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SYLVIA MIMS vs BEVERLY LINDSAY AND MICHAEL S. HOUSER, 08-002597 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida May 28, 2008 Number: 08-002597 Latest Update: Jul. 02, 2009

The Issue The issue to be resolved concerns whether the Petitioner was the victim of a discriminatory housing practice, by allegedly being denied the opportunity to rent an apartment from the Respondents, and by being falsely informed of its non- availability, based upon her race.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an African-American female. In early January 2007, she learned of an apartment for rent, owned or managed by the Respondents. She called to inquire about the apartment and was told by the Respondent, Ms. Lindsay, that the rent would be $625.00 per month, with a one-month rent amount and security deposit due in advance. She was told that the Lessee of a neighboring apartment, Clint Cook, would have a key and would show her the apartment. She went to view the apartment, and decided that she wished to rent it. She then telephoned Ms. Lindsay, and Ms. Lindsey faxed an application to her to complete. In the conversation, she told Ms. Lindsay she would not have the required deposit money until Friday. This was on a Monday or Tuesday. Ms. Lindsay then told her securing the apartment was on a “first come-first-served” basis. The Petitioner never completed the application and never tendered the security deposit. Shortly after that telephone conversation, Ms. Lindsay was contacted by Stacey Edwards, while the apartment was still available for rent, concerning rental. Ms. Edwards, on behalf of herself and her boyfriend/husband, submitted an application to rent the apartment, together with the appropriate required deposit and rental amount on January 15, 2007. Ms. Lindsay leased the apartment to the couple. They had a planned move-in date of February 1, 2007. They are a mixed-race couple, and Ms. Lindsay was aware of that fact when renting to them. Sometime after January 15, 2007, the Petitioner called Ms. Lindsay a second time, and was told that the apartment had been rented (to the Edwards couple) and was no longer available. Testimony to this effect is corroborated by the Edwards rental application and deposit receipt, which are in evidence. The Edwards rental was documented on January 15, 2007. Later that month, the Petitioner noticed the “for rent" sign displayed, or displayed again, and she and/or her witness, Lynn Kliesch, called about the apartment’s availability. Ms. Lindsay again stated that it was rented. Indeed, it was, to the Edwards. The rental sign had been left up because the Edwards couple were not scheduled to move in until February 1, 2007. This communication between the parties occurred before Ms. Edwards informed Ms. Lindsay that they would not be moving in. Shortly before February 1,2007. Ms Edwards and her husband/boyfriend learned that his employment had ended (or he was transferred to another job location). They therefore informed Ms. Lindsay that they had to re-locate to South Florida and could not take the apartment. She charged them for the two weeks of rental, and refunded their deposit. She then placed the apartment back on the rental market. On January 31, 2007, Ms. Mari Ferguson inquired of Ms. Lindsay about the apartment’s availability. This was after Ms. Edwards had informed Ms. Lindsay that she would not be renting the apartment. Ms. Lindsay told Ms. Ferguson that the property was available and she rented it to Ms. Ferguson that same day. Ms. Ferguson and her boyfriend, who occupied the apartment with her, were also a mixed-race couple, with children. In fact, the boyfriend is the nephew of the Petitioner herein. Ms. Ferguson and family moved into the apartment. Some months later a hostile situation arose between the Respondents and Ms. Ferguson. Ms. Lindsay apparently received reports that “drug dealing” was occurring in the apartment. Ms. Ferguson and/or the other occupants were responsible for some damage, and Ms. Ferguson became several months behind on rental payments. The Respondents therefore, through legal process, had her evicted. The Respondent, Ms. Lindsay, through her firm, Elite Properties of Northwest Florida, Inc., manages some 37 rental properties in Escambia and Santa Rosa Counties. She is the president and broker for the firm and has no employees or agents. Among the rental property owners she and her firm represent is her Co-Respondent, Michael Houser. Both Ms. Lindsay and Elite Properties, as well as Mr. Houser, have a significant number of minority tenants, both Hispanic and African-American. A substantial number of those, both historically, and at the time of the hearing are single, African-American females, as heads of households. There is no evidence, aside from the Petitioner’s unsubstantiated opinion, that either the Respondent has ever refused to rent to the Petitioner or anyone else, based upon race, nor that they have falsely denied availability of a dwelling for rent or sale for that reason. There is no evidence that they have refused or attempted to avoid holding out a property for rent or sale for reasons based on racial animus.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations, determining that the Respondents did not commit a discriminatory housing practice based upon the Petitioner's race and that the Petition be dismissed in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of April, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of April, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Sylvia Mims 3382 Greenbriar Circle, Apt. B Gulf Breeze, Florida 32561 Beverly Lindsay 5252 Springdale Drive Milton, Florida 32570 Michael Houser 3533 Edinburgh Drive Pace, Florida 32571 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57760.23760.34
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RUBYE JOHNSON vs CANONGATE CONDOMINIUM APARTMENTS NO. ONE INC., 10-005015 (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jul. 12, 2010 Number: 10-005015 Latest Update: Nov. 03, 2011

The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent committed an unlawful housing practice by discriminating against the Petitioner on the basis of race, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Dr. Rubye Johnson, is an African-American woman and, thus, is a member of a class protected under the Florida Fair Housing Act, sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Canongate Condominium Apartments No. One, Inc., is the condominium association responsible for operation of the Canongate Condominium Apartments No. One ("Canongate"). Petitioner is a resident of Canongate and currently resides in Unit 201. She previously owned and lived in Canongate Unit 207, the unit at issue in this proceeding.3 She no longer owns Unit 207. Petitioner could not recall precisely when she became a resident of Canongate.4 She testified that when she became a resident of Canongate she was a renter, and she rented Unit 207. The evidence indicates that she likely moved into Unit 207 sometime before February 4, 2000. On February 4, 2000, the Association voted to amend Canongate's Declaration of Condominium, Article VII, Paragraph G, Section i. This amendment (the "2000 Amendment") prohibits the leasing or rental of units in Canongate. Existing leases and tenants as of the amendment's effective date were grandfathered for the balance of the lease term; however, no lease extensions or renewals were allowed. Institutional mortgagees' existing rights under the Declaration of Condominium were expressly preserved. At some point after Petitioner began renting Unit 207, the unit owner told her that due to the 2000 Amendment, she either would have to purchase the unit or move out in five years' time. The owner told her he thought the 2000 Amendment was approved because Respondent's Board of Directors ("Board") did not want any more black residents in the building.5 Petitioner