The Issue : The issue in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner has been the victim of a discriminatory housing practice, in alleged violation of Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2007).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a physically handicapped person. He resides in a residential unit (Unit 11C) in the Sea Cabins residential complex. The Petitioner is a full-time resident at Sea Cabins and is the owner of unit 11C. The Respondent is a Florida Corporation (not for profit) and is a homeowners association, as defined by Section 720.303, Florida Statutes (2008). Sometime in early May 2007, Nancy Maconi, the Petitioner's wife, placed a number of signs around the Sea Cabins property. The Respondent purports that there were approximately 13 signs. One of the signs was a designated handicap parking space sign for unit 11C. It was erected in close proximity to the Petitioner's Sea Cabins unit 11C. Thereafter, the Petitioner sought reimbursement for the cost of the signs from the homeowners association board of directors, the Respondent. The request was denied at a meeting of the board of May 11, 2007, with the minutes reflecting that the Petitioner had not requested nor been granted permission to install any signs, hence the denial at that point. Ms. Maconi testified at the hearing that she had asked the Respondent's manager for permission to install the signs, which the manager, Willa Merriott, denied. The action of the board at the May 11, 2000 meeting, however, is not in dispute. Thereafter, on approximately June 22, 2007, the attorney for the Respondent wrote the Petitioner requesting that the designated handicap parking sign be removed since it had not been authorized by the board, nor had any formal request for the installation of the sign been made. On June 23, 2007, the Petitioner responded to that letter by requesting that the board formally authorize the handicap parking sign. A letter from the Veterans Administration was attached to that letter to the effect that the Petitioner had a service-connected disability. The specific nature of the disability was not specified, however. In any event, the Respondent association acquiesced in the handicap parking sign at issue remaining in place and use while it investigated whether the Petitioner was actually entitled to a handicap parking space. The Petitioner was advised by letter of October 11, 2007, by the Respondent, that the handicap parking sign could remain in place while his application was pending. A series of letters then passed between the parties or their representatives in October through December 2007. Pursuant to its policy concerning the granting of handicapped parking spaces and the like, the association sought information on the nature of the Petitioner's disability or handicap. The Petitioner countered by taking the position that the association already had enough information upon which to make its decision. In any event, however, through this period, the Petitioner's designated handicapped parking space and sign remained in place in the original location where Ms. Maconi had placed it. The Respondent acquiesced in its presence and in the Petitioner's use of the handicapped space. Counsel for the Respondent received a letter dated January 3, 2008, from Paul E. Brooks, a Podiatrist, revealing for the first time the specifics of the Petitioner's disability. That is, he has an orthopedic condition which limits his ability to walk. This letter was received on January 8, 2008, and considered by the board of directors at a special meeting held January 28, 2008. At that meeting the board formally granted the Petitioner's application for a designated handicap parking space and voted to allow the sign already erected by Ms. Maconi to remain permanently in place. Due to a misunderstanding between the board and its counsel as to who should notify the Petitioner of the decision, the Petitioner was not actually notified of the decision until March. By letter of March 17, 2008, counsel for the homeowners' association wrote the Petitioner of the actions of the board regarding the sign.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the subject Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of January, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 2009.
