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GIL GONZALEZ vs TRAVBUZZ INC., D/B/A PALACE TOURS, AND HUDSON INSURANCE COMPANY, AS SURETY, 20-003509 (2020)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 07, 2020 Number: 20-003509 Latest Update: Jan. 10, 2025

The Issue The issues are whether, pursuant to section 559.929(3), Florida Statutes (2019), Petitioner has been injured by the fraud, misrepresentation, breach of contract, financial failure, or any other violation of chapter 559, part XI, by Respondent Travbuzz, Inc. (Respondent), for prearranged travel services and, if so, the extent to which Respondent is indebted to Petitioner on account of the injury.

Findings Of Fact Respondent provides prearranged travel services for individuals or groups. Having relocated from New Jersey to Miami, Florida, evidently in 2018, Respondent has been registered at all material times with the Department as a "seller of travel" within the meaning of the Act and holds registration number ST-41461. With Respondent as the principal, the Surety issued a Sellers of Travel Surety Bond bearing bond number 10076529 in the amount of $25,000, effective from June 22, 2018, until duly cancelled (Bond). On November 12, 2019, Petitioner, a resident of San Diego, California, purchased from Respondent one ticket for himself and one ticket for his daughter on the Palace on Wheels: A Week in Wonderland Tour (POWAWIWT) with a departure date of April 1, 2020. Earnestly described by Respondent's principal as a "cruise ship on wheels," the POWAWIWT provides one week's transportation, accommodations, and meals for travelers seeking to visit several of India's cultural and historical landmarks without the inconvenience of changing hotels, finding restaurants, arranging intercity transportation, or, it seems, obtaining refunds for trips that never take place. The purchase price for two POWAWIWT tickets was $8600.40. Additionally, Petitioner purchased from Respondent a guided side trip at one location for $75. At the time of the purchase of the two POWAWIWT tickets, Respondent charged Petitioner's credit card for the required downpayment of $1911.20 for both tickets. By personal check dated January 6, 2020, Petitioner timely paid the balance due for both tickets of $6689.20. By personal check dated February 19, 2020, Petitioner paid the $75 charge for the side trip. The credit card issuer duly debited Petitioner's account and credited Respondent's account for the charged amount, and Respondent obtained the funds represented by both checks. Petitioner later disputed the credit card charges, and the credit card company debited the $1911.20 amount in dispute from Respondent's account. Although Petitioner claimed that his account had not been credited for this amount, as of the evening prior to the hearing, Respondent's credit for these charges had not been restored, so the $1911.20 still seems to be in the possession of the credit card issuer. Despite availing himself of the remedy available under the Act, Petitioner has not authorized the credit card issuer to restore to Respondent's account the credit for the $1911.20. This case is a byproduct of the emerging Covid-19 pandemic, which, as discussed below, caused RTDC to cancel Petitioner's April 1 POWAWIWT. According to Respondent, RTDC has refused to refund Petitioner's payment of $8600.40 gross or about $8000 after deducting Respondent's 7% commission.1 Although Respondent's principal deflects the blame to RTDC for its no-refund policy and to Petitioner for supposedly waffling on the relief that he sought for the cancelled trip, Respondent quietly has declined to refund its commission of approximately $600, as well as the additional $75 payment, although the failure to refund the $75 may be explained by Petitioner's failure to address this negligible amount until he prepared the Prehearing Statement in this case. 1 Respondent's principal testified that Respondent discounted the price of the April 1 POWAWIWT by reducing its standard 17% commission, which would approximate $1460, to 7%, for a 10% discount, or about $860, leaving a net commission of about $600. Respondent's factual defenses to Petitioner's refund claim include the several defenses set forth above and a new defense asserted for the first time at the hearing: Petitioner cancelled his POWAWIWT before RTDC cancelled his POWAWIWT, so Petitioner was never entitled to a refund under the terms of the Contract. This defense oddly finds more support in Petitioner's allegation that he demanded a refund before RTDC cancelled the April 1 POWAWIWT than in Respondent's allegation that Petitioner did not demand a refund until the March 13 email, in which he reported that RTDC had cancelled the April 1 POWAWIWT.2 Regardless, this new defense is no more supported by the facts than Respondent's previously stated defenses. Respondent's who-cancelled-first defense is based on emails and telephone calls. Petitioner's emails portray his consistent efforts to obtain a refund for the trip, but only after RTDC had cancelled the April 1 POWAWIWT. The lone email of Respondent's principal serves to reveal Respondent's inability to respond meaningfully to Petitioner's efforts to protect his travel purchase and raises the possibility of bad faith on the part of Respondent's principal. On March 9, Petitioner emailed Respondent's principal a Times of India news article that reported that RTDC had cancelled the March POWAWIWTs, but not the April 1 POWAWIWT. This email does not seek to cancel the April 1 POWAWIWT, but expresses concern that RTDC will cancel the trip. On March 13, Petitioner emailed Respondent's principal a Times of India news article that reported that RTDC had cancelled the remaining POWAWIWTs through April. This email complains that RTDC had not 2 This oddity is unsurprising given the patter of each witness's testimony. Respondent's principal peppered his testimony with false apologies while, in a reassuring tone, he gently deferred and deflected blame and patiently, but mistakenly, insisted that the Contract did not require him to refund monies paid for a train trip that never took place. Petitioner frenetically rebutted each factual defense while somehow missing the salient points that he had paid for a POWAWIWT that never took place, Respondent refused to refund Petitioner's payment, and the Contract calls for a refund. Although a retired appellate attorney for the state of California, Petitioner seems to have grounded his early demands for a refund on natural law, because he appears not to have discovered one of the crucial contractual provisions, as discussed below, until he prepared the Prehearing Statement responded to Petitioner's requests for information, requests advice as to his available options, and asks for some assurance that Petitioner would not lose his payments of $8600 for the train tour plus an unspecified amount "for post trip activities" that are also unspecified. On March 15, Petitioner emailed Respondent's principal a news article in The Hindu that reported that another operator of train tours in India was paying refunds for cancelled trips and all tourist visas into India had been cancelled through April 15. This email implores Respondent to do the right thing and immediately refund the money paid for the cancelled trip. A few hours later, Petitioner emailed Respondent's principal an India West news article that reported that India was now in a complete lockdown and the Indian government had cancelled all nondiplomatic visas. This email asks Respondent's principal to keep Petitioner informed on what RTDC was going to do and expresses hope that RTDC issues refunds. On March 19, Respondent's principal emailed Petitioner that "we are reaching some agreement with our ground operator for the train and this is what is being finalized." The statement clearly discloses no agreement, but, at best, an expectation of an agreement. The email describes the expected agreement to allow Petitioner to take a POWAWIWT during the following season from September 2020 through April 2021, but requires Petitioner to select travel dates within six days and pay whatever fare is in effect at the time of the trip. Respondent's principal never explained why Petitioner had only six days to accept an "offer" that RTDC had not yet authorized its agent to make, might not authorize within the six-day deadline, and might not ever authorize. Respondent's demand for a near-immediate acceptance of a nonexistent offer of a trip at market price was unreasonable and suggests that Respondent's principal was merely trying to induce Petitioner to make an offer in the form of an acceptance, so the principal might have greater bargaining leverage with RTDC. On March 23, Petitioner emailed Respondent's principal, noting a series of unanswered emails and phone calls from Petitioner to the principal since the receipt of the March 19 "offer." Asking for clarification of the terms of the "offer," Petitioner's email concedes that it appears that Petitioner's money is lost and asks merely that Respondent show him the courtesy of calling him, confirming his fear, and providing a full explanation of what happened. Later that day, an employee of Respondent emailed Petitioner and informed him that the principal was suffering from a respiratory disorder and was unable to talk, so that future communications needed to be by email. Petitioner received no more emails from Respondent's principal, who, having returned to the United States after taking a POWAWIWT in early March, was later diagnosed with Covid. The telephone calls are undocumented. The credibility of Respondent's principal started to leave the tracks with the March 19 email of an illusory "offer" with an immediate deadline for acceptance. A month later, in responding to the disputed credit card charge, the credibility of Respondent's principal derailed completely, as he attempted to resecure the $1911.20 credit with material misrepresentations of what had taken place in an email dated April 21 to the credit card issuer. The email claims that Petitioner never cancelled the trip, so he was a "no-show"--a Kafkaesque claim that implies a duty to report for a trip that, undisclosed in the email, the sponsor had cancelled over two weeks prior to departure. The email states that, at the beginning of March, Petitioner called and said he did not feel comfortable taking the trip, but the trains were still running and "'Cancel for Fear'" was not an allowable reason for