Findings Of Fact In 1971, the Okaloosa Island Authority, a governmental agency, leased certain real property on Santa Rosa Island in Okaloosa County to the Okaloosa Development Corporation for a term of 99 years. Certain ultimate sub-lessees under the Okaloosa Island Authority lease mortgaged their leaseholds as security for the payment of promissory notes held by petitioner First National Bank of Birmingham. Two such notes are involved, both of which were executed and recorded in Florida during 1974. Petitioner is the payee on both notes, and kept them both at its headquarters in Birmingham, Alabama. The maker of the larger note is U.R.S., Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation. The U.R.S. note is in the face amount of $2,500,000.00, although only $347,867.91 of the principal obligation was still outstanding on January 1, 1975; the note was paid in full on January 27, 1975. The makers of the second note were Phillip F. Zeidman and his wife, Nancy L. Zeidman. The Zeidman note is in the face amount of $45,000.00. On January 1, 1975, $44,000.00 of the principal obligation remained outstanding; and on January 1, 1976, $29,286.83 of the principal obligation was still outstanding. No intangible personal property tax was paid when the U.R.S. and Zeidman notes, together with the mortgages which secured their Payment, were recorded by the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Okaloosa County. Statement Required By Stuckey's of Eastman, Georgia v. Department of Transportation, 340 So.2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) Petitioner's proposed fact findings have been adopted, in substance, except as to what the First National Bank of Birmingham relied on, as to which no evidence was adduced. Respondent's proposed fact findings have been adopted, in substance, except that the face amount of the U.R.S. note was $2,500,000.00, not $500,000.00; and the real property leased by the Okaloosa Island Authority is situated in Okaloosa, not Escambia County.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner's substantive tax liability for 1975 and 1976 be set, with respect to the Zeidman note, at seventy-three and twenty-nine hundredths dollars ($73.29 = 44.00 + 29.29). That petitioner's substantive tax liability for 1975 and 1976 be set, with respect to the U.R.S. note, at three hundred forty-seven and eighty-seven hundredths dollars ($347.87 = 347.87 + 0.00). DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of June, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 1977. COPIES FURNISHED: E. Wilson Crump, II, Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 William Guy Davis, Jr., Esquire Beggs and Lane 700 Brent Building Post Office Box 12950 Pensacola, Florida 32576
Findings Of Fact On January 22, 1986, American Aviation Resources, Inc., sold an airplane to Munur Yurtsever, a resident of Brazil. This aircraft was a Hansa jet model HFB-320 with U.S. registration number N71DL (the subject aircraft). On January 28, 1986, Mr. Yurtsever transferred title of the subject aircraft to Petitioner, Selcuk Yetimoglu. At the time of the transfer, the subject aircraft was in the State of Florida undergoing repairs. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Mr. Yetimoglu resided at 20530 Jacaranda Road, Cutler Ridge, Miami, Florida, in a residence owned by Mr. Yurtsever. The aircraft bill of sale dated January 28, 1986, reflects that Mr. Yetimoglu was the purchaser of the subject aircraft and that Mr. Yurtsever was the seller. The bill of sale recited that the consideration paid was $20.00 and other good and valuable consideration. While the bill of sale reflects that Mr. Yetimoglu resided in Miami, Florida, the bill of sale does not state that the sale occurred in the State of Florida. On January 29, 1986, Mr. Yetimoglu applied to the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for the registration of the subject aircraft in his name. On March 13, 1986, Mr. Yetimoglu wrote to the FAA regarding the registration and stated, in pertinent part, as follows: Mr. Munur Yurtsever sold the aircraft to me on January 28, 1986, five days after he bought the aircraft from American Aviation Resources, Inc. when he found out that the government of Brazil did not give him a (sic) permission to import the aircraft and that he could not register the aircraft in the United States because he was not a citizen of the United States. By letter dated May 15, 1986, Mr. Yetimoglu provided the FAA proof that the subject aircraft had not been registered in Brazil. Mr. Yetimoglu was the record owner of the subject aircraft between January 28, 1986, and March 13, 1987. On March 13, 1987, Mr. Yetimoglu sold the subject aircraft back to Mr. Yurtsever. The bill of sale identifies the purchaser as being: Munur Yurtsever Rico Taxi Aereo Ltda. Av. Mal. Camara 160-GR. Rio de Janeiro - RJ Brazil On April 8, 1987, Mr. Yetimoglu wrote the FAA and stated, in pertinent part: ... I request cancelation of U.S. registra- tion for the aircraft ... because I sold the aircraft back to Rico Taxi Aereo Ltda. ... On January 11, 1988, Respondent issued to Petitioner a "Notice of Delinquent Tax Penalty and Interest Due and Assessed" (Notice of Assessment) based on the transaction involving Mr. Yetimoglu, Mr. Yurtsever, and the subject aircraft. The Notice of Assessment contained the following statement: "This Department has information that you purchased the following aircraft. However, there is no evidence of payment of Florida Sales and/or Use Tax". The Notice of Assessment reflected that Respondent had, pursuant to Section 212.12(5)(b), Florida Statutes, estimated the value of the aircraft as being $320,000 and assessed the following taxes, interest, and penalties: Florida State Sales/Use Tax 5% $16,000.00 (Estimated) Per 212.06(8), F.S. Penalty 5% per month; Maximum 25% of 4,000.00 (25%) Tax Due Per Section 212.12(2), F.S. Additional Penalty 11,840.00 (50%) Per 212.12(2)(a), F.S. Interest = 1% per month from date of 3,680.00 (23%) Purchase To Date of Payment Per Section 212.12(3), F.S. Less Tax Paid ----------------- TOTAL DUE WITH THIS NOTICE $35,520.00 Respondent requested that Mr. Yetimoglu provide it information and documentation as to the value of the aircraft. Mr. Yetimoglu contends that he paid Mr. Yurtsever nothing for the aircraft, that the title was transferred to him and registered in the FAA in his name so that the aircraft could be test flown after it was repaired, and that Mr. Yurtsever had paid $100,000 for the aircraft. There was no evidence as to the sales price that Mr. Yetimoglu paid for the aircraft other than