Findings Of Fact William B. Barker, Jr., is certified as a law enforcement officer in the State of Florida employed by the Walton County Sheriff's Department and stationed at DeFuniak Springs, Florida. On or about 20 June 1981, Diana Marie Preston was driving her automobile west on Interstate Highway 10, in Walton County, Florida, on her way to her grandparents' home in Gulf Breeze, Florida. She had just completed the Law School Admissions Test in Tallahassee that morning and was on her way back home. Due to heavy rain in the area, she was driving carefully and was not exceeding the speed limit. At approximately 3 to 4 p.m., she was hailed by a police officer in a county police car. When she pulled over to the roadside at his request, the officer advised her she had been speeding and requested to see her driver's license. Since her license was in her purse which was in the trunk of her car, she had to get out of her car and open the trunk, at which time the officer noticed a pair of high-heeled shoes she had in there and asked her to take them out, indicating he had been looking at a pair like that for his wife. When Ms. Preston got her license out, the officer requested that she accompany him to his car, get in on the passenger side and close the passenger door. She complied, though she did not close the door completely. During this period, she noticed that though the officer was in uniform, he was not wearing either a name tag or a badge with a number on it. She does not recall whether he was wearing a pistol, but states there was a rifle in the vehicle on which he placed his hand several times while talking to her. The officer took Ms. Preston's driver's license and reached across her to the glove compartment for his ticket book, but at no time did he use his radio to call in either her driver's license number or her car tag number. Before writing out the ticket, the officer indicated he would not issue a ticket to her if she would put on her high heels (she had been driving barefoot) and let him try to guess her shoe size. He stated that for every size he was off in his guess, he would kiss her foot a certain number of times. Ms. Preston repeatedly refused, but because the officer was insistent and she felt she was in a difficult position due to the fact that she was alone on a lightly travelled (at the time) section of highway, she ultimately acquiesced. Though the officer had ample opportunity to see the shoe size when he examined the shoes, he guessed wrong on the size by several sizes. At this time, her left foot was in his lap, and he picked it up and kissed it several times. When he was finished, in the course of conversation, the officer asked her what she had been doing in Tallahassee. She told him she had been taking the LSAT, and his attitude changed immediately. He told her to go on with her trip, but cautioned her not to tell anyone what had happened, as he could get into trouble. Upon being released by the officer, Ms. Preston proceeded on to Gulf Breeze to the home of her grandparents, whom she told about the incident the following day. She did not report the incident to the police nor discuss it until several weeks later when she was contacted by two investigators who showed her a large photograph of individuals who, it was represented to her, were members of the Walton County Sheriff's Department. From this group, she identified the Respondent, Barker, and subsequently again identified him at the hearing as the officer in question, describing him as a heavyset man with a mustache and wearing tinted glasses. Respondent, upon graduation from high school, attended O. W. Junior College and then went on to the University of West Florida where he received his bachelor's degree in criminal justice. He unequivocally denies the allegations against him, stating he had never seen Ms. Preston until the day of the hearing at the hearing room. In fact, his shift was over, and he signed out just prior to 3 p.m. on 20 June 1981. In his opinion and that of his mother, the allegations against him are attributable to his stated position in a political dispute during which he sided against the incumbent sheriff for whom he was working. There is no evidence bearing on this issue other than the testimony of the Respondent and his mother.
Recommendation From the foregoing, it is concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Respondent is guilty of the allegations contained in this Administrative Complaint. It is RECOMMENDED: That the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission issue a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. ENTERED this 24th day of January, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Department of Administration 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 1983.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Ellyn Schechter, who is thirty-two years of age, made application on October 14, 1985 for licensure as a real estate salesman by examination with respondent, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Division). Question six on the application requires the applicant to state whether he or she "has ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld". Petitioner gave the following response: "Yes, resist arrest w/o violence, possession cocaine." Applicant's attorney provided letter and documents attached, FDLE report lists an arrest 6-30-84 possess cocaine, narcotic equipment, tuinal (drug) - no dis- position. According to documents furnished, resisting arrest charges resulted in 1 yrs. probation effective July 10, 1984, fines and "community service hours; arrest reference drugs - withheld adj., 2 years community control, 1 year probation effective Nov. 9, 1984, 6 special conditions, concurrent. A background check by the Division revealed that Schechter was arrested and charged with three counts of resisting arrest without violence in Broward County in 1984. After pleading guilty to all three counts, the court withheld adjudication and placed Schechter on probation for one year. In addition, petitioner was also arrested and charged in Broward County in 1984 with possession of cocaine, possession of a barbiturate, and possession of drug paraphernalia . She pled guilty to the first and second charges. The third charge was dismissed. The court withheld adjudication, and sentenced petitioner to two years community control followed by one year of probation, 100 hours community service, drug evaluation and/or treatment as deemed appropriate, $1,000 court costs, and a requirement that she abstain from alcohol and drugs for three years. She satisfactorily completed her probation and community control in January, 1986. There is no evidence of any arrests or other problems since 1984. Schechter is a licensed dental hygienist and holds licenses to practice that profession in both Florida and New York. Due to a hand injury, she is no longer able to pursue that vocation. She desires to be licensed as a real estate salesman, and successfully completed the pre-examination course in October, 1985 with a score of 96. She was also offered a job at that time with Century 21 Rainbow Realty, Inc. in Plantation, Florida. At the present time, she is working as a waitress in a Fort Lauderdale area restaurant. Her employer described her as being honest, courteous and dependable, and stated that she handled his money in a responsible manner. Schechter also furnished letters from four former employers to corroborate the testimony concerning her honesty and trustworthiness. However, they all predate her 1984 convictions. Schechter freely acknowledged her prior difficulties, and was candid and forthright in answering all questions about her arrests. She stated the arrest for drugs stemmed from a passenger in her automobile having drugs in his possession. The charge of resisting arrest without violence occurred after Schechter was arrested in her home by two City of Hollywood police officers. They had apparently responded to a disturbance involving Schechter and a female guest. According to Schechter, the arrest was unjustified, and resulted in her receiving a beating from one of the officers which caused her to be hospitalized for four days.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner's application for licensure by examination be granted. DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of December, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 904/488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of December, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 86-1421 Respondent: Covered in finding of fact 1. Covered in finding of fact 2. Covered in finding of fact 2. Covered in finding of fact 2. Covered in finding of fact 2. Covered in finding of fact 2. Covered in finding of fact 2. Covered in finding of fact 5. Covered in finding of fact 5. Covered in finding of fact 5. COPIES FURNISHED: Ida M. Lawry, Esquire 621 South Federal Highway Suite 4 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Lawrence S. Gendzier, Esquire 400 West Robinson Street Suite 212 Orlando, Florida 32801 Harold Huff Director Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Wings S. Benton, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained herein, the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, (Commission), was the state agency responsible for the certification of law enforcement officers in Florida. Respondent, Kenneth E. Beck, was a police officer, certified by the Petitioner, and employed by the City of Clearwater Police Department. In September, 1988, Joyce Ann Cooper Horten, currently of Easley, S.C., was residing in Clearwater, Florida. At that time, she was approximately 16 years old. On the evening in question, two of her friends, a boy and girl, had "egged" a neighbor's apartment and the neighbor called the police. In response to this call, the Respondent came to the scene and was talking to Ms. Horten's friends in back of the house. When he had completed his conversation with them, he told Ms. Horten he had to search her for a knife, and took her into a hallway where he put his hands up under her shirt and around her shoulders and sides. In addition, he touched her legs by putting his hands on both sides of each leg, running them all the way up to the crotch. After this search, Respondent took Ms. Horten into her apartment where he searched for the knife in the kitchen. Finding nothing, he took her into the bedroom, went into her closet, and looked through her clothes as well as through her chest of drawers. Finding nothing, Respondent then had Ms. Horten roll up her skirt from both the back and the front and when she did so, pulled her panties out from the front. When he did this, he could observe her pubic area though he did not touch her there. He then had her roll up her shirt, both in the front and the back. Since she was not wearing a bra, when she rolled up her shirt front, her breasts were exposed to his view. After finishing his search, he gave Ms. Horten his card, with his name on it, and went back outside to talk to the other young