The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner, an elected circuit court judge, is entitled to renewed membership or is otherwise entitled to participate in the Florida Retirement System (FRS).
Findings Of Fact The FRS Plan There are two classes of members in the FRS: all officers or employees, except elected officers; and elected officers, including circuit judges. See §§ 121.051(1)(a) and 121.052, Fla. Stat. (2014). The second class is identified as the Elected Officers' Class (EOC). See § 121.052(1), Fla. Stat. Members of the FRS may elect to participate in either the Defined Benefit Retirement Program (Pension Plan) or the Public Employee Optional Retirement Program (Investment Plan). The Investment Plan has a one-year vesting requirement, thus enabling a vested participant to receive a distribution of his or her account at any time after leaving FRS-covered employment. Upon retirement, a vested Pension Plan member receives a monthly benefit for his or her lifetime whereas a vested Investment Plan member receives a lump-sum distribution of accumulated benefits from his or her account. Under both plans, a member must terminate all FRS-covered employment in order to receive a benefit. "Retiree" is defined at least three times in chapter 121, none the same. See §§ 121.021(60), 121.35(5)(h), and 121.4501(2)(k), Fla. Stat. However, as explained in the Conclusions of Law, all Investment Plan retirees are covered by section 121.4501(2)(k), which defines a "retiree" as "a former member of the investment plan who has terminated employment and taken a distribution of vested employee or employer contributions as provided in s. 121.591." In 2009, the Legislature created section 121.122(2), which provides that a "retiree of a state-administered retirement system who is initially reemployed on or after July 1, 2010, is not eligible for renewed membership." See Ch. 2009-209, § 12, Laws of Fla. By virtue of this amendment, FRS retirees who did not become reemployed with a covered employer by July 1, 2010, were ineligible for renewed membership in the FRS. The same bill amended section 121.053 by adding a new subsection (3)(a), which provided that on or after July 1, 2010, a "retiree of a state-administered retirement system who is elected or appointed for the first time to an elective office in a regularly established position with a covered employer may not reenroll in the Florida Retirement System." Id. at § 5. This amendment makes clear that the prohibition in section 121.122(2) applies equally to elected officials. In 2012, the Legislature amended section 121.122(2) to provide that "[a] retiree of a state-administered retirement system who is initially reemployed in a regularly established position on or after July 1, 2010, may not be enrolled as a renewed member." See Ch. 2012-222, § 7, Laws of Fla. The sole purpose of the amendment was to "make it clear that a retiree of the investment plan . . . who is reemployed on or after July 1, 2010, is prohibited from being reenrolled as a renewed member of a state-administered retirement system." Fla. Govt. Oper. Comm., CS/HB 7079 (2012) Staff Analysis, p. 5 (final May 11, 2012)(available at http//www.myfloridahouse.gov).1 Petitioner's Employment History and Retirement Option Petitioner was a member of the FRS while employed as an Assistant State Attorney from January 2, 2001, through September 30, 2003. When first employed, Petitioner was a member of the Pension Plan. Shortly thereafter, the Legislature created the Investment Plan option, and Petitioner was given a deadline of August 31, 2002, to make an election between the two plans. On August 31, 2002, she switched to the Investment Plan. On or about September 30, 2003, Petitioner left the Office of State Attorney for private law practice. In January 2006, she took a complete distribution from her FRS Investment Plan in the amount of $8,154.52. By taking a lump- sum distribution, she became a "retiree." See § 121.4501(2)(k), Fla. Stat. ("Retiree" means a former member of the investment plan who has terminated employment and taken a distribution of vested employee . . . contributions."). She was not employed in an FRS-eligible position between September 30, 2003, and January 8, 2013. On August 14, 2012, Petitioner was elected to the position of Circuit Judge in the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida. On January 8, 2013, Petitioner was commissioned as a Circuit Judge for the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida. The Proposed Agency Action In response to her request to enroll in the FRS, by letter dated November 14, 2013, Daniel Beard, who is Director of Policy, Risk Management, and Compliance for the State Board of Administration, advised Petitioner in pertinent part as follows: You retired from the FRS on January 23, 2006 when you requested a distribution of your FRS Investment Plan account. Section 121.4501(2)(k), Florida Statutes, defines a "retiree" as a member of the FRS Investment Plan who has terminated employment and has taken a distribution as provided in Section 121.591. There are no statutory provisions that would allow you to cancel or void your retirement, and there are no statutory provisions that would allow you to repay the distribution in order to be "unretired." Section 121.122, Florida Statutes, states that a retiree of a state-administered retirement system who is initially reemployed in a regularly established position on or after July 1, 2010 is not eligible to enroll in renewed membership and receive additional retirement benefits. This change in law pertained to any retiree of a state-administered retirement system who had not returned to FRS employment prior to July 1, 2010. You were hired by the Office of State Courts on January 8, 2013. Petitioner timely challenged the proposed agency action asserting that she is entitled to participate in the FRS as a compulsory member of the EOC pursuant to part I, chapter 121.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the State Board of Administration enter a final order denying Petitioner's request to reenroll in the FRS. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of September, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of September, 2014.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Department of Transportation should revoke the certification of ACS-Associated Contractual Services, Inc. (ACS), as a disadvantaged business enterprise (DBE) under Chapter 339, Florida Statutes (1997), and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 14-78.
Findings Of Fact ACS-Associated Contractual Services, Inc. (ACS), held a one-year certificate as a disadvantaged business enterprise (DBE) under Chapter 339, Florida Statutes (1997), and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 14-78, effective May 22, 1997, through May 21, 1998. From the time of ACS's application for DBE certification, John Scribner had been ACS's President, primary contact with the Department, and one-third owner. By letter dated October 10, 1997, Scribner advised the Department that he had become the majority owner and that his company no longer qualified for DBE certification. ACS did not apply to renew its DBE certificate prior to its expiration on May 21, 1998, and has not applied for certification since. Ordinarily, these facts would moot a revocation proceeding, but the Department's Minority Program Office Manager testified that the Department has a curious policy under which it has been maintaining ACS's DBE certification until the resolution of these proceedings notwithstanding its earlier expiration.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order revoking ACS's certification as a disadvantaged business enterprise (DBE) under Chapter 339, Florida Statutes (1997), and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 14-78. