Findings Of Fact The Department is an agency of the executive branch of the State of Florida. Mr. Crowell, prior to February, 1990, was employed as a career service employee of the Department for approximately 19 years. Mr. Crowell has worked for the State of Florida for approximately 24 years. Immediately prior to and during part of February, 1990, Mr. Crowell was employed as a Community Assistance Consultant with the Department's Community Development Block Grant Program (hereinafter referred to as the "Grant Program"). Wanda A. Jones, Planning Manager of the Grant Program, was Mr. Crowell's immediate supervisor at all times relevant to this proceeding. The Department has incorporated the provisions of Rule 22A-8.011, Florida Administrative Code, governing the use of leave, in the Department's Policies and Procedures No. 1109.01. Pursuant to Policies and Procedures No. 1109.01, Department employees are required to notify their supervisor of any illness and obtain approval of the use of annual leave. Mr. Crowell was counseled by Ms. Jones in January or February, 1989, concerning his failure to obtain authorization for use of sick leave each day that Mr. Crowell was sick. Ms. Jones also explained this requirement at two or three staff meetings. Mr. Crowell was aware of the Department's requirements concerning the use of leave. Mr. Crowell was required to travel as a part of his employment. Mr. Crowell traveled an average of two times per month. Mr. Crowell submitted an Authorization to Incur Travel Expense dated December 7, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the "December 7, 1989, Request"), to the Department requesting authorization to travel on State business on December 13, 14 and 15, 1989. The December 7, 1989, Request was approved by the Department. Mr. Crowell indicated in the December 7, 1989, Request that "[p]ersonal car will be used for entire trip." Mr. Crowell did not own a motor vehicle during the period of time at issue in this proceeding. Mr. Crowell intended to rent an automobile, pay the rental charges himself and claim reimbursement only for mileage incurred in travel on State business. Mr. Crowell had been issued a Budget Rent-A-Car (hereinafter referred to as "Budget"), credit card by the Department on October 6, 1989. Mr. Crowell signed a Department form at the time the Budget credit card was issued acknowledging the following: that on the date above I received the above-described credit card; that I, by my signature hereon have acknowledged that I understand all policies and procedures governing the use of said card; and that I have been advised that abuse of the use of this card may result in dismissal from employment with this Department and possible prosecution under the laws of Florida. On December 13, 1989, Mr. Crowell rented an automobile from Budget. Mr. Crowell was given a Lincoln Town Car (hereinafter referred to as the "Lincoln") because of the unavailability of a smaller automobile. Mr. Crowell signed a rental agreement (hereinafter referred to as the "Rental Agreement") for the Lincoln indicating that the rental fees were to be charged to the Department through the Budget credit card issued by the Department to Mr. Crowell. Pursuant to the Rental Agreement, Mr. Crowell was to rent the Lincoln for approximately three weeks, turning it in on January 3, 1990. The Rental Agreement listed the costs of renting the Lincoln for an hour, a day, a week or a month. Mr. Crowell submitted a Voucher for Reimbursement of Traveling Expenses dated December 19, 1989, to the Department for authorized travel on December 12-15, 1989. Mr. Crowell indicated that a "[p]ersonal car was used for entire trip" and he claimed reimbursement of $107.00 for mileage driven. During early January, 1990, Mr. Crowell went to a Budget office with the intent of returning the Lincoln he had rented on December 13, 1989. Mr. Crowell was told that he owed close to $600.00. Mr. Crowell had thought that he would owe approximately $375.00 and, therefore, had not brought enough money to pay the total rental charge. Mr. Crowell left without paying the rental charge or returning the Lincoln. On December 28, 1990, Mr. Crowell submitted three separate Authorization to Incur Travel Expense forms to the Department seeking approval of travel for State business in January and February, 1990. On the three forms "pov" was noted. Mr. Crowell used "pov" as an abbreviation for "privately owned vehicle." Mr. Crowell submitted a Voucher for Reimbursement of Traveling Expenses to the Department for two authorized trips for January, 1990. Mr. Crowell indicated that a "pov was used" on one of the vouchers and he claimed reimbursement for mileage driven on both forms. Mr. Crowell used the Lincoln he had rented on December 13, 1989, for the January, 1990, trips he was reimbursed for. Sometime during January, 1990, the Tallahassee branch manager of Budget, Russell Kennedy, became concerned that Mr. Crowell was late returning the Lincoln. Therefore, Mr. Kennedy contacted Mr. Crowell and inquired about when he intended to return the Lincoln. Mr. Crowell indicated that he would return the Lincoln on February 1, 1990. On January 30, 1990, the Department's personnel director, Mark Helms, was informed by the Director of the Housing and Community Development Division, the Division in which Mr. Crowell was employed, that he had been notified that Mr. Crowell had rented the Lincoln with his Department-issued credit card and that the Lincoln had not been returned or paid for. Mr. Helms contacted Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Kennedy informed Mr. Helms that Budget considered the Department to be liable for the rental of the Lincoln. Mr. Kennedy indicated that Mr. Crowell had agreed to return the Lincoln on February 1, 1990. Mr. Crowell did not return the Lincoln on February 1, 1990. Mr. Helms spoke with Mr. Kennedy on Monday, February 5, 1990, and was informed that Mr. Crowell had not returned the Lincoln. Mr. Helms informed the Division Director. On February 5, 1990, Ms. Jones was told by the Division Director to meet with Mr. Crowell and instruct him to resolve the problem he had created by renting the Lincoln with the Department-issued Budget credit card. Ms. Jones met with Mr. Crowell at approximately 3:00 p.m., Monday, February 5, 1990. Ms. Jones informed Mr. Crowell that the Department was concerned that he had rented the Lincoln using the Budget credit card issued to him by the Department because of the Department's potential liability for the rental. Ms. Jones informed Mr. Crowell that he had to resolve the problem he had created with Budget immediately. She suggested that, although she could not tell him how to use his leave time, he should consider taking time to take care of the matter. Mr. Crowell left the meeting and returned shortly thereafter with his time sheet. Mr. Crowell