waiving a cancellation fee--perhaps true, but irrelevant. The email encloses a copy of the principal's March 19 email, states that Petitioner did not accept this "offer," and concludes that "[s]ince [Petitioner] did not cancel or inform us of the decision for travel before the travel date, the charge is valid as per the terms and conditions." The email cites a provision of the Contract addressing no-shows and, despite the absence of any mention of RTDC's cancellation of the trip due to the pandemic, adds a seemingly obscure reference to another provision of the Contract addressing acts of God, medical epidemics, quarantines, or other causes beyond Respondent's control for the cancellation of a trip. Notably, the email omits mention of the provisions of the Contract, described below, clearly calling for a refund. On balance, it is impossible to credit the testimony of Respondent's principal that, in telephone calls, Petitioner cancelled the trip before RTDC cancelled the trip or, more generally, that Petitioner could not settle on an acceptable remedy, and his indecisiveness prevented Respondent's principal from negotiating a settlement with RTDC--an assertion that, even if proved, would be irrelevant. Notwithstanding resolute attempts by Respondent's principal to misdirect attention from these unavoidable facts, Petitioner has paid for a train tour that never took place, RTDC cancelled the tour, and Petitioner never cancelled his tickets. The question is therefore whether, in its Contract, Respondent successfully transferred the risk of loss to Petitioner for a trip cancelled by the tour sponsor due to the pandemic. Analysis of this issue necessitates consideration of several provisions of the Contract that, despite its prolixity, is initially remarkable for two omissions: Respondent's Seller of Travel registration number3 and the name of RTDC as the sponsor of the POWAWIWT. Respondent claims that Petitioner caused his injury by declining to purchase travel insurance. The cover page of the Contract contains a section 3 Section 559.928(5) requires a seller of travel to include in each consumer contract the following: "[Name of seller of travel] is registered with the State of Florida as a Seller of Travel. Registration No. [X]." Even absent any mention of a statute, this disclosure provides a consumer with some means to learn of the somewhat obscure Act, the seller's statutory responsibilities, and the relief that may be available to a consumer for a seller's failure to discharge these responsibilities. Petitioner testified only that he somehow learned of the Act, but never said how. The record does not permit a finding that the omission of the statutory disclosure was purposeful, so as to conceal from the consumer the existence of the Act, or was a product of guileless ineptitude. called "Travel Insurance." This section provides an opportunity to purchase travel insurance from an entity "recommended by [Respondent]." The options are to check a box to purchase from Respondent's recommended entity or to check a box that states the traveler undertakes to obtain travel insurance independently, but this provision adds that, if travel insurance is not obtained, the consumer "absolve[s Respondent, t]he tour operator and the travel agent of all possible liabilities which may arise due to my failure to obtain adequate insurance coverage." Respondent offered no proof that its recommended travel insurance or other available travel insurance would pay for the cancellation of the April 1 POWAWIWT due to the pandemic, so Petitioner's choice not to purchase travel insurance is irrelevant. Additionally, the clear provisions of the Contract, discussed below, requiring a refund for a trip cancelled by the sponsor rebut Respondent's labored effort to apply the travel insurance provision to shift to the customer the risk of loss posed by a cancellation of the trip by the sponsor--a risk that might be better addressed by Respondent's purchase of commercial business interruption insurance. Respondent claims that the trip was cancelled by RTDC too close to the departure date to entitle Petitioner to any refund. The Contract contains a section called "Cancellation Fees." This section provides for increasing cancellation fees based on the proximity of the cancellation to the trip departure date. The Contract provides a 10% cancellation fee "if cancelled" more than 90 days prior to departure, 20% cancellation fee "if cancelled" between 89 and 35 days prior to departure, and 100% cancellation fee "if cancelled" within 34 days prior to departure. The Contract fails to specify if this provision applies to cancellations at the instance of the consumer or the trip sponsor, but the graduated fee reflects the greater value of a trip cancelled well in advance of the trip departure date, so that the trip can be resold. Obviously, a trip cancelled by a sponsor cannot be resold, so the cancellation fee provision applies only to a cancellation by a customer and does not shield Respondent from liability in this case. Lastly, Respondent relies on a section of the Contract called "Responsibility--Limitation of Liability." Provisions in this section warn that Respondent acts as an agent for a trip sponsor, such as the railroad, from which Respondent purchases the travel services. Although Respondent makes every effort to select the best providers of travel services, Respondent does not control their operations and thus CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR ANY PERSONAL INJURY, PROPERTY DAMAGE OR OTHER CLAIM which may occur as a result of any and/or all of the following: the wrongful, negligent or arbitrary acts or omissions on the part of the independent supplier, agent, its employees or others who are not under the direct control or supervision of [Respondent]; [or] * * * (3) loss, injury or damage to person, property or otherwise, resulting directly or indirectly from any Acts of God, dangers incident to … medical epidemics, quarantines, … delays or cancellations or alterations in itinerary due to schedule changes, or from any causes beyond [Respondent's] control. … In case of overbooking, [Respondent] will only be liable for refund [sic] the charged amount to the guest. [Respondent] shall in no event be responsible or liable for any direct, indirect, consequential, incidental, special or punitive damages arising from your interaction with any retailer/vendor, and [Respondent] expressly disclaims any responsibility or liability for any resulting loss or damage. The "Responsibility--Limitation of Liability" provisions are general disclaimers of liability for various forms of damages arising out of the acts and omissions of third parties or forces outside the control of Respondent, such as the pandemic. These provisions represent a prudent attempt to avoid liability for damages, such as the lost opportunity to visit a gravely ill relative who has since died, that may amount to many multiples of the price paid for a trip. Complementing these general provisions limiting Respondent's liability, other provisions limit Respondent's liability to the payment of a refund of the purchase price of a trip cancelled by the sponsor. The section immediately following the "Responsibility--Limitation of Liability" section is the "Reservation of Rights" section, which provides: "The company [i.e., Respondent] reserves the right to cancel any tour without notice before the tour and refund the money in full and is not responsible for any direct or indirect damages to the guest due to such action." As noted above, the Contract omits any mention of Respondent's principal, so as to Respondent in the place of its undisclosed principal; thus, a provision referring to a cancellation of the tour by Respondent includes a cancellation of the tour by Respondent's principal. As cited by Petitioner in the Prehearing Statement, the other relevant provision is in the "Prices, Rates & Fares" section and states that, if a customer cancels, any refund to which the customer is entitled, under the above-cited cancellation fee provisions, will be dependent on then-current exchange rates, but "[i]n the event that a tour is canceled through no action of the Client, the Client will receive a full refund of US$."4 This provision entitles a consumer to: 1) a refund and 2) a refund in U.S. dollars, presumably unadjusted for currency fluctuations since the payment. At the hearing, Respondent's principal tried to construe the "US$" provision as a reference to the currency to which a consumer is entitled to be paid when a consumer cancels a trip under conditions in which the customer is entitled to a refund, but this construction ignores that the cited clause applies to 4 An identical "US$" provision is found at the end of the section called "A Note About Cancellation for All Tours/Reservations." cancellations occurring through no action of the consumer and imposes on Respondent the obligation to make a "full refund" in such cases.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order directing Respondent to pay Petitioner the sum of $6689.20 within 30 days of the date of the order and, absent timely payment, directing the Surety to pay Petitioner the sum of $6689.20 from the Bond. 7 Perhaps the recommended and final orders in this case will persuade the credit card issuer to issue the credit for the $1911.20 to Petitioner, who is entitled to this disputed sum. But, if Respondent regains possession of this disputed sum and refuses to refund it to Petitioner, the Department may wish to consider suspending or revoking Respondent's certificate or referring the matter to the Miami-Dade County State Attorney's Office. See the preceding footnote. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of November, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Gil Gonzalez 8444 Mono Lake Drive San Diego, California 92119 (eServed) Benjamin C. Patton, Esquire McRae & Metcalf, P.A. 2612 Centennial Place Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) H. Richard Bisbee, Esquire H. Richard Bisbee, P.A. 1882 Capital Circle Northeast, Suite 206 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) W. Alan Parkinson, Bureau Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Rhodes Building, R-3 2005 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-6500 Tom A. Steckler, Director Division of Consumer Services Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 520 407 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800

