Findings Of Fact On or about February 13, 1995, Petitioner, Hillary Sklar, filed Petitioner's Second Amended Petition. Ms. Sklar has challenged the Department's determination that an amendment to the City's comprehensive plan adopted by Ordinance No. 94-2-2 was "in compliance." In the second amended petition Ms. Sklar made the following allegations concerning her standing to institute this proceeding: * * * 2. The Petitioner's address is 11321 Southwest 49th Place, Fort Lauderdale, 33330, in the County of Broward, Florida. * * * 4. On February 8, 1994, the Respondent passed Ordinance NO. 94 -2 -2 authorizing the implement- ation of Land Use Plan Amendment 94 - S - 1. The Land Use Plan Amendment affects property located at 11791 Southwest 49th Street, Cooper City, in the County of Broward. . . . * * * Petitioner's property is located in a section of unincorporated Broward County which abuts and adjoins the property in question. Petitioner's property has been defined by Respondent as an "enclave." Petitioner's property is similarly situated to those of property owners in Cooper City and will be affected more than those property owners located in Cooper City; including, but not limited to, the allegations contained in Paragraphs 10 through 17, inclusive. Petitioner made objections to the ordinance at the February 8, 1994 City Council meeting discussing adoption of the ordinance. . . . * * * Ms. Sklar has still failed to allege that she resides, owns property or operates a business located with a City of Cooper City address or which otherwise is subject to the jurisdiction of the City of Cooper City. The oral objections made by Ms. Sklar were made at a public hearing of the City of Cooper City Council held on February 8, 1994. According to the minutes of that meeting, Ms. Sklar "said the zoning is a done deal and the annexation and sale was a done deal. Why should it be a done deal before the Public Hearing was held, she asked." The factual information contained in the Preliminary Statement of this Recommended Order is hereby incorporated by reference.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's Second Amended Petition, filed by Hillary Sklar. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of March, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of March, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward R. Curtis, Esquire Bruce Botsford, Esquire 1828 S.E. 1st Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Suzanne H. Schmith Certified Legal Intern Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Silvia Morell Alderman, Esquire Suite 1200 106 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Linda Loomis Shelley, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Dan Stengle, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100
Findings Of Fact Respondent Jorge L. Cabrera owns a parcel of land on Plantation Key some 2.73 acres in size. It is adjacent to U.S. Highway 1 and was previously zoned BU-2, a medium business district zoning classification. Respondent Cabrera filed his rezoning petition seeking a rezoning to BU-3Y, which would have permitted, among other uses, a cement plant, a petroleum storage and distribution facility, warehouse facilities, the repair and storage of construction equipment, an asphalt plant, or industrial parks. He initially informed the Zoning Department of Monroe County, in conjunction with his application for rezoning, that he intended to use the subject site as a storage area for construction equipment. The Respondent's property is located in a predominantly business area. Immediately across the highway is the State of Florida Highway Patrol Station, through which all trucks passing through the Florida Keys must stop for weighing. The property adjacent to the Respondent's property has a mixture of uses, including a gas tank storage area, a church, a bakery, a trucking company immediately adjacent to the property, heavy equipment storage and a radio transmission tower. To the rear of the property is a parcel owned by Howard Bonebrake consisting predominantly of mangrove wetlands. Howard Bonebrake appeared before the Zoning Board at its April 22, 1982, hearing in Key West, as did representatives of the Upper Keys Association and other residents in the Upper Keys Association and other residents in the Upper Keys and the vicinity of the subject site, in opposition to the proposed rezoning. The Department of Community Affairs is the state land planning agency designated by Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, to undertake statewide comprehensive planning. This project lies within Monroe County, Florida, which is the local government agency which issued the development order respecting the proposed development. On April 19, 1982, at a meeting held in Marathon, Florida, the Board of County Commissioners of Monroe County discussed the Zoning Board meeting which was scheduled for April 22, 1982. The minutes of the County Commission meeting reflected that the following action was taken under the category "Reports and Recommendations of Board Members": A motion was made by Commissioner Blair and seconded by Commissioner Harvey instructing the Zoning Board to Continue the meeting scheduled for April 22, 1982, to the Upper Keys consistent with the Board's policy of holding meetings in the areas affected. Roll call vote was taken and carried unanimously. No copy of a resolution embodying this Commission action has been placed into evidence. On April 22, 1982, the Zoning Board held a public hearing in Key West, Florida. Among the items on the agenda was Respondent Cabrera's rezoning application. Zoning Board Member Dagny Johnson sought to have that rezoning petition continued. A member of the Monroe County Commission, Jerry Hernandez, appeared before the Zoning Board at that hearing and advised the Board that it was the intent of the County Commissioners in that April 19 motion to allow the Zoning Board to decide whether the rezoning application by Cabrera was a "controversial issue" or not. He further advised the Zoning Board that it was the Board of County Commissioners' policy to hold hearings in the area of zoning impact or change when controversial issues were involved. He further advised the Board that the County Commission did not seek to dictate a decision on the location of the public hearing to the Zoning Board, but that that was a decision the Zoning Board must make itself. The chairman of the Zoning Board then stated that he had received no instruction from the County Commission to continue the hearing. Zoning Board Member Johnson then moved to have the Zoning Board hear zoning cases in the area in which the pertinent property is located. That motion failed for lack of a second. The Zoning Board's resolution granting Respondent Cabrera the requested rezoning was appealed to the Monroe County Board of County Commissioners, which affirmed the Zoning Board's decision on August 9, 1982. A