The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner was the subject of an unlawful employment practice by Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Black male. Respondent is a staffing company that contracts with third party employers. Over 80 percent of Respondent’s employees are Black. After Respondent matches a candidate with a job opening, the third-party employer interviews the candidate for employment. If the candidate is employed by the third party, the employee must abide by the third-party employer’s policies as well as the employment policies of Respondent. Petitioner was hired by Respondent some time in January 2008. Respondent requires all employees to notify Respondent of his or her absence prior to that employee’s scheduled report time for their employment. Respondent also requires that all employees report to work at their scheduled report time. Failure to either call in or show up for work is known as a ‘no call/no show’. The employment policies of Respondent reflect that a “no call/no show” is grounds for termination. Petitioner received a copy of Respondent’s employee handbook, which included the “no call/no show” provision. He was also aware of Respondent’s “no call/no show” policy. Around January 14, 2008, Respondent successfully matched Petitioner with a position at BR Williams Trucking Company (BR Williams). Like Respondent, BR Williams maintains a policy of termination when an employee fails to show up for work or does not call in prior to the start of the work day to report their absence. Petitioner’s scheduled report time for BR Williams was 7:00 a.m. On March 3, 2008, Petitioner contacted Respondent’s Regional Sales Manager, Diane Jarrett, to report that he had overheard a racial slur that a White employee, Harry Hingson, had made to another employee. Like Petitioner, Mr. Hingson had been placed at BR Williams by Respondent and was an employee of both Respondent and BR Williams. Ms. Jarrett sent Respondent’s Human Resources Assistant, Annis Herndon, to BR Williams to terminate Mr. Hingson for having made the racial slur. She met with Mr. Wilkinson, BR Williams’ manager. Mr. Hingson was terminated from BR Williams. Neither Ms. Jarrett nor Ms. Herndon disclosed that Petitioner had reported Mr. Hingson’s racial slur to her. After the termination, Mr. Wilkinson mentioned to a group of employees, including Petitioner, that he hated to fire Mr. Hingson because “everybody needs a job.” The evidence did not demonstrate that Mr. Wilkinson said that “once he found out who did this, they will pay.” Petitioner felt that Mr. Wilkinson was talking to him or targeting him because Mr. Wilkinson looked him in the eyes during the meeting. Mr. Wilkinson did not testify at the hearing. As a consequence, there is no competent evidence regarding Mr. Wilkinson’s intent showing any look he may or may not have given Petitioner. On March 24, 2008, Petitioner worked his regular shift at BR Williams. On the evening of March 24, 2008, Petitioner was arrested for driving while intoxicated (DUI) and was held in jail overnight. He was released two days later on March 26, 2008. On March 25, 2008, Petitioner was scheduled to begin his shift at 7 a.m. Petitioner did not report to work as scheduled because he was in jail. Petitioner also did not call Respondent to report his absence prior to the beginning of his shift or during the morning of March 25, 2008. Mr. Wilkinson called Respondent around 9:00 a.m. and reported that Petitioner was not at work and had not called in. He did not know where Petitioner was. Respondent could not locate Petitioner at his home. Mr. Wilkinson instructed Respondent that if he or Respondent did not hear from Petitioner before noon, Petitioner was terminated for not showing up at work and not calling in. About 1:00 p.m., after Petitioner was terminated by BR Williams, Petitioner called Respondent collect from jail. He was advised that he had been terminated from BR Williams. After speaking with Petitioner, Respondent called BR Williams to report that Petitioner had called in after noon and that she had told him that he had been terminated from BR Williams. Respondent did not tell Petitioner that he was terminated from Cardinal Staffing. BR Williams’ decision to terminate Petitioner was not based on his race or his complaint regarding Mr. Hingson’s racial slur. Indeed, there was no competent evidence to suggest that Petitioner was terminated from BR Williams for any reason other than he was in jail, and did not report to work as scheduled. Petitioner was not terminated from Cardinal Staffing. Petitioner left a message on Respondent’s answering machine on March 27 or March 28, 2008. Return calls by Respondent could not be left at the numbers that Respondent had for Petitioner. He did not contact Respondent again until August 2008, at which time there were no positions available for him. Importantly, Petitioner was not terminated from Respondent. As with all Respondent’s employees, Petitioner had the responsibility of calling Respondent as often as possible to check if other employment opportunities were available. If Petitioner had contacted Respondent to seek placement during April–June, 2008, and if a placement for which Petitioner was qualified had been available, Respondent would have sent him for an interview with the prospective employer. Indeed, it was Petitioner’s lack of action that caused him to miss any employment opportunities that may have been available to him during April – June, 2008. After August 2008, Petitioner did not contact Respondent to seek other employment opportunities. Petitioner identified two non-minority employees that were terminated from their third-party employer jobs and received new assignments with another of Respondent’s clients. The two employees were Jason Whibble and Sherita Cheshire. Neither of these employees was similarly situated to Petitioner. Mr. Whibble was terminated for having a felony conviction involving multiple traffic tickets. Ms. Cheshire was terminated because she could not perform her job duties. After termination, both employees called in on a daily or weekly basis to check to see if any job openings were available. In this case, Petitioner was terminated for a very different reason from BR Williams. Petitioner also did not frequently call Respondent to check for job openings that might be available to him. Indeed, Petitioner has not identified any similarly situated non-Black employee of Respondent’s who was terminated from an employment assignment on the basis of an employer’s “no call/no show” policy and was treated more favorably than Petitioner. The evidence was clear that Petitioner was not terminated from Cardinal Staffing and failed to maintain frequent contact with them. Clearly, Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner. Given these facts, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a Final Order dismissing the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of May, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Walter Jan Pietruszka, Esquire Shumaker Loop & Kendrick 101 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 2800 Tampa, Florida 33602 Melvin Lee Butler 40 Jack Scott Road Quincy, Florida 32351 Robert E. Larkin, III, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. 906 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on June 18, 2009.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female who was employed by Respondent from June 16, 2008, until her termination on December 10, 2008. Prior to that, Petitioner worked for the Welfare Transition Program which was taken over by Respondent. When she began her employment with Respondent, she was hired to be a customer service representative wherein she continued doing essentially the same job she was doing before Respondent took over. Respondent, Workforce Escarosa, Inc. (Workforce), is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act. Workforce is one of 24 local workforce investment boards in Florida and is responsible for Escambia and Santa Rosa Counties. Workforce oversees federal employment and training programs including the Workforce Investment Act, Welfare Transition Program, Disabled Veterans Program, Wagner Peyser Program, and other federal programs. Part of Workforce's responsibility is to train people for new jobs and careers, and to assist them in attaining economic self-sufficiency through employment. Maggie Thomas is the Assistant Director of Workforce's Welfare Transition Program and was Petitioner's supervisor. Ms. Thomas hired Petitioner in June 2008 to be part of the "Core Team." The Core Team consisted of four persons: Julie Vick, Tesha Stallworth, Julia Lockhart, and Petitioner. The Core Team provided administrative support and was responsible for front desk operations. Often, 70 or 80 people were in the waiting area near the front desk. In July 2008, Ms. Thomas counseled Petitioner following an incident that occurred when Ms. Thomas and Ms. Thomas' administrative assistant, Julie Vick, offered assistance to Petitioner regarding an overhead projector and screen. Ms. Thomas described Petitioner's response as "a real rude rebuff." Ms. Thomas also learned that there was tension between Petitioner and Ms. Vick. Ms. Thomas brought both Petitioner and Ms. Vick into her office emphasizing that staff needed to get along and that "staff should not treat staff in that abrupt rude manner." Later in July 2008, Ms. Thomas was approached by a career advisor who complained about Petitioner's demeanor with customers and staff. Ms. Thomas again counseled Petitioner regarding the importance of getting along with fellow staff members and treating customers with respect. Ms. Thomas counseled Petitioner on a third