The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, Connie B. White, committed violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Connie B. White, the Respondent, was a licensee of the Division of Real Estate at all times relevant to the allegations against her. The Respondent received a renewal notice for her real estate license and completed the information contained thereon and submitted the renewal request together with the applicable fees to the Department. The Petitioner is the state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute licensees pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida. The renewal application provides that "By submitting the appropriate renewal fees to the Department or the agency, a licensee acknowledges compliance with all requirements for renewal." The Respondent submitted to the Petitioner the licensee renewal application together with a check in the amount of $190, annotated that $95 was for her renewal fee and $95 was for her corporation’s renewal fee. In response to an inquiry from the Department, the Respondent wrote a letter, Petitioner’s Exhibit 3, which was authenticated by Judy Smith, the Department’s Investigator. See the transcript of the second hearing, pages 47 and 48. In her letter, the Respondent stated as follows regarding her application: There was never any attempt to defraud in this case. At worst this was merely a misunderstanding caused by change in the requirements. I did not think I had to have the certificate of successful completion of the continuing education in my hands by m[sic]arch 31, 1996 because of the change in the requirement omitting the need to mail in the certificate with the fee. I am sure that I did not obtain a license by means of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment. Enclosed is a copy of certificate of proof of successful completion of the continuing education course start date April 26, 1996, finish date May 28, 1996. While it is uncontroverted that the Respondent was issued a license as a broker in response to her 1996 application, no evidence was presented that the Department "relied" upon the Respondent’s "representations" regarding her qualifications as a condition to issuing her license. The Respondent thought that she did not have to complete the continuing education coursework prior to submitting the fee for the renewal of her license. Respondent took and failed the course in March of 1996, and re-enrolled in the next available course, which she passed. The Respondent thought it was up to her to complete the necessary coursework. The Respondent renewed after sending her answers to be graded, but before receiving the results. The Respondent subsequently learned that she had not passed the course, and re- enrolled in the course as stated above.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint against the Respondent be DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of April, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 2000.
Findings Of Fact Plotkin is the owner and operator of the Rendale Hotel located at 3120 Collins Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida, which has been operated by Plotkin, a family owned corporation, for more than twenty-five years. The apartment/hotel has 98 studio apartments. In the Spring of 1972, after Plotkin corresponded with DOR, it made the determination that it was exempt from the imposition of sales tax on the rentals it charges. Plotkin made the same determination for consecutive years through and including 1978. Early in September 1978, DOR caused an audit to be made of Plotkin's records and determined that Plotkin was not an exempt facility and that taxes were due for the three years prior to September , 1978, for all rentals to "non- permanent" guests. DOR's auditor utilized only the transcript of guest charges in making his determination. The transcript was compiled from April 1, 1975, a period beyond three years prior to the date of the audit. A transcript is a compilation generally prepared by the night clerk of all the active folio cards or guest ledge cards for that particular day. When tenants or guests were absent from the apartment hotel for various periods of time, they were not carried on the transcript. At times when a tenant had no charges for a particular day, the tenant was not carried on the transcript. As of April 1, 1975, Plotkin had 87 units occupied. As of June 30, 1975, it had 55 units occupied. Thirty of those units were occupied continually during that test period in 1975. As of April 1, 1976, 80 units were occupied and as of June 30, 1976, 55 units were occupied. Twenty-five units were continuously occupied during that three month test period. As of April 1, 1977, 95 units were occupied and as of June 30, 1977, 50 units were occupied. During the test period, 29 units were occupied for a continuous period of time.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, M. Betty Murray, currently holds Florida Real Estate Broker's License number 62943. At all times material to this proceeding, the license was in full force and effect. The Respondent represented L. O. Huckaby and Sarah Huckaby in the sale of property located at 363 Boylston Avenue, Daytona Beach, Florida, to Elizabeth T. Stein, the complainant in this proceeding. Pursuant to her representation of the Huckaby's, the Respondent, on or about June 18, 1979, prepared a proposed contract for the sale and purchase of the subject property. Prior to signing the contract and tendering a deposit thereunder, Ms. Stein reviewed the contract with her attorney, Berrien Becks, Sr. When reviewing the contract with Mr. Becks, Ms. Stein failed to inform either Mr. Becks or his secretary, Sylvia Van De Mark, that she intended to use the property as either a duplex or a triplex. Had