occupancy in 2005 and 99% occupancy in 2010 unless the hospital proposed by SBHD for Miramar is built. Memorial West opened in 1992 as a 100-bed hospital, in part fulfilling SBHD's vision to expand services into what was then projected to be a rapidly growing southwest part of the county, a suburban area more affluent than the District as a whole. Approved by AHCA's predecessor, SBHD's strategy in opening Memorial West was to gain access to this more affluent suburban market in order to help off-set the rising care of indigent care. The strategy has worked. Memorial West has made a profound contribution to the financial success and viability of the District. In 2001, Memorial Hospital West accounted for almost half of the District's bottom line profit. The profitability of Memorial West has allowed the District to continue to provide growing levels of indigent care, while at the same time decreasing tax millage rates. In fact, the millage rates levied by the District have decreased three times since Memorial West opened. During this same period of decreasing millage rates, the District has been able to increase its ratio of uncompensated care to tax revenues from 3-1 to 5-1. The District's third hospital, Memorial Hospital Pembroke was leased by the District for the first time in 1995. Now leased until June 2005 from HCA, Inc., HCA announced its intention at hearing to re-take the facility so that the District will lose Memorial Pembroke as one of its hospitals at the expiration of the lease. Licensed for 301 beds, Memorial Pembroke is located 10.6 miles from the proposed Miramar site. Memorial Pembroke's occupancy rate from July 1999 to June 2000 was 26.2%. This low rate of occupancy is due, at least in part, to significant physical plant constraints and deficiencies. Although licensed for 301 beds, the physical plant can only reasonably support 149 beds. When its daily census reaches 140 patients, the hospital's operational and support systems begin to fail. Prior to 1995, Memorial Pembroke was operated by a series of for-profit owners. Just as it does now, Memorial Pembroke suffered from chronically low utilization under all prior management. Before the District leased the facility from Columbia-HCA, the hospital had become stigmatized in the community; many patients and physicians were reluctant to use it. Due to a number of factors (some tangible, such as an out-of-date physical plant - others intangible) that stigma continues today. The District has invested considerable management and financial resources to improve the quality of care, the condition of the facility and the community reputation of Memorial Hospital Pembroke. Because the hospital serves as a "safety valve" for the high utilization at the District's other hospitals, especially Memorial West, Memorial Pembroke's census between 1995 and 2000 has been on the rise. Nonetheless, the facility continues to be regarded as a "second tier" hospital and to suffer a stigma within the community. Whatever the source of the stigma afflicting Memorial Pembroke, it is unlikely that occupancy rates at Memorial Pembroke will dramatically improve unless significant and substantial investment is made in the hospital. It does not make sense for SBHD to make such an investment since it will lose the facility in three years. Whether HCA will make the investment required to cure the facilities utilization woes remains an open question. (See paragraphs 103 and 104, below.) Through the three hospitals in the Memorial Healthcare system, Regional, West and Pembroke, and a number of clinics that are off-campus, the District provides a full range of health care services to residents of south Broward County. These include: general acute care; tertiary care; adult and pediatric trauma care under trauma center designation; a specialty children's hospital designated by the state as a Children's Medical Services provider for children with special needs for cardiac care, hematology and oncology, and craniofacial services; outpatient services; and primary care services. The District is the only provider, moreover, of many health care services within the boundaries of the South Broward Hospital District, all of Broward County south of SW 36th Street. (The North Broward Hospital District includes all of Broward County north of SW 36th Street.) These services include obstetrics, pediatrics, neonatal intensive care, adult and pediatric trauma at a Level I trauma center, and teen pregnancy prevention and education. Consistent with its mission, the District also operates the only system of primary care clinics for the indigent in the South Broward Hospital District. The District is clearly the safety net provider of acute care hospital and other services for south Broward residents. In 1999, the District provided 5.9% of its total revenue or approximately $63 million in charity care and 5.4% or approximately $58 million to Medicaid recipients. During the same time period, Cleveland Clinic in terms of total revenue provided 1% charity care and 1.8% to Medicaid recipients while Westside provided 0.6% charity and 2.3% Medicaid. In dollars worth of care devoted to indigent and Medicaid patients, SBHD provides over ten times more Medicaid and indigent care than Cleveland Clinic and Westside combined. Tax revenues, although supportive of the District's ability to maintain its mission, do not come close to compensating the District in full for the care it provides to charity and indigent patients. In fact, the District expends five dollars in uncompensated care for every dollar of tax revenue it receives. Still, as a significant source of income to the District, these tax dollars contribute to SBHD's robust financial health. Cleveland Clinic Cleveland Clinic Hospital is owned by TCC Partners, a partnership between the Cleveland Clinic Foundation and Tenet Healthcare Systems. Originally located in northeast Broward County in Pompano Beach, Cleveland Clinic obtained approval in 1997 to relocate its 150 beds to Weston near the intersection of I-75 and Arvida Parkway. Operation at the site of the relocation began in July of 2001. The new site is within one of the ten-zip codes SBHD has chosen as the proposed primary service area for its new hospital in Miramar, but it is outside the South Broward Hospital District. The new site of Cleveland Clinic is in the North Broward Hospital District, 1.5 miles to the north of the boundary line between the two hospital districts that divides Broward County into two distinct health care markets. Cleveland Clinic has an established history as a regional and national tertiary referral center. It is also an advanced research and education facility that benefits from the outstanding reputation of the Cleveland Clinic Foundation and the hospitals under its umbrella. Cleveland Clinic is not a typical community hospital. It follows a distinctive model of medicine based on a multi- disciplinary approach and a closed medical specialty staff. The medical staff is open to community primary care physicians but not to community specialists or sub-specialists. All of the specialists on its staff are salaried employees of the Cleveland Clinic. This means that physician specialists who are not employees of the Clinic do not have privileges to admit or treat patients at the Cleveland Clinic Hospital. The Cleveland Clinic offers tertiary acute care services, such as kidney transplantation and open-heart surgery. It also provides specialty services in colorectal surgery, voiding dysfunction and limb reattachment. Among its specialty programs are an adult spine program, an acute stroke program, an epilepsy clinic, and an orthopedic center of excellence in sports medicine. At the time of hearing and since opening, Cleveland Clinic's average daily census has been approximately 44 patients. Westside Founded 26 or so years ago in what was then considered western Broward Count from the standpoint of population (hence its name), Westside is a 204-bed acute care hospital. Slightly less than nineteen miles from the proposed Miramar site, the site of the hospital is "now somewhat central [to Broward County]" (Westside No. 39, p. 8), given the location of the population today and the growth that has occurred to the west of Westside. Westside, like Cleveland Clinic, is in the North Broward Hospital District. It is located in the City of Plantation on West Broward Boulevard. Among the variety of acute care services offered by Westside is open heart surgery ("OHS"). The OHS program, implemented two years ago has increased the hospital's occupancy rate to a near 70%. (In 2000, the hospital had an acute care occupancy rate of 69.3%). The occupancy rate is expected to increase as the open heart surgery program expands and matures. Recent capacity constraints in the ICU, for example, led to a capital project to expand the unit "about a year and a half ago." (Id. at 13). With regard to questions about whether the hospital had experienced capacity constraints or "bottlenecks" in units, Michael Joseph, the chief executive officer of Westside, answered this way: We did in tele, and that's when we did the overflow on the fifth floor. So at this time we are -- in the peak season of March, from time to time, sure. But on the annualized basis, we are in the 75 percent occupancy level. And sometimes there [are other issues] that all hospitals go through. (Id., at 14). At the time of Mr. Joseph's deposition, October 23, 2001, for the most recent year the average daily census has been "in the 175 range." (Id.) At present, therefore, Westside's occupancy is close to ideal. Westside is financially strong. It had strong financial performance in 2000 and at the time of hearing was expected to perform strongly in 2001. Replication of West Faced with both the potential loss in 2005 of Memorial Pembroke and the high occupancies at Memorial Regional and Memorial West, SBHD began investigating the opportunity to replicate the Memorial West model of success. During the investigation, the District came to believe what it suspected from obvious signs: there is a large and growing population to be served in the Miramar area. Although land was limited, the District was able to purchase within the City of Miramar a 138-acre parcel. The parcel is the site of the subject under consideration in this proceeding as detailed in CON Application 9459: SBHD's proposed project. SBHD's Proposed Project The District proposes to construct a 100-bed acute care hospital at the intersection of SW 172nd Avenue and Pembroke Road. The site is a large one. It has sufficient land available to serve ultimately as a "health park" with medical office buildings, outpatient facilities, and additional health care related facilities typical of a modern medical campus. If, on the other hand, the District decides it is in its best interest to "sell off balances" (tr. 486) of the property, it retains that option. The hospital will provide basic acute care services and be composed of 80 adult medical/surgical, 8 pediatric, and 12 obstetric beds. On the third floor, the hospital will have 28 observation status beds, in addition to its 100 licensed beds. The design of the hospital is cost efficient. It meets all license and life safety code requirements. All patient rooms are private and meet the square footage requirements of AHCA's license standards. The hospital design, costs, and methods of construction are reasonable. The project has several goals. First, it is intended to provide increased access to affordable and quality health care for the residents of southwestern Broward County. Second, the project will allow Memorial Regional and Memorial West the opportunity to decompress and operate at reasonable and efficient occupancies into the foreseeable future without the operational problems caused by the current over-utilization. Third, the project will replace the loss of Memorial Pembroke. Finally, the project will give the District a second financial "engine that drives the train" (tr. 141) in the manner of Memorial West. The project will enable the District to maintain its financial strength and viability and continue to serve so effectively as the safety net provider for the indigent in South Broward County. Stipulated Facts In their prehearing stipulation, filed on October 31, 2001, the parties stipulated to the following: On January 26, 2001, AHCA published a fixed need pool for zero additional acute care beds in District 10, Broward County, for the January 2001 batching cycle. The South Broward Hospital District ("SBHD" or "District") timely and properly filed a Letter of Intent, initial CON Application, and Omissions Response in the batching cycle. On May 16, 2001, AHCA filed a Notice of Intent to issue the CON together with a State Agency Action Report ("SAAR") recommending approval of the CON for the proposed hospital. AHCA's Notice of Intent to approve the CON for the proposed hospital was challenged by Cleveland Clinic and Westside. Hollywood Medical Center ("HMC") also filed a petition challenging the preliminary approval but later withdrew as a party from these proceedings. Broward County has been divided by the Florida Legislature into two hospital taxing districts. The SBHD includes all areas of the county south of SW 36th Street, and the North Broward Hospital District ("NBHD") includes all areas north of the demarcation line. SBHD, Cleveland Clinic, and Westside each have a history of providing high quality of care. All of SBHD's hospital facilities are JCAHO accredited. Accordingly, the quality of care provided by these parties is not at issue in this proceeding except as it may be impacted by staffing issues. The proposed staffing and salary projections included on Schedule 6 of CON Application No. 9459 are reasonable and are not in dispute, although the parties specifically preserved the right to present evidence concerning the SBHD's ability to recruit the staff projected, and whether the projected salaries will cause or accelerate the loss of staff at existing hospitals. The parties agree that the SBHD has available management personnel and funds for capital and operating expenditures. However, Petitioners assert that the District's use of such resources for this project is neither wise nor prudent and is not in keeping with appropriate health planning principles. The parties agree that the SBHD has a history of providing health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. (Section 408.035(11), Florida Statutes.) However, Petitioners do not agree that proposed Miramar Hospital can meet the levels of charity care proposed in the application for the Miramar Hospital. With regard to Schedule 1 of the Application, the parties stipulate that the Land Costs (lines 1-11) are reasonable and are not disputed; and the Project Development Costs (lines 26-31) are reasonable and not disputed. The parties agree that Schedule 3 of the Application (sources of funds) is reasonable and not disputed. The SBHD does not contest Petitioners standing in this proceeding. At hearing, the parties stipulated that SBHD has the ability to recruit and retain the staff needed for the proposed hospital. The parties also stipulated that the SBHD has in place the staff recruitment and retention programs described at pages 132-139 of the CON application. The stipulation at hearing did not preclude either Westside or Cleveland Clinic from presenting evidence with respect to the impact of the SBHD's recruitment on other programs and other hospitals. No Numeric Need As indicated by the AHCA Bed Utilization Data for CY 2000, the occupancy rate in Broward County was 48.42%. There is, moreover, a surplus of 1,786 beds. This surplus has been increasing over time and has grown by nearly 60 beds between the January 2001 and July 2001 planning horizons. The hospitals within the District's proposed primary service area had an occupancy rate of 53% in the July 2001 planning horizon and a surplus of 456 beds, a number "somewhat proportionate to the distribution of patient days as well as licensed beds within the district." (Tr. 1639.) If the 152 non- functional beds at Memorial Pembroke are deducted from the surplus then the surplus is 304 beds. Not surprisingly therefore, the Agency's fixed need formula for acute care beds produced a fixed need of zero beds in Health Planning District 10 for the January 2001 batching cycle. (Broward County composes all of Health Planning District 10). The fixed need pool of zero was published by the Agency in January of 2001. Again in July 2001, AHCA published a fixed need for zero acute care beds in Health Planning District 10. In light of the zero fixed need pool, SBHD bases its application for the proposed Memorial Hospital Miramar on "not normal circumstances." Not Normal Circumstances "Not normal circumstances" are not defined or limited by statute or rule. Nonetheless, a number of "not normal" circumstances have been recognized repeatedly by AHCA . These recognized "not normal circumstances" are generally grouped into categories of access, quality and cost-effectiveness. None of them are present in this case. "There [are] no financial access, geographic access or clinical access circumstances [in this case] that rise to the level of not-normal circumstances." (Tr. 1633). Nor are there any quality or cost-effectiveness deficiencies claimed by the District in its application. The District bases its claim of "normal circumstances" on eight factors. They are: 1) explosive population growth; 2) a mal-distribution of beds within the health planning district; the effects of not having a hospital facility in the area proposed; 4) continued and projected high occupancies at nearby hospitals; 5) inability to expand inpatient capacity at the nearby hospitals with high occupancy rates; 6) the limited functionality and uncertain future of one of the hospitals that might serve the area where the new hospital is proposed to be located; 7) the increasing retraction of access for residents