purchased Unit 207 in or about 2004. When she purchased the unit, she was aware of the 2000 Amendment. She acknowledged that the 2000 Amendment prohibits the leasing or rental of units in Canongate without regard to race or gender. Petitioner testified that when she came home one day, Laura Ochacher, who had owned Unit 210, approached her about renting one of her units. Ms. Ochacher told Petitioner that Unit 210 was the subject of foreclosure and that her family was being evicted. Petitioner saw the eviction notice. Ms. Ochacher told Petitioner that Canongate property manager Marsha Allen had found a company to purchase Unit 210, and that the company had allowed them to remain in and rent Unit 210. Through examining a document printed out from the Miami-Dade County Property Appraiser's Office website, Petitioner learned that Lansdowne Real Estate Holdings, LLC ("Lansdowne") owned Unit 210. From this information, Petitioner surmised that Lansdowne had purchased Unit 210 and rented it to the Ochachers. She believed that Ms. Allen and the Board were complicit in what she viewed as a rental arrangement that violated the 2000 Amendment. Her belief was based on her knowledge of the screening and approval process entailed in purchasing a unit in Canongate. Petitioner did not independently investigate the matters that Ms. Ochacher relayed to her. She did not ask Ms. Allen whether she had found a company to purchase Unit 210; whether Unit 210 was, in fact, being rented; or whether she or the Board knew of and allowed rental of the unit. Petitioner understood Lansdowne to be a land company that bought and sold land on a large scale. She did not know whether Lansdowne is white, black, or of any other race. Petitioner also heard rumors from other Canongate residents that other units were being rented. She identified these units as 618, 520, 602, 105, 309, 106, 115, 120, 315, 515, 313, 410, 430, 503, 514, "and perhaps more." She did not identify who told her about these units, nor did she independently investigate whether the units were, in fact, being rented. Following her discussion with Ms. Ochacher, Petitioner decided to ask the Board whether she could rent Unit 207. She sent a communication to the Board, dated April 11, 2009, entitled "Issues and Concerns."6 Item 12 of this communication states: 12. It is rumored that there are renters in the building and that the board of directors are [sic] sanctioning these arrangements. Is this true? If so, under what circumstance would the board of director's [sic] sanctions [sic] renters in the building? If not, do you have a clue how this perception has been generated? Petitioner's testimony regarding whether she had actually requested permission from the Board to rent her unit was inconsistent. In her deposition, she testified that she viewed the statement in Item 12 as a request to rent Unit 207, but conceded that the request was "implied." At the final hearing, she acknowledged that her statement in Item 12 did not constitute a specific request, but stated that she previously had sent letters asking to rent the unit. She was unable to recall any specific letters she sent, when she sent them, or to whom the letters were sent. No such letters were proffered or admitted into evidence. Petitioner claimed that she had orally asked Ms. Allen and various Board members, on numerous occasions, whether she could rent her unit. However, she could not recall who, other than Ms. Allen, she ostensibly had asked, nor did she recall the substance or details of such conversations. Petitioner testified that, "by the way they acted," she knew she was not allowed to rent her unit. She stated that she also had been informed, orally and in writing, that she could not rent her unit. However, she could not recall who informed her, or any details of those discussions. She did not provide any evidence of written refusal to allow her to rent her unit. Petitioner testified that she had discussed with Marsha Allen her concern that white unit owners were allowed to rent their units, while she was not. She acknowledged that no one had ever told her she was not allowed to rent her unit because she is black. Canongate property manager Marsha Allen testified on behalf of Respondent. Ms. Allen's duties as property manager include overseeing the day-to-day operation of Canongate, reporting to the Board, and serving as Respondent's records custodian. Ms. Allen testified that rental of units in Canongate is prohibited under the 2000 Amendment. She testified that neither she nor the Board have allowed Canongate owners to rent their units, and that whenever owners have asked, they have been denied permission because of the rental prohibition. Ms. Allen testified that none of the units Petitioner identified was, in fact, being rented. Ms. Allen stated that Petitioner never had asked her whether she could rent her unit. She was not aware of Petitioner ever having asked the Board or any Board member whether she could rent her unit. Ms. Allen did not interpret Item 12 of Petitioner's April 11, 2009, communication as constituting a request for permission to rent her unit. Ms. Allen also stated that she never had discussed Canongate's rental policy with Petitioner, and she never had refused a request from Petitioner to rent her unit. She testified that she never had been directed by the Board or any Board member to refuse to allow Petitioner to rent her unit. Ms. Allen testified that Petitioner never had complained to her that she was being discriminated against by not being allowed to rent her unit, while white owners were allowed to rent theirs. Lansdowne sent a letter dated October 30, 2008, to Ms. Allen. The letter asked her to inform the Board that Lansdowne had acquired title to Unit 210 through foreclosure and that they were entering into an agreement with the borrower, Laura Ochacher, to continue her occupancy for 12 months, during which she could redeem the property by paying the foreclosure judgment. The letter stated: "[t]his should not be considered a rental arrangement." The letter explained that Lansdowne had paid the past due assessments for the unit and would pay outstanding legal fees once the Board approved the occupancy agreement. Upon receiving the letter, Ms. Allen reviewed the Canongate Declaration of Condominium, specifically, Article VII, Paragraph H., to ensure that the occupancy agreement for Unit 210 did not violate the 2000 Amendment's rental prohibition. Article VII, Paragraph H., provides that if the mortgagee of a condominium unit subject to an institutional mortgage given as security becomes the owner of the unit, the owner has the unqualified right to sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of the unit. Ms. Allen determined that, based on this provision, the occupancy agreement did not violate the 2000 Amendment. Ms. Allen consulted with Respondent's legal counsel, who independently verified that the occupancy agreement did not violate the 2000 Amendment. Respondent also presented the testimony of Joyce Meade, who has served as Respondent's president since 2008. Ms. Meade's duties as President include enforcing Respondent's condominium documents, overseeing the Board, conducting meetings, and supervising Canongate's property manager. Ms. Meade testified that Petitioner did not ask her for permission to rent her unit. She also testified that, to the best of her knowledge, Petitioner did not ask the Board for permission to rent her unit, and the Board did not specifically refuse. Ms. Meade testified that had Petitioner asked to rent her unit, she would not have been allowed because all rental requests are refused due to the 2000 Amendment. Ms. Meade testified that Petitioner never complained to her that she was being discriminated against because she was not allowed to rent her unit, while white owners were allowed to rent theirs. She also was not aware of any such complaints by Petitioner to the Board. Determinations of Ultimate Fact Petitioner