Florida Laws (16) 120.569120.57120.60320.641394.467552.40559.927559.928559.929559.9355559.936559.937604.21760.11766.303766.304 DOAH Case (1) 20-3509
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PASSPORT INTERNATIONALE, INC. vs FAYE C. TERRY AND DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES, 94-004042 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Sep. 27, 1994 Number: 94-004042 Latest Update: Feb. 23, 1995

The Issue The issue in this case is whether petitioner's claim against the bond posted by respondent with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services should be granted.

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: At all relevant times, respondent, Passport Internationale, Inc. (Passport or respondent), was a seller of travel registered with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department). As such, it was required to post a performance bond with the Department conditioned on the performance of contracted services. In this case, petitioner, Faye C. Terry, has filed a claim against the bond in the amount of $915.00 alleging that Passport failed to perform on certain contracted services. In August 1990, petitioner purchased a travel certificate entitling the holder to a five-day, four-night vacation package to the Bahamas for $329.00. The certificate was purchased from United Marketing Group (United), an Ohio telemarketeer authorized to sell the certificates on Passport's behalf. The certificate carried the name, logo, address and telephone number of Passport. The certificate purchased by petitioner expired in August 1991. When petitioner discovered she could not use the certificate by the expiration date, on August 26, 1991, she paid a $50.00 fee to Passport to extend the life of the certificate for an additional year, or until August 30, 1992. In June 1991, all of the assets and liabilities of Passport were acquired by Incentive Internationale Travel, Inc. (Incentive), a corporation having the same address, telephone number, owners, and personnel as Passport. In addition, Passport's status as a corporation was dissolved at a later date in 1991. Even so, Incentive continued to fulfill all travel certificates sold by Passport, and all travel described in those certificates was protected by Passport's bond. Petitioner originally requested to use her travel certificate in August 1991 and sent Passport a $90.00 reservation deposit in conjunction with her request. When she was unable to travel on that date due to a personal conflict, she requested to use her certificate in June 1992. She was told that no accommodations were available. Instead, she was booked to travel in August 1992. Accordingly, on July 12, 1992, she paid Incentive for the cost of an additional traveler (her mother) to accompany her on the trip plus extra accommodations in Fort Lauderdale and certain fees and taxes. Her total payment to Passport and its successor now totaled $915.00. In a form letter dated July 24, 1992, or just twelve days after the additional monies were paid by petitioner, Incentive advised her that it had filed for bankruptcy that same date and that her trip "has been cancelled." She was told that the bankruptcy court would send her a form to file a claim for a refund. To date, she has received no refund of her money.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the claim of petitioner against the bond of respondent be granted, and she be paid $915.00 from the bond. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of December, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Faye C. Terry Post Office Box 1092 Laurens, South Carolina 29360 Michael J. Panaggio 2441 Bellevue Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Robert G. Worley, Esquire 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, Esquire The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810

Florida Laws (2) 120.57559.927
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FLORIDA HI-LIFT CORPORATION vs. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 88-005236 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-005236 Latest Update: Apr. 07, 1989

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner was properly assessed tax on the delivery fee of rental equipment as part of the "gross proceeds" of the rental operation.

Findings Of Fact Florida Hi-Lift, Petitioner, is in the business of selling, leasing, repairing and transporting aerial lift equipment. Petitioner enters into rental agreements with customers who rent specific equipment F.O.B. Petitioner's location. The lease agreement sets a fixed price for the rental of the equipment and allows the customer to pick up the equipment with the customer's own conveyance, hire a carrier to pick up the equipment, or request the equipment be picked up and delivered by Petitioner's conveyance. The customer pays for the transportation of the equipment by whichever method of transportation is selected. The rental charge is unaffected by the mode of transportation selected by the lessee. Petitioner charged the customer sales tax on the rental of the equipment but not on the charges for transporting the equipment with Petitioner's conveyances. The audit here involved covers the period February 1, 1984, through January 31, 1987, and assesses a total tax, penalty and interest through September 11, 1987 of $23,727.59 with interest at $5.29 per day until paid (Exhibit 2). The major portion of this tax and the only part contested herein is assessed on Petitioner's charges to its lessees for transportation of the equipment. The equipment rental contract/invoice (Exhibit 9) under charges lists options, Damage Waiver nine per cent, Fuel, Delivery Pickup, and Other, with tax which Petitioner computed only on the rental charge for the equipment. The Damage Waiver charge of nine percent was based on the rental price but no evidence was submitted regarding the basis for this charge. Regardless, no sales tax was added to this charge and a sales tax on this charge is not an issue. Petitioner's sole witness, the auditor who initially assessed the sales tax on the transportation charge, testified that his decision to assess sales tax for this charge was influenced by the fact that charges for leasing and transportation were included on the same invoice. Petitioner has a separate liability policy to cover equipment being transported on Petitioner's vehicles apart from the coverage of the equipment while not in transit.