to other hospitals; and, 8) the need to assure that the applicant will remain a strong competitor able to fulfill its unique role and mission that would be served by granting the application. Population Growth Broward County is one of the fastest growing counties in the United States. "According to the census 2000 data, [over the last decade] it was the fastest growing county in all of the United States based on total population gain . . . ." (Tr. 617.) The population growth was spurred in the latter part of the previous decade by the devastation wreaked by Hurricane Andrew in 1992. The hurricane's south Dade County victims used insurance proceeds to move to southwest Broward County. This migration helped to produce growth in southwest Broward County at a faster rate than the county as whole in the decade of the nineties. Growth in pockets of southwest Broward during this period of time has been phenomenal. For example, Pembroke Pines population increased 109 percent between 1990 and 2000. For the same time period, the population of Miramar (now the second fastest growing municipality in Florida) increased 78 percent. This growth was more than just steady during the 10 years before 2000; as the decade proceeded, the growth rate accelerated. In short, it is not a misnomer to describe the population increase in southwest Broward County and the Miramar area during the last decade as "explosive." (Tr. 626) With its attendant residential and commercial development, it has transformed southwest Broward County from a rural community into a suburban one. Population growth in southwest Broward County is expected to continue into the future. Substantial land in the area is under development or is available for residential development. By 2006, the population is projected to grow to 337,000, from the 2000 population of 289,000. This rate, while not comparable to the explosive rate in some pockets of the county in the last decade, is not insignificant. By way of contrast, the projected growth rate of 16.7% over the next five years in southwest Broward compares to a projected rate for the county as a whole of 8.4% and for Florida of 7.1%. In and of itself, the projected population growth in southwest Broward County is not a "not normal" circumstance. However one might characterize the projected growth rate in southwest Broward County, moreover, the acute care hospital bed need rule takes population into account in its calculations and projections. But, the bed need formula does not take into account the significant number of beds at Memorial Pembroke that are not functional. Nor does it take into account that Cleveland Clinic is not a typical community hospital. Nor does it take into account other factors such as that Memorial West and Memorial Regional are experiencing capacity problems or the division of the health planning district into two hospital taxing districts recognized as distinct medical markets, a recognition out of the ordinary for health planning districts in Florida. A geographical fact pertinent to arguments made by Cleveland Clinic and Westside with regard to the location of the population is that Memorial Miramar's proposed primary service area is divided by Interstate 75, a north-south primary travel corridor. On a percentage basis, there is faster population growth projected for areas west of I-75. But for the foreseeable future, the actual number of people populating the area west of I-75 will remain less than the number east of I-75. The area west of I-75, with the exception of one zip code in which a retirement center has been built, has a younger projected population that should produce lower use rates and average lengths of stay in hospitals than the area east of I-75. The support these facts lend to the District's opponent's arguments that bed need is greater east of I-75 than west is diminished by the absence of any hospitals west of I-75 in the South Broward Hospital District and the presence of four hospitals in the hospital district east of the interstate. Distribution of Beds Consistent with the recognition by the Legislature, AHCA, and its predecessor state agency, north and south Broward County are two distinct medical markets demarcated by the division of the county into two hospital districts. There are 3.52 beds per 1000 population in the North Broward Hospital District, 2.35 in the south. A greater number of under-utilized acute care beds are located in the northern half; a greater percentage of highly utilized hospitals are located in the southern half. Of the four hospitals located in south Broward County, both Memorial Regional and Memorial West had average annual occupancies in excess of 80% in the calendar year 2000. By contrast, of the 13 hospitals located in the northern half of the County, none had occupancy in excess of 80%, and only one had an average annual occupancy in excess of 70%. These statistics point toward an over-distribution within the health planning district of beds in the north and an under-distribution in the south. At the same time, beds are distributed between the two hospital districts in approximate proportion to the number of patient days experienced by each. In 2000, NBHD had 71% of the patient days for District 10 and 73% of the acute care beds. As one might expect, therefore, the relationship between patient days and acute care beds during the same period was similar for the SBHD: 28.9% of the patient days for District 10 and 27% of the beds. An analysis of bed to population ratio is only meaningful when occupancy rates are also considered. Occupancy rates are mixed in the south part of the county: very high for some, especially Memorial West, and very low for Memorial Pembroke. This breadth of this disparity is unusual. Effects of No Hospital in Miramar Thirty to 60 minutes to reach an acute care hospital is a reasonable driving time in an urban area. There are five existing acute care facilities within 30 minutes of southwest Broward County. In fact, most of the residents in Memorial Miramar's proposed service area are within 15 minutes or less of an existing acute care facility. Nonetheless, without a hospital in Miramar, residents must leave their immediate community to gain access to acute care services. As a matter of sound health planning, "[n]ot every city, town or hamlet can or should have its 'own' hospital." So correctly posit Cleveland Clinic and Westside. See pgs. 13-14, Cleveland Clinic and Westside PRO. But as the City Manager of Miramar wrote, "[t]he addition of a new hospital is one of the last missing links in the City [of Miramar]'s master plan . . . The city is looking to build the best possible future for its residents." District Ex. 2, Attachment G. A new hospital in Miramar would not only be a featured complement of the City of Miramar's plans for the future, it would also enhance access to acute care services and address access concerns caused by skewed utilization among the SBHD hospitals due to the unusual state of affairs at Memorial Pembroke and the high demand at West. Of great concern is that residents of southwest Broward County in need of emergency services are sometimes not able to gain access to those services at Memorial West, the closest available hospital. Memorial West operates the third busiest Emergency Department in Broward County with 65,000 visits in 2001. In Calendar Year 2000, Memorial West's emergency room went on diversion 123 times, averaging 7.7 hours per diversion. In the first months of 2001, the hospital went on diversion 89 times, with an average diversion time of 16.3 hours. These diversions have a dual effect. They mean that patients wait longer for beds. They also mean that providers of emergency medical services in ambulances are forced out of the community for extended periods of time unable to render services within the community that may be needed during that time. Diversions at Memorial West are becoming more and more problematic. Wait times are getting longer; the total time on diversion is growing. At first blush, the problems appear to be less significant at Memorial West than they might be elsewhere in District 10 because of its low "emergency room visits to hospital admissions" ratio. The Health Planning District average shows that about 20% of emergency room patients are admitted to the hospital. At Memorial West, the ratio is 8.7%, the lowest in the County. While normally this might reflect that patients visiting Memorial West have a lower acuity than patients visiting emergency rooms district-wide, the lower ratio for Memorial West is due, at least in part, to the high volume of pediatric patients seen at West who are transferred to Joe DiMaggio's Children's Hospital. The pediatric transfers, in the words of Frederick Michael Keroff, M.D., a Board-certified emergency physician who has worked in hospital emergency departments in South Florida for 24 years, create a false sense of what is actually being seen on the adult side of the emergency room department. On