motion for rehearing was denied by the County Commission on August 23, 1982. Among the arguments advanced in the appeal to the County Commission and in the rehearing were that the Zoning Board had violated its procedural rules and the County Commission's instructions by hearing the rezoning petition in Key West instead of at the property site on Plantation Key. In spite of the fact that the hearing was conducted in Key West, the adjoining landowner and others in the above association who opposed the rezoning applications had notice of and were in attendance at the rezoning hearing. Under Monroe County's Major Development Ordinance, adopted by reference as Rule 27F-9.17, Florida Administrative Code, parcels of land of five acres or more involved in a zoning application are considered to be major developments, and their developers are required to submit extensive environmental and public service impact statements. The Zoning Board and its staff also have discretionary authority to declare a project slightly smaller than five acres to be a major development and entitled to such detailed survey and study if the anticipated use is likely to be environmentally damaging, or if the projects meet certain other specific major development criteria. Monroe County's Chief Planner, Dr. Jeffery Doyle, testifying on behalf of Petitioner, established that no project under three acres had ever been considered by the Zoning Board or its staff to be a major development, nor has any concrete batching plant in Monroe County been declared to be a major development by the Zoning Board or its staff in the past. Concrete batching plants are different, in terms of environmental impacts, from large cement-producing plants, which pose substantial environmental considerations due to their release of substantial dust and particulate pollutants. Such is not the case with the relatively small concrete batching plant involved in this rezoning application and order. Although there was some speculation regarding large amounts of water which a concrete batching plant might use, water being relatively scarce in the Keys, no potential environmental damage posed by the rezoning and the resultant construction or installation of the concrete batching plant was shown. It was not demonstrated at the hearing before the Zoning Board, nor the Hearing Officer, that this project meets any criteria for being characterized as a "major development." Although a witness for the Petitioner, former County Commissioner Curtis Blair, stated that it was his belief that Monroe County had a policy of hearing zoning applications in the area where the property to be rezoned is located, he was unable to recall any actual adoption of such a policy. He acknowledged that no such rules of procedure for locations of Zoning Board hearings had been placed of record by the County Commission or the Zoning Board and admitted no such rules of procedure for hearing locations had been adopted. Rather, specific requests have been made from time to time of the Zoning Board on specific zoning matters regarding locating the hearings related thereto near the site of the property at issue. The purpose of this supposed "policy" would be to allow citizens most affected by a zoning change to appear and testify regarding it. Representatives of the Upper Keys Citizens Association and the neighbor, Mr. Bonebrake, all of whom oppose the project, were present at the hearing in this instance, however, and testified before the Zoning Board despite the fact that the venue of the hearing was in Key West. At the time the County Commission passed its April 19, 1982, motion regarding the request of the Zoning Board to hold the hearing in Plantation Key, the public notice of the Zoning Board hearing had already been promulgated and published and notices had already been sent to the adjacent property owners. Further, the Zoning Board's agenda had already been promulgated and published. Mr. Blair admitted that the April 19, 1982, motion was never incorporated in a resolution of the Board of County Commissioners. Former Zoning Board Member Dagny Johnson, testifying for the Petitioner, was of the belief that the Zoning Board had a policy to hold meetings in the affected locality, but could not establish the source of any such policy. She admitted that her view of that policy was in the minority and that the other four Zoning Board members did not agree with her that such a policy existed. Although she was certain that all major development projects which were the subject of zoning hearings were heard in the area affected, she could not recall that all other zoning change matters were heard in the affected locality and, in fact, recalled a number of cases where zoning applications were duly agendaed and noticed to the public involving projects outside the locality where the Zoning Board hearing was conducted. Both witnesses Johnson and Doyle for the Petitioner conceded that the applicant's statement of his intended use of the subject property to be rezoned has "no significance" and that the zoning applicant's intended use is not required to be advertised to the public. Rather, the proposed zone change is the subject of public notice. The applicant, once having secured BU-3Y zoning, could erect whatever structure or perform whatever use that zoning permitted, regardless of the use he may have initially proposed in the zoning application. The applicant's intended use could change; and once the property is rezoned, the property can be put to whatever use the applicant and owner chooses, provided it is within the authorized uses of the new zoning. Respondent Cabrera in this instance informed the Zoning Board at the hearing of his ultimate intended use, that is, the erection of a concrete batching plant. This was before his application was finally considered and voted upon. He informed the neighboring landowners personally of the intended use of the property prior to the Zoning Board hearing. Those neighboring landowners were in attendance at the hearing and were given an opportunity to oppose his application. At the Zoning Board hearing of April 22, 1982, Ms. Johnson made a motion calling for the Board to affirm the existence of a policy requiring all zoning changes to be heard in the portion of the Florida Keys where the properties which are the subject of the zoning applications are located. This motion was rejected by the Board, and thus at that point the Zoning Board had not affirmed the existence of such a definite policy. There is no dispute that there is no written rule or policy of the Zoning Board requiring zoning matters to be heard in the locality of the property which is the subject of a zoning application. Further, the Zoning Board's agendas do not show any consistent pattern that such hearings are conducted in the venue of the subject property; rather, some rezoning applications were agendaed in the locality of the property involved, and some were agendaed outside of the area involved in zoning or rezoning applications. It was not shown that the Zoning Board's agendas uniformly set rezoning applications for hearing in the area of impact. Thus, it was not established that any such policy existed in April, 1982, the time period pertinent hereto.