The Issue The issue in this case is whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaint are correct and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Professional and Business Regulation, Board of Medicine, (Petitioner) is the state agency with responsibility for regulation of licensed medical practitioners in the State of Florida. Anand Lattinand, M.D., (Respondent) is and at all times material to this case, has been a board certified Dermatologist and a licensed physician in the State of Florida holding license number ME0034105, and located at 3450 East Fletcher Avenue, Tampa, Florida 33613. The Respondent first met A. L. (patient), a male, upon examination in July, 1992 for a lesion on the left axilla and anterior chest. Upon the initial examination, the Respondent learned that the patient, a retired lawyer, was a charter boat operator. The Respondent diagnosed the lesion as an inflamed seborrheic keratosis and applied liquid nitrogen, causing the lesion to blister and peel off. An appointment made for December 1992, was cancelled by the patient. On or about May 6, 1993, the patient, then 61 years old, presented to the Respondent with complaints of a rash on his chest. Upon examination, the Respondent noted that the rash also appeared on the patient's back and arms. The Respondent performed a dermatological examination on the patient to determine the cause of the rash. In addition to the rash, the examination revealed redness and papules (bumps) on the patient's skin. Although the patient indicated to the Respondent that the rash did not itch, the skin rash was excoriated and ulcerated, indicating that it was being scratched. Some of the papules exhibited a "lichenified" appearance. The Respondent requested that the patient undress so that a full body exam could be performed. Further examination revealed that the papules extended to the patient's hips and upper buttocks and on the lower legs. Such papules can be indicative of scabies, insect bites, disseminated herpes simplex or seborrheic dermatitis. The patient is a nudist. The patient did not tell the Respondent about his sun exposure. Such sun exposure may result in appearance of papules on parts of the body. The Respondent was not aware of the patient's nudist activities. Based on the Respondent's suspicions about the origin of the rash, further diagnostic inquiry warranted a complete genital examination. The Respondent requested and obtained the patient's consent for the genital examination. A standard dermatological genital examination includes the touching of the penis and testicles of a male patient. The scrotum is examined for eczema. The skin of the penis is manipulated. The penis is squeezed and the urethra is examined for evidence of discharge. The Respondent put gloves on his hands and performed the genital examination. As the examination progressed, the Respondent informed the patient of the purpose for the procedure. The exam revealed no scabies or insect bites. There was no discharge present. There was no genital indication of herpes simplex or dermatitis. Despite the absence of genital symptoms, the Respondent was unable to rule out disseminated herpes simplex as the cause for the existing skin condition. Accordingly, the Respondent inquired into the patient's marital status and sexual habits. Inquiry into the sexual habits of the patient was medically appropriate given the nature of the suspected origin of the condition. Beyond mere herpes simplex, the Respondent was concerned about the possibility of AIDS and its related impact on the progression of herpes simplex. The patient appeared to be uncomfortable with the questioning. The Respondent had doubts as to the credibility of the information being provided and so discontinued the questioning. The examination was concluded. Unable to specifically identify the cause of the condition, the Respondent provided the patient with two ointments intended to treat the rash. The patient dressed, paid for the examination and left the Respondent's office. Based on the testimony of the patient, the Petitioner alleges that, without the patient's consent, the Respondent fondled the patient's genitals with his ungloved hands to the point when the patient's penis became erect, and that the Respondent then requested that the patient masturbate while the Respondent watched. The Petitioner asserts that the patient declined the masturbation request, but permitted the Respondent to complete the exam. Apparently, the patient made no objection to the alleged fondling until he was asked to masturbate. Based on the presentation and demeanor of the patient-witness at hearing, the testimony of the patient is not credible. The evidence fails to establish the allegations of the Administrative Complaint. The Respondent denies that the examination was performed ungloved, that he manipulate the patient's penis to erection or that he requested that the patient masturbate. The testimony of the Respondent is credited. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that under the circumstances, the genital examination was properly performed and is an appropriate method of attempting to diagnose the cause of the skin rash from which the patient suffered.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Professional and Business Regulation, Board of Medicine, enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed in this case. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 8th day of June, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-6252 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, the following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 5-8. Rejected, contrary to the greater weight of credible and persuasive evidence. 9-10. Rejected, unnecessary. 11. Rejected, contrary to the greater weight of credible and persuasive evidence. 12-14. Rejected, unnecessary. Respondent The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 3-4. Rejected, irrelevant, unnecessary. 7. Rejected, unnecessary. 9. Rejected as to whether patient would be aware of visual examination, unnecessary. 12. Rejected, unnecessary. 23. Third and fourth sentences are rejected, unnecessary. 27. Rejected, subordinate. 30. Rejected, unnecessary. COPIES FUIRNISHED: Dr. Marm Harris, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Jack McRay Acting General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Steve Rothenburg, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Veronica E. Donnelly, Esquire J. B. Donnelly, Esquire GREENE, DONNELLY, SCHERMER, TIPTON & MOSELEY 100 North Tampa Street, Suite 2825 Tampa, Florida 33602
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of discrimination in employment based on Petitioner's pregnancy and sexual harassment, in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a family-owned business engaged in the retail sales of wine, spirits, cigars, specialty gourmet foods, and party favors. Respondent operates about 28 stores, mostly in south Florida. Respondent employs at least 225 employees. Its chief executive officer is Paul (Bubba) Kassal. Other executive officers, superior to Bubba Kassal, are his brother Michael, who also serves as vice-president of personnel, and their father, who, with his father, started the company in 1955. Respondent hired Petitioner on October 13, 2003, as a human resources manager. As such, Petitioner reported to the human resources director. At the time of hiring Petitioner, Bubba Kassal informed her, presumably secretly, of his intent to fire the existing human resources director. Six months later, after the termination of the human resources director, Respondent promoted Petitioner to the position. As human resources director, Petitioner's primary duties were to ensure that all of Respondent's employees were paid, file all reports with the appropriate agencies, prepare internal employment policies, train managers in good hiring practices, run background checks, ensure compliance with all safety, workers' compensation and Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) issues, terminate employees, counsel employees, file unemployment compensation reports, and participate in the strategic planning for new stores. The Kassals were satisfied with Petitioner's work performance during her entire employment with Respondent. Respondent's main offices are located in Ft. Lauderdale. While working for Respondent, Petitioner commuted over one hour each day from her home in Port St. Lucie to her office in the corporate headquarters. The issues in this case divide neatly into the claims of a hostile work environment and sex discrimination due to pregnancy. The claim of a hostile work environment pertains to Petitioner's first two years with Respondent, which were from late 2003 through late 2005. The claim of discrimination due to pregnancy pertains to Petitioner's last months with Respondent, which were from spring 2008 through fall 2008. As noted below, there is evidence supportive of a claim of a hostile work environment, although this evidence fails to establish such a claim for the reasons explained below. However, the limited evidence of a hostile work environment is in no way linked to the termination of Petitioner's employment in 2008 while she was pregnant. This termination, which was due to complications associated with her pregnancy, was essentially by mutual agreement and in no way was due to some form of quid pro quo sex discrimination or retaliation for her failure to reciprocate Michael Kassal's