Ms. Stein indicated such an intent, a provision to that effect would have been included in paragraph VIII of the contract for sale and purchase. This was the normal procedure utilized in the ordinary course of business by the Becks' law firm. The contract for sale, Respondents Exhibit 1, shows no such provision or notation. The sellers, Mr. and Mrs. Huckaby, were represented by Charles E. Booth, Esquire. On behalf of Ms. Stein, Mr. Becks requested that certain repairs be made to the property. Mr. Booth rejected these demands by letter dated July 24, 1979. Although the contract does not state that the property was intended to be used as a duplex, the property is in fact recognized as a de facto duplex under the nonconforming use provisions of the city's zoning ordinance. Had Ms. Stein elected to proceed with the sale, she would have been permitted to utilize the property as a two unit property so long as she lived in one of the units which was her expressed intent. Prior to paying the balance of the deposit due on the contract, Ms. Stein and the Respondent went to Mr. Booth's office where Mr. Booth confirmed by telephone conversation with city officials and in the presence of both Ms. Stein and the Respondent, the lawful use of the property as a single family residence with attached rental unit. Following this information, Ms. Stein paid the balance into the Respondent's escrow account. On August 20, 1979, Ms. Stein demanded return of the $9,000.00 deposit from the Respondent. Upon receipt of this demand, the Respondent contacted Mr. Booth who instructed her to retain the deposit in her escrow account. Mr. Booth and Mr. Becks negotiated a release which was signed by the Sellers on August 28, 1979 and by Ms. Stein on September 11, 1979. The release authorized disbursements to be made including $500.00 to the Respondent, $150.00 to Mr. Booth, $43.00 to Lawyers Title Services, Inc. and the remaining $8,307.00 to Ms. Stein. On August 20, 1979, prior to signing the release, Ms. Stein sent a complaint to the Board concerning the return of her $9,000.00. On September 7, 1979, Ms. Stein sent another letter to the Board indicating that she had not agreed to the disbursements set forth in paragraph 8 above notwithstanding her agreement to sign the release. Ms. Stein's attorney, Mr. Becks, witnessed the release and explained the legal implications of the release in detail to her prior to her signing. Mr. Stein did not inform Mr. Becks of her correspondence with the Board which attempted to disclaim the release. At no time did the Respondent represent the property as a triplex, but only as a single family residence with a single attached rental unit, which was a permissible use under the city zoning ordinance. In fact, Ms. Stein defaulted on the contract and under its express terms could have forfeited the entire $9,000.00. The release negotiated between Mr. Becks and Mr. Booth which returned $8,307.00 to Ms. Stein was generous and demonstrated good faith efforts on the part of the Sellers to settle this matter amicably. The Respondent has maintained her registered office at 231 Gradview, Daytona Beach, Florida. The office consists of a room where she maintains her business files and which can be closed for privacy. The allegations of Ms. Stein against the Respondent were untrue and were made with knowledge that neither the Huckaby's nor the Respondent had engaged in any illegal or unethical activities regarding this transactions. The testimony of Mr. Becks, attorney for Ms. Stein and the affidavit of Mr. Booth, attorney for the Huckaby's, corroborates the Respondent's testimony and contradicts the allegations made in the complaint filed by Ms. Stein and the administrative complaint filed by the Board which was based entirely upon Ms. Stein's allegations. Ms. Stein's failure to appear at the final hearing supports the conclusion that she knew the allegations made by her could not be proved at the hearing. Any equitable or legal rights which Ms. Stein may have had to pursue this matter ended when she knowingly and voluntarily signed a release in order to secure the return of a substantial portion of her deposit monies. In effect, the only misrepresentation in this case was that made by Ms. Stein when she represented that the release would extinguish all responsibilities, obligations and rights arising from the contract in return for the $8,307.00 and then effectively requested the Board to proceed against the Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Alan D. Katz, filed an application for licensure as a real estate salesman on April 10, 1981, with Respondent, Department of Professional Regulation, Hoard of Real Estate. Question six of the application requires the applicant to answer whether he had ever been arrested without regard to whether he was convicted, sentenced, pardoned or paroled. Petitioner responded in the affirmative and attached a list of six prior arrests. All arrests occurred between the years 1958 and 1969. They included possession of marijuana (less than one gram) -1958; attempted petty larceny (misdemeanor) -1962; vagrancy- 1964; embezzlement and larceny-1965; flight to avoid prosecution-1965; and improperly filling out an application for a work card-1969. All charges were dismissed or dropped except the possession of marijuana and attempted petty larceny. For these offenses Katz was fined $50 and placed on probation, respectively. Petitioner has had no arrests since 1969. 