occasion after receiving complaints from another career advisor, Tarae Donaldson, who is African-American. Ms. Donaldson requested that she not have to work with Petitioner on a project because of Petitioner's attitude and demeanor. Ms. Thomas counseled Petitioner that Petitioner's attitude and demeanor in the workplace was affecting office morale, reminded Petitioner that this was the third time that Ms. Thomas had to counsel her about this, and advised Petitioner that she needed to take this matter seriously. In early November 2008, Petitioner had a confrontation with a co-worker, Julia Lockhart, who is white. Petitioner and Ms. Lockhart were co-workers and friends, who socialized after work and "hung out" together. That day, Ms. Lockhart was responsible for the front counter. A workforce client, Katrina Harmon, was working the front counter as part of the Community Work Experience Program (CWEP). Ms. Lockhart counseled Ms. Harmon about using "Mr.", "Mrs.", or "Ms." when addressing the Workforce clients rather than just calling out their last names. Ms. Lockhart described Ms. Harmon's actions toward the clients as unprofessional and that it "kind of reminded me of a drill sergeant." Ms. Harmon, who is African-American, later complained to Petitioner about Lockhart's counseling her. Petitioner and Ms. Lockhart then discussed the situation. Petitioner believes that Ms. Lockhart was upset with Ms. Johnson for siding with Ms. Harmon because Ms. Harmon is African-American. However, Petitioner acknowledged that this was her opinion based on her personal perception. Moreover, even if Ms. Lockhart was upset with Ms. Johnson, being upset with a co-worker does not establish racial discrimination. In early December 2008, another staff member, Tesha Stallworth, approached Ms. Thomas complaining about Petitioner's demeanor. Ms. Thomas learned more about the incident involving Ms. Harmon during this meeting with Ms. Stallworth. Ms. Thomas decided to transfer Ms. Harmon from the front desk to the Internet Café. About three weeks later, Ms. Thomas was called by Ms. Stallworth. During this call, Ms. Thomas learned that Ms. Stallworth threatened to quit because of Petitioner. During this three-week period, Ms. Thomas also heard complaints regarding Petitioner's office demeanor from Ms. Lockhart. Ms. Thomas considers Ms. Stallworth and Ms. Lockhart to be "very reliable employees." Ms. Thomas decided to have another counseling session with Petitioner. The fourth counseling session took place on December 8, 2008. Ms. Thomas felt that Petitioner's job was in jeopardy but wanted to give Petitioner one more chance. Additionally, Ms. Thomas found Petitioner's job performance to be otherwise good. Ms. Thomas described Petitioner as very defensive and that she did not take responsibility for any of her actions. Ms. Thomas presented Petitioner with a memorandum entitled, "Counseling on Unprofessional Behavior and Disrespect of other employees." Petitioner refused to sign the counseling memorandum. Following that meeting, Ms. Thomas went to Susan Nelms, Executive Director of Workforce. Ms. Thomas conveyed to Ms. Nelms her concerns, that she did not hold out any hope that the situation would be resolved, and that Petitioner was affecting morale. Ms. Nelms made the decision to terminate Petitioner. Ms. Thomas did not convey anything to Ms. Nelms that would indicate that there were any racial issues surrounding Petitioner's termination from employment. Ms. Thomas then went to Landrum to get advice on how to proceed. Ms. Thomas again met with Petitioner on December 10, 2008, and told her that her employment would be terminated. Ms. Thomas relates the following about the December 10 meeting: Q: And that's when the decision was made by Ms. Nelms to terminate Ms. Johnson? A: Yes. Q: And then was that then conveyed to Ms. Johnson? A: No. After December 8th, after Susan [Nelms] gave me the go ahead, I wanted a day to go to Landrum to make sure that I would do this in the proper manner. Q: So you got advice from Landrum? A: I did get advice from Landrum. Q: And then after that, did you meet with Ms. Johnson? A: I met with Ms. Johnson on December 10th. Q: All right. And conveyed that her position would be terminated? A: That is correct. And it is at that time, I'm positive about this, that she first brought up that it was a black/white issue against her. After she knew that she was being terminated and the reason I know-- I am absolutely positive about this, is because the day before when I visited Landrum, we were sitting there talking about the proper procedure and I remember asking-- I said, you know, what if she brings up that she thinks this is a black/white issue? I said, you know, how do I respond to that? I mean, she hasn't up to this point, but I asked and they just said, you should just say you don't want to go there. So after I handed her the termination, and she brought up that she thought it was a black and white issue against herself, that's when I said, I don't want to go there, because that's what I had been advised to say. Now, her memory on December 8th might have been that she brought up the black/white issue about Katrina [Harmon], but it was not about herself. I'm absolutely positive on that point. Ms. Thomas' testimony in that regard was credible and is accepted. That is, that Petitioner first mentioned to Ms. Thomas that the Lockhart/Harmon was a racial issue, somehow related to her, on December 10, 2008. On December 16, 2008, Petitioner wrote Ms. Nelms regarding her termination. The letter does not contain any allegation of race discrimination or that her termination was in retaliation for reporting race discrimination. On December 29, 2008, Petitioner spoke with Holly McLeod, a human resource manager with Landrum Professional Employer Service (Landrum). Petitioner did not complain to Ms. McLeod about any race discrimination or allege that her termination was in retaliation for complaining about race discrimination. On or about January 8, 2009, Petitioner filed a complaint with the Escambia-Pensacola Human Relations Commission concerning her termination from Workforce. The letter of complaint does not allege race discrimination or retaliation. Instead, the letter alleges that she was involved in a disagreement with a co-worker; that she became a victim on a "malicious vendetta" by this co-worker; that this co-worker manipulated and influenced another co-worker and their supervisor; and that the circumstances surrounding her termination were "irrational, irresponsible, and deceitful." At the time that letter was written, Petitioner believed that Ms. Thomas made the decision to fire her. Petitioner alleged in her Employment Complaint of Discrimination that she "became the subject of racial jokes and harassment by a co-worker, Ms. Julia Lockhart (white)." Petitioner's allegations in this regard are not precise in that she initially referenced four occasions of racial jokes but then characterized that as a "guesstimation." In her Proposed Recommended Order, Petitioner asserts that the number and frequency of the jokes are not known. There is testimony regarding the content of only one joke. Ms. Lockhart acknowledges that on one occasion, she told a joke when she and Ms. Johnson were outside smoking a cigarette together. Petitioner pointed out a black woman to Ms. Lockhart and commented that the woman had the biggest lips she had ever seen. In response, Ms. Lockhart then told a joke regarding African-Americans.1/ Petitioner laughed at the joke and did not indicate that she was offended. In response to a question as to whether she found the alleged jokes to be offensive, Petitioner replied, "I don't even remember what the jokes were, so how can I tell you if that they were offensive or not." Petitioner is not certain as to whether Ms. Lockhart meant to be offensive. The preponderance of the evidence suggests that Petitioner only stopped socializing with Ms. Lockhart after the incident involving Ms. Harmon, not because of any joke(s). Workforce has an open door policy for reporting discrimination. Petitioner received a copy of this policy, but did not complain to Workforce or Landrum about Ms. Lockhart's joke(s).
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Employment Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of January, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 2011.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Linda Cattanach, was subject to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent, Florida Department of Elder Affairs, based on her sex or in retaliation for her opposition to an unlawful employment practice in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2013).2/