flirtation or infatuation. Petitioner's version of events for 2003-05 is credited because Michael Kassal did not testify. Petitioner's version of events for 2008 is largely uncredited due to some inconsistencies in her testimony where she implies, for instance, that she understood that Respondent might not keep open her existing job until after she delivered. Petitioner's version of events for 2008 is less than the more plausible testimony of Bubba Kassal and Respondent's outside counsel, Amy Galloway. Shortly after starting work, Petitioner began receiving unwelcome attention from Michael Kassal, whose office was near Petitioner's office. Michael Kassal, who was married at all material times, routinely complimented Petitioner's hairstyle, teeth, shoes, and clothes. When Respondent sponsored a wine tasting at its Port St. Lucie store, Michael Kassal invited Petitioner to attend. Michael Kassal repeatedly asked Petitioner to lunch or dinner. Petitioner went to lunch with Michael Kassal only a couple of times because she was uncomfortable with the level of attention that she was receiving. During her first year of employment, Petitioner was preoccupied with the demands of her job and largely ignored the uninvited attention that Michael Kassal directed toward her. During her second year of employment, Petitioner initiated corporate-wide training sessions in sexual harassment. She used these occasions to remind Michael Kassal, when he made her uncomfortable with his comments or behavior, that he knew better and he needed to stop such inappropriate behavior. Undeterred, Michael Kassal instead confided in Petitioner that he felt trapped in his marriage, could not leave his wife due to their two children, and believed that he would have been much happier if he had met Petitioner a couple of years earlier because they would have been so good together. Michael Kassal said that his wife, who was, at times, an employee of Respondent, was an alcoholic. Petitioner suggested that Michael Kassal or his wife take advantage of Respondent's employee assistance program. Michael Kassal rejected this advice and instead stated that, if Petitioner would not go out with him, he would go out with a woman at the gym where he worked out. On Petitioner's birthday, Michael Kassal routinely gave her a card. Petitioner kept only two of the cards and could not identify the years that they were received. One card contains a handwritten note: "And I need you more than want you[,] and I want you til the end of all time." Michael Kassal printed his name at the bottom of the note, adding a heart- shaped symbol in place of the dot over the "i." The other birthday card states: Dear Angella, It[']s presently July 10th and you are in India and I am wishing I were with you riding on Elephants and protecting you from the dangers so far from home. I must tell you we all miss you and only have kind thoughts about how professionally you have with us with Cami and Johanna. You have always blessed us with organization and administrative magic. I sit here and count the days before I can smell Victor[i]a's Secret Rapture perfume. Thank you for your intervention. You have been a breath of fresh air. I know it[']s been a whirlwind to some of us to catch up but it[']s worth the effort. I always have your back. I hope this year[']s birthday brings happiness and fills your heart with songs and sunshine. I hope you get a new pair of shoes and a toothbrush. Thanks again for all your loyalty and dedication. Sincerely, Michael Kassal. The "i" in "Michael" bears no dot or other symbol. Bubba Kassal testified that Michael sent birthday cards to all of the employees of the company and that this was part of the family atmosphere that characterizes the company, which continues a tradition of family picnics, employee fitness programs, and comprehensive fringe benefits. Bubba Kassal also testified that he and his brother kiss each morning. However, Bubba Kassal did not testify that the contents of the birthday cards quoted above resemble the contents of the birthday cards that Michael Kassal sends to, say, the company truck drivers or warehouse workers. The thoughtfulness that Michael Kassal extends daily to his brother and annually to his employees is distinct from the intimacies inherent in the shorter birthday card and the reference to smelling Petitioner's perfume again. These intimacies corroborate the portion of Petitioner's testimony that describes an inappropriate level of emotional attachment from Michael Kassal toward Petitioner; the inference easily follows that this level of emotional attachment is atypical of the conventional employer-employee relationship at Respondent. Three omissions loom large in Petitioner's proof of her claim of a hostile work environment. These omissions are considered in ascending order of significance. First, at no time during her employment with Respondent did Petitioner complain to anyone about Michael Kassal's behavior. She testified that she believed a complaint would be futile because Michael Kassal was the boss. Respondent countered with evidence that complaints about Michael Kassal's wife led to her termination and argument that Petitioner's complaints would likewise have received a fair hearing. Respondent's contention overlooks the fact that Michael's wife was convicted of driving under the influence, and her continued operation of a company vehicle presented an insurance problem for Respondent that could not be ignored. Petitioner is right on this point--her complaint would have been futile. Bubba Kassal was not in a position to control his brother, and, on this record, their father does not seem to have been playing a prominent role in the business during the time in question. Factually, the failure to lodge a contemporaneous objection to unwelcome sexual behavior in the workplace may sometimes undermine the credibility of the complainant. This is not the situation here, though, because, as noted above, Petitioner's version of events from 2003-05 is unrebutted and confirmed by two birthday cards. Legally, the failure to lodge a contemporaneous objection to unwelcome sexual behavior in the workplace may sometimes preclude a finding of notice to the employer, so as to preclude a conclusion of vicarious liability. This is not the situation here, though, because, as discussed in the Conclusions of Law, Michael Kassal was Respondent for purpose of establishing notice and concluding vicarious liability for his behavior. The second omission is that nothing in the record establishes that the behavior of Michael Kassal impeded Petitioner's work performance. As discussed in the Conclusions of Law, this omission is not outcome-determinative, but, as noted above, Petitioner's work was always satisfactory, at least until her health deteriorated during her pregnancy, which is discussed below. The third omission is that the evidence fails to establish that Michael Kassal continued to lavish inappropriate attention on Petitioner after the end of 2005. The record is silent as to the nature of the relationship between Michael Kassal and Petitioner for the two and one-half years from the end of 2005 until the disclosure of her pregnancy in the spring of 2008. It is at least as plausible that, unfueled by any encouragement from Petitioner, Michael Kassal's infatuation with her tapered off after a couple of years, rather than burned with the same intensity for four and one-half years. The behavior of Michael Kassal from late 2003 through late 2005 suggests nothing more than an infatuation with Petitioner, which, however inappropriate, excludes the sexually charged actions of offensive touching or sexually explicit invitations or comments. The behavior in this case is limited to unaccepted invitations to lunch, dinner, and dates, inappropriate revelations about Michael Kassal's personal life, and transparent attempts at flattery that, at their best, suggest a failure to recognize boundaries and, at their worst, wander between the narcissistic and infantile. The record is not especially rich in detailing Petitioner's response to the inappropriate attention lavished on her by Michael Kassal, except that there is no indication whatsoever that Petitioner welcomed the attention, reciprocated in any fashion, or was in any way flattered by Michael Kassal's two-year infatuation. There is some evidence that the attention made Petitioner embarrassed and somewhat uncomfortable, but this evidence is insufficient to establish that Petitioner's subjective reaction took the form of a feeling that she was physically threatened or personally humiliated or that she was laboring under an alteration of her working conditions. Such reactions, if they had occurred, would have been disproportionate to the level of attention that Michael Kassal directed toward Petitioner. Except for the frequency of comments about attire or appearance, which may have occurred on a daily basis, the record fails to establish the frequency of the invitations to lunch, dinner, and dates or the inappropriate revelations about Michael Kassal's personal life, but these occurrences were probably infrequent. Objectively considered, none of Michael Kassal's behavior was physically threatening or humiliating, none of his behavior was so pervasive or severe as to alter the conditions of Petitioner's employment, and none of his behavior could reasonably have adversely affected Petitioner's work performance. Based on these findings and the Conclusions of Law below, Petitioner