1/ After reviewing the application, Respondent concluded that by virtue of the response to question six Petitioner had failed to demonstrate that be was "honest, truthful, trustworthy and of good character, and (had) a good reputation for fair dealing." It denied the application by letter dated July 23, 1981. The denial precipitated the instant hearing. Petitioner, 46-years old, is currently unemployed. He now considers Hallandale, Florida, to be his permanent home. He has worked in various phases of the real estate business since 1964. For the last eight years, his specialty has been vacation time sharing. Most recently, he was employed in Europe by Royal Aloha Vacation Club where he was responsible for investing 100,000 pounds (approximately $225,000 U.S. currency) on behalf of his employer to establish its European time-sharing operations, and in "setting-up" sales for its broker. Prior to that he was employed in Las Vegas, Nevada, by Passport to Pleasure in the unit acquistion phase of its operations. In that capacity, he was entrusted with dealing in small amounts of cash (less than $5,000) and making deposits on behalf of his employer. Before that, he worked in real estate sales for one of Nevada's largest developers. If the application is granted, Petitioner will associate with a broker and specialize in resort time sharing. He has been offered other real estate employment opportunities (e.g., General Development Corporation) but wishes to restrict his activities to the time-sharing field. Letters offered into evidence as Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 1 attest to Katz's honesty, integrity and ability. Although Petitioner has been arrested on at least six occasions, all cases were dismissed except for two minor misdemeanor charges, the last occurring in 1963. He attributes those arrests to immaturity during the early part of his adulthood. His conduct since 1969 is unblemished and sufficient time has lapsed to rehabilitate himself and gain the necessary maturity to operate successfully and honestly in the real estate profession.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Alan D. Katz for licensure as a real estate salesman be GRANTED. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of February, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of February, 1982
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Respondent, Charles Vincent Suter (Suter), is a licensed real estate salesman having been issued license number 0502107 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Division). When the events herein occurred, respondent was employed as a salesman for Tom Roderick Realty, 2440 Palm Ridge Road, Sanibel, Florida. He has been licensed as a salesman since September 1987. Through a mutual friend, Mary Jane Briney, Suter was introduced in 1988 to Norma Winkler, a resident of Indianapolis, Indiana, who occasionally visited Sanibel Island near Fort Myers on vacation during the winter months. Winkler was interested in renting a three bedroom condominium on the beach in January and February 1989. Briney recommended to Winkler that she rent a unit at an apartment/condominium complex known as Janthinia located on Sanibel Island and that she use respondent as her rental agent. Relying on Briney's recommendation, Winkler agreed to rent the unit and telephoned Suter in September 1988 and requested that he make reservations for her. Although Suter did not normally handle rental transactions, he agreed to assist Winkler and thereafter made reservations with Executive Services, Inc. (ESI), a corporation which managed various units in the Sanibel area including Janthinia. On September 21, 1988, Suter sent Winkler a letter confirming her reservations for Unit 2A at Janthinia with an arrival date of January 26, 1989 and a departure date of February 23, 1989. The total rent, including tax, was $7,091.23. Suter also advised Winkler that she needed to furnish a 10% deposit, or $709.12, within ten days to secure the reservation. On September 30, 1989, Winkler sent a check in the amount of $709.23 made payable to Tom Roderick Realty. The check was deposited into the firm's escrow account the same day. On October 4, 1989, the realty company issued a check in the same amount to ESI as a reservation deposit for Winkler. After the deposit was forwarded to the real estate firm, Winkler changed her date of arrival in Florida from January 26 to January 20 but kept her date of departure the same. On December 9, 1989, ESI confirmed Winkler's reservation for those dates and sent a 10% commission to the realty company. The rental fee was shown as $8,395.42 less the deposit, or a total amount still due of $7,686.30. On January 30, 1989, Suter was paid $352.75 as his share of the commission. Approximately a week before her scheduled arrival, Suter telephoned Winkler and advised her the total amount due was $8,686.30, or $1,000 more than was reflected on ESI's statement. However, Winkler had requested that Suter furnish her with a VCR, liquor, piano and other items so Suter estimated the total bill would be approximately $1,000 greater than the rent still due. On January 20, 1989, Winkler, her sister, niece and a neighbor flew from Indianapolis to Fort Myers. They were met at the airport by Suter and two mutual friends. That same morning, and before Winkler arrived, Suter received by mail Winkler's check in the amount of $8,686.30. When Suter received Winkler's check, he immediately deposited it in his own checking account and not the firm's account. The check was made out to Suter, and not the realty firm, since Winkler had suggested that she make it out in that manner. Upon depositing the check, Suter immediately asked the bank to verify if it was good, and after receiving assurances that it was, he went across the street and wrote a $7,686.30 check to ESI to pay for Winkler's rent. When Winkler, Suter and other members of the group reached Janthinia, Suter advised Winkler that he owed her a refund. Winkler told him not to worry, that she would settle up later. She then had Suter purchase a quantity of liquor and obtain a VCR for her apartment. During one of the