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Linda Cattanach, was at all times relevant hereto an employee of the Florida Department of Elder Affairs. Respondent, Florida Department of Elder Affairs (Respondent or Department), is the state agency responsible for administering human services programs for the elderly and for developing policy recommendations for long-term care. See § 430.03, Fla. Stat. (2015). Respondent operates a Comprehensive Assessment and Review for Long-Term Care (CARES) program to assess individuals for Medicaid long-term care services, whether in a nursing facility, in a private home, or in another community setting. The CARES program operates 19 offices statewide and one central office in Tallahassee. Medical assessments are conducted by CARES Assessors (CAs), and Senior CAs. CAs and Senior CAs are supervised by a Program Operations Administrator (POA) in each office, who reports to a Regional Program Supervisor (RPS). The RPS reports to the Deputy Bureau Chief in Tallahassee, who reports to the Bureau Chief; who, in turn, reports to the Division Director for Statewide and Community- Based Services. In January 2013, Petitioner began employment as a CA in Respondent’s Gainesville office. Petitioner began in a one-year probationary employment status. The record did not clearly establish how many individuals were employed in the Gainesville office with Petitioner. There was an office assistant, Rose Gonzalez; at least four other CAs, including Justin Keels; a registered nurse; and their supervisor, POA Sam Rutledge. Freadda Zeigler was the RPS for the region, which included the Gainesville, Tallahassee, Pensacola, Jacksonville, and Daytona Beach offices. Ms. Zeigler commuted from her home in Broward County. In Tallahassee, Jay Hudson was the Deputy Bureau Chief, Paula James was the Bureau Chief, Carol Carr was the Deputy Division Director, and Marcy Hajdukiewicz was the Division Director. The Gainesville territory covered from Marion County north to the Florida/Georgia line, west to the Leon County line, and east to the Duval County line. CAs were assigned to particular locations within the office’s jurisdiction. CAs traveled to both health care facilities (e.g., nursing homes, assisted living facilities) and private homes to meet with and personally evaluate the needs of the client. Petitioner was primarily assigned to cover facilities in Jasper, Live Oak, Dowling Park, Mayo, and Lake City. Petitioner was in the field conducting evaluations two to three times per week. Her assignments required some long commutes, up to one and one-half hours to Jasper (just south of the Georgia line) and over an hour to Dowling Park and Live Oak. In February 2013, a senior CA position became open in Gainesville. Both Petitioner and Mr. Keels applied and were interviewed for the position. Mr. Keels was selected for the position in March. As senior CA, Mr. Keels did not supervise other CAs in the Gainesville office, but was “put in charge” when Mr. Rutledge was out of the office. When Petitioner began her employment in Gainesville, she was told that a desk was being ordered for her. She was given a folding table to use in her workspace. Petitioner’s workspace was in an open area of the office. Other employees would pass through and occasionally gather in her workspace on breaks or on their way to lunch. Petitioner testified that Mr. Rutledge often came into the open area to interact with other employees around lunchtime to see if anyone wanted to “get food.” Sexual Harassment Claim4/ One day in late March 2013, Mr. Rutledge and Mr. Keels were in Petitioner’s workspace and began discussing a restaurant with the word “cooter” in its name. During this conversation, the two men stood on opposite sides of Petitioner’s worktable, where Petitioner was seated. One of the men asked Petitioner if she knew what the word “cooter” meant, and she responded that she did not. One of the men stated that it meant “vagina.” Petitioner testified that she was embarrassed, uncomfortable, and felt trapped at her worktable where the men stood on either side of her. Petitioner did not report this incident to anyone at first. Petitioner testified that she was afraid that if she said anything, she would be fired. Petitioner’s ambivalence was due in no small part to the fact that Mr. Rutledge was her supervisor. Petitioner described another incident that occurred shortly before the “cooter” incident. Mr. Rutledge called Petitioner into his office and asked her to look at a picture on his computer screen. The picture was of a woman in a bikini. Mr. Rutledge said something to the effect of “that is what my ex-wife used to look like.” Petitioner was embarrassed and left Mr. Rutledge’s office. Respondent maintains a sexual harassment policy of which Petitioner was aware. The policy provides, in part, that “[a]ny employee who believes that he or she is the victim of sexual harassment . . . may make an oral or written complaint to the General Counsel or Director of Internal & External Affairs within 365 days of the alleged discriminatory action.” In April 2013, approximately a week after the “cooter” incident, Respondent’s Inspector General Taroub King began an investigation of Mr. Rutledge, prompted by an anonymous complaint. Among the allegations investigated were that Mr. Rutledge borrowed money from employees, encouraged employees to participate in an investment scheme (or schemes), and utilized employees to witness signatures and notarize documents of a personal nature. The complaint described Mr. Rutledge as maintaining no management structure, lacking basic documentation, and essentially performing no work of any kind. Petitioner was interviewed in connection with the investigation by Ms. King and another investigator from the Inspector General’s office on April 4, 2013. Petitioner was placed under oath and her interview was audio-recorded. Petitioner was questioned about the allegations in the complaint against Mr. Rutledge, and she fully cooperated with the investigators. At the end of the interview, Ms. King asked Petitioner if she had any other information to relay. At that point, Petitioner reported that inappropriate comments and banter of a sexual nature occurred in the office. Petitioner did not report any other details. Ms. King asked Petitioner for particular examples. In response, Petitioner shared the “cooter” incident and the “bikini” incident. All of the employees in the Gainesville office were interviewed by Ms. King. Mr. Keels was interviewed after Petitioner and was questioned about the “cooter” incident and office banter of a sexual nature. At the final hearing, Petitioner maintained that there was both frequent sexual banter and inappropriate conversations in the Gainesville office. She testified that the staff nurse once referred to a patient as having “balls the size of a bull.” She also reported that Mr. Rutledge made hand gestures indicating that Ms. Gonzalez was large-breasted. Petitioner did not share these details with Ms. King during her interview. As with the “bikini” incident, Petitioner was able to walk away from, or otherwise ignore, the comments and gestures of a sexual nature in the workplace. Upon her return to Tallahassee, Ms. King reported her investigative findings to members of Respondent’s Human Resources Department, the Deputy Secretary, and the Director of Internal and External Affairs. Petitioner testified that she sent Ms. King an email sometime after her interview asking whether more information was needed from Petitioner regarding her complaints of inappropriate sexual comments in the workplace. Ms. King denied that Petitioner sent any follow-up email of that nature. Ms. King did recall an email from Petitioner requesting public records. Respondent terminated Mr. Rutledge on April 8, 2013, four days after Petitioner was interviewed by Ms. King. The decision to terminate Mr. Rutledge was made by management in the Tallahassee office. Both Mr. Hudson, the Deputy Bureau Chief, and Ms. James, the Bureau Chief, traveled from Tallahassee to Gainesville to terminate Mr. Rutledge. Ms. Zeigler was likewise present at the Gainesville office for the termination of Mr. Rutledge. However, Ms. Zeigler claimed not to have been informed ahead of time about the termination. She said the appearance of Mr. Hudson and Ms. James at the Gainesville office on April 8, 2013, was a surprise to her. In early May 2013, a significant remodel of the Gainesville office was initiated. The remodel created confusion in the Gainesville office, with furniture being moved around, office files and equipment being boxed up, and the general mess associated with construction in the workplace. At some point, Petitioner lost track of an entire box of her files and later found them on the floor under a pile of chairs she assumed the painters had moved.5/ Alleged Acts of Retaliation Respondent named Mr. Keels as Acting POA, effective April 8, 2013. Ms. James testified, credibly, that Mr. Keels was named Acting POA because he was the senior CA in the office. Mr. Keels was questioned about the “cooter” incident during his interview by the Inspector General. Thus, there is sufficient evidence from which the undersigned can infer that Mr. Keels was aware Petitioner had reported the “cooter” incident to the Inspector General during the investigation of Mr. Rutledge. Petitioner complained that she was ostracized by other employees in Gainesville after Mr. Rutledge was terminated. Petitioner also complained that Mr. Keels treated her unfairly in his capacity as acting POA. First, Petitioner maintained that Mr. Keels increased her caseload, from about 27 to about 44 cases, which made her job very difficult given the lengthy commutes to her assigned facilities. Petitioner introduced no evidence, other than her testimony, that her caseload substantially increased after Mr. Keels became acting POA. Petitioner complained to the Inspector General on April 4, 2013, that her caseload under Mr. Rutledge’s supervision was inordinately heavy. Petitioner also shared with the Inspector General that Mr. Keels, in his capacity as senior CA, was unfair in case distribution. Further, Petitioner testified that although her caseload was heavy in early May, it later declined. The evidence does not support a finding that Mr. Keels assigned Petitioner an inordinately heavy caseload following her complaints to the Inspector General and Mr. Keels’ temporary promotion to acting POA. Sometime after Mr. Keels became acting POA, he took away Petitioner’s worktable. According to Petitioner, Mr. Keels said he took the table for use in the conference room for “staffings,” a term that was not explained by any witness. Petitioner testified there were other tables available in the meeting room