requested that Ms. Jones approve annual leave from 3:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m., February 5, 1990, and all day Tuesday, February 6, 1990. Ms. Jones approved Mr. Crowell's request. Mr. Crowell left work at approximately 3:30 p.m., February 5, 1990. Mr. Crowell did not return to work on February 6, 1990. On Wednesday, February 7, 1990, and Thursday, February 8, 1990, Mr. Crowell spoke by telephone to an employee of the Department that worked in another section and got the employee to leave a "Post-It" note on his door both days indicating "O.C./SL". Mr. Crowell did not report to work on February 7 or 8, 1990. Ms. Jones treated Mr. Crowell as having used sick leave for these two days. On February 8, 1990, Ms. Jones sent a letter to Mr. Crowell informing him that his failure to resolve the matter with Budget was a serious disciplinary matter. Ms. Jones did not attempt to telephone Mr. Crowell because he did not have a telephone. Ms. Jones did, however, telephone Cheryl Jamison, whom Ms. Jones believed to be Mr. Crowell's daughter-in-law. Ms. Jones left a message on an answering machine to have Mr. Crowell call her immediately. On Friday, February 9, 1990, and Monday, February 12, 1990, through Thursday, February 15, 1990, Mr. Crowell did not come to work, call in sick or otherwise inform the Department of the reason for his absence or obtain approval for his absence. Mr. Crowell has not returned to work at the Department since February 5, 1990. At the formal hearing Mr. Crowell testified that he did not inform Ms. Jones that he would not be at work on February 9, 1990, or thereafter because she had instructed him to not come back until he resolved the problem with Budget over the rental of the Lincoln. This testimony is inconsistent with Ms. Jones' testimony and Mr. Crowell's actions on February 5, 1990, and February 7 and 8, 1990. If Mr. Crowell had in fact been instructed not to return until he resolved the Budget problem and that he did not have to worry about following established procedures for absences, Mr. Crowell would not have gotten approval for annual leave for February 5 and 6, 1990, or informed the Department that he would not be at work on February 7 and 8, 1990, because he was sick. On February 12, 1990, Ms. Jones telephoned and spoke with Nathan Crowell, Mr. Crowell's son. Ms. Jones indicated that she needed to speak with Mr. Crowell. She was told that Mr. Crowell had been told that she was trying to contact him. Mr. Crowell received the letter sent by Ms. Jones on February 8, 1990. Mr. Crowell was also aware that Ms. Jones had called his son's telephone number attempting to get in touch with him. Mr. Crowell made no effort, however, to respond to Ms. Jones. The Division Director was informed by Ms. Jones on February 15, 1990, that Mr. Crowell had been absent for five days without authorization. The same day Mr. Helms received a memorandum from the Division Director recommending that Mr. Crowell be treated as having abandoned his employment with the Department. Mr. Helms prepared a letter for the Secretary's signature informing Mr. Crowell that the Department was treating Mr. Crowell that he had abandoned his position. At the time that the Department decided to treat Mr. Crowell as having abandoned his position, the Department was aware of efforts by Budget to contact Mr. Crowell and obtain a return of the Lincoln. Budget had sent a certified letter to Mr. Crowell on February 7, 1990, informing Mr. Crowell that criminal charges would be brought against him if he did not return the Lincoln. The return receipt was returned on February 13, 1990, signed by Mr. Crowell. Mr. Crowell still did not return the Lincoln. Mr. Kennedy had also driven by Mr. Crowell's residence several times during early February, 1990, looking for the Lincoln. The Lincoln was not found. The letter from the Secretary was sent to Mr. Crowell by certified mail, return receipt requested, on February 15, 1990. Mr. Crowell received the letter on February 22, 1990. Mr. Crowell returned the Lincoln to Budget on Sunday, February 18, 1990. Mr. Crowell did not pay for the rental of the Lincoln at that time. On February 27, 1990, Mr. Crowell telephoned Mr. Helms. This was his first contact with the Department since February 5, 1990. Mr. Crowell did not indicate that he had not abandoned his position or offer any explanation. Mr. Crowell merely asked Mr. Helms about continued insurance coverage and the payment for his accrued sick and annual leave. Mr. Crowell sent a letter to the Department of Administration dated March 6, 1990, contesting the Department's determination that he had abandoned his employment. On March 7, 1990, Mr. Crowell met with Mr. Helms and Barbara Jo Finer, a Department Senior Attorney. Mr. Crowell discussed payment of the Budget rental charges he had incurred with the payment he was to receive for his unused annual leave as a result of his termination of employment. Budget was paid the rental charges incurred by Mr. Crowell for use of the Lincoln on April 16, 1990. Budget was paid $1,734.03 of Mr. Crowell's payment from the State of Florida for his unused leave. In addition to the inconsistencies in Mr. Crowell's testimony described in Finding of Fact 29, Mr. Crowell evidenced a lack of credibility while testifying on two other matters. First, Mr. Crowell testified at the formal hearing that he did not receive a telephone call from a representative of Budget. This testimony is contrary to Mr. Crowell's testimony during his deposition taken on June 18, 1990. Secondly, Mr. Crowell testified that he was not notified that his deposition was available to read until 5:00 p.m., Thursday, July 5, 1990. This testimony was contradicted by the office manager of Accurate Stenotype Reporters, the firm which had the deposition prepared.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order concluding that Oscar Crowell abandoned his position of employment with the Department and dismissing the petition in this case with prejudice. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of September, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 1990. APPENDIX The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Mr. Crowell's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection Page I: 1st Paragraph 32. 2nd Paragraph Hereby accepted. 