failed to present persuasive evidence that she requested Respondent's permission to rent Unit 207. Petitioner subjectively may have believed that she requested permission in Item 12 of her April 11, 2009, communication, but that item cannot reasonably be read to constitute such a request. Item 12 merely asks if there are renters in Canongate and the circumstances under which the Board would allow renters. No other items in the April 11, 2009, communication constitute a request to rent the unit. Petitioner did not present any evidence that she submitted other written requests to rent her unit, and her testimony that she had orally requested to rent her unit was unpersuasive. Respondent's witnesses credibly testified that Petitioner had never requested, orally or in writing, to rent her unit. Petitioner also failed to establish that her request to rent her unit was refused. Her testimony on this point was unclear, imprecise, and unpersuasive, and she provided no evidence of written refusal to allow her to rent her unit. By contrast, Respondent's witnesses testified unequivocally that they had not refused to allow Petitioner to rent her unit. They also credibly testified that Petitioner never had complained to them that she was refused permission to rent her unit because she is black, while white owners were allowed to rent theirs. Petitioner did not establish that she was qualified and able to rent out her unit. The uncontroverted evidence established that the Canongate Declaration of Condominium prohibits leasing or rental of units. Accordingly, Petitioner could not have been allowed to rent her unit, even if had she asked. Petitioner did not present any competent substantial evidence establishing that Respondent allows similarly situated white unit owners to rent their units, while refusing to allow Petitioner to rent hers. Petitioner's testimony that Lansdowne was a purchaser and that the occupancy agreement for Unit 210 actually constituted a rental arrangement was merely her personal opinion, unsupported by any competent substantial evidence. Respondent showed that Lansdowne is an institutional mortgagee that took title through foreclosure and, therefore, was not similarly situated to Petitioner and the other owners who had purchased their units. Moreover, Petitioner presented no evidence that Lansdowne was white. In sum, there is no competent substantial evidence in the record to support a finding of unlawful housing discrimination.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding Canongate Condominium Apartments No. One, Inc., not liable for housing discrimination and awarding no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of August, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 2011.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57120.68760.20760.23760.37
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SIMONE MORRIS vs MONTE CARLO CONDOMINIUMS, 09-001784 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Apr. 08, 2009 Number: 09-001784 Latest Update: Dec. 23, 2024
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CARLOS GOMEZ vs VESTCOR COMPANIE, D/B/A MADALYN LANDING, 05-000565 (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Viera, Florida Feb. 16, 2005 Number: 05-000565 Latest Update: Nov. 07, 2005

The Issue The two issues raised in this proceeding are: (1) whether the basis and reason Respondent, Vestcor Companies, d/b/a Madalyn Landings (Vestcor), terminated Petitioner, Carlos Gomez's (Petitioner), employment on June 28, 2002, was in retaliation for Petitioner's protected conduct during his normal course of employment; and (2) whether Vestcor committed unlawful housing practice by permitting Vestcor employees without families to reside on its property, Madalyn Landing Apartments, without paying rent, while requiring Vestcor employees with families to pay rent in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended, and Chapter 760.23, Florida Statutes (2002).

Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the demeanor and candor of each witness while testifying, exhibits offered in support of and in opposition to the respective position of the parties received in evidence, stipulations of the parties, evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (2002), and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant, material, and substantial facts are determined: Petitioner filed charges of housing discrimination against Vestcor with the Commission on August 30, 2002. Petitioner alleged that Vestcor discriminated against him based on his familial status and his June 28, 2002, termination was in retaliation for filing the charge of discrimination. Vestcor denied the allegations and contended that Petitioner's termination was for cause. Additionally, Vestcor maintained Petitioner relinquished his claim of retaliation before the final hearing; and under oath during his deposition, asserted he would not pursue a claim for retaliation. Petitioner was permitted to proffer evidence of retaliation because Vestcor terminated his employment. The Commission's Notice was issued on January 7, 2005. The parties agree that Petitioner was hired by Vestcor on June 25, 2001, as a leasing consultant agent for Madalyn Landing Apartments located in Palm Bay, Florida. Petitioner's job responsibilities as a leasing consultant agent included showing the property, leasing the property (apartment units), and assisting with tenant relations by responding to concerns and questions, and preparing and following up on maintenance orders. Petitioner had access to keys to all apartments on site. At the time of his hire, Petitioner was, as was all of Vestcor employees, given a copy of Vestcor's Employee Handbook. This handbook is required reading for each employee for personal information and familiarity with company policies and procedures, to include the company requirement that each employee personally telephone and speak with his/her supervisor when the employee, for whatever reason, could not appear at work as scheduled, which is a basis and cause for termination. The parties agree that Vestcor's handbook, among other things, contains company policies regarding equal employment; prohibition against unlawful conduct and appropriate workplace conduct; procedures for handling employee problems and complaints associated with their employment; and procedures for reporting illness or absences from work, which include personal notification to supervisors, and not messages left on the answering service. Failure to comply with employment reporting polices may result in progressive disciplinary action. The parties agree that employee benefits were also contained in the handbook. One such employee benefit, at issue in this proceeding, is the live-on-site benefit. The live-on- site benefit first requires eligible employees to complete a 90-day orientation period, meet the rental criteria for a tax credit property, and be a full-time employee. The eligible employee must pay all applicable security deposits and utility expenses for the live-on-site unit. Rent-free, live-on-site benefits are available only to employees who occupy the positions of (1) site community managers, (2) maintenance supervisors, and (3) courtesy officers. These individuals received a free two-bedroom, two-bathroom apartment at the apartment complex in which they work as part of their employment compensation package. The rent-free, live-on-site benefit is not available for Vestcor's leasing consultant agent employees, such as Petitioner. On or about July 3, 2001, Petitioner entered into a lease agreement with Vestcor to move into Apartment No. 202-24 located at Madalyn Landing Apartments. The lease agreement ended on January 31, 2002. The lease agreement set forth terms that Petitioner was to receive a $50.00 monthly rental concession, which became effective on September 3, 2001. Although he was eligible for the 25-percent monthly rental concession, to have given