The Issue The issues for determination are whether Petitioner, Kenneth Davis, made sexually harassing statements and made body contact with a female counselor so as to constitute sexual harassment and a hostile work environment, in violation of Pinellas County Sheriff Office Civil Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying in person and the documentary materials received in evidence, stipulations by the parties, evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant and material facts are found: Respondent, Sheriff Everett S. Rice (Sheriff), is a constitutional officer of the State of Florida, responsible for providing law enforcement and correctional services within the geographic boundaries of Pinellas County, Florida. Petitioner, Detention Deputy Kenneth Davis (Deputy Davis), is a 23-year employee with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, having spent his entire career as a detention officer. As a result of years of training and experience, Deputy Davis is intimately familiar with the Sheriff's policy regarding sexual harassment, detention policies, operations, procedures, and the priority of security applicable to detention deputies. The evidence demonstrates that in the collective opinions of those detention deputies who worked longest with Deputy Davis, all agreed that his personality was that of one who "[was] loud and obnoxious--to pretty much everybody," "play[ed] around a lot," "never insulted anybody," and "[didn't] mean any harm." At all times pertinent to this cause, Deputy Davis held the rank of detention corporal until the Sheriff reduced his rank to Deputy and removed him from his position of detention corporal on March 10, 2003. Deputy Davis' chain-of-command consisted of Major Kirk Brunner, Detention and Correction Bureau commander; Captain Nesbitt; Lieutenant Keith George; and Sergeant Buckingham. Deputy Davis did not have authority over Lori Atwater (Ms. Atwater), the complainant in this cause. He was not in her chain-of-command nor was he one of her bosses in the sense that he could assign her tasks. At all times pertinent to this cause, Deputy Davis worked in detention barrack C, North Division. Barrack C is a two-storied structure divided into B block and C block, with each cellblock divided into an upper level and lower level. Deputy Davis had four deputies under his supervision in cellblock C. At all times pertinent to this cause, Control Deputy Salazar worked the control center at barrack C. The control deputy is stationed in a glassed enclosure with clear view of individuals desiring entrance into the waiting room of barrack C and with clear view of inmates desiring to leave the cellblock and enter the waiting room. On or about March 4, 2002, Ms. Atwater, an African- American and a long-time resident of St. Petersburg, Florida, commenced employment with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office as an inmate-counselor. Ms. Atwater has an Associate of Science degree in Computer Technology Engineering and a Bachelor of Science degree in Management Information Systems. Her inmate- counselor duties consisted of identifying inmates who had family, legal, and personal issues requiring her intervention. The Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) employed Ms. Atwater for ten years before she began employment with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office. While employed with DCFS, she worked in food stamps, Medicaid, protective services, adoptions, and several community recruitment programs. DCFS also has a policy against sexual harassment. The Sheriff has adopted Pinellas County Sheriff's Office General Order 3-4, which defines and prohibits sexual harassment. Pursuant to General Order 3-4, sexual harassment is defined as: All unwelcome or unwanted advances; including sexual advances or unwanted sexual attention, whether between person(s) of the opposite or same sex. This includes, but is not limited to, leering, touching, patting, brushing against, hugging, kissing, fondling, any other similar physical contact, or quid pro quo arrangements (i.e., a situation in which an employee is forced to engage in unwelcomed sexual conduct in order to protect or advance his/her job.) Unwelcome requests or demands for favors, including sexual favors. This consists of subtle or blatant expectations, pressures, or request for any type of favor, including sexual favor, including unwelcome requests for dates, whether or not the request is accompanied by an implied or stated promise of preferential treatment or negative consequences. Inappropriate third party comments or one time comments made which do not constitute a hostile work environment, language not directed at the offended member, jokes (spoken, printed or drawn) that are not directed at the offended member or joint banter of a sexual or offensive nature in which the offended member may or may not be a party. All employees of the Sheriff, including Deputy Davis and Ms. Atwater, received instructions regarding the Sheriff's Sexual Harassment Policy. The evidence demonstrates that beginning in March of 2002 and continuing through the months of April and May 2002, Ms. Atwater noticed, without telling him to stop and without reporting her resulting complaint to her supervisor, that Lieutenant George would call her "Ms. Ashwood." At some unspecified time prior to March of 2002, Ms. Atwater concluded that the name "Ms. Ashwood" was offensive. Ms. Atwater based her conclusion on her interpretation and knowledge of the general reputation of a Ms. Ashwood (no first name given) within the African-American community of St. Petersburg. According to Ms. Atwater, Ms. Ashwood was known throughout the African- American community for engaging in sexual encounters with multiple partners. As a direct result of her superior, Lieutenant George, continuously calling her Ms. Ashwood, a name she considered to be sexually offensive, Ms. Atwater chose not to report her sexual harassment complaint against Lieutenant George through the proper protocol. The record contains no evidence that Ms. Atwater asked Lieutenant George what was his intended meaning by calling her Ms. Ashwood. The evidence demonstrates that Lieutenant George, having been involved in both the hiring of Ms. Atwater as well as involved in her performance evaluation, knew her name to be Ms. Atwater. Alleged statements made by Deputy Davis to Ms. Atwater in the cafeteria during a lunch period. The evidence demonstrated that Ms. Atwater and Deputy Davis initially enjoyed a rather cordial relationship at work during the period of March through May 2002, at least by outward appearances. Deputy Davis and Ms. Atwater both attended read- off sessions; on occasions, they walked together from the read- off sessions back to barrack A; and on two separate occasions, they were seated at the same table in the compound's buffet- styled cafeteria. They did not have contact with each other beyond what was necessary in the performance of their respective duties. They did not have contact with each other outside the workplace. On some unspecified date during lunch in the compound cafeteria, Ms. Atwater chose to ask Deputy Davis why Lieutenant George kept calling her Ms. Ashwood. According to Ms. Atwater, Deputy Davis came over to the table where she sat and she allegedly initiated the following conversation: Atwater: I really don't appreciate that, him [Lieutenant George] calling me Ms. Ashwood. Davis: He's probably P-U-S-S-Y whipped and you probably remind him of her. Atwater: He just alluded to--and used the term inside whore. Atwater: What's an inside whore? Davis: That's when you sleep with someone that makes Decisions for your career. Atwater: If I ever get promoted around here it will not be because I've slept with anybody, but based on my own merits. At the final hearing, Deputy Davis denied the allegations regarding the above statements attributed to him by Ms. Atwater. Thus, the evidence is irreconcilably in conflict as to whether Deputy Davis made those statements attributed to him with the intent of sexually harassing Ms. Atwater, and if the statements were, in fact, made, whether his answers were truthful responses to her question. The compound cafeteria has several long tables seating six to eight persons and several shorter tables seating four to six persons. It is significant that not a single witness, from among others who were seated at the same table with Ms. Atwater and Deputy Davis in the cafeteria on that unspecified day, was called to corroborate the statements allegedly made by Deputy Davis to Ms. Atwater. With knowledge of the Sheriff's sexual harassment policy coupled with her prior knowledge of DCFS's similar sexual harassment policy, and having been highly offended by Deputy Davis' conversation, it is significant that Ms. Atwater, whose counseling job included accurate record keeping, made no attempt to record this first incident with Deputy Davis resulting from repeated incidents with Lieutenant George. Additionally, Ms. Atwater chose not to follow protocol and report to her immediate supervisor her complaint of sexual harassment by a relatively new co-worker. Having carefully weighed and evaluated all the relevant, persuasive, and credible evidence, the undersigned is unable to find that Ms. Atwater's testimony is superior in weight and quantity, thus proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Deputy Davis made unwelcome or unwanted sexual comments or advances and/or unwelcome unwanted sexual demands, nor created a hostile work environment as Ms. Atwater has accused him. This determination reflects the fact finder's judgment concerning the weight of the evidence and nothing more; it is not a finding regarding what was said or not said by Ms. Atwater or by Deputy Davis during the alleged conversation that took place on some unspecified date in the compound cafeteria. Alleged intentional body contact by Deputy Davis with Ms. Atwater in the cafeteria buffet serving line. Ms. Atwater further testified that on another unspecified day while she was in the cafeteria buffet serving line fixing her salad, she felt "a brazen--it felt maybe like his [Deputy Davis] radio or something-it was hard--and then he went in my ear 'boo.' It made me jumpy and I made a squealing noise-because I didn't expect anything to braze in the back on my----." Continuing, Ms. Atwater testified that Lieutenant George came in the cafeteria at that time, and she asked him "why don't you tell your friend to just cut it out?" The Sheriff did not call Lieutenant George to testify. No other witness testified to corroborate Ms. Atwater's statements. Deputy Davis denied this second allegation of intentionally making body contact with Ms. Atwater and speaking in her ear. Having carefully weighed and evaluated all the relevant, persuasive, and credible evidence, the undersigned is unable to find that Ms. Atwater's testimony is superior in weight and quantity and that Deputy Davis engaged in the conduct of which Ms. Atwater has accused him. This determination reflects the fact finder's judgment concerning the weight of the evidence and nothing more; it is not a finding regarding what occurred or did not occur on that unspecified date between Deputy Davis and Ms. Atwater in the buffet serving line in the compound cafeteria. It is significant that Ms. Atwater, whose counseling job required accurate and detailed daily record keeping, made no record of Deputy Davis' second alleged sexual harassment of her person. With firsthand knowledge of the Sheriff's sexual harassment policy plus her ten-year experience with a similar sexual harassment policy during her employment with DCFS, Ms. Atwater chose again not to follow proper protocol. She chose not to properly report this second incident to her immediate supervisor. Her second decided refusal to report what she considered sexual harassment by the same co-worker is not a defense, if Deputy Davis was guilty of such conduct, and does not absolve him from liability. Having chosen for the second consecutive occasion not to report the alleged sexual harassment by Deputy Davis does present a significant impediment regarding Ms. Atwater's memory, recall, and credibility. Alleged repeated harassing comments by Deputy Davis resulting from Ms. Atwater's frightened squealing. Concluding, Ms. Atwater testified that "for months" after the undated cafeteria serving line incident, "every time" she would see Deputy Davis (minimum twice a week in barrack C) he would repeatedly come behind her and say--"Ewwww, counselor," and "Counselor, I want to see you." According to her, these statements allegedly resulted from the cafeteria serving line incident and from a subsequent work related discussion and disagreement between Deputy Davis and Ms. Atwater regarding the form "62" (a form used by inmates requesting to see the counselor). Ms. Atwater, when confronted with what she considered a third but continuing sexual harassment by Deputy Davis, again chose not to follow protocol and report this third incident to her supervisor. It is significant that according to Ms. Atwater, she was initially and had been continuously sexually offended by Lieutenant George calling her Ms. Ashwood. When she inquired of Deputy Davis why Lieutenant George called her Ms. Ashwood, she was again sexually offended by his alleged answer to her question. She turns then to Lieutenant George, who was continually sexual harassing her and (did not ask him to stop calling her Ms. Ashwood) asks his assistance (not to file a proper complaint) but to have Deputy Davis (whose answer to her question about Lieutenant George she considered sexual harassment) to "just knock it off." Regarding her third alleged sexual harassment complaint against Deputy Davis (Ms. Atwater with knowledge that Lieutenant George and Deputy Davis were friends and she admittedly intended to take advantage of their friendship), she went to Lieutenant George, who (1) had continuously called her Ms. Ashwood; (2) was in her chain-of-command; and (3) was also in Deputy Davis' chain-of-command (but not file a complaint against Deputy Davis) and asked if he would "talk to his friend [Deputy Davis]--I don't want to make waves over this-I don't want to make a big to do-if you could talk to him--just have him knock it off." At the final hearing, Deputy Davis denied her third allegation that he would repeatedly come behind her and say--"Ewwww, counselor," and "Counselor, I want to see you." It is significant that after months and three separate allegations of sexual harassment by Deputy Davis, Ms. Atwater chose not to follow protocol and make a sexual harassment complaint against Deputy Davis to Lieutenant George, who would have been obligated to initiate a formal investigation. She chose instead to ask a favor from one who had continuously called her the sexually harassing name of Ms. Ashwood. The evidence is irreconcilably in conflict as to whether Deputy Davis continually made the alleged sexual and harassing comments to Ms. Atwater during an unspecified number of months. The Sheriff presented no witness to corroborate Ms. Atwater's allegations on this issue. Lieutenant George was not called to testify, leaving Ms. Atwater's hearsay testimony regarding this particular issue without corroboration. For the third time, Ms. Atwater chose to not follow protocol and report her third sexual harassment incident. The fact finder acknowledges that her third decided refusal to report sexual harassment by the same co-worker is not a defense, if he were guilty of such conduct, and does not absolve Deputy Davis from liability. Her choosing a third time not to report the alleged sexual harassment by Deputy Davis to her immediate supervisor does present a significant obstacle in the evaluation of Ms. Atwater's credibility. Having carefully weighed and evaluated