Mr. Yetimoglu's testimony. Respondent estimated that the reasonable value of the subject aircraft on January 28, 1986, was $320,000. This estimate was based on an appraisal prepared for Respondent and assumed that the aircraft was in a scrapped or junked condition. Respondent generally uses a standard reference work on the value of aircraft to assist it in estimating the value of the subject aircraft. Because of its age and model, the subject aircraft is no longer listed in this standard reference. In support of his contention that Mr. Yurtsever paid $100,000 for the aircraft, Mr. Yetimoglu provided Respondent with a copy of a wire transfer of funds from Mr. Yurtsever to American Aviation Resources, Inc. in the amount of $100,000. However, there was no documentation provided that established that the $100,000 constituted the entire purchase price paid by Mr. Yurtsever. The dispute between the parties as to the value of the aircraft is resolved by finding, based on the greater weight of the evidence, that the reasonable value of the aircraft at the times pertinent to this proceeding was $320,000.00. In December 1986, while Mr. Yetimoglu was the record owner, the subject aircraft engaged in international flight between the Turks and Caicos Islands and the State of Florida. Respondent's Notice of Redetermination, dated February 26, 1990, upheld the Notice of Assessment on the basis that the underlying transaction was subject to use tax pursuant to Section 212.06(8), Florida Statutes. The issue to be resolved was framed by the Notice of Redetermination as being: "The only issue involved pertains to a use tax assessment upon an aircraft brought into this country". This determination was based, in part, upon a letter to Respondent from an attorney who was representing Mr. Yetimoglu at the time the letter was written. 1/ The letter implied that the aircraft was brought into Florida after the title was transferred to Mr. Yetimoglu, and provided, in pertinent part, as follows: The transferor of the aircraft, Munur Yurtsever, is a nonresident alien. His inten- tion is to deliver the plane to a purchaser outside the country. Mr. Yurtsever advises that the F.A.A. will not allow the plane to be flown in this country unless it is owned by a U.S. resident. As it was imperative to fly the plane here in order to prepare it for its flight outside the country, Mr. Yurtsever transferred the plane to his partner, Selcuk Yetimoglu, who is a resident of the United States. ... At the formal hearing, Mr. Yetimoglu established that the aircraft was in Florida undergoing repairs at the time the title was transferred to him. Prior to and at the formal hearing, Respondent asserted the position that use taxes, interest, and penalties were due for this transaction. In its post- hearing submittal, Respondent, for the first time in this proceeding, contends that sales taxes, interest and penalties are due for this transaction.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered which withdraws the subject assessment. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 11th day of March, 1991. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of March, 1991.
Findings Of Fact Burger King, a Florida corporation, is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Pillsbury Company, with headquarters located in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Burger King filed its intangible tax returns and made its original tax payments on or before their respective due dates of June 30, 1972, and June 30, 1973. On May 3, 1974, DOR sent a letter to Burger King indicating that Burger King's intangible tax account was being reviewed and that DOR's records did not reflect having received the 1972 or 1973 returns. The next piece of correspondence between the parties (according to the record) occurred over two years later on June 3, 1976. At that time DOR informed Burger King that it was auditing Burger King's intangible tax account for the tax year 1973. This letter constitutes the initiation of an investigation prior to the expiration of three years from the due date for filing the 1973 return. The parties make no further reference in their correspondence to the 1972 return or the tax year 1972. However, DOR does request a copy of Burger King's balance sheet dated December 31, 1972. This request is contained in DOR's letter of September 12, 1977, which letter in its opening paragraph limits the inquiry to tax years 1973 through 1977, inclusive. In addition to its letter of June 3, 1976, DOR filed its proposed assessment for tax year 1973, on the same date, June 3, 1976. Typed at the bottom of the proposed assessment was the following statement: This proposed assessment shall become final within sixty (60) days of receipt, unless you file a protest requesting a departmental conference, or petition for a hearing under the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act, Chapter 120, F.S. Upon receipt of these documents, Mr. Tom Howell, the property tax manager for Pillsbury Corporation asked for an extension of time to file the information requested in the June 3rd letter, which extension was granted by DOR. However, no protest or petition for hearing was filed within the sixty (60) days. Subsequently, Mr. Nicolas Joanos, a tax examiner with DOR recommended that Burger King file an amended tax return to take advantage of savings that would accrue if subsidiary corporations were consolidated on the return. While no such amended return was filed, a recomputation of tax liability based upon consolidation was made by DOR on January 6, 1977. On January 27, 1977, Burger King paid the additional tax for the years 1974, 1975, and 1976 but declined to pay the tax due for the 1973 tax year on the ground that the billing was dated past the expiration date for making a 1973 assessment. On February 23, 1977, DOR computed a new proposed assessment which included accrued interest from the prior proposed assessment. Burger King subsequently filed its request for a hearing pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. The intangible properties sought to be taxed by DOR for 1973 include some $11,000,000 of inter-company accounts receivable due from Burger King's parent corporation, The Pillsbury Company. DOR does not contest that Burger King overpaid its intangible tax for the tax year 1972, but opposes a refund on the procedural ground more fully explained below. During the applicable periods of time herein, Burger King never made application for a refund for the 1972 tax paid. Rather, the issue was first raised by Burger King in its amended petition dated January 29, 1978.
