Findings Of Fact The Petitioner made application to the Board and its physician assistant committee for certification as a physician assistant, pursuant to Section 458.347(7)(b), Florida Statutes. After three appearances before the committee, the committee recommended and the Board voted to deny his application by order of February 9, 1993. That order indicated that the Petitioner had failed to demonstrate to the committee's satisfaction that he had received a medical education, as the term is defined and employed in Chapter 458, Florida Statutes (specific citations omitted). The Petitioner timely sought a formal proceeding to contest that denial, which resulted in the matter being referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings and the undersigned Hearing Officer for conduct of that proceeding. The Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged, in pertinent part, with administering the provisions of Chapter 458, Florida Statutes, and related rules involved in regulating entry and licensing of persons entering the physician assistant professional field. Among other duties, the Respondent agency is charged with ascertaining whether an applicant for certification has completed an appropriate medical education so as to be entitled under the relevant statutes for admission to the certification examination. Such a determination was made in this case, which resulted in the denial of the application and this formal proceeding. In addition to finding in its order of February 9, 1993 that, in effect, the medical education of the Petitioner was deficient under the relevant statutes, the Board also determined that there were discrepancies in the applications on file with the Board and in the supporting documentation and testimony before the Physician Assistant Committee (Committee). The Board also determined that due to the extended length of time since the Petitioner last worked in the field of clinical medicine and because of the length of time since any significant medical education or training had taken place, the Petitioner had not established that he was currently able to practice as a physician assistant with reasonable skill and safety to the public, as envisioned by Sections 458.331(4) and 458.301, Florida Statutes (1991). Prior to the hearing, the Hearing Officer granted a motion to amend the denial order to add as a basis for denial the Petitioner's alleged ineligibility to sit for the examination for certification because of failure to pay the required fee. See Section 458.347(7)(b), Florida Statutes. A passing score on the certification examination is a prerequisite to being certified as a physician assistant. There are certain discrepancies between the applications that the Petitioner filed with the Board, as well as with regard to documentation submitted to the Committee and to the Board. The Petitioner filed three applications with the Board. On each, he, in essence, swore that he had carefully read the questions on the application, had answered them completely without reservation, and that all statements were true and correct. On all of the applications, the questions required the applicant Petitioner to be specific as to the medical schools attended, to account for each year, and to list all universities and colleges attended where medical training was received. On the first application, the Petitioner stated, in response to the question to list all universities or colleges attended or where medical training was received, that he attended Universidad Central De Este (UCE) from November 1977 to August 1980, and that he attended CETEC University from August 1980 to June 1982. When he appeared before the Committee, he acknowledged also attending classes or receiving training at Ross University (formerly known as the University of Dominica). After that appearance before the Committee, he filed a second application and in response to the same question concerning his medical education, he responded that he had attended UCE from November 29, 1977 to August 24, 1980; that he attended the University of Dominica (Ross) from August 24, 1980 to August 7, 1981; and that he attended CETEC University from August 24, 1980 to June 12, 1982. Thus, he claimed that his attendance at Ross and CETEC actually overlapped. Documentation submitted, contained in Petitioner's exhibit 17 and in the Respondent's composite exhibit, reveals that he was not accepted as a student at CETEC until August 7, 1981, however. Subsequently, he filed a third application. On this application, he, in response to that same question, as pertinent to this issue, listed attendance at UCE from November 29, 1977 to August 24, 1980; at University of Dominica from August 24, 1980 to August 6, 1981; at CETEC from August 7, 1981 to June 12, 1982; at CJ Institute from April 26, 1982 to June 8, 1982; at Adelphi University from April 4, 1981 to June 12, 1981; and CETEC (graduation) on June 12, 1982. The Petitioner, at the hearing, admitted that he had not completed an application listing Ross University until after the Committee already knew he had attended Ross. When asked at the hearing why he omitted Ross from his first application, he testified that he did not put it on the application because he did not consider that he had attended Ross. This response as to why he had made a misrepresentation on his initial application is lacking in credibility. His own testimony and evidence established that he took examinations at Ross on August 24 and 25, 1980, but he paid $9,000.00 in entrance fees to Ross in the fall of 1980, that Ross arranged a psychiatry clerkship, that he took a course in physical diagnosis specifically because Ross informed him that he needed to do so in order to take future medical clerkships; that he paid $75.00 in the spring of 1981 for malpractice coverage for those clerkships under the alleged auspices of Ross and that he was still considered a student at Ross when he began his pediatric clerkship. If he did all of this educational effort supposedly in connection with Ross University, according to his own testimony and other evidence, it is unbelievable that he could not have considered that he had attended Ross University when he filled out the subject application. His own sworn affidavit submitted to the Board explaining why he did not list Ross on the applications stated that he did not list Ross University because he did not think that there were any transcripts to indicate that he had attended Ross. He testified and stated on affidavits to the Board that the reason he transferred from Ross to CETEC was because of a sudden demand by Ross for an additional $24,000.00 in order for him to continue his education there, in excess of the amount the initial agreement had provided for. Even if that is the case, it does not change the fact that, by his own testimony, he knew that he had attended Ross University and did, in fact, attend it. Thus, under all of these circumstances, it is apparent that, for whatever reason, he intentionally misrepresented this portion of his educational history. Another discrepancy or area of misrepresentation occurred on the three applications concerning the medical clerkships which the Petitioner supposedly completed. On all three applications, he was requested to specifically describe and account for each clerkship, giving specific dates, type of rotation, the name and location of the hospital, institution or individual where or with whom the clerkship was performed or supervised. He was required to list all affiliated universities or colleges. In responding to this question, he listed on his first application the following: Psychiatry October 13, 1980 to January 1, 1981. Pediatrics July 13, 1981 to December 4, 1981. Internal medicine September 7, 1981 to October 5, 1981. Internal medicine October 5, 1981 to February 1, 1982. Surgery February 1, 1982 to April 30, 1982. OB/GYN May 1, 1982 to June 6, 1982. On the second application, he added a third internal medicine clerkship stating that it took place from October 3, 1981 to February 28, 1982. It thus overlapped his surgery clerkship. On his fourth application, he added a clerkship for radiology, showing that that clerkship had taken place from February 1, 1982 to April 30, 1982. During parts of February 1982, the Petitioner was taking clerkships in three subject areas at the same time, internal medicine, surgery, and radiology, if the disclosures on his third application are true. In discussing the radiology clerkship on cross- examination, the Petitioner acknowledged that it was somewhat of a combined surgery and obstetrics and gynecology clerkship as part of the same program. The Petitioner received an M.D. degree from CETEC. He began his medical education at UCE. He attended this university as a resident student on its campus. His transcript from UCE shows a lack of a passing score on nine courses. Ross University wrote a letter to him dated June 16, 1981, which he, in turn, provided to the Board, to the effect that he needed transcripts from UCE showing passing scores in histology, biochemistry, neuroanatomy, micro- biology, or that he would otherwise receive F's in those courses. However, the later CETEC transcript shows that CETEC "convalidated" those four courses, even though there was no evidence that he passed them. Convalidation means that the courses were accepted as having been taken and passed at another school. In fact, the accuracy and sufficiency of his medical education is complicated by the fact that his CETEC transcript credits him with courses as having actually been taken at CETEC that even the Petitioner acknowledges were not actually taken at CETEC, such as: community health III and IV, human behavior III, physiopathology, and family medicine. His speculation as to what courses he took at UCE must have counted at CETEC misses the point that CETEC does not "count" them as convalidated, but as taken at CETEC. These discrepancies bring into question the validity of his CETEC education and the documentation submitted regarding it. Whether the inaccuracy is the Petitioner's or attributable to the fault of CETEC is of no moment in determining whether the Petitioner actually received the medical education claimed or the medical education actually "documented". The Petitioner called into question Ross University's record-keeping accuracy, blamed Ross for changing its requirements, for losing his records, and allegedly reneging on certain promises, such as counting courses he supposedly previously took at UCE. However, the Petitioner has not shown any explanation of the CETEC record-keeping "errors" which give him credit for completion of courses at CETEC which he did not even take at CETEC, for his completion of courses at UCE which UCE documents as incomplete, nor for his completion of courses or credits at Ross for which there is no documentation either. It is also noted that he "attended Ross" without ever going to its campus and attended "CETEC" by only appearing on campus for his graduation. Additionally, besides the discrepancies in the academic courses established, there were a number of discrepancies related to the clerkships and preparation for the clerkships. The first of these was that he stated that he had to take a course in physical diagnosis before he could take a pediatrics clerkship through Ross. He therefore obtained an old family friend, Dr. Fleisher, to teach him physical diagnosis. Additionally, he took two nursing courses in physical diagnosis at Adelphi University. Dr. Fleisher is not an M.D., however, but rather is a podiatrist. Dr. Winchester, testifying as an expert in the medical field at hearing, established that a podiatrist cannot teach a physical diagnosis course sufficiently detailed and thorough for a medical student seeking an M.D. degree because a podiatrist is trained, experienced and qualified only to practice at or below the knee. When podiatrists are on hospital staffs in Florida, they may admit patients for surgery, but they must have an M.D. perform the history and the physical examination because of their limited expertise. See, Section 461.003(3), Florida Statutes. A medical student cannot obtain the appropriate education and physical diagnosis by taking a nursing course. In fact, physical diagnosis is an integral part of any quality medical education program and, although it may not be taught as a separate course in all of the accredited medical schools in the United States, it is taught as part of the ongoing education by the faculty of the medical school itself. Students are not sent off to find their own tutors or to attempt to obtain physical diagnosis training from taking nursing school courses in medical schools or medical education programs which are deemed in Florida to be programs or schools which have furnished their successful graduates an adequate medical education. It is thus found, based upon Dr. Winchester's testimony, that the Petitioner's education under the auspices of Ross or CETEC, whichever it was, did not constitute a medical education with regard to the physical diagnosis education. The clerkships were not taught by faculty members of medical schools or in teaching hospitals. In fact, the Petitioner began the pediatrics clerkship under the auspices of one school and finished under the auspices of another school. As established by Dr. Winchester at hearing, this would be unheard of in an accredited medical school in the United States. Since the clerkships are supervised by faculty of the medical school, a student would not transfer medical schools without having to change from one school's clerkship program to another. In addition, the clerkships are characterized by physicians writing letters of verification as to their clerkships or observerships. An observership is an educational experience in which a student only observes what is going on with regard to a particular procedure and does not actually participate. Finally, the testimony revealed that the Petitioner received clinical credit for taking an examination preparation course. This, too, would be unacceptable in a legitimate medical education setting, as shown by Dr. Winchester. Additionally, it is noted that three of the clerkships, internal medicine, surgery, and radiology all overlapped in some point in time, with all three being taken during February of 1982. A clerkship is essentially a full- time experience. A medical education, as that term is used in Florida, does not contemplate taking multiple clerkships at the same time. It is expected that a medical student will give full attention to the area of study and to the patients to which the student is assigned during the clerkship. This cannot be done if three clerkships are being performed at the same time. That this might be perceived as inadequate, even by the Petitioner, is evident in his letter of November 11, 1992 to the Board in which he stated that he had not mentioned his radiology clerkship previously because it overlapped his surgery clerkship. In summary, as to the clerkships, it is determined that they were not of the quality required to be considered a medical education in the State of Florida. This finding is based upon the testimony of Dr. Winchester, which is accepted over that of the Petitioner. Ability to Practice with Reasonable Skill and Safety The testimony and evidence of record does not indicate that the Petitioner has had an adequate medical education. In addition to the inadequacies in his medical education described in the above Findings of Fact, he has not practiced medicine since his graduation from medical school in 1982 nor has he had employment or practice experience related to the field of medicine. He has not worked in a hospital, doctor's office, clinical laboratory, or any other setting in which he might keep his medical knowledge current. He has taken a large number of continuing medical education courses of late, since he filed his initial application. The concept of continuing medical education, however, is that a person should be continually building on an actual basic medical education. The Petitioner has not demonstrated that he is currently able to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety because of this lack of continuing medical experience and education when added to the basic inadequacy of his underlying medical education, as proven by the evidence in this record. Examination Fee Section 458.347(7)(b)1., Florida Statutes, requires that an applicant pay the application fee and the examination fee. This statutory provision specifically provides that the applicant must pay the fee for the examination and if he is later deemed ineligible to take the examination, then the fee will be refunded. The Petitioner admits that he never paid the examination fee. He insists that he should not have to pay the fee until after he is declared eligible for the examination. While one can understand the applicant feeling that he should not have to pay the fee until after being ruled eligible, the legislature decided otherwise and directed that the fee be paid in order for an applicant to be considered eligible for the examination on a threshold basis. Ms. Faircloth testified that the names of students who were to take the examination have to be sent to the Bureau of Examination Services prior to the examination so that expense and other arrangements can be made for the correct number of examination booklets and proctors for the practical examination. This is a practical policy reason underlying the passage of the statute providing for the advance payment of the fee and for the manner in which the agency interprets that statute. Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates Examination. The Petitioner submitted evidence that he had obtained a score of 65 on the Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates Examination (ECFMGE). He thus maintained at hearing that he was eligible for certification as a physician assistant simply because he had received a score of 65. This evidence was presented and admitted over objection by the Respondent on the grounds that the Respondent had not been placed on notice of such issue because it was not raised in the petition. Be that as it may, the Petitioner has failed to establish eligibility for examination under that provision for the reasons stated in the Conclusions of Law below.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Board of Medicine denying the Petitioner's application for certification as a physician assistant. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of October, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of October, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-1310 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-5. Accepted. 6. Rejected, as not in itself dispositive of the issue presented. 7-15. Accepted. 16. Rejected, as unnecessary and immaterial. 17-23. Accepted. 24. Accepted, but not itself dispositive of material issues. 25-30. Accepted, in part, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and to some degree not supported by the preponderant evidence of record. 31-33. Rejected, as immaterial. 34-35. Accepted. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter, although the fact that he took a physical diagnosis course from Dr. Fleischer is accepted. Rejected, as not itself materially dispositive of the relevant issues. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as not in itself dispositive of material issues. 39-43. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and not in themselves materially dispositive findings of fact. 44. Rejected, as not supported by the preponderant evidence of record. 45-46. Accepted, but not in themselves materially dispositive. 47. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. 48-50. Accepted, but not in themselves materially dispositive findings of fact. 51-60. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as not entirely in accord with the preponderant evidence of record. 61-73. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and not in their entirety materially dispositive. Rejected, as not entirely in accord with the preponderant evidence of record and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted, but not itself material, and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted, but not itself materially dispositive. 77-84. Accepted, in part, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and not in themselves materially dispositive. 85. Accepted. 86-98. Accepted, but not in themselves materially dispositive, and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. 99-101. Accepted, but not in themselves material. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-31. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert J. Boyd, Esquire BOND & BOYD 411 East College Avenue Post Office Box 26 Tallahassee, FL 32302 M. Catherine Lannon, Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol, PL-01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Ms. Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Jack McRay, Esquire General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