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of November, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Rafael A. Robles, Esquire Post Office Box 3235 Spring Hill, Florida 34611-3235 Kelley A. Bennett, Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Attention: James C. Myers, Agency Clerk Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has been employed with the Florida Department of Transportation since 1971. He is a graduate of the University of West Florida, with a degree in business management. Petitioner is 38 years old, with a physical disability which limits his use of his left hand and arm, and his left leg is shorter than his right. In 1979, Petitioner was employed by Respondent in its right-of-way section, as a Right-of-Way Agent III. In that position, he was responsible for the coordination of the Acquisition, Relocation and Property Management sections of Respondent's District III. One of Petitioner's subordinates was H. E. Walls, who was in charge of the Acquisition section. Petitioner's immediate supervisor was J. F. Culpepper, Assistant Right-of-Way Administrator. In April, 1980, a new Right-of-Way Administrator, J. A. Alfes, was assigned to District III. In 1980, and again in 1981, Petitioner filed charges of discrimination against Respondent with the Florida Commission on Human Relations premised upon Petitioner's aforementioned disability. The 1980 charge was resolved through the entry of a settlement agreement. The charge filed in 1981 was premised upon the same disability, but that charge was ultimately dismissed by the Florida Commission on Human Relations. In January, 1981, a hearing was held in Tallahassee, Florida, on one of the charges of discrimination filed by Petitioner. On the day following that hearing, Petitioner was called into Mr. Alfes' office in Chipley, Florida, and was told that the hearing held in Tallahassee had been several hours of "horse shit." On May 18, 1981, Mr. Alfes advised Petitioner of an impending reorganization of the section in which Petitioner was employed. Subsequently, on June 17, 1981, Mr. Alfes told Petitioner that there would be "consequences" as a result of Petitioner's having filed complaints with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. In 1981 a reorganization of functions occurred in all six districts statewide of DOT. This reorganization eliminated one classification of position, Right-of-Way Agent III, which Petitioner had held in District III, and elevated the positions at the head of Acquisition and Relocation sections to the administrator level. At the time this reorganization occurred, Petitioner, as previously mentioned, was a Right-of-Way Agent III, and Herbert Walls headed the Acquisition section. Mr. Alfes, Petitioner's immediate superior, recommended that Petitioner be placed in charge of Relocation, and that Mr. Walls, who had been working in Acquisition, be placed in charge of the Acquisition section in light of his experience in that area since 1978. J. F. Culpepper, who occupied the position on DOT's organization chart to whom the Acquisition section, Relocation section, and Property Management section would report, recommended that the Petitioner be placed in charge of the Acquisition section, based upon his belief that Petitioner was better qualified by reason of his real estate training and college degree. Mr. Walls had only a high school diploma. During the period of his employment with DOT, Petitioner had not handled any complete right-of-way acquisition matters, and had never negotiated for DOT in the acquisition of any right-of-way parcels. Petitioner had, however, attended two relocation seminars while employed by DOT. Mr. Walls had been continually engaged in acquisition work for DOT since at least 1978. DOT's District Engineer, Alan Potter, was the DOT employee ultimately responsible for selecting the heads of the Acquisition and Relocation sections. Mr. Potter concurred with the recommendation that Petitioner be placed in charge of the Relocation section, based upon his belief that it was the most important job involved in right-of-way acquisition, and that it required a very thorough and cautious person. Based upon Mr. Potter's evaluation of Petitioner as possessed of high ability, and being very mature and compassionate, Petitioner was placed in charge of the Relocation section. At the time Petitioner was named as head of Relocation and Mr. Walls was placed as head of Acquisition, the two positions were both classified as Right-of-Way Specialist II's, pay grade 22. Later both were reclassified as Right-of-Way Administrator I's, at pay grade 23. The record in this cause establishes that neither position was more prestigious" than the other, or that either position placed the individual holding it in a more favorable posture for promotion or advancement. Subsequently, in the summer of 1981, the reorganization of DOT was completed, with Mr. Walls having been appointed head of Acquisition, with approximately six subordinates. Petitioner became responsible for Relocation, and shared the supervision of a clerical employee with the head of Property Management. After reorganization, Mr. Alfes relocated Petitioner's office in another building 100 feet away from the main office. Petitioner's office was initially located in a passageway and, as a result, Petitioner was required several times a day to make trips to the main building to obtain files necessary to complete his work. In August of 1983, prior to final hearing in this cause, Mr. Alfes retired, and Petitioner's office was relocated in a more spacious office close to the Acquisition section.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the State of Florida, Commission on Human Relations, dismissing the petition for relief, and denying the relief requested therein. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd of May, 1984, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM E. WILLIAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 904/488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: BEN R. PATTERSON, ESQUIRE POST OFFICE BOX 4289 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32315 VERNON L. WHITTIER, JR., ESQUIRE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION HAYDON BURNS BUILDING TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301 JEAN OWEN, ESQUIRE ASSISTANT GENERAL COUNSEL FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS WOODCREST OFFICE CENTER 325 JOHN KNOX ROAD SUITE 240, BUILDING F TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32303 DONALD A. GRIFFIN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS 325 JOHN KNOX ROAD BUILDING F, SUITE 240 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32303
Findings Of Fact Vedder and Associates Incorporated's (VAI's) application for minority certification dated January 22, 1992 was received by the Department of Management Services on January 27, 1992. Petitioner's application for minority certification was denied by the Department of Management Services in a letter dated May 22, 1992. VAI was established in October of 1991 and offers as its principal service "land surveying." VAI is licensed to do business in Florida and is fifty-one percent (51 percent) owned by Kathleen Vedder, a Caucasian female, and forty-nine percent (49 percent) owned by John Vedder her husband, a Caucasian male. Kathleen A. Vedder and John F. Vedder were the sole directors of the corporation at the time of certification denial, with Kathleen A. Vedder serving as president/secretary and John F. Vedder serving as vice-president/treasurer. On September 16, 1992, after the denial of certification, John Vedder resigned as a director of VAI. No business reason was offered for this decision. Kathleen Vedder, the minority owner, is presently the sole director of the corporation. As sole director, she represents a majority of the board of directors. She continues to serve as president and secretary. John Vedder continues to serve as treasurer. It is not clear if he still serves as vice- president. (See Findings of Fact 5-11 and 28-29). At all times material, Kathleen Vedder has owned 51 percent of the stock through a greater monetary investment than John Vedder, who owns 49 percent of the stock. At all times material, Kathleen Vedder has served as the principal officers, president and secretary. At all times material, Kathleen Vedder has made up at least 50 percent of the board of directors. Since September 16, 1992, she has made up 100 percent of the board of directors. At all times material, John Vedder has served as a principal officer, treasurer. Up until September 16, 1992, John Vedder made up 50 percent of the board of directors. Thereafter, he did not serve on the board. At all times material, Article VII of VAI's Articles of Incorporation have permitted an increase or decrease in the board of directors as permitted by the bylaws, but never less than one director. At all times material, Item III of VAI's bylaws have provided that corporate officers hold