Findings Of Fact Allis-Chalmers Corporation (ACC), Petitioner in Case 82-2774, is a Delaware corporation commercially domiciled in West Allis, Wisconsin. ACC operates in Florida at the following locations: U.S. Highway 1 opened 2/1/77 Grant (Industrial Pump Division) 5200 Kennedy Blvd. closed 10/30/78 Tampa (Industrial Pump Division) 406 Rio Street opened 11/1/78 101 Federal Place opened 5/1/80 Tarpon Springs (Cement & Mining System Division) (The locations listed are those operating during the audit period. Other locations closed prior to or opened after the audit period.) ACC makes sales of tangible personal property to Florida customers directly from the locations at (b) and (c) and also makes sales to Florida customers from these two locations where the property is shipped from out-of-state locations to the Florida customers. ACC is a diversified company which manufactures and markets the following items: (a) agricultural equipment; (b) hydropower equipment; (c) coal gasification systems; (d) ore conveyors, crushers and screening equipment; (e) bulk material-handling equipment, such as ship self-unloaders; (f) stackers and reclaimers for steel mills; (g) compressors and pumps; (h) cement and asphaltic concrete production equipment (i) valves for units larger than household or commercial plumbing installations; (j) systems for the direct reduction of iron ore; (k) kilns and coolers; (l) lawn and garden equipment; and (m) lift trucks and industrial tractors. The amount in dispute is as stated in the Petition and is not an issue in these proceedings. The only issue is the method of computing the intangible taxes. ACC contends the tax base should be the net accounts receivable based on sales transacted in Florida divided by sales transacted everywhere else. The department contends the ratio should be Florida-destination sales divided by sales everywhere else. The issue is the "business situs" of the intangibles. Allis-Chalmers Credit Corporation (ACCC), Petitioner in Cases 82-2816 and 82-2817, is a Wisconsin corporation doing business in Florida. It is the wholly-owned subsidiary of ACC and its principal business is financing the sale or lease of equipment by ACC dealers. Case 82-2816 involves an income tax assessment against ACCC for the years 1977-1979. The item in dispute involves treatment given to "waiver interest" in arriving at the ratio by which federal income tax is multiplied to determine state income tax due. This issue applies to the denominator of that equation, hence the higher the figure the lower the tax. On occasion ACC, as a marketing tool, agrees to forego interest on either retail or wholesale financing for a period of perhaps six months. If these notes are assigned to ACCC, ACC must pay the waived interest to ACCC that its dealer or the dealer's customer would otherwise have paid. This is charged to ACC at the rate of one and one-half times the cost of funds to ACCC plus the actual cost of insurance. This rate is one percent to three percent per annum less than ACCC would charge the original debtors for the same period. The difference takes into account the elimination of bad debts and the simplified collection from one source instead of many. Therefore, as contended by ACCC, this "waiver interest" is thus already net of the "expenses of the recipient related thereto." The department contends that "waiver interest," and ACCC's explanation thereof, merely reflects the fact that a reduced rate of return "interest" is charged by ACCC with respect to the higher quality risk attendant to its relationship with its parent, ACC. As to ACCC's interest expense as a cost carrying the underlying receivables, the department contends that the ratio of ACCC's interest expense as applied is an appropriate adjustment as none is reflected elsewhere as a cost of carrying "waiver interest" generating receivables. As to the related bad debt expense, the department contends it merely applied the overall bad debt information ACCC used in determining its underlying federal taxable income and, that in its use of such data, the department did not find evidence wherein ACCC in its determination of its federal bad debt expense, distinguished between classes of risks which may be in its aggregate receivables, including the receivables giving rise to the "waiver interest." Thus, the department contends that directly related expense includes interest expense and bad debt expense. By the department's calculation, "waiver interest" as an item in the sales denominator has been reduced by 61 percent to 70 percent in various years to reflect these two categories of directly related expense as mandated by Section 214.71(3)(b) Florida Statutes, and Section 220.44, Florida Statutes. The issue is what constitutes directly related expense to inter-company income. There is no dispute on the numbers. Either the return numbers or the audit numbers on this item will prevail. Case 82-2817 involves an intangible tax assessment against ACCC for the years 1979-1981. During the audit period ACCC was represented in Florida by one employee whose duties were to call on ACC Florida dealers to persuade these dealers to use ACCC for financing sales they made, to keep these dealers supplied with necessary forms, and to give advice to these dealers if complicated or difficult financing situations arose. This representative worked out of the Atlanta office but lived in Florida, the state for which this representative was responsible. Buyers of ACC equipment with good credit ratings can generally obtain bank financing at better rates than are offered by ACCC. The dealer is not required to assign conditional sales contracts to ACCC (via ACC) but is encouraged to do so. The sales contracts for Florida buyers of equipment delivered to Florida are the intangibles upon which the tax here involved was based. When a dealer sells a piece of equipment on which the buyer wants financing by ACCC, the dealer has the retail customer fill out the purchaser's statement and execute three additional forms that are provided by ACCC. Under his franchise agreement with the parent corporation, the dealer is required to use appropriate precautions in conducting financing transactions, to warranty the truth and completeness of statements in the documents and their enforceability, and to repurchase the paper on demand in the event of default. The dealer forwards the executed documents to ACCC's Atlanta branch office for review and approval before any extension of credit to the customer. In Atlanta ACCC's branch manager, acting under a power of attorney from the parent corporation, accepts the document on behalf of the parent corporation, and tenders them to himself as agent for ACCC. If the paper meets the ACCC requirements as to form, terms, execution and credit-worthiness, as defined in the Master Credit Agreement between the parent corporation and ACCC, he then accepts the documents on behalf of ACCC. In some instances he conducts a supplemental credit inquiry by mail or telephone to assure ACCC's requirements are met. His acceptance of the documents for ACCC constitutes in effect the purchase and receipt of the obligation. The customer receives his financing, and the appropriate credits are transferred from ACCC to the parent corporation to the dealer's inventory account. The dealer receives an additional credit as an incentive to recommend ACCC's financing services