Florida Laws (6) 120.68212.02212.05212.08672.106672.319 Florida Administrative Code (3) 12A-1.01612A-1.04512A-1.071
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TRAVEL SEASONS, INC., D/B/A ALL SEASONS TRAVEL PROFESSIONALS INTERNATIONAL vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 94-000568 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Petersburg, Florida Feb. 01, 1994 Number: 94-000568 Latest Update: Jun. 14, 1996

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: Stipulated Facts: Petitioner submitted its application for DBE certification on or about July 27, 1993. Petitioner and Travel Professionals International Licensing Co., d/b/a Travel Professionals, Inc. (TPI) entered into a franchise agreement on September 28, 1993. Department conducted an on-site review of Petitioner's business on November 4, 1993. Department notified Petitioner of its intent to deny its application for DBE certification by certified mail on December 9, 1993. Petitioner requested a hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, on December 15, 1993. One hundred per cent of Petitioner's stock is owned by Jeanne Santo, a "socially and economically disadvantaged individual" as defined in Rule 14- 78.002(1), Florida Administrative Code, and therefore, Petitioner is in compliance with 14-78.005(7)(b), Florida Administrative Code. All securities which constitute ownership by Jeanne Santo are held directly by Jeanne Santo, and therefore Petitioner is in compliance with Rule 14-78.005(7)(d), Florida Administrative Code. The contributions of capital or expertise invested by Jeanne Santo are real and substantial, and therefore Petitioner is in compliance with Rule 14- 78.005(7)(f), Florida Administrative Code. The provisions of Rule 14-78.005(g) and (h), Florida Administrative Code, do not apply to Petitioner. The franchise agreement (Agreement) between Petitioner and TPI contains the following terms and conditions which are not in the agreements between Petitioner and Airlines Reporting Corporation (ARC); Petitioner and International Airlines Travel Agent Network (IATAN); and Petitioner and Systems One: a requirement that Petitioner locate its travel office only in "That portion of Pinellas County, Florida lying south of Florida State Highway 694". a requirement that Petitioner pay a quarterly advertising contribution. a requirement that Petitioner attend mandatory managers' meetings. ARC is customary in the travel agency industry. IATAN is customary in the travel agency industry. A leasing agreement for an automated reservation and ticketing system is customary in the travel industry. The Agreement requires that Petitioner be an ARC agent. Facts Not Stipulated The Fral Highway Administration (FHWA) is the federal agency that inisters the DBE program on the national level. The Department is the agency charged with the responsibility of administering the DBE program for the State of Florida. In making its determination of an applicant's eligibility for DBE, the Department considers: (a) Surface Transportation Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 (Public Law 100-17); (b) 49 CFR Part 23; (c) Chapter 339, Florida Statutes, (d) Chapter 14-78, Florida Administrative Code, (e) United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) administrative decisions; and (f) guidelines and training material from the FHWA or USDOT. The USDOT through FHWA provided the Department with a copy of DBE Program Administration Manual (Publication No. FHWA-HI-90-047, April, 1990) which the Department uses as a guideline for USDOT's and FWWA's interpretation of the DBE program. Below are portions of the Agreement which are pertinent to this preceeding: Purposes of this Agreement: We have developed the Travel Professionals International System (hereinafter called "the TPI System) for the operation of retail travel agencies, and we have developed policies, procedures and techniques that are designed to enable such agencies to compete more effectively in the travel market... You have requested our assistance, the use of the TPI Systems, and a franchise from us to operate a retail travel agency using the TPI System.... Franchise: We hereby grant to you and you hereby accept from us a franchise to operate a retail travel agency utilizing the TPI System, only at the following location(s): That portion of Pinellas County, Florida lying south of Florida State Highway 694. We will not establish another franchisee or agency owned by us within the territory described above, or establish other franchises or company owned outlets providing similar products and services under a different trade name or trademark or modify your territory without your written permission, so long as you are not in default under the terms of this Agreement.... You may move the office of the travel agency to a new location in the same general vicinity with our prior written approval, which approval will not be unreasonably withheld. You may not operate any additional office or location without our prior written consent, which consent will be given upon inspection and approval of such new premises.... Advertising Contributions: In addition to the service fees set forth above, you will be required to pay an "advertising contribution" in the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY ($150.00) DOLLARS per quarter. We may adjust the advertising contribution annually on October 1, provided that any increase in the advertising contribution will be made only with the affirmative vote of at least fifty percent (50 percent) of the franchisees...The advertising contributions of all franchisees shall be placed in an advertising fund to be managed by us, and shall be used exclusively for advertising. Tradenames, Service Marks, Logos, Trade Secrets, and other Proprietary Matters: d. As you know, you will be given certain information about the Travel Professionals International System, our products and methods of doing business, as well as preferred supplier agreements, training and educational programs, computer operation and computer system arrangements, correspondence, memoranda, operating, sales and marketing manuals, and other confidential information. You recognize and acknowledge that this information is a valuable, special and unique asset belonging to us and constitutes our trade secrets which you agree to keep secret and not to disclose, during the operation of this Agreement, or after its termination or expiration, to any person or entity for any reason or purpose whatsoever.... Relationship of Parties: During the term of this Agreement, and any renewal term, you will be an independent contractor, and you will have no authority, expressed or implied, to bind us or to act as our agent, legal representative, or joint venturer. At our option, you will be required to describe yourself on all business forms, invoices, orders, stationery, and the like, as an independent licensee of Travel Professionals International, and to submit all such items to us for our written approval...The operation of your business shall be determined by your own judgment and discretion, subject only to the provisions of this Agreement and our policies and procedures, as they may be adopted or revised from time to time. We will not regulate the hiring or firing of your employees, the parties from whom you may accept business, the working conditions of your employees, or the terms of your contracts with your customers, except as may be necessary to protect the Travel Professionals International System. Service To Be Provided By Us: We will provide the following services to you pursuant to this Agreement: (b) We will prescribe certain standards of operation designed to enhance your profitability, which we shall expect you to follow. * * * (e) We may make recommendations to you regarding accounting and recordkeeping systems. * * * We will provide you with a policy manual, operations manual, preferred supplier manual, marketing manual, and an employee handbook which may be updated periodically. We will provide you with marketing, sales and promotional aids to include currently available professionally produced television spots, a series of high quality radio jingles, and from time to time, printed and other promotional material for use in your local area. We will operate an ongoing training program for you and your personnel. This program will include seminars, conferences, familiarization trips, and printed materials, such as bulletins and manuals, relating to marketing, management, and accounting procedures, and the like, and developments with the travel industry... * * * (l) We will provide, at no charge, up to five (5) person days of management expertise and sales effort effective on the first date of contract signing.... Your Obligation: During the term of this Agreement, and any renewal term, you will obligated to pay promptly to us any fees that are due hereunder, to maintain and keep such records and reports as we may prescribe, and to provide us with copies of such records and reports. You will be required to allow us to make inspection of your business and premises at any reasonable time, and to allow us to examine your books, tax returns and records during normal working hours. We reserve the right to establish a uniform accounting system to keep your books and records in conformity with such system. Your business shall be conducted in conformity with the provisions of this Agreement, with such policies and procedures as we may publish from time to time, and all state, federal and local laws and regulations.... You will be required to cause your chief operating officer or manager to attend our next available training program and to cause each of the franchise employees and principals (as shown on Schedule A attached hereto) to attend the required training courses set forth in our published policies and procedures. At present, mandatory training programs we provide include "New Owners Orientation", "New Manager Orientation", and the periodic "Managers Meetings". Although we are not obligated to do so, we offer, and plan to offer in the future, periodic (at least three times per year), Managers Meetings. Attendance at Managers Meetings, when offered, is mandatory. In the event you fail to send a representative to any Managers Meetings, then you shall pay to us the registration fee for that meeting, notwithstanding your lack of attendance at such meeting. Although paragraph 8 does require Petitioner to pay a fixed sum to TPI for advertising, it does not restrict the qualifying owner's exercise of control over the day-to-day decisions concerning advertising. In fact, TPI, under paragraph 11(i) of the Agreement, agrees to furnish certain materials to assist Petitioner in advertising on the local level. It is clear throughout the Agreement that the operation of the business is to be determined by the qualifying owner's own judgment and discretion subject to the provisions of the Agreement and TPI's policies and procedures which may be adopted or revised from time to time. Paragraph 4 , Terms of the Franchise, provides for the termination of the Agreement prior to its expiration date. It is clear from the qualifying owner's testimony ("Because nobody tells me what to do."), that she would terminate the Agreement rather than to allow TPI to exercise the day-to-day control of the business. There is no question that the qualifying owner has the authority to take such action under Paragraph 4 of the Agreement, if in no other manner, than by defaulting under Paragraph 4(4). This gives the qualifying owner the final authority as to who exercises the day-to-day control of the business. It is clear from the testimony of TPI's Vice-President of Franchise Sales and Development that TPI does not consider those provisions of the Agreement that appear to place restrictions on the qualifying owner's discretion as to the day- to-day control of the business as being mandatory, notwithstanding the language of the provisions to the contrary. Likewise, it is clear that TPI will not involve itself in the hiring, supervision or firing of employees because of the liability it would place upon TPI, notwithstanding any provision in the Agreement. The parties to the Agreement are experienced business people, who have expertise in the travel agency industry and franchising. The parties to the Agreement have clear and mutual understandings and interpretation of the meanings of the terms of the Agreement . Their understandings and interpretations are that the Agreement does not restrict the qualifying owner's exercise of the day-to-day control of the business. The parties' interpretation of the Agreement is a possible and permissible interpretation. TPI has some 60 franchisees within 22 states, with 17 franchisees in the State of Florida. There are several other franchisors that franchise travel agencies throughout the United States, including the State of Florida. The purpose of franchise agreements in the travel business in general, and this Agreement in particular, is to enable the small, independent travel agency to compete more effectively in the travel market. The growing trend in the travel agency industry is to belong to a franchise. The Agreement is a typical franchise agreement and customary in the travel industry.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department enter a Final Order granting Petitioner's application for certification as a Disabled Business Enterprise. RECOMMENDED this day 9th of January, 1995, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of January, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-0568 The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Petitioner has listed the stipulated facts separately as paragraphs 1 through 14. These stipulated facts have been adopted in Findings of Fact 1 through 14, respectively. Proposed findings of fact 1, 2, 3 and 4-5 adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 23, 24, 26 and 21, consecutively. Proposed findings of fact 6 through 9 are neither material nor relevant to this proceeding. Proposed finding of fact 10 is adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 20 through 22. Department's Proposed Findings of Fact. The Department has listed the stipulated facts separately as paragraphs 1 through 14. These stipulated facts have been adopted in Findings of Fact 1 through 14, respectively. Proposed findings of fact 1 and 2 are adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 19. Proposed finding of fact 3 is adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 20 through 22. Proposed findings of fact 4, 5 and 6 are adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 15, 16 and 17, respectively. Proposed finding of 7 is rejected as being neither material nor relevant to this proceeding. Proposed findings of fact 8 and 9 are adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 18. Proposed findings of fact 10, 11 and 12 are considered conclusions of law or legal argument and for that reason are rejected as Findings of Fact. Proposed findings of fact 13 and 14 are rejected as not being supported by the record. COPIES FURNISHED: Oscar Blasingame, Esquire Blasingame, Forisz, Smiljanich, P.A. Post Office Box 1259 St. Petersburg, Florida 33731 Dorothy S,. Johnson, Esquire Mary J. Dorman, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS-58 Tallahassee Florida 32399-0458 Ben G. Watts, Secretary ATTN: Eleanor F. Hunter Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS-58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450