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That the Petition of the Department of Community Affairs be DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of December, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of December, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Eric Taylor, Esquire Barry F. Chiles, Esquire Assistant Attorneys General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. John T. Herndon Secretary Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission Office of the Governor The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James T. Hendrick, Esquire Albury, Morgan & Hendrick, P.A. 317 Whitehead Street Key West, Florida 33040 E. Baxter Lemmond, Esquire Assistant County Attorney Monroe County 310 Fleming Street Key West, Florida 33040 C. Laurence Keesey, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2571 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Honorable George Dolezal Box 1029, Duck Key Marathon, Florida 33050 The Honorable Bob Graham Governor The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Honorable Ralph D. Turlington Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Honorable Jim Smith Attorney General The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Honorable Bill Gunter Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Honorable Doyle Conner Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Honorable George Firestone Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Steven Leftwich is a certified building contractor, having been issued license No. CB C005800. At all times here relevant he was qualifying contractor for Monterey Builders, Inc., for whom he was president and chief operating officer. On 6 June 1979 Monterey Builders, Inc., entered into a contract with Dale and Edna Reed (Exhibit 4) to construct a residence for them on their lot at Bonita Springs at a total cost of $69,426.00. The contract did not provide for institutional lender financing but provided the Reeds would make periodic cash payments upon the completion of certain stages of construction. Pursuant to this contract, Reed paid $6,942.60 prior to the start of construction and two additional payments of $13,885.20 each as the work progressed, with the third payment on October 27, 1979. The lot required additional fill. The contract included a fill allowance of 400 yards and provided that the owner (Reed) would pay for all extras costing in excess of $100.00 at the time of request. By letter dated October 22, 1979 (part of Exhibit 8), Respondent advised the Reeds that payment for fill dirt was long overdue and, unless payment was received by October 26, 1979, they would be considered in breach of contract. Another page of Exhibit 8, which purports to be an undated and unsigned addendum to the contract between Monterey Builders and the Reeds, shows delivery of 404 yards of fill on 7-26- 69[sic], 465 yards on 7-27-79, and 170 yards on 7-30-79. Written on the bottom of this document is "DISCUSSED 10/15/79." The month of the final draw is missing from the copy of Exhibit 6, admitted into evidence, but, from the testimony of Mrs. Reed, appears to be October, as found in finding No. 2 above. Since the second draw was on 9-24-79, it is unlikely that another $13,885.20 would have been paid three days later. The date of this third payment is significant only in that it corroborates Mrs. Reed's testimony that the third payment was made after the dispute over the fill arose. When Monterey demanded payment for the 600 yards of fill allegedly used over the 400 yards allowed, Reed disputed the accuracy of this amount of fill. He engaged surveyors to compute the fill and this confirmed his belief that he was being overcharged for fill and declined to pay the amount demanded. Parenthetically, it is noted that one 16-yard load would have to be delivered every 20 minutes for nine hours on 26 July to place 404 yards on the property and at the same frequency of delivery it would take ten hours to deliver the 465 yards Monterey claimed was delivered on 27 July 1979. Regardless of the accuracy of the claim for fill delivered, the Reeds made the third payment of $13,885.20 after the fill dispute in the amount of $2,556.00 arose. Nevertheless, the Respondent contends that, by failing to pay the disputed bill for additional fill, the Reeds breached the contract and Monterey Builders was thereby relieved from continuing work on this contract. Prior to stopping work on the project, Monterey Builders collected the third draw from the Reeds and had roofing material delivered to the site. When the third payment was made, the slab had been poured, plumbing roughed in, masonry walls completed, and lintel poured. Petitioner's witness estimated the project 15 percent complete, while Respondent claims the project was 35-40 percent complete. In November the Reeds went to West Virginia to attend the wedding of Mr. Reed's son and when they returned a few days later the roofing material had been removed from the site, all builder's supplies had been removed, and the house remained in the stage of construction that existed when the third payment was made. At this time the Reeds had paid a total of $34,713, exactly 50 percent of the contract price. Efforts to contact Respondent were not too successful and work was never resumed by Monterey Builders. Respondent testified that the profit on the contract had been booked by Monterey "up front" before any expenses were paid; that he purchased the roofing material out of funds provided by Reed; and that when the project was abandoned and the roofing material returned, this sum was credited to the Reed account. Despite the Reeds' demands that Respondent complete the contract, and the entering of a judgment in the Circuit Court for Collier County against Monterey Builders, Inc., for the sum of $37,243.00 plus costs when Monterey Builders failed to continue on the contract, the Reeds have been unable to recover any money from Respondent or Monterey Builders, Inc. Following the discontinuance of the work on this contract by Monterey Builders, Mrs. Reed filed a complaint with the Lee County Construction Board. On January 22, 1981, at a scheduled hearing of the Lee County Construction Board Mrs. Reed's complaint against Respondent was considered. The Board voted to suspend Steven Leftwich's permit privileges and forward the findings on to the State (Exhibit 1). Lee County Ordinance No. 76-11 (Exhibit 2) provides for the licensing of contractors by Lee County (issuance of certificates of competency) and for revocation and suspension of these certificates for cause. Among those causes for which certificates can be revoked is "abandonment of any contract without legal excuse or justification." This ordinance provides for notice to affected contractors by certified mail to their last known address. Respondent contends that he was unaware of the hearing at which his privileges were suspended. Exhibit 1 shows Respondent was not present at that hearing. There was no record in the Lee County file that showed notice was mailed to Respondent in accordance with Ordinance No. 76-11 requirements.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent Alexander J. Milanick should be required to pay attorney fees and costs in the amount of $4,976.00 to Petitioner Charles Osborne to compensate Petitioner for his defense of an ethics complaint filed with the Florida Commission on Ethics.