Petitioner the full 25 percent of his monthly rental cost would have over-qualified Petitioner based upon Madalyn Landing Apartment's tax credit property status. Petitioner and Vestcor agreed he would receive a $50.00 monthly rental concession, thereby qualifying him as a resident on the property. Petitioner understood and accepted the fact that he did not qualify for rent-free, live-on-site benefits because of his employment status as a leasing consultant agent. Petitioner understood and accepted Vestcor's $50.00 monthly rental concession because of his employment status as a leasing consultant agent. The rental concession meant Petitioner's regular monthly rental would be reduced by $50.00 each month. On September 1, 2001, Henry Oliver was hired by Vestcor as a maintenance technician. Maintenance technicians do not qualify for rent-free, live-on-site benefits. At the time of his hire, Mr. Oliver did not live on site. As with other employees, to become eligible for the standard 25-percent monthly rental concession benefits, Mr. Oliver was required to complete a 90-day orientation period, meet the rental criteria for a tax credit property, be a full-time employee, and pay all applicable security deposits and utility expenses for the unit. On November 13, 2001, Michael Gomez, the brother of Petitioner (Mr. Gomez), commenced his employment with Vestcor as a groundskeeper. Groundskeepers did not meet the qualifications for rent-free, live-on-site benefits. At the time of his hire, Mr. Gomez did not live on site. As with other employees, to become eligible for the standard 25-percent monthly rental concession benefits, Mr. Gomez was required to complete a 90-day orientation period, meet the rental criteria for a tax credit property, be a full-time employee, and pay all applicable security deposits and utility expenses for the unit. On November 21, 2001, 81 days after his hire, Mr. Oliver commenced his lease application process to reside in Apartment No. 203-44 at Madalyn Landing Apartments. Mr. Oliver's leasing consultant agent was Petitioner in this cause. Like other eligible Vestcor employees and as a part of the lease application process, Mr. Oliver completed all required paperwork, which included, but not limited to, completing a credit check, employment verification, and income test to ensure that he was qualified to reside at Madalyn Landing Apartments. Fifteen days later, on November 28, 2001, Mr. Gomez commenced his lease application process to reside in Apartment No. 206-24 at Madalyn Landing Apartments. As part of the leasing process, Mr. Gomez, as other eligible Vestcor employees who intend to reside on Vestcor property, completed all necessary paperwork including, but not limited to, a credit check and employment verification and income test to ensure he was qualified to reside at Madalyn Landing Apartments. Included in the paperwork was a list of rental criteria requiring Mr. Gomez to execute a lease agreement to obligate himself to pay the required rent payment, consent to a credit check, pay an application fee and required security deposit, and agree not to take possession of an apartment until all supporting paperwork was completed and approved. Mr. Gomez's leasing consultant was Petitioner. On December 28, 2001, Petitioner signed a Notice to Vacate Apartment No. 206-24, effective February 1, 2002. The Notice to Vacate was placed in Vestcor's office files. Petitioner's reasons for vacating his apartment stated he "needed a yard, garage, more space, a big family room, and some privacy." Thirty-four days later, February 1, 2002, Mr. Gomez moved into Apartment No. 206-24 at Madalyn Landing Apartments without the approval or knowledge of Vestcor management. On January 9, 2002, a "Corrective Action Notice" was placed in Petitioner's employee file by his supervisor, Genea Closs. The notice cited two violations of Vestcor's policies and procedures. Specifically, his supervisor noted Petitioner did not collect administration fees from two unidentified rental units, and he had taken an unidentified resident's rental check home with him, rather than directly to the office as required by policy. As a direct result of those policy violations, Ms. Closs placed Petitioner on 180 days' probation and instructed him to re-read all Vestcor employees' handbook and manuals. Petitioner acknowledged receiving and understanding the warning. At the time she took the above action against Petitioner, there is no evidence that Ms. Closs had knowledge of Petitioner's past or present efforts to gather statements and other information from Mr. Gomez and/or Mr. Oliver in anticipation and preparation for his subsequent filing of claims of discrimination against Vestcor. Also, on January 9, 2002, Petitioner was notified that his brother, Mr. Gomez, did not qualify to reside at Madalyn Landing Apartments because of insufficient credit. Further, Petitioner was advised that should Mr. Gomez wish to continue with the application process, he would need a co-signer on his lease agreement or pay an additional security deposit. Mr. Gomez produced an unidentified co-signer, who also completed a lease application. On January 30, 2002, the lease application submitted by Mr. Gomez's co-signor was denied. As a result of the denial of Mr. Gomez's co-signor lease application, Vestcor did not approve Mr. Gomez's lease application. When he was made aware that his co-signor's application was denied and of management's request for him to pay an additional security deposit, as was previously agreed, Mr. Gomez refused to pay the additional security deposit. As a direct result of his refusal, his lease application was never approved, and he was not authorized by Vestcor to move into any Madalyn Landing's rental apartment units. At some unspecified time thereafter, Vestcor's management became aware that Mr. Gomez had moved into Apartment No. 206-24, even though he was never approved or authorized to move into an on site apartment. Vestcor's management ordered Mr. Gomez to remove his belongings from Apartment No. 206-24. Subsequent to the removal order, Mr. Gomez moved his belongings from Apartment No. 206-24 into Apartment No. 103-20. Mr. Gomez's move into Apartment No. 103-20, as was his move into Apartment No. 206-04, was without approval and/or authorization from Vestcor's management. Upon learning that his belonging had been placed in Apartment No. 103-20, Mr. Gomez was again instructed by management to remove his belongings. After he failed and refused to move his belongings from Apartment No. 103-20, Vestcor's management entered the apartment and gathered and discarded Mr. Gomez's belongings. As a leasing contract agent, Petitioner had access to keys to all vacant apartments. His brother, Mr. Gomez, who was a groundskeeper, did not have access to keys to any apartment, save the one he occupied. Any apartment occupied by Ms. Gomez after his Notice to Vacate Apartment No. 103-20 was without the knowledge or approval of Vestcor and in violation of Vestcor's policies and procedures. Therefore, any period of apartment occupancy by Mr. Gomez was not discriminatory against Petitioner (rent-free and/or reduced rent), but was a direct violation of Vestcor's policies. On February 10, 2002, Mr. Oliver signed a one-year lease agreement with Vestcor. Mr. Oliver's lease agreement reflected a 25-percent employee rental concession. Throughout Mr. Oliver's occupancy of Apartment No. 203-64 and pursuant to his lease agreement duration, Mr. Oliver's rental history reflected his monthly payment of $413.00. There is no evidence that Mr. Oliver lived on site without paying rent or that Vestcor authorized or permitted Mr. Oliver to live on site without paying rent, as alleged by Petitioner. On June 2, 2002, Ms. Closs completed Petitioner's annual performance appraisal report. Performance ratings range from a one -- below expectations, to a four -- exceeds expectations. Petitioner received ratings in the categories appraised as follows: Leasing skills -- 4; Administrative skills -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in paperwork, computer updating, and policy adherence; Marketing skills -- 4, with comments that Petitioner had a flair for finding the right markets; Community awareness -- 3, with no comment; Professionalism -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in paperwork reporting; Dependability -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in attendance; Interpersonal skills -- 3, with no comments; Judgment/Decision-making -- 3, with no comments; Quality of Work -- 2, with comments that work lacked accuracy; Initiative -- 4, with no comment; Customer service -- 3, with no comments; Team work -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in the area of resident confidence; Company loyalty -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in adherence to company policy and procedures; and Training and development -- 3, with no comments. Petitioner's Overall rating was 2.5, with comments that there was "room for improvement." On June 27, 2002, while on 180 days' probation that began on January 9, 2002, Petitioner failed to report to work and failed to report his absence to his supervisor, Ms. Closs, by a person-to-person telephone call. This conduct constituted a violation of Vestcor's policy requiring all its employees to personally contact their supervisor when late and/or absent from work and prohibited leaving messages on the community answering service machine. On June 28, 2002, Petitioner reported to work. Ms. Closs, his supervisor, informed Petitioner of his termination of employment with Vestcor for failure to report to work (i.e. job abandonment) and for probation violation, as he had been warned on January 9, 2002, what would happen should a policy violation re-occur. It was after his June 28, 2002, termination that Petitioner began his personal investigation and gathering of information (i.e., interviews and statements from other Vestcor employees) in preparation to file this complaint. Considering the findings favorable to Petitioner, he failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation by Vestcor, when they terminated his employment on June 28, 2002. Considering the findings of record favorable to Petitioner, he failed to establish a prima facie case of housing and/or rental adjustment discrimination by Vestcor, based upon familial status of himself or any other employer. Petitioner failed to prove Vestcor knowingly and/or intentionally permitted, approved, or allowed either Mr. Gomez or Mr. Oliver to live on site without a completed and approved application followed by appropriate rent adjustments according to their employment status and keeping within the tax credit requirement, while requiring Vestcor employees with families (or different employment status) to pay a different monthly rent in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Petitioner failed to prove his termination on June 28, 2002, was in retaliation for his actions and conduct other than his personal violation, while on probation, of Vestcor's policies and procedures.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED the Florida Commission on Human Rights enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief alleging discrimination filed by Petitioner, Carlos Gomez. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 2005.

USC (2) 42 U.S.C 2000e42 U.S.C 3604 Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57741.211760.11760.23
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CRISELLA WINDER, AS THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF MATTHEW LES FORIS vs WHITEHALL ENTERPRISES, INC., D/B/A VILLAS DES CHENES, 04-001977 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Clearwater, Florida Jun. 04, 2004 Number: 04-001977 Latest Update: Jan. 25, 2005

The Issue Whether Respondent, Whitehall Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Villas Des Chenes, discriminated against Matthew Les Foris, deceased, on the basis of his race in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 3604(a) and/or (b), and Sections 70-77 and 70-176, Pinellas County Code, by not renewing Les Foris’ lease when it expired.

Findings Of Fact Matthew Les Foris, the complainant in this case, was an African-American male and a member of a protected class. Following initiation of the proceedings before the Commission, he passed away on August 23, 2003. Les Foris' granddaughter, Crisella Winder, was appointed as personal representative of his estate, and she was substituted as Petitioner in this matter. Respondent, Whitehall Enterprises, Inc. ("Whitehall or Respondent"), rents dwelling units to the public at various apartment communities in the Clearwater, Florida, area. Among others, Whitehall operates a 38-unit apartment community commonly known by the name Villas Des Chenes Apartments ("Villas Des Chenes"). These units are rented to adults over the age of 55 on a yearly lease basis. Maxine Chartier is general manager and vice-president of Whitehall. She has held this position since 1998, and prior to this position, worked as an assistant to Whitehall’s general manager. James Yopp is the property manager at Villas Des Chenes, as well as at four of the other Whitehall properties in the Clearwater area. He has held this position for about six years, and prior to this position, worked as a maintenance man for the Whitehall properties. He has attended fair housing training. Whitehall does not have a written policy regarding renewals or non-renewal of leases. It does not keep records of incidents at its properties. However, there were regular practices regarding renewals. At Villas Des Chenes, there are fair housing posters in the office and the laundry room describing fair housing practices. They were present when Les Foris lived there and are presently still on display. It was Yopp’s practice to visit Villas Des Chenes on an almost daily basis. He would talk with Chartier nearly every day, reporting events and problems, as needed. The two would discuss what problems there were and, where possible, reach resolutions. Chartier had a process she used in determining when to non-renew a tenancy. She would consider whether there had been problems in the previous year and consider what would work best for the property. Factors considered by Chartier included whether the tenant was unhappy and "bad-mouthing" the company, mistreating staff, getting along with others, doing damage, paying rent late, or an accumulation of those factors. She would rely on what was reported to her by the property manager and her own observations, if any. The ultimate decision to non- renew a tenancy rested with her. On November 13, 2000, Les Foris applied for an apartment at Villas Des Chenes. Yopp accepted the application, along with Les Foris’ advance payment of $200.00. The application was approved, and Les Foris and Respondent entered into a lease for a one-year term commencing December 1, 2000, and ending November 30, 2001. The leasing procedure for Les Foris was the same as that used for other tenants. Approximately 30 days prior to the end of the initial lease’s term, Yopp offered to renew the lease for another one- year term. Yopp and Les Foris signed a renewal on November 30, 2001. Under the terms of the renewal, the lease term was to end on November 30, 2002. Neither the lease nor the renewal provides for an automatic renewal of its terms. Beginning sometime in May 2002, management noticed problems involving Les Foris’ tenancy. In May 2002, Yopp received a call from a tenant who reported that Les Foris was upset with another resident. Yopp subsequently talked with Les Foris, and he complained about an upstairs neighbor on two occasions. Yopp could see no evidence of the causes for the complaints by Les Foris. A couple of days later, Les Foris complained again about the same neighbor. This time, Les Foris threatened to harm the neighbor. Yopp told Les Foris that