USC (1) 49 CFR 23 Florida Laws (2) 120.57339.0805 Florida Administrative Code (1) 14-78.005
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JAMES NEWBERRY, JR. vs BOARD OF ORTHOTISTS AND PROSTHETISTS, 98-002883F (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jun. 29, 1998 Number: 98-002883F Latest Update: Sep. 21, 1998

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is James Newberry Jr., who was also the Petitioner in the underlying challenge to Emergency Rule 64B14ER98-1 of Respondent Florida Board of Orthotists and Prosthetists, designated as DOAH Case No. 98-1186RE. The underlying case was brought pursuant to Section 120.56(5), Florida Statutes, pertaining to "Challenging Emergency Rules; Special Provisions." Mr. Newberry prevailed therein. The instant costs and fees case has been brought, in the alternative, pursuant to Sections 120.595(3) and 57.041, Florida Statutes. These are the only statutes relied upon in the Petition. In oral argument, Petitioner's counsel acknowledged that no case law exists to support an award of fees and/or costs under Section 57.041, Florida Statutes. The Petition does not contain an allegation that Petitioner incurred the attorney's fees set out in the attached affidavit of Ryan Garrett. The Petition does not attach any contract for attorney's fees. Petitioner's counsel acknowledged orally that no contract for fees existed and that the statements of the attorneys representing Petitioner addressed to "The Board of Orthotists Certification" in Baltimore, Maryland were addressed in that way because of an agreement between that private corporate entity and Petitioner Newberry, who is one of its members. By that agreement, apparently not reduced to writing, the Maryland corporation agreed to provide Petitioner with an attorney and pay the attorney's fees and further advanced all Petitioner's costs. "The Board of Orthotists Certification," also known as "The Board for Orthotics and Prosthetics Certification," of Baltimore, Maryland was not a party to the underlying emergency rule challenge. No evidence of its standing, if any, to challenge the emergency rule nor even of its involvement with Mr. Newberry for fee purposes was presented in DOAH Case No. 98- 1186RE.

Florida Laws (6) 120.54120.56120.57120.595120.6857.041
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UNIVERSAL TRAVEL AND TOURS, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 84-001362 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-001362 Latest Update: May 21, 1990

Findings Of Fact In January 1984, Respondent Department of Transportation (DOT) published a Request for Proposal for travel services (RFP). After receiving proposals, Respondent reconsidered its financial statement requirement and returned all proposals. DOT then published a second RFP deleting the financial statement requirement. In its second RFP, Respondent stated: The Department intends to award the contract to the responsive and responsible proposer whose proposal is determined to be the most advantageous to the Department. A responsive proposer is one who has submitted a proposal which conforms in all material respects to this Request for Proposal . . . As the best interest of the State may require, the right is reserved to reject any and all proposals or waive any minor irregularity or technicality in proposals received. Proposers are cautioned to make no assumptions unless their proposals have been evaluated as being responsive. The RFP directed that all proposals include a resume of the travel agency, explaining the abilities that make it best qualified to perform the required services and information relating to years of experience, ownership, minority ownership, volume of business, proof of membership in Air Traffic Conference (ATC) and International Air Transport Association (IATA), number of persons employed, number of persons to be assigned to DOT business, and computer/communications facilities. The required minimum services specified in the RFP included: 1) planning fares and itineraries; 2) scheduling and arranging airline and rental car reservations; 3) issuing and delivering airline tickets; 4) processing unused tickets; 5) providing sufficient direct communications to DOT; 6) providing rental car confirmation numbers; 7) ensuring social security numbers recorded on tickets; 8) providing copies of used tickets for billing reconciliation purposes; 9) providing a monthly financial statement in a prescribed format, and 10) providing monthly summary analysis of travel trends and patterns. Each travel agency was also required to list any additional services it proposed to provide that were not included in the minimal travel service requirements and to list the additional services to be incorporated in the executed contract. In order to determine the proposal which offered the most advantageous combination of services, Respondent developed a rating scale for the assignment of points to each additional service proposed according to its value (zero points for no value, one point for limited value, two points for reasonable value, and three points for significant value). Respondent intended that the agency proposing the most advantageous combination of services would receive the highest number of points and therefore award of the contract. Proposals were submitted by eight travel agencies. The proposals were evaluated by Respondent and points were assigned on the zero to three point rating scale. Intervenor's score was highest with 24 points. Petitioner's proposal was second with 14 points. Respondent initially announced its intention to award the contract to Intervenor, but thereafter advised proposers that it intended to reject all proposals and withdraw the intended award. Respondent's intent to withdraw is based on its admitted failure to announce criteria. This failure allowed bidders to obtain points for services of questionable or non-existent value. Petitioner, for example, received one point for Telex service which was not available when the proposal was submitted and still not installed at the time of final hearing. The ratings were highly subjective as indicated by the disagreement of witnesses over the value of various services. Intervenor, for example, received several points for such questionable services as a newsletter, proposed workshops and staff visits. However, Respondent's principal rater supported his reasons for assignment of points on a rational basis. He conceded only a one point change in Petitioner's score and no change in Intervenor's score. Both Intervenor and Petitioner claim advantages for the reliability and range of services provided by their computer systems. Respondent lacked the expertise necessary to resolve these competing claims with the precision demanded by Petitioner. However, the evidence offered at hearing by Petitioner in support of its claims of system superiority was largely self serving and unsubstantiated by any studies or performance data.

Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order denying the petition of Universal Travel and Tours, Inc. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of August, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas M. Beason, MOYLE, JONES & FLANIGAN 118 North Gadsden Street, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mark A. Linsky, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William L. Grossenbacher, Esquire BORNE, RHODES, & JAFFRY Post Office Box 1140 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Paul N. Pappas, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (1) 287.057
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GENEVA BATSHEBA DOWNER vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 00-003015 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tavares, Florida Jul. 24, 2000 Number: 00-003015 Latest Update: Jun. 30, 2004

The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner suffered an adverse employment action as a result of unlawful discrimination because of the Petitioner's race, sex, national origin and religion, as provided in Section 760.10 et. seq., Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact At times pertinent hereto, the Petitioner was employed by the Respondent Department of Corrections at the Central Florida Reception Center. The Petitioner is an African-American woman who is dyslexic and is Jewish. Ms. Downer is no longer employed by the Department of Corrections. By her own admission, she was terminated from the Department at some point in July or August of 1997, for matters not related to the issues in the subject case. On August 15, 1996, the Petitioner approached Officer Kunkle and began to verbally assault him for his filing of an incident report on August 13, 1996, concerning the condition of a "post vehicle." Ms. Downer stated that she was going to "kick his ass" and made derogatory remarks about his race and gender. On April 4, 1996, the Petitioner attended a pre- determination conference that allegedly occurred on a Jewish holiday. The conference had been postponed once and was scheduled on April 4, 1996, at the request of Jim Payne, Downer's Police Benevolent Association (PBA) union representative. Mr. Payne was not an employee of the Department of Corrections. He informed Ms. Downer that if she wanted her job she would have to attend the conference. On February 6, 1996, Captain D. C. Havelick, Ms. Downer's supervisor, issued a written reprimand to Ms. Downer for abuse of sick leave privileges. The reprimand was issued because Ms. Downer stated that her sick leave would end on the particular day in question at 4:00 a.m., and because her supervisor learned that she had been working in the citrus groves instead of actually being sick. He perceived this as an abuse of sick leave privileges. The Petitioner has dyslexia. She did not request an accommodation for her dyslexia and there is no evidence that it affected her ability to perform her duties. Nevertheless, Colonel Frank Lopez accommodated the dyslexia by instructing Captain Havelick that reports for Downer's review should be read to her. No other disability was established at the hearing. Ms. Downer was assigned a vehicle based upon her post assignment. Each post has a specific vehicle assigned to it. Other officers use the same vehicle and equipment as Ms. Downer. All guard post vehicles are substantially similar. The Petitioner was allowed several Jewish holidays off from work. No evidence was presented at the hearing indicating that she did not receive a Jewish holiday off from work between August 15, 1996 and January 28, 1997, the time span involved in the Petition for Relief and the charges filed by the Petitioner. Whether the Petitioner received a holiday off depended upon the staffing situation at the institution at the time. A critical compliment of officers is necessary in order to effectively operate the correctional institution, and if another officer could not replace Ms. Downer for her shift, it is possible that she would be required to work on a Jewish holiday. Reasonable efforts were made to accommodate her leave requests as they were made.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Geneva Batsheba Downer 5446 Terrell Road Mount Dora, Florida 32757 Gary L. Grant, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Louis A. Vargas, General Counsel Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-6563 Michael J. Moore, Secretary Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Azizi Coleman, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-3100

Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10
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IN RE: GEORGE COSTAGE vs *, 92-001007EC (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Clearwater, Florida Feb. 14, 1992 Number: 92-001007EC Latest Update: Dec. 11, 1992