has failed to prove a hostile work environment from 2003-05. The inception of the claims arising out of Respondent's treatment of her pregnancy is March or April 2008, when Petitioner learned that she was pregnant and due to deliver in November. In June, Petitioner decided to reveal her pregnancy to family, friends, and Respondent. On the morning that Petitioner had decided to inform Respondent of her pregnancy, the first person who came to her office was Bubba Kassal. He congratulated Petitioner, laughingly saying, in a manner that did not offend Petitioner, that he did not know that she had a boyfriend. Bubba Kassal then spoke of his two boys and added that he was sorry that Petitioner's mother was no longer alive to support her at this time. Bubba Kassal called his mother and told her, and she called Petitioner the next day and congratulated her. The record does not disclose whether Petitioner told Michael Kassal at this time, or, if she did, the nature of his response. A short while later, on June 13, Petitioner had an office visit with her physician, who became concerned about her high blood pressure. The physician asked if Petitioner could work at home, and Petitioner assured him that she could. The physician wrote a note to this effect. Driving back to the office, Petitioner called Ms. Galloway, with whom Petitioner had worked on human-resource issues. Petitioner told Ms. Galloway about her pregnancy, the health risks, and the support that she had already received from "the Kassals." Ms. Galloway advised Petitioner just to go in and tell them that she needed to work at home. Toward this end, Petitioner arranged a meeting with Michael and Bubba Kassal on June 18. At the meeting, Petitioner gave the Kassals a copy of her physician's note. Petitioner acknowledged that she had been with Respondent a long time, and she thanked them for the work that she had been allowed to do. She mentioned her pregnancy complications, which included blacking out and falling--these made the long drive between work and home especially dangerous. Petitioner offered to recruit someone to replace her, but she wanted to be kept on the payroll in return for performing various human resource duties as best as she could, mostly from home. Michael Kassal reacted to the request poorly. He replied that it had not been his idea to purchase a house so far from the office in Port St. Lucie, and the human resources director needed to be onsite. Notwithstanding Michael Kassal's reaction, Respondent accepted Petitioner's request, as Bubba Kassal and Petitioner generally agreed to an arrangement in which Petitioner would continue to be paid her normal salary through delivery in return for working on human resources matters on a limited basis. An important component of the understanding reached at the June 18 meeting was its term, which was through the birth of the baby. Bubba Kassal asked what would happen if, after baby was born, Petitioner decided not to return to work. Petitioner was unable to promise that she would return to work, but replied that she needed to work, and she could bring her aunt from Jamaica to watch the baby. Bubba Kassal asked when the work-at- home arrangement would go into effect, and Petitioner replied it was intended to go into effect right away, but she would try to work with them and offered to help find someone to perform her duties in her absence. Bubba Kassal replied that he had someone in mind. Petitioner herself testified that Bubba Kassal asked what would happen if they liked the replacement, and Petitioner replied that she understood that they had a business to run, implying that, consistent with this understanding, they might not have a position for her after the baby were born, just as she might not want to return to work with Respondent. Bubba Kassal promised to memorialize the understandings reached at the meeting. Despite the doctor's orders, Petitioner continued to report to the office until the July 4 weekend. At that time, she asked Bubba Kassal about the document to memorialize their understandings, and he said that Amy Galloway was working on it. On July 7, Ms. Galloway emailed to Bubba Kassal a draft letter agreement, which, among other things, confirmed that neither party was committing to Petitioner's ongoing employment after the birth of the baby. On July 8, Petitioner sent an email to Bubba and Michael Kassal and Ms. Galloway advising them that she was on bed rest and would submit FMLA paperwork as soon as possible. For some reason, the recipients did not receive this email, so they were unaware in early July of the status of Petitioner, who, understandably, did not undertake any unnecessary communications during her period of bed rest in order to save the baby. On July 11, Petitioner visited the doctor, who found that her blood pressure had soared to 200/100. Petitioner talked him out of ordering an ambulance to take her to the hospital, but the doctor ordered bed rest for Petitioner. By this time, Petitioner realized that, for the remainder of her pregnancy, she would not be able to perform even at the limited level that she had said she would work at the June 18 meeting. From this point forward, the June 18 understanding was superseded by Petitioner's medical issues. On July 11, Petitioner returned to the office briefly to advise her staff that she would be going home for the time being. While at the office, she saw an invoice from Ms. Galloway's law firm that reflected legal research conducted a couple of days after the June 18 meeting and concerned the Title VII ramifications of Petitioner's situations. Petitioner assumed that Respondent was terminating her and began to cry. On the same day, Petitioner returned to the doctor's office and had him complete the FMLA paperwork, which Petitioner had previously thought was unnecessary. The necessity for FMLA paperwork was as much Petitioner's realization, on July 11, that she could not perform even the limited duties contemplated by the June 18 understanding as her discovery, also on July 11, that Respondent had ordered its counsel to research Title VII. Later on July 11, Petitioner returned to the office with the completed FMLA paperwork and left it for Bubba Kassal. Pursuant to this paperwork, the FMLA period, during which Respondent would have to keep open her job, expired before the projected delivery date. On July 14, Petitioner returned a telephone call of Ms. Galloway and updated her on her condition. As Ms. Galloway confirmed in an email of the same date to Bubba Kassal, Petitioner wanted to take her FMLA time and understood that she would not be able to perform the transitioning tasks contemplated in the June 18 understanding. Ms. Galloway promised Petitioner that she would discuss with Bubba Kassal a reworking of her benefits, including maintaining present health benefits and obtaining disability benefits. On August 5, Petitioner sent an email to Bubba and Michael Kassal advising that she had not received her paycheck on August 2 and stating that she "continued" to be available to perform her end of the June 18 understanding. This is an attempt to document a fact that was untrue: Petitioner had not been able to perform her responsibilities under the June 18 understanding at any time after July 11. Ten minutes after receiving the email, Bubba Kassal emailed Ms. Galloway stating that they would proceed by paying Petitioner disability benefits through the birth, paying the company's portion of the health insurance until the birth, and giving Petitioner access to her company laptop computer and cellphone until October 1 in return for a release, presumably from any employment-related liability claims. It is impossible to infer that Bubba Kassal was miffed at Petitioner's misstatement, but it is likely that the misstatement motivated Bubba Kassal to define the status of Petitioner's employment relationship. By letter dated August 5 from a human relations employee to Ms. Galloway, the position of Respondent was documented, at least internally. This letter states that Petitioner's FMLA start date is July 11, 2008, and end date is October 4, 2008. This letter restates the undertakings that Bubba Kassal detailed in his August 5 email and notes that Petitioner has exhausted all of her sick and vacation time. The letter notes that the June 18 understanding was superseded by Petitioner's subsequent incapacitation. On August 14, Ms. Galloway emailed a letter to Petitioner reiterating much of the contents of the August 5 email and noting that, due to Petitioner's emergent health needs, Respondent had hired an acting human resources director on July 28. Ms. Galloway's letter restates the conditions set forth in Bubba Kassal's email of August 5, adding only that there is no expectation that Petitioner can perform any human resource duties and omitting the request for a release. A couple of weeks later, Petitioner emailed a brief message to Ms. Galloway acknowledging receipt of the letter and thanking her for all that she "does," but not otherwise responding to the letter. On October 8, Ms. Galloway sent another letter to Petitioner noting that the FMLA period had expired and that Respondent continued to perform the conditions detailed in the August 14 letter. The letter asks for the return of the laptop computer and cellphone. On November 5, Petitioner delivered her baby. One month later, she spoke with Ms. Galloway exploring, in Ms. Galloway's opinion, the possibility of returning, if her replacement were not working out, or