people. Ms. Horten did not think that what Respondent was doing to her was appropriate, but claims that since she was not familiar with the law, she did not know she could resist. Nonetheless, she later told her mother and the neighbor who had initially called the police. This neighbor apparently filed a report with the police and Ms. Horten thereafter taped a statement as to the matters previously discussed, a typed copy of which she subsequently signed under oath. At approximately 3:50 AM on April 16, 1989, Tara D. Grey, then a 17 year old college student, was driving her car eastward on Drew Street in Clearwater, Florida when she was pulled over by the Respondent who was in a police cruiser and in uniform. Initially he did not tell her why he had stopped her, but asked for her driver's license and registration, which he took back to his cruiser. After approximately 5 minutes, he came back and told her that her license did not check out and asked for additional identification which, he claimed, did not check out either. Finally, she gave him her social security card which seemed to satisfy him. After an extended series of questions regarding her drinking, her use of illegal drugs, or her prior arrest record, all of which she denied, he required her to get out of her car, after which he administered a sobriety test to her. He then asked if he could search her car, to which she consented. While he conducted the initial search, he asked her to stand behind the car, but then requested her to take the numerous items which were on the car floor out so he could see what he was doing. At time she was wearing a miniskirt and boots, along with a sweater, and when she did what he asked of her, she had to bend over and her skirt came up in the back, giving him a broad view of her posterior. When she finished cleaning out her car to his satisfaction, Respondent asked her with whom she lived and why she had other clothing in the car. After several other questions, he finally told her, after about 45 total minutes of interview, that she had been stopped because she was speeding. He then indicated he would have to follow her to her friend's home, (the place to which she was in progress when stopped), and kept her license while he followed her there. Before he allowed her to go into the house, he indicated he would have to frisk her, and in doing so, had her put her hands up on the top of his car. He then ran his hands across her shoulders and across her hips and bottom, but did not touch either her pubic area or her breasts. He also checked her socks and in doing that, felt her legs down in that area but did not run his hands up over her bare legs. After finishing the frisk, he drove off and Ms. Grey went into her friends's home. In April, 1990 Louise Ann Frattaruolo, Respondent's former mother-in- law, received a letter through the mail which, when opened, indicated that her husband had broken his word and must pay the penalty. The letter then went on to indicate that all the Frattaruolos must die. This letter was unsigned, but Mrs. Frattaruolo turned it over to her daughter, a police officer, who released it to the Clearwater Police Department. A latent fingerprint was developed on the envelope in which the letter was sent, which was subsequently analyzed and determined to be that of the Respondent. From the date of the postmark on the letter, the day it was mailed, to the day the fingerprint identification was made, there was absolutely no opportunity for Respondent to have handled either the letter or the envelope. Therefore, it is concluded that the envelope containing the letter was at least touched by the Respondent prior to mailing, and was most likely mailed by him. On October 30, 1990, Patrick J. Lombardi was working as a security officer at the Clearwater Mall and was approached by a man and lady who pointed out an individual allegedly exposing himself on a bench within the mall. Mr. Lombardi got his supervisor, Mr. O'Dell, and both officers observed an individual, subsequently identified as the Respondent, sitting on a bench, wearing bright yellow jogging shorts that were split up the sides. They observed him sitting in such a manner whereby whenever a woman or a group of women walked by, he would open his legs and then slap them together, and both officers observed that when he did this, his genitalia, which had been released from the inner lining of his shorts, would fall out onto the bench. To insure they were not making a mistake, the two officers went to one of the jewelry stores in the mall and contacted Janine M. Edwards, a clerk who they asked to walk by the individual and tell them what she observed. When she did so, she observed the Respondent open his legs and expose himself to her. She noted that the liner of his shorts had been pulled to one side allowing his penis and testicles to be fully exposed. She also observed Respondent do this in front of a couple, and she is convinced it was not accidental. Respondent appeared nervous and when she first saw him, he was hunched over. When he saw her, however, he turned toward her and opened his legs to show her his private parts. It is concluded, therefore, that his actions were intentional. Shortly thereafter, Respondent was observed by a mall employee leaving the mall and getting into a blue Ford automobile. The employee got the license number of the vehicle which was subsequently traced to the Respondent. Thereafter, Sgt. Joseph Tenbieg, of the Clearwater Police Department, put together a package of 5 or 6 photographs of individuals, including Beck, all of whom resembled the Respondent, which he showed, independently, to Officers O'Dell and Lombardi, as well as to Ms. Edwards. All three identified the photograph of the Respondent, which was taken from his police personnel records, as the individual who was exposing himself in the mall.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore recommended that a Final Order be entered revoking the Respondent, Kenneth E. Beck's certification as a law enforcement officer. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of April, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Elsa Lopez-Whitehurst, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Kenneth E. Beck 28 Valencia Circle Safety Harbor, Florida 34695 James T. Moore Commissioner Florida Department of Law Enforcement P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jeffrey Long Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rodney Gaddy General Counsel FDLE P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact From August 15, 1967, until his retirement on April 1, 1991, Jackson continued to serve as a game management specialist and a laboratory technician (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 9). As part of his duties, Mr. Jackson would perform controlled burns and post wildlife areas. However, Col. Robert Brantly, the Executive Director of the Commission since 1977 and an employee of the Commission since 1957, stated that those duties were not law enforcement duties and were commonly done by biologists and other non-law enforcement personnel. James A. Carpenter testified that Mr. Jackson worked on controlled hunts and was responsible for the check stations. However, the Commission hired civilians to perform that job, and Col. Brantly stated that the operation of a check station was not a law enforcement function. Mr. Jackson's Commission ID card contained the statement as contained in the Recommended Order, Findings of Fact No. 9. The ID card shows that Mr. Jackson was an "employee" of the Commission and not a "law enforcement Officer". Col. Brantly, was and is a certified law enforcement officer, testified that he had two (2) identification cards (Respondent's Composite Exhibit 2). The first card stated as follows: This card identifies: Robert M. Brantly as a Certified Florida Law Enforcement Officer who has complied with Section 943.14(1) (2), Florida Statutes, and Section 11B-7, relating to Standards and Training Col. Brantly's second ID card contained the following statement: Certificate of Appointment Pursuant to Section 372.07 Florida Statutes State of Florida at Large Be it known that Colonel Robert M. Brantly is a regularly constituted officer of the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission with full arrest powers to bear arms and to execute and fulfill the duties of said office. This appointment is in full effect until revoked. Dated this 1st day of March, 1990 Col. Brantly's ID card states he is an "officer" with full police powers while the ID cards of Jackson and Carlton Chappel, a biologist employed by the Commission, state that they are "employees" with full authority to enforce the laws relating to protection of the environment and wildlife resources. In fact, the ID cards of Mr. Jackson and Mr. Chappel are identical. (Compare Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7 with Respondent's Exhibit No. 6) Col. Robert Brantly, Executive Director of the Commission, testified concerning Mr. Jackson's claim. Col. Brantly began his career with the Commission in 1957 as a wildlife officer, became the Deputy Director in 1974 and Director in 1977. He has been and is currently a law enforcement officer and has had special risk membership in FRS. He stated that Mr. Jackson and several others classified as game management specialists had been given law enforcement powers in the mid-1960's and had certain limited duties with respect to enforcement of the state fish and game laws. When the Police Standards Commission was established in 1972, Mr. Jackson and the others were "grandfathered" by Police Standards as law enforcement officers. He testified that the Commission had two (2) classes of law enforcement officers in the 1960's and 1970's. Wildlife officers were full time law enforcement officers whose primary duties were law enforcement. Game management specialists were not considered to be law enforcement officers and had no duties in law enforcement. As an exception to that rule were Mr. Jackson and some other game management specialists who had been "grandfathered" in as law enforcement officers by the Police Standards Commission in 1972. These individuals had law enforcement authority but were considered by the Commission to be part-time law enforcement officers. Col. Brantly stated that law enforcement was not a part of their primary or essential duties. The amount of law enforcement that each of the game management specialists performed was up to each individual, but law enforcement was not a duty required of any of them. For example, one of the above specialists could perform no law enforcement activities if he did not want to. Col. Brantly testified that controlled burning was a wildlife management practice and not a law enforcement activity. He stated that the operation of hunt check stations was not a law enforcement activity, and the check stations were manned by citizens of the area. Likewise, posting of the management areas was not a law enforcement activity. Jackson introduced Exhibit No. 10 from the Commission clarifying the Police Standards Board ruling. Field personnel other than those in the Law Enforcement Bureau were "auxiliary officers" who were to call a wildlife officer to the scene of the violation for the arrest, if possible. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 11 makes it even clearer and also explains the policy and the attachment thereto. The attachment, Administrative Directive No. 25, clearly states that "(w)ildlife management duties will remain the first priority job for Division personnel", with clear guidelines for open and closed hunting seasons. The work week was 40 hours with no deviation permitted. Thus, the primary duty of Jackson was game management and not law enforcement. In September, 1979, a number of problems concerning the law enforcement powers of the game management specialists forced Col. Brantly as the agency head to remove the certification (law enforcement powers) from the game management specialists with such power such as Mr. Jackson. The removal of the certification was effective September 6, 1979 (Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, letter to Don Dowling). In Petitioner's Exhibit No. 14, the memorandum from Col. Brantly of September 27, 1979, he made it abundantly clear that the wildlife (game) management specialists were part-time law enforcement personnel. Toby Harris, the personnel officer for the Commission since December, 1979, also testified on both State and Commission personnel practices. He had previous service with the Pay and Classification Section of the Department of Administration and had worked in pay and classification for a state agency for 25 years. He was admitted as an expert in the area of state pay and personnel classification. Mr. Harris stated that at the time Jackson's position questionnaires or descriptions were prepared, it was a requirement that the employee himself prepare the section on "duties and responsibilities" and assign the percentages of time on the form. These forms were not mass produced by the agency but were individually crafted for each job and for each employee. Mr. Harris stated quite emphatically that the position description is (and was for the period in question) the most important document in a state employee's personnel file. It is only on the basis of that position description that the employee knew what his duties were and knew the criteria upon which he would be evaluated. He identified the letter of October 10, 1975, from Brantley Goodson, Director, Division of Law Enforcement, concerning Jackson's status as a grandfathered law enforcement officer in a part-time position. Harris also stated that the evaluations for Jackson up to the early 1970's were above average and that after that date, they were average. The Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Police Standards Commission, kept the files for the Police Standards Commission for all state agencies with law enforcement officers. The records showed whether or not a law enforcement officer was considered full-time, part-time or an auxiliary officer. According to the records of the Commission , Mr. Jackson was considered a full- time law enforcement officer from March 1, 1965, until August 15, 1967, and a part-time law enforcement officer from August 15, 1967, until September 27, 1979, when he was removed from any law enforcement activities by the Commission. Carlton Chappel, an employee of the Commission, testified that in the late 1960's and during the 1970's, he and all field personnel of the Commission, including game management specialists, were issued the same uniforms, badges and identification cards as wildlife officers. On an "as needed basis", the field personnel would be assigned to field duty and had the power to make arrests and enforce the game and fish laws of the State; however, during this time, he did not consider himself to be a law enforcement officer and never had applied for such status. His identification card was identical to the ID card of Mr. Jackson. He further stated that all game management specialists had to prepare work plans for each management area to explain the work that was to be done during the upcoming fiscal year. These work plans included both State and federal projects. (Respondent's Exhibit No. 7) The work plans for the fiscal years 1969-70 and 1970-71 for Mr. Jackson were introduced (Respondent's Exhibit No. 7) and show for FY 1969-70 that Mr. Jackson spent his time in the following projects: PROJECT NO. OF PAY PERIODS Wildlife Research Project 2 No. W-48-4 No. W-35 Mgt. Area Develop. 18 Apalachee Mgt. Area 10 Robert Brent Mgt. Area 4 Point Washington Mgt. Area 2 The work plans for the 1970-71 fiscal year show that Mr. Jackson spent his time on the following projects: PROJECT NO. OF PAY PERIODS Fed. Statistical Harvest & Inventory 1 Fed. Statewide Mgt. Area Development 10 State Hunts 8 State-General Game Management 7 TOTAL PAY PERIODS 26 SPECIFIC PROJECTS NO. OF PAY PERIODS Wildlife Inventory, Harvest & Economic Survey (Project No. W-33-21) 1 Development and Operations (Project No. W-35-20) 10 State-Apalachee Wildlife Mgt. Area 10 Carolyn McGlamery, an employee of the Division, testified that Jackson had transferred from SCOERS to the FRS during the initial transfer period effective December 1, 1970. She further testified about the statutes and the various changes over the years and the administrative rules that concerned high hazard membership under SCOERS and then special risk membership under FRS.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's application for high hazard or special risk membership in either SCORES or FRS. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of March, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April 1992.
The Issue Whether Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, the Act or Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office is a law enforcement agency that employs roughly 3,400 individuals, of whom approximately 1,200 are sworn law enforcement officers and 700 are sworn corrections officers. The remaining employees are civilian or non-sworn. Murphy was hired as a deputy sheriff by PBSO on October 26, 1992. He was continuously employed in that capacity until his termination on October 11, 2002. For portions of the time he worked for PBSO, Murphy also was employed at a Home Depot store and in his father's towing business. Murphy’s career at PBSO was the fulfillment of a life dream, one for which he had worked extraordinarily hard. Murphy's father worked in law enforcement, and instilled within his only son a dream "to serve and protect." Despite his family background, Murphy was not an obvious candidate for a career in police work. Murphy was a marginal student all his life. He failed second grade, and passing any academic subject was a struggle. Yet, he persevered, determined to realize his dream of following his father's footsteps. Murphy worked long hours on schoolwork, sports, and in the family towing business. He was able to attain a high school diploma by applying himself diligently to his academics and seeking out extra help. With constant practice and repetition of his class work, Murphy was able to master material well enough to pass necessary courses, but he was not good at transferring knowledge and information to other settings. Despite his weak academic history, or perhaps because of the perseverance it showed, Florida State University awarded Murphy a partial football scholarship. In pursuit of his life dream, Murphy chose to major in criminal justice. Again, he experienced academic difficulty. As he had done in grammar school and high school, Murphy sought out extra tutelage and put in whatever hours it took to complete his degree. In due course, Murphy applied for and obtained a job at PBSO, having fulfilled all its employment criteria, including being licensed to carry a firearm and having passed a psychological evaluation. Murphy's first assignment was road patrol. Road patrol in most law enforcement agencies, particularly those in large urban areas such as Palm Beach County, is an entry-level position, and a baptism by fire. Every traffic stop is potentially life threatening. Road patrol officers may be called upon on a moment's notice to provide back up to fellow officers who are under fire. Virtually every interaction with the public calls for grace and good judgment under stressful circumstances. The most ordinary of days on road patrol result in a need to generate reports. There are, as Murphy noted, "hundreds of formulas" which deputies must understand so that they can properly document traffic accidents. A working knowledge of Florida Statutes, criminal and civil procedure, and related court rules, is also required. It soon became apparent that Murphy was unsuited to road patrol. With its incessant demands upon him to quickly access and apply academic training to the infinite variables of street policing, road duty revealed that Murphy was unable to translate his classroom learning to the demands of the job. His supervisors were therefore obliged to spend a disproportionate share of time addressing situations created by Murphy's sub-par performance. After two years, Murphy was assigned to Palm Beach International Airport (PBIA). Murphy found this position more congenial. Freed of the stress of road patrol and its unceasing paperwork demands, Murphy’s weak academic skills were no longer a constant irritant to his supervisors. Nonetheless, Murphy's annual job evaluations make clear that in either assignment, his job performance was marginal. Murphy maintained excellent physical fitness and a professional appearance at all times, but was often rated borderline in areas involving judgment, ability to withstand pressure, and relations with colleagues and the public. As far back as his 1993-94 evaluation, Murphy's supervisors cited concerns regarding his common sense, and his ability to make sound decisions and to exercise good judgment. Murphy found it difficult to stay awake when assigned to the midnight shift, a problem that was easily remedied with a schedule change. Much more problematic was his difficulty in quickly and effectively writing reports. Murphy's deficiencies in report writing were noted on at least three annual evaluations, and PBSO made a good faith effort to assist Murphy in remediating his deficiency by providing him extra report writing training. Murphy places substantial significance upon an incident which he states occurred in April 1995 when he was on routine road patrol and was one of several deputies asked to respond to a domestic disturbance call. The incident involved unholstering his gun. Based upon Murphy's description of the incident and resulting symptoms years after the fact, doctors diagnosed PTSD. The 1995 incident was not documented in any PBSO records presented at hearing. The only evidence regarding PTSD is contained in Murphy's description of the event and his reaction to it, which he related to a number of doctors he saw in connection with his pending dispute with PBSO regarding his