all the relevant, persuasive, and credible evidence, the undersigned is unable to find that Ms. Atwater's testimony is superior in weight and quantity that Deputy Davis for months engaged in the conduct of which Ms. Atwater has accused him. This determination reflects the fact finder's judgment concerning the weight of the evidence and nothing more; it is not a finding regarding what occurred or did not occur during unspecified months when Deputy Davis may have been in the presence of Ms. Atwater. Allegations that Deputy Davis intentionally delayed or caused delay of inmates desiring conference with Ms. Atwater. Regarding her final allegation of sexual harassment by retaliation against Deputy Davis, Ms. Atwater recalled that on one occasion, Deputy Davis intentionally caused a "two-hour" delay in getting inmates on her list from their cells to the conference area where she awaited them. The purported intent of this alleged two-hour delay was to threaten or to produce a negative consequence regarding Ms. Atwater's performance of her duties. I find that Ms. Atwater's August 9, 2002, memo to her supervisor, Deputy Armsheimer, purporting to be a chronology of events that occurred on August 8, 2002, conclusively demonstrates that Deputy Davis was not the cause, directly or indirectly, for Ms. Atwater's two-hour delay in getting the two inmates she had requested. The evidence demonstrates that Ms. Atwater gave her form "62" list (inmates to be pulled who had requested a conference with her) to the control deputy, Deputy Salazar, in barrack C and waited 40 minutes. Returning to the holding area and inquiring as to the whereabouts of her inmates, Deputy Davis and not Deputy Salazar informed Ms. Atwater that the top three inmates on her list were not there. Ms. Atwater asked Deputy Davis of the inmates' whereabouts, but he gave her no further explanation. Ms. Atwater thereafter called Deputy Hartfield, who is in her chain-of-command, to ask if he would look into the matter and Deputy Hartfield promised to get back to her. Ms. Atwater waited for Deputy Hartfield's return call. After waiting an unspecified period of time and not receiving Deputy Hartfield's returned message, she called Deputy Hartfield a second time and was told that he had relayed his message to control (Deputy Salazar) about one and one-half hours ago. In that message, Deputy Hartfield explained that her first requested inmate (no name given) had been moved to maximum security and her second inmate (Brandon) was written up earlier that morning by him. In her August 9, 2002, memo to Deputy Armsheimer, Ms. Atwater wrote, "the conversation concluded with me stating [to Deputy Hartfield] if I had known 1 1/2 hours ago, I would have just left out of here and could have eaten lunch." It is significant that Ms. Atwater authored her August 9, 2002, memorandum to Deputy Armsheimer, for the singular purpose of explaining the exact cause (and persons involved) of her two-hour plus wait for inmates who were not pulled for her. At the final hearing in May 2003, she contradicts her August 9, 2002, written statements by testifying that Deputy Davis caused her a "two-hour" delay in pulling her inmates. This obvious contradiction is a severe detriment upon her credibility. Ms. Atwater's memorandum to Sergeant Groff, dated October 30, 2002, was written to give a recount of her experiences with Deputy Davis during all times pertinent to this case. She began her memorandum with the statement: "[S]o for the whole story to be clear, I must tell you how we ended up here and start from the beginning." In her first sentence of the second paragraph appears the first conflict in the evidence of record. In that sentence, Ms. Atwater writes, "Shortly after starting to work here, I began to experience unpleasantness from Cpl. Kenneth Davis. His obnoxious gestures, comments and disposition could not be tolerated any longer." (This conclusion consisted of the three separate allegations against Deputy Davis made herein above.) With this opportunity to formally complain of sexual harassment in the work place, Ms. Atwater failed to include the fact that it was she who initially asked Deputy Davis why Lieutenant George called her the sexually offensive name of "Ms. Ashwood." Intentionally choosing to allege that Deputy Davis' answer to her question why Lieutenant George kept calling her "Ms. Ashwood" was the initial sexual harassment that created a hostile work place is contradictory to her testimony. Continuing, Ms. Atwater wrote--"I did tell him that I felt he 'played too much,' and need[ed] to stop moaning and groaning behind me." Even though she recounted moaning and groaning, she specifically omitted her alleged verbatim statements made by Deputy Davis (Finding of Fact 12 hereinabove) when he answered her question "why Lieutenant George calls me Ms. Ashwood." This is significant in that Ms. Atwater's testimony was that Deputy Davis' alleged verbatim statements when he answered her question were so "sexually harassing" that she was "immediately" offended the moment she heard them. Yet, she omits any mention that it was Lieutenant George continuously calling her "Ms. Ashwood" that initially and repeatedly offended her. The name Ashwood she considered had such a negative sexual reputation in the community that she was immediately offended and sexually harassed when Lieutenant George first called her Ms. Ashwood and each time thereafter. She omits any mention that it was her inquiry of Deputy Davis, "why Lieutenant George [sexually harassing her] was calling her the offensive name of Ms. Ashwood" that produced the alleged response. Based upon Ms. Atwater's acknowledgement contained in her October 30, 2002, memorandum to Sergeant Groff, I find that her allegations that Deputy Davis caused a delayed wait of two hours to get inmates pulled and, thus, "creat[ed] a hostile work environment" to be contrary to her August 9, 2002, memorandum to Sergeant Armsheimer, admitting that had she known her inmates were not in barrack C, she would have left and had lunch "one and one-half" hours prior. Ms. Atwater further admits in writing that from May of 2002 forward, she and Deputy Davis "barely" spoke to one another. If Ms. Atwater's memory is presumed to be accurate and she and Deputy Davis discontinued speaking to one another during the March through May 2002 period, it was not logical to conclude that Deputy Davis repeatedly and continually moaned and groaned in her ear for "months" thereafter (i.e. June, July, August, and October). For the fourth time, Ms. Atwater chose not to and did not report this fourth incident to her immediate supervisor at or near the time it occurred. Her sexual harassment complaint against Deputy Davis was filed after her October 2002 complaint was filed against Lieutenant George. Her fourth decided refusal to immediately report sexual harassment by the same co-worker is not a defense, if he were guilty of such conduct, and does not absolve Deputy Davis from liability. Her choosing a fourth time not to report the initial alleged sexual harassment by Deputy Davis during the March through May period, when coupled with the contradiction between her testimony that Deputy Davis was the cause of a two-hour delay in pulling her inmates, and her memorandum wherein she acknowledges that her inmates had been written up by Sergeant Hartfield, presents a credibility obstacle. Ms. Atwater makes no further mention of Deputy Davis in her October 30, 2002, memoranda, devoting the remainder to Lieutenant George. She recounts in detail their initial friendly relationship, turning to a cold and unfriendly relationship, the keeping-your-distance treatment, their many phone conversations at work, their lunch dates away from the work place, and their private phone calls when at home, ending on October 24, 2002, with an incident of kissing and Lieutenant George rubbing his groin against her buttocks and her resisting his advances. (See Joint Exhibit J-1.) In her final paragraph, Ms. Atwater relates how, unbeknownst to Lieutenant George, she arranged for a three-way call between herself, Lieutenant George, and her uncle, a City of St. Petersburg employee. She arranged the three-way call for the purpose of securing a witness to corroborate her statements regarding the Lieutenant George sexual harassment encounter. Though her alleged initial sexual harassment was initiated by Deputy Davis and continued for months, Ms. Atwater made no similar attempt to corroborate her claims of sexual harassment against Deputy Davis. Knowing that Deputy Davis was not within her chain-of-command and not in a supervisory position over her, there was no logical reason for Ms. Atwater to fear promotions and job security. Ms. Atwater knew that filing a complaint against a lieutenant within her chain-of- command presented a greater risk than filing a complaint against Deputy Davis who was not in her chain-of-command. Her choosing not to record (or procure corroboration) the Deputy Davis incidents, when coupled with her delay of many months in reporting her compliant through proper channels because of fear of reprisal, rings hollow. It was after the Administrative Review Board had begun an investigation of Ms. Atwater's October 2002 complaint of sexual harassment against Lieutenant George that the Sheriff initiated an investigation of Deputy Davis. Only after her egregious October 24, 2002, incident involving Lieutenant George did she file a subsequent and separate sexual harassment compliant against Deputy Davis. In the absence of corroboration, Ms. Atwater's testimony of a single incident of intentional touching and her testimony of alleged verbatim statements made by Deputy Davis and his unequivocal denial presents a "she said-he said" dilemma. Neither party's testimony is inherently more credible than the other party's testimony. Contrary to the opinion of Major Brunner, who sat on the Administrative Review Board, that when the Administrative Review Board questioned Deputy Davis regarding those allegations, Deputy Davis was "in denial." This assumption and by implication presumed guilt, thereby lending credibility to Ms. Atwater's allegations, is a conclusion not based on fact and is contrary to the evidence adduced during the de novo proceeding. Ms. Atwater's testimony of incidents having occurred over a four-month or more period and the lack of time or specific dates coupled with the contradictions between her testimony during the final hearing and her August 9, 2002, memorandum to her supervisor, creates an unfathomable chasm in the evaluation of her credibility. The Inspection Bureau of the Administrative Inspection Division investigated Ms. Atwater's complaint and submitted their investigative results to the Administrative Review Board, made up of various employees with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office. The Administrative Review Board determined that Petitioner, Deputy Davis, had violated the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office Civil Service Act, Laws of Florida, 89-404, as amended by Laws of Florida, 90-395, Section 6, Subsection 4: violation of provisions of the law or rules, regulations, and operating procedures of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office. The Administrative Review Board determined that Deputy Davis' conduct was a violation of the rules and regulations of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, Rules 3-1.1 (level five violation) and 5.16, relating to sexual harassment and discrimination as defined in the Sheriff's General Order 3-4. The Administrative Review Board determined that Deputy Davis' available range of discipline was calculated in conformance with the matrix contained within General Order 10-2 of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office that allocates a point scale to various violations. The matrix provides that a level five offense, which includes sexual harassment, results in a 50- point assessment. Deputy Davis scored a total of 50 cumulative points with a discipline range of five-day suspension up to and including termination. Demotion is also authorized under the applicable General Order. After considering the evidence and available sanctions, the Sheriff notified Deputy Davis on March 10, 2003, that he was imposing a ten-day suspension without pay and demoting him from the rank of corporal to the rank of detention deputy. After weighing all the evidence, including the Sheriff's evidentiary presentation of Ms. Atwater's testimony of verbal comments made and intentional body conduct allegedly engaged in by Deputy Davis, this fact finder finds the uncorroborated hearsay evidence insufficient to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the allegations that Deputy Davis made sexually harassing verbal comments to Ms. Atwater, and that he made intentional sexually harassing body contact with her, so as to create a hostile work environment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Civil Service Board of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office enter a final order finding that: Petitioner did not commit the verbal and physical conduct alleged in the charging document and that there was no violation of the rules, regulations, and policies of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office as alleged. Petitioner's ten-day suspension from his employment as a detention corporal with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office was therefore inappropriate. Petitioner's demotion from his previous rank of detention corporal to the rank of detention deputy was therefore inappropriate. Petitioner's ten-day suspension from his employment as a detention corporal with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office be restored with full detention corporal's pay and benefits. Petitioner be restored to the rank of detention corporal2 and given full duties and responsibilities as previously held. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of August, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of August, 2003.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner based upon her sex/gender and/or disability. For the reasons more fully explained below, Respondent did not sexually harass Petitioner nor did it discriminate against her on the basis of her alleged disability.