obtaining additional severance pay. Ms. Galloway explained the company's view that the termination was voluntary, not involuntary. Eventually, Respondent agreed to pay Petitioner another week's salary, through July 18, and extended her insurance through December 31, so that Petitioner would have another chance to exercise her COBRA rights. Respondent advised that it was treating Petitioner's termination date as October 4, which was when the FMLA period had expired. There is no evidence of discrimination in Respondent's handling of Petitioner's pregnancy. Respondent assigned no role of substance in the 2008 events to Michael Kassal, whose objections to the June 18 understanding were completely ignored. There is no evidence that the company's actions in 2008 were influenced in any way by Michael Kassal's 2003-05 infatuation. Petitioner testified to a 4-6 week period during which she had previously worked at home. However, this earlier period of working at home was when Petitioner was engaged in the solitary task of converting payroll systems on the computer, and she needed a quiet place to work. Working at home under these conditions is entirely appropriate. During this period, Petitioner was working exclusively on this task, leaving her other human resources duties to others or deferring them until the conversion was finished. Any insistence by Respondent in 2008 that Petitioner work in the office is justified because Petitioner's duties generally required her to be in the office, where she would be available for, among other things, drop-in visits by corporate management needing assistance in the wide range of personnel matters that arise daily in a business of this size. However, Petitioner's claim of discriminatory treatment regarding working at home misses the larger point that, in the June 18 understanding, Respondent allowed her to work at home for the duration of her pregnancy. This understanding was defeated, not by Respondent's insistence that she work in the office, but by Petitioner's deteriorating medical condition. Petitioner also testified that Respondent allowed other managers to work at home. Again, this proof overlooks the fact that Respondent also allowed Petitioner to work at home under the June 18 understanding, and her subsequent inability to do so was due to her deteriorating health, not the demands of Respondent. Also, the other situations are distinguishable, even if Respondent had prohibited Petitioner from working at home. While one district manager's wife recovered from a broken leg and another district manager recovered from a heart attack and stroke, they worked in some fashion, either with reduced hours in the office or reduced hours from home. Petitioner's situation was different in the nature of her duties, which were corporate-wide, not district-wide; the fact that she was completely unavailable for an extended period of time; and probably for the fact that, for a substantial period of time, she failed or was unable timely to communicate her situation to Respondent. Based on these findings, Petitioner has failed to prove any form of sex discrimination in Respondent's handling of her pregnancy in 2008.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 2010 . COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert A. Bogdan, Esquire Robert Anthony Bogdan, P.A. 410 Southeast 1st Terrace Pompano Beach, Florida 33060-7108 Salvatore H. Fasulo, Esquire Trip Scott, P.A. 110 Southeast Sixth Street, 15th Floor Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
The Issue Whether or not on or about December 5, 1975, the Respondent, Evelyn R. Doege, licensed under the beverage law, did allow or permit Angela Davies an employee to conduct herself in a lewd and lascivious manner to wit; performing in the nude and the placing of foreign objects on or into Angela Davies vagina, the touching or rubbing the vaginal area with Angela Davies fingers to simulate masturbation, in violation of Section 847.011(4), Florida Statutes, thereby violating Section 561.29, Florida Statutes. Whether or not on or about January 23, 1976, the Respondent, Evelyn Christine Doege, licensed under the beverage law, did knowingly allow or permit a person or persons, to wit; William Thomas Hogan, Robert Joseph Ruchanelli, Leroy Francis Bonifay, Hervert Ronnie Milstead and Joseph Stephen Tronie, to roll dice on the countertop of the bar in her licensed premises for money and/or beer, in violation of Section 849.01, Florida Statutes, and thereby violating Section 561.29, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Evelyn Christine Doege, is the holder of license no. 27-374, series 2-COP, held with the State of Florida, Division of Beverage. The Respondent held such license on December 5, 1975 and January 23, 1976, the operative dates of the complaints under consideration. On December 5, 1975 the Respondent was operating under the aforementioned license at 508 South Navy Boulevard, Escambia County, Florida. Among the employees of the Respondent were certain topless dancers. These dancers had been instructed by the Respondent to act decent and to keep their clothes on, with the exception of the tops of their clothing. These dancers mentioned were female. On that same date, to wit; December 5, 1975, between the hours of 3:00 P.M. and 3:30 P.M., one of the employees, employed on that day and time was Angela Davies. While dancing in the bar proper, Angela Davies removed the top and bottom of her clothing to include the T-string which she was wearing as a bottom part of her undergarment and left the stage area where she was performing. She then proceeded to a patron's table and thrust her vagina at the patron seated at that table. This course of conduct went on for a couple of songs over a period of five to ten minutes. Angela Davies then went back to the stage and continued to expose her vagina, she took eye glasses from one of the patrons and placed the ear piece into her vagina. She then squatted down and removed a dollar bill from the mouth of a patron with her vagina and then took the dollar bill out with her hand. Still in the presence of patrons she fondled her breasts with her fingers and inserted her fingers in her vagina simulating masturbation. At this point in time a female patron identified as Rhonda or Debbie, who had formally been a dancer in the bar, was challenged by the patrons in the bar to, "show Angela how to do it." At which time Rhonda or Debbie got up on the stage with Angela Davies, took off all her clothes and began dancing. In the course of the performance Angela and Debbie or Rhonda fondled each others breasts and vaginal area. Rhonda or Debbie then exited from the stage. Angela then took an advertising figure made out of cardboard which was in the form of a man, placed that figure between her legs and thrust her vagina at the figure. When Angela had concluded this she took a wine bottle and placed the wine bottle in the pubic area. The wine bottle was then broken on the stage. During the course of Angela Davies' performance the Respondent, Evelyn Doege had come to the back of the stage and thrown water at Angela Davies and attempted to make her stop. In addition, when the bottle was broken she made another attempt to have the employee, Angela Davies, cease her dance. She was unsuccessful in her attempts. Agent David Cobb had witnessed Angela Davies activities. He took the Respondent from the bar into the parking lot, and placed her under arrest. He then reentered the bar and placed Angela Davies under arrest. Angela Davies had been drinking and appeared not to be in control of her faculties. It was established that the employee, Angela Davies, was a roommate of Rhonda or Debbie, and the Respondent knew of this fact prior to the actions of those two persons. Moreover, the Respondent was able to see these actions from her location within the bar during the course of the dances. On January 23, 1976, while serving a notice to show cause for the events of December 5, 1975, certain patrons within the Respondent's bar at 508 South Navy Boulevard, Escambia County, Florida, were observed rolling dice on the countertop of the bar. The Respondent was standing at the bar while this activity was occurring. Those patrons stated that they were rolling the dice to see who would buy a round of beer. The Respondent admitted seeing this activity but stated that she felt it was not illegal. The dice and cup in which the dice had been placed were not the property of the Respondent.
Recommendation For the violations as established in the notice to show cause, it is recommended that the Respondent be suspended for a period of 90 days and fined in the amount of $500.00. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of October, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Charles F. Tunnicliff, Esquire Division of Beverage 725 Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Anthony E. Fiorentino, Esquire 105 South Navy Boulevard Pensacola, Florida 32507