fitness for duty. Murphy expressed to some of these doctors that the transfer to PBIA was provoked by the 1995 incident, but there is no record or testimony corroborating Murphy's opinion in this regard. Murphy has always enjoyed his posting at PBIA, but his personnel file reflects that after three years there, his job performance remained well below reasonable expectations. Although he could handle most of the everyday tasks presented to deputies assigned to the airport, he at times appeared confused when called upon to make a decison for which there was no blueprint. He lacked the knowledge of criminal law and procedure, as well as basic airport operation, reasonably expected of a deputy with his experience. Supervisors gave Murphy credit for a "can-do" attitude and for promptness. However, he had a propensity to blame others or make excuses for his mistakes. It followed that Murphy continued to require a disproportionate share of attention of supervisors, even on routine decisions. Several years into his career, he continued to struggle with basics, for example, maintaining composure when challenged by members of the public or given constructive feedback by colleagues or supervisors. In 1998, it was recommended that Murphy be required to re-enter the field training officer ("FTO") program, and spend at least six months on road patrol to provide "much needed experience and the self confidence that is presently lacking." By the 1998-99 evaluation, supervisors' impatience with Murphy was growing. While acknowledging his ambition and willingness to pursue educational opportunities, the report noted his continued propensity to become aggressive with co- workers and antagonistic to supervisors and "apparent inability to control his temper." Murphy completed the FTO remedial training recommended the previous year, as well as eight additional courses aimed at improving his performance, and achieved an overall performance evaluation of "average, meeting the basic requirements of most [job] descriptions." In early 2000, Murphy received a 90-day unsatisfactory performance notice. In-house remedial training was offered, but the tone of the evaluator was decidedly impatient and frustrated. Murphy's supervisors began to document specific instances of their dissatisfaction with his performance. One example from his 2000 evaluation reads: "After an incident where [Murphy] had taken 21 hours to complete a simple drug arrest, he was placed with an FTO in the airport. These training sessions had little effect on his overall job performance. " While some improvements were noted in 2001, Murphy was again counseled on common sense, judgment and job knowledge. Against this background, an incident occurred on January 18, 2002, which would eventually result in Murphy’s termination. Early that morning, Murphy was off-duty and in a hurry to catch a flight out of PBIA to Washington D.C. via Charlotte. As a result of five years’ experience enforcing airport security protocols, Murphy was well aware that it was impermissible to leave baggage at the skycap station while he parked his car. However, Murphy identified himself as a deputy assigned to the airport and insisted that the skycaps check his baggage for him while he parked. Inside the airport, Murphy observed a lengthy passenger screening line. Murphy admits to feeling "entitled," in that this would be his first vacation in two years. Determined to make his flight, he formed an intent to cut to the front of the line to pass through the metal detectors and then to his gate. Murphy made contact with a fellow deputy, David Shoemaker (Shoemaker) who had been assigned to the airport less than six months. Shoemaker told Murphy to come around the metal detector, which he did, chatting briefly with National Guard officers on duty, as well as the "screening people,” all of whom were well known to him from his years of service at PBIA. At hearing and at all times since the incident, Murphy has attempted to deflect responsibility, saying, ”My intent was to cut in line. My intent was to go through the screening process. However, the deputy sheriff was on duty. I did what I was told, and I walked around the screening area. " It was Murphy, not Shoemaker, who was the experienced sheriff's deputy in this situation. Murphy was reasonably expected to know, particularly in the post-September 11 environment, that it was inappropriate, and possibly illegal, to seek special treatment based upon his personal acquaintance with security personnel. Members of the general public witnessing this "professional courtesy" could be reasonably expected to be irritated, angry, or even in fear for their safety, inasmuch as Murphy was dressed in civilian clothing; the public had no way of knowing that he was any more "safe" than the wheelchair-bound elderly people and babies who are screened in the interests of passenger safety. In this instance, one person was sufficiently annoyed or concerned to report the incident to airport officials and to seek an explanation. By this time, Murphy and his bags were enroute to Charlotte, N.C. At the Charlotte Airport, Murphy and his luggage were briefly detained and searched, and he was thereafter allowed to proceed to his final destination. At some point while on vacation, Murphy called a person named Gilbert Johnson, whom Murphy identified as a friend of his from the National Guard. According to Murphy, "Gilbert had told me that everybody was telling me [sic] I was going to jail for a federal crime, and I was very scared and very worried. " There was no evidence to suggest that Murphy was ever in danger of being jailed for a crime, federal or otherwise. However, the poor judgment he exercised in the service of making his plane would, in time, result in credible medical evidence that Murphy could not, at all times relevant, fulfill the requirements for service as a sheriff's deputy, with or without accommodations. Shortly after the January 18 incident, PBIA officials asked that Murphy be removed from his airport posting, at least until the incident could be investigated. Even before he returned from vacation, PBSO had decided that Murphy would be reassigned to road patrol. Upon his return to work, Murphy met with supervisors. At some point in this meeting, he ceased to participate, instead exercising his right to be represented by counsel. Murphy was informed that he would be suspended with pay pending the outcomes of routine criminal and administrative investigations. Although the facts surrounding the incident were in all material respects undisputed, it took months for PBSO to conclude its internal affairs investigation, which ended with a recommendation that Murphy receive a two-day suspension for having improperly used his status as a law enforcement officer to gain special privileges not available to the general public. No state or federal agency pursued criminal charges against Murphy. Neither the internal affairs investigation nor criminal investigation(s), if any there were, played any role in Murphy's eventual termination. Murphy's anxiety about what he perceived as immense threats to his employment and to his liberty persisted and fed on themselves. The delay in completing the internal affairs investigation exacerbated his fears, particularly his baseless belief that he would be sent to jail for having sought and received special treatment at PBIA. Murphy persisted in the belief that jail was a real possibility, and he was consumed with worry. Almost as distressing to Murphy was the possibility that he would be returned to road patrol, a job for which Murphy correctly believed he was unsuited. In the immediate aftermath of the PBIA incident, Murphy's problems, real and imagined, combined to cause him to decompensate. He became physically ill and emotionally distraught to a degree which rendered him unfit for duty. To his credit, Murphy informed his supervisor that he was uncertain of his present ability to adequately back up fellow officers should the need to do so arise. Concerned for Murphy's well being, a PBSO supervisor sent to his home deputies to check on him, and immediate arrangements were made to have him evaluated by Dr. Raul Diaz (Dr. Diaz). Dr. Diaz supported Murphy's belief that he was at the time temporarily unfit for duty. Dr. Diaz recommended psychological evaluation by Dr. Myles Cooley ("Dr. Cooley"). At hearing, Murphy stated his belief, but offered no evidence, that officers who are the subject of an internal affairs investigation are granted administrative leave to preserve their full salary and benefits pending the outcome of the investigation. In this case, PBSO insisted that Murphy take family medical leave beginning on Februry 1, 2002. By this time, Murphy felt he was able to return to work and sought to persuade PBSO to return him to PBIA. To that end, he cooperated with PBSO's efforts to obtain medical and psychological evaluations. He also proceeded on a parallel track, seeing medical professionals of his own choosing and cooperating in the testing, evaluation, and medication regimens they recommended. In February 2002, Murphy's attorney provided PBSO with signed prescription pad notes from two medical doctors, Sanford Kaufman and Kevin Inwood. Dr. Kaufman’s note read, "No psych diagnosis other than reactive stress. Okay to return to work, no restrictions." Dr. Inwood wrote, "Pt. Is fit for duty after today exam not completed." Neither note indicated the respective doctor's area of specialization, credentials, what tests had been performed on Murphy, what information concerning Murphy had been furnished to them, and from what sources. Standing alone, these doctors' notes did not furnish a factual basis upon which a reasonable person could conclude that Murphy was fit for duty. Meanwhile, Murphy continued to cooperate in evaluations commissioned by PBSO. Dr. Cooley saw Murphy in March and April 2002, and conducted exhaustive testing, including evaluations for attention dysfunction, learning disabilities, and other disorders that might affect his job performance. In speaking with doctors in the course of these evaluations, and in his testimony at hearing, Murphy acknowledged that both before and after being diagnosed with ADD, ADHD, and PTSD, he was fully able to perform the numerous activities of daily living pertinent to a man of his age who has always been active in sports and has held physically demanding jobs. Murphy is unrestricted in his ability to lift, see, hear, breathe, swim, sit, stand, bathe, and dress, all of which are necessary to the performance of active police work, and countless other jobs requiring an individual to be in good physical condition. At all times material to this case Murphy is qualified to work in construction, having built the home he lives in. He is also licensed to operate any type of vehicle, continues to work in the family towing business, and has worked in retail. In his final report dated April 8, 2002, Dr. Cooley concluded, in pertinent part: In this examiner's opinion, Mr. Murphy does have Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and