to his customers. ACCC files the signed financing statement with the Florida Secretary of State to protect its security interest under U.C.C. Article 9, and pays the appropriate filing fee. ACCC also files continuation statements in the event the account is extended or refinanced beyond five years. The customer makes his installment payments reflecting the base price plus a time-price differential or finance charge by mailing the payments to ACCC's Atlanta lock box. ACCC furnishes him coupon books or reminder notices by mail. In the event a customer account becomes overdue, ACCC takes limited enforcement action by issuing dunning letters. ACCC, through its Florida Finance Representative, contacts the delinquent customer by telephone or in person, and arranges in appropriate cases for extensions or refinancing of the initial obligation, using printed forms with ACC's name prominently displayed thereon. In the event the customer defaults, ACCC has authority to repossess and resell the security, to sue on the note, or to amend, extend, renew or release the customer's obligations. In practice ACCC rarely, if ever, exercises these powers, but simply resells the paper to the parent corporation which takes the actions described above. The agreement between Allis-Chalmers and its dealers is that of buyer and seller and this agreement specifically provides the dealer is not an agent of Allis-Chalmers and is without authority to bind the company. In Case 82-2817 Petitioner contends that no tax is due because it is not transacting business within the state. The department contends that tax is due because the original contracts, which have been assigned once or twice depending upon whether they were wholesale or retail, have acquired a business situs in the state since they arose from, or are issued in connection with, the sale of tangible personalty in this state. In the event the department prevails, the parties have stipulated to the manner in which the modified tax shall be computed, for this case only. This stipulation is not material to the issues involved and is not replicated herein.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner paid intangible personal property taxes in the amount of $2,706.26 on March 22, 1977 for the tax year of 1977. The said taxes were not due until June, 1997. The Petitioner filed an application with the Respondent, Office of the Comptroller, State of Florida, on May 5, 1980, requesting a refund of the taxes paid because of the subsequent discovery by the Petitioner that the monies had been paid by mistake or in error. The Respondent, Office of The Comptroller, served a Notice of Intent to Deny by U.S. Mail upon the Petition on November 12, 1980. Respondent's Notice of Intent to Deny Refund is based upon the three- year statute of non-claim, as provided in Section 199.252, Florida Statutes. The issues to be determined are whether the right to refund accrued to the Petitioner when the taxes were paid (March 22, 1977) or when the taxes were due (June 30, 1977).
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent is guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against her, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken, if any.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Anne E. Carr is and has been at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0268356. In 1988 Helen B. Moser and her husband, John J. Moser, Jr., obtained their real estate salesman licenses. In 1989 they became real estate brokers. Upon becoming licensed brokers, they decided that they would like to open their own real estate office. They began contacting various real estate brokers seeking advice on how to open and operate a real estate business. Respondent was one of the brokers the Mosers contacted for advice. She and the Mosers already knew each other from previous professional activities. At the time, Respondent was the broker and sole stockholder of Carr Real Estate, Inc. She also was spending a substantial amount of time selling luxury condominiums for a particular developer, which required her to be on-site at the development. Respondent suggested to the Mosers that they join Carr Real Estate, Inc., and run the office for her rather than opening their own office, which would give them immediate access to her listings and many clients and allow her to devote her time to sales for the large real estate development. The Mosers agreed that was a good opportunity for all concerned and joined Carr Real Estate, Inc., as broker/salesmen in October of 1989. The Mosers began running the business for Respondent at her request, providing Respondent with monthly accountings. During 1990 the Mosers earned approximately $90,000 as a result of the listings they took over from Respondent and as a result of the listings Respondent referred to them. Throughout that year Carr Real Estate, Inc., remained a major presence in the Highland Beach area where Respondent was well known both for her flamboyant fashions and her ability to list and sell luxury ocean-front and water-front properties. During the first week of December 1990 Respondent advised the Mosers that due both to financial problems she was experiencing and pressure on her from the developer to devote full time to his sales she would be closing the business on December 31 unless the Mosers wanted to purchase the company from her. They advised Respondent they were interested in doing so and that they would draft the documents for Respondent's signature. Many discussions took place between Respondent and the Mosers over the next several weeks formulating the terms of the sale of the business, and the Mosers submitted to Respondent a number of drafts of documents. While the negotiations were on-going, Respondent filled out and executed on December 12, 1990, the documents necessary for her to file for personal bankruptcy. On December 15 she faxed written instructions to her attorney to not file the bankruptcy petition because she was selling her company. On December 20, 1990, Respondent and the Mosers executed a Purchase and Sale Agreement and a Bill of Sale. It is noted that those documents also involved the sale of Respondent's interest in two other corporations to the Mosers but that portion of the transaction raises no issues involved in this proceeding. The Purchase and Sale Agreement provided that its effective date would be January 1, 1991. The Agreement specifically represented that Carr Real Estate, Inc., was being sold free of any liabilities and encumbrances and that the corporation did not own any tangible assets. The Agreement further provided that Respondent would indemnify the Mosers from all obligations and liabilities incurred by Carr Real Estate, Inc., prior to January 1, 1991. The Agreement provided for no money to change hands as a result of the Mosers' purchase of Respondent's business; rather, the purchase price for the corporation was five percent of all sales commissions received by the corporation for a period of two years. On December 29, 1990, Respondent executed the Seller's Affidavit given to her by the Mosers. The portion of the Seller's Affidavit pertinent to this dispute is that Respondent attested that there were no actions or proceedings then pending in any state or federal court in which "the Affiant or Corporations" are parties, including bankruptcy. It was very clear in Respondent's mind that what she