Findings Of Fact Respondent grew up in Havana, Cuba and was a university student there when Castro came into power. As did most university students, Respondent initially supported Castro but later became disenchanted with the regime. Respondent became interested in photography as a boy and became proficient to the point he sold photographs to the news media and helped defray the expense of his medical training through photography. Following the Bay of Pigs Invasion, Respondent smuggled out of Cuba photographs of the Russian missiles that had been delivered to Cuba. Respondent acknowledged that he took all of the photographs and videotapes entered into evidence in these proceedings. At all times relevant hereto, Respondent was licensed as a physician by the Florida Board of Medical Examiners. He graduated from medical school in Madrid, Spain in 1964, completed his internship at Johnson Willis Hospital, Richmond, Virginia, in 1965, and his residency in psychiatry at the Menninger School of Psychiatry, Topeka, Kansas in 1968. Respondent came to Naples, Florida in 1969 as Director of Collier County Mental Health Clinic which post he held for several years before devoting all of his time to his private practice. Respondent was married in 1962, and divorced in 1978. He is the father of three children. His two older daughters are working on advanced degrees while the younger son is entering high school. Following his divorce Respondent concluded that by marrying at a young age, he had perhaps missed out on much of life and decided to try a more libidinous life-style. In 1980, Respondent became attracted to a 19-year old licensed practical nurse who was working at Naples Community Hospital. Although he saw her several times in the hospital, they did not engage in conversation but made eye contact in passing each other. In October 1980, another doctor referred a patient who had suffered head injuries in a motorcycle accident to Respondent for treatment. This patient, Joseph DiVito, was seen in the hospital several times by Respondent and again after DiVito was released from the hospital. At the first hospital visit with DiVito, Respondent was surprised to see Laura Hodge, the LPN at Naples Community Hospital, whose eyes had attracted Respondent. She was the woman with whom DeVito was living at the time of his accident. The charges in the Administrative Complaint involving Laura Hodge are sustained only if a doctor-patient relationship existed between Respondent and Hodge. The doctor patient relationship, if it existed, was related solely to the treatment provided DiVito. Hodge testified that she was counseled by Respondent jointly with DiVito and also alone; that Respondent gave her the drug Artine to give DiVito in the event he suffered a reaction from the drug Haldol, which was given DiVito to aid in his memory loss; that after his release from the hospital DiVito was like a baby who had to be taught to feed himself, to walk, and to get around; that she had lunch with Respondent twice, once at Keewaydin Island, where they went by Respondent's boat, and once at a restaurant in North Naples; that following the lunch she felt dizzy and does not remember removing her clothes at her apartment when returned there by Respondent and having pictures taken of her; that after being shown nude photographs of herself, she was afraid of Respondent and feared he would show the pictures to DiVito; that she Accompanied Respondent on an overnight trip to Miami where they shared a motel room; that they went to dinner at a caberet where she drank some wine and began feeling strange; that when they returned to the motel that night, she does not remember anything until the following morning when she awoke upset and began crying; and that Respondent then drove her back to Naples. Shortly thereafter, Hodge left Naples with DiVito and went to Panama City where DiVito operated a boat leasing business during the summer of 1981. She returned to Naples that fall but had no further contact with Respondent. Respondent testified that he was surprised to see Hodge the first time he went to DiVito's room in the hospital; that Hodge told him that she didn't want to stay with DiVito; that the principal person who took care of DiVito when he was released from the hospital was his brother, William DiVito; that DiVito had been a very active man and was anxious to leave the hospital before he was physically ready to do so; that he was ambulatory, could feed himself and his principal problem was loss of memory; that Hodge was never his patient; that they had lunch twice, once at Keewaydin Island and again at a restaurant in North Naples; that both of these times Respondent took numerous photographs of Hodge and gave them to her; that following the lunch and picture-taking at Vanderbilt Beach (North Naples) he drove her to the apartment she had just moved into; that he visited her at this apartment at a later date and while she changed clothes, he took pictures of her in various stages of undressing; that he showed her these pictures after they had been developed; that she accompanied him to Miami where they shared a motel room and went out to dinner; and that they returned to Naples the following day because Hodge was upset. Photographs of Hodge which were admitted into evidence are of a person who appears fully aware that she is being photographed and in many of the pictures appears to be posing. Haldol, the drug given DiVito, can cause an epileptic type reaction; however, the treatment for this reaction is by injection and not orally because of the time it takes oral ingestion to work. The testimony of Hodge respecting Respondent entrusting to her the Artine tablets to place in DiVito's cheek if he had a reaction to the Haldol is less credible than is the testimony of Respondent. Although Respondent saw Hodge when he was treating DiVito and talked to the two of them, he did not thereby make Hodge his patient. Furthermore, no credible evidence was presented that Respondent surreptitiously gave Hodge any drug which could cause her to not remember the taking of the nude photographs. Her coordination and awareness shown in those photographs belie the contention that she was drugged. Diane Beck, R.N., arrived in Naples in 1981 and worked as a nurse at Naples Community Hospital where she met Respondent. After declining several dates with Respondent, Ms. Beck accepted an offer to go scuba diving from Respondent's boat. This involved a weekend trip to the Florida Keys on the boat and they had sex over this weekend. Respondent also took some nude photographs of Ms. Beck with her consent. Evidence presented to establish a doctor-patient relationship between Respondent and Beck included one instance where, following a D & C on Beck, the gynecologist asked Respondent if he had Tylenol #3 which Beck could take if needed for pain. When Respondent replied in the affirmative, the gynecologist did not write a prescription for medication for Beck. Although Beck testified that while they were living together, Respondent gave her Darvocet, Motrin and Tylenol #3 for dismenorreah from which she chronically suffered, Respondent denied prescribing these medications for her. The most likely scenario in this regard is that Respondent had such medication available in his home and Beck took them in accordance with instructions previously received from her gynecologist. This did not create a doctor-patient relationship between Respondent and Beck. Respondent prescribed benzodiasepines to many of his patients as a tranquilizer and sleeping pill. During the period December 1981 and October 1982 the Upjohn representative (detailer) whose territory included Respondent's office, gave Respondent 465 Xanax tablets as samples. Xanax is a benzodiasepine and the Xanax tablets were .25 mg and .5 mg in strength. The Upjohn company detailer who serviced the Naples area between October 1982 and June 1984 did not testify and no record of benzodiasepines left as samples with Respondent during this period was available at the hearing. Records of those drugs are maintained by Upjohn for the current year and two preceding years only. At the time of this hearing, the earliest record Upjohn had of drugs dispensed to physicians was January 1, 1985. Around November 1982, Upjohn came out with a benzodiasepine called Halcion. This drug was left with Respondent by detailers as samples. Halcion is packaged in sleeves with two tablets in a sleeve. Generally when Halcion is left as a sample, the box contains five sleeves with two tables per sleeve. Halcion has advantages over some other benzodiasepines that it works quickly, the effects wear off quickly and it leaves no hangover effect. Furthermore, the patient may have a memory lapse for the time sedated with Halcion. Use of Halcion is contraindicated by a woman of childbearing age because the drug can adversely affect and cause deformities in a fetus in the early stages of development. Halcion (as well as other drugs) may be obtained by a physician in a stockbottle which generally consists of 100 tablets in a square bottle with a round top. To obtain a stockbottle the physician places his order with the detailer, signs the appropriate FDA forms, the detailer sends the order to his area office and the stockbottle is mailed directly to the physician. No credible evidence was presented that Respondent ever obtained a stockbottle of Halcion from Upjohn. When benzodiasepines are taken in conjunction with the ingestion of ethyl alcohol, the effects of both are enhanced. Hence, there is a danger in taking sedatives while drinking alcoholic beverages. Alcohol alone is a sedative and it is quickly absorbed in the soft tissue such as the brain. When a benzodiasepine is taken at the same time ethanol is being ingested, the alcohol provides a vehicle which allows the benzodiasepine to be more quickly absorbed into the body. While Diane Beck was dating and living with Respondent, several videotapes were made of her and Respondent engaged in various sexual