office at the "satisfaction" of the board of directors; that the president shall be the chief executive officer; and that subject to any specific assignment of duties by the board of directors, the vice-president, the secretary, and the treasurer act under the direction of the president. VAI was formed by the purchase of assets from the Perry C. McGriff Company, which had employed Kathleen and John Vedder. Kathleen Vedder began her career with the surveying firm of Keith & Schnars, P.A., in Fort Lauderdale in 1976. She was the administrative assistant to the President. In 1981 she and John Vedder moved to Gainesville to manage the Perry C. McGriff Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of Keith & Schnars. John Vedder handled the surveying aspects of the business, and Kathleen Vedder handled most of the management of the company other than the surveying portion, including purchasing, handling business accounts and financial affairs, client relations, insurance, and correspondence. This continued until 1991 when the assets of the Perry C. McGriff Company were sold to VAI. Kathleen Vedder now performs for VAI basically the same functions as she did for the predecessor company with certain additions. John Vedder served as the director of survey for the Perry C. McGriff Company which employed both Mr. and Mrs. Vedder prior to the formation of VAI. In his position as director of survey at Perry C. McGriff Company, he was responsible for all contracts and negotiations and coordination of personnel to ensure timely completion of contracts. His background by education, training, and experience is extensive in the technical applications to perform land surveying. The business of VAI essentially began on December 6, 1991. Prior to that date, husband and wife had discussed the purchase of the McGriff assets. Kathleen Vedder discussed the purchase of the business with her husband and informed him that she wanted to run the business. He accepted this relationship and her role as "boss" because he hated working in the office and wanted nothing to do with running the business. Kathleen Vedder contacted the old Perry C. McGriff clients and facilitated the transition from the old company to the new company. The Perry C. McGriff Company was purchased for $100,000 with a $15,000 down payment and the remainder to be paid over 7 years. Funds for the original purchase price of the assets were obtained by cashing Kathleen Vedder's 401K plan, two IRA's, and by loans against her life insurance policies for an investment of $57,185.62 by Kathleen Vedder and $25,682.25 of marital assets held with her husband, John Vedder. John Vedder participated in the negotiations to buy Perry C. McGriff Company. John Vedder provided input and expertise regarding the assets of Perry C. McGriff Company which were to be purchased, whether survey equipment was acceptable, and the vehicles to be purchased. John Vedder discussed and consulted with Kathleen Vedder regarding the financial aspects of the purchase of Perry C. McGriff Company. He discussed with her the starting salaries of employees to be hired/transferred to VAI, and the leasing and location of business premises for VAI and purchase of furniture. Kathleen Vedder established the corporate policies, the accounting procedures, the job costing, and the standard management practices of the new company. Kathleen Vedder, as VAI president, made all of the final decisions regarding implementation of the new business such as renting the office, moving the assets purchased from the old Perry C. McGriff Company, establishing lines of insurance, determining the manner and location of the survey records purchased, and hiring the staff. Kathleen Vedder and John Vedder made it clear to all of the employees from the beginning of the company that she was the "boss". The takeover of Perry C. McGriff Company by VAI was explained to former employees during a field visit by John Vedder. His explanation was made at Kathleen Vedder's direction and took place while these employees were already in the field, during a time of transition, in a spirit of damage control when Kathleen and John Vedder were concerned that rumors might affect the new company's ability to retain good personnel from the old company and over concern that some might have trouble working for a woman. Kathleen Vedder hired six employees initially from the old Perry C. McGriff Company. Kathleen Vedder set the initial pay scale for the employees of the company and maintained the documentation relevant to this function. The additional four persons hired by the company since it began were Robert Henderson, Tom Crossman, George Gruner, and Doug Zimmerman, each of whom were hired by Kathleen Vedder who interviewed them, who set their wages and benefits, and who described their job functions to them as new employees. VAI has a business license posted on its premises issued by the City of Gainesville, Florida, in the name of John Vedder, authorizing the performance of land survey services. VAI currently employs eight permanent employees and the qualifying agent is John F. Vedder, who serves as a principal officer, treasurer. He holds a land survey license issued by the State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, Land Surveying Board. In order to be qualified as a licensed land surveying corporation, a principal officer must be a licensed land surveyor. The participation of John Vedder or another duly-licensed land surveyor is required to satisfy the requirements of Chapter 472 F.S., for a qualifying agent. Under that statute, the qualifying agent must have a license as a land surveyor and hold a position as a principal officer in VAI. If John Vedder were to lose his professional land surveyor license, there would be three licensed land surveyors remaining with the company, and it would be possible for VAI to continue if one of these were designated as a principal officer. Kathleen Vedder holds no license or certification other than a notary public. In terms of any special needs or requests, such as medical needs, all employees are required to report to Kathleen Vedder. Kathleen Vedder earns $14.50 per hour. The survey party chiefs, including John Vedder, now earn $13.00 per hour. These amounts are commensurate with Kathleen Vedder's percentage of VAI ownership of fifty-one percent (51 percent). The evidence is conflicting as to whether another crew chief earned more than John Vedder in one year due to a higher rate of pay or more hours worked in that period. No one in the company draws any bonus, commission or has any particular insurance coverage as a benefit of employment. The company has not posted any dividends or distributed any proceeds from business investments or engaged in any profit sharing. The corporation has, as a risk of doing business, the liability connected with its $85,000.00 promissory note to Keith & Schnars, P.A. It also has the risk associated with premises liability, with motor vehicle liability, with general errors and omissions liability, and with professional liability. Kathleen Vedder has procured insurance to cover all these risks. These premiums are paid by the corporation. There has been no additional ownership interest acquired by anyone since the inception of the corporation. There are no third party agreements. There are no bonding applications. The company has not at any time entered into an agreement, option, scheme, or created any rights of conversion which, when exercised, would result in less than fifty-one percent (51 percent) minority ownership and minority control of the business by Kathleen Vedder. Kathleen Vedder controls the purchase of the goods, equipment, business inventory and services needed in the day-to-day-operation of the business. Kathleen Vedder expressly controls the investments, loans to and from stockholders, bonding, payment of general business loans, and payments and establishment of lines of credit. The corporate business account of VAI contains the signatures of John Vedder and Kathleen Vedder on the bank signature card. Only one signature is required to transact business. Of the 823 checks issued by VAI since it began, John Vedder signed one at Kathleen Vedder's direction when it was not possible for her to be in two places at once, and Kathleen Vedder signed 822 checks. Although he is treasurer, John Vedder professed to know nothing of VAI's finances and deferred to Kathleen Vedder in all