Findings Of Fact The Respondent. At all times relevant to this proceeding, the Respondent, George Costage, served as a member of the City Commission of the City of Safety Harbor (hereinafter referred to as the "City"). Mr. Costage was first elected to the City Commission in March of 1986. He was reelected to the City Commission in 1988 and 1990. His bid for reelection in 1992 was unsuccessful. Mr. Costage's service on the City Commission was his only experience holding public office. Mr. Costage had previously worked as a fireman in the City of Detroit until his retirement. Mr. Costage was paid a salary of approximately $400.00 a month for his service on the City Commission. The City of Safety Harbor's Travel Policy and Procedure. Members of the City Commission, including Mr. Costage, were required from time to time to travel on behalf of the City. For example, travel for the City in conjunction with the Florida League of Cities was expected of Commissioners, including Mr. Costage. Mr. Costage served on the Ethics Committee of the Florida League of Cities. Commissioners also incurred expenses dealing with the citizens of the City which they usually were not specifically reimbursed for. In lieu of reimbursing Commissioners for such expenses, all Commissioners were paid $150.00 a month by the City. The $150.00 monthly payment was intended as reimbursement for the otherwise unreimbursed expenses they incurred. Commissioners were paid $150.00 per month regardless of the amount of actual expenses they incurred. The City also paid Commissioners for expenses they incurred for travel out side of the City on City business. For example, travel by Commissioners to an annual Florida League of Cities' meeting in Crystal River, Florida, was paid for by the City. There were several methods by which the City paid for out-of-town travel expenses of Commissioners: The City made payments directly to the vendor on behalf of a Commissioner; A credit card was issued by the City for each Commissioner. Commissioners were allowed to use the credit card to charge expenses which the City then paid directly to the credit card company; Commissioners could obtain reimbursement from the City for expenses they had previously incurred and paid out of their own resources; and The City could advance funds to Commissioners to cover estimated travel expenses to be incurred. The City used a form titled a "Travel Expense Certificate" (hereinafter referred to as the "Travel Form") in conjunction with the payment of travel expenses of Commissioners. The Travel Form was to be used by Commissioners to obtain reimbursement of travel expenses a Commissioner incurred and paid for out of the Commissioner's own resources. See Advocate's exhibit 4A and 4B, a photocopy of Travel Forms used by Mr. Costage. On the back of the Travel Form were instructions concerning how to complete the form and "Travel Expenses Regulations." Among other things, the following was printed on the back of the Travel Form: Traveling expenses shall be limited to those expenses incurred in the performance of a public purpose authorized by law to be performed and must be within the limitations prescribed below. . . . . . . . Certificate: "I certify that the expenses shown herein were necessary and actually incurred during, authorized travel in performance of official duty and the claim made herewith is true and correct in every manner." The City had established policies governing reimbursement of travel incurred by Commissioners. Some of those polices were in writing, having been included on the back of the Travel Form. The evidence failed to prove that the City, however, always strictly enforced its policies. Because of alleged problems associated with travel expenses paid by the City, including the issues in this case, the City adopted more extensive written travel policies by Resolution adopted November 20, 1989. Travel Expenses of Family Members. Commissioners, at times, took family members, including spouses, with them while traveling on City business. The City also, at times, made travel arrangements for family members and made advance payments of travel expenses for family members. It was the policy of the City that travel expenses of family members of Commissioners were not "expenses necessarily incurred in the performance of a public purpose authorized by law to be performed . . . ." Therefore, the City expected reimbursement of travel expenses incurred by family members. Although the City's policy concerning the payment of travel expenses of family members set out in finding of fact 15 was not specifically stated in writing, the general policy contained on the back of the Travel Form is sufficient to put a reasonable person on notice that they should determine whether a family member's travel expenses are "necessarily incurred in the performance of a public purpose authorized by law to be performed " It was not the policy of the City that travel expenses of spouses or other family members of a Commissioner incurred while the Commissioner was traveling on City business were to be borne by the City. The City did not require reimbursement for certain travel expenses incurred by a Commissioner which also benefited a family member of the Commissioner. Those expenses were limited to expenses which would generally have been incurred by the Commissioner regardless of the presence of the family member on the trip, i.e., the cost of a rental vehicle. Travel Expenses Incurred by Mr. Costage's Spouse Paid by the City. At issue in this proceeding is the period of time between March, 1986 and November 20, 1989, when the City adopted a written policy clearing setting out more extensive travel policies of the City. During the period of time at issue in this case, and while Mr. Costage was a Commissioner, his wife of thirty-seven years accompanied him on trips he took on City business. The City paid Mrs. Costage's travel expenses directly to the vendor when making travel arrangements or it paid travel expenses attributable to Mrs. Costage charged on the credit card provided to Mr. Costage by the City for his use. On at least one occasion, the cost of a helicopter trip over the Grand Canyon incurred by Mr. and Mrs. Costage was paid for by the City. Mr. Costage took no immediate action to reimburse the City for travel expenses paid by the City for Mrs. Costage's travel. Not until well after Mr. Costage was questioned publicly about the expenses paid by the City for Mrs. Costage's travel did Mr. Costage reimburse the City for her travel expenses. Mr. Costage's Payment of Mrs. Costage's Travel Expenses to the City. During Mr. Costage's campaign for reelection to the City Commission in the Spring of 1990, the propriety of the payment of the City of travel expenses incurred by Mr. Costage's spouse was questioned. As a result of the issue being raised, Mr. Costage requested that the City Manager determine the amount of travel expenses which the City had paid for Mrs. Costage's travel. This request was made in approximately March, 1990. The City Manager then requested and received an accounting from the City finance department. Based upon the records of the City finance department, it was initially determined that a total of approximately $3,100.00 in travel expenses attributable to Mrs. Costage had been paid by the City and had not been repaid by Mr. Costage. Mr. Costage was apprised of the City finance department's determination in approximately March, 1990. Mr. Costage asserted that the correct amount was about half the $3,100.00 amount arrived at by the City finance department. No reimbursement was made in March, 1990. At about the same time that Mr. Costage was informed of the amount of travel expenses attributable to his spouse, the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office began an investigation into the City's payment of travel expenses on behalf of family members of Commissioners and others. This was a general investigation, not limited to any one Commissioner or individual. As a consequence of the investigation, Mr. Costage took no further action to reimburse the City for the expenses paid on behalf of his spouse. Subsequent to the completion of the Sheriff's Office investigation, Mr. Costage again discussed the amount of his spouse's travel expenses with the City and it was mutually agreed that the correct amount of unreimbursed travel expenses paid by the City for Mrs. Costage was $2,974.63. Mr. Costage reimbursed the City this amount in February, 1991. Mr. Costage's Knowledge of the City's Policy Concerning the Payment of Family Member Travel Expenses. Mr. Costage has suggested that he did not violate Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, because of his assertion that the City did not have a policy that required him to pay for his spouse's travel expenses--that the City practice was just the opposite. He also has asserted that, if the City had such a policy, he was never informed that he was required to repay his spouse's travel expenses and he was not otherwise aware of such a requirement. These assertions are not supported by the weight of the evidence. First, the assertion that no policy requiring reimbursement of family- member travel expenses existed is contrary to the weight of the evidence: The statements on the back of the Travel Form are sufficient to place a reasonable person on notice that such expenses should not be paid for by the City. The statements are, at the very least, sufficient that it would be unreasonable for Mr. Costage to simply assume that his spouse's travel was "incurred in the performance of a public purpose authorized by law"; Several other Commissioners who served during at least part of the period that Mr. Costage was a Commissioner were specifically told that travel expenses incurred by family members of Commissioners were required to be repaid to the City by the Commissioner. See the testimony of Commissioners Caldemeyer, Cincota and Baty, City Mayor Dettmer and City Mayor Levine. Mr. Costage's assertion that it was the practice, if not the policy, of the City that travel expenses of family members were to be paid by the City is also not supported by the weight of the evidence: Except for Mr. Costage and former Commissioner McLaughlin, all the City officials who served during the period of time at issue and who testified at the final hearing of this matter indicated that they were aware that they were ultimately responsible for travel expenses incurred by family members and that the City did not pay those expenses; The evidence failed to prove that travel expenses of family members other than those attributable to Mr. Costage's spouse and possibly Mr. McLaughlin's spouse were paid for by the City without reimbursement; If the City had a policy of paying for spouse travel expenses without requiring reimbursement, why then did Mr. Costage ultimately repay the City almost $3,000.00? He repaid the expenses because he knew City policy required reimbursement and because his use of public funds for his spouse's benefit had been exposed; At best, the evidence proved that the City did not strictly enforce the policy that travel expenses were only to be paid with public funds if they were incurred for a public purpose. As a consequence of the City's lack of strict enforcement, Mr. Costage was able to avoid paying for his spouse's travel expenses from March, 1986 until February, 1991. The lack of enforcement of the City's travel policies, however, does not prove that the City had an established policy of paying the travel expenses of Commissioner's spouses. It only proved that City employees failed to question members of the City's governing body about their actions. The weight of the evidence also proved that Mr. Costage, despite his assertions to the contrary, was told and/or was aware of the City's policy requiring reimbursement of travel expenses of spouses: First, it is concluded that Mr. Costage was aware of the instructions on the back of the Travel Form: Mr. Costage filed two Travel Forms for which he received reimbursement of expenses incurred in 1986 and 1987. Although Mr. Costage was not able to say absolutely that the signature on the Travel Forms (Advocate's exhibit 4A and 4B) was his signature, he was also not able to say that it was not his signature and he acknowledged that the signatures could be his. It is, therefore, concluded that the two Travel Forms were signed and submitted by Mr. Costage. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that one other Commissioner witnessed Mr. Costage filing a Travel Form; Although on infrequent occasions a copy of a Travel Form without the back of the form was used by City personnel, it was the prevailing practice, especially of individuals such as Commissioners who were located in City Hall, to file an original three part Travel Form which included the instructions. Secondly, it is inferred from the following that Mr. Costage received instructions from the City Manager shortly after he was elected concerning the City's travel policies, including the policy concerning travel expenses of spouses: It was the City Manager's common practice and procedure to discuss, or cause to be discussed, City policies and procedures, including those governing spouse travel expenses, with all new Commissioners; All of the Commissioners who served during the period of time at issue and who testified in the final hearing, except Mr. Costage, recalled meeting with the City Manager or, at the City Manager's direction, the City's finance director, and discussing travel procedures. All of these Commissioners, except Mr. McLaughlin, recall being told that family travel expenses were to be paid by the Commissioner. Even Mr. McLaughlin admitted that he had been told that travel expenses attributable to his children were to be reimbursed by him. Mr. McLaughlin's testimony that the City policy concerning the payment of spouse travel expenses was not credible, especially in light of the ongoing litigation between Mr. McLaughlin and the City over travel expenses of Mrs. McLaughlin paid for by the City. While on a break during a budget workshop in 1986 or 1987, Mrs. Costage remarked in the presence of Mr. Costage and others that she thought the City should pay for the travel expenses of spouses of Commissioners because of all that the spouses did on behalf of the City. Mr. Costage did not indicate, as he has asserted in this proceeding, that the City already had a policy of paying for spouse travel expenses. The statement is also contrary to Mr. Costage's assertion that he was unaware of the actual policy of the City requiring that Commissioners ultimately pay for their spouse's travel; In 1987, Arthur Levine ran against Alton Dettmer for the position of City Mayor. At some time before the election Mr. Costage advised Mr. Levine to look into Mr. Dettmer's travel expense reports, implying that there was something wrong with the manner in which Mr. Dettmer had been paid for travel expenses. This act by Mr. Costage supports a finding that Mr. Costage was aware that the City had at least some policies governing travel. Benefit of Spouses Travel Expenses to Mr. Costage. Based upon the conclusion that Mr. Costage was aware that the City's policy required that he pay for Mrs. Costage's travel expenses and the fact that Mr. Costage did not pay for almost $3,000.00 in expenses incurred during the period March, 1986 through November 20, 1989, until February, 1991, it is concluded that Mr. Costage was aware that his failure to pay Mrs. Costage's travel expenses would be a financial benefit to him.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Ethics enter a Final Order and Public Report finding that the Respondent, George Costage violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Complaint No. 91-37. It is further RECOMMENDED that Mr. Costage be publicly censured and reprimanded. It is further RECOMMENDED that Mr. Costage be required to pay a civil penalty of $3,000.00. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of September, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of September, 1992. APPENDIX Case Number 92-1007EC The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Advocate's Proposed Findings of Fact A 1 2. 2 3. 3 5. 4 19. 5 12. B 1 4. 2-4 6. 5 7. 6 8. 7 14-15. 8 9. 9 Hereby accepted. 10 9. 11 33. 12 10. C 1 20-21. 2 22. 3 23. 4 24. 5 25. 6 Hereby accepted. 7 25. 8 26. 9 See 27. 10 27. 11 28. The last sentence is hearsay. 12 29. D 1-2 33(a) and hereby accepted. 3-5 33(b). 6 Hereby accepted. 7 31-32 and 33(b). 8 33(b). 9 Hereby accepted. 10 33(c). Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Hereby accepted. 13 33(d). 14 33. Mr. Costage's Proposed Findings of Fact Mr. Costage's proposed "Findings of Fact" consists primarily of a summary of the testimony of the witnesses and not the ultimate facts which the testimony may support. In large part, the summary of testimony is accurate. It has been noted below where testimony has been mischaracterized or where the testimony does not support the ultimate fact which the testimony may or may no support. Advocate's Witnesses: Constitutes a generally accurate summary of testimony. Constitutes a generally accurate summary of testimony. The second sentence is not, however, relevant. The suggestion in the next to the last sentence that "no reimbursement was sought" is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Constitutes a generally accurate summary of testimony. The last sentence is not relevant and/or is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Constitutes a generally accurate summary of testimony. Whether Mr. Caldemeyer's testimony was "repetitious" is not relevant. Constitutes a generally accurate summary of testimony. Constitutes a generally accurate summary of testimony. The last sentence is hearsay. Mr. Costage's Witnesses: Constitutes a generally accurate summary of testimony. Ms. Adkins testimony involved a period of time subsequent to the period of time at issue in this proceeding. Consequently, her testimony was not of much relevance. Nor was her testimony concerning what others did supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Constitutes a generally accurate summary of testimony. Mr. Costage's testimony was generally not supported by the weight of the evidence or was not relevant. The first three sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. The fourth sentence has been generally accepted in finding of fact 14. The fifth through seventh sentences are not relevant. With regard to the last sentence, see findings of fact 24- 29. Mr. Costage's proposed findings of fact end on page 7 of Mr. Costage's proposed recommended order. Beginning on page 7, Mr. Costage has provided argument and conclusions of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Virlindia Doss Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Suite 101 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 George A. Routh, Esquire George A. Routh, P.A. 1446 Court Street Clearwater, Florida 34616 Bonnie J. Williams, Executive Director Commission on Ethics The Capitol, Room 2105 P. O. Box 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0006