3rd Paragraph Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Page II: Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first sentence is accepted. The rest of the paragraph is not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first sentence is accepted. The rest of the paragraph is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Page III: 1st paragraph Hereby accepted. Although the Department did take the position that it was not liable for the total rental charge incurred by Mr. Crowell for use of the Lincoln, Budget was taking the position that the Department was liable. Therefore, there remained a potential liability which the Department was concerned with. 2nd paragraph Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 3rd paragraph Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 4th paragraph Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 5th paragraph (including part of this paragraph which appears on page IV) Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Page IV: 1st full paragraph Not relevant to this proceeding and not supported by the weight of the evidence. 2nd paragraph The first sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Even if Ms. Jones had told Mr. Crowell to resolve the problem before returning to work, it was unreasonable for Mr. Crowell to not return to work for almost two weeks without obtaining authorization for such an extended absence. The rest of the proposed findings of fact are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 3rd paragraph Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not relevant or supported by the weight of the evidence. (including part of this paragraph which appears on page V) Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Page V: st paragraph Hereby accepted. nd paragraph The weight of the evidence failed to prove that Mr. Crowell was directed to leave and not return. The rest of this paragraph has been accepted in Finding of Fact 26. rd paragraph Not supported by the weight of the evidence. th paragraph Not supported by the weight of the evidence and argument. Page VI: 1st paragraph Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 2nd paragraph Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 3rd paragraph The first sentence is hereby accepted. The rest of the proposed findings of fact are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 4th paragraph 2. Except for the first sentence, these proposed findings of fact are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 5th paragraph This paragraph is Mr. Crowell's recommendation and not a finding of fact. The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 2, 27 and 32. 2 1-2. 3 4. 4 3. 5 7. 6 Hereby accepted. 7 5. 8 6. 9 Hereby accepted. 10 12, 23-24. 11 24. 26. The last four sentences are not relevant to this proceeding. The Department treated Mr. Crowell as having taken sick leave on February 7 and 8, 1990. The Department did not treat Mr. Crowell as being absent without authorization on those days. Hereby accepted. 14-15 27. 16 30. 17-18 28. 19 31. 20 Hereby accepted. 21 36. 22 32 and 34. The first two sentences are hereby accepted. The rest of this proposed finding of fact is not relevant to this proceeding. Mr. Crowell requested a formal hearing to contest the Department's decision by letter dated March 6, 1990. His failure to discuss the matter after that date, therefore, does not support a conclusion that Mr. Crowell was abandoning his employment. 38. The last sentence is not relevant to this proceeding for the same reasons the last part of proposed finding of fact 23 is not relevant. See 29. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. It is not clear what Mr. Crowell meant. See 5. Hereby accepted. Subparagraph (b) does not support a conclusion that Mr. Crowell abandoned his position. 29 12. 30 20. 31 23. 32 33. 33-34 33. 35 12, 14, 17-18 and 35. 36 Hereby accepted. 37-44 and 47 Mr. Crowell did make the statements referred to in these proposed findings of fact and they are not consistent. As the trier of fact, I do not find that Mr. Crowell's credibility was called into question by these inconsistencies. 45-46 40. COPIES FURNISHED: Oscar Crowell 1038 Preston Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 G. Steven Pfeiffer General Counsel Barbara Jo Finer Senior Attorney Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Thomas G. Pelham, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, Connie B. White, committed violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Connie B. White, the Respondent, was a licensee of the Division of Real Estate at all times relevant to the allegations against her. The Respondent received a renewal notice for her real estate license and completed the information contained thereon and submitted the renewal request together with the applicable fees to the Department. The Petitioner is the state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute licensees pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida. The renewal application provides that "By submitting the appropriate renewal fees to the Department or the agency, a licensee acknowledges compliance with all requirements for renewal." The Respondent submitted to the Petitioner the licensee renewal application together with a check in the amount of $190, annotated that $95 was for her renewal fee and $95 was for her corporation’s renewal fee. In response to an inquiry from the Department, the Respondent wrote a letter, Petitioner’s Exhibit 3, which was authenticated by Judy Smith, the Department’s Investigator. See the transcript of the second hearing, pages 47 and 48. In her letter, the Respondent stated as follows regarding her application: There was never any attempt to defraud in this case. At worst this was merely a misunderstanding caused by change in the requirements. I did not think I had to have the certificate of successful completion of the continuing education in my hands by m[sic]arch 31, 1996 because of the change in the requirement omitting the need to mail in the certificate with the fee. I am sure that I did not obtain a license by means of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment. Enclosed is a copy of certificate of proof of successful completion of the continuing education course start date April 26, 1996, finish date May 28, 1996. While it is uncontroverted that the Respondent was issued a license as a broker in response to her 1996 application, no evidence was presented that the Department "relied" upon the Respondent’s "representations" regarding her qualifications as a condition to issuing her license. The Respondent thought that she did not have to complete the continuing education coursework prior to submitting the fee for the renewal of her license. Respondent took and failed the course in March of 1996, and re-enrolled in the next available course, which she passed. The Respondent thought it was up to her to complete the necessary coursework. The Respondent renewed after sending her answers to be graded, but before receiving the results. The Respondent subsequently learned that she had not passed the course, and re- enrolled in the course as stated above.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint against the Respondent be DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of April, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 2000.