was selling under the Purchase and Sale Agreement and the Bill of Sale and what she was attesting to in the Seller's Affidavit was in regard to the corporation and not her personally. It never occurred to Respondent that she was representing to the Mosers that she personally had no bills and no assets. Respondent had no intention of defrauding the Mosers. Supporting this intent is the clear language contained in the Purchase and Sale Agreement, the Bill of Sale, and the Seller's Affidavit that she would personally indemnify and hold harmless the Mosers from any liabilities incurred by the corporation prior to the effective date of the sale. In mid-January 1991, approximately two weeks after the effective date of the sale, the Mosers discovered that a bankruptcy petition had been filed on behalf of Respondent as an individual. Although that petition did not involve the corporation, John Moser immediately contacted Respondent who did not know that her attorney had filed the petition contrary to Respondent's instructions. On January 23, 1991, Respondent wrote to Helen Moser apologizing for the erroneous filing of her bankruptcy petition and assuring her that it would be corrected. Respondent immediately contacted her attorney to ascertain how the petition could be dismissed. She was advised by her attorney that the only way she could dismiss the petition was to not attend the first meeting of creditors which would cause the petition to automatically be dismissed. Respondent did fail to attend the first meeting of creditors. Due to her failure to attend, her bankruptcy petition was dismissed. She immediately contacted Helen Moser to advise her of the dismissal. On February 1, 1991, John Moser called Respondent to inform her that a statement for a monthly automobile lease payment in the name of Carr Real Estate had been received. Respondent immediately sent the Mosers a note indicating that she had contacted G.M.A.C. but that company refused to allow her to transfer responsibility for her automobile lease payments from the corporation to herself. She acknowledged that she was responsible for any of the lease payments and requested that the Mosers acknowledge that the automobile was not an asset of the corporation. At the time Respondent knew that she was responsible for the lease payments because she signed the lease agreement as an individual. Respondent's contact with G.M.A.C. was unnecessary since her automobile had been leased to her as an individual in June of 1988, a date which preceded the existence of Carr Real Estate, Inc. The automobile was insured in Respondent's individual name and was registered in the name of G.M.A.C. at Respondent's address. The Bill of Sale executed by Respondent and the Mosers does not list the automobile as an asset of the corporation that was conveyed. The automobile leased by Respondent was not an asset of the corporation. The only relationship between Respondent's leased automobile and Carr Real Estate, Inc., concerns the deduction of automobile expenses as business expenses on the tax return for Carr Real Estate, Inc. On February 6, 1992, Helen Moser asked Respondent for a copy of the 1990 corporate tax return for Carr Real Estate, Inc., and Respondent provided a copy to her that same day. The return had been prepared in August or September of 1991 by Mary Dorak, a person enrolled with the Internal Revenue Service. It contained an entry entitled "loan from shareholder" in the sum of $107,060. Respondent had been the sole shareholder of the corporation. On February 26, 1992, the Mosers obtained an opinion letter from an attorney advising them that the corporation was not liable to Respondent for any debts. Neither the Mosers nor their accountant ever contacted Dorak or Respondent about the information contained in that tax return. Instead, the Mosers filed an amended corporate tax return for 1990 for Carr Real Estate, Inc. They removed the automobile as a corporate asset while leaving the shareholder's loan because it benefited them tax-wise. Instead of amending the return, the Mosers could have filed a 1991 return showing Respondent's stock exchange for the basis that was left of the stock in the corporation because the transaction took effect on January 1 of that year. Doing so would have caused no adverse tax consequences to the Mosers. Respondent typically provided Dorak with a listing of Respondent's income and expenses for the year and would then simply sign the return after Dorak had prepared it without reviewing the return first. Without any input from Respondent, Dorak had listed the automobile and some personal debts of Respondent on the 1990 corporate tax return because Respondent could take advantage of certain business deductions. That action had no adverse tax consequences for the Mosers. The Mosers never requested a tangible property tax return which would have reflected if there were any assets in the corporation. Had they made this request, they would have been told that there was none in existence because the corporation had no assets. At the time that Respondent and the Mosers executed the Purchase and Sale Agreement, the Bill of Sale, and the Seller's Affidavit in December, all three believed that the corporation had no assets or liabilities and that any assets and liabilities of Respondent were hers personally. As of January 1, 1991, the effective date of the sale, the corporation had no assets or liabilities. There were no tax consequences to the Mosers because of the listing of the shareholder loan in the 1990 corporate tax return because in that Subchapter S corporation the person ultimately adversely affected by the sale would be Respondent since she owned all of the shares in 1990. On the other hand, the filing of an amended 1990 corporate tax return by the Mosers without Respondent's knowledge and consent has resulted in adverse tax consequences to her, an unnecessary result. In November 1988 Respondent was involved in the sale of a condominium unit owned by Mr. and Mrs. Roy Heinz. Due to extended negotiations, the buyer's decision to not purchase the unit, and instructions from Heinz who was her client, Respondent delayed in placing the buyer's deposit check in her escrow account. Petitioner filed an Administrative Complaint against Respondent only and not also against Carr Real Estate, Inc., since that corporation was not yet in existence. After a formal evidentiary hearing, a Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings specifically cleared Respondent of any intentional wrongdoing and of any culpable negligence. Respondent was found guilty, however, of what was specifically characterized to be a technical violation of failure to immediately place the deposit check into her escrow account. The minimum penalty permissible was assessed against Respondent. Respondent was also dismissed from the civil lawsuit filed by Roy Heinz which emanated out of the same circumstances for which the administrative action was brought. The Mosers knew about the disciplinary action and the civil lawsuit pending against Respondent individually prior to their execution of the December 1990 documents transferring Carr Real Estate, Inc., from Respondent's ownership to theirs effective January 1, 1991. The "Roy Heinz matter" was specifically raised by John Moser during the negotiations among the Mosers and Respondent. In April of 1991 Respondent sent Helen Moser