is significantly intellectually limited. He does not qualify for a diagnosis of a learning disability because his IQ and his academic skills are quite similar. In a more generic sense, however, he is clearly learning disabled based on his limited cognitive skills particularly in the verbal domain. Finally, Mr. Murphy appears to be experiencing a Generalized Anxiety Disorder or an Adjustment Disorder with Anxiety. Mr. Murphy's behavior in the presence of this examiner indicates severe anxiety and fear that he reacts to with anger, denial, defensiveness, and suspicion and he tries to protect himself from people and procedures he does not fully understand. He could truly benefit from some counseling as he awaits the resolution of his employment status. Dr. Cooley's evaluation was forwarded to Murphy's counsel, and to Dr. Diaz, who, after re-evaluating Murphy and reviewing prior test results and Dr. Cooley's report, prepared a second report for the PBSO. In this report dated May 9, 2002, Dr. Diaz concluded that "Murphy, within reasonable probability remains not fit for duty to function in law enforcement at this time." Dr. Diaz left open the possibility that with appropriate treatment, Murphy may, at some future date become fit for law enforcement duty. However, on September 16, 2002, Murphy's own doctor, forensic psychiatrist Harley Stock (Dr. Stock), opined in pertinent part: . . . Murphy is likely to have difficulties in carrying out the following specific duties and responsibilities of a law enforcement officer: Subdue resisting offenders using appropriate force, including the use of deadly force – Deputy Sheriff Murphy may become emotionally overwhelmed if placed in a position in which lethal force may be necessary. In this regard, such behavior may lead to the endangerment of the public or other officers. Conduct law enforcement investigations – Deputy Murphy has a difficult time formulating appropriate law violations. Because of his limited cognitive abilities, he will have difficultly preparing and distributing reports. These deficits may manifest themselves in difficulty coordinating activities at crime scenes; collecting crime scene evidence; conducting interviews, taking sworn statements, formal confessions or depositions; preparing reports of affidavits; and presenting testimony in both civil and criminal proceedings. Should Deputy Murphy be placed in a situation in which his anxiety level overwhelms him, he will have difficulty interacting with the public. His judgment is likely to be impaired in such a situation and he may not follow appropriate procedures. He is also likely to have difficulties in the following area performance aptitudes: Data Utilization – Deputy Sheriff Murphy will have difficulty calculating or tabulating data or information in a systemized way. He also may have difficulty performing actions subsequent to these computational operations. In terms of situational reasoning, Deputy Sheriff Murphy is likely to have difficulty exercising good judgment and decisiveness in those situations that are unexpected and involve exposing the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office to significant litigation. Based on the above, it is this examiner's opinion that Deputy Sheriff Murphy should be considered permanently unfit for duty. It is further my opinion that no reasonable accommodation can be offered and that his impairment is a direct result of his employment as a law enforcement officer. . . . No purpose is served by additional invasive recitation of the content and conclusions of reports and testimony provided by doctors who evaluated Murphy. The evidence regarding Murphy's fitness for duty, with or without accommodation, has been carefully considered and demonstrates that no combination of job accommodations, medication, treatment or training, would render Murphy able to fulfill the requirements for service as a deputy sheriff at any time material to this case, including at the time he was terminated on October 11, 2002. Notwithstanding the medical evidence, Murphy contends that PBSO had, and continues to have, the ability to ". . . put me into another law enforcement position, which they can clearly still do." With all respect for Murphy's opinion, the unambiguous testimony provided by Respondent’s human relations office is that PBSO does not distinguish between what a deputy is required to do at the airport, on road patrol, or behind a desk. To the contrary, officers assigned to PBIA, or off duty officers for that matter, may be mobilized on a moment's notice to address a profoundly dangerous and chaotic situation, at their assigned post, or elsewhere in the jurisdiction. Contrary to the assertion in his FCHR charge, there was no evidence that Murphy "ask[ed] for help with his law enforcement duties." He rejected as insulting any discussion of being placed in a civilian position or a position involving a substantial wage cut. The only accommodation he sought was re- assignment to PBIA in his former position.
Recommendation Based on the above Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order denying Petitioner’s charge of discrimination and dismissing his complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of August, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michael G. Whelan, Esquire Whelan, DeMaio & Kiszkiel, P.A. 80 Southwest Eighth Street, Suite 1830 Miami, Florida 33130 Jack Scarola, Esquire Searcy Denney Scarola Barhart & Shipley, P.A. 2139 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33409 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Kenneth Katsaris, is the duly elected Sheriff of Leon County, Florida. Respondent has its principle place of business in the City of Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, where it is engaged in the business of operating a county-wide law enforcement agency, pursuant to the Florida Constitution and the applicable statutes promulgated thereunder. Charging Party, Perry Lawrence was employed by Respondent as deputy with the Leon County Sheriff's Department of approximately four years and seven months prior to his discharge on February 3, 1977. Charging Party, Michael Spiers was an employee with the Leon County Sheriff's Department for approximately four years and one month prior to his discharge on February 3, 1977. At times material herein, Gene Goodman was employed as a Captain with the Leon County Sheriff's Department and as such was an agent and a representative of the Respondent acting on its behalf, and/or a managerial employee. On February 3, 1977, and for sometime previous thereto, Joe E. Davis was employed with Respondent as a Sergeant and was the immediate supervisor of Deputy Perry Lawrence. Also on February 3, 1977, Wilford Jiles was employed as a Lieutenant with the Leon County Sheriff's Department and for approximately one week prior to the termination of Deputy Spiers, was his immediate supervisor. During the period during which Lawrence and Spiers was employed with the Leon County Sheriff's Department, both under former Sheriff Raymond Hamlin and the present Sheriff Kenneth Katsaris, neither received an oral or written reprimand regarding their conduct; nor had they been counseled by either Sheriff or any superior with regard to any type of attitude problem or complaints about their work performance. THE ORGANIZATIONAL EFFORTS The deputy sheriffs of the Leon County Sheriff's Department discussed and began to consider the possibility of organizing collectively in October or November of 1976. However, serious organizational efforts did not begin until January of 1977. On January 31, 1977, Perry Lawrence contacted union organizer James Mixon and established February 5, 1977 as the date for the initial organizational meeting of the Leon County Sheriff's Deputies. The record reveals that deputies Lawrence and Spiers spearheaded the organizational drive, however, they made no contacts concerning organizational activities with employees during their working hours or of the working hours of the deputy employees whom they solicited. The evidence reveals that solicitation efforts were made during the period January 31, February 1 and February 2, 1977, at which time the first meeting was scheduled for February 5 at deputy Lawrence's house. January 31 was the last day of the January pay period for the Leon County Sheriff's Department employees. Evidence further reveals that Respondent Sheriff first learned about the organizational efforts within his department in mid to the latter part of January, 1977. Nearing the end of January or the first of February, Sheriff Katsaris learned of the roles of Lawrence and Spiers in the organizational effort. It was during this time period that deputy Spiers was being considered for a position in the detective division by Captain Poitinger, a managerial employee who was first employed with the advent of the new administration on January 4, 1977. Following the defeat of the incumbent sheriff in November, 1976, by Sheriff Katsaris, he (Katsaris) conducted interviews with the deputy sheriffs appointed by Sheriff Hamlin in order to ascertain those individuals who would be retained on his staff. Both deputies Lawrence and Spiers were interviewed and indicated their desire to continue their law enforcement careers and pledged to support the new administration. Sheriff Katsaris, based on this interview, decided to retain both deputies Lawrence and Spiers. Sheriff Katsaris took office as the Sheriff of Leon County on January 4, 1977. Sheriff Katsaris testified that individuals whose name he could not recall, indicated that deputies Lawrence and Spiers were dissatisfied with his administration and they decided to try to organize the deputy sheriffs. Interestingly, it was about this same time period that Sheriff Katsaris began thinking about terminating deputy sheriffs Lawrence and Spiers. In this regard, Sheriff Katsaris, who had only been in office 10 to 14 days, testified that "he had been unhappy with the conduct of both of them for some time." The record is devoid of any specific incident which deputies Lawrence and Spiers had committed which would bring them under the Sheriff's scrutiny. However, it was revealed that the alleged discriminatees (deputies Lawrence and Spiers) as were numerous other deputies including Sergeant McDearmid, Spier's supervisor, indicated that it had taken a period of adjustment to adapt to the new administration; some deputies voiced their dissatisfaction with the administration and complained about the "colors of the cars, shining their shoes" and the "change in uniforms that was imminent." Based thereon, plus the fact that Deputy Spiers failed to speak to the new Sheriff on numerous occasions, Sheriff Katsaris had decided as of mid January that he know deputies Lawrence and Spiers could not remain with his administration. This decision was, according to his testimony, based on the above unspecified conduct by them during his two week's tenure which in his opinion was so reprehensible that termination of their employment was necessary. Deputies Lawrence