social gatherings attended by Winkler and Suter a few weeks later, the two had a falling out. At that point, Winkler telephoned Suter's broker and told him she was due money from Suter. On February 7, the broker confronted Suter around 4:00 p.m. regarding Winkler's allegation. Suter readily acknowledged that Winkler still had money due and that he would immediately pay her. He also acknowledged that the money had been placed in his own bank account rather than the broker's escrow account. Although Suter volunteered to hand carry a check to Winkler that afternoon, she insisted he pay it to the broker who would then write her a check. Suter did so within the hour and Winkler later received a check for $1,000 from the real estate firm. The broker then made an inquiry with the Division concerning Suter's actions, and upon advice from a Division attorney, filed a complaint against Suter. Winkler was described by a longtime friend as a 1,dangerous person", a "troublemaker", and someone who had caused problems for many persons over the years with various types of accusations, most of which were unfounded. Suter denied that he knew it was unlawful to deposit the rent check in his personal account since he considered the transaction as a favor for a friend. He blamed the entire episode on Winkler who became mad at him for paying too much attention to a young widow, and not Winkler, at a dinner party in early February 1989. There was no intent on the part of Suter to use the deposited funds in an illicit manner or to defraud his broker and Winkler. Even so, Winkler's check should have been deposited in the broker's escrow account. There is no evidence that Suter has ever been disciplined by the Division on any prior occasion. Further, Suter's initial reluctance to give a statement to an investigator was founded on the valid reason that he first wished to consult an attorney.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty as charged in Counts II, III, and IV of the administrative complaint and that Count I be dismissed with prejudice. It is further RECOMMENDED that respondent be given a $500 fine to be paid within thirty days from date of order. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of November, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of November, 1990. APPENDIX Petitioner: 1-3. Partially adopted in finding of fact 1. 4. Partially adopted in finding of fact 3. 5-6. Partially adopted in finding of fact 4. Partially adopted in finding of fact 5. Partially adopted in findings of fact 6 and 8. 9-10. Partially adopted in finding of fact 2. 11. Rejected as being unnecessary. 12-13. Partially adopted in finding of fact 6. 14. Partially adopted in findings of fact 7 and 8. 15-16. Partially adopted in finding of fact 10. 17-18. Partially adopted in finding of fact 12. 19-21. Partially adopted in finding of fact 10. Respondent: 1-2. Partially adopted in finding of fact 1. Partially adopted in finding of fact 2. Partially adopted in findings of fact 2 and 3. Partially adopted in finding of fact 4. Partially adopted in finding of fact 5. Partially adopted in findings of fact 5 and 6. 8-9. Partially adopted in finding of fact 5. 10-11. Partially adopted in finding of fact 8. Partially adopted in finding of fact 7. Partially adopted in finding of fact 9. 14-15. Rejected as being unnecessary. 16. Partially adopted in finding of fact 10. Note - Where findings have been partially used, the remainder has been rejected as being cumulative, unnecessary, subordinate, irrelevant or not supported by the more credible and persuasive evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900 Jerrold S. Stern, Esquire P. O. Box 112 Sanibel, FL 33957 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Darlene Keller, Executive Director Division of Real Estate P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900
The Issue The issue presented for decision herein is whether or not Respondent's real estate brokers license should be disciplined because he engaged in acts and/or conduct amounting to fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence and breach of trust, and for failure to account and deliver1 in violation of Subsections 475.25(1)(b) and (d), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, including post-hearing memoranda, I hereby make the following relevant factual findings: During times material herein, Respondent was, and is, a licensed real estate broker in Florida and has been issued license number 0007278. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1). Maryland Properties, Inc. was a corporation organized under the laws of Florida during times material and incorporated as such on March 24, 1977 and was involuntarily dissolved on November 10, 1983. At times material, Respondent was President of Maryland Properties, Inc. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2). Prior to December, 1980, Mr. and Mrs. Emeterio Padron Cruz were the owners of lots 16 and 17, block 11, of Athol Subdivision, Dade County, Florida. (Petitioner's Exhibit 11) Padron Deposition-Page 5; Petitioner's Exhibits 12-Mrs. Padron Deposition-Pages 2 and 3; Petitioner's Exhibit 3). Mr. and Mrs. Padron were interested in selling lots 16 and 17 and Respondent, in his capacity as real estate broker, sought buyers on behalf of the Padrons. (TR 94). On September 6, 1980, a contract was obtained by the Respondent between Mr. and Mrs. Padron, as sellers, and Roberto Hernandez and/or assigns as buyer. According to the terms of the contract, a real estate commission of $650 was to be paid to Respondent. (TR 97). The transaction between the Padrons as sellers and Roberto Hernandez as buyers did not materialize and instead Respondent, through the entity Maryland Properties, Inc., purchased the property and a closing was held on December 