The Issue Whether the respondent is guilty of the violations alleged in the Notice of Intent to Impose Administrative Fine, and, if so, the amount of the fine which should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency charged with the administration of sections 501.012-.019, Florida Statutes, and is responsible for registering health studios. The Division of Consumer Services carries out this function. Mr. Beattie and his brother, Tim, are owners of the Paradise Gym, a health studio located at 1236 South Dixie Highway, Coral Gables, Florida. The gym has been in business since 1976 and in its present location for over six years. The Department contacted the Paradise Gym several times in 1992 regarding the statutory requirement that it register as a health studio. The gym continued to operate without being registered, however. In the spring of 1993, the Department obtained an injunction from the circuit court in Dade County, Florida, barring the gym from operating until it registered with the Department. On July 9, 1993, the Department conducted an on-site undercover investigation at the Paradise Gym and found that it was operating as a health studio in violation of the injunction. After the Department scheduled a contempt hearing, the Paradise Gym finally submitted a completed registration application. The gym was registered with the Department on December 6, 1993, and assigned registration number 02370. The annual registration for the Paradise Gym expired on December 6, 1994. The Department sent the Paradise Gym a registration packet enclosed with a letter dated October 24, 1994. The packet contained a registration form, and the letter contained instructions to send the completed form to the Department "together with a copy of the membership contract currently in use and the annual registration fee of $300." (Emphasis in original.) The Department did not receive a response to the October 24 letter. In a letter dated December 2, 1994, the Department notified the Paradise Gym that it must send the completed registration form and other documents within fifteen days of the date of the letter. The December 2 letter contained the warning that the gym must immediately cease "all non-exempt activities" until it came into compliance with the statutes governing health studios. The Department did not receive a response to the December 2 letter. On January 24, 1995, an employee of the Department telephoned Mr. Beattie and was told that the registration packet would be sent by January 27, 1995, and that the application had not been mailed sooner because the gym's offices had flooded and suffered serious damage. The Department did not hear from Mr. Beattie until February 20, 1995, when it received the Paradise Gym's Application for Registration; Affidavit of Exemption from the requirement that a bond, Certificate of Deposit, or letter of credit be posted; and check in the amount of $300 for the annual registration fee. These documents were signed by Mr. Beattie on February 6, 1995. The gym's membership contract was not included with the registration materials, and the Department sent a letter to the Paradise Gym dated February 21, 1995, stating that the Department could not process the application for registration until it received a copy of the contract. The Department received no response to the February 21 letter. In a letter dated March 21, 1995, the Department notified Mr. Beattie that the application for registration of the Paradise Gym was denied because the Department had not received a copy of the gym's membership contract. The letter contained a Notice of Rights and was sent via certified mail. The letter was received at the Paradise Gym, and the return receipt signed, on March 27, 1995. The Department did not receive a response to the letter, either in writing or by telephone, and the denial became final agency action 21 days after it was received at the gym. On May 5, 1995, an investigator for the Department conducted an on- site undercover inspection of the Paradise Gym. The inspection revealed that the gym was operating as a health studio and was offering memberships payable annually or by down payment and monthly installments. On June 13, 1995, the Department issued the Notice of Intent to Impose Administrative Fine at issue in this case and sent it to Mr. Beattie via certified mail. The notice included an offer to settle the matter upon payment of an administrative fine of $3500. The Department did not receive a response to the notice and did not receive a return receipt indicating that the notice had been delivered. In late July, 1995, Douglas Jennings, an employee of the Department, telephoned Mr. Beattie to inquire about his failure to respond to the notice. Mr. Beattie stated that he had not received it, and Mr. Jennings sent him a copy via certified mail. The notice was received at the Paradise Gym on August 3, 1995, and the Department granted the request for hearing dated August 21, 1995. On September 19, 1995, Mr. Jennings received a telephone call from Mr. Beattie in which he asked if the Department would drop the fine; on September 22, 1995, the Department received a copy of a document bearing the logo of the Paradise Gym and entitled "Waiver and Release from Liability and Indemnity Agreement." The contents of this document were substantially different from the contents of the document of the same title submitted in 1993 with the gym's initial application for registration, although the consumer disclosures required by statute remained the same. At hearing, Mr. Beattie explained his failure to submit the Paradise Gym's membership contract until September 22, 1995. He asserted on the one hand that there was no "membership contract" for the gym, just a waiver of liability, and on the other hand that the Department had a copy of the Waiver and Release from Liability and Indemnity Agreement he provided in 1993 with the gym's original application for registration. He did not explain why the Paradise Gym continued to operate after being notified in December 1994 that the gym could not continue operating until it had registered with the Department or why the gym continued to operate after March 21, 1995, when its application for registration was denied. The Department has proven by clear and convincing evidence that the Paradise Gym operated as a health studio without being registered with the Department.