Findings Of Fact The Town of Beverly Beach, Florida has a population of about 600 located in Flagler County, Florida. It is about one mile from north to south, and occupies about .4 square miles. It is bounded on the west by the Intracoastal Waterway and on the east by the Atlantic Ocean. U.S. Highway A1A is the main north-south route through the town. Mr. Osborne is an aerospace engineer who served on the Beverly Beach Town Commission from 1997 through March 1999. He was mayor from March 1999 until 2001. He has lived at 2641 Osprey Circle, in Beverly Beach, in a home constructed at that location, since 1995. This residence is closer to the southern boundary of Beverly Beach than to the northern boundary. Dr. Milanick is a dentist who, along with his brother John, and a person named McGee, during times pertinent, owned land immediately north of Beverly Beach. On the property then and currently owned by Dr. Milanick, and east of A1A, is a restaurant named the Shark House. The premises has also been known as Crabby Joe's. In 1995, Dr. Milanick applied to the Town Commission to have his property, and that of his brother, and that of McGee, annexed into the town limits of Beverly Beach. He did this by asking a Mr. Taylor to do what was necessary to cause the annexation to occur. Mr. Taylor thereafter filed a petition with the Town Commission. By Ordinance 95-9-4, the Town Commission, in 1995, assented to the request and it was made effective November 15, 1995. The Ordinance purported to annex the Milanick property into the Town of Beverly Beach and to zone it general commercial. Mr. Osborne was not a member of the Town Commission and was not mayor during this time. The Ordinance, however, was defective in four ways. The Ordinance purported to annex the property into Bunnell, Florida; it was not properly signed by all commissioners; it was not publicly noticed; and it did not provide a legal description of the property. It was not filed with either the Flagler County Clerk of the Court or the Florida Secretary of State. The matter languished until 1997 when Dr. Milanick determined that his property had not in fact been moved within the boundaries of Beverly Beach. Dr. Milanick brought this to the attention of the Town Commission in October 1997. At a Town Commission meeting on December 3, 1997, the Town Attorney stated that he had not had a chance to look into the Milanick and Shark House issue. At a Town Commission meeting on February 4, 1998, Dr. Milanick inquired as to the progress being made on the annexation of his property and was told that the Town Attorney would get with him and discuss the procedure. Subsequently, the Town Attorney, Pat McCormick, suggested that it would be necessary to start the process from the beginning if the land was to be annexed. At a Town Commission meeting on March 4, 1998, Mayor Osborne stated that there was no benefit to the annexation of the Shark House. One member of the Town Commission suggested that they honor past commitments. Dr. Milanick was in attendance at this meeting. At a Town Commission meeting on May 5, 1999, Dr. Milanick and his brother again attended the Town Commission meeting and requested the annexation of their property and discussed the procedure that would be necessary. At a Town Commission meeting on June 2, 1999, a motion was made to go forward with Ordinance 95-9-4 and to amend the official city map and legal description to include the Shark House property. The motion passed but Mayor Osborne vetoed it. During a regular monthly meeting of the Town Commission on July 7, 1999, James Kearn, an attorney retained by Dr. Milanick, who was authorized to act for Dr. Milanick, appeared and requested that the Commission direct the Town Clerk to sign Ordinance 95-9-4 and to forward it to the county and the state in order to determine if the Ordinance was valid. This request was approved by the Town Commission. Mayor Osborne, vetoed the measure. Thereafter, the veto was over-ridden by the Commission. At a Town Commission workshop on July 21, 1999, there was additional discussion regarding the annexation of the Shark House. Mr. Kearn accused Mayor Osborne of discussing the Milanick annexation matter with Sid Crosby, Clerk of the Court of Flagler County. Mayor Osborne denied the charge. The discussion became heated and accusatory and Mayor Osborne threatened to have the sheriff eject Mr. Kearn from the meeting. Subsequent to the action of the Town Commission of July 7, 1999, the Town Clerk, Douglas Courtney, took Ordinance 95-9-4 to Syd Crosby, Clerk of the Court for Flagler County. In a memorandum dated July 26, 1999, Mr. Courtney reported to the Town Commission that Mr. Crosby would not file Ordinance 95-9-4 because it was defective. One of the defects cited was that the instrument purported to annex the land into the City of Bunnell, Florida. No creditable evidence was adduced which indicated that Mayor Osborne visited Syd Crosby for the purpose of preventing the recording of the annexation of Dr. Milanick's property. Mr. Crosby concluded from the beginning that Ordinance 95-9-4 was not recordable. Mayor Osborne suggested some solutions which would permit the annexation, including, re-submission of a proper application. Over a period of time some "glitch" bills were considered which would annex the land. However, none passed. Mr. Kearn attended the Town Commission meeting on February 2, 2000, and the minutes of the meeting noted that he was accompanied by "a person taking notes." Following this meeting, in a February 16, 2000, letter to Dennis Knox Bayer, Town Attorney, Mr. Kearn claimed that Mayor Osborne had a personal vendetta against Dr. Milanick, and that he was exercising dictatorial efforts to prevent citizens to speak at town meetings. He further demanded that ". . . all Town officials, including you as their representative, refrain from saying things that are simply and blatantly false, which only serve to incite Mr. Milanick." At a town meeting on March 1, 2000, Mr. Kearn complained about the annexation not being on the agenda and Mayor Osborne stated that a request for inclusion on the agenda had not been made in writing. Mr. Kearn was permitted to