activities. Ms. Beck acknowledged that she voluntarily participated in some of these videotapes but that she was unaware that others were taken. She has no recollection that some of the tapes were being made, nor did she subsequently (before the charges here considered first arose) learn of these videotapes. In those tapes, Beck had been administered Halcion by Respondent without her knowledge or consent. This finding is based upon the following facts: Respondent told Beck he had given her a lot of Halcion. When Beck became pregnant by Respondent in mid-1983, Respondent told her of potential dangers caused by the use of Halcion and suggested she have an abortion. An appointment was made by Respondent with Dr. McCree, a gynecologist, to perform the abortion and on July 11, 1983, Dr. McCree performed a D & C on Beck, aborting the fetus. On one or more occasions Beck observed what appeared to be residue in her after dinner drink, and on at least one occasion asked Respondent about it. Respondent told her it was sugar from the old brandy she was drinking. Respondent acknowledged that he often performed sexual acts on Beck while she was "passed out" and unaware of what he was doing. However, he contended she enjoyed it and had given him permission. The videotapes of a comatose female being shifted around by Respondent to improve the angle for the pictures being taken. This does not appear to be a person merely intoxicated, certainly not one intoxicated with ethanol. This person is as limp as a rag with all muscles appearing to be totally relaxed who is certainly oblivious to what is going on. It is not believed a person merely intoxicated (unless dead drunk) could be moved and manipulated the way Beck was without some reaction. Had Beck been dead drunk, she would perhaps still be intoxicated when she awoke and/or be hung over. Neither of these events occurred. Respondent's steady relationship with Beck terminated in April 1984 after the date for a wedding could not be agreed upon. She moved out of his house but they remained on friendly terms until the existence of the videotapes became known. The third complaining witness, Sandi Karppi, met Respondent in June 1984 on the beach in Naples. At the time Ms. Karppi was an LPN on private duty with a patient where she had one hour off in the late afternoon which she used to walk on the beach. One day while walking along the beach, she was followed by Respondent who was attracted to the energy with which she walked. Respondent overtook her and engaged her in conversation. During the conversation Respondent disclosed his name and that he was a psychiatrist. Ms. Karppi disclosed to him that she had a pap smear taken which was suspicious, that a second test had been done, and she was anxious to obtain the results but her doctor did not return her calls. Respondent volunteered to obtain the results of the later test and inform her. Karppi told Respondent that she walked the beach almost every afternoon and Respondent began visiting the beach to meet her during her hour off from her nursing duties. A short time after the first meeting Respondent called Karppi to tell her that he had the results of her lab test and offered to take her to dinner to give her the results. She consented. Thereafter he continued to meet her on the beach and engage her in conversation. Respondent's version of the timing of the initial events of their relationship is a little different from the version testified to by Karppi; however, these differences are not material to the issue here presented. Respondent testified that Karppi told him of her problems with the pap smear test several days after their first meeting and that he agreed to get the results of the tests. Dr. King advised Respondent obtaining the results of the pap smear and passing them to Karppi. During the meetings on the beach and on boat trips Karppi took on Respondent's boat, Respondent took numerous photographs of Karppi. On one occasion, they went on an overnight trip to Keewaydin Island with Respondent's son Eric and a friend of Eric. The two boys slept in a tent on the beach leaving Karppi and Respondent on the boat. On another occasion they went alone on the boat to Captiva Island where they spent the night on board. Karppi testified that she went to sleep fully clothed while at Keewaydin Island in a bunk bed on one side of the cabin with Respondent in another bed and when she awoke, she was naked. Nude photographs of Karppi in a comatose state are contained in Exhibit 1. Karppi never consented to having her picture taken in the nude. Respondent's version of the nude photographs is that he frequently talked to Karppi about taking nude photographs but she never consented, saying only that maybe she would allow the photographs if out of town or if she was tipsy. Respondent contends these photographs were taken while they were at Captiva Island with only the two of them on the boat and that Karppi drank a lot of wine and passed out. He then disrobed her and took the photographs. Respondent contends he gave Karppi no drugs before she passed out. However, it is concluded that Karppi was given some sedative along with the wine she drank. This conclusion is based upon the following facts: Respondent had access to Halcion, Xanax, Tylenol #3, and other drugs that could induce coma. Respondent had used such drugs on Diane Beck and was aware of the potential for use of these drugs. In order to take some of the photographs in Exhibit 1, Karppi had to be moved around enough to awaken one who was just sleeping or only sleeping off ethanol induced sleep. Some of the actions of Respondent as depicted in these photographs would have awakened or aroused one who was not fully comatose. Karppi has no recollection such photographs were ever taken, though she was sober and had no hangover the next morning. Subsequent to the boat trips Respondent took a vacation during most of the month of July during which he travelled to Europe and the Caribbean. Upon his return to Naples, he renewed his courtship with Karppi and she moved into his home August 26, 1984, the day after Respondent's oldest daughter returned to college. Respondent's testimony that they first had sex that night which Karppi spent in his bedroom is not disputed by Karppi. If they engaged in sex before that time, Karppi was unconscious and unaware of it. During part of the time Karppi stayed at Respondent's home and shared his bedroom, her mother also visited and slept in another bedroom at Respondent's home. This relationship terminated around September when Karppi moved into her own apartment. She and Respondent remained friendly and saw each other occasionally. One night in late December 1984, Karppi called Respondent from the hospital to tell him she had a headache and to ask him to prescribe some medication for her. After learning that Karppi had tried without success to get her doctor on the telephone and that her doctor had prescribed Cafergot for her headaches, Respondent called in a prescription to the hospital pharmacy to give 4 Cafergot tablets to Karppi. The label from the bottle dated December 29, 1984 was admitted as Exhibit 16. In early January 1985, Respondent went to Vail, Colorado, with another woman and Karppi offered to stay at his house with Respondent's elderly mother while he was gone. He agreed and Karppi moved in. While looking for a book in Respondent's bedroom closet, Karppi discovered the nude photographs of her which were admitted into evidence as Exhibit 1. Having no recollection these pictures had been taken, she was quite shocked and called Respondent at his hotel in Vail. He told her to be calm and they would discuss the matter when he returned. Following a more extensive search, Karppi found numerous other photographs of naked women as well as several videotapes. Karppi contacted her doctor for advice, and he referred her to an attorney who in turn referred her to the State Attorney's Office. At the State Attorney's Office, she produced the photographs of herself she had removed from Respondent's residence and her affidavit was taken. On the basis of Karppi's affidavit and the photographs, a search warrant was obtained and on January 11, 1985, a search of Respondent's home was conducted. During this search, Exhibits 1 - 16 were seized. Subsequent to the conclusion of the hearing, those exhibits unrelated to any individual involved in these charges which were objected to at the hearing were not admitted into evidence as having no relevance to these charges. Following the search of Respondent's residence, criminal charges were brought against Respondent in the Circuit Court in and for Collier County alleging sexual battery and administering drugs to Karppi without her knowledge or consent. Respondent was acquitted of those charges.