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order finding that the Paradise Gym violated section 501.015(1) by operating without being registered with the Department and imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $100. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 11th day of April 1996. PATRICIA HART MALONO Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of April 1996.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, as alleged in the Housing Charge of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on or about October 9, 2015.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, since March 2015, has been a resident at Respondent’s facility. Respondent is a private residential condominium association, which operates and maintains three condominiums in Osprey, Florida. Each condominium unit has its own designated parking space. Petitioner’s assigned parking space, number 364, lies between parking spaces 362 and 366. The respective parking spaces are next to each other, with parallel lines dividing the same. Each parking space has a concrete tire-stop that has painted on it the corresponding condominium unit number so that when a vehicle turns into a space the driver is able to discern the corresponding unit number. All parking spaces and road surfaces relevant to this dispute are paved. If one is positioned such that the painted numbers on the tire-stops are visible, then to the left of space 362 is an unassigned space (unassigned space #1) and to the right of space 366 is an area containing shrubbery. From the photographs admitted into evidence, the dimensions of unassigned space #1 appear to be essentially the same as parking spaces 362, 364, and 366. However, unassigned space #1 differs from the others in that on either side of the parallel lines that demark the interior boundaries of the parking space, there are pathways which provide more space for pedestrian traffic. Although neither party offered evidence of the dimensions of the parking spaces, photographs of the area demonstrate that unassigned space #1, when considering the usable pathways, is wide enough to allow for reasonable entry to and exit from a mid-sized sedan while the vehicle’s occupant is being assisted by a walker or wheelchair. In order to access the parking spaces discussed in the preceding paragraph, motorists must use a one-way road which requires them to turn to the right when they are parking their vehicles such that the front tires are closest to the concrete tire-stops. Approximately 20 feet from unassigned space #1, on the other side of the one-way road used to access the parking area, is another unassigned parking space (unassigned space #2). Unassigned space #2 is perpendicular to unassigned space #1 and spaces 362, 364, and 366. Accordingly, motorists parking in unassigned space #2 enter the space by veering to the left off of the one-way road and driving head-on into the parking space (essentially a parallel parking space). There is no evidence of record as to the exact dimensions of unassigned space #2, but in comparing the photographic evidence, this space is comparable in size to the handicapped parking space near the condominium complex clubhouse. Additionally, unassigned space #2 is situated such that no other vehicles can park in front of, behind, or on either side of a vehicle parked in the space, and there is no curbing that would serve as barrier to accessing one’s vehicle while parked in the space. Although each unit is assigned one designated parking space, Petitioner recalls that when she initially moved in, she parked her vehicle by straddling the line between parking spaces 364 and 366. According to Petitioner, she was able to use both spaces because the respective tire-stops for the spaces were each marked “364.” Petitioner stopped parking her vehicle in this manner after the association re-painted all of the tire- stops; which included refreshing the unit numbers painted on the same so as to make it clear that there were not two parking spaces for unit 364. Also, Petitioner testified that her vehicle was vandalized once while parking her car in spot 364. After Petitioner’s car was vandalized and Respondent re-painted the tire-stops, Petitioner, during the weeks leading to June 2015, began occasionally parking her vehicle in the designated handicapped parking space located at the condominium clubhouse parking lot. Petitioner asserts that because of issues related to her physical disability, it is necessary that she be able to park her car, without restriction, in the handicapped parking space designated by Respondent for use by visitors and residents at the condominium complex clubhouse. The handicap parking space is several hundred feet from Petitioner’s condominium unit, and in order to access the handicap parking space, Petitioner utilizes a pathway constructed of dirt and crushed seashells. There is no record evidence indicating that Petitioner has difficulty traversing the seashell pathway or walking from her condominium unit to her car, and vice versa. Petitioner’s designated parking space is considerably closer to her unit (less