speak for three minutes, he spoke for three minutes, and immediately thereafter Mayor Osborne adjourned the meeting. On or about April 25, 2000, Dr. Milanick and his brother John, filed suit against the Town of Beverly Beach and Mayor Osborne personally, in the Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit in and for Flagler County. The suit alleged that the Town of Beverly Beach and Mayor Osborne violated the civil rights of the Milanicks. The suit alleged that Mayor Osborne had a vendetta against Dr. Milanick and should be held personally liable to Dr. Milanick. The Circuit Court dismissed the civil rights count against Mayor Osborne and the town, and this dismissal was affirmed by the Fifth District Court of Appeal. The Circuit Court also dismissed the mandamus action, finding that the 30- day limitations' period for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari applied and that a prima facie case for mandamus had not been established. The Fifth District Court of Appeal, on October 19, 2001, remanded that count to the Circuit Court with directions to grant the petition for mandamus, but upheld the dismissal of the civil rights counts. On January 23, 2003, the Circuit Court entered its Alternative Writ of Mandamus. The Writ incorporated the allegations of Plaintiff's Complaint by reference and ordered that the Defendants take whatever steps necessary to sign and record Ordinance 95-9-4. When this occurred, Mr. Osborne was no longer an elected official of Beverly Beach. The Circuit Court complaint filed by Dr. Milanick recited that the recording of the ordinance did not occur because Mayor Osborne conferred with the Clerk of the Court to block recording of the ordinance. The adoption of the matters recited in the complaint as true, by the appellate court, does not make them proven facts because no evidence was taken in the case. The complaint, moreover, alleges actions, such as being tyrannical and peevish, which could not in any event constitute a violation of a person's civil rights. The complaint does not allege that Mr. Osborne took any action, as mayor, because he wished to obtain a personal advantage and does not allege that the annexation of Dr. Milanick's real property would affect Mr. Osborne's real property in terms of value or otherwise. As of the date of the hearing, Dr. Milanick's property had not been annexed into the corporate limits of Beverly Beach. Mr. Osborne, while serving as mayor, was not helpful in causing the annexation to occur and it is apparent that his relations with Mr. Kearn were not amicable. Mr. Osborne, while serving as mayor was irascible, intimidating, and controlling. Mr. Osborne believed that the annexation would bring no benefit to Beverly Beach and believed it would, "change the town's character." Mr. Osborne gained nothing directly or personally by preventing, or making difficult, the annexation of Dr. Milanick's land. As an elected official, he was permitted to advance his own ideas with regard to what he believed would be best for Beverly Beach and for himself as a citizen and property owner of Beverly Beach. He could act in this regard so long as he did not secure a special privilege, benefit, or exemption for himself, as opposed to a general benefit. A letter signed by Mr. Kearn dated July 18, 2003, accompanied by an affidavit signed by Dr. Milanick, requested that the Commission conduct an investigation into the activities of Mr. Osborne during the period when he was the mayor of Beverly Beach. For reasons which become apparent hereafter, this letter, which had the words "Via Airborne Overnight Mail" stamped on its face, will be hereinafter referred to as the "Airborne" letter. The following statements were contained in the "Airborne" letter: Specifically, while Mayor, Charles Osborne simply refused to sign and record the ordinance duly adopted by the Town, which annexed land into the Town as a general commercial, simply because he personally did not want anymore general commercial land in the Town, which could jeopardize his personal investment in the Town. He also met with the former Clerk of Court for Flagler County, Mr. Syd Crosby, to persuade the Clerk to not record anything regarding the annexation of such land, in order to prevent the completion of the annexation. He thus plainly put his purely personal concerns, ahead of his duties as mayor, and fiduciary duty to the citizens of Beverly Beach. The mayor still refused to oblige the Town's request, or to honor the duly adopted resolution, for his own personal reasons, irrespective of his duties as mayor to the citizens of Beverly Beach.... Even worse, he met with the former Clerk of Circuit Court of Flagler County, Mr. Syd Crosby, to attempt to persuade Mr. Crosby to not record any ordinance presented by the Town, annexing the Milanicks' property. Mayor Osborne repeatedly ignored and defied the will of the Town to complete the annexation, to pursue his own personal agenda, i.e., stopping annexation of land as general commercial. The "Airborne" letter then parroted items that indicated that the Circuit Court had found to be true, as follows: Additionally, Mr. Osborne simply does not allow anyone to speak with whom he disagrees, or to address matter that he does not want addressed. Mayor Osborne has... refused to put the Milanicks' matters or requests on the Town Council agenda; taken action regarding the Milanicks' properties, without any notice to the Milanicks, or without knowledge by the Milanicks that such action was being taken against their property, as required by the Town's own law; refused to allow the Milanicks to speak to matters that affect their personal and property interests, once the Town Council had opened discussion regarding the annexation and zoning of the Milanicks' properties; blatantly and willfully misrepresented the Milanicks' positions, actions, and statements at Town meetings, beyond the scope of the privilege normally attendant to a politician's statements at such meeting, in order to defeat the Milanicks' requests, and to harm the Milanicks; refused to honor Ordinances passed by previous Town councils, as detailed above; refused to follow through with completing the annexation approved by previous council members of the Town; worked to undercut the recording of the completion of the signing of the ordinance, and the recording of the ordinance, to complete the annexation, all as detailed above. The matters in paragraph 25, are misleading because they indicate that the Circuit Court found these items to be true when in fact no evidentiary proceedings with regard to these items occurred in the Circuit Court. Moreover, the Complaint alleged several matters which Dr. Milanick either knew to be untrue, or should have known that it was untrue. Specifically, the Complaint alleged that Mayor Osborne "did not want anymore general commercial land in the Town, which could jeopardize his personal investment in the Town." This allegation implies that he was acting for some personal and specific reason financial reason, as opposed to a general opposition to development. This allegation, had it been true, would have been actionable pursuant to Section 112.313(6) The Complaint also alleged that Mayor Osborne met with Syd Crosby in order to prevent the annexation of the Milanicks' property. This allegation, coupled with the allegation as to a financial interest, bolsters the asserted improper purpose. Based on this Complaint, the Executive Director of the Commission issued a Determination of Investigative Jurisdiction and Order to Investigate, which was filed with the Commission on September 26, 2003, and assigned Complaint Number 03-091. Investigator Travis Wade of the Commission was directed to conduct a preliminary investigation into whether or not there was probable cause to believe a violation of Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, had occurred. That section reads as follows: (6) Misuse of public position.