and Spiers continued to work in their departments unaware that their conduct was below the expectations and standards of the new administration. Between 7:00 and 8:00 a.m. on February 3, 1977, Sheriff Katsaris discharged Deputies Lawrence and Spiers. The reasons assigned for the discharge of Deputy Lawrence was that his attitude was bad and his conduct was unethical and Deputy Spiers' assigned reasons for discharge were a "bad attitude"; "unability to adjust" and "poor work performance." As stated above, and as acknowledged by Sheriff Katsaris, neither Lawrence nor Spiers were ever counseled about their conduct, attitude, or work performance, nor were their supervisors consulted with regard to their conduct, attitude of work performance. The undersigned is mindful of Sergeant McDearmid's testimony that when Deputy Spiers initially came on board, he was over zealous. This, however, is not considered as a shortcoming in terms of ability to adequately perform. In any event, this matter was corrected at the outset of Spiers' employment. Aside from the unsubstantiated rumors received from unknown sources that Deputies Lawrence and Spiers were disgruntled with the new administration and were hampering the new administration's programs, the only specific action discernible in the record which is attributable to Deputy Lawrence is his failure to say "Hello" to the Sheriff on several occasions. Similarly, except for the rumors relied on by the Sheriff, the only two specific actions attributable to Deputy Spiers were: Stating, after the Sheriff inquired about his opinion of the newly painted police cars, that they looked like those on "TV, Adam-12"; and (b) advising the Sheriff that he had been offered a position in other police departments but had turned them down in hopes that he could get into the detective or narcotics unit with the Leon County Sheriff's Department. The record is barren of any further specific actions attributable to the alleged discriminatees. The evidence reveals that on January 26 - 28, 1977, Sheriff Katsaris attended a workshop of the Florida Sheriff's Association. At the workshop a session was held on dealing with unions. Following the session, the Sheriff concluded that under the circumstances it was time for him to deliver a message to the men as to how he felt about unions. On January 31, 1977, Deputy Lawrence contacted the union organizer, James Mixon and established February 5, as the date for the initial organizational meeting. During the period of January 31 through February 2, Deputies Lawrence and Spiers contacted all deputy sheriffs and sergeants, some 85 individuals about the union and the organizational meeting on February 5, 1977. On February 1, 1977, Captain Gene Goodman, a managerial employee of the Sheriff's Department called Deputy Sheriff Scott Key into his office. Among other things, Captain Goodman inquired about Key's knowledge about the union movement; whether Perry Lawrence was contacting the men; when the organizational meeting was being held; whether it was being held at Lawrence's home and what was Lawrence's home address. Captain Goodman indicated that Sheriff Katsaris might like to speak to Deputy Key immediately contacted Deputy Lawrence and advised him of the meeting because he (Key) thought Lawrence's position was in jeopardy. During the nights of January 31, 1977 and February 1 and 2, 1977, Sheriff Katsaris conducted several command staff meetings with his attorney. At the meetings several matters were discussed including union activities of employees and the names of Deputy Spiers and Lawrence were discussed at those meetings. On February 3, 1977, Deputies Lawrence and Spiers were terminated and on February 4, 1977, Sheriff Katsaris posted a no solicitation- no distribution rule and at the same time issued a departmental policy on unions and employee organizations. Included in the Sheriff's position letter was an expression of his feeling that union organization of the department's employees would not serve their best interests and will work to their substantial detriment of the high professional standards that [he] was seeking to achieve. He therefore concluded that it was his firm policy to oppose union organization of any group of the Leon County Sheriff's Department employees by every proper and legal means. (See Respondent's Exhibit #1, Attachment #2) Following the termination of Deputies Lawrence and Spiers the subsequent distribution of the Sheriff's no solicitation-no distribution rule and the position letter dated February 4, 1977, organizational activities within the Sheriff's Department ceased and testimony reveals that those employees who had signed authorization cards became disinterested and requested that they be returned to them.
Conclusions An examination of the above factors leads the undersigned to the conclusion that the Respondent's discharge of Deputies Lawrence and Spiers was discriminatorily motivated and undertaken based on anti-union sentiments. The Respondent was aware that organizational activities were occurring among its employees and that admittedly, Deputies Lawrence and Spiers were spearheading this activity. Respondent's knowledge was gained, at least in part, from its agent, Captain Goodman's interrogation of Deputy Scott Key. Without reciting her the details of Goodman's interrogation, it suffices to say that Respondent was much concerned about the on-going organizational drive. A reading of Respondent's position statement released the day following the discharges of Deputies Spiers and Lawrence unquestionable confirms this concern. Prior to these terminations, the organizational drive was mounting with great interest. However, following the terminations, those employees who had expressed organizational interests by executing authorization cards manifested no further interest and attempted to withdraw their support by requesting that their executed authorization cards be returned. Without question, at this point Respondent had driven home its point that those employees who cared to exercise their right to engage in collectively organized activities faced the ultimate penalty of discharge. The reasons advanced by the Respondent for the discharge of Deputies Lawrence and Spiers were considered and are rejected. The discriminatees had been employed for more than four years and at no time had either been disciplined, reprimanded or counselled about their work performance or attitude. The reasons rested on unsubstantiated rumors without any efforts to confirm that they (Deputies Lawrence and Spiers) were experiencing attitudinal problems. Nor were they given any opportunity to deny, admit or correct such problems. This entire matter hardly resembles the workings of an efficient law enforcement agency that prides itself (according to Respondent) with effective investigative techniques. Respecting Respondent's claim that they (Deputies Lawrence and Spiers) were not adjusting to the new administration, evidence reveals that employees are yet adjusting to the new administration. Indeed, Deputies Lawrence and Spiers had no idea (based on the benefit of consultations from their supervisors) that their performance was anything but satisfactory. To adjust to the new administration, they were given all of one month. Given these facts, the undersigned can only conclude that the reasons assigned by Respondent were merely a pretext and the real reasons that Deputies Lawrence and Spiers were discharged are accurately cited in the complaint herein and it is so concluded. The interrogation of Deputy Scott Key by Captain Goodman constitutes a violation of Section 447.501(1)(a) of the Act since the interrogation centered exclusively around the union activities of Respondent's employees. See e.g. Laborer's International Union, Local #666 v. Jess Parrish Memorial Hospital 3 FPER 172 (June 30, 1977). In the instant case, the Respondent, as was its right, expressed its position opposing unionization of its employees; the interrogation sought information which would lead one to reasonably conclude that such would form a basis for taking disciplinary action; the interrogator was a high-ranking staff personnel and the Deputy (Key) was called away from his duty station. Key's testimony reveals that it was indeed unusual for Captain Goodman to summon employees to his office except in matters of extreme importance. The fact that Deputy Key feared that disciplinary action would be taken is borne out by the fact that when Captain Goodman confirmed that Deputy Lawrence was active in the organizational drive, he advised Deputy Key that he thought that the Sheriff would like to know about that; and that (Key) should wait in his office until he could locate the Sheriff in order that he could be briefed on the matter. When the Sheriff was located, and the matter called to his attention, he told Captain Goodman that he was not interested in speaking to Deputy Key about the subject. Deputy Key spoke to Deputy Lawrence about the interrogation as quickly as he could after leaving Captain Goodman's office and attempted to convince Lawrence to "quit the organizing effort before he lost his job." It is apparent that the Sheriff recognized the dangers inherent in the situation, however, he did nothing to alert the other rank and file employees that he was repudiating the action of Captain Goodman. By failing to do so after learning of the interrogation, the Sheriff is held accountable for the acts and conduct of Captain Goodman. It is so recommended.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby recommended that the Respondent cease and desist from engaging in unfair labor practices in violation of Chapter 447.501(1)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes, as required by Chapter 447.503(4)(a), Florida Statutes. Based thereon, it is further recommended that the Respondent be ordered to reinstate Deputies Perry Lawrence and Michael Spiers to their former or substantially equivalent position of employment and be reimbursed for all back pay with interest computed at 6 percent per annum beginning on February 4, 1977, in accordance with the formula set forth in Pasco County Teachers Association v. Pasco County School Board, PERC Order No. 76U-U75 (1976). It is further recommended that Respondent be required to post in each of its facilities in Leon County, Florida, on copies of an appropriate "notice to employees" for a period of sixty (60) days, a notice substantially providing that the Respondent will cease and desist from engaging in unfair practices within the meaning of Chapter 447.501, Florida Statutes. RECOMMENDED this 11th day of October, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 1977. COPIES FURNISHED: Gene L. Johnson, Esquire Staff Attorney Public Employees Relations Commission 2003 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 300 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 P. Kevin Davey, Esquire Post Office Box 1674 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jack M. Skelding, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 669 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner was terminated unlawfully from employment by the City of Orlando (City) on the basis of his national origin and disability, and in retaliation for engaging in a protected activity.