than one hundred feet) than the handicapped parking space, but, according to Petitioner, her designated parking space is inadequate because it does not provide her with sufficient space to enter and exit her vehicle. Respondent does not dispute this fact. Petitioner suffers from a physical disability which requires her to ambulate with the occasional assistance of either a walker or wheelchair. Petitioner drives a late model, mid-size four-door Mercedes Benz. Petitioner’s vehicle is not equipped with any special assistive devices, such as a ramp, which would add to the amount of space needed for vehicle ingress and egress. When Petitioner is either entering or exiting her vehicle while using her walker or wheelchair, she requires additional space beyond the swing path of her car doors. Petitioner did not offer evidence of the amount of space required for her to enter or exit her vehicle when using either her walker or wheelchair. Petitioner also did not offer evidence regarding the dimensions of her vehicle, or the dimensions of either her designated parking space or any of the other parking spaces at issue. Nevertheless, Respondent concedes that Petitioner’s designated parking space, when cars are parked on either side of her in spaces 362 and 366, does not afford Petitioner adequate space to reasonably access her walker or wheelchair when entering and exiting her vehicle. In June 2015, Petitioner, as she often did, parked her car overnight in the handicapped parking space at the clubhouse. When Petitioner arrived at her vehicle, she noticed that a note from Respondent had been placed on the car, which reads as follows: Overnight parking in this clubhouse lot must have approval of the Pine Run Board of Directors. Approval is normally awarded for stays of no more than one week. In addition, this handicapped space is reserved for residents or visitors to the pool or clubhouse, not for general resident parking. We discourage resident parking in this lot if not for these reasons. However, if on rare occasion, you wish to park a car in this lot during the day when you are not using the pool or clubhouse, please use an unassigned space on the pond side. This minimizes the chance that you will interfere with our maintenance crew, or the delivery of a large quantity of materials. Within a few days of receiving the note, Petitioner explained to Respondent that she has a handicapped parking decal and should therefore be able to park in the handicapped parking space without restriction. Under the circumstances, Petitioner’s statement is reasonably interpreted as a request to Respondent that her physical disability should be accommodated by allowing her to park in the handicapped space. Respondent took no immediate action regarding Petitioner’s request for accommodation. Respondent did, however, allow Petitioner to continue to park in the handicapped space whenever Petitioner desired to do so. On August 27, 2015, Petitioner sent an email to Respondent and stated therein the following: We are formally informing you again, since our encounters with Mrs. and Mr. Foley, that we do indeed, have a disabled tag, and need and expect accommodations for ours and others, disabled individuals, owners, lessees and visitors, with any parking accommodations, walkers, chairs, etc., and their vehicles and equipment and with regards to any and all entrances to, and any and common areas, we should have easy access to. The circumstances leading up to, and including, Petitioner’s correspondence of August 27, 2015, make clear that Petitioner continues to seek a parking accommodation. At 4:51 p.m. on October 5, 2015, a letter from Petitioner’s attorney, Ms. Jennifer Daly, was sent to Respondent’s representative Jim Kraut. The missive from Ms. Daly states: As you are aware, this firm represents Ms. Valerie Collier [Walters] and I am contacting you to notify you and the Association that she will be parking in the handicapped parking spot tomorrow due to a surgery she is having. Please notify the Board of Directors to ensure no threats of towing are made and no notes are left on her car during her recovery. Upon receipt of the email from Ms. Daly, Mr. Kraut immediately conveyed the request to Mrs. Foley, who at the time was president of Respondent’s board of directors. In response to Petitioner’s request, Mrs. Foley, at 5:02 p.m. on October 5, 2015, sent the following email message to Mr. Kraut: Jim, Since the handicapped spot by the Club House is a considerable distance from her unit could you suggest that she just pick a spot in front of her unit that is much closer? We would have no problem identifying a handicapped spot closer to her unit. Mr. Kraut conveyed Mrs. Foley’s suggestion to Petitioner’s attorney Ms. Daly, who at 5:21 p.m. on October 5, 2015, responded via email as follows: Jim, Thank you for your rapid response and Ms. Foley’s suggestion; however, please let her know that choosing a different spot near her unit will not address our client’s needs. Rather, the problem is when the Association repainted the parking lot, the parking spots were made too small. From what we have been advised, all the spaces in close proximity to our client’s unit are only slightly bigger than the width of a sedan and offer no additional space for the opening of doors, much less the further space needed for someone who requires the assistance of a walker or wheelchair in addition to other equipment. Mrs. Foley, in response to Ms. Daly’s email, stated the following: I note your reply concerning Mrs. Valerie Collier [Walters]. Please be advised that the Association has not changed either the size or assignment of any parking spaces in the even 300’s on Pine Run Drive. All of the spaces have been repainted if the numbers were not visible or the