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an "employer" within the meaning of section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Respondent operates a chain of fast food restaurants, including several in the Pensacola area. Petitioner, an African-American female, began working for Respondent in April or May 2008. Petitioner was still working for Respondent on December 22, 2009, when she filed her complaint with FCHR. Petitioner was hired to work 10 to 15 hours per week. She worked the late-night shift and worked primarily in the cash register area inside the restaurant where she took customers' orders and delivered them food. Additionally, Petitioner typically cleaned the front of the restaurant. During the late-night shift, the restaurant is typically staffed with just three or four people—one manager and two to three employees. Consequently, everyone is expected to work hard during the entire shift. Further, the late-night shift is when the restaurant undergoes its daily major cleaning, which Petitioner typically performed. Petitioner has a long history of pursuing discrimination or workers' compensation claims against her employers. Petitioner admitted that she had filed discrimination claims against every employer for whom she had worked, except Waffle House. She claims that at other jobs (not at Whataburger) her co-workers had assaulted her, cast Satanic spells on her, intentionally hurt her (e.g., poured hot grease on her and hit her in the face with a pan), and threatened to kidnap her children. She also alleged she had been discriminated against before, such as being called "Kunta Kinte" at two different jobs. Petitioner has not been previously successful in pursuing any of these claims. Petitioner claims to have written to and/or discussed these various claims with the FBI and President Obama. She also claims that she sees events before they occur through dreams and "flashes." She claims to have foreseen the kidnapping of a young local boy and that she has the ability to "block" hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico from harming Pensacola "where her babies live" and even predict hurricanes. All of Petitioner's prior claims and her boasts of mystical powers undermine her credibility in this case. Sexual Harassment Petitioner claims to have been the victim of sexual harassment. At the hearing, she testified that one of her supervisors, James Cook, touched another supervisor, Shurnita Ruffin, in a sexual way (put his hands in her pants and shirt), on more than one occasion, and allegedly asked Petitioner if she was going to tell his wife what she witnessed. Petitioner claims this occurred because Mr. Cook wanted to somehow prove she was a racist (Mr. Cook is Caucasian, and Ms. Ruffin is African-American), and because Petitioner's son was dating Caroline Dickerson's babysitter. Petitioner claimed this was a racist action on the part of the two supervisors, not sex or gender discrimination. Petitioner further claimed that Mr. Cook encouraged one of Petitioner's co-workers, Jordan Yeager, to talk about his homosexuality at work. Finally, Petitioner alleged that Ms. Ruffin frequently cursed out Mr. Cook, the same individual she allegedly allowed to put his hands on her in a sexual way on multiple occasions in Petitioner's presence. Petitioner did not explain how these alleged actions were related to her sex or gender. Petitioner claimed that Ms. Ruffin treated everyone (except Jordan Yeager) poorly, regardless of the person's sex or gender. Mr. Cook, Ms. Ruffin, and Mr. Yeager testified. Each denied all of the allegations against them, and each denied doing or witnessing anything that could be construed as sexual harassment. The testimony of each of these witnesses was straightforward and credible. Mr. Yeager testified that he was sensitive to talking about his homosexuality since he was the only homosexual employee to his knowledge. Regardless, talking about one's sexuality is not sexual harassment even if it did occur and even if Petitioner were offended by homosexuality. After Petitioner filed her complaint with FCHR, Respondent investigated the allegations by interviewing all of the people with whom Petitioner worked and reviewing video taken in the store at the time of Petitioner's alleged sexual harassment. Respondent has eight different video cameras positioned around the restaurant (except in the bathrooms in which no claims of harassment had been made) and no footage corroborated any of Petitioner's allegations. Further, all of the employees interviewed signed statements that they had witnessed no incidents of sexual harassment. The restaurant is small enough that it is highly unlikely any sexual activity alleged by Petitioner could have occurred outside the view of the cameras. Petitioner's testimony regarding the claims of sexual harassment was not credible, and she failed to prove the existence of a sexually hostile work environment. Further, Petitioner never complained about or reported the alleged sexual harassment to her supervisors or through any of the prescribed channels provided by Respondent for reporting harassment or discrimination. This was despite the fact that she was aware Respondent has a zero tolerance policy towards sexual harassment, provided multiple ways for her to report sexual harassment, and even required that she take a sexual harassment quiz when she was hired. Also, Petitioner was no stranger to the corporate office when she had a complaint or needed information. Since she worked only a block away from the corporate office, she had visited there several times on a variety of issues. Petitioner failed to utilize the well-known procedures put in place by Whataburger for reporting the alleged harassment. Disability Discrimination Petitioner also claims she was the victim of disability discrimination because her hours were reduced from 10 to 15 per week down to only three hours per week because Respondent perceived her as being disabled. Petitioner described in detail an accident in June 2008 when she slipped and fell in the back of the restaurant on some grease or pickle juice that had been spilled on the floor. She completed her shift on the date of the fall, but sought medical attention the next day. Petitioner claimed to have suffered a second accident on the job in June 2009, when she hit her knee on a toilet in the restaurant. Petitioner filed a workers' compensation claim after the first accident, but not the second. Respondent was aware of the first accident, but not the second. Petitioner claimed these incidents were not accidents, but were intentional acts on the part of Respondent's employees. She could not identify the particular employees involved, and she could not testify as to why anyone would have caused these accidents other than her belief that they did not like her. The evidence does not support any of these allegations, especially Petitioner's claims that the accidents were intentionally caused. There was no showing these accidents had anything to do with her sex or gender, sexual harassment, or alleged disability. Petitioner's claim that her hours were reduced from 10 to 15 per week to three per week due to Respondent perceiving her as disabled is not supported by credible evidence. Petitioner acknowledged she was hired to work part-time for 10 to 15 hours a week and could not even provide a timeframe of when her hours were further reduced to only three per week, other than to say this occurred sometime in July 2009. Respondent noted that the reduction in hours occurred during a four-week period in October and November 2009, when Petitioner underwent the first of her two surgeries on both knees. She had surgery on her left knee on November 11, 2009, and on her right knee on February 12, 2010. Petitioner admitted that Ms. Ruffin, one of Respondent's managers, reduced her hours around the time of her first surgery because she was working too slowly, and Petitioner admitted she moved 60-70 percent slower during this period than when she first started working for Respondent. Petitioner further admitted she was in chronic pain every day, that both her knees swelled up constantly, and that her leg would lock constantly. Petitioner also admitted she called Respondent's corporate office and told them she could not stand the pain she was suffering, and that she also had stomach and rectal bleeding. Petitioner did not know whether Ms. Ruffin was aware of this call. Petitioner also admitted that she was often sent home early by Ms. Ruffin once the restaurant stopped serving customers inside (typically around midnight or 1:00 a.m.), and business slowed down. Petitioner admitted Ms. Ruffin did this to reduce the restaurant's labor costs which, in turn, enhanced Ms. Ruffin's bonus. Petitioner testified that Ms. Ruffin never told her she was being sent home early for anything related to her health or alleged disability. Respondent's witnesses testified that Petitioner's hours were reduced only because Petitioner had a habit of calling out of work (before her scheduled shift began) and asking to leave early almost every time she was scheduled to work (generally after she had finished cleaning the front of the restaurant). In each instance, Petitioner initiated her own reduction in work time. Also, in March 2010, Petitioner was warned about calling in advance after a "no call/no show" where she failed to call her supervisor and did not show up for work that night. She used the same excuse that she had used two weeks earlier (that all four of her car's tires had been slashed). This created a hardship for her supervisor who had to work short- handed that night since she was unable to find a last-minute replacement. Such behavior of not calling in advance or calling at the last minute was repeated by Petitioner on other occasions. Respondent considers this a serious offense because the manager is left without sufficient personnel to operate the restaurant at the last minute. Additionally, Petitioner experienced a slow recovery from each surgery and missed long periods of work before she was able to return. When she did return to work, she missed several scheduled shifts due to pain and/or slipping and falling outside of work. Petitioner's reduction in hours caused by these absences was not the result of Respondent perceiving her as being disabled and was not otherwise the result of disability discrimination. Respondent's witnesses were more credible than Petitioner concerning this claim. Petitioner did not prove that she was disabled or that Respondent treated her as though she were disabled. Although Respondent was aware of Petitioner's first accident on the job in June 2008, it was not aware of her alleged second accident in July 2009. Petitioner never filed a workers' compensation claim based upon the alleged second accident. Regardless of such knowledge, Respondent provided legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for Petitioner's receiving fewer work hours, which Petitioner did not show were mere pretexts for unlawful discrimination. Therefore, any reduction in Petitioner's hours was not the result of Respondent's perceiving her as being disabled and was not otherwise the result of disability discrimination.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that no act of discrimination was committed by Respondent and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of July, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of July, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 S. Gordon Hill, Esquire Hill, Ward & Henderson, P.A. 101 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 3700 Tampa, Florida 33602 Carolyn Johnson Post Office Box 4671 Pensacola, Florida 32507 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent, Lincare, Inc., is liable to Petitioner, Sharon Ford, for subjecting her to a hostile work environment based on sexual harassment.
Findings Of Fact The Parties and Complaint Allegations Lincare is a Tampa-based company that focuses on home- healthcare services. It has an annual revenue of over $3 billion and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a company based in Germany. Ms. Ford, a married woman with children, is an accountant and an attorney. Lincare first hired her as its acquisition counsel in 2001 and promoted her to director of acquisitions in 2002. She held that position for almost 15 years before she left the company on January 27, 2017. Mr. Tripp, a married man with children, served as an Arabic linguist in the Army before obtaining his law degree. Lincare hired Mr. Tripp to replace Ms. Ford as its acquisition counsel in 2002 and promoted him to general counsel in 2013. He still holds that position. On January 19, 2018, almost a year after leaving Lincare, Ms. Ford filed a Complaint with the Commission alleging a hostile work environment. She alleged that Mr. Tripp, over a 15-month period from December 2015 through March 2017, subjected her to severe and pervasive sexual harassment. On July 13, 2018, the Commission issued its notice of determination of no reasonable cause and mailed it to Ms. Ford. The notice advised her that she “may request an administrative hearing . . . by filing a Petition for Relief within 35 days of the date the determination was signed by the Executive Director.” Ms. Ford received the notice in the mail on July 16, 2018. On August 16, 2018, 34 days after the Commission issued its notice, Ms. Ford requested an administrative hearing by mailing her Petition to the Commission via U.S. mail. The Commission received the Petition on August 20, 2018. On the same day, the Commission generated its transmittal letter. But, instead of transmitting the Petition to DOAH, the Commission advised Ms. Ford that the Petition appeared to be untimely because it was received three days beyond the 35-day deadline under section 760.11(7), Florida Statutes. After Ms. Ford responded that she timely requested a hearing by post-marking her Petition before the 35-day deadline, the Commission transmitted the case to DOAH on September 21, 2018. The transmittal letter, dated August 20, 2018, did not dismiss the Petition as untimely but rather requested assignment of a judge to “conduct all necessary proceedings required under the law.” Lincare’s Structure and Policies Between 2015 and 2017 Lincare had three officers: chief executive officer (“CEO”), chief financial officer (“CFO”), and chief operating officer (“COO”). The corporate chart had the CEO at the top and the CFO and COO, who reported to the CEO, immediately thereunder. The second tier of the chart listed six department heads, none of whom were corporate officers: corporate compliance officer, head of business innovation, head of human resources, head of public relations & communications, general counsel, and director of acquisitions. These managers were equal on the hierarchy chart and all reported directly to the CEO. As director of acquisitions, Ms. Ford brought in the deals, negotiated the business side, and quarterbacked them to closing. She helped move the deals along by ensuring that Lincare personnel communicated and accomplished their required tasks. She provided business advice to the legal department and worked closely with the acquisition attorney (on smaller deals) and the general counsel (on larger deals). Ms. Ford received a salary and an objective bonus tied to the deals that closed.2/ As the general counsel, Mr. Tripp oversaw legal affairs and supervised five lawyers in the legal department, but had no control over any other department. As to the deals, Mr. Tripp handled the legal aspects, such as contracts, due diligence, and compliance, provided legal advice, and assessed risks. The CEO, COO, and CFO had sole authority to decide whether a deal closed. Mr. Tripp received a salary and a discretionary bonus tied to the company’s financial success in a given year. Although Ms. Ford and Mr. Tripp gave each other advice, they were equals on the corporate chart. Mr. Tripp had no authority over Ms. Ford and lacked the power to hire, discipline, promote, transfer, fire, or control her compensation. They were coworkers who both answered directly to the CEO. The head of human resources (“head of HR”) ran the HR department and its roughly 15 to 18 employees. Directly under the Head of HR was the employee relations director, Ms. Adams. Among other things, the HR department oversaw the employee handbook and investigated reports of discrimination and harassment. The handbook included a detailed anti-harassment policy forbidding sexual harassment by any employee at work or at work-related events outside the office. Harassment was defined to include unwelcome sexual advances, requests for conduct of a sexual nature, and other unwelcome behavior that was personally offensive and interfered with work effectiveness done in person or through electronic means. The policy prohibited any employee from making employment decisions based on the submission to or rejection of sexual advances, and noted in bold that any violation would subject an employee to discipline up to an immediate discharge. The handbook contained a detailed reporting procedure for employees who believed, had concerns, or suspected they or anyone else may have been harassed. The policy required them “to immediately notify” a named individual based on their