1, 1980. Respondent became interested in the purchase of this property based on a need expressed by the Padrons that they needed to dispose of their property and they wished that Respondent would purchase the property along the same terms as Roberto Hernandez had previously agreed. In this regard, Respondent executed the closing documents as President of Maryland Properties, Inc., the purchaser of the Padron property. The Padrons were aware that Respondent was President of Maryland Properties, Inc., based on their review of the closing documents. Respondent received a $650 commission in his capacity as broker in the Padron to Maryland Properties, Inc. transaction. (Petitioner's Exhibit 13; Petitioner's Exhibit 11-Padron Deposition-Pages 13 and 14). As part of the Padron/Maryland Properties, Inc. transaction, a mortgage dated December 1, 1980 was given back to Padron by Maryland Properties, Inc. for $8,000. The mortgage deed and note were not recorded until March 11, 1981. Respondent prodded the Padrons to record the mortgage and to keep the note in a safe in the event that it was needed later on. Per Respondent's insistence, the Padrons finally recorded the mortgage and note on March 11, 1981. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4). On November 27, 1980, Maryland Properties, Inc., through its President, the Respondent, entered into a contract to sell the same lots (16 and 17) to Agustin R. and Gladys A. Verde (Respondent's Exhibit 1). The Maryland Properties, Inc./Verde transaction closed on February 4, 1981 without the Verdes or their attorney, Antonio Alonso, being aware of the Maryland Properties, Inc. to Padron Mortgage. At no time prior to closing did the Respondent reveal to the Verdes or Mr. Alonso the existence of the mortgage. Mr. Alonso, prior to closing, received and reviewed an abstract on the property which abstract did not contain the mortgage as it could not have since the mortgage was not recorded until subsequent to the Verde closing. Additionally, Respondent executed an affidavit prior to closing wherein it is stated that the property was free and clear of any lien or encumbrance. (Petitioner's Exhibit 15) The closing statement executed by Respondent speaks of a purchase money (first) mortgage, which mortgage was from the Verdes to Maryland Properties, Inc. (Petitioner's Exhibits 4, 5, 8, 14, 15; TR 70-77). Respondent, as President of Maryland Properties, Inc., failed to make the final mortgage payment of $4,000 to Padron when same became due on December 2, 1982. Padron foreclosed on the mortgage which action was initiated on December 1, 1983. Respondent entered a settlement to the foreclosure action and paid the mortgage deficiency, however, there remains outstanding an award for attorneys fees for the foreclosure action in favor of the Padron's attorney (Louis Sabatino).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent 's license number 0007278 be suspended for a period of six (6) months. RECOMMENDED this 27th day of May, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of May, 1986.
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether respondent committed the offenses alleged in the administrative complaint and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Department), is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent, Donald L. Katz, is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0111863. The last license issued was as a broker, c/o KLF, Inc., 7991C Johnson Street, Hollywood, Florida 33024. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, respondent was a member of the Veteran Administration (VA) Fee Panel, and appraised properties for the VA in Broward, Dade and the upper half of Monroe Counties. On or about October 2, 1989, Unified Mortgage Company, which apparently held a mortgage guaranteed by the VA on the property and was in the process of foreclosure, requested that respondent do an "as is" appraisal of the residential property located at 11950 SW 176th Street, South Miami, Dade County, Florida. Consequently, respondent undertook to appraise the property as requested, and thereafter submitted an appraisal report to the VA which identified the property that was appraised as being located at 11950 SW 176th Street, South Miami, Florida, and estimated its market value at $32,900.00. Unfortunately, respondent had erroneously identified the residential property located at 11940 SW 176th Street, which lay immediately next door to the subject property, as the property to be appraised and, consequently, his appraisal was not of the correct property. Such error was, however, promptly caught by the VA, and there was no apparent damage to anyone as a result of respondent's error. Regarding the origin of such error, the proof at hearing demonstrated that the two residential properties, which lay next to each other, were quite similar, although not identical, and that their improvements were in similar states of disrepair. Each property was abandoned, both were boarded up, their lots were extremely overgrown, and neither had any identifying sign or number. As a consequence of such difficulties, although exercising his best judgment, respondent erred in his identification of the correct property. Such error was not, however, shown to have resulted from any act or failure on his part that a reasonable appraiser under similar circumstances would have done differently. To the contrary, petitioner offered no proof as to what, if anything, respondent could or should have done, that he did not do, to correctly identify the property.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered which dismisses the administrative complaint. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 8th day of May 1992. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of May 1992.