The Issue The issues for determination in this case are: 1) whether Respondent, the Agency for Health Care Administration has made a nonrule policy statement which constitutes a “rule” as defined in Section 120.52(15), Florida Statutes, which in substance states that a hospital, licensed as a general hospital as defined in Section 395.002(10), Florida Statutes, may use the term “children’s hospital” and otherwise hold itself out and advertise as a “children’s hospital” without obtaining a license as a specialty hospital for children as defined in Section 395.002(27), Florida Statutes, and Rule 59A-3.02, Florida Administrative Code; 2) whether such agency policy statement, if made, constitutes a “rule” as defined in Section 120.52(15), Florida Statutes; 3) whether such agency policy statement, if made, has been adopted by rule as provided for in Section 120.54, Florida Statutes; and, 4) whether such agency policy statement, if made, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority as defined in Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, ALL CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL, INC. (ALL CHILDREN’S), is a licensed Class II Children’s Specialty Hospital located in St. Petersburg, Florida. ALL CHILDREN’S is licensed for 168 beds, including 108 acute care beds, 36 Level II neonatal intensive care (NICU) beds, and 24 Level III NICU beds. Historically, since its founding in 1926, ALL CHILDREN’S has been primarily committed to providing medical services to children, although ALL CHILDREN’S does provide limited services to adult patients, including a shared open heart surgery program with Bayside Medical Center. Petitioner, VARIETY CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL, INC., d/b/a MIAMI CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL (VARIETY), is a licensed Class II children’s specialty hospital located in Miami, Florida. VARIETY is licensed for 268 beds, with 218 acute care beds, 20 psychiatric beds, 7 Level II NICU beds, and 23 Level III NICU beds. Respondent, FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION (AHCA), is the agency of the State of Florida vested with the statutory authority for administering the provisions of Chapter 395, Florida Statutes, relating to hospital licensure and regulation. Intervenor, ST. JOSEPH’S HOSPITAL INC. (ST. JOSEPH’S), is licensed as a Class I general acute care hospital located in Tampa, Florida. ST. JOSEPH’S is licensed for 883 beds, with 799 acute care beds, 42 adult inpatient psychiatric beds, 15 Level II NICU beds, and 27 Level III NICU beds. ST. JOSEPH’S operates a pediatric unit within the hospital which is designated as Tampa Children’s Hospital at ST. JOSEPH’S. ST. JOSEPH’S uses this designation in its publications and advertisements. Intervenors, FLORIDA STATUTORY TEACHING HOSPITAL COUNCIL and SHANDS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA (SHANDS), intervened jointly; however, the primary party substantially affected by the issues raised in this case is SHANDS. SHANDS is a statutory teaching hospital located in Gainesville, Florida. SHANDS is licensed as a Class I general acute care hospital and has 568 beds including 484 acute care beds, 24 adult inpatient psychiatric beds, 18 child inpatient psychiatric beds, 30 Level II NICU beds, and 20 Level III NICU beds. SHANDS provides children’s health care services in a distinct pediatric unit within the hospital. SHANDS uses the term “children’s hospital” in its publications and advertisements regarding the provision of the services in its pediatric unit. Intervenor, SOUTH BROWARD HOSPITAL DISTRICT d/b/a MEMORIAL REGIONAL HOSPITAL and JOE DIMAGGIO CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL (MEMORIAL), is licensed as a Class I general acute care hospital located in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. MEMORIAL is licensed for 680 beds, including 515 acute care, 100 adult inpatient psychiatric beds, 36 comprehensive rehabilitation beds, 10 Level II NICU beds, and 19 Level III NICU beds. MEMORIAL operates the Joe DiMaggio Children’s Hospital (which MEMORIAL has registered as a fictitious name) as a distinct pediatric unit within MEMORIAL, and uses the term “children’s hospital” in its publications and advertisements. Intervenor, HOSPITAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF LEE COUNTY d/b/a LEE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL (LEE), is licensed as a Class I general acute care hospital located in Ft. Myers, Florida. LEE is licensed for 427 beds, including 367 acute care beds and 60 comprehensive medical rehabilitation beds. LEE also is licensed for its Health Park campus which contains 220 beds. Within the hospital LEE operates a distinct pediatric unit which has been designated the “Children’s Hospital of Southwest Florida” (registered as a fictitious name), and which designation LEE uses in its publications and advertisements. THE AGENCY STATEMENT As indicated above, the Petition filed in this case alleges that AHCA has made the following nonrule policy statement which constitutes a rule: The Agency for Health Care Administration takes the position that a hospital licensed as a general hospital, pursuant to Chapter 395, can designate itself as a “Children’s Hospital” and advertise such hospital status to the general public, without following the requirements of Rule 59A-3.202 and 59A- 3.201(65) and without obtaining a license as a Class II Specialty Hospital for Children. In this respect, Rule 59A-3.202(1), Florida Administrative Code, provides that AHCA will license four classes of hospital facilities. In pertinent part, the rule provides: 59A-3.202 Classification of Hospitals. The agency will license four classes of facilities: Class I or general hospitals which includes; General acute care hospitals with an average length of stay of 25 days or less for all beds; Long term care hospitals, which meet the provisions of 59A-3.201(31); and Rural hospitals designated under s. 395, Part III, F.S. Class II specialty hospitals offering the range of medical services offered by general hospitals, but restricted to a defined age or gender group of the population which includes; Specialty hospitals for children; and Specialty hospitals for women. Class III specialty hospitals offering a restricted range of services appropriate to the diagnosis, care, and treatment of patients with specific categories of medical or psychiatric illnesses or disorders which include; Specialty medical hospitals; Specialty rehabilitation hospitals; Specialty psychiatric hospitals, which may include beds licensed to offer Intensive Residential Treatment programs; Specialty substance abuse hospitals, which may include beds licensed to offer Intensive Residential Treatment programs; and Class IV specialty hospitals restricted to offering Intensive Residential Treatment Programs for Children and Adolescents, pursuant to s. 395.002(16), F.S. Regulation of advertisement by licensed hospitals is provided for in Section 395.003(1)(b)1., Florida Statutes, which states: (b)1. It is unlawful for any person to use or advertise to the public, in any way or by any medium whatsoever, any facility as a “hospital” or “ambulatory surgical center” unless such facility has first secured a license under the provisions of this part. For several years, and at least since 1990, concerns have been expressed to AHCA and its predecessor agency, the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), regarding the use of the term “children’s hospital” by Class I general acute care hospitals. While not adopting a specific agency position on this issue, Sharon M. Gordon-Girven, the former HRS Director of Community Health Services & Facilities Regulation and Health Facilities, by letter dated June 1, 1990, expressed the following concerns regarding the legal permissibility of the portrayal of pediatric beds within a general hospital as a separate and distinct licensed facility: The portrayal of the pediatric beds as a separate and district licensed entity from the licensee, Baptist Medical Center, may not be legally permissible. I call this to your attention so that you can obtain a legal interpretation concerning the provision of Chapter 395.003(1)(b)1. Subsequently, by letter to ALL CHILDREN’S dated March 17, 1994, Gloria Crawford Henderson, then Director of the Division of Health Quality Assurance for AHCA, expressed continuing agency concerns: First, let me address the issue as it relates to unlicensed acute facilities. Let me assure you that it is this agency’s policy to vigorously enforce the prohibition in section 395.003(1)(a), Florida Statutes (F.S.), against the establishment or operation of any hospital without first obtaining a hospital license. This agency will respond to any allegation received of any unlicensed facility operating and advertising itself to the public as a children’s hospital. Second, if I am correctly interpreting your letter, your clients’ greater concern is about licensed general hospitals that advertise to the public that they are in whole or in part a children’s hospital, although they have not been licensed as a specialty hospital, as defined in section 395.002(27), F.S. I too, am concerned with public perception, as it relates to this matter. Specifically, a hospital license issued by this office represents an assurance to the public that a hospital meets certain standards of safe and quality care. Clearly, a specialty children’s license, or a general acute license that includes specialty children’s beds/services as approved by the certificate of need office, represents to the public that the hospital has fulfilled particular certificate of need and licensure regulatory requirements related to children’s services. The same assurances of specialized capability and quality of care cannot be made to the public in the absence of such a specialty license or specialty notation on a general license. I believe that the hospital licensure rule as written, Chapter 59A-3, F.A.C., does not adequately address this issue. The rule is presently being substantially revised and it is my intent to include this issue in the revision. It is my objective to clarify the circumstances under which a hospital may advertise children’s services, relative to the statutory licensure and certificate of need framework under which this office regulates hospital quality of care. We will keep you informed as to the status of our rulemaking efforts, and invite your input regarding proposed language. Again, I appreciate you bringing this matter to my attention, and trust that we will be able to achieve a resolution that is satisfactory to the industry as a whole while preserving the integrity of the licensure process and its assurances of public safety and quality of care. On January 20, 1995, AHCA published proposed Rule 59A- 3.202(2) which provided the following restrictions on advertising by licensed hospitals: (2) Licensed hospitals may not advertise to the public, by any medium whatsoever, that they are a specialty hospital, unless they have been licensed as a specialty hospital, as defined in s. 395.002(27), F.S. Proposed Rule 59A-3.202(2), as set forth above was thereafter challenged under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. AHCA then withdrew the proposed rule on advertising restrictions, and on July 13, 1995, the proposed rule challenge case was closed by the Division of Administrative Hearings. By letter dated April 11, 1996, in response to an inquiry by SHANDS, Daryl Barowicz, Supervisor of Hospital and Outpatient Services for AHCA, made the following statements regarding the agency’s position: This is in response to your recent letter and your subsequent telephone conversation with Mr. Elmo Elrod regarding Shands Hospital proposal to establish a Children’s Hospital within a Hospital. You will recall from your conversation with Mr. Elrod, that last year they agency proposed Rule 59A-3.202(2), which in essence would have prohibited licensed hospitals from advertising to the public that they are a specialty hospital, unless they had been licensed as a specialty hospital, as defined in s. 395.002(27), Florida Statute. The rule was challenged and the agency subsequently withdrew the rule, with the plan to develop standards for children’s hospitals in the coming months. The first workshop for developing children’s hospital standards was held on January 12. These standards will apply to free-standing premises, as well as portions of hospitals. Any facility that does not meet the requirements once they are established, will no longer be allowed to advertise itself as a “Children’s Hospital.” Although the present rules would not prohibit Shands from doing what they are proposing to do, we believe that they should consider the potential ramifications of this new rule, once it is adopted. The evidence does not establish that Respondent AHCA has made the specific statement set forth in the allegations of the Petition filed in this case; however, at final hearing in this case, the agency representative, Tanya Williams, AHCA’s Bureau Chief for the Bureau of Health Facility Regulation, testified that it is AHCA’s current position that the provisions of Sections 395.002 and 395.003, Florida Statutes, do not vest the agency with the statutory authority to regulate advertising by licensed hospitals beyond the express limitations of Section 395.003(1)(b)1., Florida Statutes. Because the statute contains no express limitation regarding specialty designations in advertising by licensed hospitals, the agency has taken the position that a rule prohibiting the use of the term “children’s hospital” in advertising by Class I general hospitals is without legislative authority. Accordingly, the agency has in substance adopted the nonrule policy statement at issue in this case. Status of Agency Rulemaking Subsequent to the agency’s withdrawal of proposed Rule 59A-3.202(2) in 1995, the agency has continued development of rules regarding standards for children’s hospitals, and conducted workshops for the development of such rules. The rules currently under development by the agency do not provide for restrictions on advertisement by licensed hospitals. Operation and Advertisement of Children’s Hospitals As indicated above, AHCA is in the process of developing rules regarding standards for children’s hospitals in Florida. On a national level, the National Association of Children’s Hospitals and Related Institutions (NACHRI) has promulgated criteria for children’s hospitals. Membership in NACHRI is limited to those hospitals and institutions which meet NACHRI’s membership criteria. The membership criteria require a commitment to providing children’s medical services, and include specific medical staff training and teaching, organizational support for the pediatric program, appropriate resource allocation, and community involvement. Petitioners, ALL CHILDREN’S and VARIETY, are the only hospitals in Florida with full institutional membership in NACHRI. Intervenor SHANDS has associate membership in NACHRI. Several charitable organizations, including the Children’s Miracle Network raise funds for children’s medical needs. ALL CHILDREN’S currently holds the franchise for the Children’s Miracle Network in central Florida. Advertising for charitable contributions for children’s medical needs may enhance the contributions to a medical institution. AHCA has not received any complaints regarding deceptive or misleading advertisements regarding children’s hospitals.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is ORDERED that the Petition filed in this matter is hereby DISMISSED. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. RICHARD HIXSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of April, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald B. Sternstein, Esquire Frank P. Rainer, Esquire RUDEN, MCCLOSKY, SMITH, SCHUSTER and RUSSELL, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 815 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard P. Ellis, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Building 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Carroll Webb, Executive Director Administrative Procedures Committee Holland Building, Room 120 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300 R. Terry Rigsby, Esquire Wendy Delvecchio, Esquire Richard A. Lotspeich, Esquire BLANK, RIGSBY & MEENAN 204 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mark K. Delegal, Esquire John C. Taylor, Jr., Esquire TAYLOR, DAY & RIO 311 South Calhoun Street, Suite 206 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Glenn Burton, Esquire SHEAR, NEWMAN, HAHN & ROSENKRANZ 201 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 1000 Tampa, Florida 33601-2378 Robert C. McCurdy, Esquire Hospital Board of County Commissioners Post Office Box 2218 Ft. Myers, Florida 33902-2218 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue Whether Lazaro Saavedra is eligible for licensure by endorsement as a registered nurse in Florida, as provided in Chapter 464, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 210, Florida Administrative Code?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Lazaro Saavedra, received his education in Cuba (Tr. 109). There is evidence that he attended medical school for a period of four to five years beginning in 1960 (Tr. 109, 110, 119; JX-4), but he did not complete his medical education (Tr. 109). Petitioner asserts that he attended nursing school in Cuba from 1959 to 1962 (Tr. 108), and was licensed to practice nursing in Cuba (Tr. 118-119, 125). The record in this cause is devoid of any documentation of Petitioner's nursing education. While a witness apparently had a paper that may have been some sort of copy of Petitioner's nursing degree, it was neither identified for the record or offered into evidence (Tr. 85, ln. 11-15; 86, ln. 2-6). Petitioner attempted to prove his nursing education by his own testimony, but he was unable to describe well the content of his nursing program (Tr. 124, ln. 24-25, 125). He was unclear and imprecise regarding the dates of his nursing education and its overlap with his medical education (Tr. 109, 110, 124). The only testimony Petitioner offered to prove his attendance in nursing school, other than his own, was that of Bruno Barreiro. Mr. Barreiro knew Petitioner to be a nursing student (Tr. 91). He later saw Petitioner on "rounds" at a hospital (Tr. 92), but stated that medical students and nursing students took rounds together (Tr. 99). The witness expressed no knowledge of Petitioner as a graduate or as a practicing licensed nurse (Tr. 91, 98). Petitioner attempted to prove his nursing education and licensure in Cuba by the testimony of witnesses who "knew him as a nurse" in Cuba. Alicia de la Rua is a Florida licensed nurse who worked in the same hospital as Petitioner in Cuba for three months in 1964 (Tr. 55, 56, 59). They did not work together (Tr. 59), but were on the same ward in separate men's and women's sections (Tr. 61). Ms. de la Rua never saw Petitioner's nursing diploma or license (Tr. 60) and has no personal knowledge that he attended nursing school in Cuba (Tr. 61). She did see him dressed as a nurse and acting as a nurse in the principal hospital in Matanzas, Cuba (Tr. 55, 61-62). Francisca Garcia is licensed as a nurse in Florida. She met Petitioner in 1965 or 1966 in the clinic Petitioner's father and brother, who were medical doctors, operated in Havana (Tr. 69, 91, 118-119). Petitioner treated Ms. Garcia's nephew by giving him a vaccination (Tr. 70). In Cuba that treatment could have been performed by someone with a medical education or even a nurse's aide (Tr. 70). Although Ms. Garcia states that she saw Petitioner's diploma or license at the clinic (Tr. 65, ln. 9-15), no such document has been offered in this proceeding, and her testimony about the diploma is not persuasive due to Petitioner's failure to offer any copy of the degree for admission into evidence, although a copy was apparently available at the hearing. See Finding of Fact 2, above. Petitioner first sought licensure in Florida in 1977 (JX-4). The basis for that application was his incomplete medical education, and the application was denied (Tr. 111, 117). On that application, Petitioner did not indicate any nursing education, either under "Official Name of Nursing Program" (JX-4, ln. 8) or under a question regarding receipt of nursing education in another country (JX-4, ln. 10). The latter question was left blank; all other questions on the application were answered (JX- 4), including that Petitioner had not written a nursing licensing examination before. Petitioner again applied for licensure by examination in 1981 (JX-5). On the 1981 application, Petitioner did refer to his nursing education, but in vague terms, giving the Official Name of Nursing Program as "Registered Nurse" (JX-5, ln. 8). This application also contains the false statement that Petitioner had never before made application for licensure in Florida (JX-5, ln. 9), and the statement that he had not written a nursing licensing examination before. Petitioner applied for licensure a third time, this time by endorsement rather than by examination, in an application received by the Board on May 18, 1984 (JX-3). This application contains several false statements or omissions. Petitioner again failed to advise the Board of his previous applications (JX-I, section 4E). Petitioner stated that he had never held a license to practice nursing in another country (JX-3, section 4F). Petitioner again stated that he had never written a nursing licensure examination in Florida or any other state or country (JX-3, section 6A). Petitioner made a further false answer to the question "Have you ever been denied a license to practice nursing in Florida . . .?" (JX-3, section 6D). Truthful answers to these questions are necessary so that the Board and its staff may review sufficiently and evaluate an application, taking into consideration any previous Board actions (Tr. 146, 147). To prove eligibility for licensure by endorsement, an applicant who was educated and licensed in Cuba before a prescribed date must demonstrate that licensure by means of official documents (Tr. 140). If original documents are unavailable, as is often the case with Cuban nurses (Tr. 98), the Board requires some other competent, substantial proof, including affidavits of other nurses or doctors licensed both in Cuba and in Florida (Tr. 140, 149). Those affidavits must be consistent with other information received by the Board concerning the applicant's qualifications (Tr. 149). The Board amended its rules by emergency rule effective May 18, 1984 (RX-1), to provide that nurses licensed in Cuba prior to December 31, 1961, would be eligible for licensure by endorsement upon successful completion of a refresher course (Tr. 142, 143). Although Petitioner purportedly graduated from nursing school after that date, the Board reconsidered his application because he had been approved to begin and had completed the refresher course at Miami-Dade Community College before the effective date of the emergency rule (Tr. 144, 145). Petitioner completed the variable time nursing refresher program at Miami-Dade (Tr. 46; JX-2), which was a 16- week course designed for people who had never taken a licensing examination (Tr. 45, ln. 9-14). This program contained no clinical component or direct patient care (Tr. 46, 47). According to the dean of the Miami-Dade program, Dr. Jeanne Stark, who also developed the program (Tr. 46, 47), an individual with a medical background but who had not had a nursing education could successfully attend and complete the 16-week variable time refresher program (Tr. 47-50). Petitioner was approved to take the refresher course by the Board (Tr. 51), prior to his 1984 application, on the basis of affidavits provided by the Cuban Nurses in Exile Association that he was licensed in Cuba (Tr. 141, 142). Those affidavits are no longer relied on by the Board as proof of licensure because of inconsistencies and inaccuracies in them (Tr. 141, 144).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Board of Nursing enter a final order DENYING the application of Lazaro Saavedra for licensure by endorsement. DONE AND ORDERED this 4th day of April 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR., Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April 1986.
Findings Of Fact On August 7, 1984, the Petitioner, Abraham W. Chames, executed an application for examination for licensure as a medical doctor which was filed with the Florida Department of Professional Regulation on behalf of the Board of Medical Examiners, (now Board of Medicine), on August 9, 1984. Among other information required on the application was a section requesting information regarding the applicant's medical education. That question reads as follows: Be specific. Account for each year. List all universities or colleges where you attended classes and received training as a medical student. In response and on each of four lines which required the name of the medical school and location and the dates of attendance, the applicant listed the names of the appropriate universities. These were: Universidad Del Noreste/Tampico, Mexico, from August, 1978 to June 1979. Universidad Del Noreste/Tampico, Mexico, from August 1978 to June, 1979 [sic] CETEC University/Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, from June, 1980 to June, 1981. CETEC University/ Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, from June, 1981 to December 1981. The question immediately preceding the one just described requires the applicant to list all places of residence since initiation of medical training. In response, the applicant listed, Tampico, Tamps, Mexico, from August, 1978 to June, 1980 and on the second line, Miami Beach, Florida from June, 1980 to June, 1982. For the question that requires the applicant to account for all time from date of graduation to present, the Petitioner stated: "Started my residency in family medicine at the University of Miami: June 83 until present." Dr. Chames also indicated on his application that his Doctor of Medicine degree was obtained from CETEC University, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic from which he graduated on December 12, 1981. As a part of the narrative reports submitted with his application and relating to the period of time spent at CETEC University from June, 1980 through December, 1981, Dr. Chames stated: "During this time, I performed all of my required and elective clinical rotations under the auspices of CETEC University and its New York City based office of C.J. Institute. I lived at 1247 West Avenue, Apt No. 1, Miami Beach, Florida." By so doing, he explained the apparent ambiguity between his place of residence and his medical education during the period, June, 1980 through December, 1981. The rotations taken and the dates thereof were thereafter listed immediately below the above-cited statement. It should be noted that all the rotations were completed at hospitals in the Miami, Florida area. It is not at all unusual for situations like this to happen and it is not improper. Along with the application submitted by Dr. Chames was a certification that he had successfully passed the examination of the Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates, (ECFMG), which he took on July 21, 1982. On August 20, 1984, Dr. Chames was notified by the Board that it had been advised by the ECFMG that as of March, 1984, that body was withholding verification of its certificates for individuals with medical credentials issued in the name of CETEC University because of alleged irregularities with regard to these medical credentials. The Board requested that Dr. Chames waive the 90 days that it had for approval or denial of his application for licensure, which he did. ECFMG subsequently verified Dr. Chames' certification and this information was sent directly to the Board. On September 18, 1984, the Board advised Dr. Chames that he would be required to appear personally before the Foreign medical Graduate Committee, (FMGC), of the Board when notified. Two days later, on September 20, 1984, the Board advised him that his application was considered incomplete because he had failed to submit a copy of his medical school diploma, (notarized and certified as a true and correct copy) and a certified translation thereof. He was further advised that he had failed to submit an accounting for all of the time between December, 1981 and May, 1983, and a FLEX application with Part A completed. On August 23, 1985, Dr. Chames submitted a notarized affidavit in which he attempts to account for all time from December, 1981 through May, 1983 as requested. On August 15, 1985, Ms. Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director of the Board, notified Petitioner that his application was still considered incomplete because of the failure to submit certain documentation including his diploma and translation thereof, an examination fee, a standard ECFMG certificate, photographs, letters of recommendation, an accounting for all of the time since graduation, and a FLEX application. By letter dated August 23, 1985, Dr. Chames' counsel, Deborah J. Miller, forwarded a notarized copy of the medical school diploma certified by the U.S. Vice-Consul, a notarized copy of the original translation thereof, a notarized copy of the ECFMG clearance, a notarized copy of the original standard ECFMG certificate, an accounting of Dr. Chames' time since graduation, and a comment that the addition application fee requested had been forwarded previously. The two photographs requested were forwarded by counsel on September 3, 1985. In her September 3, 1985 letter, Ms. Miller indicated she understood the ECFMG would contact the Board directly in the event that written verification had not been received by the time Dr. Chames was to appear before the FMGC. On September 27, 1955, the Board, by letter, advised Dr. Chames, (the salutation refers to Dr. Eaton) that he was required to appear personally before the FMGC at Sarasota on October 4, 1985. Dr. Chames appeared as required and was examined verbally by committee members, primarily Dr. Robert Katims, Chairman, on his credentials as a graduate of CETEC. His answers apparently raised some further questions and an extract of the minutes of that committee meeting reflects that Dr. Chames, a candidate for licensure by examination and a graduate of CETEC University, received a... unanimous vote to recommend unfavorably for examination based upon a total lack of credibility, deliberately failed to tell the truth in the application process. It cannot be determined in whose handwriting this notation was made. Dr. Katims, who was Chairman of the FMGC since its founding until just prior to the hearing, examined Dr. Chames from the file maintained by the Committee on foreign medical graduates. The Petitioner's testimony was not of a nature to inspire confidence in his credibility. He was hesitant in his answers and those which he gave were, if not evasive, at least not definitive. While acknowledging he made several mis-statements of fact on his application, Petitioner contended these were made through honest error rather than through design. He was obviously not believed by any committee member. No doubt this antipathy toward the applicant, manifested by the blatant hostility and outrage evidenced by Dr. Katims during his questioning and his threats to carry the matter further, even to the pressing of criminal charges if available, indicates that no matter what Dr. Chames would have said, the likelihood of his being voted upon favorably was remote. The file examined by Dr. Katims and the committee consisted of the application, letters of reference, test scores and other matters relevant to the candidate's suitability for licensure. This file documentation is knows as the Agenda Book. The Agenda Book maintained on Dr. Chames was reviewed by Dr. Katims prior to Petitioner's appearance. In his evaluation of this file, Dr. Katims looked primarily at Petitioner's application to take the ECFMG exam and his attention was drawn to the sites of medical education listed thereon. The file contained several different applications which, when reviewed, reflected that on two, Dr. Chames listed his medical schools as Del Noreste and Dominica and on a third he listed CETEC and Del Noreste. Dr. Katims also noted a different listing for undergraduate education. He did not look so much at the dates listed, though dates are important. At that time, his policy as Chairman and that of the committee, was to look closely at CETEC graduates because of that institution's reputation for fraud in the issuance of diplomas. It was his understanding that several people associated with CETEC, including some applicants, had been jailed in the United States and as a result, CETEC graduates got a lot of scrutiny. In fact, Dr. Katims threatened to "...pursue this beyond the actions of this Board, if it seems appropriate, along the lines indicated by Board Counsel...." The Board's counsel had just previously noted a change in the Florida law to make it a criminal offense to obtain or attempt to obtain a license by knowing misrepresentation. Dr. Katims categorically denies that he felt all CETEC students were trained by this "stink of corruption". In fact, he recalls many CETEC graduates have been voted upon favorably after they had been afforded an opportunity to prove their credentials and discuss their applications before the committee. As a result, Dr. Katims felt he did not prejudge the Petitioner. Dr. Katims has interviewed many applicants during his term in office and this includes many CETEC graduates. Consequently, he looked closely at Dr. Chames' application but it was the discrepancy in the applications and the applicant's failure to clarify it satisfactorily that was the problem here, not the fact that he was a CETEC graduate. Dr. Chames was called before the FMGC because it was felt necessary to have him amplify his file and give greater information on his actual scholastic residence. This was because several applicants