a copy of the Recommended Order finding Respondent not guilty of any dishonest conduct or culpable negligence, and Helen Moser failed to even read the entire Order since she considered it unimportant and because she knew the transaction involved occurred prior to the formation of Carr Real Estate, Inc. The Mosers continue to operate Carr Real Estate, Inc. The business has been diminishing, however, since 1991 due to the reduction in the number of salespersons affiliated with the business, John Moser's inability to attract listings and retain clients, and the amount of time the Mosers have been devoting to John Moser's computer business. Respondent's actions and/or inactions have not been the cause of the decline in Carr Real Estate, Inc.'s, business. Moreover, the Mosers have not been harmed financially or in any other way due to any statements contained in the Purchase and Sale Agreement, Bill of Sale, or Seller's Affidavit executed by Respondent. The sale of Carr Real Estate, Inc., by Respondent to the Mosers benefited all three of them. In her negotiations surrounding that sale, Respondent agreed to the terms desired by the Mosers, acted honestly, and did not knowingly or intentionally misrepresent any material fact. Those misrepresentations alleged by the Mosers and Petitioner to be contained in the closing documents, such as any statement that Respondent personally had no assets or liabilities, were not material to the sale and purchase of the corporation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against her and dismissing that Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of December 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-4, 6-11, 13, 15, 18, and 19 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 5, 16, and 17 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the credible evidence. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 12 and 14 have been rejected as being subordinate. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-29, 31, and 33-36 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 30 has been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the credible evidence in this cause. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 32 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack McRay, Esquire Acting General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Theodore R. Gay, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue, Suite N-607 Miami, Florida 33128 Harold M. Braxton, P.A. Suite 400, One Datran Center 9100 South Dadeland Boulevard Miami, Florida 33156-7815
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Petitioner owes sales, use, intangible taxes, penalties and interest; and, if so, the amount.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Allor, Inc., performs accounting services through the individual, Allan Steinberg. Subsequent to an audit of one of Mr. Steinberg's clients, the Department directed Curt Horton, a tax auditor, to perform an audit of Allor, Inc. In furtherance of the audit, Mr. Horton requested records necessary to complete the review. He discussed the audit with Mr. Steinberg and advised him of all records needed. When Mr. Steinberg produced no records the audit was estimated based on the federal tax return. Later, Mr. Horton adjusted the estimate based on actual deposits for sales. For purchases, a one year period was selected and, again, the federal tax return was reviewed. The audit was performed in this manner as the records offered by the taxpayer were insufficient to perform the audit in the more conventional format. Mr. Horton made numerous requests to the taxpayer for documentation. Mr. Horton extended the time to provide records so that the taxpayer had additional opportunity to document the audit. Credit was given for invoices that the taxpayer was able to produce and, for the remainder of the period, the amounts were averaged to determine the tax amount owed. The sales and use tax audit covered the period December 1, 1985, through November 30, 1990. The amount of the tax owed was calculated at $4,933.35. The amount of the penalty was $1,099.92. The interest owed through October 11, 1991, was $2,026.61. Based upon the foregoing, the total assessment for this audit was $8,059.88 with interest continuing to accrue at the rate of $1.62 per day. With regard to the intangible tax assessment for the period 1984 through 1991, Mr. Horton computed the accounts receivable and estimated that $2,000.00 per year would be the amount for this category. Since this taxpayer filed no intangible tax returns at all, the penalty owed was high relative to the tax amount owed. Based upon the foregoing computation, the intangible tax owed calculated to be $33.33 whereas the penalty for not filing was $2,763.55. The interest through September 20, 1991, was $14.76. Based upon the foregoing, the total assessment for the intangible tax owed was $2,811.64 with interest continuing to accrue at the rate of $.01 per day. Following the audit, the results of which were made available to the taxpayer on or about March 20, 1992, the Department issued a notice of decision on April 23, 1993, which responded to a protest letter filed by Petitioner on May 15, 1992. In substance, that notice sustained the results of the audit and noted that the taxpayer had not presented any additional documentation to support a conclusion to the contrary. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed another letter of protest and the Department issued a notice of reconsideration on February 7, 1994. That notice provided that upon further review, the proposed sustained amount for the sales and use tax was $6,945.63 and the amount owed for the intangible audit assessment was $48.09. This latter amount was reduced because the Department proposed to compromise the penalty in full. All of the acts of the auditor in this case were in keeping with the standard audit practices of the Department. None of the documents marked for identification as Petitioner's composite 2, which have not been received into evidence, were made available to the Department at any time during the audit. The Department afforded the Petitioner approximately three years after the audit to produce relevant documentation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Revenue enter a final order sustaining the proposed sustained amounts set forth in the notice of reconsideration dated February 7, 1994. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 28th day of September, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-1892 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: 1. None submitted. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: 1. Paragraphs 1 through 11 are accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Allan D. Steinberg Tax Accountant Allor, Inc. Suite 14-B 4953 North University Drive Lauderhill, Florida 33351 Mark T. Aliff Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General The Capitol-Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda Lettera General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs Executive Director 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue The issue is whether petitioner's candidacy for the office of Tax Collector would conflict or interfere with his employment as an auditor for the Department of Revenue.