such conduct by Les Foris would be inappropriate. Although Yopp had handled numerous tenant squabbles during his career as property manager, in none of them had a tenant threatened to harm someone. However, after this incident, Les Foris and the neighbor had no further problems. Subsequently, the neighbor moved out of the complex for unrelated reasons. In addition, Les Foris repeatedly parked his car in spaces not reserved for him. On an almost daily basis when he was not working, Les Foris would park his car in spaces reserved for other tenants. The tenants would call Yopp, who would then ask Les Foris to move the car. Les Foris would then return his car to his proper parking space. The next day, the scenario would repeat itself. Les Foris would explain that he was moving his car so that it could be in the shade. Yopp told Les Foris that such conduct was inappropriate. Yopp testified that he received complaints from two residents about Les Foris. The complaints were from Ruth Poetter and Carmella Eichen. Each of the women complained that Les Foris made them feel uncomfortable, without offering greater explanation. It was a customary practice for many of the residents at Villas Des Chenes to sit outside their units at tables and chairs. Poetter followed this custom. About the time of her complaint to Yopp, Yopp observed that Poetter ceased sitting outside. When Yopp visited the property, Les Foris would complain about Whitehall. Ralph Agliano, a former tenant of Villas Des Chenes, testified that Les Foris would routinely complain about things, and Agliano would attempt to explain them. Yopp reported all problems, including those involving Les Foris, to Chartier. On or about September 15, 2002, Yopp delivered a notice to all tenants, including Les Foris, regarding proposed rent increases that management intended to implement beginning in December 2002. The delivery of that notice was not triggered by the end date of any tenant’s lease and was not an offer to renew. As of September 15, 2002, when the notice about proposed rent increases was delivered to all tenants, no decision had yet been made to renew or not renew Les Foris’ lease. Yopp and Chartier subsequently discussed whether to renew Les Foris’ lease. Chartier decided that, based on the complaints relayed to her about Les Foris in the preceding months, Les Foris' lease would not be renewed when it expired at the end of November 2002. Chartier felt that it was not in the best interest of Whitehall to continue with a tenant who was unhappy with the company, made a threat to harm another tenant, and who made other residents uncomfortable. She did not want the residents of Villas Des Chenes to be afraid. It was an accumulation of things that formed her decision. This process by Chartier, as applied to Les Foris, was the same as that which she used for others. Yopp prepared and issued a notice of non-renewal to the tenant. The notice did not set forth a reason for the non- renewal. Yopp admitted that other tenants also parked in parking spaces other than those assigned to the tenant. In addition, it is anticipated that other tenants have disputes with their neighbors. In the six years Yopp had been property manager at the complex, no residents were non-renewed specifically for either reason. When Les Foris received the notice, he became upset. He asked Yopp to explain the reason for the decision. Yopp declined to give an explanation. In the year that Les Foris received his notice of non-renewal, Yopp delivered notices of non-renewal to three other tenants. In none of them did Yopp give a reason for the non-renewal. The notice of non-renewal given to Les Foris did not differ in form or substance from that used for other tenants. Les Foris spoke with Chartier by phone about the non-renewal. Les Foris asked Chartier the reason for the non-renewal. Chartier also declined to give one stating that she was not required to give a reason. At the hearing, Chartier explained that it was her practice not to explain the reasons for non-renewals. Because the lease did not require a reason, she did not offer one. Discussions about the reasons for non- renewal often lead to arguments and to Chartier, they serve no purpose. During the phone conversation, Les Foris requested reconsideration and, if that failed, then additional time to find a new place to live. He explained to Chartier that he lacked funds and had no one to help him move. Chartier offered to allow some extra time to remain on the premises and to make an early refund of the security deposit. Chartier returned the security deposit to Les Foris by way of a letter dated November 15, 2002. Les Foris filed his complaint of housing discrimination on November 7, 2002. Chartier learned of it after sending him the November 15, 2002, letter. Les Foris moved out of Villas Des Chenes in November 2002. Winder had lost touch with her grandfather for sometime and had "found" him only about two years prior to his death. At the time she formed a bond with Les Foris, he was a tenant at Villas Des Chenes. Les Foris was happy there because he resided close to Winder and her children and was within walking distance of the grocery store where he worked part-time. Winder testified that when Les Foris was informed of the non-renewal, he became upset. He expressed to her his distress at being made to move. However, she helped him find a new apartment and helped him move. Winder found movers and paid them on Les Foris' behalf. She also arranged for storing his property in a commercial facility. The move cost less than $400.00. The rent was higher at the new complex, where Les Foris lived for just a few months before becoming ill. Winder saw her grandfather regularly after he received the non-renewal notice. He frequently called her after having anxiety problems at his new apartment. Les Foris was disoriented about the location of items in his new apartment. He was definitely inconvenienced by the move. He was also humiliated and ashamed in front of his neighbors for being forced to move out. His daily routine was disrupted, and he was unable to make friends at the new complex.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Law Judge will enter a final order dismissing Petitioner, Crisella Winder, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Matthew Les Foris’ Petition for Relief for failure to prove a case of housing discrimination against Respondent, Whitehall Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Villas Des Chenes, after the period for submission of exceptions has expired. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Leon W. Russell, Human Rights/EEO Officer Pinellas County Office of Human Rights 400 South Fort Harrison Avenue Fifth Floor Clearwater, Florida 33756 W. Oliver Melvin, Compliance Officer Pinellas County Office of Human Rights 400 South Fort Harrison Avenue Fifth Floor Clearwater, Florida 33756 Matthew P. Farmer, Esquire Farmer & Fitzgerald, P.A. 708 East Jackson Street Tampa, Florida 33602 Lynn Hanshaw, Esquire Gulfcoast Legal Services 314 South Missouri Avenue, Suite 109 Clearwater, Florida 32756 Cathy L. Lucrezi, Esquire Law Offices of Heist, Weisse & Lucrezi, P.A. 1661 Estero Boulevard, Suite 20 Post Office Box 2514 Fort Myers Beach, Florida 33932

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 3604 Florida Laws (4) 120.5783.6490.80390.804
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GERARDO VILLAMIZAR AND RODICA VILLAMIZAR vs EDDIE GOMEZ, 03-002470 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jul. 08, 2003 Number: 03-002470 Latest Update: Nov. 15, 2006

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated the provisions of Florida’s Fair Housing Act, Section 760.20-760.37, Florida Statutes (2002) (the Fair Housing Act), by evicting Petitioners and thereby allegedly breaching a rental agreement, as more fully described in the Petition for Relief. (References to statutory sections and chapters are to Florida Statutes (2002.)