curbs required repair in the entire Association. The size of the spaces ha[s] never changed. We would be very willing to accommodate Mrs. Collier’s [Walters] need for a handicapped space closer to her unit if she requested such. My suggestion was the quite large parallel space next to the grass island [unassigned space #2]. There is no curb there and no vehicle could park beside her. Another suggestion would be to swap her space for the adjacent space for #366. This is the same size but an end space, however I think she would have more room with the parallel space just behind her assigned space. Petitioner’s reaction to Respondent’s suggested parking accommodations was to file, on or about October 9, 2015, a charge of housing discrimination. Additionally, Petitioner parked her car in the handicap space without incident following her surgery. As noted in Ms. Daly’s email of October 5, 2015, Petitioner rejected the parking spaces offered by Respondent because the spaces are “too small.” Petitioner offered no standard by which to determine the appropriateness of the offered parking spaces other than her own subjective opinion. Additionally, Petitioner testified that both unassigned spaces are unacceptable because they are too close to the condominium unit of a neighbor she dislikes. Petitioner testified that what she now wants is to park in space 366, if Respondent widens the space by removing the hedges to the immediate right and paving the newly-cleared area. Petitioner offered no credible evidence establishing that this proposed accommodation is equal to, or more reasonable than the accommodations offered by Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that Respondent, Pine Run Association, Inc., did not commit unlawful housing discrimination as alleged by Petitioner, Valerie Walters, and denying Petitioner’s Housing Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of June, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Cindy Hill, Esquire Hill Law Firm, P.A. 456 South Tamiami Trail Osprey, Florida 34229 (eServed) Gary Parker, Esquire Legal Aid of Manasota 1900 Main Street, Suite 302 Sarasota, Florida 34236 Sharon S. Vander Wulp, Esquire Sharon S. Vander Wulp, P.A. 712 Shamrock Boulevard Venice, Florida 34293 (eServed) Scott H. Jackman, Esquire Cole, Scott and Kissane, P.A. Suite 400 4301 West Boy Scout Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33607 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact In April, 1975 Mrs. Wright, an inspector assigned to the District Office in Panama City inquired of her supervisor regarding outside employment and was told she had to obtain permission from Tallahassee. She subsequently telephone Jack Pelham in Tallahassee who advised her the department would have no objection if it did not interfere with her state duties, but she would have to send a request in writing stating the details of her outside employment. On April 25, 1975 she submitted a letter (Exhibit 4) stating she had accepted outside employment on weekends at an amusement park starting at 6:00 P.M. on Friday afternoon, and requested she be advised if the employment constituted a conflict of interest. No response was received indicating objection on behalf of the Department. Some time in early June Petitioner commenced working on week days in addition to weekends. No request for authority to so work was submitted by Petitioner. Department regulations and policy require prior approval for outside employment. During the period from June 6, 1975 through June 27, 1975 time sheets certified by Mrs. Wright showed she worked from 8:00 to 12:00 and 1:00 to 5:00 Mondays through Friday. Time sheets on June 30 and July 1st showed work hours from 8:00 to 12:00 and 12:30 to 4:30. On July 2 and 3 time sheets showed work from 8:00 to 12:30 and annual leave for 3 hours on July 2 and 8 hours on July 3rd. From July 7 through 10 time sheets showed hours worked from 7:15 to 12:15 and 12:45 to 3:45. From July 14 through 17 time sheets showed hours worked from 7:30 to 12:00 and 12:30 to 4:00. Time sheets from Miracle Strip Amusement Park showed that on June 6, 9, 12, 18, 20, 23, 25, 26 and 30 Mrs. Wright commenced work at 4:30 and on July 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, and 17 she commenced work at 2:45 P.M. Copies of Department policy manual and personnel rules and regulations are available in the District Office out of which Mrs. Wright worked, but she was not furnished a copy of the policy manual until October, 1975 after the incidents herein involved. Testifying in her own behalf Petitioner contends that she signs most of the time sheets in blank and the secretary filled in the hours for her the same as she did for the other inspectors. She further contends that she was unaware that she needed approval for changing the hours of outside employment from the weekend to include weekdays; that she had worked overtime on many occasions for which she had not made a claim; that her supervisor told her he had no objection to her working outside so long as she put in 8 hours for the state; and that she could work early hours if she desired. Except for about 4 days in July she contended that each day she worked the full 8 hours required by the Department. With respect to those 4 days in July for which attendance sheets show less than 8 hours per day worked, she contends she asked if she could take leave and was told it wasn't necessary. Her supervisor has no recollection of such a request and no leave slips were presented to him for approval.
The Issue The issue is whether Department of Lottery Rule 53ER88-16, entitled Handicap Accessibility, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it does not require handicap parking spaces at the location of lottery ticket vendors.