the adult side . . . [the ratio] varies somewhere between 12 and 16 and a half percent which is comparable with any other facility. . . . [W]hen you mix in such a large pediatric population into the adult population, obviously it dilutes out the number and drops [the ratio] down . . . . (Tr. 2568.) A solution to emergency room diversion at Memorial West and an alternative to the construction of Memorial Miramar proposed by Cleveland Clinic and Westside is more SBHD urgent care centers in the Miramar area. SBHD operates seven urgent care centers. Of these seven, the proposed Miramar PSA has only one. Additional urgent care centers more readily accessible in the 10 zip code area that comprises Memorial Miramar's PSA might reduce the number of visits to the ER at Memorial West. But they might not. Patients don't self-triage when they are presented with a problem. They go to the hospital. [Triage is a medical decision.] Patients usually come to the hospital, even [with] urgent care centers down the block, because they don't know what the problem is and they allow the hospital to make the decision about what the problem is. (Tr. 2571.) Additional urgent care centers would not solve the problem created when diversion is a result of the lack of acute care beds for Memorial West ER patients who need to be admitted to the hospital for treatment beyond that provided in the ER. Cleveland Clinic hospital is not likely to offer much of an alternative. Because of the closed nature of the Cleveland Clinic specialty staff, it will not be a hospital of choice for community physicians in the South Broward Hospital District. Nor will it be a hospital of choice for patients able to elect the hospital at which to seek emergency services. It is apparent from the demand on Memorial West, despite the number of beds and other emergency departments within acceptable reach, that a Memorial West-type facility is what the residents of southwest Broward County prefer and opt for even if it means they have will have to wait for emergency services. In cases of patients transported from southwest Broward County via ambulances forced to go to Cleveland Clinic in Weston to deliver patients in need of emergency services, the transport presents difficulties of their own. It is not efficient management of emergency services due to their very nature to require ambulances to leave their service areas. There are no clear solutions to the problems emergency room diversions present for patients, their families, physicians, and the emergency medical system in general in southwest Broward County other than construction of new acute care hospital in Miramar. Construction of a new acute care hospital in Miramar will help to alleviate the high occupancies and emergency room diversions currently experienced at Memorial West. It will reduce disruptions to Miramar residents and will provide an easily accessible alternative to southwest Broward County residents, thereby enhancing access to emergency services. High Occupancy Rates at West and Regional The current and reasonably-projected high occupancies at Memorial West and Memorial Regional are extraordinary circumstances for a health planning district with as many excess beds as District 10. The calculation under AHCA's formula for hospital bed need for the January 2001 batching cycle yielded an excess of 1,717 beds. Calculation by the Agency using the same formula for the July 2001 batching cycle showed an excess of 1,786 beds or 59 more excess beds than just six months earlier. The import of these results was described at hearing by Scott Hopes, Westside's expert health planner: Obviously when you have a situation like this, the default is a zero published fixed need which is what was published. But the importance here is that there are so many excess beds. And if you look also on the line [of Westside Ex. 23] that deals with occupancy rate, the occupancy rate is about 48 percent, and it hasn't varied much between the six-month period. In fact, the occupancy rate in Broward County has been under 50 percent for some quite sometime. (Tr. 2076-7). It is extraordinary that a health planning district with so many excess beds would also have two hospitals, Memorial West and Memorial Regional, with capacity problems. Memorial West, by any standard, is a successful hospital. Since it opened in 1992, the inpatient volume there has tripled. Opening as a 100-bed facility, Memorial West now has 184 licensed beds, an expansion aimed to meet the demand for its services. As alluded to elsewhere in this order, because there are often not enough available acute care beds at Memorial West, some patients have to wait in the ER six hours or more. It is not unusual for more than 40 patients to wait at one time. Despite these conditions, patients, when offered the opportunity for a transfer to another hospital, rarely accept the offer. More often than not the patients do not wish to go. The reputation of Memorial Hospital West, the loyalty factor, if you will, to Memorial, to the medical staff, the patients want to remain at the facility. (Testimony of Memorial West Administrator Ross, Tr. 152-3.) Memorial West plans expansion but even with its current planned bed expansion, it is reasonable to expect it to reach unacceptably high occupancy rates by 2006 if Memorial Miramar is not built. Furthermore, the only obstetric programs in south Broward are at Memorial West and Memorial Regional. Memorial West performed 4,400 births last year, and its obstetrics unit often operates in excess of 100% occupancy. The only constraint on additional births at West is the limited physical capacity of the facility. Memorial Regional experienced even more births last year than West with about 5,000 deliveries. Memorial Regional is operating at or exceeding its functional capacity in other departments. The current medical/surgical occupancy at Memorial Regional is approximately 80% year round. Some units experience much higher occupancies. The intensive care unit's occupancy frequently exceed 100%, as does the cardiac telemetry unit. In certain medical/surgical units, peak occupancy is as high as 125%. Memorial Regional's capacity to handle its high patient volume is limited by certain factors. Semi-private rooms are limited to use by members of the same sex. As a tertiary facility, there are specialty patients who must be served by nurses trained in that patient's specialty, with appropriate monitoring equipment. Without approval of Memorial Hospital Miramar, Memorial Regional will reach 85% occupancy by 2008 and 88% occupancy by 2010. These occupancy rates create an inefficient and untenable environment in which to deliver the mix of specialized and tertiary services offered by Memorial Regional. The overcrowding at Memorial West and Memorial Regional is dramatic and continuing. There are simply more patients seeking care at these hospitals than the hospitals can serve appropriately. This overcrowding exists despite the excess of acute care beds within the health planning district. In sum, despite the plentiful nature of the number of acute care beds in the health planning district, a need exists to either decompress Memorial Regional and Memorial West by some means such as the proposed new hospital in Miramar or to expand one or both of the two hospitals by way of new construction or conversion of LDR and observation beds. A decompression alternative to the new hospital is to transfer beds from existing hospitals to create a satellite hospital. Because of high occupancy rates at West and Regional and because Pembroke's lease will expire in 2005, transfer of existing beds is not a feasible option. That leaves expansion, as the only alternative to a new hospital in Miramar. Cleveland Clinic and Westside argue there are ample opportunities at the two hospitals for expansion. Expansion New Construction In pre-CON application evaluation, SBHD commissioned a study from Gresham, Smith and Partners, an architecture firm. The firm studied the three Memorial facilities to determine whether expansion of the acute care bed complement at any of them was feasible. In a "Memorial Health System Facility Expandability and Master Plan Review Report" the firm concluded that it was clearly not feasible to expand either Memorial Pembroke or Memorial Regional and there were problems with expanding Memorial West. With significant problems including its aged plant and its uncertain future, expansion at Memorial Pembroke would not be cost-effective. It would cost $31 million in capital improvements to maintain Pembroke's functional capacity at 149 beds. If the present location of nursing administration, hospice and other necessary services were moved out of the hospital, the hospital's function could be expanded to 215 beds. No evidence was presented with regard to the advisability of moving those services or the additional costs associated with this alternative. HCA's willingness to make the investment necessary to renovate the facility