Findings Of Fact Plotkin is the owner and operator of the Rendale Hotel located at 3120 Collins Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida, which has been operated by Plotkin, a family owned corporation, for more than twenty-five years. The apartment/hotel has 98 studio apartments. In the Spring of 1972, after Plotkin corresponded with DOR, it made the determination that it was exempt from the imposition of sales tax on the rentals it charges. Plotkin made the same determination for consecutive years through and including 1978. Early in September 1978, DOR caused an audit to be made of Plotkin's records and determined that Plotkin was not an exempt facility and that taxes were due for the three years prior to September , 1978, for all rentals to "non- permanent" guests. DOR's auditor utilized only the transcript of guest charges in making his determination. The transcript was compiled from April 1, 1975, a period beyond three years prior to the date of the audit. A transcript is a compilation generally prepared by the night clerk of all the active folio cards or guest ledge cards for that particular day. When tenants or guests were absent from the apartment hotel for various periods of time, they were not carried on the transcript. At times when a tenant had no charges for a particular day, the tenant was not carried on the transcript. As of April 1, 1975, Plotkin had 87 units occupied. As of June 30, 1975, it had 55 units occupied. Thirty of those units were occupied continually during that test period in 1975. As of April 1, 1976, 80 units were occupied and as of June 30, 1976, 55 units were occupied. Twenty-five units were continuously occupied during that three month test period. As of April 1, 1977, 95 units were occupied and as of June 30, 1977, 50 units were occupied. During the test period, 29 units were occupied for a continuous period of time.
The Issue The issue for consideration was whether Respondent's license as a real estate salesman in Florida should be disciplined because of the alleged misconduct outlined in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Diamond was licensed as a real estate salesman in Florida on November 4, 1957. On April 1, 1978, he renewed his salesman's license in a "non-active" status. Renewal has not been sought again by Respondent nor has any renewal of the license, in any fashion, been accomplished by Petitioner. Respondent has not been notified of the status of his license since March 31, 1980. On or about November 16, 1983, an indictment was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida against Respondent and others alleging 48 counts of mail and wire fraud involving the sale of advisory contracts relating to oil and gas leasing operations under the Federal SIMOL program. On November 23, 1983, Respondent was arraigned before United States Magistrate Peter R. Palermo and entered a plea of Not Guilty to the charges laid against him. The indictment in question related to the Respondent in 18 of the 48 Counts. On February 8, 1985, as a result of a trial by jury, Respondent was found guilty of 7 of the 18 Counts laid against him specifically and not guilty of the remaining 11 Counts which related to him. Review of the pertinent Counts of which Respondent was found guilty reflects that these allegations, notwithstanding the terms of the Administrative Complaint filed herein, relate specifically and exclusively to mail fraud only. There is no evidence that Respondent was found guilty of wire fraud. From the date of the conviction up until January 31, 1986, Respondent failed to notify the Florida Real Estate Commission in any way of his conviction as stated above. Respondent admits all the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint which relate to his guilt of and conviction for mail fraud in his letter requesting hearing in response to the Administrative Complaint. On April 9, 1985, Respondent was sentenced to 2 years imprisonment on each of the 7 counts of which he was found guilty each term to run concurrently, and was ordered to serve his sentence in the Eglin Federal Prison Camp at Eglin AFB, Florida.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that Respondent J. LEONARD DIAMOND's license as a real estate salesman in the State of Florida be revoked. RECOMMENDED this 7th day of March, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th of March, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Sue Hartman, Esquire Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation 400 W. Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Harold Huff, Exec. Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation 400 W. Robinson Street Orlando; Florida 32801 J. Leonard Diamond #12936-004 P. O. Box 800 Eglin AFB, Florida 32542
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Edward J. Miller, is entitled to be licensed as a resident life and variable annuity insurance agent.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Edward J. Miller, is employed at Washington Mutual Bank. His supervisor is Tracy Tarach. It was Ms. Tarach's desire that Mr. Miller become licensed as a resident life and variable annuity insurance agent. To that end, she and Mr. Miller filed the necessary papers with Washington Mutual Bank to approve the application process as well as the course to become licensed. The process of having the bank issue the check to cover the licensing procedure was timely. Additionally, the Petitioner could only be scheduled for the licensure class and completion of the licensing process when the bank took favorable action on the request. Accordingly, for this Petitioner the licensing process was dragged out over the course of several months. In January 2003 the Petitioner completed the state application for licensure but did not transmit it to the state. He submitted the request to the bank for course approval and planned to submit the paperwork when it was successfully completed. At that time, the Petitioner did not have any criminal charges pending against him and the answers noted on the