Findings Of Fact Dr. Steven Krisher was trained and practiced as a dentist until he developed the disability of multiple entrapment neuropathy, which now has progressed to the point that he can no longer engage in gainful employment, drive an automobile, exercise, or engage in sports. In order to be mobile outside his home he uses a wheelchair. He holds a permit for disabled parking from the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles. The Department of Lottery promulgated Rule 53ER88-16, Florida Administrative Code, to replace its prior rule on handicap accessibility. The text of the current rule, which is the subject of this challenge, is as follows: Retailers shall be required to provide accessibility for disabled persons on habitable grade levels according to the following minimum specifications: A ramp 44 inches wide for changes in level in excess of 1/2 inch at doorways. The grade shall be not more than 1 inch vertically in 12 inches horizontally. A platform at the top of the ramp which is five feet by five feet if the door opens onto the platform, or three feet deep and five feet wide if the door does not open onto the platform. Aisles or pathways from the entrance door to the counter at which lottery tickets are sold shall be 44 inches in width. A clear turn-around space of at least five feet square in front of the counter at which lottery tickets are sold. An entrance door meeting one of the following specifications: Single leaf walk-through swinging door, 32 inches; One leaf of manually operated multiple- leaf swinging door, 32 inches; Any other walk-through opening, 29 inches. The Department shall not enter into a retailer contract with any retailer whose application is received by the Department after the date of adoption of this rule until the retailer is in compliance with the requirements of paragraphs 1 through 5 above. All retailers whose applications were received by the Department prior to the effective date of this rule shall, not later than 90 days after contracting with the Department, provide the Department with a certificate under oath, affirming that the retailer is in full compliance with the handicap accessibility requirements set forth above. This section does not apply to a retail location which has an entrance door threshold more than 12 inches above ground level.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Homeowners' objection to the issuance of the final site approval order permitting the helistop at Joe Robbie Stadium as requested in the Airport Site Approval and License Application filed on October 20, 1987 by Joe Robbie Stadium Corporation be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of August, 1989, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings, The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Robert L. Shevin, Esquire 200 South Biscayne Boulevard Suite 3300 Miami, Florida 33131-2385 George F. Knox, Esquire 4770 Biscayne Boulevard Suite 1460 Miami, Florida 33137 Kaye N. Henderson, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thomas H. Bateman, III General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact Petitioner owns Lot 70, Gates Knoll 1st Addition, which abuts a medical office complex of eighteen offices west of Lot 70. Off-street paved parking for the medical offices presently abuts Lot 70, but additional parking is needed. Lot 70 fronts on Barry Street, which is the only east-west through street in the immediate vicinity and is heavily travelled. Zoning for Lot 70 is "RS 50," which is single family residential. West of Lot 70 to Highland Avenue is zoned "PS," which would allow multiple family dwellings or business and professional services such as those for which the property is presently used. South of the area zoned "PS" the property adjacent to Gates Knoll 1st Addition is zoned "RM 28," which provides for high density multi-family use and just west of "RM 28" between that zoning and Highland Avenue the property is zoned "CS" for General Commercial use. A bowling alley is located in this area a short distance south of Barry Avenue. Lot 70 is currently fenced and the southern and western part of this lot is used for parking a few automobiles during business hours. The north side of Lot 70 is part of a drainage easement or ditch which occupies approximately 35 feet of this property. Lot 70 is 100 feet wide on Barry Street and 105 feet deep. The north 35 feet of this lot is unusable for construction due to the drainage easement. Adjoining property owners across Barry Street from Lot 70 oppose the special exception primarily because they want the lot to remain vacant to serve as a buffer zone between their property and the commercial development. Others oppose the application because they fear use of the property for anything except a single family residence will reduce their property values, increase the traffic in the neighborhood, and increase the noise and pollution from automobiles. Mr. Huff, the adjoining property owner whose home is immediately east of Lot 70 on Lot 71, is concerned about the proximity of the parked vehicles to his home. The existing fence is some ten feet from Huff's home.
The Issue This is an appeal from a resolution of the Monroe County Planning Commission ("Planning Commission") granting the application of Barry J. Mankowitz, M.D., for a variance from the off-street parking requirements of the Monroe County Code. The appeal was transferred from the Planning Commission to the Division of Administrative Hearings pursuant to Article XIV, Monroe County Code, the Hearing Officer Appellate Article. The issue presented in the appeal is whether Resolution No. P33-97 of the Planning Commission should be affirmed, reversed, or modified.
The Issue Whether Resolution No. P36-98 of the Monroe County Planning Commission should be affirmed, reversed or modified.