matters of financing from the very beginning. Nonetheless, the corporate documents list the treasurer as the chief financial officer in ultimate charge of all funds. Kathleen Vedder has knowledge of only the minimum technical standards required for a survey. In her certification interviews, Mrs. Vedder did not know how to establish true north or how a line survey would establish true north. She lacks basic survey knowledge and could not identify Polaris as the north star or state the standard measurement (length of a chain) for a surveyor. Identifying Polaris is not particularly important in modern surveying. Kathleen Vedder is capable of doing the necessary paper search and telephone call regarding underground utilities for surveyors in the field. Kathleen Vedder has extensive experience in the production of a surveying product and is able to manage the surveyors who perform the technical aspects of the business. Upon acquisition of the assets and formation of the new company, Kathleen Vedder began directing the two field crews newly employed by VAI to the various projects and work which she had scheduled. This direction has primarily been in the timing and coordination of projects and is commensurate with some of the work previously done by John Vedder when he was director of survey for the predecessor company, Perry C. McGriff Company. (See Finding of Fact 14). Technical problems involving a particular site do not arise very often so as to require a discussion among the land surveyors of the company but if they do, the professional land surveyors jointly or singly make all technical surveying decisions. Surveys must be signed by a registered land surveyor pursuant to Chapter 472 F.S. John Vedder provides Kathleen Vedder technical advice, coordinates field crews' work, makes decisions pertaining to technical work which is not within Kathleen Vedder's abilities, consults with Kathleen Vedder once a week concerning the general financial picture of VAI, and does some job estimating and quality control. Kathleen Vedder rarely visits work sites in the field. Employees in the field report to John Vedder whenever they have a problem and report to Kathleen Vedder if the problem is in the nature of project coordination. John Vedder is responsible for training and working with employees and providing technical training required for the performance of land surveys. He does computer aided drafting (CAD) and provides technical assistance to the CAD operator, which Kathleen Vedder cannot do, however she works it afterward on her computer. Kathleen Vedder does not work in the field, and of the two, John Vedder performs the majority of work in the field. Kathleen Vedder defers to John Vedder to handle technical matters because he has more experience. Party Chief John Vedder supervises his crew. Party Chief Louis Crosier supervises his crew. Kathleen Vedder supervises Louis Crosier and John Vedder and a third crew chief when one is used, usually Robert Henderson. Kathleen Vedder established a fee schedule for the company and a method of formulating the estimates and bids which the company would propose to prospective clients. John Vedder is not knowledgeable in this area. When a job comes in, the prospective client initially contacts Kathleen Vedder. If a client calls requesting a survey, Kathleen Vedder does the research and provides the estimate or bid without further input from any surveyor if the survey requested is a standard routine survey. If the job is complex, Kathleen Vedder requires man hour estimates from two land surveyors, one of whom is often John Vedder. She takes these estimates and applies previous histories, experience, and adjustments in order to prepare the final bid or survey estimate. Once she has received the man-hour estimate, Kathleen Vedder reviews it, compares it with previous surveys, applies a job costs analysis to it, applies any other known costs to it, and presents the final estimate or bid. There is a difference between compiling the work hours necessary for the estimate and compiling the estimate itself. Kathleen Vedder has the ultimate responsibility for finalizing complex estimates and bids. Kathleen Vedder makes presentations as a part of her function which involve technical presentations of the survey services rendered by VAI. In the fourteen month period since the business began, Kathleen Vedder has given approximately eight presentations of a technical nature to prospective clients, including the Florida Department of Transportation (DOT). Kathleen Vedder is capable of complying with DOT bid specifications to submit material on a DOS disc. DOT has qualified VAI under its Disadvantaged Business Enterprise program. Petitioner's witnesses skilled in land surveying consistently testified that without Kathleen Vedder's skilled contributions to the firm, technical land surveying could be accomplished but the firm would not show a profit. Rule 13A-2.005(3)(d)(4), requires minority owners to have managerial, technical capability, knowledge, training, education and experience to make decisions regarding the business. In interpreting this rule, the Respondent agency relies on Barton S. Amey v. Department of General Services, DOAH Case No. 86-3954, (RO 3/5/87; FO 4/21/87), aff'd Fla. DCA February 11, 1988, No. 87-235. The agency has no further refinement by way of rule or policy which applies specifically to the land surveying industry. It does not require the minority owner to have a land surveying license per se. It does not require the minority business owner to have an extensive knowledge of surveying.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that a final order be entered certifying Vedder Associates, Incorporated as a Minority Business Enterprise. RECOMMENDED this 7th day of June, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 92-3763 The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to S120.59(2), F.S., upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF: The so-called "stipulated facts" is accepted, as stipulated, but not as to the inserted conclusion of law/argument. 1-19 Accepted except to the degree it is unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative. 20-21 Accepted, but not dispositive, subordinate. Rejected as a conclusion of law or argument. Accepted, but not dispositive, subordinate. Rejected as a conclusion of law or argument. 25-33 Accepted as modified to more closely conform to the record, and to eliminate mere leal argument, conclusions of law, and unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative material. Also testimony was to 823 checks. Rejected as stated as not supported by the greater weight of the credible evidence. Accepted, except to the degree it is unnecessary, subordinate or cumulative. Rejected as out of context, a conclusion of law, or argument. 37-46 Accepted, as modified, except to the degree it is unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative. 47-48 Rejected as out of context, a conclusion of law, or argument. 49-53 Covered to the degree necessary in Finding of Fact 65, otherwise irrelevant and immaterial to a de novo proceeding under Section 120.57(1) F.S. 54-56 Accepted except to the degree unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative. 57 Rejected as out of context, a conclusion of law, or argument. 58-60 Accepted except to the degree unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative. Petitioner's "factual conclusions" are rejected as proposed conclusions of law not proposed findings of fact. Respondent's PFOF: 1-10 Accepted except to the degree unnecessary or cumulative. 11 Rejected as subordinate. 12-14 Rejected as stated as argument. Covered in Findings of Fact 27-30, absent argument, conclusions of law, and erroneous statements not supported by the greater weight of the credible competent evidence. Rejected as argument. Mostly accepted except to the degree it is unnecessary, subordinate or cumulative. However, the job estimating as stated is not supported by the record nor the argument of "day-to-day business." 17-19 Accepted as modified to conform to the record evidence, and except to the degree it is unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative. 20 Rejected as argument. 21-22 Accepted but incomplete, irrelevant and immaterial in a de novo Section 120.57(1) F.S. proceeding. Also, the footnote is rejected as mere argument. 