application were all correct and truthful. In February 2003 the Petitioner was stopped for DUI. The next workday the Petitioner went to his supervisor and fully disclosed the arrest as well as the charge. The Petitioner made no effort to hide the arrest from his employer and the employer considers the Petitioner a valuable employee, despite the incident. In March 2003 the Petitioner was formally charged with DUI, a misdemeanor. Meanwhile, the bank approved the Petitioner's request to take the course for licensure. The forty-hour course in another work location required the Petitioner to travel to the school site and reside in a hotel for a week while the course work was completed. Obviously the Petitioner's supervisor was willing to invest the costs of licensure school and accommodations for the Petitioner with full knowledge of the Petitioner's pending criminal matter. After successfully completing the licensure course in April 2003 the Petitioner submitted the license application to the state. He failed to double-check the forms. He failed to correct an answer that was now incorrect. That is, he failed to fully disclose the arrest. Subsequently, the criminal case went to hearing, and the Petitioner entered a plea and was placed on probation. The resolution of the DUI charges was completed after the application was submitted. Section 3 of the license application asks several screening questions of applicants for licensure. Applicants are required to answer "yes" or "no", depending on the information sought. In this case, it is undisputed that the Petitioner failed to correct his answers to the questions posed in Section 3. More specifically, the Petitioner failed to truthfully disclose that he had been arrested for DUI. This failure was an oversight on the Petitioner's part, and not intended to deceive the Department. The answers should have been corrected when the Petitioner amended the application form to include the information regarding his completion of the Gold Coast School of Insurance class on April 11, 2003. He did not do so. When the Department reviewed the Petitioner's application and discovered the false answer, it took action to deny the licensure request. That denial was entered on January 22, 2004. A notice of the denial was provided to the Petitioner and he timely challenged the proposed action. On October 31, 2003, the Petitioner completed all of the terms of his court-ordered probation and the entire DUI incident was put to rest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a Final Order granting the Petitioner's application for licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ___________________________________ J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Pete Dunbar, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dana M. Wiehle, Esquire Department of Financial Services 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Edward J. Miller 6205 Northwest West Deville Circle Port St. Lucie, Florida 34986
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this matter, Margaret C. McBride was a licensed real estate salesman in Florida holding salesman's license numbered 0056930, which expired on September 30, 1982, and has not been renewed. On June 15, 1982, W. T. and Agnes Wilson entered into a contract with Presidential Homes, through McBride Real Estate, Inc., for the construction of a home in Martin County, Florida, for the total purchase price of $65,610. The contract called for a down payment of 10 percent to start construction and subsequent periodic payments of 10 percent or 20 percent at set stages during construction of the home as called for in the contract. The Wilsons, who were residents of the Jersey Islands in the United Kingdom, had arranged with the Florida National Bank, Stuart, Florida, for a total of $75,000 to be paid out of their account, in periodic partial payments, on schedule directed by letter of June 21, 1982, to the McBride Real Estate, Inc., Escrow Account, from which payments could be made to Presidential Homes, Inc., in accordance with the contract provisions. The initial payment of 10 percent ($6,561) was made by the Wilsons on June 16, 1982. Thereafter, an additional $13,122 was paid to the McBride Real Estate, Inc., Escrow Account on July 13, 1982, and a second payment in the same amount was to be paid into that escrow account on July 20, 1982. Marie A. McBride, an authorized signatory on the McBride Real Estate, Inc., Escrow Account and Respondent's mother-in-law, on July 7, 1982, drew a check for $6,561 on that account, payable to Presidential Homes, Inc., for "Wilson," which check was subsequently endorsed by Respondent, Margaret McBride, who identified herself in the endorsement as vice president and treasurer of Presidential Homes, Inc. This second payment to Presidential Homes, Inc., according to the contract, was not due until the footings, foundation, and floor slab were complete. At no time did Presidential Homes, Inc., do more on the Wilson home than clear the land. No payment beyond the initial down payment was ever earned under the contract. Respondent, Margaret C. McBride, was also listed as an authorized signature on the McBride Real Estate, Inc., Escrow Account at the Florida National Bank of Martin County. On July 30, 1982, along with Henry V. McBride, her husband, she drew two checks, numbers 158 and 159, to cash, in the amounts of $4,400 and $5,000, respectively, on the escrow account and, also with Henry V. McBride, endorsed both and presented them for payment. Check numbered 159 reflects it was for the "Witte draw." Grant J. Bartels, an investigator for the Florida Real Estate Commission (FREC), received a call from Mrs. Wilson on August 4, 1982, complaining of unauthorized draws for construction on their house which was not accomplished. When he thereafter went to the offices of McBride Real Estate, Inc., to initiate his investigation, he found that all records on some 110 contracts procured by that company for Presidential Homes, Inc., were missing, as were Respondent, Margaret C. McBride, and