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Robert M. Hendrick, a career service employee, is employed with respondent, Department of Revenue (DOR), as a Tax Auditor IV in its Leesburg, Florida field office. He has been employed by DOR since September 1991. In his position, petitioner primarily audits tangible personal property assessments performed by the local Property Appraiser and, on occasion, he inspects the property which is the subject of the assessment. In March 1996, the Lake County Tax Collector publicly announced that he would not run for reelection. After learning of this decision, by letter dated March 19, 1996, petitioner requested authorization from his employer to run for that office. The letter was received by DOR's Executive Director on April 1, 1996. On April 10, 1996, the Executive Director issued a letter denying the request on the ground the candidacy would conflict with petitioner's job duties. More specifically, the letter stated in relevant part that: Under section 195.002, Florida Statutes, the Department of Revenue has supervision of the tax collection and all other aspects of the administration of such taxes. Your position with the Department may require you to review or audit the activities of the office you propose to seek. Also some of your duties in supervising other officials in the administration of property taxes may be affected by your proposed candidacy. Your job requires you to review appropriate tax returns, and other records to resolve complex issues related to taxing statutes administered by the Department of Revenue. It also requires you to identify and scrutinize transactions to ascertain whether taxpayers have escaped paying property taxes. In addition, it also requires you to review and audit procedures used by counties to identify and value tangible personal property and accomplish statutory compliance, to investigate taxpayer complaints, to conduct field review with county staff as appropriate, and to provide education and assistance to county taxing officials. Because of the Department's statutory supervision of the office of tax collector, there cannot be a certification that your candidacy would involve "no interest which conflicts or activity which interferes" with your state employment within the definitions in section 110.233(4), Florida Statutes. The letter went on to say that This letter is a specific instruction to you that you should not qualify or become a candidate for office while employed in your current position. If you wish to commence your campaign by performing the pre-filing requirements, the law requires that you first resign from the Department. Failure to do so shall result in disciplinary action to dismiss you from your position in accordance with the Department's disciplinary standards and procedures, and Rule 60K-4.010, F.A.C., on the grounds that you are in violation of the Department's Code of Conduct, Section 110.233, Florida Statutes, and Rule 60K- 13.002(3), F.A.C. After receiving the above decision, by letter dated April 15, 1996, petitioner requested that the Executive Director reconsider his decision. Thereafter, on April 24, 1996, petitioner filed a request for a formal hearing to contest the agency's decision. Both the Property Appraiser and Tax Collector play a role in the property tax program in the State of Florida. The Property Appraiser generally values or assesses property subject to taxation and applies the millage rate set by the taxing authority. After the tax roll is approved by DOR, it is certified to the Tax Collector who then collects the taxes and distributes them to the appropriate taxing authorities. It is noted that ad valorem taxes make up the lion's share of taxes at the local level while tangible personal property taxes are a very small source of revenues. DOR is charged with the duties of providing oversight to the property tax program and aid and assistance to the Property Appraiser and Tax Collector. In this regard, DOR views the two offices as an integral part of the property tax program rather than two separate entities. It characterizes the program as "a stream or process where (the) lines of delineation (between the two offices) are not as distinct as they might have been ten or fifteen years ago." Because of the highly sensitive nature of the tax program, it follows that a certain degree of trust and integrity must exist between DOR (and its employees) and the local offices. Petitioner does not interface with the office of Tax Collector in any respect, and his duties do not require that he audit any of that office's records. His only duties are to audit the tangible personal property assessments performed by the Property Appraiser. These facts were not controverted. Although he has never differed with a valuation of the Property Appraiser during his five year tenure at DOR, and no such disagreement has occurred in Lake County during the last twenty-five years, petitioner could conceivably disagree with an assessment while running for office during the next few months. If the matter could not be informally settled, the tax rolls would not be certified by DOR, and litigation against DOR could be initiated by the Property Appraiser. Under those unlikely circumstances, petitioner might be called as a witness in the case, although the general practice has always been for DOR to use personnel from the Tallahassee office in litigation matters. To the very minor extent that petitioner could affect the tax rolls by disagreeing with the Property Appraiser's valuations, this could also impact the amount of money collected by the Tax Collector. DOR cites these circumstances as potentially affecting in an adverse way the level of trust and integrity between DOR and the office of Tax Collector. However, under the facts and circumstances of this case, this potential conflict is so remote and miniscule as to be wholly immaterial. The evidence also shows that in his audit role, petitioner has the "opportunity . . . to look and have access to tax returns," some of which "are of TPP (tangible personal property) nature (and) have attached to them federal tax returns" which might be used by the Property Appraiser for establishing the value of tangible personal property. Whether petitioner has ever had access to, or reviewed such, returns is not of record. In any event, to the extent this set of circumstances would pose a potential conflict with the Property Appraiser, as to the Tax Collector, it would be no more significant than the purported conflict described in finding of fact 7. Finally, DOR suggests that if petitioner was unsuccessful in his bid for office, it would likely damage the "relationship of trust" that now exists between DOR and the Tax Collector. Again, this purported conflict is so speculative as to be deemed immaterial. The parties have stipulated that, as of the date of hearing, petitioner's only option for qualifying to run for office is to pay a $6,173.00 qualifying fee no later than noon, July 19, 1996. The opportunity for submitting an appropriate number of signatures in lieu of a filing fee expired on June 24, 1996. On the few, isolated occasions during the last twenty-five years when the Lake County Tax Collector has requested information from DOR personnel, he has spoken by telephone with DOR legal counsel in Tallahassee. Those matters of inquiry, primarily relating to ad valorem taxes, do not concern any area related to petitioner's job