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Respondent unlawfully terminated the employment of the Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was born in 1964 as an anatomical male named Andrew Allen Shepley. The Petitioner married a female in 1984. The couple separated in December 2000. During the course of the marriage, the couple produced four children. They divorced in July 2002. The Respondent is a large recreational vehicle dealership located in Seffner, Florida. The winter months are the busy season for sales and service of recreational vehicles, and the Respondent may employ several hundred employees at that time. In August 1999, the Petitioner began employment as a technician (essentially a mechanic) with the Respondent. His duties as a technician included inspections and service and repair responsibilities for recreational vehicles. He also sometimes performed "walk-throughs" with vehicle purchasers at the time of delivery during which features and operations of the vehicle are discussed with the new owner. The Petitioner worked for the Respondent for approximately one year, and then in about August 2000, he moved with his wife and children to Chicago where his wife's family was located. In December 2000, the Petitioner returned to Florida after separating from his wife. He sought a job and was again employed as a technician by the Respondent. Although the Petitioner was born anatomically male, he psychologically identifies himself as female. The Petitioner has been aware of the issue since his early childhood. For various reasons, in Spring 2001, the Petitioner began a course of psychotherapy. During the psychotherapy, the Petitioner was diagnosed with gender identity disorder, a condition wherein the psychological perspective of a person does not correspond to the anatomical gender into which the person was born. After the diagnosis, the Petitioner continued with psychotherapy and in June 2001 began transitioning into living as a female, initially on a part-time basis. He lived as a female during non-work hours and as a male during his hours of employment. As time passed, the Petitioner decided to begin living as a female on a full-time basis. In July 2001, the Petitioner requested approval from the Respondent to take the last week of the year as vacation during which he planned to visit his children in Chicago. He also intended to begin living full-time as a female during the vacation. Some co-workers were already aware of the Petitioner's intent to begin living as a female. The Respondent's technicians work in teams of between six and ten employees per team. Each team has a foreman. Andrew Dietz was the foreman for the Petitioner's team. The Petitioner advised Mr. Dietz at some point in mid-2001 that he had been diagnosed with gender identity disorder and was planning to transition to life as a female. The Petitioner believes that for various reasons other employees may have been aware of the situation. In August 2001, the Petitioner informed the Respondent's human relations office that he intended to begin living as a female on a full-time basis and would return to work after the December vacation as a female. The human relations office apparently was supportive of the Petitioner's decision. The human relations office informed Allen Kelley of the Petitioner's intent to begin living as a female. Mr. Kelley was the manager in charge of the Respondent's service and delivery operations. There is no evidence that Mr. Kelley had any concerns about or objections to the Petitioner's decision to live as a female. In September 2001, the Petitioner began hormone treatments which resulted in physical changes to the Petitioner's body including breast development, but the Petitioner testified that the changes were not likely visible to an "untrained eye." The Petitioner also began to let his hair grow longer than he had previously. He began to wear acrylic fingernail extensions without polish. His ears were pierced. In December 2001, the Petitioner received a merit pay increase and was part of a team of technicians receiving an award for superior service. As planned, the Petitioner took the last week of December 2001 as vacation. During the Petitioner's vacation, Mr. Kelley conducted a series of meetings with the teams of service personnel and advised them that the Petitioner would return to employment as a female. Some employees expressed discomfort with the Petitioner's decision during the meetings, but Mr. Kelley advised them that the Respondent was going to "work as best we can to accommodate him." Also during the Petitioner's vacation, the Respondent re-labeled an existing single-user lockable restroom (previously identified as a women's facility) as a "unisex" facility to provide restroom access for the Petitioner. On January 2, 2002, the Petitioner returned as a female to his employment with the Respondent. He wore the same uniform he wore prior to the vacation. He put colored nail polish on the acrylic fingernails he had already been wearing. He added breast forms under the bra he had been wearing prior to his vacation. He wore makeup, including eye shadow and lipstick. The Respondent provided to the Petitioner, a nametag for his uniform identifying him as "Madalynn." There is no evidence that any person employed by the Respondent in a management position made any derogatory comments about the Petitioner, suggested that there should be any change in the Petitioner's appearance or behavior, or was otherwise unsupportive of the Petitioner's decision to return to work as a female. Mr. Kelley testified that beginning with the Petitioner's return to work on January 2, 2002, Mr. Kelley spent approximately two hours of each day dealing with issues related to the Petitioner's return to work as a female. Mr. Kelley testified without contradiction that there were complaints from several unidentified customers, to him and to sales staff, about having to interact with the Petitioner. The Petitioner acknowledged being aware of one specific customer who complained. Mr. Kelley testified that he advised customers that the Petitioner was a good technician, but that other employees were available to work with customers upon request. Mr. Kelley subsequently decided to address the issue by assigning other technicians to conduct vehicle walk-throughs with customers, and so informed the Petitioner. Mr. Kelley had to twice warn one employee (Bruce Dickens) who was loudly unhappy with the Petitioner's decision to live as a female, but after Mr. Kelley advised Mr. Dickens that further disruption by Mr. Dickens would result in unpaid suspension, Mr. Dickens refrained from continuing his complaints. Mr. Kelley testified as to "threats" relayed to him by employees who claimed to have knowledge that other employees were planning some unidentified action against the Petitioner, but Mr. Kelley was unable to recall the names of any of the employees involved in either the threats or the reporting of the threats. He did not advise the Petitioner of the alleged threats. He did not contact law enforcement about the situation. He made no written record related to the threats. Mr. Kelley monitored the employee parking area to ascertain whether any inappropriate activity was occurring, but observed nothing of concern. Mr. Kelley testified that between six to twelve times daily, he observed various groups of technicians standing around talking, and that he had to enter the service area and direct them to return to work. He did not overhear any conversations, but assumed that the conversations were related to the Petitioner. An incident involving graffiti placed in the "unisex" bathroom was resolved by removal of the graffiti after the Petitioner reported it to management. On January 7, 2002, the Petitioner was called to the human resources office where Mr. Kelley informed him that he was a substantial disruption in the workplace and that his employment was being terminated. Mr. Kelley testified that he was solely responsible for making the termination decision. There is no evidence that Mr. Kelley discussed the termination with the owner of the Respondent, or that any other employee was involved in Mr. Kelley's decision. The Respondent employed several homosexual technicians during the period of the Petitioner's employment who were not subjected to any adverse employment action. The Respondent employed a female employee who underwent breast enlargement surgery during the time the Petitioner was employed by the Respondent. The Petitioner testified that the female was a "distraction" at work that was not subjected to any adverse employment action.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order DISMISSING the complaint of discrimination filed by the Petitioner in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of November, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard C. McCrea, Jr., Esquire Luisette Gierbolini, Esquire Zinober & McCrea, P.A. 201 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 800 Post Office Box 1378 Tampa, Florida 33601-1378 Craig L. Berman, Esquire Berman Law Firm, P.A. 111 Second Avenue, Northeast Suite 810 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Mary Anna Cline (Ms. Cline), is a fifty-two year old female who was employed by USBI Company (USBI) from 1985 until November 15, 1994. USBI refurbishes the solid rocket boosters for the space shuttle program at the Kennedy Space Center, Brevard County, Florida. It employs substantially more than fifteen full-time employees. Ms. Cline was hired for the position of technical illustrator, which position is responsible for drawing mechanical components, doing illustration and charts, and preparing manuals and documents that apply to the day-to-day work of the company. She was a good employee and had excellent technical skills, as reflected in her performance evaluations and numerous commendations. At the time that she left the company, she was in a position titled "senior technical illustrator." In early 1992 the company had some internal reorganization, and Ms. Cline and a group of employees were transferred from Management Services to Documentation Support. The job duties remained substantially the same, but the