had told Dr. Katims their only visit to the CETEC campus was to get their diploma. This is exactly what Dr. Chames stated in his interview. Though enrolled at both (Dominica) Ross and CETEC at the same time, he says he did not attend any classes at either campus, did not ever visit the (Dominica) Ross campus, and in fact visited the CETEC campus only once, in December, 1981, to get his diploma. In short, it appears that neither school required regular on-site educational activities. In substance, the Board considered that Dr. Chames' attendance at CETEC raised a question that required a more detailed examination. However, Dr. Katims, on behalf of the committee, clearly contends that CETEC graduates were held to no more strict standards of qualifications than other graduates of foreign medical schools. With regard to this Petitioner, the Board only looked at the educational discrepancies. Nothing else was looked into by the committee before it's report the next day to the full Board. Dr. Katims felt that Petitioner's story was "incredible." He could not accept Petitioner's story that he simultaneously applied to and attended both CETEC and Dominica (Ross) and concluded that Dr. Chames deliberately falsified his application. The discrepancies regarding the schools attended were not consistent with his explanation, and to this date, Dr. Katims feels the same way. He concludes that Petitioner lied in his applications and may have conspired with unknown others to do so but he has no proof of a conspiracy. The important issue to Dr. Katims was initially the caliber of education available at both (Dominica) Ross and CETEC. It was only when Petitioner testified and his testimony was felt to be "incredible" that the issue became his credibility. Dr. Chames graduated from Miami-Dade Community College with an AA degree; then from Yeshive University in New York with a BA degree and thereafter from Florida International University with a BS degree. He then entered Universidad Del Noreste medical school in Tampico, Mexico where he actually attended classes for two years. At his hearing before the FMGC, he stated that during his fourth semester there, he decided to transfer and looked into two medical schools both located in the Caribbean. They were the University of Dominica (Ross) and CETEC. He contends that he applied to both, took some entrance exams for Dominica which he passed and paid some initial fees to that school. He states, however, that it was CETEC that he stayed with and from which he got his degree. According to Dr. Chames, this was a tumultuous time for foreign medical schools. Many students of these institutions wanted to come back to do their obligatory rotations in the United States. As a result, he enrolled in both schools, though he felt affiliated with Dominica (Ross) and paid it only. CETEC indicated he could pay later. In the fall of 1981, he switched to CETEC because a number of states were determining that students of proprietary foreign medical schools could not do U.S. residencies. CETEC was considered to be a higher quality school and had a greater legitimacy in the Dominican Republic. It was a viable school in disciplines other than medicine and was not categorized as an "offshore" medical school. Dr. Chames was expelled from Dominica (Ross) on July 12, 1982, because he failed to pay for the fourth year of medical school. He had, by this time, transferred his credits to CETEC and had graduated from there in December, 1981. Neither school had a requirement for on-campus participation. Students paid their money and turned in the paperwork, and the rotations--the learning periods spent in active hospitals--which constitute the greatest part of the last two years of medical school, were done in the United States. In reality, Dr. Chames arranged his clerkships and rotations by himself. When asked by the various hospitals to which he applied where he was in school, he would say either Del Noreste, Dominica (Ross), or CETEC depending on the time in question. He claims he considered himself to be a student at both Dominica (Ross) and CETEC at the same time. He gave his clerkship evaluations, however, only to Dominica (Ross) until the end of the fourth year of training, when he also gave one to CETEC. He first started paying fees to CETEC and provided a clerkship evaluation there in the fall of 1981, even though he says he considered himself a student there from the beginning. He intended to graduate in December, 1981. This date was established in the fall of 1981 when he started sending CETEC the evaluations of clerkships he had completed almost two years previously which had already been sent to Dominica (Ross). Dominica (Ross) required the taking of a basic second examination upon starting and a final examination prior to graduation unless one took and passed the ECFMG examination. Petitioner admittedly failed the final at Dominica (Ross). CETEC required no examinations. He took and passed the ECFMG exam long after he graduated from CETEC. Petitioner applied to CJ Institute, CETEC's U.S. affiliate, in November, 1981. He contends that he had applied to CETEC previous to that time, but paid no money to CETEC until approximately two weeks prior to graduation, and he got credit from CETEC for rotations/clerkships performed while enrolled at Dominica (Ross). In reality, what appears to be the fact, and it is so found, is that Dr. Chames was enrolled for by far the greatest majority of the last two years of his medical training at Dominica (Ross). Having failed the final examination and being concerned over the ECFMG examination, he looked around and found another medical school that would grant him a diploma based on work done at his former institution, Dominica (Ross). This he found in CETEC which had no requirements and was willing to give him full credit for all work performed at or under the auspices of Dominica (Ross). It would graduate him, awarding him a medical degree upon payment of the required fees, even though no work was done either in the classroom or in rotations while enrolled at that university. When the applicant subsequently filled out the forms for admission to licensure in Florida, he unfortunately listed only CETEC and not Dominica (Ross) as his medical school, even though the application form instructed him to list all schools and omit nothing. He admits that since he did his rotations, and since CETEC granted him credit for them even though he did them while enrolled at another school, he didn't feel it necessary to list Dominica (Ross) as one of his schools. Notwithstanding the apparent lapse as defined above, Respondent's reputation for honesty is generally good. His wife for almost nine years, who has known him since he was fifteen, considers him a most honorable man who makes no distinction between his personal and business ethics which are high in both categories. Though she is an attorney and notarized at least one of the applications he filled out, she did not discuss them with him. She has no reason to believe that they were not accurate and knows no reason that Petitioner would falsify them as she knows he dearly wants to be a doctor. When he filled out his applications, he did them based on his recollection and not on files or documents. She knows he has a terrible memory for dates and numbers and this may have contributed to his mistake. Mrs. Chames' testimony is not credited highly as to her failure to discuss the applications with her husband, however. Dr. Lynn Carmichael, Chairman of the Department of Family Medicine at the University of Miami Medical School, supervised the Petitioner in the Family Practice service at Jackson Memorial Hospital when Petitioner was a resident there. Petitioner's employment file contains all materials received regarding him including evaluations, letters, applications, etc., and a review of this file reveals that all evaluations rendered on Petitioner over the three years of his residency were above average. At the time Petitioner applied for the residency program in October, 1982, he listed his medical school as CETEC University. While he was in the residency program, Petitioner consistently performed in an outstanding manner in all six criteria considered and his reputation for truth and veracity, a highly important factor in evaluation, is good. Dr. Carmichael became aware of the denial of Petitioner's application for licensure after the fact and is aware now of the reasons therefor. Based on his knowledge of the Petitioner, he does not feel that Dr. Chames is a perjurer, or a liar, or would deliberately falsify an application. He was very surprised at the result of the committee hearing because the facts discussed there did not fit in with his evaluation of Petitioner. In fact, his peers at the University Hospital thought so highly of Dr. Chames, that if he had been licensed, the hospital was going to ask him to stay on for a fellowship, for which a license is required. Dr. Carmichael does not consider the listing of the medical school on the application for as a particularly important factor in evaluating foreign medical graduates for the simple reason that these graduates are required to show ECFMG certification which, in fact, the Petitioner was able to do. Ms. Deborah Miller, an attorney specializing in administrative and governmental law, represented Petitioner in his efforts to apply for licensure in Florida. He was concerned that foreign medical graduates were being unduly scrutinized and discriminated against in the licensing process. In this case, the Board of Medicine had asked Petitioner to waive the 90 days they had to rule one way or another on his application and she looked into this for him. In doing so, she procured the Petitioner's application file and went over it item by item with a representative of the Board. It was after this that Dr. Chames was notified of his requirement to appear before the FMGC, as were most foreign medical graduates and all CETEC graduates. Ms. Miller wrote to the Board just before the meeting to see if there was anything else in Petitioner's file than that of what she had been notified and was told that there was not. However, an AMA profile on Petitioner was in the file which listed both CETEC and Dominica (Ross) medical schools and this document may not have come to her. In the past, it has been Ms. Miller's experience that the Board does not always give a "full" file upon request, at times holding matters back. Based on what she knew, Ms. Miller had no reason to believe Dr. Chames had concealed anything regarding his application. Had Petitioner told her that he had applied to both CETEC and Dominica (Ross), she would have advised him to amend his application to correctly reflect the situation which could have been done at that time. On cross examination, Ms. Miller indicated that Petitioner told her that he applied to CETEC and Dominica (Ross) because he had heard of CETEC and was impressed by its good reputation. When he was accepted at CETEC, he dropped all further dealings with Dominica (Ross). He felt the board was concerned more with the courses and rotations not with which school was listed on the application form. This third story regarding Dr. Chames' reasons for switching from Dominica (Ross) to CETEC, clearly establishes that his application forms were consciously filled out; that he knew what he was doing; that his omission was more-than mere oversight; and that he was not particularly concerned with the accuracy of his application and the requirements for forthrightness contained on the face of it. On all of the reports of rotations and clerkships submitted to Dominica (Ross) during the time he was enrolled there and performing them, Dr. Chames was always highly rated and no adverse comments about his ability, his sensitivity, his patient relationships or his integrity was ever raised. There is no doubt that Dr. Chames possesses the clinical and technical skills necessary to be an excellent physician. He also apparently possesses the sensitivity to patients which separates a healer from a technician. In substance, then, it is found that Dr. Chames was enrolled for the last two years of his medical education at Dominica (Ross) and completed the course work/rotation/clerkships satisfactorily. Unfortunately for him, Dominica (Ross) required the passing of an examination prior to the award of the medical diploma, which Dr. Chames failed once and chose not to taken again. He found another school, CETEC, that would award him his medical degree upon payment of the required fees on the basis of the work done while a student at Dominica and without any work being done under the auspices or supervision of CETEC at all. Thereafter, when he applied for licensure in Florida, notwithstanding the fact that the application form clearly required a listing of all medical schools attended, Dr. Chames neglected to list his enrollment at Dominica (Ross), choosing instead, to list only his graduation from CETEC. It is this failure to list Dominica, coupled with the apparently false listing of the true term of the CETEC enrollment which constitutes the discrepancy of such grave concern to the Board and, the ultimate basis for its denial of Petitioner's application. Notwithstanding the apparent hostility of the Chairman of the FMGC and his predisposition to vote unfavorably on this Petitioner's application, it would appear that the unfavorable vote was justified and appropriate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's current application for examination as a physician in Florida be denied. RECOMMENDED this 14th day of April, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-1438 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. By Petitioner Petitioner failed to number his proposed Findings of Fact. To facilitate identifying them for ruling, I have numbered them consecutively as they appear in the Proposed Recommended Order. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted except for the reason for changing schools which is contrary to the better evidence. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted as to date of filing and schools listed. Rejected as to his reason for failing to list Dominica, Petitioner's different stories as to the point make it impossible to determine why he failed to list Dominica. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted except for words "sting of corruption" which should be "stink of corruption." Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Sentence 1 rejected as comment and not a Finding of Fact. Sentence 2 accepted. Sentence 3 & 4 rejected as speculation. Sentence 5 accepted. Sentence 6 rejected as argument. Sentence 7 accepted. Sentence 8 rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of the evidence. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Rejected as irrelevant except for the last sentence which is argument, not Finding of Fact. Sentences 1-3 rejected as argument. Sentence 4 et seq. accepted. By Respondent Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. First sentence accepted, Second sentence rejected as irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Sentences 1 & 2 accepted. Sentences 1 & 2 rejected as recitations of the evidence. Sentence 3 rejected as contrary to the better evidence. Sentence 4 et seq. are recitations of the evidence and not Finding of Fact. Rejected as a recitation of the evidence. Accepted. No numbered paragraph. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Florida Board of Medicine 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold M. Braxtone Esquire Suite 406, Datran Center 9100 South Dadeland Blvd. Miami, Florida 33156 Catherine Lannon, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs Room 1601, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, James K. Hester, applied for licensure as a medical doctor in Florida. The Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged with administering and enforcing the statutory and regulatory standards by which physicians enter the practice of medicine in Florida as well as by which the practice of medicine by licensed physicians in Florida is regulated and enforced. The Petitioner's application was for licensure by endorsement. That application was denied on the basis that the Petitioner's supervised clinical training was not obtained in either a hospital affiliated with a medical school accredited by the LCME or in a residency program accredited by the ACGME in a specialty area in which the Petitioner's clinical training was done. This requirement is set forth in Rule 21M-22.018 (a substantial reenactment of former Rule 21M-22.18), Florida Administrative Code, the so-called "clerkship rule." The Petitioner's supervised clinical training at issue in this proceeding involved clerkships in internal medicine, surgery, obstetrics and gynecology, and pediatrics. The Petitioner performed the clerkships in 1983 and 1984. The parties have stipulated that the clinical clerkship performed by the Petitioner at Englewood Hospital in New Jersey in the area of internal medicine was an approved clerkship under the requirements of the above Rule. Therefore, the only clerkships at issue concern those in surgery, obstetrics and gynecology, and pediatrics, which were performed at Englewood Hospital by the Petitioner. In determining which clerkships comply with the Rule, and thus which hospitals are affiliated with accredited medical schools in certain specialty areas and in determining which residency programs are accredited by the ACGME in specified specialty areas, the board commonly and customarily relies on a directory or compilation of accredited programs which depicts medical training programs on a nationwide basis which are accredited by the ACGME. This compilation is generally relied upon by professionals in the medical education field as well as by medical licensing regulatory agencies nationwide. Its compilations of accredited medical schools and affiliated hospitals and accredited residency programs are compiled by the ACGME which organization in turn is accepted as authoritative in determining such matters, as is depicted on the face of the above-cited Rule. 1/ Englewood Hospital is not affiliated with a medical school which is accredited by the liaison committee on medical education in the specialty areas in which the Petitioner's disputed clinical training was performed. The hospital does not have a residency program accredited by the ACGME in the specialty areas in which the Petitioner's clinical training was performed. Although residents training in a residency program of other hospitals in the area accredited by the ACGME rotated through Englewood Hospital and took training in the relevant specialty areas in which the Petitioner participated, the Petitioner was not a participant or enrolled member in those residency programs of the other hospitals whose residents trained in part at Englewood Hospital. Although the Petitioner participated in some of the clinical training programs which residents affiliated with training programs at other hospitals participated in at Englewood, in addition to not being enrolled in residency training with those other hospitals and accredited programs, it was not shown he participated in all of the required "rotations" of those accredited training programs which full complement of rotations was the essential basis for the accreditation of those residency programs. Although Englewood Hospital had a relationship with the unaccredited medical school from which Petitioner graduated and certified the completion of his clerkships at Englewood, the Petitioner's training was not certified by an accredited residency program or hospital, because the Petitioner and his medical school had no affiliation with those accredited hospitals and residency programs who happened to have participants training at Englewood. Thus the Petitioner's clerkships in the disputed specialty areas were not verified as to their completion by any hospital affiliated with an accredited medical school or whose residency program was accredited by the above organization. Englewood Hospital was not approved or accredited for training in surgery, obstetrics and gynecology, or pediatrics for the years 1983-1984 at issue, as clearly shown by Respondent's Exhibit 1 in evidence.