which could have been used for that purpose. For the next two months, Petitioner completed her in- office work at a window ledge. She placed her laptop and files on the ledge and utilized extra chairs for additional workspace. In June 2013, Petitioner was presented with a new desk. Petitioner’s Termination During Mr. Rutledge’s tenure as POA, the Bureau had rolled out significant changes to the CARES program. Those changes had not been implemented by Mr. Rutledge, much less communicated to the Gainesville staff. After Mr. Rutledge’s termination, CARES management began monitoring the Gainesville office very closely. During the next few months, Ms. Zeigler was more frequently present in the Gainesville office and was in almost constant contact with Mr. Hudson regarding the activities of the Gainesville office. However, Ms. Zeigler was unaware of any discussions Mr. Hudson may have had with the Bureau Chief or the Division Director. Shortly after Mr. Rutledge’s departure, Ms. Zeigler met with the Gainesville staff to explain new procedures. Among the procedures was a requirement to include on employees’ GroupWise calendars, an entry of every planned field visit. The CAs’ GroupWise calendars were accessible not only to their immediate supervising POA, but also to the RPS and higher-level managers. The calendar was an important management tool used by Respondent both to perform quality assurance checks and to monitor employee performance. On May 9, 2013, Ms. Zeigler sent the following email to the CAs in Gainesville: Good afternoon all, As mentioned in the past meeting in your office, it was requested that I be given access to your GroupWise calendars to help monitor accountability for field visits with Specialization. I would like to thank each of you for adhering to the request, and would like to ask each of you to add the following information to your calendars: First and Last name of client visiting Facility name where client will be visited Home address if visiting client in the home Purpose of visit Time of visit (include estimated travel time) * * * This information is needed for accountability purposes, and also used to check that assessments are being entered in CIRTS, per the attached CARES policy #PPH Update No2011_2, that is still currently in place. Effective immediately, I would like for each worker to add this information to their calendars prior to making a visit. You should also add any approved leave time that you will be taking as well. If your visit schedule changes, it needs to be noted on the calendar with the appropriate change. Please revisit this memo for a thorough understanding. On May 14, 2013, Ms. Zeigler sent an email to Petitioner informing Petitioner that information on her calendar was incorrect. On May 31, 2013, Ms. Zeigler issued a formal counseling memorandum to Petitioner for failure to list her client visits on her GroupWise calendar as directed. The following excerpt is especially relevant: You were instructed to submit your plans for field visits [sic] travel at least one day in advance of the actual travel. A review of your calendar clearly showed that you either did not put any information on your calendar as required and/or you entered incorrect data, for the following dates: April 16, 2013, May 6, 2013, May 7, 2013, May 9, 2013, May 10, 2013, and again on May 14, 2013. At the final hearing, Petitioner did not deny that she failed to enter required information on her calendar. Instead, Petitioner offered a series of excuses, including system connectivity issues, her travel schedule, and confusion regarding a transition from GroupWise to the Outlook calendar system. With regard to connectivity, Petitioner explained that there were problems connecting to the Department’s computer system from remote locations and, occasionally, in the Gainesville office. Petitioner likewise testified that she would not return home until 6:00 p.m. or later on days she traveled to Jasper and other remote field locations. Petitioner complained that connectivity issues prevented her access to GroupWise from home, and thus, was unable to enter the visits scheduled for the following day. Petitioner testified that she complained to the information technology department in Tallahassee about connectivity issues and diligently tried to address these concerns. Petitioner introduced in evidence an email exchange between herself and Ms. Zeigler in which she complained about, and Ms. Zeigler resolved, an issue with Petitioner’s access to CIRTS – the Department’s online case input system. The email string is dated July 17, 2013, well after the date of Petitioner’s documented missing calendar entries. Further, the email relates to access to the case input system and is irrelevant to Petitioner’s claim of issues with connectivity to the computer system in general. Finally, Petitioner explained that the Department changed from GroupWise to the Outlook system, and she was confused about whether to continue adding entries on her GroupWise calendar during that transition. In the May 31, 2013, counseling memorandum, Ms. Zeigler referred to the program’s transition from the GroupWise to the Outlook calendaring system, as follows: The Microsoft Outlook Email and Calendar program was installed on all computers in DOEA, migrating existing GroupWise information to the new Outlook program on May 28, 2013. Instruction videos and online documentation were made available to all DOEA employees to learn how to utilize the new program. You were instructed to give proxy access to the RPS via email from the acting Supervisor. It is evident that you were successful in accessing the Outlook Calendar, as you sent the RPS a request to share your calendar on May 30, 2013. On the same date, you left the office to go to the field at 12:55 p.m., and failed to update/place any information on your calendar before departing. The sign in sheet indicated that you were going to a nursing facility. This repeated failure to comply with procedures is unacceptable. As a result of this failure, your supervisor was unaware of what facility and/or client you were seeing and how long it would take time wise for the field visit. You effectively prohibited your supervisor from knowing your whereabouts and/or the client(s) to be seen. In light of the facts, Petitioner’s alleged confusion about whether to continue adding information to her GroupWise calendar is not credible. Petitioner did not send an Outlook calendar-sharing invite to Ms. Zeigler until May 30, 2013, well after her missing GroupWise calendar entries of April 16 and May 6, 7, 9, 10, and 14, 2013. Further, Petitioner failed to calendar her appointments the same day she sent Ms. Zeigler the calendar- sharing invitation, thus belying any excuse that she had connectivity issues, at least on that particular date. In an effort to minimize the significance of her failure to document her field visits on her calendar, Petitioner testified that she noted her field visits on a daily sign-in log physically maintained in the Gainesville office. Petitioner introduced a composite exhibit purporting to be copies of the daily sign-in logs from April, May, June, and July 2013. Even if the exhibit was reliable evidence of Petitioner’s whereabouts, the logs are irrelevant to the issue of whether Petitioner complied with the electronic calendaring requirement. No evidence was introduced to support a finding that the daily sign-in log was an acceptable alternative to Ms. Zeigler’s specific, clear, and repeated direction to all Gainesville employees to use their GroupWise, and later Outlook, calendars to note their planned field visits with required details. The evidence conflicted as to whether Ms. Zeigler’s May 31, 2013, counseling memorandum constituted discipline. Petitioner testified that the memorandum was a training tool. Ms. Zeigler testified alternately, and with hesitancy, that the memorandum was “almost like a verbal warning type of thing,” and “unofficially formal.” On cross-examination, Ms. Zeigler testified, “I don’t think that that would be a reason to fire somebody after one counseling memo. I mean that would be absurd.” Ms. James testified that the memorandum constituted a first-step disciplinary action. Ms. James explained that a counseling memorandum is preceded by a verbal warning from the supervisor. The Department’s disciplinary policy was not introduced in evidence. In light of Petitioner’s probationary employment status, the issue of whether the counseling memorandum constituted discipline is largely irrelevant. The counseling memorandum is evidence of poor job performance during Petitioner’s probationary employment period. At some point after Mr. Rutledge’s termination, the Department advertised for the open POA position. Both Petitioner and Mr. Keels applied for the position. Mr. Hudson and Ms. Zeigler conducted interviews for the position. Petitioner was not responsive to Ms. Zeigler’s efforts to schedule Petitioner’s interview for the position. Eventually, Ms. Zeigler did interview Petitioner for the position. Ms. Zeigler also interviewed Mr. Keels. In June 2013, Ms. Zeigler prepared performance evaluations of the Gainesville staff. Ms. Zeigler had little knowledge of staff performance prior to Mr. Rutledge’s termination, as Ms. Zeigler was new to the region. Ms. Zeigler gave all the Gainesville employees ratings of “3,” satisfactory performance, across the board. In late July 2013, Ms. Carr and Ms. Hajdukiewicz from the Tallahassee office came to the Gainesville office and personally terminated Mr. Keels. Ms. James did not directly make the decision to terminate Mr. Keels, but she agreed with the decision. Ms. James stated that Mr. Keels was terminated based on his actions after he became acting POA in Gainesville. Ms. James did not elaborate and neither counsel asked any follow-up question. On July 31, 2013, Ms. Carr and Ms. James came to the Gainesville office from Tallahassee, met with Petitioner, and offered her a choice of resignation or termination. Petitioner chose termination. That same day, after leaving the office, Petitioner called the Department of Human Resources and requested to change her termination to resignation. The request was granted. Petitioner did not ask why she was being terminated or asked to resign. Petitioner testified that neither Ms. Carr nor Ms. James gave her a reason. Ms. Zeigler resigned from the Department in October 2013. The circumstances of Ms. Zeigler’s resignation were not introduced in evidence. In that regard, Ms. Zeigler testified as follows: I had a lot of questions with the State that probably should not come up here, but there are a lot of questionable things that were going on with the State at the time which led to my resignation. So I did not question it. I did not question [Petitioner’s] termination based off of my ability to run the office, because I almost felt like it was being run above me.