23-24 Rejected as argument. Accepted, but not complete or dispositive; unnecessary and cumulative. Accepted to the degree stated except to the degree unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative. She also did more. Rejected as partially not supported by the record; other parts are rejected as unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative. Accepted except to the degree unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative or not supported by the record. Accepted in part and rejected in part upon the greater weight of the credible, competent record evidence. Rejected as argument. Rejected as stated as not supported by the greater weight of the credible, competent record evidence, also unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative. Accepted except to the degree it is unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative. Rejected as argument 34-35 Accepted in part. Remainder rejected as stated as not supported by the greater weight of the credible, competent record evidence, and as a conclusion of law contrary to Mid State Industries, Inc. v. Department of General Services, DOAH Case No. 92-2110 (RO 9/14/92). 36 Rejected as argument. 37-38 Accepted in part, and rejected in part because not proven as stated. Rejected as argument. Rejected as stated because out of context or not supported as stated by the greater weight of the credible, competent record evidence. Rejected as argument. Accepted, except to the degree unnecessary, subordinate or cumulative. Rejected as argument. 44-46 Rejected as subordinate. 47,(No #48),49 Accepted except to the degree unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative. 50-55 Rejected as subordinate or unnecessary or as conclusions of law or argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Peter C. K. Enwall, Esquire Post Office Box 23879 Gainesville, FL 32602 Terry A. Stepp, Esquire Department of Management Services Koger Executive Center Suite 309, Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950 William H. Lindner, Secretary Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950 Susan B. Kirkland, Esquire Department of Management Services Koger Executive Center Suite 309, Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-0950
Findings Of Fact On July 7, 1978, Petitioner, Amelia M. Park (Park), was hired as District VI Legal Counsel of Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Department). The position was included in the Florida Career Service System, and Park obtained permanent status in the position in January 1979. The Legislature exempted the position from the Career Service System and made it a Senior Management Service position on November 12, 1981. On the morning of November 9, 1984, Park was in Bradenton to attend a hearing for the Department in Manatee County Court. She had scheduled a meeting with Bill Presmeyer at the Manatee Health Department, but the meeting was cancelled at the last minute. Because Park had pre-approved annual leave for the afternoon, she went to her vacation home located in Holmes Beach on Anna Maria Island. Late in the morning, Park received a telephone call from her secretary, Muriel Pages, who informed Park that Assistant District Legal Counsel, Dennis Palso, who had been on the job only one week, and District Program Manager, Stephanie Watson Judd, wanted to talk to her. Park knew or should have known that the matter to be discussed was considered important by the Department staff or they would not have telephoned her at her home. Judd told Park that the Department had received a court order committing a juvenile to the Department but that they were not sure what the Department properly should do in response to the Order. Palso, who only had been on the job for one week, pointed out internal inconsistencies in the Order. The Order found the juvenile both incompetent to stand trial and not guilty by reason of insanity. The Order also cited the rules of criminal procedure instead of the rules of juvenile procedure. At the request of Carl Neill, the Department's District Administrator, Park's immediate supervisor, Judd and Palso relayed this information to Park and sought her advice on several questions: (1) whether the Order was legal; (2) whether the juvenile could be placed in a mental health facility based on the Order alone without bringing a Baker Act proceeding; and (3) whether and how the Department should take the child into custody. Park responded that the Order was sufficient for the Department to take the juvenile into custody and place him in a mental health facility. Notwithstanding the questions Park was being asked, she assumed that the juvenile was in custody because she would not have expected the judge to release such a juvenile into the community. Park told Palso that he or she would be able to clear up the internal inconsistencies and problems in the Order the following week by filing a motion in court. Park recommended that the Department's staff telephone "central admissions" in Tallahassee since Park believed that office of the Department had experience with similar orders and would know how to proceed. After talking to Park, Judd telephoned Sam Ashdown in Tallahassee to discuss the case and receive advice on how to proceed. In the course of their discussion, Judd read the Order to Ashdown over the telephone and, to her surprise, Ashdown took the position that the Order was illegal and that the Department could not act upon it. Judd informed Ashdown that Park, as District VI's legal counsel, had given the District VI staff a contrary opinion and suggested that Ashdown talk directly with Park, giving him the telephone number at Park's vacation house. Later in the afternoon of November 9, Judd telephoned Park again to inform her about Judd's conversation with Ashdown and to prepare her to receive a telephone call from Ashdown. Park became angry at Judd for having given Ashdown her telephone number. She denied ever having given a legal opinion that the Order was legal, but told Judd that there was nothing that could be done about it by the end of Friday afternoon. Park told Judd to call Ashdown back and tell him not to telephone Park about the matter. In the face of Park's tirade, Judd informed Carl Neill of what Park had said and telephoned Ashdown to relay Park's message and tell him not to call Park. Neill became very concerned about the manner in which Park handled the matter earlier in the afternoon of November 9, 1984. Although Park was a knowledgeable lawyer and able advocate for the Department, she had a history of difficulty working, relating, and communicating with certain members of the Department's District VI staff. This history included several occasions in which Park's personal relationships with Department staff deteriorated to the point of affecting Park's ability to work with or even talk to staff. Neill suspected that a recent deterioration in the personal relationship between Judd and Park may have been partially responsible for the manner in which Park handled the juvenile matter on November 9. Park's work relationship with each of the two assistant attorneys working under her before Palso had deteriorated to the point that Park could communicate with them only in writing and not very well. Park's personality and deficient interpersonal skills was at least partially responsible for those problems in District VI's legal office. Park also had a deserved reputation among District VI's staff for being unpredictable. For no apparent reason, Park would sometimes be unreasonably irritable and rude. For example: Park has chastised Joseph Tagliarini in front of other staff for operational (not legal) difficulties in dealing with the local Sheriff's Office. This rebuff was hostile and angry, inappropriate and unwarranted. On another occasion, Park refused to dis- cuss a personnel matter with Allen Mundy and William Stanley, became rude and directed them to leave her office. Personnel officer, David Stoops, had asked Mundy and Stanley to discuss the matter with Park. At a training session she was giving on child support enforcement, Park became angered by questions being asked by one of the partici- pants, became progressively more hostile and angry, and ended up yelling at the employee from the podium in the middle of the training session. James Freyfogel, one of Park's own wit- nesses, was unfairly accused by Park with having concealed information material to a real estate transaction entered