duties. He also pointed out that his office always cooperates with the office of the Property Appraiser, especially when "corrections" must be made due to errors by that office. Even so, he described the two offices as being separate and with entirely different duties. This testimony is accepted as being the most persuasive on this issue. At least four persons have already announced that they would run for Tax Collector for Lake County. The parties have stipulated that one of those persons is a regional administrator for the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles who was not required to resign his position in order to run for office. According to the incumbent Tax Collector, that individual supervises other state employees who occasionally audit certain aspects of his office pertaining to automobile license plates and decals. Because of the time constraints in this case, and although not legally obligated to do so, respondent has voluntarily agreed to allow petitioner to take annual leave (or presumably leave without pay) commencing on the date he qualifies for local public office, or July 19, 1996, and to remain on leave until a final order is issued by the agency. At that time, if an adverse decision is rendered, petitioner must choose between resigning or withdrawing as a candidate. These terms are embodied in a letter from DOR's counsel to petitioner dated July 3, 1996. If petitioner is allowed to run for office without resigning, he has represented that he will campaign while on leave or after regular business hours. He has also represented, without contradiction, that his campaign activities will not interfere with his regular duties. If elected, he intends to resign his position with DOR.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order granting petitioner's request that it certify to the Department of Management Services that his candidacy for the office of Lake County Tax Collector would involve no interest which conflicts, or activity which interferes, with his state employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of July, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Respondent: Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. Partially accepted in findings of fact 2 and 3. 3-5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 7-9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 10-11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 12. Rejected as being irrelevant since petitioner was not an employee of DOR in 1990. 13-17. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 18. Rejected as being unnecessary. 19-20. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 21. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 22-23. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. Rejected as being unnecessary. Note - Where a proposed finding of fact has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, not supported by the evidence, unnecessary, subordinate, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: L. H. Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, Esquire Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Mr. Robert M. Hendrick 5022 County Road 48 Okahumpka, Florida 34762 Peter S. Fleitman, Esquire Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668
The Issue The issue presented is what is Peaches' basis in the Sterling stock?
Findings Of Fact There is no dispute as to the material facts in the instant case, Exhibit 1 presented at the hearing is a composite exhibit which is comprised of the Petitioner's U.S. Corporate Income Tax Return and Florida Corporate Income Tax Return for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1973. Exhibit 3 is the Respondent's document entitled "Income Tax Audit Changes" which reflects the adjustments made by the Respondent based upon a review of the Petitioner's return and the reasons for assessing the deficiency. Exhibit 2 is a composite exhibit comprised of the Petitioner's Amended Protest of the proposed deficiency and the Respondent's letter denying the same. Petitioner's federal return (Exhibit 1) Schedule D, Part II, reflects the 31,500 shares were acquired in 1958 at a cost basis of $10,191.00. These shares were subsequently sold by Peaches in 1972 for $1,160,131.00 or a gain of $1,149,940.00. This gain was reported on line 9(a) of the federal tax return as a portion of the "net capital gains." On its 1973 Florida Corporate Income Tax Return, Petitioner computed the income using the basis for the stock as of January 2, 1972, thereby reducing its reported income by $1,013,040.00 from the federal tax. The $1,013,040.00 reflects the amount of appreciation in the value of the stock between the transferrer's acquisition and January 1, 1972, the effective date of the Florida corporate income tax code. The shares of stock of Sterling Drugs were acquired by Peaches in 1971 from the controlling stockholder who made a contribution to capital to the corporation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Petitioner's petition be denied and that the assessment against the Petitioner in the amount of $29,435.00 together with interest be assessed. DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of January, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Edwin J. Stacker Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 James S. Moody, Jr., Esquire Trinkle and Redman, P.A. 306 West Reynolds Street Plant City, Florida 33566 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA PEACHES OF FLORIDA, INC. Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 78-1433 STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Respondent. / NOTICE TO: JAMES S. MOODY, JR., ESQUIRE ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER TRINKLE AND REDMAN, P. A. 306 WEST REYNOLDS STREET PLANT CITY, FLORIDA 33566 E. WILSON CRUMP, II, ESQUIRE ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL POST OFFICE BOX 5557 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32304 You will please take notice that the Governor and Cabinet of the State of Florida, acting as head of the Department of Revenue, at its meeting on the 5th day of April, 1979, approved the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer dated January 22, 1979, with paragraph 3 of the "Findings of Fact" therein amended to read as follows: "The shares of stock of Sterling Drugs were acquired by Peaches in 1972 from the controlling stockholder who made a contribution to capital to the corporation", in accordance with Stipulation of the Petitioner and Respondent filed in the case on March 1, 1979. This constitutes final agency action by the Department of Revenue. JOHN D. MORIARTY, ATTORNEY DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE STATE OF FLORIDA ROOM 104, CARLTON BUILDING TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32304 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice was furnished by mail to James S. Moody, Jr., Esquire, Trinkle and Redman, P. A., 306 West Reynolds Street, Plant City, Florida 33566, Attorney for Petitioner; by hand delivery to Wilson Crump, II, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, Post Office fox 5557, Tallahassee, Florida 32304, Attorney for Respondent and Stephen F. Dean, Hearing Officer, Division of Administrative Hearings; Room 530, Carlton Building, Tallahassee, Florida this 5th day of April, 1979. JOHN D. MORIARTY, ATTORNEY