location, which included the employee relations director or the HR Manager for employees in the corporate office. The handbook required employees to follow the procedure and noted that the failure to do so could adversely affect their rights to pursue a claim. Lincare took harassment allegations seriously. Once an allegation was reported, the employee relations director or HR managers investigated; the legal department was not involved unless a particular legal question arose. They obtained as much information as possible from the victim, spoke to potential witnesses, reviewed available documents, and interviewed the accused. If the investigation uncovered no corroborating evidence and the accused denied any wrongdoing, a report would be added to the accused’s personnel file; upon a second allegation, the accused would be terminated. If a supervisor retaliated against an employee for reporting harassment, that supervisor would be terminated. Lincare disseminated the handbook and updated versions to employees and required them to sign a form acknowledging that they received the handbook and would abide by its policies. Ms. Ford signed such forms each time she received a revised handbook, including in 2015——the version in effect until she left Lincare in January 2017. She knew about the harassment policy, the reporting requirement, and the fact that her failure to so report could adversely affect her rights. Friends and Coworkers for Over 15 Years Ms. Ford and Mr. Tripp worked closely together at Lincare for 15 years and they became good friends in the process. When Lincare hired Mr. Tripp as acquisition counsel in 2002, he worked closely with Ms. Ford on hundreds of deals. They were in constant, daily contact to strategize, handle diligence and compliance issues, advise each other on the tasks they both had to complete, and ensure the deals closed. They also had a close friendship. They regularly went to lunch alone and with others, as often as three days per week, attended social events with mutual friends, and spoke on the phone and texted about business and personal matters. They had much in common as married parents with kids around the same age and they enjoyed each other’s company. When Mr. Tripp became general counsel in 2013, Ms. Ford initially worked closely with the new acquisition counsel. In late 2014, however, she and Mr. Tripp resumed working closely together when Lincare began negotiating larger transactions. Project Maverick was the largest acquisition of Ms. Ford’s career and it closed in March 2016. Project Falcon was the largest divestiture of her career and it closed in August 2016. These two deals, and others, required Ms. Ford and Mr. Tripp to work even more closely together from 2015 until she left the company in January 2017. They often met multiple times per day. Ms. Ford sought Mr. Tripp’s assistance on the legal side and he sought her assistance on the business side. As before, she remained the quarterback shepherding the deal forward. Their friendship continued during this period. They invited each other to lunch regularly, alone and with coworkers. They attended social events with friends, including holiday dinners in 2015 and 2016. On out-of-town work trips, they rented cars together and sometimes spent time alone, such as for meals. They continued to text and speak on the phone about business and personal matters. They talked about their families, children, and other personal matters much like longtime friends do. They checked in on each other when personal crises occurred. And, when Ms. Ford began tense negotiations with the CEO about her compensation, which ultimately led her to leave Lincare, she relied on Mr. Tripp as a sounding board and for moral support. Even after Ms. Ford left the company in January 2017, she maintained contact with him. They had lunch alone at least once. For months, they continued to text each other, even about personal matters such as when she texted him after he had been in a car accident. However, their communication largely ceased once Ms. Ford filed a lawsuit against Lincare over her compensation. Ms. Ford’s Testimony Accusing Mr. Tripp of Sexual Harassment The first incident occurred on December 11, 2015. In that 10 to 20 minute conversation in her office, Mr. Tripp professed strong feelings for her and that he desired a confidential, sexual relationship with her. She rejected him and said they were just friends. She immediately called her husband and spoke to him all the way home. She felt humiliated, embarrassed, and angry. She did not attend a football game that weekend with other coworkers to avoid Mr. Tripp and kept her communications with him to e-mail for the next week. The second incident occurred in her office later in December 2015. While discussing another affair that may be happening at work, Mr. Tripp said he could not report the other employee because he wanted to do the same thing with Ms. Ford, notwithstanding the professional and personal risks. She again rejected him. For the next few weeks, Ms. Ford tried to avoid him as much as possible, but she had to face him because the deals began to lag. She said he continued to make comments here and there, but she offered no specific details. The third incident occurred in January 2016, after a conference call in Mr. Tripp’s office. He said he knew Ms. Ford was avoiding him, but he could not function. He told her he was willing to leave his wife, but she again rejected him. Over the next few months, the comments and innuendo pretty much ceased so Ms. Ford decided to go back to being friends to ensure that the Maverick and Falcon deals closed. However, a fourth incident occurred in the parking lot after a late conference call in June 2016. Mr. Tripp professed that his feelings were stronger now and that he was waiting for Ms. Ford to change her mind. She said her feelings had not changed and he said he understood. For the remainder of 2016, Ms. Ford testified generally that Mr. Tripp continued to make comments about his inability to function and that he got more obsessive as the year progressed. But she offered little detail about the comments or where and when they occurred, except that she had to be around Mr. Tripp’s wife several times and she and Mr. Tripp agreed it was uncomfortable. The fifth incident occurred in October 2016 when Mr. Tripp told her he was learning Hebrew to “connect” with her in her native language. He tried to communicate with her in Hebrew in person and via text, despite her telling him to stop because it made her very uncomfortable. As a result, she again started to avoid him at the office, though he texted her to see if she was alright and admitted to acting like a high school student. In January 2017, Mr. Tripp continued with innuendo, spoke in Hebrew, and told Ms. Ford that he might move closer to her. She believed he was obsessed, which made her nervous about his stability and her safety. But she offered no specific dates on which these events occurred. Mr. Tripp came to Ms. Ford’s office twice that month after she had heated meetings with the CEO, including on her last day at the company, January 27, 2017. He cried because he could not imagine how he would go on if she left, as she was the only reason he came to work every day. That evening, he told her on the phone that he now knows what a divorce feels like. Mr. Tripp continued to harass her following her departure, including taking his family to the same ski resort in March 2017. She testified that she stayed in her room to avoid him and never initiated contact with him while there, though text messages admitted into evidence confirm she texted him several times, about a security breach and generally about his vacation. In January 2018, a year after she left the company during a mediation of her lawsuit against Lincare, Ms. Ford for the first time accused Mr. Tripp of sexual harassment. She had not reported the allegations pursuant to Lincare’s policy, though she knew it required her to do so. She never informed other coworkers either. In fact, the only person she said she told was her husband, though he did not testify at the hearing. Ms. Ford testified that she did not report the allegations because she had a contentious relationship with the CEO during this period and she believed the CEO would terminate her. She also was concerned that Mr. Tripp was unstable and could decide to kill the deals to ensure she missed out on her bonuses. Lastly, she thought reporting would be futile due to Lincare’s culture of harassment, including by one of the two individuals to whom she was directed to report, the head of HR. Mr. Tripp’s Testimony Denying the Alleged Sexual Harassment Mr. Tripp said that he never harassed Ms. Ford. Indeed, no one has ever accused him of harassment. He said he never expressed romantic feelings for her, suggested having a sexual relationship with her, or did anything to scare her. Ms. Ford’s allegations against him came as a shock. He believed they had been good friends for over 15 years and she never indicated otherwise. They enjoyed each other’s company, had children around the same age, and spoke often about business and personal things, like friends often do. Even during the period of alleged harassment, he noticed no changes in her behavior. They continued to invite each other to lunch regularly, often eating together alone, and continued to discuss deeply personal matters about their families. They texted each other often and attended holiday dinners with friends. She chose to sit next to him at a work event at a hotel in the fall of 2016. The same could be said for business trips during this period. On a March 2016 trip to New York, Ms. Ford left a group dinner early with him because he was sick, they worked out the next day, and had breakfast. On an August 2016 trip to Nashville to celebrate the closing of the Maverick deal, they rented a car together and went to dinner alone after Ms. Ford invited him. On a trip to New York in August/September 2016, Ms. Ford stayed with Mr. Tripp to retrieve his briefcase from the office and went to the airport together after the rest of the team left. Mr. Tripp admitted to learning some Hebrew, but because he liked languages (he was an Arabic linguist in the Army), not to become romantically connected to Ms. Ford. He practiced with her because she was the only person he knew who spoke Hebrew, just as he did with other coworkers who spoke another language. She never said it made her uncomfortable. Mr. Tripp also admitted that his wife suggested moving closer to Plant High School because it had a beneficial program for their son. The idea had nothing to do with Ms. Ford, who did not live nearby, and they decided not to move in any event. Even on her final days at Lincare, they had usual interactions. Mr. Tripp admitted calling Ms. Ford the evening of her last day (but said he had not come down to her office earlier) to express concern for his friend and sadness that they would no longer be working together. He did not recall commenting about a divorce, but if he had, it only related to her being a friend. For a few months after she left Lincare, Mr. Tripp believed their relationship had not changed. They continued to text each other and had lunch alone at least once. Though he took a ski trip to the same resort in March 2017, his wife chose the resort and Ms. Ford reached out to him several times during that trip to see how he was doing. Ms. Ford also texted him after he had a car accident in March/April 2017. It was not until several months after Ms. Ford left Lincare and filed her lawsuit against the company that he noticed a change in her attitude. At one point, he invited her to lunch with a mutual friend, but she did not respond and he later learned they had lunch without him. Ms. Ford also told him on the phone that he was going to hate her someday, though he had no idea then what that meant. After a hurricane in August/September 2017, he reached out to make sure she was safe; she thanked him and wished his family well too. That was their last communication before the sexual harassment allegations were made. Credibility Findings as to the Conflicting Testimony After hearing the conflicting testimony from Ms. Ford and Mr. Tripp and observing their demeanor, the undersigned found it exceedingly difficult initially to determine who is telling the truth and who is quite an effective storyteller. Ms. Ford’s conviction in her accusations against Mr. Tripp was equal to his conviction in his denials. But, when considering all of the record evidence and testimony, the scales of credibility tip in Mr. Tripp’s favor for several reasons. For one, Ms. Ford cultivated a professional and personal relationship with Mr. Tripp throughout the alleged harassment period and continued to do so even after she left Lincare. Although she said she maintained contact because they had to work together and she wanted him as an ally, she also accused him of stalker-like, obsessive, humiliating, and unstable behavior. Her efforts to maintain a friendship with him, even after leaving Lincare, are at odds with someone who feels humiliated and fears for their safety. Ms. Ford’s testimony also veered from the affidavit she filed with the Commission. She testified that he generally made comments between November 2016 and January 2017, yet her affidavit offered more specifics as to the comments allegedly made. Her testimony about him moving to her neighborhood was entirely omitted from her affidavit. Her testimony about his efforts to sometimes communicate with her in Hebrew was at odds with the affidavit’s claim that he did so “continuously.” And, her testimony about the comments he made on her last day at Lincare differed as to substance and degree from her affidavit. Further, Ms. Ford’s testimony was directly refuted by other evidence. She testified that she did not affirmatively communicate with him about anything personal in March 2017, but text messages confirm that she checked in with him several times during the trip about his vacation and engaged in more friendly conversation than initially admitted. Ms. Ford’s reasons for waiting until a year after she left Lincare to report the accusations also call her credibility into doubt. Though she testified that she feared Mr. Tripp would kill two large deals and her bonuses therefrom, those deals closed in March and August 2016, and yet she never reported the allegedly ongoing harassment before she left Lincare at the end of January 2017. It also cannot be ignored that she waited until January 2018 to report the accusations and did so during the mediation of her compensation lawsuit against the company. Lastly, though not fatal to her claim, Ms. Ford’s failure to present any corroborating evidence cannot be ignored. She testified that she lost weight, suffered hair loss, and could not sleep, and said that it was the worst year of her life. Yet, the record is devoid of evidence that any other friends or coworkers noticed such changes, that she missed work or social events, or that she suffered at work in any way. She said he sent her inappropriate text messages, but provided no proof of them. She apparently kept a journal about work issues, but did not document the harassing incidents. And, though she said she immediately told her husband in December 2015, she chose not to present his testimony even though he was the only person who could corroborate her accusations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Petitioner, Sharon Ford, failed to timely file her Complaint and, regardless, that Ms. Ford failed to establish that Respondent, Lincare, Inc., committed an unlawful employment practice against her, both of which warrant dismissal of her Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ANDREW D. MANKO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 2019.