Florida Laws (6) 104.31112.312112.313112.317112.322120.57 Florida Administrative Code (2) 34-5.001534-5.010
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LINDA MAE KRUEGER vs. ONE STOP OIL COMPANY, 88-004063 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-004063 Latest Update: Jan. 17, 1989

Findings Of Fact Petitioner Linda Mae Krueger, a white female, became a manager at One Stop Oil's Riverview, Florida, store on April 1, 1986. Petitioner's first immediate supervisor was Mr. Tom McBeth, area supervisor for six stores. Mr. McBeth was replaced by Mr. John Richardson on January 26, 1987. Upon becoming area supervisor, Mr. Richardson implemented certain changes in the manner in which all store managers under his supervision were to perform their duties. Petitioner disagreed with Mr. Richardson's changes and failed to follow some of Mr. Richardson's instructions regarding these changes. Petitioner developed a great deal of hostility towards Mr. Richardson and refused to accept the fact that the changes in operation were within Mr. Richardson's managerial capacity. The basis of Petitioner's claim of discrimination was Mr. Richardson's attempt to implement operational changes which Petitioner disagreed with and which were clearly not sexually discriminatory in nature. At the hearing, Ms. Krueger testified that she felt like she was treated unfairly by Mr. Richardson, but admitted that Mr. Richardson placed the same requirements on all other store managers. Petitioner, in June of 1988, told Mr. Richardson that she was considering leaving employment during the beginning of July. Petitioner marked on her store's calendar that she was leaving employment on July 2, 1988. Petitioner, on August 12, 1988, again gave verbal notice to One Stop Oil that she was separating employment with the company on August 27, 1988. At the time the Petitioner gave One Stop Oil this verbal notice of separation, Petitioner was planning to move with her family to North Carolina. On August 17, 1988, Petitioner quit her position as store manager at One Stop Oil's Riverview store. She quit because of a pay dispute over the amount of her bonus check. Petitioner and her husband expected a larger check. When Petitioner's husband saw the actual amount of the check he called the Jacksonville office of Respondent and told them he was closing the store and they had "better get somebody down there." Petitioner and her husband then left the store. Respondent sent Mr. Richardson to the store. He called in Cheryl Chipman and began accounting for the store receipts. He discovered that $1,700 in deposits was missing. Petitioner had given the deposit money to her husband on the day the check dispute arose. Petitioner's husband could not adequately account for the missing money. 1/ Respondent obtained Petitioner's store keys from her without any discussion. The keys were voluntarily turned over by Petitioner. Petitioner never reported for work afterwards. Petitioner's position was filled by Ms. Cheryl Chipman, a white female.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the petition against Respondent be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 17th day of January, 1989. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of January, 1989.

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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