her husband, Henry V. McBride. Investigation revealed that these 110 contracts represented approximately $500,000 in payments paid out of the escrow account and, of the 110, work was started on only 11 homes. A total of 20 construction permits had been pulled for all the contracts. All of the 11 homes started were heavily encumbered by unsatisfied mechanics' and materialmen's liens. President of record of Presidential Homes, Inc., was John Gideon, a contractor who ran the construction aspect of the company. Respondent was vice president and treasurer, but Henry V. McBride basically directed operations. According to Raymond P. Arndt, who worked for McBride Real Estate, Inc., during the period in question, Respondent started out working with the real estate company as Henry V. McBride's secretary, but then became the vice president of Presidential Homes. As a part of her job, Respondent handled the mortgage applications for clients of Presidential Homes, Inc., and Mr. Arndt would deal with her on an almost daily basis. Though Mrs. McBride worked for Presidential Homes, she worked out of the McBride Real Estate, Inc., office. No one other than the McBrides, including Respondent, had access to the real estate company records after hours. During the week prior to August 6, 1982, Mr. Arndt, who had been present when the FREC investigator first came, told Respondent the investigator would be back the next day. When the investigator did come back the next day to Respondent's office, Respondent, her husband, and all records pertinent to Presidential Homes, Inc., which had been present when Mr. Arndt locked up the night before, were missing. Mr. Paul Turscak also was a former employee of McBride Real Estate, Inc., during the period leading up to the McBride disappearance. He talked with Respondent frequently about Presidential Homes, Inc., operations, but whenever he would ask her about the status of a particular property--its construction schedule or its funding--he would not get a straight answer. Both McBrides took several vacation trips to such places as Jamaica, Tennessee, and the Bahamas in the months prior to their disappearance. After a complete investigation of the situation by the Martin County State Attorney, Mr. McBride was tried, convicted, and sentenced to 30 years in prison for his complicity in the operation. Respondent was not tried.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent Margaret C. McBride's license as a real estate salesman in the State of Florida be revoked. RECOMMENDED this 18th day of June, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: William M. Furlow, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Ms. Margaret C. McBride 562 North West Riverside Drive Port St. Lucie, Florida 33452 Mr. Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Harold Huff Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
Findings Of Fact From December 12, 1975, to June, 1976, Steiner was a registered real estate salesman in the employ of FAR, a registered corporate broker, located in Dade County, Florida. During that period of time, FAR was engaged in an enterprise whereby advanced fee listings were obtained from Florida property owners. Salesmen known as "fronters" or "qualifiers" were employed to place calls to Florida property owners where names and phone numbers had been provided to the salesmen by FAR. The prospects were asked if they cared to list their real estate with FAR in anticipation of resale. It was explained that there would be a refundable fee to be paid by the property owner for the listing. The refund was to occur upon sale of the property. If the prospect was interested, then certain literature was mailed out to them. Other salesmen were employed as "drivers" who would make the second contact of the prospect who indicated an interest in listing his property. The driver would secure a signed listing agreement along with a check for $375.00 which constituted the refundable listing fee. Steiner, although a salesman and not a broker, was the person responsible for running the operations of the FAR. A Mr. Lawrence Mann was employed as a figure-head broker for FAR and named as its president. Mann's only duties were to insure that all salesmen employed were properly licensed with the Real Estate Commission. Steiner hired and fired salesmen, sometimes took over difficult listing cases, provided the preplanned sales pitch for the salesmen and generally supervised the over-all operation. Steiner had a monitor in his office so that he could listen in on telephone calls being made to prospective clients. There was no evidence that any of the listings obtained by FAR were ever resold. There were, however, three parcels of land in negotiation for sale when the operations of FAR were terminated in June, 1976. There was to be a division separate and apart from the "fronters" and "drivers" to do the actual selling of the property. However, Steiner would set the listing price for the property after receiving a description of the property from the salesman. The listings were advertised in the Fort Lauderdale area but there was no evidence to establish whether or not other advertising occurred. There was a total absence of evidence and, hence, a failure of proof as to the allegations of misrepresentations by Steiner. FREC introduced no evidence to show that Steiner represented that the property could be sold for several times the purchase price, that it would be advertised nationwide and in foreign countries or that the company had foreign buyers wanting to purchase United States property listed with the company. There was no evidence introduced to show that Steiner either made the representations or knew them to be false. There was no evidence introduced to show that Steiner knew that no bona fide effort would be made to sell the property listed. There was no evidence of any nature introduced by FREC to show that Steiner was dishonest or untruthful.
The Issue Whether Petitioner qualifies for retirement benefits as a joint annuitant of the late Roy Hartley, Jr.