Findings Of Fact On or about March 8, 1988, Petitioner filed a charge of discrimination based upon sexual harassment with the City of Clearwater, Office of Community Relations, involving Respondent. Petitioner had been employed at Respondent from approximately April, 1987 until she resigned in November, 1987. This case was duly noticed for hearing on August 24, 1988, by Notice of Hearing dated June 6, 1988. Petitioner received this Notice of Hearing, and did appear at the hearing. Petitioner testified, under oath, at the hearing that she did not want to pursue her claim of sexual harassment, and would offer no evidence in support of her claim. In fact, she did not offer any evidence in support of her claim.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Petitioner's claim of discrimination based upon sexual harassment against Respondent be DISMISSED. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of September, 1988 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of September, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth Moore 1411 Illinois Avenue Palm Harbor, Florida 34663 Scott McGregor, Owner Heavenly Bodies II 3323 U.S. 19 North Clearwater, Florida 34619 Ronald M. McElrath Office of Community Relations Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 34618 Miles Lance, Esquire Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 34618
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Respondent operates the Best Western Admiral’s Inn and Conference Center in Winter Haven. Petitioner worked as a waitress in the hotel’s first floor restaurant from March 8, 2005, through March 18, 2006. Petitioner testified that she was sexually harassed “for months” by Marcus Owens, a cook who worked with her in the restaurant. According to Petitioner, Mr. Owens made vulgar and sexually-explicit comments to her on a number of occasions while they were working together. Petitioner could not recall precisely when the harassment started, but she estimated that it started approximately two weeks after Mr. Owens started working at the restaurant. Mr. Owens started working in the restaurant on July 28, 2005, which means that the harassment would have started in mid- August 2005. Petitioner did not complain about the harassment until November 9, 2005, when she reported it to her supervisor, Cory Meeks. This was the first notice that Respondent had about the alleged harassment. Petitioner’s testimony that she complained to the hotel’s general manager, Jeffrey Vandiver, about the harassment several weeks prior to her complaint to Mr. Meeks was not persuasive. Petitioner and Mr. Meeks met with the hotel’s human resources manager, Lin Whitaker, on the same day that the complaint was made, November 9, 2005. Ms. Whitaker told Petitioner that she needed to put her complaint in writing for the hotel to take formal action. Petitioner refused to do so because she was scared of retribution by Mr. Owens, even though Mr. Meeks and Ms. Whittaker assured her that she would be protected from Mr. Owens. Petitioner asked Mr. Meeks and Ms. Whitaker to address the situation with Mr. Owens without using her name, which they did. Mr. Owens denied sexually harassing anyone when confronted by Mr. Meeks and Ms. Whitaker. On December 2, 2005, Petitioner again complained to Mr. Meeks about Mr. Owens. She told Mr. Meeks that the harassment had not stopped and that it had gotten worse through even more vulgar comments. Petitioner again did not want a formal investigation into the allegations, but Ms. Whitaker told her that an investigation was required by company policy since this was the second complaint. Mr. Owens was immediately suspended without pay pending the completion of the investigation. The investigation was conducted by Mr. Vandiver, Mr. Meeks, and Ms. Whitaker on December 7, 2005. They first met with Petitioner to get her side of the story. Then, they met separately with Mr. Owens to get his side of the story. Finally, they interviewed all of the employees who worked with Petitioner and Mr. Owens. This was the first time that Petitioner went into detail about what Mr. Owens had said and done. She stated that, among other things, Mr. Owens asked her whether she had “ever had a black man” and whether her boyfriend “is able to get it up or does he require Viagra.” She also stated that there were no witnesses to the harassment because Mr. Owens was "discreet" about making the comments to her when no one else was around. Mr. Owens again denied sexually harassing anyone. He acknowledged asking Petitioner whether she had ever dated a black man, but he stated that the question was in response to Petitioner asking him whether he had ever dated a white woman. (Mr. Owens is black, and Petitioner is white.) The other employees who were interviewed as part of the investigation stated that they had not witnessed any sexual harassment or overheard any sexually explicit conversations in the restaurant. Mr. Vandiver, Mr. Meeks, and Ms. Owens concluded based upon their investigation that “there is not enough evidence of sexual harassment to terminate Marcus Owens.” They decided to let Mr. Owens continue working at the hotel, provided that he agreed to be moved to the hotel’s second floor restaurant and that he agreed to attend a sexual harassment training program. On December 8, 2005, Mr. Meeks and Ms. Whitaker conveyed the results of their investigation and their proposed solution to Petitioner. She was “fine” with the decision to move Mr. Owens to the second floor restaurant where she would not have contact with him. On that same day, Mr. Meeks and Ms. Whitaker conveyed their proposed solution to Mr. Owens. He too was “fine” with the decision, and he agreed that he would not go near Petitioner. Mr. Owens came back to work the following day, on December 9, 2005. On December 14, 2005, Mr. Owens was involved in an altercation with Stephen Zulinski, a dishwasher at the hotel and a close friend of Petitioner’s. The altercation occurred at the hotel during working hours. Mr. Zulinski testified that the incident started when Mr. Owens made vulgar and sexually explicit comments and gestures about Mr. Zulinski’s relationship with Petitioner. Mr. Zulinski was offended and angered by the comments, and he cursed and yelled at Mr. Owens. Mr. Zulinski denied pushing Mr. Owens (as reflected on Mr. Zulinski’s Notice of Termination), but he admitted to putting his finger on Mr. Owens’ shoulder during the altercation. Mr. Owens and Mr. Zulinski were immediately fired as a result of the altercation. Petitioner continued to work as a waitress at the hotel’s first floor restaurant after Mr. Owens was fired. Petitioner received awards from Respondent for having the most positive customer comment cards for the months of October and November 2005, even though according to her testimony she was being sexually harassed by Mr. Owens during those months. She testified that her problems with Mr. Owens affected her job performance only to a “very small degree.” Petitioner had no major problems with her job performance prior to December 2005, notwithstanding the sexual harassment by Mr. Owens that had been occurring “for months” according to Petitioner’s testimony. Petitioner was “written up” on a number of occasions between December 2005 and February 2006 because of problems with her job performance. The problems included Petitioner being rude to the on-duty manager in front of hotel guests; taking too many breaks and not having the restaurant ready for service when her shift started; failing to check the messages left for room service orders; and generating a guest complaint to the hotel’s corporate headquarters. Petitioner was fired after an incident on March 11, 2006, when she left the restaurant unattended on several occasions and the manager-on-duty received complaints from several hotel guests about the quality of service that they received from Petitioner that night. Petitioner ended up being sent home from work that night because, according to her supervisor, “she was in a crying state,” unable to work, and running off the restaurant’s business. Petitioner’s employment with Respondent was formally terminated on March 18, 2006. The stated reason for the termination was “unsatisfactory work performance” and “too many customer complaints.” None of the supervisors who wrote up Petitioner were aware of her sexual harassment complaints against Mr. Owens. Petitioner claimed that the allegations of customer complaints and poor job performance detailed in the write-ups were “ludicrous,” “insane,” “almost a complete fabrication,” and “a joke.” The evidence does not support Petitioner’s claims. Petitioner admitted to having “severe” bi-polar disorder, and she acknowledged at the hearing and to her supervisor that she was having trouble with her medications over the period that she was having problems with her job performance. For example, the comment written by Petitioner on the January 27, 2006, write-up stated that she was “at a loss” to explain her job performance and that she “hope[d] to have [her] mental stability restored to what everyone else but [her] seems normalcy.” Petitioner worked 25 to 30 hours per week while employed by Respondent. She was paid $5.15 per hour, plus tips, and she testified that her biweekly take-home pay was between $200 and $250. Petitioner applied for unemployment compensation after she was fired. Respondent did not dispute the claim, and Petitioner was awarded unemployment compensation of $106 per week, which she received for a period of six months ending in September 2006. Petitioner has not worked since she was fired by Respondent in March 2006. She has not even attempted to find another job since that time. Petitioner does not believe that she is capable of working because of her bi-polar disorder. She applied for Social Security disability benefits based upon that condition, but her application was denied. Petitioner’s appeal of the denial is pending. Petitioner testified that one of the reasons that she has not looked for another job is her concern that doing so would undermine her efforts to obtain Social Security disability benefits. Respondent has a general “non-harassment” policy, which prohibits “harassment of one employee by another employee . . . for any reason.” Respondent also has a specific sexual harassment policy, which states that “sexual harassment of any kind will not be tolerated.” The policy defines sexual harassment to include verbal sexual conduct that “has the purpose or effect of interfering with the individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.” The general non-harassment policy and the specific sexual harassment policy require the employee to immediately report the harassment to his or her supervisor or a member of the management staff. The Standards of Conduct and the Work Rules adopted by Respondent authorize immediate dismissal of an employee who is disrespectful or discourteous to guests of the hotel. The Standards of Conduct also authorize discipline ranging from a written reprimand to dismissal for an employee’s “[f]ailure to perform work or job assignments satisfactorily and efficiently.”
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of June, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Donald T. Ryce, Esquire 908 Coquina Lane Vero Beach, Florida 32963 Nora E. Bartolone 119 Alachua Drive Southeast Winter Haven, Florida 33884
The Issue Does the Department of Corrections' Sexual Harassment Policy, as contained in the Pamphlet "Sexual Harassment, Your Rights and Responsibilities", in a one-page document entitled "Department of Corrections Sexual Harassment Policy", and Chapter 7 of the Department's Personnel Procedures Manual, constitute umpromulgated rules, pursuant to Section 120.535 F.S.? Are existing Department of Corrections Rules 33-4.001(4)(a), 33-4.002(4), and 33-4.003(22) and (24), F.A.C. invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority due to vagueness, pursuant to Section 120.56 F.S.?
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Petitioner has been a career-service employee working as a Parole Officer I for DOC. He has earned a master's degree in criminology. At all times material, DOC has had in effect a one-page document entitled "Department of Corrections Sexual Harassment Policy" (P-5), a Pamphlet entitled "Sexual Harassment, Your Rights and Responsibilities" (P-3), and a Personnel Procedures Manual. Chapter 7 of the Personnel Procedures Manual is entitled "Sexual Harassment Complaints" (P-6). DOC has not adopted these documents as rules, and Petitioner here challenges them as unpromulgated rules. On February 22, 1996, Petitioner received written notice that he would be suspended without pay for ten days as a result of his violation of DOC Rules 33-4.001(4)(a), 33-4.002(4) and 33- 4.003(23)(25), F.A.C., (since renumbered) and the DOC's Policy on Sexual Harassment. The letter did not rely on Chapter 7 of the agency's Personnel Procedures Manual or its Pamphlet entitled "Sexual Harassment, Your Rights and Responsibilities". Petitioner appealed this action to PERC, which subsequently entered a recommended order upholding DOC's disciplinary action. Language from PERC's recommended order, which is pertinent to this instant rule challenge is: Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4.001(4)(a) states, in pertinent part, that 'No . . . employee shall knowingly . . . commit any act or engage in any conduct which would violate any state statute, rule, directive or policy statement.' Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4.002(4) states, in pertinent part, that 'Each employee . . . shall perform his duties fairly and impartially and otherwise conduct himself both on-duty and off-duty so as to command the respect of fellow employees, persons on parole, probation or otherwise under his supervision, inmates and the general public.' Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4,.003(23) states that a first offense of conduct unbecoming a public employee is punishable by a written reprimand, up to a thirty day suspension or dismissal. Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4.003(25) states that a first offense of willful violation of rules, regulations, directives or policy statements is punishable by a written reprimand, up to a thirty day suspension or dismissal. The DOC pamphlet entitled 'Florida Department of Corrections Sexual Harassment: Your Rights and Responsibilities,' provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Sexual Harassment requires two elements: The alleged conduct must be of a sexual nature, must be unwelcome and unwanted. Sexual harassment may be any of, but not limited to, the following: * * * continued suggestions regarding invi- tations to social events outside the work place, after being told such suggestions are unwelcome; * * * prolonged staring or leering to [sic] a person; * * * 32. State of Florida, Department of Corrections, Personnel Procedures Manual, Chapter 7, Sexual Harassment, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: * * * O. Sexual Harassment - Sexual Harassment is defined as unwelcome sexual advances, unwelcome requests for sexual favors, and other unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature from or involving an employee's supervisors, peers, subordinates or any other persons in contact with an employee or applicant during the course of the conduct of the employee's or applicant's business when: Submission to such conduct is either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of employment; or Submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual; or Such conduct has the purpose or effect of interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment. 33. The DOC Sexual Harassment Policy provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Sexual harassment may result from unwelcome sexual advances or a hostile environment created by conduct offensive to the victim such as suggestive or lewd comments, dirty jokes, offensive pictures or physical touching. Accordingly, all employees are being placed on notice that any employee found guilty of having engaged in sexual harassment will be severely disciplined, up to and including dismissal. * * * The charge of conduct unbecoming a public employee is a general charge that is subsumed if the Agency has a more specific charge that fully describes the alleged misconduct. Ford v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 9 FCSR Para. 148 (1993); Mathis v. Department of Corrections, 6 FCSR Para. 122 (1991). In this case, I conclude that the charge of unbecoming conduct is subsumed within the charge of sexual harassment and should be dismissed. PERC's recommended order also applied the foregoing provisions. At the date of formal hearing in the instant rule challenge, PERC had issued no final order. Before this instant Division of Administrative Hearings final order could be entered, PERC had extended the time for the parties to file exceptions to its hearing officer's recommended order, and ultimately, on August 13, 1996, PERC adopted its hearing officer's recommended order, thereby rendering Petitioner subject to future disciplinary action at the second occurrence level under Rule 33-4.003, F.A.C. The final order of PERC is now under appeal by Petitioner. These facts are officially recognized, sua sponte. Petitioner received copies of the Pamphlet, the Sexual Harassment Policy, and a copy of Chapter 33-4, F.A.C., on July 16, 1993, when he began employment with the agency. He did not receive a copy of Chapter 7 of the Personnel Manual and was unaware of it until his PERC proceeding. DOC imposes disciplinary action against its employees for conduct which constitutes sexual harassment. Petitioner received periodic training in agency seminars on the agency's Sexual Harassment Policy, including annual film presentations. He did not receive similar training regarding "conduct unbecoming a public employee", which is a term utilized in Section 110.227(1), F.S., and for which an employee may be disciplined. Section 110.227(1), F.S., also permits discipline of employees for "willful violation of the provisions of