at Pembroke was not supported by any specifics. HCA's announced its intention, "to take the hospital back at the end of the lease and run it," (tr. 1511-2) but, in fact, the company has not taken any action to evaluate the potential for assuming operation of the hospital in 2005. Nor has it even begun the process it must go through before final decisions are made. The overarching intention to "re-take the hospital and run it," at this point in time, does not mean HCA will be willing to make the investment necessary to renovate the facility either during the term of SBHD's lease or afterward. It still needs to "do a very detailed discounted cash flow analysis to make a final decision on the investment needed and the return on that investment." (Tr. 1514.) Memorial Pembroke's uncertain future makes it an unlikely candidate for expansion. However unlikely such a result, with the problems that afflict Memorial Pembroke, there is, moreover, no guarantee that HCA's intended analysis will convince it even to continue operation of the hospital. Memorial Regional has different problems from Memorial Pembroke. It takes up an entire block surrounded by residential property and parking garages. There is almost no opportunity for growth on the site. Of the few areas that could be expanded vertically, only one would be conducive to bed addition. "[I]t is so remote, it doesn't tie back to the main nursing care areas." (Tr. 482.) Expansion at Regional would also be plagued with concurrency problems and zoning issues. Of the three hospitals, Memorial West presents the best option for expansion. A facility master plan for Memorial West provides for the addition of a patient tower on the north side of the facility ("the north tower"). The addition of the north tower could add as many as 50 beds to Memorial West at a cost substantially less than the construction of Memorial Miramar. Still, SBHD's architects, Smith and Gresham, concluded that expansion of the size necessary to alleviate the overcrowding at West was not cost-effective. The force of the Smith and Gresham opinion is tempered by the firm's standing to benefit financially to a much more significant degree if Memorial Miramar is built than if the planned-for tower is constructed to add 50 beds to Memorial West. But the opinion is not groundless. Put simply, construction of an additional tower at West is no simple solution to its capacity problems. The tower was planned for maternal services but like the minimal opportunity for expansion at Regional, it would be "remote from the rest of the nursing function . . . [it would, moreover] trigger huge upgrades to the infrastructure." (Tr. 480.) The hospital site is constricted already because of additions that have almost completely built out the campus. A new north tower would add inefficiencies in hospital operations because of the increase in travel distance for materials delivery and meeting the dietary needs of patients. Despite the master plan for growth, an improvement the size of the north tower would begin to turn West into another Memorial Regional: a huge hospital, overdeveloped for its site. The improvement, like every improvement thereafter, would require patient shuffles and disruptions in patient care. Like Memorial Regional, expansion at West, too, would have concurrency issues and could create a land use dispute with neighbors, the outcome of which is uncertain. In light of these obstacles, SBHD prefers the option of constructing the new hospital in Miramar over expansion at West. There is, however, in the view of SBHD's opponents, another option for expansion of existing facilities: conversion of LDR and observation beds. Expansion through conversion of LDR and Observation Beds Cleveland Clinic and Westside contend that another option to relieve overcrowding is conversion of observation and LDR beds to acute care hospital beds. But these beds are used to meet the need of observation and maternity service patients. There are patients who need closely supervised medical care but whose care has not been determined to require admission to the hospital. Observation patients, sometimes referred to as "23 hour" patients, may suffer from various conditions, including chest pain, fever, abdominal pain, rectal bleeding or nausea. Given the high number of births at Memorial West, many obstetrical patients present at the hospital in "false labor" or for antipartum testing, complications of pregnancy, or symptoms that should be treated as observation or on an inpatient basis. It would be impractical for Memorial West to convert observation and maternity service beds, whether existing or still planned for, to inpatient acute care beds. If these beds were converted, Memorial West would find itself once again in its present straits of not enough beds for observation purposes particularly for obstetrical patients for whom there is little choice where to obtain obstetrical services in the South Broward Hospital District. Limited Functionality and Uncertain Future of Memorial Pembroke Memorial Pembroke has undergone seven ownership changes since it first opened. Perceived as a hospital where neither patients nor physicians want to go, it has suffered from a stigma within the community. Even with recent gains in utilization, it achieved an occupancy rate of only 24% in calendar year 2000. Pembroke suffers from physical and infrastructure limitations that reduce its functional bed capacity to 149 beds. Its mechanical and heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems are outdated and inadequate. For example, a primary generator is vented to the outside by a 6-foot hole in the ceiling. The electrical panels are at absolute capacity. The first floor has an outdated, plenum air return with no ducts in the ceiling. The generators have transfer switches that require them to be turned on manually. Facilities management personnel are reluctant to do so for safety reasons. The semi-private patient rooms at Pembroke are too small for modern care and do not have adequate space for the monitors, IV equipment, pumps and other technology required by today's health care delivery system. Many rooms do not have showers. The hospital has a number of three bed wards woefully outdated by the standards of modern care. It would cost $31 million in capital improvements to simply maintain Pembroke's functional capacity at 149 beds, to upgrade the facility to bring it into compliance with existing code and to otherwise modernize inadequacies. Whether Pembroke will continue to operate after 2004 is unknown. While HCA stated its intention to do so, it has not made a final decision to assume operations. It still needs to conduct a financial analysis sufficiently detailed to determine whether the necessary expenditures to bring the hospital up to par are practical. Any capital investment by HCA in excess of $1 million requires the approval of HCA's national office, approval that has not yet been provided. The level of capital investment required at Memorial Pembroke is significant and it cannot be assumed that HCA will make this investment. (See paragraph 89, above.) Increasing Retraction for Access in SW Broward Of the three hospitals located within the ten zip codes that constitute southwest Broward County: Memorial West, Memorial Pembroke and Cleveland Clinic, each poses some manner of access impediment for the residents of the area. Memorial West is overcrowded. Memorial Pembroke's future is uncertain, its present clouded by significant physical plant problems and stigma that keeps its occupancy low. Cleveland Clinic's distinctive character, its closed specialty staff and its regional, national and international draw discourages utilization by southwest Broward residents seeking routine acute care hospital services at a community hospital. The Cleveland Clinic medical staff is open to community primary care physicians. "[W]ith the qualification that if there's a specialty for some reason that is not adequately manned, the clinic can go out and contract with community physicians to provide the services" (District No. 55, p. 39), the Cleveland Clinic medical staff is not open to community specialists or sub-specialists. Its specialty and sub- specialty staff, therefore, is closed. The medical staff building, moreover, located on the campus is also closed to community practitioners even to those primary care physicians with privileges at the hospital to manage their patients care. Like the specialty medical staff, the building is restricted to Cleveland Clinic salaried specialists. Due to the closed nature of the specialty staff at Cleveland Clinic, any patient admitted to the Cleveland Clinic hospital will be seen by a Cleveland Clinic physician. This sets up reluctance on the part of community physicians to use the Cleveland Clinic hospital. As expressed by the hospital's CEO, "it's sometimes difficult to convince a primary care physician that he needs to change his referral patients, so yes, there is some