Findings Of Fact Petitioners are Hispanic. The parties agree that Mrs. Villamizar is handicapped by a mental disability of an undocumented nature. Respondent works full-time as a fireman, and he has managed real estate on a part-time basis for over 15 years. Sometime in August, 2001, Petitioners rented an apartment from Respondent pursuant to a verbal rental agreement. The apartment is identified in the record as Apartment 5 (the apartment). The apartment is one of several in a building located at 1484 Northwest 15th Avenue, Miami, Florida 33125 (the building). Petitioners rented the apartment in conjunction with a rent subsidy program administered by Volunteers of America. Petitioners resided in the apartment as their primary residence until approximately February 23, 2003. At that time, Respondent evicted Petitioners pursuant to a court order issued by the County Court In and For Dade County, Florida (the County Court). Respondent evicted Petitioners for nondiscriminatory reasons. Mr. Villamizar threatened Respondent, abused alcohol and drugs, and was involved in approximately 12 police incident reports at the building. After Respondent painted the outside of the building, Mr. Villamizar painted the apartment door, the railing, and an exterior wall with a different color. Mr. Villamizar also painted, "Fuck the fire department" on the outside of the apartment.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michelle Jackson, Acting Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gerardo and Rodica Villamizar Post Office Box 010461 Miami, Florida 33130 Eddie Gomez 17835 Southwest 10th Court Pembroke Pines, Florida 33029

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57760.20760.23760.37
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SERGIO TRUJILLO-GONZALEZ AND MARIELLA TRUJILLO-GONZALEZ vs RICHMAN PROPERTY SERVICES, INC.; JOE LAMBERT; MIRA VERDE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; AND RMS GP, LLC, 19-003655 (2019)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Jul. 09, 2019 Number: 19-003655 Latest Update: Jan. 15, 2020

The Issue Did Respondents, Richman Property Service, Inc. (Richman Property); Joe Lambert; Mira Verde Limited Partnership (Mira Verde); and RMS GP, LLC; discriminate against Petitioners, Sergio Trujillo-Gonzalez and Mariella Trujillo-Gonzalez, in the sale or rental of housing on account of a handicap? Did Respondents, Richman Property; Joe Lambert; Mira Verde; and RMS GP, LLC, discriminate against Petitioners, Sergio Trujillo-Gonzalez and Mariella Trujillo-Gonzalez, in the sale or rental of housing on account of national origin?

Findings Of Fact Mr. Trujillo-Gonzalez is handicapped. He routinely uses an electric wheelchair to move about. Due to his disability, he needs assistance and accommodation in moving about, including a ramp and "grab bars" in the bathroom. Richman Property and Mira Verde hold ownership interest in the Mira Verde apartments. Mr. Lambert is their manager for the property. There is no evidence establishing any relationship of RMS GP, LLC, with Mr. Lambert, Mira Verde Apartments, or the events described in this Order. From March 31, 2018, forward, Mr. Lambert, Richman Property, and Mira Verde were aware that Mr. Trujillo-Gonzalez was disabled and needed these accommodations. When asked about Mr. Trujillo-Gonzalez's patently obvious disability, Mr. Lambert prevaricated in his answer. Asked if Mr. Trujillo-Gonzalez used a wheel chair, Mr. Lambert replied, "I've seen him with an electric chair. I have seen him walking with a walker or a stick. I have seen him drive his Hummer. I have seen him walking without any assistance." (T-143) This evasiveness, along with the differences in demeanor of Mr. Lambert and Mr. Trujillo-Gonzalez, caused the undersigned to find Mr. Trujillo-Gonzalez more credible and persuasive when testimony of the two witnesses differed. In addition Mr. Trujillo-Gonzalez's willing admission of harmful facts enhanced his credibility. For these reasons, Mr. Trujillo-Gonzalez's testimony about requesting a modified apartment is accepted as more credible than Mr. Lambert's statements that Mr. Trujillo-Gonzalez never requested a modified apartment. Mr. Trujillo-Gonzalez is of Cuban descent. At all times material to this case, Mr. Lambert, Richman Property, and Mira Verde were aware of this. On March 31, 2018, Mr. and Mrs. Trujillo-Gonzalez entered into a Florida Tax Credit Lease Agreement with Richman Property and Mira Verde for a Mira Verde apartment. The apartment complex is part of a Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program. The maximum allowable apartment rent is based on the area's median income published annually by HUD. The majority of the apartments rent for 60 percent of the allowable rent. A minority of them rent to qualified tenants at 35 percent of the allowable rent. A goodly amount of evidence was directed to the Trujillo-Gonzalez's efforts to obtain a 35 percent apartment and Mira Verde's responses. There are no findings of fact on this subject because there is no evidence that difficulties or delays obtaining a lower rent apartment were due to Mr. Trujillo- Gonzalez's handicap or the Trujillo-Gonzalez's national origin. Mr. Trujillo-Gonzalez acknowledged there was no national origin discrimination in his testimony. He was asked, "Do you have any evidence with you here today that Mr. Lambert, the property manager, treats Cubans differently than other Hispanic tenants?" Mr. Trujillo-Gonzalez responded, "He mistreats everybody." (T-75) Mr. Trujillo-Gonzalez was asked, "And you don't have any evidence with you today to show residents who were non-Cubans were treated any differently, meaning you don't have a witness here today to show that they were – that non-Cubans were treated any differently than you?" He answered, "No. No." (T-75) The 14-page lease agreement between the Trujillo- Gonzalezes, Richman Property, and Mira Verde addresses a multitude of matters. They include security deposits, subletting, late payments, tenant utility responsibilities, the landlord's right to enter the premises without notice, tenant responsibility for clean carpets, waiver of landlord responsibility for criminal activity on the premises, pet prohibitions, waivers of claims for mold or mildew injury, tenant responsibility to report fire extinguisher malfunctions, prohibitions against all weapons including BB guns and paintball guns, restrictions on installation of satellite dishes, and curfews. The agreement does not contain a single word about when or how to request an accommodation for a handicap. On August 8, 2017, the tenant in Apartment 95 vacated the apartment. Apartment 95 had been modified to accommodate handicapped residents. Mr. Trujillo-Gonzalez asked Mr. Lambert to lease that apartment to him as an accommodation for his handicap. Mr. Lambert did not grant the request. The tenant who moved did not have a handicap. (T-21) There is no credible, persuasive evidence that allowing the Trujillo-Gonzalezes to rent that apartment was not reasonable. Instead of granting the request, Mr. Lambert