The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her race or sex in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Alicia Valentine ("Valentine") is an African- American woman who currently resides in Chicago but lived in Miami, Florida, at all relevant times. Respondent Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Miami, Inc. ("Catholic Charities"), is a Florida nonprofit corporation that provides social services in Miami-Dade, Broward, and Monroe counties. At no time relevant to this action did Catholic Charities sell, lease, rent, finance, broker, or manage real property, including dwellings of any nature. At all relevant times, Valentine leased Apartment No. 1410 at 1451 South Miami Avenue, Miami, Florida, for the sum of $2,000.00 per month from her landlord, Park Place at Brickell, LLC. Before contacting Catholic Charities and setting in motion the events that led to this action, Valentine had lost her job, exhausted her unemployment compensation payments, and wound up having no income. Unable to pay rent, Valentine applied to Catholic Charities, on or around January 27, 2016, for emergency rental assistance to avoid losing her apartment. Catholic Charities runs an Emergency Services program that provides cash payments to individuals to help them pay one month's rent in crisis situations. The program limits rental assistance to a single payment of up to $1,000.00 per applicant, which may be received only once every 12 months. Catholic Charities has written eligibility criteria that an applicant must satisfy to qualify for emergency rental assistance. The eligibility criteria require that the applicant have an eviction notice; justification of need; proof of income (showing ability to continue paying the rent after assistance); some form of identification; and a Social Security card. Catholic Charities denied Valentine's request for emergency rental assistance because she failed to meet all of the eligibility requirements. Specifically, Valentine did not provide an eviction notice, nor, perhaps more important, did she provide proof of income. Thus, Valentine failed to demonstrate that she had the ability to pay the balance of her $2,000.00 monthly rent——or any subsequent month's rent——if provided the maximum $1,000.00 in emergency assistance. It is undisputed, moreover, that Valentine never personally appeared at Catholic Charities' office to verify her identity, although, in fairness to Valentine, there is some uncertainty as to whether Catholic Charities communicated to Valentine that she was required to provide proof of identification in person. The fact that Valentine did not appear in person to verify her identity is, however, ultimately immaterial, for even if she had, her application still would have been denied based on the failure to satisfy other eligibility criteria, e.g., proof of sufficient future income. Determinations of Ultimate Fact There is no persuasive evidence that any of Catholic Charities' decisions concerning, or actions affecting, Valentine, directly or indirectly, were motivated in any way by discriminatory animus directed toward Valentine. There is no persuasive evidence that Valentine met the written eligibility criteria for emergency rental assistance. There is no persuasive evidence that Catholic Charities sold, leased, rented, financed, or managed real property. There is competent, persuasive evidence that Valentine did not qualify for emergency rental assistance and was denied on that basis. In sum, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of any sort of unlawful housing discrimination could be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that Catholic Charities did not commit any prohibited act.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Catholic Charities not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Valentine no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2016.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner as alleged in the Petition for Relief dated February 22, 2005, and if so, what relief should the Florida Commission on Human Relations provide.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Wana Dennard (Petitioner or Dennard), is African-American; it is undisputed that Petitioner is a member of a "protected class" of persons protected from discrimination based upon race pursuant to the Fair Housing Act. Respondent, Charter Realty Group (Respondent or Charter), manages a residential apartment complex (the community) subsidized by HUD. Respondent, Ada Pumerol, has served as Charter's on-site property manager for approximately three years; she has worked as a property manager for over 20 years. Respondent Maria Stewart (Stewart) was not identified by competent evidence presented at hearing, and no evidence was offered against her; accordingly, it is determined that Petitioner has abandoned any claim of discrimination against Stewart and/or failed to meet her burden of proof with respect to Stewart. Dennard has resided in Unit 103 of the community since April 1996. At the time she moved to the community, three children resided with her. At some point(s), the two older children moved out. At times relevant to this case, the youngest child, then aged 17, lived with Petitioner. Latisha Thomas (Thomas), also an African-American woman, moved into a one-bedroom unit next door to Petitioner in the spring of 2002. Thomas' son, then aged four, resided with his mother. A situation developed between Petitioner and Thomas. Petitioner testified in her case-in-chief that she was "calling the police on a constant regular basis." Petitioner also sought help from Charter's on-site manager, Ada Pumerol (Pumerol). Specifically, Petitioner asked that she be