[6/] Ms. Zeigler’s testimony was introduced in support of Petitioner’s claims. However, Ms. Zeigler had difficulty recalling events, including the timing of relevant events. Of note, Ms. Zeigler testified that she was the RPS for Gainesville about a year, meaning she would have begun in the position in October 2012. Later, she testified that Mr. Rutledge was terminated “not long after I was there [as RPS].” Her testimony was hesitant, hedging, and sometimes conflicting. Ms. Zeigler testified that she was in daily contact with Mr. Hudson about issues in the Gainesville office after Mr. Rutledge was terminated, but claimed to have had no advance notice of either Mr. Keels’ or Petitioner’s termination. As such, the undersigned finds Ms. Zeigler’s testimony to be both unreliable and unpersuasive. Ms. Zeigler’s counseling memorandum to Petitioner regarding calendaring is credible evidence of Petitioner’s job performance which cannot be discounted by Ms. Zeigler’s after-the-fact, and apparently biased, testimony.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Respondent, Florida Department of Elder Affairs, did commit an unlawful employment practice as to Petitioner, Linda Cattanach, and prohibiting the practice. However, under the specific facts of the case, the undersigned recommends no affirmative relief from the effects of the practice. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of October 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of October, 2015.
The Issue This is a proceeding pursuant to the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act, Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, and Rule 60Q-2.035, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner, Dr. Hoover, seeks to recover his attorney's fees and costs incurred in the defense of an action brought against him by the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine. The issues for determination are whether Respondent, the state agency charged with regulation of the professional conduct of physicians in the State of Florida, was substantially justified with regard to the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against Petitioner, a licensed physician, in DOAH Case No. 92-2202, DPR Case No. 0104601, and whether, in the absence of such substantial justification, Petitioner is entitled to the award of the amount of attorney's fees and costs sought, or whether special circumstances exist which would make an award unjust.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Professional Regulation, a state agency, initiated action against Dr. Hoover by filing an Administrative Complaint on May 16, 1991, in DPR Case No. 0104601 (Hoover I); Dr. Hoover by election of rights requested a formal hearing; the case was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) and was assigned DOAH #91-4068. (DOAH Case No. 91-4068: Administrative Complaint, Election of Rights form) The case was set for final hearing on November 13-14, 1991. Dr. Hoover requested a continuance on October 16 because he would be unavailable to assist counsel prepare for hearing. Hearing Officer Robert Meale denied his request. (DOAH Case No. 91-4068: Request for Continuance, Order Denying Continuance) The Department moved for a continuance on October 29th because the primary expert witness had gone to Japan and could not return in time for the hearing or depositions by Dr. Hoover. The Hearing Officer also denied this motion. (DOAH Case No. 91-4068: Petitioner's Motion for Continuance, Order Denying Continuance) On November 5, 1991, the Department filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, Without Prejudice. (DOAH Case No. 91-4068: Notice) The Hearing Officer closed the DOAH file on November 13, 1991. (DOAH Case No. 91-4068: Order) Dr. Hoover then filed a Petition for Fees and Costs on November 21, 1991, and the case was assigned DOAH Case No. 91-7526F. (DOAH Case No. 91- 7526F: Petition) After formal hearing the Petition was denied by the Hearing Officer, who on March 31, 1992, ruled that "the Department has met its burden of showing that the filing of the Administrative Complaint was substantially justified." (DOAH Case No. 91-7526: Final Order) Immediately, without returning the case to the Probable Cause Panel, the Department served the same Administrative Complaint in DPR Case #0104601 on Dr. Hoover (Hoover II). By election of right, he again requested a formal hearing. (DOAH Case No. 92-2202) On April 8, 1992 two cases against Dr. Hoover were referred to DOAH, DPR Case #0104601 and #110008. They were assigned DOAH Case #92-2202 and 92- 2201, respectively, and were assigned to Hearing Officer Mary Clark, who consolidated them without objection. (DOAH Case Nos. 92-2201, 92-2202) Dr. Hoover's counsel withdrew and Mr. Brooten became counsel of record on May 4, 1992. (DOAH Case No. 92-2202) On May 14, 1992, Dr. Hoover filed his Motion to Dismiss DOAH Case #92- 2202. After oral argument the motion was granted by the Hearing Officer on September 16, 1992. (Recommended Order of Dismissal, DOAH Case No. 92-2202) The Hearing Officer held in her Conclusions of Law that the Department of Professional Regulation had no jurisdiction to dismiss a complaint, hold it in abeyance, and refile at its convenience without a new probable cause determination. The Hearing Officer also noted that the passage of time might yield changed circumstances and a changed result. (Recommended Order of Dismissal, DOAH Case No. 92-2202) On October 12, 1992, Dr. Hoover filed a Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs which was denied without prejudice by the Hearing Officer on October 21, 1992, on the grounds that, without a final order, he was not a prevailing small business party. (DOAH Case No. 92-2202) On October 4, 1992, a Probable Cause Panel of the Board of Medicine again found probable cause in DPR Case #0104601. (Memorandum of Finding of Probable Cause, filed by DPR in DOAH Case No. 93-0168F) By Final Order filed on December 30, 1992, the Board of Medicine dismissed DPR Case #0104601 without prejudice. The Board of Medicine in its Conclusions of Law in the Final Order expounded and clarified the Board's intentions and interpretation of the governing statutes. The Board rejected the Hearing Officer's conclusions, but "in the interest of equity" determined that ". . . the disposition recommended by the Hearing Officer be ACCEPTED AND ADOPTED." (DOAH Case No. 92-2202) On February 8, 1993, the Department served the Administrative Complaint in DPR Case #0104601 (Hoover III) on Dr. Hoover. (Motion to Abate, filed 3/8/93 in DOAH Case No. 92-2201). DPR Case #0104601 (Hoover III) is now pending in the Fifth District Court of Appeal, Case #93-455, on a petition for writ of prohibition by Dr. Hoover. DOAH Case #92-2201 (DPR Case #0110008) is in abeyance, at the request of the parties, awaiting determination by the appellate court on the extraordinary writ. (Order of Abeyance dated 3/17/93 in DOAH Case No. 93-2201) It is uncontroverted that DOAH Case #92-2202 was initiated by a state agency, that Dr. Hoover prevailed when the case was dismissed, and that Dr. Hoover is a "small business party" as defined in Section 57.111(3)(d), F.S. The reasonableness of the claimed fees and costs, $10,376.22, total, is likewise uncontroverted.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding are whether Respondent was the employer of Petitioner; and, whether Petitioner was terminated from his employment with Respondent because of his race.