law or agency rules". Rule 33-4.001(4)(a), F.A.C., provides, in pertinent part: Responsibility for Conduct of Employees, Inmates and Others. No Administrator, Superintendent, Officer-In-Charge, Supervisor, or other employee shall knowingly permit any subordinate, inmate or other person to, nor shall he, commit any act or engage in any conduct which would violate any statute, rule, directive or policy statement . . . . Petitioner claims that Rule 33-4.001(4)(a), F.A.C., is vague as applied to him because he is not an administrator, superintendent, officer-in-charge, or a supervisor. According to Petitioner, this rule in only applicable to those who supervise subordinates. Rule 33-4.002(4), F.A.C., provides in pertinent part: (4) Each employee shall keep himself physically fit, mentally alert, personally neat and clean and shall perform his duties fairly and impartially, and otherwise conduct himself both on-duty and off-duty so as to command the respect of fellow employees, persons on parole, probation or otherwise under his supervision, inmates and the general public . . . . Rule 33-4.003, F.A.C., is entitled "Range of Disciplinary Actions" and lists a number of violations. Item (22) is "Conduct Unbecoming a Public Employee"; Item (24) is "Willful Violation of Rules, Regulations, Directives, or Policy Statements". The range of disciplinary penalties is increased at the second occurrence level under the rule. The agency Policy Statement, Pamphlet and Chapter 7 of the agency Personnel Manual state that sexual harassment is conduct unbecoming a public employee and contain definitions of sexual harassment, including hostile work place sexual harassment. The first sentence of the Pamphlet states that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and is conduct unbecoming a public employee, as provided in Sections 110.105, 110.227 and 110.233, F.S., and Chapter 33-4, F.A.C. (Rules of the Department). The first page of the Pamphlet states EEOC guidelines defining sexual harassment, as recognized by the agency: Unwelcome sexual advances, unwelcome requests for sexual favors, and other unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when: Submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of a person's employment, or Submission to, or rejection of, such conduct by [sic] decisions affecting an individual, or Such conduct has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with a person's work [sic] hostile or offensive working environment. The Pamphlet goes on to advise that sexual harassment requires two elements: conduct of a sexual nature/that is unwelcome and unwanted. It lists examples of harassing behavior, advises of the need to report such behavior, and explains the agency's internal complaint procedure and the procedure's protections against retaliation. It gives references for legal remedies outside the agency. Chapter 7 of the Personnel Procedures Manual states basically the same information as the Pamphlet, lists the same legal authorities and details the internal complaint procedure. It specifically provides, If there is a determination that there is cause to believe sexual harassment occurred, disciplinary action shall be taken in accordance with Chapter 33-4 Department of Corrections Rules. Chapter 7 was first effective on January 25, 1989 and last amended on March 5, 1993. It derives its authority from Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Sections 110.105, 110.227, and 110.233, F.S., and Chapter 33-4, F.A.C. Both the agency Pamphlet and Chapter 7 of the Manual state that sexual harassment is conduct unbecoming an employee. Petitioner's position with regard to whether or not the Pamphlet and Chapter 7 of the Manual constitute unpromulgated rules appears to center on his belief that without them, employees are not on notice as to exactly what behavior constitutes sexual harassment, that they contain a subtext of what types of sexual harassment, i.e. hostile work environment, will be disciplined, or that they alone reveal that sexual harassment constitutes "conduct unbecoming". Petitioner testified that he understood blatant sexual harassment, such as unconsented physical contact, to be conduct unbecoming a public employee, but he did not have a clear understanding about the "gray areas", such as complimenting co- workers, socializing outside work, or what acts constituted hostile work place sexual harassment. However, Petitioner testified that he was on notice that the agency had an Anti-Sexual Harassment Policy and that at all times material, he knew that if he committed sexual harassment, he would be subject to discipline, up to and including termination. Petitioner admitted that if any employee engaged in actual sexual harassment against another employee, the offending employee would not command the respect of fellow employees, as described in Rule 33-4.002(4), F.A.C. He also was on notice through Rule 33-4.003, F.A.C., that he could be disciplined for "conduct unbecoming" or "willful violations of law or policy statements". He is charged at law with knowledge of Section 110.227(1) requiring discipline for "conduct unbecoming" or "willful violation" and Chapter 760 F.S., which implements Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The agency routinely disciplines its employees for sexual harassment and has a long history of application of its Anti-Sexual Harassment Policy. Petitioner did not submit any evidence as to how Chapter 7 of the agency's Personnel Procedures Manual, the Pamphlet, or the one- page Policy Statement had any affect on him, beyond the discipline described, supra. Furthermore, there was no evidence presented to show that the agency's Sexual Harassment Policy, the Pamphlet, or Chapter 7 of the Personnel Procedures Manual have any affect on any person not employed by Respondent. There was no evidence that any of the provisions in these documents were self-executing.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Rural Metro of North Florida, Inc., violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was hired by Respondent on October 11, 1999, as an Emergency Medical Technician Basic, until July 2001 when he was reclassified with Respondent as an Emergency Medical Technician Paramedic, until his termination from employment with Respondent on April 16, 2003. In July 2001, Petitioner told his then manager, Dominic Persichini, that he no longer wanted to work with his partner, Marlene Sanders, and he requested a transfer. Petitioner gave as his reason for the transfer that Ms. Sanders was interested in him in an inappropriate way which disrupted his family life. He never actually heard Ms. Sanders make any inappropriate sexual remarks directed at him. Ms. Sanders accused Petitioner of allowing his wife to interfere with their working relationship and to involving herself in Ms. Sanders' personal life, which made her uncomfortable working with Petitioner. On March 27, 2002, Stephen Glatstein, Respondent's new General Manager, wrote a letter to Petitioner in which he acknowledged that problems had occurred between Petitioner and Ms. Sanders, that the two of them would be separated and reassigned to new shifts, and that Petitioner was being reassigned to the B-shift rotation (1800-0600 hours), which conflicted with his family duties. Petitioner received a good evaluation and a pay raise dated February 15, 2003, in which his supervisor, Ryan Jenkins, stated that "Michael's abilities meet or exceed industry standards. Michael keeps current by completing CEU's and taking refresher classes. There is one new Corrective Action Notice in his file since last year involving a post move. The incident was on 08-07-02 and to my knowledge there have not been any further problems since." Further, the evaluation reads that "Michael shows a great attitude and appears to really enjoy his job. This makes him very easy to work with. Michael's good personality and working knowledge of E.M.S. is a benefit to the customers that he serves. It is clear that we should be proud to have Michael as part of our team." Petitioner received letters of commendation from his supervisors and letters of thanks from patients and their families he had served. In April 2003, Natashia Duke, a new employee with Respondent, went to the General Manager, Mr. Chalmers, and accused Petitioner of having made statements of a sexual nature to her and of touching her inappropriately. Ms. Duke provided a written statement to Mr. Chalmers who forwarded the information to the Division General Manager, Chris Rucker. Mr. Rucker advised Mr. Chalmers to place Petitioner on paid administrative leave pending the outcome of an investigation concerning Ms. Duke's complaint. Mr. Chalmers followed this instruction and placed Petitioner on leave. Mr. Rucker traveled to Pensacola to meet with Mr. Chalmers and Ms. Duke. At this meeting, Ms. Duke reaffirmed what she had written in the complaint against Petitioner and told Mr. Rucker and Mr. Chalmers about another employee she believed had been sexually harassed by Petitioner, Kristy Bradberry. The next day, Mr. Rucker and Mr. Chalmers interviewed Ms. Bradberry who informed them that she had been sexually harassed by Petitioner. She provided a written statement which described the alleged harassment in detail. Ms. Bradberry told the interviewers of another person she believed had suffered sexual harassment by Petitioner, Tina Dunsford (Tina Richardson at the time of her complaint). Mr. Rucker and Mr. Chalmers next interviewed Ms. Dunsford who confirmed that Petitioner had sexually harassed her as well by making sexual comments and propositions to her, and by touching her inappropriately. After Ms. Dunsford's interview, Ryan Jenkins, another of Respondent's employees, reported that Ms. Dunsford had complained to him of sexual harassment by Petitioner a few months earlier. Mr. Jenkins had failed to take any action on the previous complaint. After interviewing the three complainants, Ms. Duke, Ms. Bradberry, and Ms. Dunsford, Mr. Rucker and Mr. Chalmers met with Petitioner. At that meeting, Petitioner denied all of the allegations made by the three female co-workers and gave no explanation for what they alleged had happened. Mr. Rucker believed the statements given by the three female co-workers who complained of sexual harassment by Petitioner were credible. Mr. Rucker made the decision with Mr. Chalmers to terminate Petitioner's employment. Respondent had no prior history of problems with any of the three female co-workers who complained of sexual harassment by Petitioner. Petitioner believes the sexual harassment charges were trumped up against him so that Respondent could fire him, since he was beyond the company probationary period and therefore could be terminated only for a business purpose pursuant to the company employee handbook. No evidence was produced at hearing to support a violation of company policy by Respondent in Petitioner's termination. At the time of hearing, Petitioner was employed with the Escambia County E.M.S.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's claim for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michael J. Welch 2060 Burjonik Lane Navarre, Florida 32566-2118 John B. Trawick, Esquire Shell, Fleming, Davis & Menge 226 Palafox Place Post Office Box 1831 Pensacola, Florida 32591-1831 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether there is just cause, within the meaning of Section 231.36(1), Florida Statutes (1999), to terminate Respondent's employment as a non-instructional employee for alleged sexual harassment of a co-worker. (All chapter and section references are to Florida Statutes (1999) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has employed Respondent as a maintenance worker at Yulee Primary School in Yulee, Florida (the "school") for approximately 18 years. Petitioner has employed Ms. Joyce Sullivan as a food service worker for approximately three years. Respondent and Ms. Sullivan are co-workers. Respondent has no supervisory authority over Ms. Sullivan, has no authority to discipline Ms. Sullivan, and has no authority to affect the conditions of employment for Ms. Sullivan. The material facts in this case transpired over approximately ten minutes during work hours on April 6, 2000. Respondent approached Ms. Sullivan in the back kitchen of the school cafeteria shortly after breakfast and asked to speak to her privately. Ms. Sullivan agreed, and the two moved to the adjacent serving area near the checkout counter in the cafeteria. Respondent asked Ms. Sullivan to pose for pictures that would be nude, semi-nude, or partially clothed and that Respondent would enter into a contest on the internet. Respondent explained that the pictures would not identify Ms. Sullivan because the pictures would be taken from the neck down and that Ms. Sullivan could wear a bikini, a thong, or a bra. Ms. Sullivan asked Respondent what he was talking about. Respondent assured Ms. Sullivan that she would not be identified because the pictures would not identify Ms. Sullivan's face. Ms. Sullivan told Respondent that he was crazy. The entire conversation lasted approximately three minutes. Ms. Sullivan left Respondent and walked to the cash register to "ring up" the school principal who purchased some food. Ms. Sullivan went to an office in the back of the cafeteria with Ms. Sullivan's assistant manager. Respondent went to the back room and told Ms. Sullivan that he would show her some pictures on his computer. Respondent exited the room through the back door of the room to retrieve a laptop computer. Ms. Sullivan and her assistant manager went outside the back room and discussed the situation. Ms. Sullivan was embarrassed. After four or five minutes, Respondent returned to the back room and placed the laptop on the desk in front of Ms. Sullivan. The assistant manager was in the same room at another desk engaged in a telephone conversation. It took about 1.5 minutes for Respondent to turn on the laptop and display some pictures. The pictures included pictures of partially clad women and topless women. The situation terminated after 1.5 minutes when the assistant manager ended her telephone conversation, a child asked Ms. Sullivan to "ring up" some papers, and Ms. Sullivan's manager approached the room. Respondent changed the computer screen to a picture of his daughter and began talking to Ms. Sullivan's manager. Respondent left the school with the computer. Ms. Sullivan reported the incident to her manager, but Ms. Sullivan did not file a complaint for sexual harassment or state to her manager that she had been sexually harassed. Ms. Sullivan's manager relayed the information to Respondent's supervisor who discussed the matter with Respondent. Respondent admitted to the facts and expressed regret. Respondent's manager relayed the information to the Superintendent. The Superintendent investigated the matter and determined that Respondent had engaged in sexual harassment. The Superintendent based his determination on the definition of sexual harassment in the Board's Official Rule 3.54I.C. Rule 3.54I.C., in relevant part, states that sexual harassment consists of: . . . unwelcomed sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other inappropriate oral, written or physical conduct of a sexual nature when: . . . such conduct substantially interferes with an employee's work performance . . . or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work . . . environment. Respondent's request for Ms. Sullivan to pose for sexually revealing pictures was either an unwelcomed sexual advance, request for sexual favor, or other inappropriate oral or written conduct of a sexual nature within the meaning of Rule 3.54I.C. Respondent's conduct substantially interfered with Ms. Sullivan's work performance or created an offensive work environment. The Superintendent testified during cross-examination that he would not have determined that Respondent engaged in sexual harassment if Ms. Sullivan had not said no to Respondent's request. A preponderance of the evidence fails to show that Ms. Sullivan expressly said "no" when asked pose or view pictures. However, a preponderance of the evidence shows that Ms. Sullivan was embarrassed and that the entire episode was unwelcomed and offensive within the meaning of Rule 3.54I.C. Respondent has no previous discipline history. Article VII of the collective bargaining agreement between the Board and its employees prescribes progressive discipline procedures for this case. Except in unusual circumstances, employment can be terminated only after an oral warning for a first offense, a reprimand for a second offense, a written warning for a third offense, and suspension for a fourth offense.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of sexual harassment and suspending Respondent from employment for the time of the current suspension. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 2000, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry W. Whitmore, Chief Bureau of Educator Standards Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Suite 224E Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Michael H. Olenick General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Dr. John L. Ruiz, Superintendent Nassau County School Board 1201 Atlantic Avenue Fernandina Beach, Florida 32304 Brent P. Abner, Esquire Suite F 4741 Atlantic Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Brian T. Hayes, Esquire 245 East Washington Street Monticello, Florida 32344 Martha F. Dekle, Esquire 806 G Street Post Office Box 1644 Jacksonville, Florida 32207
The Issue The ultimate issue is whether the Respondent, Tallahassee Coca-Cola Bottling Company (Coke), engaged in an unlawful employment practice on the basis of race in its termination of James Andrews, the Petitioner. Andrews was purportedly terminated because of allegations that he had repeatedly sexually harassed and touched female employees. Resolution of the ultimate issue does not require a determination of whether such sexual harassment actually occurred. Instead, the issue is whether Coke's motivation for the termination was racially based and thus impermissible.