concern [about the willingness of community physicians to utilize the hospital]." Id., p. 40. In multiple prior CON applications approved by AHCA, Cleveland Clinic projected that up to 30% of its patients would come from outside Broward County and that it would draw patients from throughout Broward County, rather than having a more traditional, limited service area typical of a community hospital. Patient origin data for Cleveland Clinic when at its old location in Pompano Beach shows the hospital, unique among Broward County hospitals, has a broad county-wide, regional and national draw. While all other hospitals in Broward County can identify fewer than 25 zip codes that generate the first 75% of patient admissions in 1999, 60 zip codes generated the first 75% of Cleveland Clinic's admissions. Similarly, while all other hospitals in Broward County can identify fewer than 25 zip codes that generate the first 90% of their patient admissions in 1999, the first 90% of patient admissions at Cleveland Clinic's hospital were generated by no less than 287 zip codes. Cleveland Clinic presented evidence of its intention to be available to the local community. It has marketed in Broward County by means of newspaper and television advertisements and various community programs. It has also conducted outreach and training programs with the emergency medical service providers in the Broward County area, not only to improve the quality of care for the patients of Broward County but also to educate the emergency medical service providers about Cleveland Clinic. The patient origin data for Cleveland Clinic's first three months of operation in Weston, however, verifies its continued broad draw. This data shows that within Broward County, only 30% of patients originated within the 9 southwest Broward zip codes that Cleveland Clinic identifies as its "immediate service area"; the other 70% of its patients come from outside the immediate service area. Cleveland Clinic is not a typical community hospital. Its previous CON applications have been granted in part on its unique characteristics. Whether its image or persona will change with the move to Weston to attract more patients from southwest Broward County is an open question. Given its nature and the focus of the health care it is likely to deliver, however, it is not likely that it will be utilized regularly by residents of southwest Broward County seeking routine hospital care either because not their hospital of choice or because of community physician referral patterns. h. Assurance that SBHD Can Fulfill its Mission The final "not normal" circumstance relied on by SBHD relates to the affluence of the patients in southwest Broward County and the profits that are reasonably expected to be generated by virtue of the proposed hospital's location in this affluent area. The expected profits will both subsidize SBHD's charity care and support its ability to be competitive. The importance of SBHD remaining competitive and able to serve the indigent in Broward County was explained at hearing by Jeffrey Gregg, Chief of AHCA's Bureau of Health Facility Regulation: [A]s a major indigent care provider for the State of Florida, [SBHD is] providing a service that extends far and wide that benefits everyone. In our state we have indigent care concentrated in relatively few facilities … [I]t is a very important resource that needs to be nurtured and protected to the greatest extent possible because it is fragile and vulnerable. We have many uninsured people in the state, somewhere between two and three million. It is reasonable to expect now with the economic downturn that we are going to be seeing an increase in uninsured people, so the value of hospitals that function as safety net providers is . . . very important. (Tr. 1240-1). This rationale supported the District's CON application for Memorial West. Because of SBHD's financial success to which Memorial West has been a major contributor, SBHD has achieved a significant degree of financial stability in this day of decreasing reimbursements, managed care, and increased health care costs. It is not contested that its financial position is sound. For fiscal year 2002, SBHD was running ahead of revenue and profit projections at the time of hearing. Nonetheless, if hospitals are constrained and the payor mix becomes less favorable, financial conditions can change quickly. Only three years ago, the District posted an $18 million debt. The capacity constraints at Memorial West will limit its ability to generate additional profits. At the same time, the District must accept all charity care patients. This requirement coupled with capacity constraints has the potential for an unfavorable payor mix for the District. The addition of Memorial Miramar will help to ensure that the District maintains its strong market position and will sustain a favorable payor mix. The profits expected to be generated by Memorial Miramar will ensure that the District can continue to provide care to the indigent without raising, and perhaps by lowering, the tax rate for the tax payers of Broward County. The Proposed Primary Service Area The District's proposed primary service area ("PSA") is a 10 zip code area in southwest Broward County. It excludes zip codes in Dade County that might have been included as well as the eight easternmost zip codes in south Broward County. Usually a set of contiguous towns or minor subdivisions or zip codes that represent a substantial majority of a hospital's patients, there is no single way of defining a hospital's primary service area. Some health planners use a region from which 75% of the patients come but a range of 60 to 80 percent is not unreasonable. There are other approaches to defining primary service areas: zip codes, for example, in which a threshold level of market share was achieved or that account for a minimum percentage of the hospital's patients. While one method may be more usual than another, any of a number of ways of defining a PSA may be reasonable. Cleveland Clinic's health planner, Ms. Patricia Greenberg sees Dr. Finarelli's PSA for the Miramar hospital as not rational from the perspective of health planning. The zip codes Dr. Finarelli chose include a number that are to the east of Memorial West. Ms. Greenberg asserts that it is unlikely that patients will drive from the east past Memorial West in order to reach Memorial Miramar. It would have made much more sense, in her view, for the PSA to have included three zip codes to the north of the PSA in western Broward County: zip codes 33327, 33326 and 33325. But these zip codes, entirely within North Broward Hospital District, are not South Broward Hospital District zip codes. Nor are three other zip codes that Ms. Greenberg sees for the Miramar PSA as more rational choices than zip codes east of Memorial West that Dr. Finarelli chose. Ms. Greenberg's other choices outside Dr. Finarelli's PSA are not only not in the hospital district, they are not in AHCA Health Planning District 10. They are in Dade County. Determinations of bed need do not always rise and fall on the selection of the primary service area. To the contrary, as Dr. Finarelli stated at hearing, "[h]ow and where the boundaries are drawn between the primary and secondary service area is less important [than] making sure that any analysis of bed need and demand incorporates both the primary and secondary service areas." (Tr. 724). This statement loses its potency, however, and the import of the choice of the primary service area is raised in light of the population-based bed need projections made by Dr. Finarelli within the PSA in support of the application. Population Based Bed Need Projections within the PSA Dr. Finarelli conducted a standard population based bed need analysis to determine the gross bed need within the PSA selected for the proposed hospital. His bed need calculations were computed separately for adult medical, surgical, pediatric and obstetric beds. The assumptions used by Dr. Finarelli were reasonable and appropriate. The level of detail in Dr. Finarelli's model was described by another of SBHD's expert health planners who testified in this case, Mr. Balsano and who has been qualified as an expert in health planning and health care financial feasibility approximately 20 times over the last decade, as the most detailed model he had ever seen. Dr. Finarelli's analysis accounted for the current and projected population as well as the current and projected hospital discharge rate per 1000 population within the PSA. Multiplying the population (in thousands) by the discharge rate yields the total number of current and projected hospital discharges by PSA residents for the planning horizon. The total number of hospital discharges was then multiplied by an appropriate average length of stay ("ALOS") to determine the total number of current and projected patient days by PSA residents. The total patient days were divided by 365 (days in the year) to arrive at the