Findings Of Fact Roy Hartley, Jr., died on June 11, 1994, with more than ten years of service as a member of the Florida Retirement System (FRS). Mr. Hartley was employed as a police officer with the Metro Dade Police Department. His Social Security Number was 267-70-3906. At the time of his death, Mr. Hartley had personally contributed the sum of $655.38 to the FRS. On October 29, 1993, Mr. Hartley designated Petitioner as the beneficiary of his retirement benefits on FRS Form M-10. After Mr. Hartley's death, Petitioner applied to the State of Florida, Division of Retirement, for benefits as Mr. Hartley's designated beneficiary. To be entitled to monthly retirement benefits, Petitioner must establish that she was a dependent of Mr. Hartley so as to qualify as a joint annuitant of his monthly retirement benefits. Section 121.091(7)(g), Florida Statutes (1994), contains the option that Petitioner seeks to exercise: (7)(g) The designated beneficiary who is the surviving spouse or other dependent of a member whose employment is terminated by death subsequent to the completion of 10 years of credible service but prior to actual retirement may elect to receive a deferred monthly benefit as if the member had lived and had elected a deferred monthly benefit, as provided in paragraph (5)(b), calculated on the basis of the average final compensation and creditable service of the member at his death and the age the member would have attained on the commencement date of the deferred benefit elected by his beneficiary, paid in accordance with option 3 of paragraph (6)(a). Section 121.021(28)(c), Florida Statutes, contains the definition of the term "dependent beneficiary" that is pertinent to this proceeding: (28) Dependent beneficiary means any person designated by the member to receive a retirement benefit upon the member's death who is either: * * * (c) A person who is financially dependent for no less than one-half of his support from the deceased at retirement or at time of the death of such member, whichever occurs first. Rule 60S-6.001(34), Florida Administrative Code, defines the term "joint annuitant" as follows: JOINT ANNUITANT -- Means . . . any other person who is financially dependent where the other person is someone who is receiving one-half or more of his support from the member or is eligible to be claimed as a dependent or exemption on the Federal income tax return of the member. Petitioner and Mr. Hartley were not married, but they were living together at the time of his death. Except for a relatively short breakup, they had lived together for thirteen years. Petitioner was not claimed as a dependent on Mr. Hartley's federal income tax return. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner worked part-time as a bartender. Respondent requires a person who is claiming to be a dependent of a deceased member pursuant to Section 121.021(28)(c), Florida Statutes, to document that the member contributed more than half of the alleged dependent's support. Stanley Colvin, the administrator of Respondent's retirement section, established that the Respondent typically reviews financial data for the year preceding the member's death in determining whether the deceased member contributed half of the alleged dependent's support. In making this determination, the Respondent determines the amount that the alleged dependent has to contribute to his or her own support and thereafter requires the alleged dependent to establish that the member contributed an amount equal to or more than that amount. Since the member died in June of 1994, Respondent in this case examined the W-2 statements for Petitioner and for Mr. Hartley for several years proceeding his death and for the year 1994. The 1993 W-2 statements reflect that Mr. Hartley had income from his employment of $67,360.23 while Petitioner had income from her employment of $9,450.00. Based on the differences between their earnings, it did not appear that there would be a problem with Petitioner's claim when Respondent's staff first reviewed the claim. The house in which Petitioner and Mr. Hartley lived at the time of his death was titled solely in the name of the Petitioner. This house was purchased in 1992. The fact that Petitioner owned the house only in her name caused Respondent's staff to question this claim. After learning about the house, Respondent's staff asked Petitioner to document that Mr. Hartley contributed more than half of her support and requested that she provide copies of cancelled checks and tax returns. In response to that request, Petitioner provided copies of certain cancelled checks and copies of her tax returns for 1992 and 1993. 1/ Mr. Hartley and Petitioner routinely gambled at Seminole Bingo. The down payment for the house came from their bingo winnings. Although they both gambled at bingo, Petitioner usually sat in the chair so that she would be the one to claim any bingo winnings. These winnings were reported on Petitioner's income taxes for the years 1992 and 1993. For 1992, Petitioner claimed bingo winnings in the amount of $60,531 and wagering losses in the amount $45,850. For 1993, Petitioner claimed bingo winnings in the amount of $21,860 and wagering losses in an equal amount. Petitioner's federal income tax return for 1993 reflected an adjusted gross income of $31,508. This sum included bingo winnings of $21,860. Petitioner testified, credibly, that they did not go to bingo as frequently in 1994 because Mr. Hartley had become interested in racing automobiles, but there was no evidence as to whether Petitioner or Mr. Hartley won at bingo during 1994 prior to Mr. Hartley's death. After reviewing the documentation provided by Petitioner, the Respondent denied monthly benefits to her. Respondent's denial was based on its interpretation of its rule that all income, including gambling winnings, should be considered as being available for the support of a person claiming to be a dependent of a member of the FRS. 2/ Respondent is not concerned with whether the alleged dependent loses his or her winnings at bingo or uses the winnings to pay bills. Respondent allocated the house payments, household expenses, and grocery costs paid by Mr. Hartley to have been one-half for Petitioner's support and the other half for his own support. 3. Respondent determined, correctly, that the documentation did not support a findings that Mr. Hartley contributed more than half of Petitioner's support when the bingo winnings were considered. Respondent advised Petitioner that she was entitled to a refund of Mr. Hartley's contribution to the FRS in the amount of $655.38. Petitioner established that Mr. Hartley paid the house payment ($683.00 per month in 1994), that he paid most of the household expenses, and that he routinely gave Petitioner cash for food, clothes, and miscellaneous expenses. The only bill routinely paid by Petitioner was the utility bill. She also paid her car bill and her auto insurance bill. Mr. Hartley occasionally assisted her with those bills. Based on the totality of the evidence, 4/ including the discrepancy between Mr. Hartley's earned income and Petitioner's earned income, 5/ the fact that Mr. Hartley paid the housing expenses, except for utilities, and the fact that he routinely gave Petitioner cash to use for her support, it is found that Mr. Hartley contributed more than $10,000 a year toward Petitioner's support. The evidence does not, however, support a finding that Mr. Hartley contributed more than $31,000 a year toward Petitioner's support. 6/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein and approves Petitioner's application for monthly benefits as a joint annuitant of Roy Hartley, Jr. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of August, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 1996.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner violated Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, by not having workers' compensation insurance coverage, and if so, whether the Agency's calculation was proper and accurate based on the methods used to establish the payroll for Petitioner and the resulting penalty.