Findings Of Fact Andrews, who is black, was initially hired by Coke in 1969 and worked on the production line until he quit in 1971. Andrews was rehired by Coke in 1973, also in the production department. He worked in various positions in both the production department and in the inventory warehouse, and was promoted to assistant production superintendent in 1977. When the production department was closed in June 1982, Andrews transferred to the warehouse as assistant warehouse supervisor. In 1983, he assumed the responsibilities of head shipping and receiving clerk, and was placed in charge of inventory control, plant security and vehicle maintenance. Warehouse Supervisor Dale Dunlap resigned in July 1988 and Andrews was promoted to Warehouse Supervisor. As warehouse supervisor, Andrews had primary responsibility for the overall management of the warehouse, including inventory control, shipping and receiving, personnel management, and warehouse and vehicle maintenance. Andrews' performance evaluations were generally excellent, but the most recent evaluations were less favorable than his earlier reviews. Reports of Sexual Harassment Prior to Andrews' termination reports of sexual harassment were made to Coke by three employees: Susan Lingerfelt, Mandy Stinson, and Sue Rosenthal (now Rubin). In summer 1989, Lingerfelt reported to Office Supervisor Mandy Stinson that Andrews had just grabbed her in the warehouse by the Coke machine and had forced her head back and kissed her. She had shoved Andrews into the Coke machine, told him not to do that, and went to report it to her supervisor. Because the Sales Center Manager had resigned and his replacement had not yet been appointed, the two women agreed not to tell anyone about the incident, but instead to wait until the new manager arrived. In February 1990, around Valentine's Day, Lingerfelt reported that Andrews came up behind her when she was sitting alone at a computer terminal, grabbed her hair, pulled her head back, and again kissed her on the lips. Lingerfelt again protested and tried to get away from Andrews. Lingerfelt again reported the incident immediately to Stinson. Stinson and Lingerfelt went immediately to Lee Burk, the new Sales Center Manager, and reported the incident and the earlier incident at the Coke machine. During this same meeting with Lee Burk, Stinson also complained that she had been repeatedly harassed by Andrews and that Andrews had come up behind her, given her a "bear hug," and tried to kiss her. Burk was confused about what had happened to Lingerfelt because a black employee, Roosevelt Humphrey, had reported to him a couple of months before that he had seen two employees consensually embracing at the Coke machine. Humphrey had not identified the two employees except to say one was a supervisor. Burk mistakenly believed that the two separate Coke machine incidents were the same event. Based on this mistaken belief, Burk thought that a supervisors' meeting would be enough to solve the problem. A few days later, Burk called a supervisors' meeting and discussed several topics, including sexual harassment. He redistributed and discussed Coke's written policy forbidding sexual harassment. Burk told all the supervisors in no uncertain terms that he would not tolerate unwelcome sexual advances at the plant and that if anything of that sort had happened, the supervisor had better clean up his act. In August 1990, Andrews again was reported by Lingerfelt for grabbing her hair, pulling her head back and kissing her on the lips. Lingerfelt tried to slap Andrews, but missed, hitting him on the shoulder. Lingerfelt went immediately to Stinson and they went to see Burk. Lingerfelt was quite upset and was crying. When Burk heard the report, he said he would take care of it. Lingerfelt left the plant for about an hour to collect herself. While Lingerfelt was gone, Burk called Andrews to his office and confronted him with the two women's allegations, including the previous reports by both women. Andrews categorically denied the allegations, except that he had once put his arms around Lingerfelt. He denied ever kissing her and said he did not mean anything by his actions. Burk stressed to Andrews that he could not touch any female employee again, even if he didn't think anything was wrong with it--that he must stop it. Andrews claimed that Lingerfelt had invited the contact by bumping against him and that she was making the allegations because he was black. Andrews also claimed that Lingerfelt had allowed sexually explicit advances from a white supervisor, Doc Roddenberry, and that Roddenberry, not Andrews, should be the subject of Burk's admonitions. Burk told Andrews that he had only gotten complaints about him (Andrews) and that if he continued with his unwelcome conduct, he could lose his job. No advances were reported by Lingerfelt for a few months, but she did complain that Andrews was uncooperative with her about work. In January 1991, Lingerfelt noted that Andrews was calling her frequently and spending long periods of time in her office. Because this behavior was similar to Andrews' conduct before the previous incidents, Lingerfelt became concerned. On January 16, 1991, Stinson was in Jacksonville at Coke's regional office. Lingerfelt became so concerned that she called Stinson in Jacksonville and reported that Andrews had spent several hours that day in Lingerfelt's office staring at her. Stinson immediately asked the Regional Human Resources Manager, Thomas Bauman, for assistance. Stinson informed Bauman of all the prior alleged sexual harassment by Andrews. The next day Stinson returned to Tallahassee and she and Lingerfelt spoke with Burk. Lingerfelt, who was visibly scared and crying, explained to Burk that Andrews had been standing around her office staring at her. Burk said he would address the problem immediately. After talking with Bauman and obtaining his approval, Burk called Andrews into his office and confronted him again. Andrews denied that he had been hanging around Lingerfelt's office staring at her. Burk then brought Stinson into his office to confront Andrews about his persistent harassment against her. Andrews denied the allegations and accused Stinson of "coming on" to him. Andrews again asserted that the women's allegations were racially motivated. He also brought up his allegations against Roddenberry and Lingerfelt and demanded to know why Roddenberry could "get away with it" and he couldn't. Burk advised Andrews that it was only his own misconduct which was being addressed at the moment. Burk also informed Andrews that the allegations of Andrews' misconduct would be brought to the attention of Bauman for further action. Shortly thereafter, Coke's Special Events Supervisor, Sue Rosenthal (now Rubin), reported several events of sexual harassment by Andrews. She had come forward to help support Lingerfelt. Coke's Investigation After discussing the situation and receiving instructions from Buddy Donaldson, Coke's Florida Human Resources Director, Bauman travelled to Tallahassee to conduct an investigation on January 24 and 25, 1991, into the allegations against Andrews. Bauman first met with Burk and received a briefing on the series of allegations. Burk reported the incident which Roosevelt Humphrey had reported to him, still thinking that incident involved Andrews. Bauman interviewed Lingerfelt, who related in great detail each of the alleged incidents set forth above. Bauman took notes and Lingerfelt signed those notes as being an accurate account of her statement. Bauman asked Lingerfelt whether she had any racial motivation for her reports. Lingerfelt denied that Andrews' race had anything to do with her allegations. At this meeting, Lingerfelt told Bauman that she had hired an attorney and had filed sexual harassment charges against Coke with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Bauman next interviewed Roosevelt Humphrey. Humphrey told Bauman that the two people he had reported were Lingerfelt and Roddenberry, not Lingerfelt and Andrews. Humphrey also acknowledged that he had not seen any other such incidents involving Lingerfelt and Roddenberry since the one incident he had reported to Burk without giving names. Bauman then went to Lingerfelt and asked if Roddenberry had sexually harassed her. Lingerfelt denied that Roddenberry had ever harassed her. Bauman next interviewed Rosenthal. Rosenthal told Bauman that before she became a supervisor in early 1989, Andrews had engaged in unwelcome sexual conduct toward her on three occasions. The first two times, Andrews came up behind her in her office, lifted the hair on the back of her neck, and kissed her on the neck. The third time, Andrews surprised her by kissing her on the lips after she had finished a telephone call and had turned around. Rosenthal said she was too startled to say anything after the first incident, but after the second and third events, she told Andrews not to do that. She said she did not report these incidents at the time because she was new, young and nervous. Rosenthal also reported that she had recently seen Andrews "stalking" Lingerfelt, staring at her for long periods of time and waiting for Rosenthal to leave so that he could be alone with Lingerfelt. Bauman asked Rosenthal whether her allegations could be racially motivated. Rosenthal said race had nothing to do with it and, in fact, she lived with a black roommate. Rosenthal had selected that woman from a pool of applicants who had responded to her newspaper ad seeking a roommate. Bauman next interviewed Stinson. Stinson told Bauman of the harassment she had suffered from Andrews, which included several attempts by Andrews to hug and kiss her. She also related information about the times Lingerfelt would come to her and they would go to Burk about Andrews' actions toward Lingerfelt. On January 25, 1991, Bauman officially interviewed Burk. Burk related the actions he had taken, including the supervisors' meeting in February 1990 and the personal meetings with Andrews in August 1990 and January 1991. Burk also recommended that Andrews be terminated for sexual harassment and stalking. Suspension and Termination Bauman then called Donaldson and discussed the information he had learned. They decided that Andrews should be suspended immediately, pending a final decision. They also decided not to interview Andrews again because he had denied any wrongdoing twice, most recently a week earlier. They had no reason to believe that Andrews would recede from his denials. Before suspending Andrews, Bauman asked Lingerfelt and Stinson to leave the building. He did so because of his concern and the women's concerns about their personal safety, especially when Andrews was told of the suspension. As soon as the two women had left the building, Bauman called Andrews to Burk's office. They told Andrews that he was being suspended for conduct unbecoming a supervisor. Andrews wanted to know "who said what" about him, but Bauman declined to give him further details. As he was leaving Burk's office, not knowing that Lingerfelt and Stinson had left the building, Andrews shouted to the closed door of Stinson's office something to the effect of "Did you women hear that--are you happy now?" As soon as Andrews was escorted from the premises, Coke changed all the locks at the Tallahassee facility, which was standard procedure. Bauman also had an automatic front door lock installed so that no one could enter the front office without being pre-screened. The following week, Bauman and Donaldson reviewed all the information, including the interview notes which had been attested to by the three women. They concluded that sufficient evidence existed to require termination of Andrews' employment. On January 31, 1991, Donaldson came to Tallahassee, summoned Andrews to the facility, and terminated him for misconduct. The decision to terminate Andrews was based on a good faith belief that he had engaged in inappropriate sexual conduct on multiple occasions, despite and in the face of at least two warnings by the sales center manager. Coke did not immediately replace Andrews. Due to a "cost containment" program that had recently been instituted and because Tallahassee's volume was too low, Burk was not permitted to hire a replacement. In February 1992, more than a year later and after two neighboring sales centers were closed and their operations consolidated at the Tallahassee facility, Burk was allowed to hire a replacement. He hired the warehouse manager from one of the closed sales centers, a white male. Other Victims Come Forward While Coke knew of only three female employees who had been harassed by Andrews when Coke terminated him, three additional women also came forward to testify about sexual harassment they had suffered at the hand of Andrews. Johnnie Mae Marshall, a black woman who had worked for Coke as a receptionist, said Andrews had suggestively rubbed her arms and hands when she handed him documents. To stop it, she ceased to hand him papers, instead placing all such documents in a mail tray for him. Christen Cheshire, a white female telephone sales operator, testified that Andrews harassed her beginning in late 1988. She said Andrews came into her office once or twice a day, hugged her around the neck, and kissed or attempted to kiss her. This went on for about two months before Cheshire was able to persuade Andrews to stop the unwelcome advances. While Cheshire never reported Andrews' advances, Marshall remembers Cheshire complaining to her about it. Jeanie Benton, a white female who worked for Coke from 1987 to 1990, also testified about Andrews' unwelcome advances. One time when she rose from her desk and turned around, Andrews was right behind her and tried to kiss her. She told him to get back and leave her alone. On a later occasion, Andrews tried to massage her shoulders and she told him to stop. Thereafter, Andrews would stand in her office door and stare at her. Andrews' Claims of Discrimination Andrews' claims that the termination was motivated by racial discrimination and that Coke's reasons for terminating him were pretexts for discrimination. As evidence, he offered a story that Roddenberry committed egregious acts of sexual harassment and misconduct, but was not disciplined. Additionally, he alleged that a "white clique" wanted to get rid of him because they did not like that a black man was made warehouse supervisor. Not one shred of credible evidence was given to support Andrews' claims. Besides Andrews' own testimony, the only witness who claimed to have seen any sexually inappropriate conduct between Roddenberry and anyone, including Lingerfelt, was Roosevelt Humphrey. Humphrey was not a credible witness. First, he was terminated by Coke for stealing a check from a coworker and cashing it. Next, he said he saw Roddenberry and Lingerfelt three times a week with Roddenberry kissing Lingerfelt, rubbing her buttocks and her breasts. However, he was not even working at the warehouse during most of the time he said he saw this and his testimony was filled with contradictions and discrepancies. Finally, he named others who saw and discussed this behavior; but each of those named persons denied ever seeing any sexually inappropriate behavior between Roddenberry and Lingerfelt or other female employees. Andrews' suggestion that his termination was racially motivated by false reports from a group of white employees, including Lingerfelt, Stinson, Rosenthal, and Roddenberry, is also unworthy of belief. Andrews' purported to support his conspiracy theory with anecdotes about other white employees, Jeanie Benton and William Beck, who tried to help him in the face of the covert actions of the alleged conspirators. However, Benton and Beck both denied that the events Andrews described in his anecdotes ever occurred. Additionally, Andrews' version of all these incidents was simply implausible and inconsistent with the credible and substantial evidence. Finally, Andrews presented no credible evidence to rebut Coke's evidence of its legitimate reason for the termination. Andrews simply offered no competent or probative evidence of a racial motivation for his termination.