current and projected hospital average daily census ("ADC"). Finally, the ADC was divided by the desired 75% occupancy rate to arrive at a gross bed need for the PSA. The calculations result in a projected need in the 2006 planning horizon for a total of 457 acute care beds; including 386 adult medical surgical, 25 pediatric, and 46 obstetric beds. Based only on projected population growth within the PSA, there will be an incremental gross bed need for 75 acute care beds; 67 medical/surgical, 3 pediatric and 5 obstetric. Existing Inventory and Bed Supply The three hospitals located within the 10 zip code PSA have a total of 667 licensed acute care beds, existing or approved. Including the 36 approved and 16 conditionally approved beds at West, Memorial West has 216 beds. Memorial Pembroke has 301 and there are 150 licensed beds at Cleveland Clinic. This total, however, is "simply not a reasonable or realistic measure of how many beds in those three hospitals are truly available to the residents of Southwest Broward County . . . ." (Tr. 837-8.) Patient origin statistics and representations made by Cleveland Clinic in its certificate of need applications bear out that it is not a typical community hospital. Appropriate to its mix of tertiary services and its focus on education and research, it has a broad service area reaching far beyond Broward County. Consistent with the nature of the hospital, in its first three months of operation at Weston, 35% of its patients came from outside Broward County and only 16% have come from southwest Broward County or the 10 zip code PSA used by SBHD in its application for the Miramar hospital. Based on available data and information, it is reasonable to project that Cleveland Clinic will draw approximately 26% of its patients from within Memorial Miramar's PSA. It is reasonable, therefore, to allocate 26% of Cleveland Clinic's 150 beds to meet the population based demand for adult medical surgical beds in the PSA, for a net contribution of approximately 40 beds. With its functional capacity of 149 beds, it is not reasonable to consider all of the 301 beds at Memorial Pembroke. Fifty-four percent of its patients come from within the Memorial Pembroke PSA. The product of 149 beds multiplied by 54% is approximately 80 beds available to meet the population-based demand of the residents of southwest Broward County. There is, moreover, some doubt about whether any beds will be available at Memorial Pembroke after the expiration of SBHD's lease with HCA. Given the stigma Memorial Pembroke suffers and its uncertain future, an estimate of 80 beds is a reasonable projection for the number of beds at the hospital available to meet the needs of the residents of southwest Broward County. With 65% of its patients coming from within the proposed PSA for the Miramar Hospital, Memorial West is the hospital of choice for the residents of the proposed PSA. With 186 adult medical surgical beds, 120 meet the needs of patients coming from Miramar's PSA. Thus, there are approximately 240 adult medical surgical beds (120 at West, 80 at Pembroke and 40 at Cleveland Clinic) available to meet the projected need of 386 adult medical surgical beds in the 2006 planning horizon. Subtracting the 240 beds from the 386 needed yields a net need of 146 beds to serve residents of the Miramar PSA. Although some patients will continue to seek services outside the PSA, Dr. Finarelli's projection that there is a sufficient net need to support the 80 adult medical surgical beds proposed at Memorial Miramar is reasonable. Building Memorial Miramar will help reduce the percentage of people who leave the area for acute inpatient adult medical surgical services from its current level of about 50% to approximately 25%. This will improve access to health care for the residents of southwest Broward County. Memorial West is the only provider of obstetrical services in southwest Broward County, and only one of two in all of south Broward (the other being Memorial Regional). Both Memorial West and Memorial Regional are operating above capacity in their obstetrical units. In calendar year 2000, Memorial West's 24-bed obstetric unit operated at 130% occupancy. Hollywood Medical Center recently closed its obstetric unit thereby increasing the pressure on Memorial Regional and Memorial West to provide services to area patients. With a projected gross need for 46 obstetric beds in the planning horizon, there is a net need for at least 22 more obstetric beds. The proposed 12-bed unit at Memorial Miramar will help to meet that need. Memorial Hospital West's 6-bed pediatric unit is the only unit of its kind in southwest Broward County. The only other provider of pediatric services in all of south Broward is Memorial Regional's Joe DiMaggio Children's Hospital. Dr. Finarelli reasonably projects that one-half of the pediatric patient beds needed in southwest Broward would continue to be filled by Joe DiMaggio's Children Hospital. This leaves a net need for at least 7 pediatric beds in southwest Broward; the proposed 8-bed unit at Memorial Miramar will fill that need. Patient Days, Utilization and Market Share Projections To project utilization and market shares for the proposed hospital, Dr. Finarelli used a geographic area comprised of 28 zip codes that represent the primary and secondary service areas of the proposed hospital. The areas are expected to account for 90% of the hospital's admissions. The 28 zip codes were divided by Dr. Finarelli into four geographic clusters: the 10 zip code PSA or "Southwest Broward", 9 zip codes in "Other South Broward", 3 zip codes in "North Broward" and 6 zip codes in north Dade County or "Select North Dade." Based on historical and current data and market trends, Dr. Finarelli assigned current and projected inpatient market shares in each zip code cluster to each hospital in south Broward County and to select hospitals in north Broward County and north Dade County, with and without the existence of Memorial Hospital Miramar. He also assigned market shares and projected patient days separately by service category for adult medical/surgical, obstetric and pediatric services. Dr. Finarelli's market share assumptions for the proposed hospital were as follows: for Southwest Broward County in the Adult Service Category, 6% and 18%, in OB, 7% and 20%, in Pediatrics, 7% and 20%, all for the years 2005 and 2010, respectively; for Other South Broward County, in the Adult Service Category, 0.3% and 1%, for OB, 0.3% and 1%, for pediatrics, 0% and 0%, all for the years 2005 and 2010, respectively; for North Broward in the Adult Service Category, 0.6% and 2%, for OB, 0.8% and 3% and for pediatrics, 0.8% and 3%, all for the years 2005 and 2010, respectively; and for Select North Dade, in the Adult Service Category, 0.8% and 2.5%, for OB, 1% and 3%, and for pediatrics, 0.8% and 2.5%, all for the years 2005 and 2010, respectively. Taking into account available data and projected trends in each of the zip code clusters, these market share projections are reasonable. Dr. Finarelli applied his market share assumptions to overall projections of hospital discharges for each zip code cluster to arrive at the projected number of discharges for the proposed hospital in its first and second year of operation. He included an additional 9% to 10% in projected discharges to account for patients admitted from outside the 28 zip codes, such as patients from areas elsewhere in Broward, Dade, other parts of Florida and out of state. It is typical for hospitals in Broward County to receive approximately 10% of patients from outside of their primary and secondary service areas. By multiplying the projected number of hospital discharges by a reasonable length of stay for each category of service, Dr. Finarelli arrived at his projections of patient days. His "average length of stay" assumption was less than the District average. These calculations demonstrate that Memorial Miramar will have total acute care utilization of 19,958 patient days in its first full year of operation, and 25,503 patient days in its second full year of operation. Dr. Finarelli's projections of market shares, admissions and patient days for the new hospital appear to be reasonable. The Statutory Criteria Section 408.035, Florida Statutes, provides the review criteria for CON applications. The parties agree that subsections (3) and (4) are not in dispute. Section 408.035(1) concerns whether the proposed project is supported by and consistent with the applicable district health plan (the "Plan"). The Plan contains recommendations, preferences and priorities. The majority of the preferences and priorities contained in the Plan are not applicable to this application. The Plan recommends that there should be a reduction of licensed beds in Broward County until a ratio of 4.0 beds per 1,000 population is less than 4.0 beds per thousand and/or an overall occupancy rate of 85% is achieved. Although the bed population ratio is less than 4.0 