transferred to an apartment further away from Thomas. Thomas also desired to obtain a different and larger apartment within the community. Thomas had accepted a one- bedroom apartment in order to move into the community, but only because a two bedroom--which would afford separate bedrooms to her and her young son-- was not available. In the fall of 2002, Thomas sought to effect a transfer to a larger apartment and requested same by submitting a unit transfer form to Charter. At all times material to this case, Charter is bound by its contract(s) with HUD to obey the HUD Multifamily Occupancy Handbook (the Handbook). The Handbook provides for unit transfers based upon: (1) a verifiable change in family size or composition; (2) additional policies developed by [Charter] to address transfer requests beyond family composition, for reasons including transfers based upon medical reasons or to accommodate a disability; and (3) a reasonable accommodation for a household member’s disability. Such requests, if determined to be within the foregoing guidelines, are granted. If a transfer is approved pursuant to Handbook guidelines, the resident will be placed on a waiting list if a suitable apartment is not then available. The unit transfer form is prescribed by HUD in its Handbook, and is a prerequisite to consideration by Charter of any transfer request. As previously noted, Thomas filled out the required unit transfer form. She cited, as a basis for her request, an increased need for an extra bedroom based upon her family size and composition -- a growing child who was more appropriately housed in his own room. The transfer was approved, but a two- bedroom apartment did not become available until November 2004, at which time Thomas and her son moved. Requests for transfer are considered on a first-come, first-accommodated basis. Thomas' request for transfer would not have been considered by Charter had she not complied with HUD's requirement that a unit transfer form be completed. Petitioner complained to Pumerol about Thomas, and verbally requested a transfer for the purpose of getting away from Thomas. Petitioner claimed that Thomas engaged in threatening and inappropriate behavior towards her. There is no persuasive evidence that this is true. Thomas testified persuasively that she and Petitioner did not make for congenial neighbors, but Thomas did not threaten or otherwise engage in inappropriate behavior towards Petitioner. Moreover, the evidence established that Charter, which is bound by the Handbook, may not predicate a unit transfer decision upon complaints regarding the behavior of a resident's neighbor. Petitioner admits she was familiar with the requirement that a unit transfer form be completed as a prerequisite to Charter's consideration of a request for transfer, and that she failed to fulfill this prerequisite. Although Ms. Dennard complained about Ms. Thomas, and Ms. Thomas complained about Ms. Dennard, there was no basis for Charter to separate the women. Dennard's complaint of discrimination is also predicated upon a claim that Charter responded promptly and positively to resolve a dispute between two Hispanic female residents by providing one of the Hispanic residents with a unit transfer in order to separate them. To the contrary, the greater weight of competent, persuasive evidence established that the two Hispanic women were separated for reasons having nothing to do with dispute(s) between them. It is determined instead, based upon the greater weight of competent, persuasive evidence, that one of the Hispanic women filed a unit transfer request based upon a change in her family size and composition and for medical reasons. To be precise, other grandchildren were moving in with her; one of the granddaughters was mentally disabled and required her own room. The grandmother therefore submitted a unit transfer request which cited the increased size of the family and medical necessity. Upon consideration and verification of the basis for the request, a transfer to a three-bedroom apartment was approved by Charter. The second Hispanic woman was evicted for egregious violations of requirements set forth in Charter's lease agreement with her concerning maintenance of the apartment. More specifically, the apartment was filthy and attracted the attention of the health department; in addition, the woman had made threats to office workers at the community. Although the Hispanic women ended up "separated" in a literal sense, the separation was based upon legally appropriate reasons having nothing to do with any dispute they may have had while neighbors; there was no competent evidence that the Hispanic women were separated and the African-American women were not on account of discrimination by Charter against African-American women. All of the persuasive evidence demonstrated that the Hispanic women were "separated" due to the appropriate application of the HUD regulations to which Charter was contractually bound. In sum, there was no persuasive evidence that either Hispanic woman sought a transfer on account of poor relations with the other. There is no competent, persuasive evidence that a request based upon such grounds would have been granted.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter its Final Order dismissing Dennard's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of April, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Wana Dennard 18665 Northwest 37th Avenue Apartment 103 Opa Locka, Florida 33056 Rachel M. LaMontagne, Esquire Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz Edelman and Dicker LLP 3800 Bank of America Tower 100 Southeast Second Street Miami, Florida 33131 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301