--No public officer, employee of an agency, or local government attorney shall corruptly use or attempt to use his or her official position or any property or resource which may be within his or her trust, or perform his or her official duties, to secure a special privilege, benefit, or exemption for himself, herself, or others. This section shall not be construed to conflict with s. 104.31. Mr. Osborne learned of the Determination of Investigative Jurisdiction and Order to Investigate and thereafter retained Robert J. Riggio, of the firm of Riggio & Mitchell, P.A., located in Daytona Beach, as his attorney. Mr. Riggio worked on the case from October 24, 2003, until September 29, 2004. He charged $150 per hour, which is below the customary charge in the Daytona Beach area, and the hourly rate therefore, is reasonable. He expended 33 hours which is reasonable. He expended $180 in costs. These expenditures totaled $4,976 which was billed to Mr. Osborne. He paid the bill. On April 6, 2004, a second letter dated July 18, 2003, was sent to the Commission by Mr. Kearn by facsimile. This will be referred to as the "Fax" letter. This was precipitated by a request to Mr. Kearn from Investigator Wade that he provide a copy of the original letter. The "Fax" letter differed from the "Airborne" letter. In the second paragraph of the "Fax" letter the following sentence appears: "Specifically, while Mayor, Charles Osborne simply refused to sign and record the ordinance duly adopted by the Town, which annexed land just north of Mr. Osborne's manufactured home . . . ." And in the fourth paragraph of the "Fax" letter, the following sentence appears: "The Mayor objected, because it would serve to annex land as general commercial, just north of his own manufactured home." It further stated that his motivation was ". . . stopping land as commercial near him." Mr. Kearn testified under oath that when Investigator Wade was discussing the case with him, that he, Mr. Kearn, realized the "Fax" letter was a draft that had been sent to Investigator Wade in error. Mr. Kearn said that the "Fax" letter was a draft that had subsequently been edited by Dr. Milanick who knew, July 18, 2003, that Mr. Osborne did not live in a manufactured home located immediately south of the property which was sought to be annexed. Mr. Kearn said that it the "Airborne" letter was supposed to be the operative document. He said that he realized that the "Fax" letter was being used by Investigator Wade when he was talking to him on the telephone on June 8, 2004, and that he advised Investigator Wade of the error. He testified that he made it perfectly clear to Investigator Wade that the "Airborne" letter was the operative document. Investigator Wade's Report of Investigation, however, recites that during the telephone interview of Mr. Kearn, that Mr. Kearn advised him that Mr. Osborne resided in a mobile home community immediately south of the Milanick property, while he served as mayor and that Mr. Osborne's interest in stopping the annexation was to use his position for his personal benefit. At the hearing, Investigator Wade stated under oath that Mr. Kearn advised him during their telephone conversation that Mr. Osborne resided in a mobile home community immediately south of the Milanick property while he was serving as mayor. Investigator Wade stated that the issue of whether or not Mr. Osborne lived in the immediate vicinity of the Milanick property was the key element in his investigation because if that were true, stopping the annexation could be a personal benefit to Mr. Osborne. Mr. Wade was a disinterested and credible investigator and witness and his testimony is taken as true and accurate. Mr. Osborne did not live in either a manufactured or mobile home. The type of home he lived in is irrelevant. What is relevant is that Mr. Osborne did not live adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the Milanick property. In fact, Mr. Osborne did not live near the north side of town. He lived closer to the south side of town and it is unlikely that the annexation of the Milanick property would have an economic effect on Mr. Osborne's property. Mr. Kearn was aware of Mr. Osborne's resident address because he had him served with a civil suit at his residence in 2000. Mr. Kearn knew that Mr. Osborne did not live in a mobile home community, or in a manufactured home near the Milanick property, or anywhere near it. Nevertheless, he asserted that to be true when he talked to Investigator Wade. Mr. Kearn is the attorney and agent of Dr. Milanick. Mr. Kearn is, therefore, the alter ego of Dr. Milanick so that the actions of Mr. Kearn, are the actions of Dr. Milanick. The Commission, found in their Public Report, dated September 8, 2004, that Mr. Osborne's opposition to the annexation was not connected to any desire to secure a benefit for himself. The Commission dismissed the Milanick complaint on a finding of "no probable cause."