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a white male. At all times relevant to this matter, Petitioner was employed with the City of Tallahassee (City). Petitioner continues to be employed by the City. As part of its municipal function, the City of Tallahassee has the responsibility of maintaining drainage ditches located within the City limits. The Leon County Sheriff’s Office (Sheriff's Office) provides inmate work crews to the City for assistance in carrying out this responsibility. The Sheriff's Office also provides the inmates with any food or other items they require. The inmate work crews are supervised by City employees who have completed the Sheriff’s Office certification program for supervising inmates. The certification program is required because of security concerns involved with utilizing the labor of incarcerated individuals outside of the controlled environment of a jail. Because of security concerns, employees are instructed not to provide contraband to inmates. Contraband is defined as any item given to an inmate which the Sheriff's Office has not authorized to be given to the inmate. If any items are provided to inmates, all inmates must receive the item. Petitioner completed the certification program and was employed by the City to supervise inmate work crews. He was told during the training session that inmate supervisors could not provide contraband to inmates, but if any items were provided to inmates, all inmates must receive the item. On or about August 16, 2000, Petitioner gave a bucket of Popeye's chicken to an inmate under his supervision. The bucket of chicken had been given to Petitioner by a Popeye’s employee to give to the inmates because the Popeye's employee knew one of the inmates. Each inmate received a piece of chicken. However, even though Petitioner checked the bucket for weapons, Petitioner did not obtain or attempt to obtain authorization from the Sheriff's Office to give the chicken to the inmates. When Sergeant Lee, a Sheriff’s Office sergeant, visited the work site and saw the chicken bucket and that chicken had been eaten, he asked Petitioner if he had given the chicken to the inmates. Believing that he had done something wrong, Petitioner lied to Sergeant Lee and said that he had not given chicken to the inmates. Sergeant Lee instructed Petitioner to return the inmates to the Leon County Jail. While at the jail, Petitioner admitted that he had given the chicken to the inmates. Petitioner was advised by the Sheriff’s Office that he could no longer supervise inmates. The Sheriff's Office also advised the City that Petitioner was no longer certified to supervise inmates. The City then transferred Petitioner to another position but did not reduce his pay or benefits. On a date after Petitioner’s removal from supervising inmates, the City held a luncheon and invited inmates. There was no evidence presented that the invitation to lunch was or was not authorized by the Sheriff’s Office. Ted Hubbard, a white City employee, has provided watermelons to inmates and other unnamed black inmate supervisors were present when Leon County employees gave Gatorade and other items to inmates. Neither Hubbard nor any other person has been removed from supervising inmates. However, other than very vague references to these "other" supervisors, Petitioner offered no evidence of any similarities between his employment and these other employees or that the items allegedly given to the inmates were not authorized by the Sheriff's Office or that the Sheriff's Office even knew alleged contraband had been given to any inmates. Certainly, no other person lied about providing items to inmates. At no time did the Sheriff's Office make any employment decisions on behalf of the City. Likewise, at no time did the Sheriff's Office employ Petitioner. In fact, the City made all decisions with regard to Petitioner's employment and was the actual employer of Petitioner. Therefore, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of July, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of July, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda G. Bond, Esquire Powers, Quaschnick, Tischler & Evans Post Office Box 12186 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-2186 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Donald H. Lairsey 8031 Smith Creek Road Tallahassee, Florida 32310 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Charge of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on November 17, 2004.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Linda Marchinko, was employed by the Witteman Company, Inc., from 1966 until April 2003. The Witteman Company, Inc. (hereinafter "Inc.") was a division of the Dover Corporation. While employed by Inc., Petitioner held the position of traffic manager. The most recent description of the duties of the position of traffic manager reads as follows: Responsible for, but not limited to, traffic managerial duties, coordinate and arrange for all product shipments, required documentation, customer interaction, and providing back-up support as required to others within the Company. Work with minimum supervision, produce quality, complete and accurate work and be an active and positive participant on teams and committees to which assigned. In February 2003, Cryogenic Industries made an asset purchase of Inc. and established Witteman, LLC (hereinafter LLC). LLC engineers and sells carbon dioxide, recovery, and production equipment to soft drink and brewing companies. Whereas Inc. had a maximum of 110 employees, LLC was established with only 17 employees, as many departments such as purchasing, traffic, and accounting were eliminated or "farmed out." At the time of the asset purchase, all employees of Inc. were terminated due to the sale of the assets of Inc. Petitioner was terminated from employment with Inc. effective April 8, 2003. She signed a Severance Agreement and Waiver and Release of Claims, releasing Inc. from all claims, including any related to the Age Discrimination and Employment Act. The position of traffic manager has not and does not exist at LLC. Petitioner was not hired by LLC. Petitioner has never been employed by LLC and, therefore, was not terminated by LLC. A few employees of Inc. were hired by LLC. Petitioner was not one of them. Cara Brammer is one of the employees of Inc. who was hired by LLC. Her position is Comptroller. Petitioner contends that regardless of Ms. Brammer's title, Ms. Brammer performs the same functions that Petitioner used to perform for Inc. Petitioner believes that Ms. Brammer was hired by LLC because she is younger than Petitioner. At the time Ms. Brammer was hired by LLC, she was approximately 39 years old and Petitioner was 55 years old. Ms. Brammer's duties as Comptroller include accounts payable, cost accounting, and general ledger work. According to Ms. Brammer, the traffic manager duties previously performed by Petitioner were separated between two of LLC's sister companies in California, which handle all of the major equipment, including manufacturing and shipping for LLC. William Geiger is General Manager of LLC. According to Mr. Geiger, the manufacturing of the product was shifted to two divisions located in California. The primary shipping of the company's product was also shifted to California. This is consistent with Ms. Brammer's testimony. According to Ms. Brammer, a small portion of the shipping duties that had initially been sent to California are now handled by LLC. She estimates that she spends only four to five hours a week on these traffic duties, that Mr. Geiger handles some of these duties, and that "quite a bit" of these traffic duties have been farmed out to a company called Freight Forwarder. LLC employs people in their thirties, forties, fifties, and sixties. There is no competent evidence that LLC used age as a criterion in its determination of who would and who would not be hired for the newly formed company.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of November, 2005.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice by retaliating against Petitioner for filing a charge of discrimination.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Jacques Pierre (Petitioner or Mr. Pierre) is black and his national origin is Haitian. He has worked in the United States for 24 years. On or about January 25, 2006, Mr. Pierre filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) a charge of discrimination against his employer, Respondent, SSA Security, Inc., a/k/a Security Services of America, a California Corporation (Respondent or SSA). SSA, under a subcontract with a federal government contractor, Alutiiq-Mele, provided security services for a federal building in Miami. SSA continued to employ Petitioner as a security guard when it took over the contract from his previous employer, Superior Protection. Contractors and managers changed, in the past, but the security guards stayed the same. On August 10, 2006, and August 15, 2006, first Mr. Pierre, then a representative for SSA signed an agreement to settle the EEOC complaint. With a letter dated August 23, 2006, Mr. Pierre received a settlement check in the amount of $1,257.04, and he was advised to report any future unlawful harassment or discrimination charges by use of a "Harassment Hotline and [to] speak with your local area manager, Barry Hirsch [sic]." Captain Barry Hersch was Mr. Pierre's immediate supervisor. The agreement was approved, in principle, by Kent Jurney, Sr., an SSA corporate officer. The language of the agreement is, in relevant part, as follows: Removal of all Disciplinary Notices in File. Company agrees to remove all writings related to disciplinary actions taken against Employee from Employee's personnel file maintained by the Company. Employee understands that the removal of said documents does not prevent the Company from issuing disciplinary notices and/or taking disciplinary action against Employee as necessary in the future should Employee violate the Company's rules of [sic] policies. * * * 4. Confidentiality Clause. The Employee and the Company agree to the following confidentiality and non-disclosure agreement: (a) The parties represent and agree that they will keep the terms and amount of this agreement completely confidential. The parties will not hereafter disclose any information concerning this agreement to anyone, including but not limited to, any past, present or prospective employee of the Company or any prospective employer of the Employee. On August 25, 2006, the federal government changed the requirements in the contract. No longer would security guards be allowed to take breaks at the start or end of their shifts, but only during the middle. Mr. Pierre was made aware of the change. In violation of the requirement, on