into by the Depart- ment. Because of Park's conduct, Freyfogel tried to avoid any contact with her for about a year and a half. Another of Park's witnesses, Judy Wichter- man, testified that Park was "a nasty person" and that she and other counselors avoided con- tact with Park whenever possible. Park was not even aware of the effect of her personality on Freyfogel and Wichterman. The strained work relationships described in paragraph 9 above (and others) do not typify all of Park's relationships with members of the staff of the Department's District VI. Park had many good days and many positive working relationships. However, Neill was aware that Park's personality had caused several problems in work relationships at District VI and that it was not a matter of one or two isolated incidents. At least part of the blame for these problems rests with Park's personality. Problems caused by Park's personality were not limited to lower staff members whom Park intimidated. For example: Neill also was aware that Park had unknow- ingly offended Larry Overton, then Deputy As- sistant Secretary For Operations for the De- partment in Tallahassee. Overton related to Neill that Park had become hysterical during a meeting he had with her concerning problems with a nursing home in District VI. In the fall of 1984, Park insisted on be- ginning a letter to a private attorney with whom she was dealing on behalf of the Depart- ment by stating that she was "outraged" at some of the attorney's tactics and conduct. Neill had specifically requested that Park, as representative of a State agency, not express "outrage." Neill told Park that he thought this form of expression was inappropriate, and he directed that the letter be reworded. Despite Neill's direct request, Park sent the letter as originally written with the justifi- cation that she was indeed "outraged." Park also angered two judges before whom she appeared as attorney for the Department, a Judge Pope and a Judge Calhoun. In compliance with Neill's suggestion and request, Park wrote a letter of apology to Judge Pope. When Park returned to work after the weekend and Monday holiday on Tuesday, November 13, 1984, Neill asked her into his office to discuss the events of November 9. During the discussion, Neill referred to the events of November 9 as an emergency, and Park attempted without success to learn from Neill why it was an emergency. Neill explained his position that it is unacceptable for senior managers on leave to refuse to permit HRS staff to contact them to discuss matters staff believes need to be discussed. Neill stated that senior managers must be available in such circumstances. Park became very angry and upset at having been accused of less than satisfactory performance. She lost her temper in front of Neill. She stated that she was incensed that Judd had given her home telephone number to Ashdown and stated that, in the future, she would avoid this situation by not leaving a telephone number where she could be reached. Park then stormed out of Neill's office. As a result of all of the events referred to in these Findings of Fact, including Neill's meeting with Park on November 13, 1984, Neill's confidence and trust in Park was shaken. Neill did not believe he could continue to function with Park as his legal counsel. Neill did not think he could count on Park to make herself available to Neill and his staff when needed. Neill also believed he could retain competent legal counsel who would be able to get along better with a larger part of Neill's staff so that Neill's staff could function more smoothly and effectively as a whole. Neill telephoned HRS supervisors in Tallahassee for advice and was told that he had authority to terminate Park in his discretion. After spending the rest of the day and evening of November 13 making up his mind, Neill decided to terminate Park as his legal counsel. On November 14, 1984, Neill again met with Park and informed her that he intended to make a change in the position of legal counsel and asked for Park's assistance in making the transition smooth. Park interpreted Neill's comment as a request for Park's resignation, and Park responded that she could not agree to resign without giving the matter further thought and discussing it with her husband, Park's counsel in this case. Because of Park's work schedule she requested until Monday, November 19, 1984, to give Neill an answer, and Neill agreed. On November 19, 1984, Park and her husband met with Neill as scheduled at 8:30 in the morning. Neill handed Mr. Park a letter informing Park of Neill's intent to terminate Park's employment effective November 27, 1984. Mr. Park asked if the meeting was a pre-termination conference. Neill stated that he did not believe a pre-termination conference was required for senior management but that he was willing to treat the meeting as a pre-termination conference and would consider anything Mr. or Mrs. Park had to say about the matter. Mr. Park suggested to Neill that Neill was exposing himself to possible personal liability by terminating Mrs. Park but had nothing else to say about the matter. The Parks stated that they had all they needed and left Neill's office. Towards the end of the final hearing, Park stipulated that she was not dismissed for political reasons.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, enter a Final Order consistent with the previous exercise of its discretion to terminate Petitioner, Amelia M. Park, from her Senior Management Service position. RECOMMENDED this 15th day of November, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 1985. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 84-4443 Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Adopted. See Finding 1. Rejected as unnecessary, irrelevant and subordinate. As reflected in the Conclusions Of Law, the ultimate issues of fact are narrower than Petitioner perceives. Unless the subordinate facts in proposed Finding 2 persuade the finder of fact that the alleged legitimate reasons for termination of Petitioner's employment were mere fabrications, they are unnecessary and irrelevant. In any event, they are subordinate. Covered by Findings 2 through 6. Covered by Finding 12. Covered by Finding 14. Covered by Finding 15. See Paragraph 1 above. See Paragraph 1 above. Also covered in part by Findings 9 and 10. See Paragraph 9 above. See Paragraph 9 above. See Paragraph 9 above. See Paragraph 9 above. Also covered in part by Finding 8. See Paragraph 9 above. See Paragraph 9 above. See Paragraph 9 above. See Paragraph 9 above. See Paragraph 9 above. See Paragraph 9 above. See Paragraph 9 above. See Paragraph 9 above. Also covered in part by Finding 8. Covered by Findings 2 through 4. See Paragraph 8 above. Also covered in part by Findings 2 through 6. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings Of Fact Covered by Finding 1. Rejected in part as being subordinate. Also covered in part by Finding 11(a). Covered by Finding 9(a).* Covered by Finding 9(b). Covered by Finding 9(c). Rejected in part as subordinate or cumulative. Covered in part by Finding 8. See Paragraph 6 above. See Paragraph 6 above. Covered by Finding 11(b). Rejected in part as subordinate, cumulative, and argumentative. Covered in part by Finding 9. Covered by Finding 8. Rejected in part as subordinate, cumulative, and argumentative. Covered in part by Finding 8. See Paragraph 12 above. See Paragraph 12 above. See Paragraph 12 above. See Paragraph 12 above. See Paragraph 12 above. See Paragraph 12 above. Also covered in part by Finding 7. Rejected in part as subordinate. Covered in part by Finding 11(c). Rejected in part as subordinate, cumulative, and argumentative. Covered in part by Findings 8 thorough 11. See Paragraph 20 above. Covered by Finding 9(d). Rejected in part as subordinate and cumulative. Covered in part by Finding 9. See Paragraph 23 above. Covered by Finding 9(e). Rejected as subordinate, unnecessary, and argumentative. Rejected in part as subordinate, cumulative, unnecessary, and argumentative. Covered in part by Finding 10. Covered by Findings 7 through 10. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary. 30-35 Covered b Findings 2 through 6. Covered by Finding 12. Rejected in part because Rule SM-1.09, Florida Administrative Code, is a conclusion of law, not a finding of fact. Rejected in part because there was no evidence of HRS Regulation 60-49. In part covered by the Findings 2 through 6. Covered by Finding 14. Covered by Finding 15. Covered by Finding 15. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary. Covered by Finding 16. *It should be noted that parts of this proposed finding of fact and many others have been rejected to the extent that they contain excessive argument. COPIES FURNISHED: William M. Park, Esquire Building 501, Suite A 8001 N. Dale Mabry Tampa, Florida 33614 Jay Adams, Esquire Deputy General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee Florida 32301 David Pingree Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as a personal view of the premises by the Hearing Officer, the following relevant facts are found: In January of 1975, Central Development Company, as the owner of the Mainland Lot 20, Parkers Haven, and the owner of Parker Island, submitted to the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund its application for an easement across the sovereignty land between these properties in King's Bay, Crystal River. An application for a permit from the Department of Environmental Regulation to construct a concrete bridge across this land had previously been submitted. By letter dated March 16, 1977, Edward H. Cederholm with the Department of Natural Resources was notified that the Department of Environmental Regulation had determined that the bridge proposed by the applicant would have no significant adverse effect on water quality. Representatives from the Department of Natural Resources had previously concluded, after a biological and hydrographic assessment, that the bridge in itself would not significantly affect aquatic biological resources nor would it have significant adverse hydrographic effects. The Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission had no objection to the bridge itself, but did express concern over the future development of Parker Island. The request for a right-of-way easement for the bridge construction was a scheduled item for the Trustees' Agenda for April 7, 1977. The Staff of the Department of Natural Resources recommended approval of the easement request, noting that "the executed easement will be provided to the applicant upon affirmative permitting action by D.E.R." The Trustees deferred action on the request until a public hearing pursuant to Florida Statutes Section 253.115 could be conducted by the Department of Natural Resources. The Department of Natural Resources thereafter withdrew its recommendation to the Trustees pending the outcome of the public hearing. That public hearing was conducted in Crystal River on September 9, 1977, by the Department of Natural Resources. Having previously submitted an application to the Department of Environmental Regulation for the installation and maintenance of power poles and lines on and between Banana and Parker Island in Citrus County, Florida Power Corporation submitted an application to the Department of Natural Resources for an easement or other form of consent for the same. Presumably, the public hearing held on September 9, 1977, included this issue as well as the proposed bridge issue. No application has been received by the Department of Natural Resources for the construction and maintenance of a boardwalk by the Banana Island Recreation Association, Inc. The petitioners herein attempted to present evidence that it would not be in the public interest for Department of Natural Resources or the Trustees to grant easements for the bridge, power poles and lines, or boardwalk projects for the reasons that said projects would: present a hazard or serious impediment to navigation in the area; have an adverse effect upon water quality and aquatic resources; endanger an already endangered species - the manatee; and deprive waterfront property owners of their common law riparian rights to an unobstructed view. Additionally, petitioners contend that the applicants and Department of Natural Resources have failed to comply with the provisions of Chapter 253 regarding sales and conveyances of land, the title to which is vested in the Trustees. The Department of Natural Resources forwarded the requests for hearings to the Division of Administrative Hearings, and the undersigned Hearing Officer was duly designated to conduct the hearings. Upon the agreement of all parties, the hearing in this cause was consolidated with the hearings on the Department of Environmental Regulation permit applications for the bridge, the power poles and lines and the boardwalk. The separate recommended orders entered in those cases contain specific findings of fact concerning the evidence presented at the hearing relating to the effect of those projects upon navigation, water quality, aquatic resources, the manatee and riparian rights to an unobstructed view. In summary, it was concluded that the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence that the public interest in these areas would be harmed by the granting of the Department of Environmental Regulation permits. The reader of this recommended order is specifically referred to the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the recommended orders entered in Case Nos. 76- 1102, 76-1103 and 77-849 and 850, all of which are attached hereto.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund issue to Central Development Company and Florida Power Corporation the required easements or other forms of consent authorizing the proposed usages of sovereignty lands as set forth in their applications for the same. Respectfully submitted and entered this day of September, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth F. Hoffman, Esquire Post Office Box 1872 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Alfred W. Clark, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2562 Executive Center Circle, E. Montgomery Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Baya Harrison, III, Esquire Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 David Gluckman, Esquire 3348 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Mr. H. A. Evertz, III Florida Power Corporation Post Office Box 14042 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 Kent A. Zaiser, Esquire Assistant Department Attorney Department of Natural Resources Crown Building 202 Blount Street Tallahassee, Florida ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= BEFORE THE STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND STANLEY HARTSON et al., ) ) Petitioner, ) ) vs. ) CASE NO. 77-960 ) DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, ) et al., ) ) Respondents. ) )
Findings Of Fact Florida Real Estate Commission is a licensing and regulatory agency charged with the duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, and Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and their implementing rules. Respondent Louis Diabo is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker holding license number 0146400. The last license issued was as a broker in limbo with a home address of Post Office Box 2386, Marathon, Florida 33050. On or about July 13, 1988, Ms. Diabo solicited and obtained a one (1) year exclusive right to sell agreement from Anthony and Milagros P. Bonachea, as owners, to sell vacant land located in the Florida Keys, further described as Lot 11, Block 16, Coco Plum Beach Subdivision. On or about March 13, 1989, Ms. Diabo solicited and obtained a contract for sale and purchase of Lot 11, Block 16, Coco Plum Beach Subdivision, between Duane W. Lewis and Helen F. Lewis, as buyers, and Anthony and Milagros P. Bonachea, as sellers, for a total price of $34,900. Ms. Diabo drafted the contract for sale and purchase. In its paragraph VII, "Restrictions, Easements, Limitations," the buyer accepted title subject to zoning, restrictions, prohibitions and other requirements imposed by governmental authority, but Ms. Diabo added that nothing would prevent use of the property for the purpose of "single family" housing. As a real estate professional and as the listing agent Ms. Diabo was aware that she was under a duty and an obligation to know the correct zoning, restrictions, prohibitions and other requirements imposed by governmental authorities on the property she listed for sale. She also knew that there was uncertainty about whether county development regulations under consideration might require the buyer to obtain transferrable development rights from other property owners in the Keys to build on