beds per thousand, the annual occupancy rate is below 50%. This criterion, quite obviously, is not met by SBHD. But its importance diminishes in light of the "not normal" circumstances in support of the application, particularly the overcrowding at Memorial West and Regional. The Plan states that "priority consideration for initiation of new acute care services or capital expenditures shall be given to applicants with a documented history of providing services to medically indigent patients or a commitment to do so." SBHD promises to provide 3.21% of gross revenue for charity care and 4.14% of its patient days for Medicaid patients at Memorial Pembroke. These figures are not unattainable. Memorial West provided 3.2% of its revenues toward charity care in the most recent year. The effect of the expiration of SBHD' lease without renewal at Memorial Pembroke may increase pressure on Memorial Miramar's charity care services. On the other hand, in light of Memorial West's history in meeting its charity care commitment and the relative affluence of the Miramar's PSA, there is some question as to whether Memorial Miramar can meet the commitment contained in the application. West has fallen far short of its 7.0% commitment. Less than 1% of its admissions were charity care admissions between 1997 and 2000 and only 2.6% of its gross revenues were for charity care in 1999, for example. Whatever West's experience bodes for Miramar's future, it is clear that SBHD has a documented history of providing services to the medically indigent. It is committed, moreover, to do so throughout the hospital district whether it achieves its commitment at Memorial Miramar or not. The preferences of the Plan related to the provision of care for the indigent is clearly met by SBHD. Section 408.035(2) addresses the availability, quality of care, accessibility and extent of utilization of existing health care facilities and health services in the service district of the applicant. There is no problem with quality of care in the district. The extent of utilization of all the facilities in the district is not high. Nonetheless, there is an access problem that constitutes not normal circumstances. Memorial West, in particular, is overcrowded. A new hospital in Miramar will enhance access for the residents of the hospital district who want to access one of the District's hospitals and so directly meets the criterion in Section 408.035(7), the "extent to which the proposed services will enhance access to health care for residents of the service district." Section 408.035(5) addresses the needs of research and educational facilities including facilities with institutional training programs and community training programs for health care practitioners at the student, internship and residency training levels. The District's affiliation with medical schools provides some satisfaction with this criterion but on balance, SBHD receives little credit under this criterion. Section 408.035(6), Florida Statutes is "[t]he availability, of resources, including health personnel, management personnel, and funds for capital and operating expenditures, for project accomplishment and operation." The parties stipulated that SBHD has the ability to recruit and retain the staff needed for the proposed hospital. Cleveland Clinic and Westside argue that SBHD's recruitment of staff will have a detrimental impact on existing providers. A shortage of skilled nurses and other allied professionals exists nationally, in Florida and in Dade and Broward Counties. The nursing shortage has intensified in recent years due to the decline in the number of licensed nurses further compounded by a drop in the number of nurses enrolled in nursing schools. As a result it has become increasingly difficult for hospitals to fill nursing vacancies. In order to ensure adequate staffing in the midst of the nursing shortage, especially during the peak season of late fall and the winter months, Westside and Cleveland Clinic are forced to utilize "agency" or "pool" nursing personnel. These nurses command higher wages than non-agency nursing personnel. The District's application projects a need for 128 registered nurses who will be full-time employees ("FTE"s). This need increases to 167. New hospitals are usually able to attract staff from other facilities who prefer to work with new equipment in a new setting. Recruitment of personnel to staff the Miramar Hospital will come at the expense of existing providers such as Cleveland Clinic and Westside. Subsection (8) of the Review Criteria is "[t]he immediate and long-term financial feasibility of the proposal." The District has the financial resources to construct the hospital and meet start-up costs. There was no challenge to SBHD's demonstration of short-term financial feasibility. Projections of revenues and expenses were based on SBHD experience at Memorial West and its other hospitals. These projections are reasonable. Based on Dr. Finarelli's patient day projections, showing a net profit of $1.6 million in year 2, the project is feasible in the long-term. Subsection (9) of the Review Criteria is "[t]he extent to which the proposal will foster competition that promotes quality and cost-effectiveness." Aside from the impact the new facility will have on Cleveland Clinic and Westside's ability to recruit and retain staff, the evidence failed to show that either Cleveland Clinic or Westside would suffer significant impact if SBHD's application is approved. No matter which experts projections of lost case volume are accepted, both Cleveland Clinic and Westside should generate substantial net profits. The future of Memorial Pembroke, after the expiration of the current lease, is too speculative to factor into the impact to HCA. Subsection (10) of the Review Criteria relates to the costs and methods of the proposed construction. The District satisfies this criterion. (See paragraph 34, above). Subsection (11) addresses the applicant's past and proposed provision of health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. As stated above, while there is legitimate doubt whether or not SBHD can meet the conditions it proposes in its application, there is no question about its past provisions of services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. Rule Criteria There are two rule criteria that relate to the application. Rule 59C-1.038, acute care bed priority considerations and Rule 59C-1030, additional review criteria. Under the Rule 59C-1.038 there are two priorities, only the first of which (documented history of providing services to medically indigent patients or a commitment to do so) is applicable. Stated in the disjunctive, just as its corollary statutory criterion, SBHD clearly meets the criterion based on its documented history regardless of the case Cleveland Clinic and Westside present relative to doubts based on the history of condition compliance at Memorial West. The criteria in Rule 59C-1.030 generally address the extent to which there is a need for a particular service and the extent to which the service will be accessible to underserved members of the population. The application did not identify an underserved segment of the population that is in need of the services proposed for Memorial Miramar. As for the remainder of the criteria under the rule, there is a need for the proposed project as concluded below in this order's conclusions of law.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration grant South Broward Hospital District's CON Application 9459 to establish a 100-bed acute care hospital in southwest Broward County. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of July, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of July, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: C. Gary Williams, Esquire Michael J. Glazer, Esquire Ausley & McMullen 227 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Stephen A. Ecenia, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 420 Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0551 Robert A. Weiss, Esquire Parker, Hudson, Rainer & Dobbs, LLP The Perkins House, Suite 200 118 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 F. Philip Blank, Esquire Geoffrey D. Smith, Esquire Blank, Meenan & Smith, P.A. 204 South Monroe Street Post Office Box 11068 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-3068 George N. Meros, Jr., Esquire Michael E. Riley, Esquire Gray, Harris & Robinson, P.A. Post Office Box 11189 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Gerald L. Pickett, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building Three, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 William Roberts, Acting General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building Three, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building Three, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403

Florida Laws (3) 120.569408.035408.039
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