September 1, 2006, Mr. Pierre took his break at the end of his shift. The federal government contract also prohibited security guards from being on the work premises more than 30 minutes before or after their shifts. On August 28, 2006, Mr. Pierre returned to his work site and entered the building more than 30 minutes after his shift to retrieve keys and a telephone charger. Mr. Pierre also got into a loud and profane argument with another worker during his unauthorized return to the building. Mr. Pierre admitted he had an incident where he got into an argument with and "fired back" at a supervisor in 1995 or 1996. Beginning on or about July 10, 2006, Petitioner began to request, but initially was denied, leave. Mr. Pierre was feeling threatened and harassed by his supervisors and was suffering physically as a result. On a form dated August 25, 2006, Mr. Pierre said he was requesting leave from September 11 to September 25, with a return date of September 27, 2006. Spaces on the form to indicate whether it was approved or disapproved, and by whom are blank. As the reason for the request, Mr. Pierre indicated "stress related: as a result of retaliation.” This time, Captain Hersch, approved the request and Mr. Pierre went on vacation in September 2006. On September 5, 2006, as instructed by Mr. Jurney, another Miami supervisor, Bill Graham, issued a memorandum to Mr. Pierre requiring him to attend a mandatory meeting "about several important issues and notifying him of his "temporary removal from the schedule until this meeting has taken place." Copies of the memorandum were sent to Mr. Jurney and Captain Hersch. The evidence is insufficient to determine if other security guards who violated the same rules were subjected to the same consequences, or if discipline was uniformly applied. Mr. Pierre requested, either through his supervisor, Captain Hersch, or directly to Mr. Graham, that the attorney who handled his EEOC complaint and settlement agreement be allowed to attend the meeting with him. Mr. Jurney denied the request. Because he never attended a meeting, Mr. Pierre remained "off the schedule." For the remainder of 2006 and in early 2007, he was working part-time only at his second job with the State Department of Corrections. Mr. Pierre's income was reduced from $15 an hour ($17 minus $2 for insurance) for 40-hour weeks with SSA, plus $1,000 every two weeks from Corrections to only his Corrections pay. The evidence is insufficient to determine how long Mr. Pierre was, or if he still has, a lower income and what, if any, efforts he has taken to secure alternate employment to mitigate damages. SSA supposedly notified Mr. Pierre, in a memorandum dated September 22, 2006, that he was suspended without pay for two weeks for his rule violations and his failure to attend the mandatory meeting. The authenticity of the memorandum was questioned, and no witnesses testified to sponsor it or to explain why it was necessary, given the fact that Mr. Pierre was already "off the schedule." On October 3, 2006, Mr. Pierre filed a charge of retaliation with the Florida Commission on Human Relations which, on July 2, 2008, found that reasonable cause existed to believe that an unlawful employment practice had occurred. In the fall of 2006, Mr. Pierre applied for a job with the Miami-Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation Department (Miami- Dade). It was his understanding that his background investigation had been successfully completed, but that SSA had not responded to a reference form. Mr. Pierre took the form to SSA. The form, dated October 4, 2006, was completed by Captain Hersch, who responded, in relevant part, as follows: Reason for termination (voluntary/fired)? NON APPLICABLE Describe the applicant's work performance. GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE Describe the applicant's attendance record. GOOD OVERALL Was the applicant ever disciplined for any reason? If YES, please explain. YES CONFIDENTIAL." Is applicant able to work well with others? YES Is applicant trustworthy? YES Describe applicant's work habits? KNOWS HIS JOB, AND DOES IT Is applicant eligible for re-employment? If NO, please explain why. STILL EMPLOYED There is no explanation why Captain Hersch mentioned the confidential agreement, but not the subsequent disciplinary actions that were the focus of concern to Mr. Jurney and Mr. Graham, which could have been disclosed without violating the agreement. Based on the earlier assurances from Miami-Dade, Mr. Pierre, having put "no" when asked about discipline of his job application, believes the contradictory response from SSA caused him not to get the job. He received a letter informing him, but without giving specific reasons, that he was not hired by Miami-Dade. He failed to prove the correctness of his belief. Mr. Pierre testified, but presented no supporting evidence, that he could have earned up to $120,000 a year with Miami-Dade. SSA received notice on the second anniversary of its contract, in October 2006, that the federal government contract would not be renewed. Some time in 2007, most likely in February, at Mr. Pierre's request, he met with Mr. Jurney. It was not until that meeting, Mr. Pierre remembered, that Mr. Jurney had someone remove pre-settlement discipline records from his personnel file. By that time, SSA no longer had a contract with the federal government and was transferring its personnel over to work for the next contractor, Alutiiq. Mr. Pierre asked to be transferred and Mr. Jurney testified that he contacted someone at Alutiiq and asked for Mr. Pierre to be interviewed, but the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that SSA attempted to transfer Mr. Pierre to Alutiiq, or what the routine procedures were for transferring security guards. When Mr. Pierre found out that the necessary paperwork was never sent from SSA to Alutiiq, he tried unsuccessfully for two or three weeks to contact SSA. It is reasonable to believe that SSA, while not allowing Mr. Pierre to work, would not help him transfer over to the next contractor. Mr. Pierre was not transferred and was not employed by Alutiiq. Mr. Jurney testified unconvincingly that he made non-federal contract job offers to Mr. Pierre and Mr. Pierre found the offers acceptable, “but he didn’t accept them.” It is inconceivable that Mr. Pierre, who has three children to support and a wife who works part-time, would have rejected any legitimate job offer at that time. Mr. Pierre and Mr. Jurney, a former highway patrol trooper and member of an advisory board for the Florida Highway Patrol, discussed Mr. Pierre’s desire to be a trooper. Mr. Jurney offered to assist him but that employment never materialized. As a corporate officer, Mr. Jurney was responsible for overseeing hundreds of contracts involving 1,500 employees. He was senior to Mr. Graham and Captain Hersch. Yet, once he authorized the EEOC settlement, he became directly involved in the decision-making concerning discipline and consequences for Mr. Pierre. There is no evidence that Mr. Pierre had ever come to his attention before he approved the settlement.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order directing that Respondent cease the discriminatory employment practice evidenced in this case and awarding Petitioner back pay at the rate of $15.00 an hour for each normal 40-hour work week between September 5, 2006, and the date of the final order, offset by earnings from substitute employment, if any. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ronald G. Polly, Esquire Hawkins & Parnell, LLP 4000 SunTrust Plaza 303 Peachtree Street, Northeast Atlanta, Georgia 30308-3243 Jacques Pierre 19601 Northwest 12th Court Miami, Florida 33169 Erwin Rosenberg, Esquire Post Office Box 416433 Miami Beach, Florida 33141
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Cassondra Davis, suffered an adverse employment action as a result of unlawful discrimination.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following findings of facts are made. Petitioner, Cassondra Davis, is a female African- American. At all times material, Petitioner was employed by Respondent, Department of Corrections, at Brevard Correctional Institution (Department). Petitioner's last day of actual work at the Department was April 10, 1996. Susan Blais, Personnel Manager at Brevard Correction Institution during the relevant time frame, testified that because of medical problems, Petitioner was unable to return to work after April 10, 1996, until her physician released her to return to work. Petitioner never presented a medical return-to-work release. Instead, she utilized her entitlement to Family Medical Leave Act leave. Once this leave was exhausted, rather than terminate Petitioner, the Department wrote to her physician, Dr. F. F. Matuk, on September 16, 1996, requesting a diagnosis of Davis' condition, as well as an opinion as to whether she could perform the duties of a correctional officer as outlined in a job description enclosed with the request for opinion. (Respondent's Exhibit 1) Dr. Matuk responded to the Department by letter dated September 20, 1996, stating that Petitioner had several work restrictions, including no weight manipulation over 20 to 30 pounds, avoidance of driving over 30 to 40 minutes, avoidance of neck extension, and allowances for extended periods of rest. He did not believe that Petitioner was able to perform the duties of a correctional officer but stated that she would most likely be able to perform a sedentary desk job. (Respondent's Exhibit 2) Susan Blais testified that no such desk jobs were available at that time. Petitioner submitted a letter of resignation to the Department in July 1997, wherein she attributed the resignation to medical reasons. (Respondent's Exhibit 3)