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Board of Medical Examiners denying the application of James K. Hester for licensure as a medical doctor in the State of Florida. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of October, 1986 in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 1986.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, David U. Ewing-Chow, filed an application for licensure by examination as a medical doctor with respondent, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners, on February 24, 1984. The application was reviewed and considered by respondent at a meeting on December 2, 1984, and proposed agency action denying the application was issued on January 9, 1985. As grounds for denying the application, the agency stated that: . . . the applicant has not demonstrated to the Board that he is capable of safely engaging in the practice of medicine with reasonable skill and safety. See Section 458.311 (3), F.S. Further, the applicant has not graduated from medical school or college as required by Section 458.311(1)(b), F.S. The proposed agency action prompted this proceeding. In his request for a hearing, petitioner challenged the agency's signs, and contended he satisfied both objections raised by the agency. Petitioner first enrolled as a regular medical student in October, 1969 at the University of the West Indies in Kingston, Jamaica. He remained in the school's medical program until he failed the preclinical examination a second time in 1972. Because successful completion of that examination was required to remain in medical school, he withdrew from school and moved to England. There he successfully completed the conjoint preclinical examination administered by the Conjoint Society of Apothecaries Preclinicals in London, England. Having passed that examination, Ewing-Chow was readmitted in October, 1972 to the University of the West Indies as a non-degree seeking student to pursue clinical medical courses to qualify him to take the licensure examination in England. Although he was a special student, Ewing-Chow's curriculum was identical to the coursework required of medical degree seeking students. He completed the program in 1975, but did not receive a medical degree from the university. After completing his medical coursework, EwingChow returned to England where, based upon his medical education, he qualified to take the examination for a License in Medicine and Surgery administered by the Society of Apothecaries of London (Society). To qualify for this examination, one need not graduated from a medical school. The Society is not a school or university, and offers no instruction. Rather, it conducts examinations for a License in Medicine and Surgery, and is described in The World Directory of Medical Schools as a "nonuniversity licensing bod(y)." After passing the examination EwingChow received a "Diploma of Licentiate in Medicine and Surgery" from the Society. The Diploma of Licentiate is not a degree in medicine, but is a title or qualification which allows the individual to "temporarily" register for an internship. A one-year internship is required before one can be issued a certificate of registration by the General Medical Council (Council), a statutory body responsible for registering all medical practitioners in Great Britain. Like the Society, the Council grants no degrees, but merely issues a certificate of registration to qualified physicians. In the case at bar, Ewing-Chow completed a one-year internship program in both Trinidad and the University of West Indies. Thereafter, he was certified in full registration by the Council and was accordingly authorized to practice medicine in the United Kingdom. Full registration is the British equivalent to a license to practice medicine in the United States. He also received a license to practice in the European Economic Community. In addition, he is licensed to practice in Trinidad, Jamaica and Tobago. After spending some thirty months in Trinidad as a government physician, Ewing-Chow moved to Miami, Florida in September, 1980, and enrolled in the three-year residency program in the Department of Family Medicine at Jackson Memorial Hospital. He successfully completed this program in June. 1985 and is now chief resident in the family practice residency program. As such, he is in charge of supervising thirty-six other residents in the program. He is eligible to take the examination for board certification in the family practice specialty, but must first be licensed by the State of Florida in order to take the examination. Ewing-Chow has also submitted his credentials to the Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates (ECFMG), and has passed the examination administered by that body. The evidence clearly demonstrates that Ewing-Chow is capable of safely engaging in the practice of medicine with reasonable skill and safety. This was attested to by the chief of family practice at the University of Miami School of Medicine at Jackson Memorial Hospital and is evident from Ewing-Chow's present responsibilities as chief resident in that program.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of David U. Ewing-Chow for licensure as a medical doctor by examination be DENIED. DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of March, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of March, 1986.
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent’s denial of Petitioner’s Level II appeal should be upheld or whether the inpatient residential mental health services provided to R.H. by McLean Hospital’s 3 East Dialectical Behavior Therapy (“DBT”) program from September 9, 2015, through September 22, 2015, and again from October 15, 2015, through December 11, 2015, were “medically necessary” and therefore covered under the terms of the State Employees’ PPO Group Health Insurance Plan.
Findings Of Fact DSGI is the state agency responsible for administration of the state group insurance program, pursuant to section 110.123, Florida Statutes. Petitioner, A.H., is a State of Florida employee and was insured through the State Employees’ PPO Group Health Insurance Plan (the “Plan”). R.H., the child of A.H., was eligible for coverage under A.H.’s health insurance policy as of September 1, 2015. Pursuant to contract, Florida Blue acts as DSGI’s third-party medical claims administrator for employee health insurance benefits. New Directions is Florida Blue’s subcontractor and third-party administrator for mental health and substance abuse reviews and authorizations. “Utilization management” is the process of reviewing a service claim to determine whether the service is a covered benefit under the Plan and whether the service is “medically necessary” as that term is defined in the Plan. In cases involving mental health or substance abuse services, the service must also satisfy the more detailed and specific coverage guidelines, titled “Medical Necessity Criteria,” established by New Directions.1/ Consistent with general practice in the field, the “medical necessity” criteria of the New Directions document observe the following levels of care, in increasing order of intensity: psychiatric outpatient; psychiatric intensive outpatient; psychiatric partial hospitalization; psychiatric residential; and psychiatric acute residential. In the interests of conserving medical resources and preserving patient liberty, safety, and dignity, every effort is made to place patients in the least intensive level of care consistent with effective treatment of their presenting condition. R.H., a female who was 15 years old during the period relevant to this proceeding, has been diagnosed with borderline personality disorder and has a history of eating disorders. Her treating psychologist in Florida, Nicolle Arbelaez Lopez, noted that R.H. was also being treated for generalized anxiety disorder. R.H. had an inpatient admission to the Renfrew Center in Florida for eating disorder treatment in May 2015. R.H. transitioned to partial hospitalization over the summer, followed by a step down to the Renfrew Center's intensive outpatient program, then by a step up back to partial hospitalization when her eating disorder behaviors worsened. Though less intensive than a full residential admission, intensive outpatient treatment and partial hospitalization allow patients to receive comparatively intensive treatment while remaining in their home environment.2/ R.H.’s final discharge from the Renfrew Center was on August 21, 2015. At the time she was admitted to McLean Hospital’s 3 East DBT program, R.H. had a recent history of engaging in superficial cutting of her arm. On August 30, 2015, R.H. intentionally hit herself in the hand with a hammer. R.H.’s mother took her to the emergency room for treatment and told the treating personnel that R.H. had fallen down some stairs. The hammer blow caused swelling and bruising but no broken bones. R.H. was also continuing to purge and restrict her food intake. R.H.’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Thania V. Quesdada, and her psychologist, Ms. Lopez, both urged that she be admitted to one of three nationally-recognized immersion DBT programs. Her family chose the program at McLean Hospital. DBT is a cognitive behavioral treatment that was originally developed to treat chronically suicidal individuals diagnosed with borderline personality disorder, though it is now employed for treatment of other conditions, including eating disorders. DBT teaches behavioral coping skills such as mindfulness, distress tolerance, interpersonal effectiveness, and emotional regulation. At the hearing, DSGI did not dispute the general efficacy of DBT treatment. However, DSGI did dispute whether R.H.’s presentation merited “immersion” DBT, i.e., a residential inpatient admission. McLean Hospital’s 3 East DBT program is self-pay and requires a minimum stay of 28 days. The program does not accept insurance and does not assist patients with insurance reimbursement efforts. Because of its stance on insurance, the 3 East DBT program is obviously not an in-network provider under the Plan. Prior to admission, Petitioner was aware that the 3 East DBT program did not accept insurance. R.H. was in residential treatment at McLean Hospital from September 9, 2015, through September 22, 2015. While at McLean Hospital, R.H. engaged in restricting and purging behaviors that led to medical instability. She was discharged to Cambridge Eating Disorder Center on September 23, 2015. She remained at the Cambridge Center until October 15, 2015. R.H.’s stay at the Cambridge Center was pre-certified by New Directions and is not at issue in this proceeding. On October 15, 2015, R.H. returned to McLean Hospital, again as a residential inpatient admission. She remained at McLean Hospital until her discharge on December 11, 2015. The total billed amount for R.H.’s two stays at McLean Hospital was $96,950, which was paid by the family out-of- pocket. Section 3-5 of the Plan sets forth the following under the heading “Mental Health and Substance Dependency Services”: “Physician office visits, Intensive Outpatient Treatment, Inpatient and Partial Hospitalization and Residential Treatment Services are covered based on medical necessity.” The general definition of “Medically Necessary” is set forth at section 15-4 of the Plan: [s]ervices required to identify or treat the Illness, injury, Condition, or Mental and Nervous Disorder a Doctor has diagnosed or reasonably suspects. The service must be: consistent with the symptom, diagnosis and treatment of the patient’s Condition; in accordance with standards of good medical practice; required for reasons other than convenience of the patient or the Doctor; approved by the appropriate medical body or board for the illness or injury in question; and at the most appropriate level of medical supply, service, or care that can be safely provided. The fact that a service, prescription drug, or supply is prescribed by a Doctor does not necessarily mean that the service is Medically Necessary. Florida Blue, CVS/Caremark, and DSGI determine whether a service, prescription drug, or supply is Medically Necessary. New Directions’ Medical Necessity Criteria guidelines provided the following admission criteria for psychiatric residential admissions: Must meet all of the following: A DSM diagnosis is the primary focus of active, daily treatment. There is a reasonable expectation of reduction in behaviors/symptoms with treatment at this level of care. The treatment is not primarily social, custodial, interpersonal, or respite care. The member has documented symptoms and/or behaviors that are a significant deterioration from baseline functioning and create a significant functional impairment in at least three (3) of the following areas: primary support social/interpersonal occupational/educational health/medical compliance ability to maintain safety for either self or others Must have one of the following: The member’s family members and/or support system demonstrate behaviors that are likely to undermine goals of treatment, such that treatment at a lower level of care is unlikely to be successful. This lack must be situational in nature and amenable to change as a result of the treatment process and resources identified during a residential confinement. The member has a documented history of an inability to be managed at an intensive lower level of care. There is a recent (in the last six months) history of multiple brief acute inpatient stays without a successful transition to a lower level of care, and at risk of admission to inpatient acute care. New Directions’ Medical Necessity Criteria guidelines provided the following admission criteria for eating disorder residential admissions: Must meet 1-4 and either 5, 6, or 7 A DSM diagnosis found in the Feeding and Eating Disorder section is the primary focus of active, daily treatment. There is a reasonable expectation of reduction in behaviors/symptoms with treatment at this level of care. The treatment is not primarily social, custodial, interpersonal, or respite care. The member has documented symptoms and/or behaviors that are a significant deterioration from baseline functioning and create a significant functional impairment in at least three (3) of the following areas: primary support social/interpersonal occupational/educational health/medical compliance ability to maintain safety for either self or others Must have one of the following: The member’s family members and/or support system demonstrate behaviors that are likely to undermine goals of treatment, such that treatment at a lower level of care is unlikely to be successful. This lack must be situational in nature and amenable to change as a result of the treatment process and resources identified during a residential confinement. The member has a documented history of an inability to be managed at an intensive lower level of care. There is a recent (in the last six months) history of multiple brief acute inpatient stays without a successful transition to a lower level of care, and at risk of admission to inpatient acute care. There are active biomedical complications that require 24-hour care, including, but not limited to: Adults Children/Adolescents Pulse <40 <50 Blood Pressure <90/60 <80/50 Orthostatic changes in BP Systolic: >20 point drop Systolic: > 20 point drop (Supine to standing) Diastolic: > 10 point drop Diastolic: > 10 point drop Potassium < 3 meq/l Hypokalemia Body temperature < 97 F Abnormal core temperature Electrolytes/ serum chemistry Significant deviation from normal Significant deviation from normal Must have either a. or b.: A low body weight that can reasonably lead to instability in the absence of intervention as evidenced by one of the following: Less than 85% of IBW or a BMI less than 16.5. Greater than 10% decrease in body weight within the last 30 days. In children and adolescents, greater than 10% decrease in body weight during a rapid growth cycle. Persistence or worsening of eating disorder behavior despite recent (with [sic] the last three months), appropriate therapeutic intervention in a structured eating disorder treatment setting. If PHP or IOP is contraindicated, documentation of the rationale supporting the contraindication is required. One of the following must be present: Compensatory behaviors (binging, purging, laxative abuse, excessive exercise, etc.) have caused significant physiological complications. Compensatory behaviors occur multiple times daily and have failed to respond to treatment at a lower level of care