Findings Of Fact The Division is a component of the Department of Financial Services. It is responsible for enforcing the workers' compensation coverage requirements pursuant to Section 440.107, Florida Statutes. All Florida is a corporation operating as a land clearing and tree trimming or tree debris removal business in Florida. Alan McPherson is the sole owner and president of All Florida. On August 30, 2007, as a result of an anonymous tip, Denise McNeal, a workers' compensation investigator for the Division went to a land clearing site at 4441 Club Estates Drive in Naples, Florida, where an All Florida crew of workers was clearing the land using heavy equipment, to determine whether the workers had workers' compensation coverage. She interviewed approximately 11 employees who were working at the site. Ms. McNeal made inquiry into the employment relationships of these workers and attempted to determine whether the workers on the site were covered by appropriate workers' compensation insurance. After Ms. McNeal had been at the site for approximately an hour, Mr. McPherson arrived. Mr. McPherson indicated that All Florida had workers' compensation insurance through AMS Leasing. Ms. McNeal conducted a search in the Coverage and Compliance Automated System (CCAS), a database that reliably reveals whether or not there is coverage by a workers' compensation policy of insurance. The search revealed that All Florida did not have its own workers' compensation insurance and AMS was not covering the workers either. All Florida had failed to fax the employee information to AMS to start the coverage for the employees. Based on the information Ms. McNeal had at the time, and after consulting with her supervisor, Ms. McNeal issued SWO number 07-269-D7 to All Florida and a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation ("Request for Business Records"). The Division's request asked All Florida to produce business records for the period of August 30, 2004, through August 30, 2007, including payroll records, tax returns, proof of insurance, and certificates of exemption. The Request for Business Records listed specific records that All Florida should provide the Division so that the Division could determine the workers paid by All Florida during the preceding three years. The Request for Business Records notes that the requested records must be produced within five business days of receipt. All Florida did not respond to the Division's Request for Business Records on time. On or about September 25, 2007, All Florida produced its first set of documents. At that time, Ms. McNeal did not calculate the penalty amount and deemed the records insufficient to calculate penalty. On October 1, 2007, All Florida produced a second set of business records. Ms. McNeal reviewed the records produced by All Florida and calculated a penalty of $466,262.62 for failure to obtain workers' compensation coverage. The next day, Mr. McPherson provided additional business records and Ms. McNeal recalculated the penalty again. The new penalty amount was $324,080.01 and Ms. McNeal personally served All Florida with the penalty assessment. On October 2, 2007, All Florida entered into an agreement with the Division, which consisted of putting ten percent of the penalty amount down, demonstrating proof of coverage, and agreeing upon a conditional payment plan. After reaching the agreement, All Florida was conditionally released from the SWO and permitted to resume operations because it had cured all its violations. Subsequently, All Florida provided the Division additional business records. The Division calculated a third amended penalty assessment on October 17, 2007, in the amount of $300,450.24. On November 28, 2007, Ms. McNeal had to recalculate the third amended penalty amount because she discovered an error in her use of class code 5606. She recalculated the penalty amount with the proper class code 6217, changed Alan McPherson's earnings to "payroll/premium cap" and added remuneration for Dana McPherson. The other proper class codes Ms. McNeil used in her calculations were 8742 and 8810. In Ms. McNeal's calculations, she used the business records submitted by All Florida and figured the gross payroll for the period she found to be the period of noncompliance, in the case of each assumed employee, and divided that amount by She multiplied that figure by the approved manual rate (risk of injury) for each claimed employee. This figure was multiplied by 1.5 in order to obtain the penalty for failure to obtain workers' compensation coverage for each employee. The figures for each employee used in the calculation were added and resulted in the total penalty assessment of $281.903.32, which was the ultimate sum reported in the 4th Amended Order of Penalty Assessment at issue in this case. Ms. McNeal used the correct calculation methods to determine the assessed penalty. Ms. McNeal's calculations for the 4th Amended Penalty amount were accomplished in accordance with the requirements of Subsection 440.107(7), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.035. All Florida submitted Account QuickReport business records detailing the checks cut from the business to individuals, the amounts, dates, and a brief description. Ms. McNeal used the records to calculate payroll for the 4th Amended Order of Penalty Assessment. She correctly excluded the check if the memo description listed the payment was for something other than payroll, if the check was written to a company name, or if the check was written to a subcontractor that had an exemption. Ms. McNeal included the payment by All Florida to each individual whose name was highlighted in blue as set forth in Petitioner's exhibit 8 (hereinafter referred to as "highlighted subcontractors") as payroll in her calculation of penalty.2 Dana McPherson’s $540,000.00 was also included in the gross payroll calculations. Mr. McPherson conducted All Florida business by contracting with municipalities to get jobs. Then, All Florida would give the work from the contract to individuals and companies with their own equipment and employees to perform and complete the job for the contract. All Florida hired the highlighted subcontractors by oral contracts and did not have time to check the highlighted subcontractors' statuses because the company was inundated with contract work, on a tight schedule, and wanted to get the jobs started as soon as possible. There was a great demand for debris clearing due to the consecutive hurricanes and their devastation, which provided All Florida numerous land clearing contract opportunities. Prior to Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.035 becoming effective, the Division determined payroll by reviewing the actual business records that were provided by the employer. If the actual cost of the payroll and materials or equipment rental were separated, the Division would only utilize the amount identified as payroll for payroll. If the payroll was not separated out, the whole amount was used as payroll in the calculation of penalty.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation enter a final order: Finding that All Florida violated Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, by failing to secure the payment of workers' compensation coverage for its employees; Finding that a penalty be imposed for the violation; and Calculating the penalty amount using the law that was in effect at the time the violation took place. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of June, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. McKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 2008.