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of March, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Azizi M. Coleman, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Cassondra A. Davis 1009 Cannes Drive Poinciana, Florida 34759-3918 Cassondra A. Davis 1216 Pua Lane, No. 107 Honolulu, Hawaii 96817-3821 Gary L. Grant, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether the Department of Insurance (DOI), now Department of Financial Services, discriminated against the Petitioner on the basis of national origin or age contrary to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is Elamir G. Ghattas, a naturalized American of Egyptian birth, who is 71 years of age. The Petitioner was employed by the DOI for 18 years. He was assigned to maintain the law library at the DOI in 1985, and performed those duties until 2002. His job title at that time was "Records Specialist," and his supervisor was Beverley DiGirolamo, who was the office manager of the Legal Division. In 2002, he was transferred from his duties in the law library to duties in the Service of Process Division (SPD) of DOI. His new supervisor was initially Carolyn Ash, who was asked to sign Petitioner's timesheet, and who was at a lower pay grade (13) than the Petitioner's pay grade (16). After he brought this to management's attention, Pam Edenfield was assigned to sign his timesheet. His duties involved maintaining and filing documents received by the DOI relating to the service of process in the legal cases filed throughout the state. The work of the division has increased greatly due to a change in the statutes, and the SPD could not process the increased workload with its existing employees. To resolve the workload issues, personnel from other portions of the legal department were transferred to the SPD. The Petitioner was one of approximately four individuals who were transferred from Legal Services Division to SPD. The decision to move the Petitioner was made by Ms. DiGirolamo and Ms. Edenfield based upon his low workload in the library and the high workload in SPD. After the Petitioner was moved, his duties were assumed as an additional duty by one of the legal secretaries who spends between four and eight hours on the activity per month. The basis for his move was explained to Petitioner by Ms. DiGirolamo and Ms. Edenfield, and by Mr. DowDell, who was their supervisor. Following his transfer, the Petitioner's performance suffered, and when he was formally counseled about it, he ultimately resigned and retired.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter its final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of August, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Elamir Ghattas 811 Chestwood Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Dennis Silverman, Esquire Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner was the victim of an unlawful employment practice, by allegedly being subjected to discriminatory terms and conditions of employment, based on her race.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner Rosa Pearl McDonald is an African- American female. She was employed at times pertinent to this dispute as a driver, delivering meals to elderly clients of the Walton County Council on Aging. The Petitioner is also a Licensed Practical Nurse (LPN). The Respondent, Walton County Council on Aging is a charitable social services agency, domiciled in Walton County. As pertinent to this case, it delivers and serves meals to elderly clients throughout the county, through the use of hired and volunteer drivers. The Petitioner was a recently-hired driver, of less than 30 days' employment, when the operative facts occurred. The Petitioner was still in probationary employment status. The Petitioner contends, in effect, that she was subjected to disparate terms and conditions of employment due to her race. She states she was the only black driver and that her supervisor, Kay Brady, is white. The Petitioner noticed after hiring, that the food delivery boxes had the assigned drivers' names on them. The box she was assigned had only the route name. She states she had asked Ms. Brady to place her name on the box, but the route name was placed on the box instead. The Petitioner acknowledged, upon cross-examination, that she did not know who placed the route label on the food box. She was still a probationary employee at this time. The probationary period was 90 days, and the Petitioner resigned only 30 days or less, after her hiring. Inferentially, it may be that the probationary status was the reason her name was not used, or it may have been an oversight. There is no evidence other than the Petitioner's stated opinion, that the labeling situation was due to racial animus. In fact, the Petitioner had been hired, and fired, by the Respondent twice in the past, and yet it still re-hired her shortly before the subject situation arose. Moreover, Ms. Brady gave the Petitioner extra hours of work when she requested them. These facts tend to negate the existence of racial bias in the imposition of any term or conditions of the Petitioner's employment. The Petitioner also contends that she was treated disparately, compared to other drivers. She maintains that a white driver, "Margaret," on occasion had guests ride along with her on her deliveries. The Petitioner states that she asked twice to be allowed to have friends ride with her on deliveries, but Ms. Brady would not allow it. Ms. Kay Brady was the Petitioner's supervisor. She established with her testimony, that the Respondent has a regularly-adopted policy of allowing no riders to accompany route drivers, other than trained volunteers or office personnel, who occasionally go along on deliveries to ascertain that client services are being provided appropriately. Occasionally spouses of regular drivers make deliveries when the driver is ill or must miss work for any reason. The Respondent also uses volunteer drivers, as well. In both situations, however, the spouses or volunteers are given training before being allowed to make deliveries to clients, chiefly because of the privacy requirements of the "Hippa Privacy Law" and the Respondent's client confidentiality policy. The point is, the Petitioner sought to have friends ride with her on deliveries (for reasons which are unclear) and her friends were not trained and oriented to the Respondent's job requirements. The Respondent had a policy of not allowing friends or family to simply accompany drivers without such training, and for reasons which did not relate to job requirements, except in unusual circumstances. One such circumstance involved a driver who needed to be allowed to take her grandchildren with her on a delivery or deliveries, when she was unable to engage a baby sitter. This was an isolated and unusual occurrence, during a time when the children were out of school for Christmas break. On such rare occasions, the Respondent has allowed children to accompany drivers on short trips, on routes near their homes and where children can safely remain in vehicles during deliveries. The above circumstance was probably the one involving driver "Margaret" which the Petitioner described in her testimony. In any event, however, the Respondent had a regular written policy regarding requirements and qualification for persons making deliveries to clients and it followed it, with the above rare exceptions. The employee handbook, Council on Aging Handbook and the Employee Handbook receipt, in evidence as Respondent's Exhibits 5, 6, and 4, respectively, show this policy and the fact that the Petitioner was informed of it. The Petitioner's friends, whom she sought to have accompany her, were not shown to be qualified under the Respondent's requirements. Because the reasons for requesting the accompaniment of proposed "riders" were different for employees other than the Petitioner, referenced in the above examples of policy exceptions, these other drivers were not shown to be similarly-situated exemplar employees, who received more favorable treatment. In fact, the Petitioner was favored in a different way. The Respondent was able to give the Petitioner extra hours of work "sitting" with elderly clients when their caregivers were absent. The Respondent and Ms. Brady would learn about such needs through its normal service contacts with clients and their families. Because the Petitioner is an LPN, the Respondent would refer her for extra work, to her benefit. In summary, the preponderant evidence and above facts show that no adverse employment action occurred. There were no verbal or other acts or adverse employment directives toward the Petitioner at all, much less any that evidence racial animus, by supervisors or employees. Therefore, there was no racially hostile environment, so there could not be one in which her terms and conditions of employment were altered. Moreover, since there were no disciplinary actions toward the Petitioner, nor adverse employment directives or conditions (in fact she was favored with extra hours), there could be no constructive termination. There certainly was no actual termination. The Petitioner, in fact, resigned her position, telling both Ms. Brady and Mr. Moore that it was for health reasons. She admitted as much in her testimony.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying the Petitioner's Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of March, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Rosa Pearl McDonald 1961 McLeod Road DeFuniak Springs, Florida 32435 Kay Brady Walton County Council on Aging Post Office Box 648 DeFuniak Springs, Florida 32435 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