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order denying and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by James Andrews, Jr. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of September, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-2063 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, James Andrews, Jr. 1. Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1-3(1-3); 9-12(8-11); 17-19(13- 15); 23-25(20-22); 34(29); 36(31); 37(32); 40(35); 41(36 & 37); 42(38); 45(42); 46(43); 50 & 51(46); and 53(47). 2. Proposed findings of fact 4-8, 13-16, 20-22, 26-33, 35, 38, 39, 43, 44, 47-49, and 54 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. 3. Proposed finding of fact 52 and 55 are irrelevant. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, Tallahassee Coca-Cola Bottling Co. 1. Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 53(35). 2. Proposed findings of fact 4, 5, 12-17, 19, 20, 22-27, 29-36, 40, 43, 44, 47-52, 55, 56, 79, 80, 87-90, 127, and 137 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. 3. Proposed findings of fact 6-9, 11, 18, 85, 91, 102, 107-113, 117, 118, 121, 128-130, 134, and 136 are unsupported by the credible, competent and substantial evidence. 4. Proposed findings of fact 10, 21, 28, 37-39, 41, 42, 45, 46, 54, 57-78, 81-84, 86, 92-101, 103-106, 114-116, 119, 120, 122-126, 131-133, 135, and 138-152 are irrelevant, repetitive, unnecessary, and contain summaries of testimony and argument which are not appropriate proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Marie A. Mattox Attorney at Law 3045 Tower Court Tallahassee, Florida 32303 William R. Radford Attorney at Law 5300 First Union Financial Center 200 South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131-2339 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird General Counsel 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Respondent, Carrabba's Italian Grill, Inc., subjected Petitioners, Jasen Baker and Bernard Southwell, to a hostile work environment and retaliation in violation of Subsection 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2004).
Findings Of Fact Respondent operates a chain of casual Italian restaurants. Respondent has adopted a policy against discrimination and harassment. In addition to prohibiting harassment, the policy instructs employees whom to contact if they experience harassment. The policy is contained in an employee handbook that is distributed to all employees during the initial orientation process. During orientation, Respondent's manager reviews the employee handbook with the new employee, including the policy on sexual harassment. During the orientation process, Respondent also requires employees to view a video that explains that Respondent will not tolerate harassment. The video familiarizes the employees with the company's expectations regarding the reporting of harassment in the workplace. During the orientation process, the employees are required to sign an acknowledgment on the exterior of their employee folders indicating that they have received and read the policy against harassment. The critical sections of the policy are reprinted on the folders immediately above the signature lines. All of Respondent's restaurants are required to display a poster known as the "Carrabbamico Info" poster in the kitchen area. This poster reprints the harassment policy and provides employees with a list of names to call if they feel that they have been harassed. Respondent has implemented reasonable precautions to prevent harassment from occurring in its restaurants. In the Central Florida market, Respondent's restaurants are overseen by a joint venture partner named Dick Meyer. Meyer is responsible for hiring and firing the managers of the restaurants that he oversees. In March 2000, Lawton DePriest became the managing partner at Respondent's Palm Bay location. DePriest reported to Meyer. DePriest remained in that capacity until September 2003, when he became the managing partner of Respondent's restaurant located in Formosa Gardens. It was DePriest's management style to frequently yell at employees in order to motivate them. It is also possible that he had favorites on the staff of the Palm Bay restaurant. Baker was hired by Respondent's Palm Bay restaurant in January 2002. At the time that Baker began working for Respondent, he attended an orientation session conducted by DePriest. It was DePriest's practice during orientation to discuss harassment issues and instruct employees to come to him directly if they experience any problems with sexual harassment. If for some reason an employee is not comfortable with him, DePriest would encourage the employee to contact any other person listed on the poster. Baker was given a copy of Respondent's handbook, which contains the company's policy against harassment. On that same date, January 19, 2002, Baker signed his employee folder on the blank line under the harassment policy indicating that he had read and received the policy. Whether he reviewed the employee handbook further after that date is irrelevant. Baker "vividly remembers" that during his orientation, he watched the videotape that included instructions on what he should do if he felt harassed. However, during the hearing, Baker denied ever seeing the Carrabbamico Info poster. However, Baker admitted on cross-examination that during his deposition, he had acknowledged seeing the Carrabbamico Info poster posted in the store. During the deposition, Baker specifically remembered that there were business cards with contact information for Meyer and Cheri Ashe attached to the bottom of the poster. Despite Baker's attempt to deny seeing the poster, his earlier answers in deposition were more credible in view of his specific recollection of the attached business cards and the lack of any persuasive explanation for the discrepancy. After completing his orientation, Baker initially worked as a dishwasher. Later, he was shown how to do food preparation work. Before coming to work for Respondent, Baker had previously worked for a restaurant by the name of Golden Corral. During the time that he worked with Golden Corral, he became acquainted with a co-worker named Bernard Southwell. In the summer of 2002, Petitioners discussed the possibility of Southwell coming to work for Respondent. Baker spoke favorably of the restaurant and recommended that Southwell submit an application. At the time, Baker had worked for Respondent for six or seven months. Baker did not express to Southwell that he had observed or experienced any problems with unwelcome harassment. Southwell submitted an application and was hired by Respondent's Palm Bay restaurant in August 2002 as a dishwasher. At the time he began employment with Respondent, Southwell was living with a friend of his named Joe Corbett. At the time, Baker was living in a one-bedroom apartment with his girlfriend. Several weeks later, Baker's girlfriend decided to move out. According to Petitioners, she suggested to Southwell that he move into Baker's apartment to replace her. Around October 2002, Southwell moved out of the Corbett residence and moved in with Baker. A third employee named Chris Germana also moved into the residence around the same time. Because the apartment only had one bedroom, Germana slept on the couch. Petitioners slept in the bedroom. When employees at the restaurant learned of these arrangements, speculation began about whether the two men were homosexual. According to Petitioners, sometime after Southwell started to room with Baker, co-workers at the restaurant started referring to Petitioners by nicknames. The co-workers referred to Baker as "powder," "crack pipe," and "crack head." Baker knew that "powder" was a reference to a character from the movie "Powder" and that the name had nothing to do with his sexuality. The co-workers also referred to Petitioners as "butt buddies." Southwell testified that a male co-worker, Christopher Bouley, told him, "I know you guys are lovers." Bouley, Arnold Samuel and DePriest all used these nicknames on occasion to refer to both Petitioners, according to Baker. After several months, Southwell eventually went to DePriest and complained about the "powder," "crack pipe," and "butt buddies" nicknames. Southwell told DePriest that the nicknames were funny at first, but that they started getting old. DePriest then told Samuel and Bouley to stop using the nicknames. Thereafter, the use of the nicknames stopped. Southwell claimed that Bouley would gyrate his hips behind other employees as they were bending down. However, Petitioners both admitted that Bouley would do these hip motions to both male and female employees. During the hearing, Petitioners claimed that Bouley subjected them to unwelcome touching. Baker claimed that Bouley had touched his buttocks once. However, Baker acknowledged that when his deposition was taken prior to the final hearing, he did not mention that Bouley touched his buttocks. In fact, when asked during his deposition whether he had been sexually harassed, Baker testified that he had not and that he had only been verbally harassed. Furthermore, Baker made no mention of any physical touching in the Affidavit that he submitted to FCHR at the time he filed his charge of discrimination. Southwell never saw Bouley touch or grab Baker's buttocks. And despite their close relationship, Baker never told Southwell that Bouley had grabbed his buttocks. Accordingly, Baker's allegation that he was touched inappropriately by Bouley or any other of Respondent's employees is not credible. Southwell claimed that Bouley had touched his buttocks on two or three occasions and touched his nipples twice. Southwell also claimed that Bouley had touched his penis on one occasion. According to Southwell, he was bending down to pick up sauté pans when Bouley, who was supposedly standing behind him, reached between Southwell's legs from behind and clutched Southwell's genital area through his trousers. This incident supposedly occurred during the restaurant's hours of operation while customers were in the restaurant. The alleged grabbing supposedly took place in front of a stove that sat in full view of customers seated at the restaurant's bar. Bouley flatly denied ever touching Southwell's genitals or private area. In the Affidavit that Southwell submitted to FCHR at the time he filed his charge of discrimination, Southwell made no mention of Bouley touching Southwell's penis. At the time that he submitted this Affidavit, Southwell was represented by counsel. Southwell did not offer any convincing reason for the omission of any description of his genitals being grabbed. Accordingly, Southwell's allegation that Bouley touched Southwell's genitals is not credible. Although Petitioners testified that they spoke to DePriest on several occasions, they admit that they never spoke to any of the other individuals listed on the harassment poster to complain about sexual harassment. DePriest testified that the only complaint he ever received had to do with the nicknames and that he took prompt action to resolve this problem. Annually, Respondent submits an employee experience survey to its employees that is completed anonymously and forwarded to an outside company for analysis. After the survey is completed, employees participate in a small group feedback session to discuss the results of the survey. On March 11, 2003, DePriest held the feedback session for his store, which was attended by Petitioners. During the session, Southwell commented about the situation with the nicknames. He indicated that the situation was resolved when it was brought to DePriest's attention. This was the sole extent to which either employee complained of unwelcome behavior. Respondent was not on notice of any problems with regard to touching or more serious inappropriate behavior. On March 12, 2003, Petitioners' last day of work, Southwell approached DePriest to complain about scheduling for a special event at the convention center. Southwell stated that he and Baker had signed up to participate in this event. Southwell was scheduled for the event, but Baker was not. DePriest explained that he needed Baker to float, because there were not enough people scheduled to work at the restaurant that night. DePriest later talked to Baker, who indicated that he was not disappointed that he was not participating in the event. That conversation, however, was the last time that DePriest saw Baker. DePriest learned that Petitioners had left before the end of their shift, when the plates in the restaurant were getting low and the sauté pans were getting stacked up. DePriest asked about the whereabouts of Petitioners and learned that they were seen riding their bicycles away from the restaurant. DePriest could not contact them because they did not have a telephone. DePriest eventually terminated their employment for voluntarily walking off the job.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order that: Dismisses the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner, Jasen Baker, in DOAH Case No. 05-0623, FCHR No. 23-03891; and Dismisses the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner, Bernard Southwell, DOAH Case No. 05-0632, FCHR No. 23-03892. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jason M. Gordon, Esquire Gordon & Cornell 103 North Atlantic Avenue Cocoa Beach, Florida 32931 Kevin D. Johnson, Esquire Thompson, Sizemore & Gonzalez, P.A. 501 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 1400 Tampa, Florida 33602 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