and acute physiologic imbalance can reasonably be expected. New Directions’ contact notes for this case indicate that it was called by someone named “Rachelle” on behalf of A.H.’s family on September 3, 2015. This person asked about the authorization process for McLean Hospital. No witness was presented who had direct knowledge of the contents of this conversation. The note indicates that “Rachelle” was advised that any authorization process must be initiated with New Directions by McLean Hospital. On September 9, 2015, the day R.H. was admitted to McLean Hospital, Florida Blue received what its notes reference as a “critical inquiry” message regarding this admission. A Florida Blue employee phoned the number attached to the message but discovered it was not for A.H. but for “someone at AllState Insurance who is out of the office.” (This person turned out to be Pearl Harrison, R.H.’s grandmother and qualified representative in this proceeding, who had not yet obtained a release to receive confidential medical information concerning R.H.). No number for A.H. could be found. Florida Blue contacted New Directions, which confirmed that no request for pre-authorization3/ had been received from McLean Hospital or the member. R.H.’s stays at McLean Hospital were not emergency admissions. The term “medical emergency” was not specifically defined in the 2015 Plan, but expert testimony at the hearing established that it is a term of common meaning and usage in the medical community. An emergency situation is one in which there is an immediate risk of death, serious bodily harm, or creation of an irreversible condition. If care is not administered immediately, the person will harm herself or someone else. Michael Shaw, the utilization management team leader for New Directions, explained that emergency care is not provided at the residential level of care, but in an inpatient setting under lock and key. The medical records indicated that R.H.’s last incident of self-harming behavior occurred about a week prior to her admission to McLean Hospital. Her injuries were superficial and she was in no immediate danger or risk of irreversible damage. Section 7-1 of the Plan provides for hospital admissions, including the following pertinent language as to non-emergency admissions to non-network hospitals and pre- certification for stays at non-network hospitals: Non-Network Hospital: Non-emergency Admission Every non-emergency admission to a non- network Hospital must be pre-certified. This means that before services are provided Florida Blue must certify the Hospital admission and provide the number of days for which certification is given. Precertification of non-network Hospital stays is your responsibility, even if the Doctor admitting you or your dependent to the Hospital is a Network Provider. Failure to obtain pre-certification will result in penalties (higher out-of-pocket costs). For more information on penalties, see “If You Do Not Pre-Certify Your Stay” within this section below. To pre-certify your stay in a non-network Hospital, ask your Doctor to call Florida Blue at (800) 955-5692 before your Hospital admission and provide the reason for hospitalization, the proposed treatment or surgery, testing, and the number of Hospital days anticipated. Florida Blue will review your Doctor’s request for admission certification and immediately notify your Doctor or the Hospital if your admission has been certified and the number of days for which certification has been given. If the admission is not certified, your Doctor may submit additional information for a second review. If your Hospital stay is certified and you need to stay longer than the number of days for which certification was given, your Doctor must call Florida Blue to request certification for the additional days. Your Doctor should make this call as soon as possible. * * * If You Do Not Pre-Certify Your Stay: Non- Network Hospital Benefits for covered services will be reduced by 25 percent of the covered charges, not to exceed a maximum benefit reduction of $500 IF you are admitted to a participating Hospital (Payment for Hospital Services or PHS Provider)[4/] that is not part of the Preferred Patient Care (PPC) Network and admission certification has not been requested on your behalf or the request is denied. This Plan will not pay room and board benefits for your first two days of hospitalization IF your non-network Hospital admission is denied, but you are admitted to a non-network Hospital anyway. This Plan will not pay room and board benefits for your entire Hospital stay IF you are admitted to a non-network Hospital without having your Doctor call prior to the admission. This Plan will not pay room and board benefits for the additional days that were not certified IF your non-network Hospital admission is certified but your stay is longer than the number of days for which the admission was certified. The Plan’s pre-certification requirement was not met. Neither A.H. nor McLean Hospital requested pre-certification. Mr. Shaw testified that he spoke to three different people at McLean Hospital, all of whom stated that the 3 East DBT program does not accept or work with insurance. Mr. Shaw was unable to generate the paperwork needed to begin the pre-certification process because McLean Hospital declined to share with him the necessary clinical information about R.H.5/ Although pre-certification was not obtained for R.H.’s stays at McLean Hospital, Florida Blue conducted a post-service review to determine whether the claim was eligible for reimbursement. Petitioner submitted a request for a Level I appeal pursuant to Section 12 of the Plan, under which a person denied benefits or payment of a claim for medical services may obtain a review by Florida Blue. Petitioner submitted a package of R.H.’s medical records for review. Prest & Associates, Inc., a URAC-approved independent review organization,6/ was retained to conduct an independent review of Petitioner’s claim. Dr. Barbara Center, a staff psychiatrist with Prest & Associates, performed a review designed to determine the medical necessity of R.H.’s stays at McLean Hospital. Dr. Center is board-certified in General Psychiatry, Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, and Addiction Medicine. Dr. Center reviewed the claim in terms of the New Directions criteria for psychiatric residential admissions and for eating disorder residential admissions. She performed two reviews, one for the admission starting on September 9, 2015, and another for the admission starting on October 15, 2015. Dr. Center stated that the McLean Hospital medical records provided by Petitioner gave a detailed description of R.H.’s history of present illness, past psychiatric history, and other elements of her history that were adequate for making a medical necessity determination. As to the September 9 admission, Dr. Center concluded that medical necessity criteria were not met for either a psychiatric residential or an eating disorder residential admission. As to the psychiatric residential criteria, Dr. Center concluded that R.H.’s admission failed to satisfy criteria 3, 4, and 5. Dr. Center testified that criterion 4 looks at symptoms and behaviors that represent a significant deterioration from the patient’s baseline functioning in several areas. R.H.’s primary support structures were stable. Her mother was clearly involved in her care and had the support of other family members. Dr. Center stated that the medical records showed no sign of substantial social or interpersonal deterioration, aside from some typical difficulty in starting high school. R.H. was having no medical instability at the time of admission. She was not at a dangerously low body weight. She had a recent onset of self-harming behaviors, but there was no documentation of acute risk issues that warranted placement in 24-hour care. As to criterion 5, Dr. Center testified that the records showed no indication that R.H.’s family and support system was unsupportive or unable to take her to treatment and participate in her care. There was no documentation that R.H. could not progress in a less intensive level of care. Dr. Center noted that R.H.’s prior treatment for eating disorders had been at varying levels of care and that R.H. had not had multiple brief acute inpatient stays. Criterion 3 is a diagnosis of exclusion, meaning that if there is no apparent medical necessity for the residential placement, then the reason must be “primarily social, custodial, interpersonal or respite care.” Dr. Center found in the records no support for a 24-hour residential placement. She noted that R.H.’s self-injury was of a recent onset and that McLean Hospital had ruled out any immediate prospect of self-injury or serious threat to other people. Cutting is not uncommon among adolescents and does not rise to the level of requiring residential care. Mental health providers distinguish between self-injurious behaviors and suicidal ideation, and McLean Hospital did not describe R.H. as suicidal. Dr. Center testified that, at the request of Mr. Shaw, she also reviewed R.H.’s admission in terms of the New Directions eating disorder residential criteria. Dr. Center noted that R.H. was not at a dangerous body weight (122 pounds, with a BMI of 22.2) at the time of her admission on September 9. There was no indication of medical instability or of out-of- control eating disorders requiring 24-hour care. Dr. Center testified that DBT is routinely taught on an outpatient basis and that she recommended outpatient treatment for the stay beginning on September 9. She opined that R.H. did not meet numbers 3 through 7 of the New Directions eating disorder residential criteria. As to the McLean Hospital admission beginning on October 15, 2015, Dr. Center recommended intensive outpatient treatment. Dr. Center knew that R.H. had been transitioned from McLean Hospital to the Cambridge Center to address the eating disorder as her primary symptom. Dr. Center felt that continuing R.H. in an intensive outpatient setting would help her stabilize and maintain the progress she had made at the Cambridge Center. Dr. Center stated that a basic tenet of medical care, and especially psychiatric care, is that the patient be treated in the least restrictive setting possible under the circumstances. She stated that it is always best to treat people in the environment they live in. Treatment in the 24- hour residential setting removes the patient from the stressors she will have to deal with when she goes home. Upon her readmission to the McLean Hospital from Cambridge Center, R.H. denied suicidal ideation and homicidal ideation, and the record disclosed nothing to indicate suicidal thoughts. R.H. denied auditory or visual hallucinations and her mood was described as “euthymic,” i.e., essentially normal. Dr. Center acknowledged that the medical record showed that R.H. had been in intensive outpatient treatment for her eating disorder at the Renfrew Center in Florida from July 23 through August 21, 2015, with limited success. Dr. Center stated that the issue for R.H. had recently changed from her eating disorder to her self-harming behavior and believed that an intensive outpatient program focusing on skills to deal with self-injurious behaviors would be the appropriate placement under the circumstances. Dr. Center also acknowledged that her review did not include the records of R.H.’s treating psychiatrist and therapist during her stay at Renfrew, and that their notes indicated that R.H.’s condition had regressed while in intensive outpatient care. Dr. Center testified that these records might have persuaded her to recommend a higher level of care, such as a partial hospital program, but that she still would not have recommended residential placement. After Dr. Center rendered her opinion that R.H.’s residential stays at McLean Hospital were not medically necessary, the claim was reviewed by Dr. Frank Santamaria, Florida Blue’s care management medical director. In rendering his opinion, Dr. Santamaria reviewed the medical records sent by Petitioner and McLean Hospital, the log of contact notes kept by New Directions, and Dr. Center’s report.7/ He testified that the available records were adequate to allow him to render an opinion as to medical necessity. Dr. Santamaria concluded that, as to the New Directions criteria for psychiatric residential admissions, R.H. failed to meet criteria 3, 4, and 5. He opined generally that when assessing the need for a residential stay, he is looking for someone who is at risk of self-harm or harming others or who has an acute severe psychiatric condition such as a psychotic disorder that requires confinement. Dr. Santamaria noted that R.H.’s eating disorder was not the primary concern at the time of her admissions to McLean Hospital; however, because the eating disorder was occurring at the same time as the psychiatric problem, he was also looking for medical manifestations of the eating disorder, such as severe weight loss affecting blood chemistry. Criterion 4 requires documented symptoms and/or behaviors that are a significant deterioration from baseline functioning and create a significant functional impairment in at least three of five listed areas. Under area 4a, “primary support,” Dr. Santamaria noted that R.H. had good support from her mother and grandmother. He did not believe that primary support was a problem.8/ As to area 4b, “social/interpersonal,” the notes indicated that R.H. recently had an altercation with a friend. Dr. Santamaria did not find such an altercation out of the ordinary for a 15-year-old and thus found no functional impairment under 4b. Area 4c, “occupational/educational,” appeared to pose no problem because the records indicated that R.H. was an A-B student, despite her rocky first week of high school. As to area 4d, “health/medical compliance,” Dr. Santamaria noted that R.H. had been compliant with medical instructions and her family had been good about seeking care for her. As to area 4e, “ability to maintain safety for either self or others,” Dr. Santamaria acknowledged that R.H. had hit her hand with a hammer and acted in other self-injurious ways, chiefly superficial cutting. He testified that such behaviors are not uncommon in younger populations and do not necessarily make the person a candidate for residential care. Self-injury alone does not satisfy the criterion, unless there is a concern for suicide or homicide. The hammer incident occurred in August, at least one week before R.H.’s admission to McLean Hospital. The McLean Hospital admission note of September 9, 2015, indicates no reported history of suicidal thinking. Dr. Santamaria found no documentation to indicate R.H. was aggressive against herself or others. She had no acute conditions such as psychotic disorders. Dr. Santamaria noted that even if area 4e were deemed to have been met, criterion 4 requires significant functional impairment and degradation from baseline functioning in at least three of the listed areas, and that R.H. at most satisfied one area of the criterion. Criterion 5 of the New Directions psychiatric residential criteria requires that one of three conditions relating to the patient’s support system or treatment history be met. Dr. Santamaria concluded that none of the three conditions were met. Condition 5c requires a recent history of multiple brief acute inpatient stays without a successful transition to a lower level of care. Dr. Santamaria conceded that the record he examined disclosed little information about prior therapies that had been tried with R.H., but he concluded that the record was sufficient to confirm that R.H. did not have multiple brief inpatient stays. He was reasonably confident that McLean Hospital would have documented such stays had they occurred because they would be a very significant part of her history. Dr. Santamaria also noted that R.H. had been able to transition to an intensive outpatient program from her inpatient admission to the Renfrew Center in May 2015. Condition 5a requires that family members or the patient’s support system demonstrate behaviors that are likely to undermine the goals of treatment, such that treatment at a lower level of care is unlikely to be successful. The record disclosed that R.H.’s mother, who was her custodial guardian, had a history of substance abuse but had gone through a rehabilitation program, attended Narcotics Anonymous regularly, and had been sober for one year at the time of R.H.’s October 15, 2015, admission to McLean Hospital. Dr. Santamaria testified that if R.H.’s mother were currently using drugs and R.H. had nowhere else to go, then condition 5a might be met. However, the actual situation presented by the medical record did not establish that R.H. was living in an unsafe environment that could undermine her treatment. As to condition 5b, a documented history of an inability to be managed at an intensive lower level of care, Dr. Santamaria concluded that R.H. had responded to various therapies in the past. As noted above, criterion 3 of the New Directions psychiatric residential criteria is exclusionary, i.e., if the placement appears not to be medically necessary, then one begins to seek another motivation, such as the desire for a change of pace or a respite for the family. Dr. Santamaria noted that DBT does not require placement at the residential level. It can be done at an intensive outpatient or partial hospitalization level, both of which are lower levels of care than residential.9/ This fact made Dr. Santamaria suspect that the prime motive for R.H.’s placement may have been custodial. Dr. Santamaria testified that he also analyzed R.H.’s admission under the New Directions eating disorder residential criteria. He stated that he could not be certain from the record whether McLean Hospital was treating R.H.’s eating disorder, as well as providing DBT, but he knew that McLean Hospital was mindful of the eating disorder. He also knew that R.H.’s transfer to the Cambridge Center was partly because her eating disorder was becoming worse. Dr. Santamaria concluded that R.H. did not satisfy criteria 3 through 7 for an eating disorder residential admission. Dr. Santamaria testified that R.H. did not meet eating disorder residential criteria 3 through 5 for the same reasons she did not meet the identical criteria 3 through 5 of the psychiatric residential criteria. Criterion 6 concerns biomedical complications of an eating disorder. Dr. Santamaria reviewed the medical records and concluded that R.H. presented none of the complications that would require 24-hour care at the time of her admission on September 9, 2015. Dr. Santamaria likewise found that R.H. satisfied neither factor 7a nor 7b of Criterion 7. As to 7a, R.H. did not present with a low body weight and there was no documentation that she had lost 10 percent of her body weight in the last 30 days. As to 7b, there was no evidence that R.H.’s “compensatory behaviors,” i.e., binging and purging, had caused “significant physiological complications” or that such behaviors occurred multiple times daily and did not respond to treatment “at an intensive lower level of care.” Dr. Santamaria testified that his analysis as to the October 15, 2015, admission was identical to that for the September 9, 2015, admission. As to both admissions, he believed that intensive outpatient was the appropriate level of care. Dr. Santamaria defined “intensive outpatient” as three hours of intensive therapy for at least three days per week. He believed that this level of care could address all of R.H.’s issues, including her self-injurious behavior. Dr. Santamaria concluded that if R.H. tried the intensive outpatient level of care and failed, then a higher level could be considered. Like Dr. Center, he stated that he might have recommended a partial hospitalization setting had he known that intensive outpatient had been tried and failed, but he still would not have recommended a 24-hour residential admission. Petitioner’s presentation implied that Florida Blue and/or Prest & Associates base their coverage decisions on financial considerations rather than strictly on the merits of the claims. Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria both testified that they had no incentive, financial or otherwise, to deny a claim for reimbursement. Their testimony on this point is credible. Petitioner offered no direct evidence that Florida Blue or Prest & Associates directly pressure their physician employees to reject meritorious claims, and there is no evidence that Dr. Santamaria or Dr. Center based their recommendations on anything other than their assessment of R.H.’s medical records in light of the relevant medical necessity criteria. Petitioner raised questions about the completeness of the records examined by Dr. Santamaria and Dr. Center and sounded a skeptical note as to the diligence of the physicians’ efforts to obtain additional documentation. As found above, both Dr. Santamaria and Dr. Center testified that they had adequate documentation to render an opinion as to medical necessity in this case. Both physicians stated that in other cases they have taken additional steps to obtain missing information, including making peer-to-peer calls to the treating physicians or reaching out to the case managers, but that no such steps were necessary in this case. Both physicians conceded that not all of the medical records were available to them at the time of their reviews. They did not have records from R.H.’s stays at the Renfrew Center and the Cambridge Center or the notes of R.H.’s treating physicians in Florida. Both Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria credibly testified that nothing in these additional records would have changed their opinion as to the medical necessity of residential treatment for R.H. Section 12 of the Plan, which sets forth the appeal process for a denied claim, expressly states: “Your appeal may include any additional documentation, information, evidence or testimony that you would like reviewed and considered during the appeal process.” This language is included in the explanations for both the Level I and Level II appeals. Nothing prevents the member from providing any documentation whatsoever during the appeal process. Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria are physician reviewers, not medical investigators. If something Petitioner asserted to be relevant to the decision was missing from the files, it was not the fault of the reviewing physicians. It is ultimately the member’s responsibility to provide appropriate documentation for review. By letter dated April 5, 2016, Florida Blue notified Petitioner that it “remains unable to approve additional coverage and/or payment for the Residential Treatment.” The letter set forth the following rationale for the denial: Per the State Employees’ PPO Plan Booklet and Benefits Document page 5-5: “Services or supplies that are not Medically Necessary, as determined by Florida Blue and/or CVS Caremark clinical staff and Division of State Group Insurance, are non- covered.” Specifically, coverage for the Mental Health (Eating Disorder) Residential stays is denied as it does not meet the definition of medical necessity. This is for hospital stay on and after 09/09/2015 and 10/15/2015. The final decision to proceed with the requested services is between the provider and the member. Records show that the member was not deemed to be a present risk to self or to others. Though the member had a preoccupation with weight sand [sic] eating, there was no evidence of inability to adequately care for self with functioning in multiple sphere areas, including stabilization of the eating disorder issues. There was no report of medical instability or psychosis. The member was in a body weight range. The member was described as having her eating disorder symptoms under control. From the clinical evidence, this member could have been safely treated at each occasion at a lesser level of care such as in an eating disorder intensive outpatient setting. This review was done using New Directions Clinical Care criteria and is based on the opinion of a board certified psychiatrist. Services that are not medically necessary are not covered under your health benefit plan. The denial letter provided Petitioner with information regarding the Level II appeal process to DSGI, including a reference to the pertinent section of the Plan. The denial letter reiterated that Petitioner could submit any information or documentation that Petitioner believed could assist in DSGI’s review of the appeal. Petitioner submitted a request for a Level II appeal to DSGI on May 23, 2016. The Level II appeal was reviewed by DSGI’s legal nurse coordinator, Kathy Flippo. Ms. Flippo reviewed all of the documents reviewed by Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria, plus additional records submitted by Petitioner with the Level II appeal request. Ms. Flippo determined that the stays at issue were non-emergency admissions that required pre-certification and that the pre-certification requirements of the Plan were not met. Ms. Flippo reached the same conclusions as Dr. Center and Dr. Santamaria regarding the New Directions psychiatric residential criteria. Ms. Flippo concluded that R.H. did not meet criteria 3, 4, or 5. Ms. Flippo testified that she did not review the case pursuant to the New Directions eating disorder residential criteria because Petitioner’s Level II appeal addressed only the psychiatric issues and because R.H.’s eating disorder stay at the Cambridge Center was covered by Florida Blue. By letter dated July 29, 2016, signed by Tami Fillyaw, director of DSGI, Petitioner was informed that the Level II appeal had been denied. The letter informed Petitioner of his rights under the Plan to file a petition for a formal or an informal hearing contesting the denial of the appeal and/or to request a binding external review from an Independent Review Organization (“IRO”).10/ Petitioner requested both an administrative hearing and an external review.11/ The external review was conducted under the auspices of the Medical Review Institute of America, Inc. (“MRIoA”), a URAC-accredited external review network. The MRIoA assigned a physician whom it stated is board-certified by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology in the specialties of General Psychiatry and Child & Adolescent Psychiatry.12/ The external review upheld the adverse determinations regarding coverage for the McLean Hospital stays. In its decision letter dated November 11, 2016, the MRIoA provided the following relevant clinical summary and findings: At the time in question, the patient was a 15 year old female with a variety of difficulties related to depression, anxiety, eating disorder symptoms, and symptoms of obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) with self-harming behaviors. This review has to do with a question of whether residential treatment center (RTC) level of care (LOC) for two episodes of service 9/9/15-9/22/15 and 10/15/15-12/11/15 met the plan criteria for medical necessity. It is noted that the patient was treated in a special eating disorders program on the dates between these two episodes. * * * The patient’s presentation did not meet the plan criteria for medical necessity for the dates in question. Specifically, the patient did not meet criteria #5 of the Admission Criteria. The patient is noted to have a caring and effective support system that would have supported a less intensive level of care. There was no recent history of inability to be effectively treated at an intensive level of service below residential treatment center (RTC) level of care (LOC), and there was no recent history of inability to transition from inpatient treatment into a less intensive level of care. At the time of admission to residential treatment, it is clear that the patient struggled with mood dysregulation along with episodes of food restriction and self- harming behaviors. She was not responding to attempts at outpatient treatment. The residential program in question was sought out specifically due to its approach to the utilization of DBT (dialectical behavior therapy). However, there is no indication that the patient could not have responded to attempts to escalate her treatment in the outpatient setting through the use of either intensive outpatient or partial hospitalization services. In particular, the patient could have been involved in a formal DBT program without utilization of residential treatment. Her symptom severity for the dates in question was not of a severity to require the use of round the clock observation and treatment. As a result, there was no medical necessity for residential treatment center (RTC) level of care (LOC). * * * The appeal letters from the patient’s family, outpatient providers, and residential facility discuss the need for residential treatment due to the patient’s symptoms severity, particularly the patient’s episodes of self-harming behavior and the need for her to participate in the immersive DBT program utilized at the residential program in question. The patient’s need for more intensive treatment is acknowledged. However, the patient’s recent treatment history was one of outpatient treatment with a previous history of residential treatment for eating disorder symptoms. For the DOS in question, the patient could have obtained appropriate and effective DBT in a less restrictive setting, such as either a partial hospitalization program (PHP) or an intensive outpatient program (IOP). Based on the above, the previous determination has been upheld. At the hearing, Petitioner complained that, prior to receiving the letter denying the Level II appeal, he had no inkling that medical necessity determinations were based on criteria produced by New Directions. The Plan’s definition of “medically necessary” does not reference the fact that Florida Blue relies on the New Directions criteria for medical necessity determinations in psychiatric and eating disorder admissions. Petitioner basically argues that not having the precise language of the New Directions medical necessity criteria deprived him and the medical providers of the ability to frame the coverage requests in such a way as to satisfy the criteria. The record evidence shows Florida Blue does not make the New Directions medical necessity criteria directly available to its members. In fact, New Directions is nowhere mentioned in the Plan. Witnesses for DSGI correctly stated that anyone can download the criteria from the New Directions website, but Petitioner pointed out that one must be aware the criteria exist before one can download them. If this case is typical, it appears that a Florida Blue member must be denied coverage and go through the appeal process before Florida Blue makes him aware of precisely how the determination of medical necessity is made. Dr. Santamaria testified that Florida Blue does not expect its members to have any knowledge of the New Directions criteria or to “understand all the medical jargon.” The member is expected to present Florida Blue with the best and most accurate medical information available (preferably before the services are rendered) and rely on Florida Blue to make the decision. Dr. Santamaria stated, “Your role is not to do the utilization management. That’s my role. Your role is, if you disagree with a coverage determination, to appeal it and to even have your doctor speak on your behalf or write a letter or do whatever. It’s not your role to access the documents and to use them on your own. That--that’s not what they were created for.” Dr. Santamaria emphasized that the member’s “role” is not to “meet criteria” but to provide Florida Blue with information sufficient to allow its experts to apply the criteria. While his phrasing may be condescending, Dr. Santamaria’s statement is basically accurate: the medical records determine whether the criteria have been met. Petitioner’s awareness of the particulars of the criteria would not change the substance of the medical record. The undersigned tends to agree with Petitioner that Florida Blue’s process could be more transparent. However, Petitioner failed to show how the outcome would have been different if the New Directions medical necessity criteria had been available to him or McLean Hospital. Every expert who examined the medical records agreed that R.H. did not meet the criteria for medical necessity. Their opinions are credited. Ms. Flippo emphasized that Florida Blue did not deny coverage merely because McLean Hospital’s 3 East DBT program was self-pay. If the member had been able to obtain pre- certification for hospitalization and a proper bill had been presented to Florida Blue, it would have been covered at the allowable non-network coverage amount. Ms. Flippo also stated that even if pre-certification had been obtained, Florida Blue would certainly not have covered the 70 days that R.H. spent in McLean Hospital. Ms. Flippo had never seen more than 15 days at a time approved, even for members who were floridly psychotic and admitted under the Baker Act. With modern treatments and medications, it is seldom necessary to keep patients at a residential level of care for months at a time. All of the experts agreed that DBT is more commonly provided on an outpatient basis. Additionally, Mr. Shaw pointed out that the ability of the insurer to pay the non-contracted, non-network rate to the hospital is contingent on the hospital’s willingness to accept insurance payments. McLean Hospital’s 3 East DBT program did not accept insurance. Mr. Shaw succinctly stated, “We’re not obligated to pay you back because you made the choice to go to a facility that takes your money but not ours.”
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of State Group Insurance, issue a final order denying Petitioner’s claim for coverage under the State Employees’ PPO Plan for R.H.’s residential treatment at McLean Hospital from September 9, 2015, to September 30, 2015, and October 15, 2015, to December 11, 2015. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 2017.