the vacant lot being sold to Dwayne and Helen Lewis. Ms. Diabo owed Mr. and Mrs. Lewis a duty and they reasonably expected Ms. Diabo to inform them about governmental restrictions that might limit the use of the real property as a single family homesite. The transaction closed on or about April 7, 1989. Subsequent to closing, Mr. & Mrs. Lewis learned that they would have to purchase from $9,000 to $18,000 worth of transferable development rights (TDRs) in order to build on the vacant lot they bought through Ms. Diabo. Ms. Diabo had not explained to Mr. and Mrs. Lewis that they might be required to buy transferable development rights from another landowner to build on their lot, but there is no proof that such restrictions were effective at the time she dealt with the Lewises. There is no evidence in the record showing when the requirement to obtain transferrable development rights went into effect. As a consequence, it is not possible to determine whether Ms. Diabo failed to disclose to Mr. and Mrs. Lewis a zoning or use restriction in effect at the time of their purchase while she had asked Mr. Lewis to check on the zoning with the county building official, this did not relieve her of her own duty to investigate under Paragraph VII of the contract, and tell the purchasers of any limitations on building a single family home on the property. Petitioner failed to demonstrate, however, that any restrictions existed as of the time of the closing.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued and filed by the Florida Real Estate dismissing the Administrative Complaint DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of February, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 90-6140 All but proposed paragraph 12 have been accepted and used, with appropriate editing, in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900 Louise Diabo, pro se 3015 Seville Street Apartment 14 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33304 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802 Kenneth E. Easley, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact The Subject Property. The property at issue in this proceeding was acquired by the Applicant, Bear Run Development, Inc., in August, 1986. After rezoning the property, the Applicant began to develop the property in phases or units as "Bear Run". At issue in this proceedings is Unit 6 of Bear Run. Plat Book 23, page 49 and 50. Unit 6 of Bear Run consists of 100 subdivided lots. A total of 24 lots in Unit 6 have been developed. Six of the 24 developed lots of Unit 6 have been sold and have homes constructed on them. Government Action Relied Upon. By letter dated March 9, 1987, the Clay County Engineering Office notified the Applicant's engineers that the preliminary plans for the development of Unit 6 were conditionally approved. This notification was the equivalent of a "notice to proceed." The plat for the development of Unit 6 was approved by Clay County on or about August 22, 1989. On August 25, 1992, Clay County accepted Unit 6 for maintenance. Prior to accepting Unit 6 for maintenance, and prior to July 1, 1992, Clay County notified the Applicant that an easement which was being used for stormwater ultimate outfall for Unit 6 was a privately owned easement. The Applicant diligently pursued acquisition of title to the easement required for stormwater outfall from Unit 6. The easement problem was resolved to the satisfaction of Clay County in the fall of 1992. But for the easement, the development of Unit 6 would have been completed prior to the effective date of the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan. The evidence failed to prove, however, that development would have been complete before the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan was adopted. The Applicant's Detrimental Reliance. In reliance on Clay County's actions in approving the Applicant's preliminary plans on March 9, 1987, approving the plat for Unit 6 on August 22, 1989 and requiring that the Applicant obtain the necessary easement to accept maintenance of Unit 6, the Applicant has expended funds in furtherance of the development of Unit 6. In total, the Applicant has spent less than $246,589.69 in reliance on the actions of Clay County described in findings of fact 5-9. Rights That Will Be Destroyed. The Applicant will, if required to comply with the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan, incur additional expenses to comply with transportation concurrency requirements of the Plan. Procedural Requirements. The parties stipulated that the procedural requirements of Vested Rights Review Process of Clay County, adopted by Clay County Ordinance 92-18, as amended by Clay County Ordinance 92-22 have been met.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Respondent should be subject to an administrative fine for failing to submit a timely change of ownership notice to the Agency, and, if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Agency for Health Care Administration was the state agency responsible for the licensing and regulation of assisted living facilities in Florida. Respondent, Long Shadow Retirement Home, Inc., operated the Long Shadow Inn, an assisted living facility, in Palm Harbor, Florida. Rozsi Bogdan and her husband contracted to purchase the Long Shadow Inn from the prior owners, Long Shadow, Inc., a Florida corporation, sometime before January 10, 1997. The closing actually took place on January 10, 1997. Thereafter, on January 27, 1997, Respondent submitted to the Agency an application for change of ownership re-licensing of the facility. This was not in conformity with the provisions of Section 400.412(1), Florida Statutes, which requires that the prior owner submit to the Agency a notice of intent to transfer ownership to another and that the prospective new owner submit a change of ownership license application, at least sixty days before the date of transfer of ownership. When the application was received, however, a provisional license was issued by the Agency, and there is no indication of any intent to discipline that license. The Agency’s consultant, Mr. Strazulla, justified the administrative fine of $3,000, as proposed by the Agency, on the basis that a maximum fine of $5,000 was authorized, and due to the size of the resident population, the proposed figure was deemed appropriate. Ms. Bogdan admits the change of ownership license application was not timely filed. She asserts, however, that neither she nor her husband was aware of the requirement to file such an application for the change in ownership before their real estate agent advised them of the requirement at the time of closing. She also asserts, however, that even had she known of the filing requirements, she did not know whether the transaction would be consummated until just three days before closing, and, therefore, could not have filed the application before knowing that the sale would be consummated. That is no justification for failing to file the required notice. If the proposed transfer did not go through, notice of that fact thereafter could have been submitted. Ms. Bogdan also contends that due to the deplorable condition of the facility when they took ownership, she and her husband spent as much as twenty hours per day for several weeks to correct the identified deficiencies and did not have time to file the change of ownership license application. Condition of the facility at the time the Bogdans took over is supported by the summary statement of deficiencies prepared as a result of a survey conducted on June 7, 1995, long before the Bogdans took over.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of a Class “IV” violation for failing to file a timely change of ownership application and impose an administrative fine of $200. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of August, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of August, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas W. Caufman, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 7827 North Dale Mabry Highway Tampa, Florida 33614 Rozsi Bogdan, Administrator Long Shadow Inn 2275 Nebraska Avenue Palm Harbor, Florida 34683 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox, Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32309 Jerome W. Hoffman General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Building 2 Tallahassee, Florida 32309