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Ethics enter an order requiring Dr. Milanick to pay Mr. Osborne $4,976.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of July, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of July, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Kaye Starling, Agency Clerk Commission on Ethics 3600 Maclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 James J. Kearn, Esquire James J. Kearn, P.A. 138 Live Oak Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114-4912 Gary S. Edinger, Esquire 305 Northeast First Street Gainesville, Florida 32601 Martin A. Pedata, Esquire Martin Pedata, P.A. 505 East New York Avenue, Suite 8 DeLand, Florida 32724 Robert J. Riggio, Esquire Riggio & Mitchell, P.A. 400 South Palmetto Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Bonnie J. Williams, Executive Director Commission on Ethics 3600 Maclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phillip C. Claypool, General Counsel Commission on Ethics 3600 Maclay Boulevard, South, Suite 201 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Virlindia Doss, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. By its Administrative Complaint filed February 21, 1980, the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board (herein sometimes referred to as the Board), seeks to indefinitely suspend the Certified General Contractor License No. CGC007304 held by Robert L. Huffman (herein sometimes referred to as the Licensee or Respondent) and requests that his license not be reissued until Respondent provides to Petitioner proof of compliance with the Collier County Industry Licensing Board. Additionally, Petitioner seeks to impose an administrative fine of five hundred dollars ($500.00) against Respondent. Specifically, Petitioner alleges that Respondent abandoned a construction project without legal excuse in violation of Collier County Ordinance 78-2, 4.1.3 and thereby violated Section 468.112(2)(h), Florida Statutes. Based thereon, Petitioner alleges that Respondent willfully and deliberately disregarded and violated the local applicable building codes and laws in violation of Section 468.112(2)(a), Florida Statutes. Respondent, Robert L. Huffman, entered into a contract with Mack and Lois Trent of Columbus, Ohio, for the construction of a residence in Collier County on February 10, 1978, for a cost of $41,950.00. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1.) Pursuant to the terms of the contract entered into between the parties, Respondent agreed to use his best efforts to deliver the completed residence within one hundred fifty days (150) from the start of construction. The evidence reveals that construction commenced on June 1, 1978. (Respondent's Exhibit 1.) The Trents became dissatisfied at the pace that the Respondent constructed their residence and filed a claim with the local Collier County Construction Board. The Trents did not release the final 10 percent of the contract price to Respondent since, according to the Trents, the house was not completed as scheduled. As a result of the complaint filed by the Trents with the local building officials, Raymond Dulaney, Jr., Building Administrator for the Collier County Building Administration, visited the Trent property on July 23, 1979, and issued a check list of incomplete items to Respondent which was memorialized by letter dated July 23, 1979. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2.) That list contained approximately nineteen (19) items which remained incomplete at the time of Mr. Dulaney's visit to the Trents' residence. When the Trents withheld the construction monies, there was approximately seven thousand dollars ($7,000.00) remaining in the construction loan to be used by Respondent to complete construction of tie Trents' residence. During May of 1979, Respondent and the Trents had a discussion with regard to the rate of progress on their residence. The Trents then advised Respondent that they had planned to utilize the home for rental purposes to offset the mortgage payments. According to the Trents, they sustained a loss of approximately five thousand eight hundred twenty-four dollars and ninety-eight cents ($5,824.98) which amount reflects a rental loss beginning approximately March 1, 1979, until the home was completed during November of 1979, plus travel and other incidental expenses. The Trents rented the home during December of 1979. On October 10, 1979, Respondent and the Trents entered into an agreement respecting the problems connected with the Respondent's construction of the Trents' residence. Based on the agreement, Respondent was released from the building contract and likewise, the Trents were also released from any and all further obligations that they had under the building contract dated February 10, 1978. (See Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 2.) Additionally, Respondent installed a sprinkler system for the Trents at no additional cost. Raymond Dulaney, Jr., related the circumstances surrounding Collier County's investigation and determination of a complaint filed by the Trents against Respondent. Mr. Dulaney confirmed that he forwarded to Respondent a letter dated July 23, 1979, advising of the incomplete items remaining for the final inspection for the Trent residence. The results of the charges filed by the Trents against Respondent resulted in an action by the Collier County Board preventing Respondents from "pulling" building permits. (Petitioner's Exhibits 4, 5, 6, 7, 10 and 11.) A certificate of occupancy was issued for the Trent residence on October 29, 1979. RESPONDENT'S DEFENSE Respondent denied that there was any abandonment of the Trent residence. Instead, Respondent maintains that when the construction funds were withheld by the Trents, there was a delay in construction which Respondent argues cannot be regarded as an abandonment. Respondent acknowledged that there were some problems in getting the subcontractors to complete their phase of the construction which was aggravated by the Trents withholding of construction monies. Finally, Respondent points out that the parties entered into an agreement which resulted in a release of obligations and claims by both parties (Trents and Respondent). That release gave the Trents the right to retain the remaining monies, which amount was more than sufficient to complete their house. Respondent noted that the parties entered into the agreement for the construction of their residence on February 10, 1978, and that a notice of commencement could not be issued until June because the Trents had not completed their arrangements for financing. Respondent acknowledged that when the owners withheld construction monies that were due, he was unable to complete the construction of their residence with his own money, resulting in the usual problems with subcontractors in situations where monies were unavailable. Respondent also points out that the house was approximately 90 percent complete when the funds were withheld and that even given the nature of the problems respecting the withholding of construction monies, construction progressed at a normal rate. In support of that statement, Respondent pointed out that in Collier County during the period in question, two hundred twenty to two hundred thirty (220 to 230) days was the average period required for completion of a residence. Respondent met with the Trents' attorney, a Mr. McMahon, on October 9, 1978, at which time he (Respondent) provided attorney McMahon a list of all contractors who were owed monies and a release was signed the following day at Naples Federal Savings and Loan Association. To satisfy the Respondent's agreement to reimburse the Trents at the rate of four hundred dollars ($400.00) per month for every month that their residence was not completed, Respondent gave the Trents a sprinkler system plus a final release of all claims for monies due him as part of the settlement. Respondent has not applied for any permits in Collier County since approximately February of 1979. When Respondent and the Trents entered into their settlement, the terms of the release agreement encompassed a discussion and made provision for rents and all other items due the Trents. Richard McDole, Administrative Director of Code Enforcement for Lee County, Florida, is in charge of taking action on citizens' and other complaints filed against builders in Lee County, Florida. Director McDole was familiar with Respondent's work and had encountered no problems relative thereto in Lee County, Florida.