The Issue The issue in this case concerns whether Petitioner has met the residency requirement for issuance of a restricted license to practice medicine under Section 458.3124, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact In June of 1998, Petitioner, Gilberto Cabrera-Diaz, M.D., submitted an application for a restricted license to practice medicine in the State of Florida. His application sought licensure pursuant to the provisions of Section 458.3124, Florida Statutes. One of the requirements for licensure under that statutory provision is a showing that the applicant "has been a resident of this state since July 1, 1996." Petitioner first came to the United States in December of 1990, at which time he and a number of his relatives were seeking refuge from the civil war in his homeland, El Salvador. Petitioner's first stop in the United States was in Florida, but he stayed in Florida for only a few weeks. By March of 1991, Petitioner had obtained employment at a clinic in Houston, Texas, and had moved to Houston with his wife and two children. From March of 1991 through May of 1995, Petitioner and his wife and children lived in Houston, Texas. During this period of time Petitioner continued to be employed by a family practice clinic in Houston. Sometime in May or June of 1995, Petitioner and his wife and children moved to El Paso, Texas. On July 1, 1995, Petitioner began a training program at a hospital in El Paso, Texas, that lasted through February of 1996. When Petitioner finished the training program in February of 1996, his prospects for the future appeared to be rather bleak. He had no immediate prospects for employment anywhere and he had very little in the way of savings. One of his hopes was to find employment in Florida. Another of his hopes was to be accepted into a residency program just about anywhere in the United States of America.3 In March of 1996, Petitioner's wife and children returned to El Salvador, where they lived with her parents. That same month Petitioner sold his automobile and went to Miami, Florida, where he moved in temporarily with one of his cousins. Petitioner had another cousin who lived in Boca Raton, Florida. For the next several months, until about September or October of 1996, Petitioner spent most of his time trying to find employment in Florida and preparing and sending approximately 150 applications to residency programs. During these several months Petitioner lived part of the time with his Miami cousin and part of the time with his Boca Raton cousin. Due to his limited financial resources at the time, Petitioner was living with his cousins to minimize expenses until he either found a job in Florida, or was accepted into a residency program. During 1996, Petitioner never had his own dwelling place in Florida. There is no evidence that during 1996 Petitioner ever intended to permanently reside with either of his Florida cousins. During 1996, Petitioner was unsuccessful in his efforts to be accepted to a residency program. However, he was successful in obtaining employment as a Urologist Assistant in Houston, Texas. Petitioner began his new employment in Houston in September or October of 1996. As of the date of the final hearing in this case, Petitioner was still employed in the same position in Houston, Texas. For the first year and a half or so after starting his current employment in Houston, Petitioner rented a series of apartments in Houston, where he lived alone or with a roommate. By the middle of 1998, his financial circumstances had improved sufficiently for him to bring his wife and children back from El Salvador. In August of 1998, Petitioner moved into a larger apartment in Houston, Texas, and his wife and two children returned from El Salvador and moved into the apartment in Houston with Petitioner. Both of the children attend school in Houston. As of the date of the final hearing, Petitioner and his wife and children continue to live together in an apartment in Houston, Texas; Petitioner continues to work in Houston; and Petitioner's children continue to go to school in Houston. Petitioner has several relatives who live in Florida. During the years Petitioner has been living in the United States, he has made numerous trips from Texas to Florida to visit his Florida relatives.4 Petitioner has a desire to live in Florida so that he can be closer to his relatives, as well as to facilitate the possibility of his son becoming a student at the University of Miami. Since 1991, Petitioner has had a Texas driver's license. He still has a current Texas driver's license. Petitioner obtained his first Florida driver's license in May of 1998. The Florida driver's license lists Petitioner's address as 9439 Fontaineblue Boulevard, No. 211, Miami, Florida, which is the address of Petitioner's Miami cousin. On at least several occasions since 1991, Petitioner has obtained automobile insurance policies in Texas showing Texas addresses for the automobiles. Petitioner has never obtained an automobile insurance policy in Florida for an automobile registered in Florida. Since leaving Florida in early 1991, Petitioner has lived with his wife and children in several locations in Texas. He is presently living with his wife and children in Houston, Texas. Since leaving Florida in early 1991, Petitioner has never lived with his wife and children anywhere in the State of Florida. Since leaving Florida in early 1991, Petitioner ha worked for many years in Texas, and is presently employed in Texas. Petitioner has never worked in Florida.
Recommendation On the basis of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued in this case denying Petitioner's application for a restricted license pursuant to Section 458.3124, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of September, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of September, 1999.