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 55-year-old male of Hispanic (Cuban) heritage. He worked full-time as a police officer with the City until 2011, when he resigned his full-time status and was granted permission to begin working as a reserve officer. Reserve officers are appointed by and serve at the discretion of the Chief of Police. Only retiring or resigning sworn officers with at least ten or more years of consecutive service and in good standing can be members of the reserve unit. Currently, around two dozen reserve officers work for the City. A reserve officer must be a sworn law enforcement officer and able to exercise law enforcement authority and make arrests. If a reserve officer is unable to perform law enforcement functions, the Chief of Police will exercise his authority to withdraw his or her reserve status. Reserve officers have no employment or promotion rights. In addition to their contract assignment, they must satisfy a volunteer commitment by working at least 12 hours per month in either a patrol first-responder assignment or pre-approved special assignment. However, the volunteer commitment does not apply to reserve officers working at the Orlando International Airport (Airport). If a reserve officer is unable to fulfill this 12-hour requirement, the Chief of Police will exercise his authority to withdraw his or her reserve status. Beginning in January 2012, Petitioner worked exclusively as an Airport Specialist at the Airport on successive one-year contracts. Reserve officers working at the Airport are called Temporary Employee Police Reserve Officers (TEPROs). The TEPRO program was initiated by the City in 2012 and is designed to augment the number of police officers working at the Airport. This is because the Airport law enforcement contingent has been understaffed for many years.2/ TEPROs have arrest powers, wear uniforms, carry a gun and taser, and are required to take police action just like full- time law enforcement officers. The Greater Orlando Airport Authority (GOAA) contracts with the City to provide law enforcement services at the Airport and reimburses the City for salaries and equipment of full-time officers and TEPROs. Therefore, TEPROs cannot be assigned to any other division in the Police Department. Approximately 70 to 80 officers, including command staff, full-time officers, and TEPROs on one-year contracts, work in the Airport Division (Division). When the events herein occurred, the number of TEPROs working at the Airport was capped at nine. In January 2012, Petitioner entered into his first Temporary/Seasonal Employment Contract with the City, whereby the City agreed to employ Petitioner in the Police Department as a TEPRO for one year from January 2012 through January 2013. At that time, Petitioner was capable of performing the full duties of a law enforcement officer without accommodation. Petitioner was not hired for any particular assignment and could be assigned to any number of posts throughout the Division. In March 2013, March 2014, January 2015, and January 2016, Petitioner entered into new employment contracts with the City, whereby the City agreed to hire Petitioner as a TEPRO for one year. The last contract was executed on January 13, 2016, and ran through January 13, 2017.3/ When he signed each contract, Petitioner was capable of performing the full duties of a law enforcement officer without accommodation. On September 8, 2016, Petitioner was injured in an on- the-job accident at the Airport. He had pulled over a taxicab for a traffic stop when another vehicle struck his police car from behind, driving Petitioner underneath the dashboard and pinning him there while pushing his car into the taxicab he had stopped. The accident required Petitioner to undergo cervical fusion of his C-6 and C-7 vertebrae in February 2017 and damaged his ulnar nerve causing numbness in his right hand. He still experiences severe pain in his back and neck on a daily basis. Petitioner’s injuries limit his ability to perform manual tasks for extended periods. His musculoskeletal functions are substantially limited, and he cannot sit or stand for prolonged periods. The range of movement in his neck is also substantially limited. He is restricted from pushing or pulling any amount of weight, and from lifting more than ten pounds. As of April 2018, or 15 months after his last contract expired, these medical conditions still existed and prevented Petitioner from performing the job duties of a full-time police officer, such as carrying a weapon, making arrests, responding to calls, assisting other officers, and taking other police enforcement action. Unfortunately, there is still no definitive timetable for a full recovery. Although the City had the discretion to immediately terminate Petitioner’s contract when the accident occurred, it permitted him to assess the injury and address the medical issues. A few weeks after the accident, Petitioner requested an accommodation that would permit him to go on light duty. His request was approved. The City’s policy is to allow full-time officers to remain on light duty for no more than twelve months; they then are required to be medically retired or terminated from employment unless the Chief of Police, at his discretion, authorizes another six-month extension. While he was not sure, the Deputy Chief of Police believed this policy did not apply to reserve officers. Petitioner returned to work on October 13, 2016, in a light-duty capacity because of restrictions imposed by his physician. As noted above, these restrictions prevent Petitioner from responding to a situation that could escalate and require him to take police action. From October 13, 2016, through January 16, 2017 (or three days after his contract expired), Petitioner worked in a light-duty capacity in “district 285.” District 285 is the nomenclature for a police officer position in the Division’s office at the Airport that takes walk-up calls for matters such as stolen vehicles or answering calls from outside or within the Airport for general questions. The office is manned by an officer 24 hours per day, seven days per week. If the officer is on light duty, he works in plain clothes, does not carry a firearm, and, pursuant to Police Department policy, cannot take police enforcement action. District 285 refers to the position during the day shift, while district 185 refers to the position during the night shift. The position cannot be filled by a civilian. At least one officer must fill each shift (day and night) at the front desk of the office. The position is filled by a mix of full-time officers and TEPROs, a few of whom from time to time may be on light duty. If an officer on light duty works the front desk, this would enable an officer with no restrictions to be assigned to a patrol position. If a full-time or reserve officer without restrictions works the front desk, he or she is required to respond to calls for service and take police action for any incidents that may arise. From October 13, 2016, to January 16, 2017, Petitioner worked one to three shifts per week (ten hours per shift) in the front desk position. Officers on light duty are required to submit an Alternative Duty Update (Update) every 30 days in order to remain on light duty and to continue to work. On December 14, 2016, Petitioner provided the City with an Update in order to remain on light duty. The Update indicated that he still had work restrictions (no pushing, pulling, or lifting anything over ten pounds, limited bending, no overhead work, and changing his seated or standing position every 30 to 60 minutes); his physician recommended surgery (which was approved by Risk Management on January 18, 2017, and performed the following month); and there was no estimated date for his return to full duty. After the surgery, Petitioner would be in no-duty and light-duty status until the recovery was complete. The Chief of Police approved his alternative duty request on January 3, 2017. This allowed Petitioner to finish out his one-year contract, which expired ten days later. Contrary to Petitioner’s suggestion, the Update did not constitute a request for an accommodation under a new contract. On or about January 6, 2017, Petitioner was informed by his direct supervisor, Lieutenant Boos, that the City would not be offering him a new employment contract after his current contract expired a week later. When told that his contract would not be renewed, Petitioner did not request an extension of his light duty, a transfer to a light-duty position downtown, a leave of absence, or any other accommodation. Also, he did not ask the City to reconsider offering him a new contract. When he asked Lieutenant Boos if there was a reason why it was not renewed, his supervisor responded “no,” and Petitioner was told that the City just wanted to exercise its right not to renew the contract. Neither Lieutenant Boos, nor the commander of the Division, Captain DeSchryver, knew the exact reason for this action; they knew only that the Deputy Chief had told Captain DeSchryver not to renew the contract. According to Captain DeSchryver, he recommended that the City renew the contract, but after reviewing the matter, the City decided it needed a full-time officer at the Airport. Petitioner filed his TAQ with the FCHR a few weeks later. Even then, he did not suggest a specific accommodation. At the time his contract was not renewed, Petitioner was unable to exercise law enforcement authority or make arrests. The City could not assign Petitioner to the district 285 position for another 12 months because there was no timetable for his return to full duty. Also, the City needed all positions at the Airport staffed by as many full-duty officers as possible who were capable of performing the essential functions of the job. As explained by the Deputy Chief, the City needed to have “a number of full-body officers out there to work the calls and to assist each other and to keep everybody at the airport safe,” and not to just have a certain number of officers assigned to the Airport, even if they could not perform the essential functions of the job. The Deputy Chief went on to explain that “it was decided that we would take another course of action and terminate the contract and get a full-body person at the airport.” He also testified that the City “needed a full-fledged officer out there [at the Airport]”; “we needed an officer who could do the full job of a police officer”; “we just need to have as many full-time officers or full-service officers as we can”; and by hiring a full-time reserve officer, that would give him “a full-time officer out there who can respond to any kind of call out there and also assist the other officers out there to handle anything that comes up.” The Chief of Police added that “it’s really a waste of taxpayers’ money to keep someone on contract in light- duty status when they cannot perform the function of a reserve officer or TEPRO.” Petitioner contends the statements of the Chief of Police and Deputy Chief fall within the category of “the most blatant remarks,” whose intent could be nothing other than direct evidence of discrimination. However, this testimony is not evidence of discrimination, given the fact that Petitioner’s latest Update in mid-December 2016 indicated that he faced impending major surgery, he had numerous doctor-imposed physical limitations, and there was no timetable on when, if ever, he would return to full-duty status. For the first time, in his PRO, Petitioner contends that, as an accommodation, the City should have: (a) executed a new contract and assigned him to the district 285 position for another year, or (b) executed a new contract with a different reserve unit and transferred him to a light-duty position in another division. In essence, Petitioner argues that the City should have given him another one-year contract, even though he was awaiting major surgery (which was performed the following month) and would be on light-duty or no-duty status for an indefinite period of time. Indefinite light duty or no duty is not a reasonable accommodation. If the TEPRO contract was renewed, transfer to another light-duty position in another division was not possible. As a contract employee with GOAA, Petitioner could not be transferred to another division. If Petitioner signed a new contract with another reserve unit, it would be a burden on the City, and an unreasonable accommodation, to assign him to a light-duty position for an indefinite period of time. As it turns out, Petitioner would have been on light-duty or no-duty status for the duration of the renewed contract. Assuming another contract was executed in January 2018, Petitioner would still be on light duty as of April 2018, with no timetable for returning to full service, if ever. In sum, assuming that Petitioner’s injury constitutes a disability, there was no reasonable accommodation that the City could have offered. Petitioner was replaced by another reserve officer, Don Luezzi, a white male, who formerly worked in the Airport Division before he retired and expressed interest in an Airport Specialist position. In 2017, the City also hired Izzy Hernandez, a Cuban, as a TREPRO. His contract was renewed in 2018. Even though his contract was not renewed, Petitioner remained a reserve officer, serving at the pleasure of the Chief of Police. To retain reserve status, however, Petitioner was required to file Updates on his medical status. On April 2, 2017, Petitioner submitted an Update, advising that he remained in no-work status (due to his recent surgery) and that his next follow-up appointment was scheduled on June 1, 2017. On June 26, 2017, Petitioner was issued a Return to Duty Notice (Notice), advising him that his reserve status would be revoked effective September 8, 2017, if he was not able to return to full duty by that date. A Notice is an administrative form letter that is generated and issued automatically to all employees who are on alternative-duty status or medical leave for the preceding six months. From January 2017 through July 2017, Petitioner was unable to work any off-duty jobs as a reserve officer because of his medical condition and work restrictions. During this same time period, he was unable to work as a patrol first-responder or in a pre-approved special assignment as a law enforcement officer. He did not identify any reasonable accommodation which would have allowed him to do so. On July 26, 2017, Petitioner’s reserve status was withdrawn, effective immediately, by the Chief of Police on the advice of counsel and because Petitioner was unable to fulfill the requirements of the reserve unit. Actually, the reserve status could have been revoked earlier because Petitioner was unable to fulfill the requirements of the reserve unit, specifically the requirement that he volunteer 12 hours per month as a law enforcement officer. The withdrawal of Petitioner’s reserve status occurred six months after the TAQ was filed, was not considered by the FCHR, and is not a relevant issue. Assuming arguendo that it is a relevant consideration in the case, there is no evidence that this action was taken for discriminatory reasons. Petitioner is not precluded from re-applying for reserve status or as a TEPRO once he is able to perform the functions of a law enforcement officer and fulfill the requirements of the reserve unit. Petitioner contends the City treated another TEPRO, Kathy Tomas, a white female, more favorably than him by offering her a new one-year contract while she was on light duty. Ms. Tomas suffered an on-the-job injury on March 18, 2017, while attempting to arrest an unruly JetBlue passenger who was refused boarding because of too many carry-on bags. At the time, she was working under a one-year contract that expired in January 2018. Because of a fractured elbow and torn rotator cuff suffered during the arrest, Ms. Tomas went on light duty after the incident. After the elbow injury was resolved, she had surgery performed on her rotator cuff, and, as of April 2018, still remained on light duty. In September 2017, the City entered into new contracts with all of its TEPROs, including Ms. Tomas, in order to effectuate a pay raise. New contracts were necessary because the existing contracts provided for a set pay rate, and without a new contract, the new pay rate could not be implemented. If Ms. Tomas is unable to return to full duty at the expiration of her current contract in September 2018, the City will not enter into a new employment contract with her. Although her accommodation was longer, Ms. Tomas received the exact same accommodation as Petitioner. Petitioner was not treated less favorably than other employees who were similarly situated, based on his national origin or perceived disability. In his PRO, Petitioner asserts the December 14 Update is the protected activity that forms the basis for the retaliation charge. On the other hand, the City’s PRO asserts the only protective activity identified by Petitioner is his TAQ filed in March 2017. (The TAQ was actually filed on January 23, 2017, not in March 2017.) However, both assertions miss the mark, as the TAQ alleges the protected activity is Petitioner’s filing of a workers’ compensation claim. The exact date on which he filed his claim is not of record, but an email indicates that Petitioner spoke with the “workers’ comp case manager” on September 14, 2016, or eight days after he was injured. Resp. Ex. 1. In any event, the TAQ trumps the other assertions and is the only protected activity that has been considered. There is no evidence that the filing of the workers’ compensation claim was in any way related to the non-renewal of the TEPRO contract. The City’s decision to not renew the contract was not based on Petitioner’s heritage (Cuban), disability, or in retaliation for him filing a workers’ compensation claim.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief, with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of July, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of July, 2018.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of Sections 760.10(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent Conoco meets the statutory definition of an "employer" within the meaning of Section 760.02, Florida Statutes. Petitioner, Marlan D. Williams, who is black, is a member of a class protected by this statute. Petitioner began work at Conoco on January 4, 1990, as a sales associate and was discharged from his employment on May 27, 1992. When Mr. Williams was hired on January 4, 1990, he was required to sign a new employee agreement. Section 3 of that agreement explains to new employees the importance of good customer relations. After reading the employment contract, Mr. Williams signed the agreement. Mr. Williams testified that he understood the importance of good customer relations. Mr. Williams also testified that he understood that he could be terminated for multiple customer complaints and was aware of a white employee who had been terminated for customer complaints. Conoco's personnel policies and procedures regarding termination state in relevant part that, "involuntary terminations occur for a reason, such as when an employee's performance does not meet acceptable standards, if the employee violates Company policy, or when there is no work available for the individual." The details of Conoco's policy were left up to each sales district's manager. In this case, the district manager was Tammy Hunter. Her policy was that three complaints involving customers would result in termination. Ms. Hunter was not concerned with the truth behind these complaints, but only with the fact of multiple complaints. In the past, Conoco, through Ms. Hunter, has consistently applied its termination policy to employees receiving complaints involving customers in a nondiscriminatory manner. In fact, there was no evidence presented at the hearing that the policy was not applied in a nondiscriminatory or had unintended discriminatory impact. 1/ Over the term of his employment Mr. Williams received at least three complaints. Two of the complaints were made by customers directly to Ms. Hunter. One complaint was reported by management to Ms. Hunter and involved a very heated and nasty argument between Mr. Williams and a manager trainee in front of customers. Numerous other incidences of nonspecific poor customer relations involving employees and poor attitude were noted by the store manager, Julia Meuse. Mr. Williams received informal verbal and written counseling regarding his poor behavior towards customers, from his store manager and two assistant store managers. Conoco accordingly discharged Mr. Williams for violation of the Company policy regarding acceptable performance standards in customer relations and customer complaints. The evidence did not demonstrate these reasons were pretextual. Petitioner failed to present any evidence that he was replaced by a person not from a protected class. Therefore Petitioner has not established a prima facie case of discrimination. Finally, the decision to discharge Mr. Williams was made in good faith, for legitimate nondiscriminatory business reasons, and was based upon the objective application of Conoco's policies. Since Petitioner has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons given by the Respondent for discharging him were a mere pretext to cover up discrimination on the basis of race, Petitioner has failed to establish he was discriminated against and therefore the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is accordingly, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was discriminated against because of his race in violation of the Florida Human Rights Act and that the petition be dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED this 2nd day of June, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of June, 1994.