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Sections 112.4143(3)(a), and (4), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994), by committing the acts alleged in the Order Finding Probable Cause and, if so, what penalty is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact All times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent served as a member of the Mexico Beach Planning and Zoning Board (Zoning Board). Respondent began his service on the Board in mid-March, 1995. In that public position, Respondent was subject to the requirements of Part III, Chapter 112, Florida Statutes, the Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees. Respondent owns and operates a marina in Mexico Beach, Florida which he sought to expand. To accomplish the expansion, Petitioner needed to purchase certain parcels of property adjacent to his marina and have the parcels rezoned from single family residential to tourist commercial. If the Zoning Board granted the rezoning request, Respondent planned to buy the land and expand his business. The Zoning Board is empowered to make decisions relative to the zoning or rezoning of property in Mexico Beach, Florida. Thus, on June 12, 1995, Respondent presented to the Board a request to rezone certain parcels of property adjacent to his marina from single family residential to tourist commercial. Respondent participated in the Zoning Board's discussion on the matter. However, prior to his participation in the discussion, Respondent failed to formally announce his interest of the matter. Respondent failed to file a written memorandum disclosing his interest in the matter prior to the June 12, 1995, Board meeting. Respondent also failed to make an oral disclosure of his interest in the matter at the June 12, 1995 Board meeting. Respondent abstained from voting on the rezoning request on June 12, 1995, but did not file a Memorandum of Voting Conflict with respect to the rezoning request within fifteen days of that meeting. The matter was reheard by the Board on August 1, 1995. At that time, Respondent again made a presentation and requested that the Zoning Board rezone the property adjacent to his marina. Following his presentation, Respondent also participated in the Zoning Board's discussion of the matter. Respondent's objective in participating in the discussion was to persuade the Zoning Board to grant the rezoning request. However, prior to his participating in the Zoning Board's discussion, Respondent failed to formally announce his interest in the matter. Respondent did not file a written memorandum prior to the August 1, 1995, Zoning Board meeting disclosing his interest in the matter. On August 1, 1995, Respondent abstained from voting on the rezoning request, but did not file a written memorandum disclosing his interest in the rezoning request within fifteen days of the Zoning Board meeting. Respondent filed a Form 8B, Memorandum of Voting Conflict with respect to the rezoning matter, but did not do so until August 24, 1995.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Final Order and Public Report be entered by the Florida Commission on Ethics finding that Respondent, Jim McCullough, violated Sections 112.3143(4) and 112.3143(3)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994), and imposing a civil penalty of $200.00. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of April 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUMCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of April 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Eric Scott Assistant Attorney General Attorney's General's Office The Capitol PL-01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Kerrie Stillman Complaint Coordinator Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Box 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Mr. Jim McCullough 105 North 36th Street Mexico Beach, Florida 32410 Bonnie Williams Executive Director Florida Commission on Ethics Suite 101 2822 Remington Green Circle Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool General Counsel Florida Commission on Ethics Suite 101 2822 Remington Green Circle Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
Conclusions An Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings has entered an Order Closing File in this proceeding. A copy of the Order is attached to this Final Order as Exhibit A.
Other Judicial Opinions REVIEW OF THIS FINAL ORDER PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.030 (b) (1) (C) AND 9.110. : Page 2 of 4 Final Order No. DCA-GM-211 TO INITIATE AN APPEAL OF THIS ORDER, A NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE DEPARTMENT’S AGENCY CLERK, 2555 SHUMARD OAK BOULEVARD, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-2100, WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DAY THIS ORDER IS FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE SUBSTANTIALLY IN THE FORM PRESCRIBED BY FLORIDA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.900(a). A COPY OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL AND MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE FILING FEE SPECIFIED IN SECTION 35.22(3), FLORIDA STATUTES. YOU WAIVE YOUR RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW IF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL IS NOT TIMELY FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK AND THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL. MEDIATION UNDER SECTION 120.573, FLA. STAT., IS NOT AVAILABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUES RESOLVED BY THIS ORDER. CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that the original of the foregoing has been filed with the undersigned designated Agency Clerk, and that true and correct copies have been furnished bo, bbe persons listed below in the manner described, on this — day of May, 2009. Paula Ford Agency Clerk David S. Sadowsky, Esquire Pinellas County Board of County Commissioners 315 Court Street Clearwater, Florida 33756 Sandra Lee Snyder 4851 164° Avenue North Clearwater, Florida 33762 David S. Waddell Pinellas Grove’s Hamlet Citizens Committee 4851 164 Avenue North Clearwater, Florida 33762 Page 3 of 4 Dennis G. Ruppel, Esquire Johnson, Pope, Bokor Ruppel & Burns LLP 911 Chestnut Street Clearwater, Florida 33756 Page 4 of 4 Final Order No. DCA-GM-211