The Issue Whether Petitioner meets the residency requirement prescribed by Section 458.347(7)(b)1.d., Florida Statutes, for certification as a physician assistant?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the following Findings of Fact are made: From May, 1957, until her retirement 33 years later, Petitioner was employed as a physician by a government agency in India. Her first position was that of an Assistant Surgeon. When she retired, she was the Chief Superintendent of a 350-bed hospital. Petitioner is now, and has been since November 11, 1959, happily married to Dayaldas M. Punwani. Petitioner and her husband were married in Bombay, India. They lived together in India until March, 1981, when Dayaldas moved to the United States. Petitioner remained in India with the couple's two children. At the time of their physical separation, Petitioner and her husband enjoyed a congenial relationship, as they have throughout their marriage. Their plan was for Petitioner to eventually join Dayaldas in the United States and live with him in the same household, but only following her retirement from government service and after their children were married and settled in accordance with Indian custom and tradition. When Dayaldas arrived in the United States, he first went to Boston, Massachusetts. Sometime in late 1981 or in 1982, he settled in Broward County, Florida and has lived there since. Using a visitor's visa to enter the United States, Petitioner visited her husband on two occasions after he had settled in Florida: from May, 1983, to August, 1983, and from November, 1985, to March, 1986. During her first visit, Petitioner and Dayaldas decided that when Petitioner joined Dayaldas in the United States to once again live with him, they would make Florida their permanent home. On neither of her visits to her husband did Petitioner come with the intention of staying for an indefinite period of time. Rather, she fully intended both times to return to India to continue her employment with the government until she reached retirement age 1/ and to discharge her responsibilities to her children. On February 8, 1990, Dayaldas became a permanent resident of the United States under this country's immigration laws. By February, 1990, both of Petitioner's and Dayaldas' children were married and settled. In April, 1990, Petitioner began to dispose of household items and other personal belongings in anticipation of her retirement and her subsequent move to Florida to join her husband. On May 30, 1990, at the age of 58, Petitioner retired from government service. The retirement age for physicians in government service in India is They have the opportunity, however, to seek reappointment to their position and work two years beyond their 58th birthday. Petitioner opted not to seek reappointment and extend her employment an additional two years because she wanted to move to Florida to live with her husband. At the time of her retirement, Petitioner was living in the same government-owned apartment in Bombay that she had been living in since September, 1964. The apartment was provided to her by the Indian government as part of her compensation package. 2/ Petitioner had a maximum of eight months following her retirement to vacate the apartment. Petitioner used only approximately one half of the allotted time. She vacated the apartment in December, 1990. On December 31, 1990, Petitioner arrived in Florida and moved in with her husband, with whom she has been living since. She came only with a few clothes. She had disposed of her other possessions, including her automobile, before leaving India. During the time that Petitioner was living in India and Dayaldas was living in the United States, Petitioner had an Indian driver's license and voted in local Indian elections. In or around April, 1991, Petitioner and Dayaldas filed a joint 1990 U.S. tax return. They subsequently filed an amended return. On June 14, 1991, Petitioner became a permanent resident of the United States under this country's immigration laws. On or around June 29, 1991, Petitioner mailed to the Board her completed application for certification as a physician assistant. On her application, she "list[ed her] place of residence on July 1, 1990," as "Bombay, Maharashtra, India."
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order finding that Petitioner is not qualified to be certified as a physician assistant pursuant to Section 458.347(7)(b)1., Florida Statutes, because she has not shown that she was a legal resident of Florida on July 1, 1990, or was licensed or certified in any state in the United States as a physician assistant on July 1, 1990. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 17th day of June, 1992. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 1992. 1/ During both visits, she was on leave from her government position. 2/ The Indian government provides apartments to medical staff members regardless of their citizenship or immigration status. 3/ One may establish such a new residence in Florida without being a citizen of this country. See Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1950); Perez v. Perez, 164 So.2d 561 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964). APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-3. Accepted and incorporated in substance, although not necessarily repeated verbatim, in this Recommended Order. To the extent that it suggests that Petitioner and her husband decided, during her 1983 visit, that they would both make Florida their permanent home from that moment on, rather than at some future date, this proposed finding has been rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Otherwise, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it is more in the nature of a statement of the law than a finding of fact. 7-11. Accepted and incorporated in substance. The Board's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-4. Accepted and incorporated in substance. 5. First sentence: Rejected because it is a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based upon such testimony; Second and third sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance. 6-7. Accepted and incorporated in substance. First and third sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Second sentence: Rejected because it is a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based upon such testimony. Accepted and incorporated in substance. First and second sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Third sentence: Rejected because it is a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact based upon such testimony. COPIES FURNISHED: Julian Gonzalez, Esquire 150 Southeast 12th Street, Suite 401 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Edwin A. Bayo, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Suite LL04, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Jack McCray, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Respondent Shirley Holland was registered with Petitioner as a real estate salesman