gave Mr. Trujillo-Gonzalez a form to complete. The form only provided for requesting physical modifications to an apartment. The form also stated that the tenant understood and agreed that he was responsible for all costs for the modifications. A few days later Mr. Lambert gave Mr. Trujillo-Gonzalez an estimate for the installation of "four handicap bars." The cost was $795.00. The Trujillo-Gonzalezes could not afford this and told Mr. Lambert so. Since they could not afford to pay for the modifications, Mr. Trujillo-Gonzalez did not complete the form. Apartment 95 stood vacant for two months. (T-21) In November of 2017, Mr. Trujillo-Gonzalez asked Mr. Lambert to rent him apartment number 134. This apartment had been modified to accommodate tenants with handicaps. Mr. Lambert did not grant the request and indicated that the apartment was involved in a court proceeding. Yet Mr. Lambert rented the apartment to someone else in January 2018. There is no credible, persuasive evidence that allowing the Trujillo-Gonzalezes to rent that apartment was not reasonable. In late March or early April of 2018, Mr. Lambert told Mr. Trujillo-Gonzalez he would rent him the next vacant apartment modified to accommodate a handicap. He did not do this. In June of 2018, Mr. Trujillo-Gonzalez told Mr. Lambert that if Mr. Lambert would not rent him a modified apartment, then Mr. Trujillo-Gonzalez needed a shower, grab bars for the bath, and a wheelchair ramp for his apartment. On June 13, 2018, Mr. Lambert again provided the form described in Finding of Fact 13. Mr. and Mrs. Trujillo-Gonzalez filed their complaint with HUD on July 18, 2018. The complaint stated that June 11, 2018, was the most recent date of discrimination and that the discrimination was continuing. The complaint did not state that June 11, 2018, was the first or the only date of discrimination. In July and August of 2018, Mr. Trujillo-Gonzalez provided Mr. Lambert letters from Alvarez Gonzalez Gemayaret, M.D., of the University of Miami, Miller School of Medicine, stating that Mr. Trujillo-Gonzalez needed home modifications for his handicaps. The July 11, 2018, letter stated his needs included a ramp and a modified bathroom. The August 21, 2018, letter provided more detail. It stated: Mr. Trujillo is an established patient of the UHealth Institute for Advanced Pain Management and he is being treated for his chronic Right sided pain in his RU and RLE subsequent to subcortical ischemic stroke. Mr. Trujillo requires electric wheelchair to assist his mobility which is impaired because of the hemiplegia and RLE pain. Patient also has certain needs related to his stroke and disability and will greatly benefit from certain home improvements such as a ramp at the entrance to his house, as well as necessary rails in his house and bathroom, which will facilitate his daily activities. On August 7, 2018, Mr. Lambert contacted the Trujillo-Gonzalezes about completing an application for the transfer to a 35 percent lease that the Trujillo-Gonzalezes had been seeking. Mrs. Trujillo-Gonzalez refused to speak to him. Mr. Trujillo-Gonzalez stated that he would not participate further in the process until the Commission had completed its complaint review. (R. Ex. 16). Mr. Trujillo-Gonzalez testified: "I told him that I was going to wait for the commission investigation to finish. See, because that was the advice that they gave me, to wait for the investigation to be concluded." (T-72) Nonetheless, Mr. Trujillo-Gonzalez continued to communicate about obtaining a modified apartment. Mr. Lambert says that because of this exchange, he did not communicate further with the Trujillo-Gonzalezes about changing apartments to obtain a 35 percent lease or to obtain a modified apartment. This was not reasonable in light of Mr. Trujillo-Gonzalez's subsequent communications about obtaining a modified apartment. The tenant in Apartment 106 vacated the apartment on October 31, 2018. Apartment 106 was modified to accommodate handicapped tenants. Mr. Trujillo-Gonzalez asked Mr. Lambert to lease him that apartment. Mr. Lambert did not grant the request. (T-39-41). There is no credible, persuasive evidence that allowing the Trujillo-Gonzalezes to rent that apartment was not reasonable. November 30, 2018, Apartment 85 became available. It was modified to accommodate handicapped residents. Mr. Lambert did not offer it to the Trujillo-Gonzalezes. Instead, he rented it to another family. There is no credible, persuasive evidence that allowing the Trujillo-Gonzalezes to rent that apartment was not reasonable. Apartment 20 is modified to accommodate handicapped residents. The tenants vacated the apartment on December 31, 2018. Mr. Lambert did not offer it to the Trujillo-Gonzalezes. There is no credible, persuasive evidence that allowing the Trujillo-Gonzalezes to rent that apartment was not reasonable. Renting an already modified apartment to Mr. and Mrs. Trujillo-Gonzalez was a reasonable, cost-free accommodation for Mr. Trujillo-Gonzalez's handicap. Starting August 8, 2017, the Trujillo-Gonzalezes repeatedly requested this accommodation. Mr. Lambert, Richman Property, and Mira Verde never granted this reasonable request. Renting Mr. and Mrs. Trujillo-Gonzalez an apartment with bathroom grab bars and a wheel chair ramp within 30 days of the effective date of this order is reasonable affirmative relief providing a reasonable accommodation for Mr. Trujillo-Gonzalez's handicap. Modifying the apartment by installing grab bars in all bathrooms and installing a wheelchair ramp within 30 days of the effective date of this order is alternative, reasonable affirmative relief providing a reasonable accommodation for Mr. Trujillo-Gonzalez's handicap.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a Final Order that: Dismisses the Petition against Respondent, RMS GP, LLC; Prohibits Respondents, Richman Property Services, Inc.; Joe Lambert; and Mira Verde Limited Partnership from refusing to provided reasonable accommodations to handicapped tenants. Requires that within 30 days of the Commission's order becoming final that Respondents, Richman Property Services, Inc.; Joe Lambert; and Mira Verde Limited Partnership; either: Lease the Trujillo-Gonzalezes an apartment with existing modifications that at least include bathroom grab bars and a wheel chair ramp, or Modify the Trujillo-Gonzalez's existing apartment, at Respondents' expense, by installing at least grab bars in each bathroom and a wheelchair ramp. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of January, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of January, 2020.

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 13601 Florida Laws (9) 120.569120.57120.68760.20760.22760.23760.34760.35760.37 DOAH Case (1) 19-3655
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JOHN COHEN vs FOUR WINDS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, ET AL., 09-002068 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Apr. 17, 2009 Number: 09-002068 Latest Update: Dec. 23, 2024
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