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner, Rene Delgado Leon, M.D., is eligible for examination for licensure to practice medicine in the state of Florida. The Petitioner, of course, contends that he is eligible. The Respondent, Board of Medical Examiners, contends that the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate eligibility, having previously advised him, inter alia: Your application and supporting documentation contained substantial omissions of material information relative to your medical education. Additionally, your application and supporting documentation does not provide sufficient information to demonstrate that you can practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety. See Section 458.301, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations of the parties, on the exhibits received in evidence, and on the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact. The Petitioner, Dr. Rene Pedizo Delgado Leon, was born on November 26, 1936, in Cuba. All of his formal education prior to medical school was obtained in Cuba. He attended medical schools, off and on, at various times and places between 1955 and June of 1980. His medical education commenced in 1955 at the Medical School of the University of Havana and ended when he-was awarded his medical degree from the University of Dominica in June of 1980. The Petitioner's first language was Spanish and he is not completely fluent in the English language. When communicating in English he appears to have a tendency to interpret statements and questions in a very literal manner. The Petitioner does not appear to have intended to deceive the Board of Medical Examiners or to misrepresent information about his education and experience. Nevertheless, he has not been very clear about a number of details. Since receiving his degree from the University of Dominica in 1980, the Petitioner has completed a residency in pathology, has passed the FLEX exam in conjunction with his application for licensure in the state of Georgia, and has been licensed to practice medicine in the state of Georgia. There were several discrepancies between information given by the Petitioner to the Board of Medical Examiners and to the Hearing Officer concerning various aspects of his background, particularly concerning his medical education. With regard to his medical education, Petitioner listed on his first application that he attended medical school in Havana, Cuba, from April 1954 until December 1962. On his second application he stated that he attended medical school in Havana, Cuba, from September 1955 until September 1960. He testified before the Foreign Medical Graduate Committee that he attended medical school at the University of Havana from 1955 until 1962. At the final hearing he testified that he attended the University of Havana from 1955 until 1962. On his first application, in response to the direction that he list all universities or colleges where he attended classes and received training as a medical student, he stated only that he attended the University of Dominica from June of 1977 until June of 1980. He subsequently filed a form, received by the Board on October 26, 1983, stating that he had attended the University of Zaragoza, Zaragoza, Spain, and received training as a medical student from November of 1974 until April of 1975. On his second application, he stated that he had attended the University of Zaragoza as a medical student from November of 1974 until April of 1975. At the final hearing he testified that in 1973 while he was in Zaragoza he applied to revalidate old courses taken in Havana and that thereafter he took all examinations up to the third year. He stated that he took other courses in Zaragoza, but that he did not take the examinations for any of the medical courses taken in Zaragoza. He also testified that he was given credit for courses at Zaragoza even though he did not take the examinations. The next segment of his medical education was consistently testified to as having been had at the Universidad Central del Este in the Dominican Republic. He attended the Universidad Central del Este for only one semester, during which he took six or seven subjects. He testified that Universidad Central del Este did give him some credit for the third year of medical school; in spite of the fact that he did not take examinations in any of the third-year courses he took in Zaragoza. In January of 1979 he transferred to Universidad Nordestana and spent approximately one year there. Univeraidad Nordestana gave him two and one half to three years of credit. Although his initial application showed that he had attended the University of Dominica in the West Indies from June of 1977 until June of 1980, his subsequent written and oral testimony was that he was enrolled at the University of Dominica only from January of 1980 until June of 1980. He testified before the Foreign Medical Graduate Committee that at the time he transferred from Nordestana, he was basically finished with his medical education and he said he transferred to Dominica because they did not talk in English in Santo Domingo. He also testified that he transferred to Dominica so that he could get some exposure to how medicine was practiced in the United States. Petitioner testified that although he transferred to the University of Dominica and he received his degree from the University of Dominica six months after he transferred there, he did not pay any monies to the University of Dominica. His explanation of why he did not pay money to the University of Dominica is that he wrote things for them, like a pathology booklet. The application form which Petitioner completed requested that he specify all places of residence since beginning medical training. On his first application he showed that he resided in Dominica, West Indies, from January of 1980 until June of 1980. On his second application he listed as residences since initiation of medical training only the University of Miami, Jackson Memorial, VA Hospital, and the University of South Florida, Tampa. In August of 1983 he followed up the second application with a letter to Mrs. Faircloth which stated that his place of residence while attending medical school was the "students quarters and dormitories" at Portsmouth, University of Dominica, West Indies. However, at the hearing before the Foreign Medical Graduate Committee and at the final hearing, Petitioner admitted that he was, in fact, on the campus of the University of Dominica only one day, and that was on graduation day. In fact, when he testified before the Foreign Medical Graduate Committee, he was specifically asked, "When you left Nordestana, where did you go?" To that question he replied, "Oh, to Dominica." However, he later admitted that when he left Nordestana, he went to Miami and he did not go to Dominica until he went six months later in order to graduate. On both of his written applications, Petitioner was asked to list the degrees earned other than M.D. On neither application did he list a bachelor's degree. Yet, in testimony before the Committee and at the final hearing, he testified that he had earned the equivalent of a B.S. in chemistry at the University of Havana. He testified that the reason that he omitted it was that he thought the question referred to medical education. However; in response to the same question, he listed that he had obtained a Licensee in Science and a Doctor in Science from the University of Zaragoza. With regard to the matter of what clerkships, if any, Petitioner performed as part of his medical education, the record shows that he was enrolled at the University of Dominica, the school from which he received a medical degree, from January or February of 1980 until June of 1980. The record also shows that during that five- or six-month period he performed what purported to be clerkships at the VA Hospital and at Coral Gables Hospital, in Miami, and at the same time was an employee of the VA Hospital. He testified that his clerkship at the VA Hospital was in pathology and that he was employed full time in the same area as he was receiving clerkship credit. He arranged the clerkships himself and informed the university of the clerkships. He testified that he did the same activities as the other clerks did, but he worked approximately forty hours and they worked thirty to forty hours. He effected his transfer to the University of Dominica by writing to the New York office and by taking some "required" examinations in basic sciences and clinical studies. He took the examinations in Miami and passed everything but gynecology. He eventually passed gynecology, but not until May of 1980 after he had almost completed clerkships. He testified that when he did his "rotation" at the VA Hospital, he was told that he could "moonlight." He testified that he did all of the autopsies while the other medical students watched. He testified that he went in to work at about 7:00 a.m. and left around 4:00 p.m. and that the other residents did not arrive until about 8:00 a.m. However, he did testify that the clerks arrived at 6:00 a.m. Petitioner testified that he was doing a clerkship at the time, not a residency, and that it was the extra time that he put in that justified his being both paid and given credit for an educational experience. Dr. Robert M. Clark was Petitioner's supervisor during the period of approximately January of 1980 until June of 1980. Petitioner worked in the morgue as a Physician's Assistant and also did "resident physician work." Petitioner was paid at the same time as he was doing a rotation because there was a shortage of residents. Petitioner had the same exposure to pathology as the other residents, all of whom were from the University of Miami. None of the other students were paid employees. A Physician's Assistant requires two years of medical school. Dr. Clark was introduced to Petitioner by Dr. Kuhnhardt. Dr. Kuhnhardt was not connected in any way with the medical school at the University of Dominica. The only other purported clerkship about which there was testimony at the hearing related to a clerkship at Coral Gables Hospital. That clerkship was under Dr. Hurst. That clerkship was done from January of 1980 until June of 1980, the same period during which the clerkship at the VA Hospital was done. Petitioner testified that he went to Coral Gables Hospital after he left the VA Hospital, usually after 4:00 p.m., and stayed however long was necessary, possibly as late as 8:00 or midnight. Dr. Hurst only let the students observe medical procedures. That clerkship was conducted in a community hospital. As for the supervision by the school, the testimony was that the school played no role in arranging the clerkships. Petitioner testified that people from the school came for general meetings every once in a while during the clerkships. As for evaluation, Petitioner testified that the school sent evaluation forms to him and he distributed the forms to whoever was supervising him.
Recommendation Based upon all of the foregoing it is my recommendation, because of the contradictions and uncertainties on the record in this case regarding the nature of the Petitioner's medical education, that the Board of Medical Examiner issue a final order denying the Petitioner's application for licensure by examination without prejudice to the filing of any future application for licensure by examination or endorsement, unless; for reasons analogous to those set forth in the Lopez decision, supra, the Board is persuaded that the shortcomings in the application and its supporting evidence may be overlooked in light of the Petitioner's achievements since 1980. DONE AND ORDERED this 3rd day of January, 1986, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of January, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: M. Catherine Lannon, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Room LL-04, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jorge A. Sibila, Esquire 2751 Coral Way Miami, Florida 33145 Dorothy Faircloth; Executive Director Board of Medical Examiners Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Fred Roche; Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 APPENDIX The following are my specific rulings on each of the proposed findings of fact submitted by each of the parties. Rulings on Petitioner's proposed findings: The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact consist of a two- line introductory clause and six unnumbered indented paragraphs. The six unnumbered indented paragraphs are addressed below in the order in which they appear in the Petitioner's proposed findings of fact. First Paragraph: Rejected. This paragraph is merely a commentary on the state of the record and does not contain any proposed finding of fact. Second Paragraph: Rejected for the same reason as the first paragraph. Third Paragraph: Rejected in part and accepted in part. Rejected portions are rejected for the most part for the same reason as the rejection of the first two paragraphs. The "fully explained" portion of this paragraph is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Findings have been made consistent with the portions of this paragraph relating to when Petitioner's medical education began and ended, his completion of a residency in pathology, and his passing of the FLEX examination. Fourth Paragraph: The first sentence of this paragraph is rejected in part because it is merely a commentary on the state of the record and in part because it is inconsistent with the evidence of record. Dr. Clark did not explain the Petitioner's work in detail: to the contrary, his testimony was rather vague about a number of the details and he failed to recall a number of specific details. The last sentence of this paragraph is rejected because it is not supported by competent substantial evidence. Fifth Paragraph: Rejected for the same reason as the first paragraph. Sixth paragraph: The first sentence of this paragraph is rejected because the Petitioner's explanations were incomplete. With regard to the second sentence of this paragraph, it is accepted that the Petitioner is "not fluent/native in the English language or in legal terminology," and that the Petitioner did not intend to deceive the Board or misrepresent information to the Board. m e remainder of the second sentence is rejected on the grounds that it is in part irrelevant and immaterial as well as on the grounds that the ultimate factual conclusion urged in the second sentence is not warranted by the evidence in the record. Rulings on Respondent's proposed findings: The Respondent's proposed findings of fact consist of seventeen separately numbered paragraphs. The paragraph numbers which follow correspond to the numbers of the paragraphs of the Respondent's proposed findings. Accepted in substance with certain gratuitous editorial material deleted. Accepted in substance. Accepted in substance with the exception of the sentence reading: "In contradiction, he testified at the final hearing, on both direct and cross-examination, that he furthered his medical education in Spain in 1970." The quoted sentence is rejected because it does not accurately reflect the totality of the Petitioner's testimony on this subject. Some other redundant material in this paragraph is also rejected. Rejected on the grounds that it consists of irrelevant and cumulative details which are not necessary to the disposition of this case. Accepted in substance with certain gratuitous editorial material deleted. The first sentence of this paragraph is accepted. The second sentence is accepted with the exception of the words ". . . at which time he needed three years." The quoted language is rejected as not being supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Accepted. The first two sentences of this paragraph are accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as irrelevant in part, cumulative in part, and not supported by competent substantial evidence in part. Accepted in substance with certain gratuitous editorial material deleted. Accepted. Accepted in part and rejected in part. Reasons for rejection include the feet that although most of this paragraph is an accurate summary of portions of the Petitioner's testimony; some of the testimony on this subject was not persuasive and has not been used as the basis for findings of fact. The parenthetical mention of the pathology booklet is rejected because there is no competent substantial evidence as to when Petitioner wrote any pathology books Accepted in substance. Accepted in part and rejected in part. Reasons for rejection include the fact that although much of this paragraph is an accurate summary of portions of Dr. Clark's testimony, much of the testimony on this subject was not persuasive and has not been used as the basis for findings of fact. Portions of this paragraph have also been rejected on the grounds that they constitute commentary on the quality of the testimony or argument and are not proposed findings of fact. Accepted in part and rejected in part. Reasons for rejection include the fact that although most of this paragraph is an accurate summery of portions of the Petitioner's testimony, much of the testimony on this subject was not persuasive and has not been used as the basis for findings of fact. Accepted. Rejected as findings of fact because it constitutes argument rather than proposed findings of fact. [Much of the argument is well taken, but it is argument nevertheless and not appropriately part of the findings of fact.] Rejected for the same reason as Paragraph 16.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to sit for the examination for licensure as a physician assistant.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an applicant to sit for the examination for licensure as a physician assistant in Florida. Petitioner relies on the provisions of Section 458.347(7)(b), Florida Statutes, which provide, in pertinent part, as follows: 1. . . . [T]he department shall examine each applicant who the board certifies: Has completed the application form ... Is an unlicensed physician who graduated from a foreign medical school listed with the World Health Organization ... Has applied for certification as a physician assistant in this state between July 1, 1990, and June 30, 1991. Was a resident of this state on July 1, 1990. . . Petitioner's application to sit for the examination for licensure as a physician assistant was denied by an Order entered by the Board of Medicine on March 12, 1992. The Order cited the following four grounds for the denial: The applicant (Petitioner) does not have a medical degree as required by Sections 458.347(b)1.b. and 458.311(1)(f)3.a., Florida Statutes. The applicant has been unable to provide adequate evidence that he was a resident in Florida on July 1, 1990. The applicant has failed to account for all time and activities on his application from July 1981 - May 1982. The applicant has failed to list all employment activities on his application when compared to the Resume of Qualifications he submitted. Petitioner attended medical school at the Universidad Central del Este (UCE) in the Dominican Republic from 1975 to 1981. Petitioner testified that he completed his assigned curriculum and that he participated in graduation exercises. Petitioner did not receive a diploma or a medical degree from UCE because he owed the university for tuition. In response to an inquiry from Respondent, the Dean of Medicine of UCE provided the following information: ... [W]hile it is true that [Petitioner] completed the curriculum of our School of Medicine, he has other requisites to be completed. Among these is an outstanding debt for registration fees at our University. Until this debt is satisfied he cannot be awarded the degree of Doctor of Medicine, nor can any documents be issued. Petitioner's application and the documentation he initially submitted in support thereof did not establish that Petitioner met the residency requirements of Section 458.347(7)(b)1.d., Florida Statutes. The evidence submitted at the formal hearing established that Petitioner was a resident of the State of Florida on July 1, 1990, and at all other times pertinent to this proceeding since that time. Petitioner, in his application for licensure, failed to set forth his activities between July 1981 and May 1982./1 Petitioner has subsequently provided that information to the Respondent. During that time, Petitioner was unemployed and studying for his medical examinations. Petitioner, in his application for licensure, failed to completely set forth his employment history, including his work as a medical health counselor and as a mental health supervisor. His employment history is required by the application form and should have been included as part of his application package. All information pertinent to his employment has now been provided by Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's application on the grounds that he is not a graduate of a medical school recognized by the World Health Organization. DONE AND ORDERED this 28th day of July, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of July, 1993.