in January, 1976, associated with Vern Duncklee Real Estate and Insurance, Inc., Naples, Florida. He is presently registered as a real estate broker. (Stipulation) On January 5, 1976, W. H. Ragan gave the Duncklee firm a listing to sell real property consisting of approximately one and one-quarter acres located in Collier County, Florida, for a selling price of $7,500. Respondent was the listing salesman. (Testimony of Respondent, Ragan, Duncklee, Petitioner's Exhibit 6). Respondent also was a builder who operated as Holland Investment Company. It was his practice to purchase various properties, remodel existing structures on the same, and thereafter sell them at a profit. There was a two- room shed located on the Ragan property that had no inside finishing work, electricity, or septic tank. Respondent decided to take an option on the property in order to remodel it by adding a room and to place it in a habitable condition. He broached the subject to Ragan on January 6, 1976, and Ragan told him on January 7, that he was agreeable to such a contract. On January 8, Respondent and Ragan and his wife entered into a Sales Contract and Option to Buy for $7,500. The contract provided that closing would take place within twelve months and that the seller would give possession of the property to the purchaser on January 8, 1976. This was pursuant to an accompanying rental agreement dated January 8, 1976, between the parties for a period of twelve months which provided that Respondent could exercise his option at any time within the stated twelve-month period whereby all rents paid would be applied toward the down payment on the property of $1,900 which was to be made at closing of the sale. The rental agreement further provided that if Respondent did not exercise his option within the required time, any improvements made by him on the property during that period would be considered liquidated damages of the owner. Pursuant to these agreements, Respondent made a payment of $100 at the time they were executed, which represented an initial deposit on the contracts and as rent for first month of the term. The Option Agreement also gave Respondent authority to remodel the building on the property and it further reflected that Respondent was a registered real estate salesman and would be selling the property for profit. (Testimony of Respondent, Duncklee, Petitioner's Exhibits 5, 7) On January 5, 1976, Respondent showed Harold and Ruby Stacy several houses in the area that were for sale. On January 9, Respondent went by the Stacy residence to see if they were interested in any of the houses he had shown them. They were not interested in those houses and Respondent told them of property that he had recently acquired which was the Ragan property. He showed it to Mr. Stacy that night and the next day Mrs. Stacy went with him to look at the premises. During the course of their conversations, Respondent offered to rent the property to them for $100 for the period January 10 to February 1, 1976. It was his intention to rent it to them for $125 per month commencing in February on the condition that they clean and fix up the property. They also discussed the possibility of purchase at a later date. Respondent told them that he would sell to them for $13,000 if Harold Stacy would do the remodeling work on the shed with Respondent supplying the materials. Respondent quoted a possible sales price of $14,500 if he was obliged to provide both labor and materials for renovating the shed and providing for utility services. Respondent and the Stacys entered into a rental agreement on that day for the initial period of some three weeks and Ruby Stacy gave him a check dated January 10 for $100 with a notation thereon that it was a deposit on land. Respondent explained to Mrs. Stacy that he was merely renting the property at that time and added the word "rent" at the bottom of the check. (Testimony of Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibit 1, 2) Thereafter, the Stacys proceeded to clean the premises and commence installing a ceiling in the building located on the property. They also installed a septic tank. At some undisclosed date, Ragan came to the property to obtain some of his belongings and found the Stacys there. He learned that they supposedly had purchased the property from Respondent, Ragan was of the opinion that Respondent had purported to sell the property before he had obtained the option thereon and that he had therefore defrauded the Stacys. Ragan thereupon filed a complaint against Respondent with the local Board of Realtors in latter January, 1976. About the same time, Respondent had been in the process of obtaining local permits to install the septic tank and do the other work. He discovered that the Stacys had installed a septic tank without his authorization and without obtaining a permit. He thereupon, by letter of January 21, 1976, informed the Stacys that they had done work on the property without a building permit or approval of the County Health Department and therefore was refunding the rental payment of $100. He enclosed his check in that amount, dated January 21, 1976. Although Respondent later attempted to exercise his option to purchase the property, Ragan refused to fulfill the agreement and later sold the property to the Stacys himself for $7,500. (Testimony of Respondent, R. Stacy, Ragan, Petitioner's Exhibits 3,4) Mrs. Stacy testified at the hearing that she was under the impression that she and her husband had purchased the property in question on January 10, 1976, and that the $100 payment had been a deposit for such purchase. She was under the further impression that they were to make a $2,500 down payment in February to consummate the deal. She further testified that they made the improvements on the land because of their understanding that they were going to purchase it. Mrs. Stacy had never been involved in a prior purchase of real property and is unfamiliar with contract documents and terminology. It is found that Mrs. Stacy honestly believed that she and her husband had a valid agreement to purchase the property. Her testimony that she and her husband entered into the rental arrangement in January to enable them to work on the property until they could make the down payment in February is deemed credible. (Testimony of R. Stacy) Ragan and Respondent had been involved in a prior real estate transaction and Respondent testified that Ragan had not been satisfied with that transaction, but Ragan testified to the contrary. However, Ragan talked to Respondent's broker in January, 1976, about the Stacy situation, at which time Ragan stated that he had a chance to get even with Respondent for the prior transaction and that he was going to do so. (Testimony of Respondent, Ragan, Duncklee, D. Holland)
Recommendation That the Administrative complaint be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph A. Doherty, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Ed R. Miller, Esquire Suite 212 - 1400 Gulf Shore Boulevard Naples, Florida 33940