new group also had responsibility for the Routing of Documents (RODS) program, which involved the tracing of detailed technical drawings, to be used on a computer mainframe by the "techs" (engineers). Documentation Support generated technical documentation for the rockets, all technical manuals, standard procedures, testing, fliers and presentations - generally all of the paperwork used by the company, including verbiage and graphics. The supervisor of Documentation Support, then and now, is a woman, Monica Teran. Approximately seventy-five percent of Ms. Cline's work group were women. In June 1992, Richard Bowen was hired by USBI as a technical illustrator and was assigned to Documentation Support. He became a coworker of Ms. Cline and their assigned work stations were side-by-side without a partition. Richard Bowen's two main hobbies are photography and computers. He was generally accepted as the computer expert in the work group; when there were problems with the computers, Richard Bowen could often work them out. Bowen's interest in photography is also more than a casual avocation. He attended photography school in Chicago when he was younger and worked with a modeling agency. He holds an occupational license to conduct a photography business and performs commercial photography services that do not conflict with his 9-5 job: weddings, portraits, some modeling photographs and some work with a theme park in Orlando. He is a member of the Audubon Society and takes wildlife photographs and does computer work for the organization. The Photograph Incident Staff in the work group were interested in Bowen's photographs. He brought samples of his pictures to work to show off. He usually left the pictures on his desk, face up, so that people could come to his work area and look at them. Some time in the latter months of 1992, Bowen purchased an expensive special soft-focus lens that gives the subject a soft, romantic, mystical look and deletes the wrinkles or blemishes. He discussed the lens with a fellow photographer at work and brought in a sample of photographs he had taken with the lens. Most of the pictures among the twelve to fifteen which he brought on this occasion were wildlife; there also were a few photographs of a model. She was bare-breasted, but was not exposed from the waist down. While there is no clear description of her pose in the record, she was described by some as nude and others as partially nude. None described the photographs as sexually suggestive or pornographic. In the early morning before work started, some female staff members were shuffling through the photographs. Ms. Cline was part of the group looking on. Bowen said something semi-jokingly like, "You might not want to look at these; there's a bare-breasted model." One of the women replied that it was nothing that she had not seen before, and continued shuffling through the photographs. Ms. Cline saw the model's photograph, remarked that the girl had pretty eyes, and returned to her own work station. Several months later, after a workshop that management had initiated to deal with problems in the workplace, Ms. Cline reported the photographs to Carol DuBray, Director of Human Resources and Darryl LeCanne, the immediate supervisor of Monica Teran. Ms. Cline was embarrassed by the photographs. Management's Response As soon as Ms. Cline left Darryl LaCanne's office, he called Monica Teran, and the two supervisors met with Richard Bowen. They informed him that USBI had a policy of not tolerating nude photography or pin-up calendars in the workplace and that his bringing the photographs to work was unacceptable behavior. Darryl LaCanne told Richard Bowen that the next time severe disciplinary action would be taken. Richard Bowen was also called in to speak with USBI's director of security, Barry Wysocki. Mr. Wysocki informed him that nude pictures were prohibited by USBI's regulations. Mr. Bowen received the message in clear terms that the matter was very serious. Bowen never again brought nude or semi-nude photographs to work and Ms. Cline never again saw such photographs at work. Offensive Shop Talk Work stations in the Documentation Support unit were divided into cubicles, some separated by dividers, some (Richard Bowen's and Ms. Cline's) were side by side, facing a partition with two other workers on the opposite side. Workers interacted within a small space and moved about to use different computer equipment, printers, files, and similar work tools. Among some of the workers there was occasional bawdy banter and comment about boyfriends, weekends and vacations, and the like. It was sexually oriented in a sophomoric, adolescent schoolyard manner. It included terms like "shit" and "fuck" and included conversation about "blow jobs" or "hard-ons," and other slang words involving male genitalia. With one exception, the language was not directed to Ms. Cline. That exception was one occasion when Richard Bowen responded to her criticism of some work with the expletive "fuck." Both male and female workers engaged in the banter, which was overheard by Ms. Cline and others. Ms. Cline was particularly offended by banter between Bowen and a female worker, Anna Silvestri, who occupied a workstation on the other side of the partition in front of Ms. Cline and Mr. Bowen. Ms. Silvestri sometimes initiated this banter. In May or June of 1993 Ms. Cline reported to her supervisor, Monica Teran, that Richard Bowen and Anna Silvestri used the word "fuck" and engaged in sexually explicit conversations. Ms. Teran went to her supervisor to see what to do about the complaint and Carol DuBray requested that Barry Wysocki conduct an investigation. Barry Wysocki interviewed and took statements from employees in the Document Support Unit, including Ms. Cline. She complained that Richard Bowen created a hostile environment; that she heard him say "fuck" on one occasion in the past two months and that she heard Anna Silvestri say the word on two occasions. Ms. Cline said that Bowen and Silvestri discussed Ms. Silvestri's sex life and that on one occasion Ms. Silvestri tried to discuss her sex life with Ms. Cline, but she cut her off with a comment that it was improper. Ms. Cline reported hearing Monica Teran and Beth Seaman use the word "fuck" in the work area. Bowen and Silvestri did not deny mild profanity and mildly sexual conversations. Other employees reported hearing some profanity, primarily "shit," "damn" and "bullshit." Richard Bowen and Anna Silvestri were seriously reprimanded by Barry Wysocki, by Barry Smoyer, by Darryl LaCanne and by Monica Teran. Each supervisor impressed on the two employees that the use of foul language was not tolerated and was against company policy. Barry Smoyer gave the two employees a letter "for the record," documenting the counselling session and reprimand. Monica Teran moved Ms. Cline to Anna Silvestri's workstation on the other side of the partition from Richard Bowen. She moved Anna Silvestri two cubicles away, with several partitions between her and Mr. Bowen. And George Roberts was placed next to Richard Bowen in Ms. Cline's former workstation. The intent by the supervisor was to accommodate Ms. Cline's concerns and to separate the two prime offenders. In the two years that he worked for USBI, including the time that he worked next to Richard Bowen, George Roberts heard nothing more than "hell" or "damn" from Bowen. Nevertheless, around August 1994, during her performance review, Ms. Cline informed Monica Teran that the sexual conversations were continuing. Ms. Teran informed her supervisors and another investigation commenced, this time by USBI's new security director, Al Eastlack. Mr. Eastlack conducted an interview with Ms. Cline, among others, and took her formal statement in September 1994. Barry Smoyer reviewed a draft report of Mr. Eastlack's investigation and although he understood the results were "inconclusive," Mr. Smoyer renewed his admonishments to Richard Bowen and Anna Silvestri in separate memoranda to the two, reminding them of USBI's intolerance of sexual harassment in any form and warning them that inappropriate language would result in disciplinary action. Alleged Threats After the photograph incident, but before she complained, Richard Bowen and Mary Anna Cline had a conflict over the use of some computer graphics software. Bowen was advocating one type of software that Ms. Cline opposed. Monica Teran had to intervene and instructed Ms. Cline to install the program and learn how to use it. After she complained about the photographs, Ms. Cline became convinced that Richard Bowen was going to retaliate. She complained to Monica Teran that she was afraid of Bowen but her complaints were non-specific. She began to complain of stress and sleep problems. Ms. Teran recommended that she go to the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) counsellor or to see her own counsellor or doctor. This was around the same time that Ms. Cline complained about the offensive language and conversations, and Ms. Cline took the recommendation to mean that Ms. Teran did not believe her, or that Ms. Teran felt Ms. Cline was at fault. Ms. Teran also commented to Ms. Cline that she should simply tell Bowen to stop talking like that. Another employee, Dorothy Stokey, who was offended by Bowen's use of "fuck" had told him to stop. Ms. Cline was too intimidated by him to confront him directly. Some time in the latter months of 1993, Monica Teran found Ms. Cline in the ladies' room crying and upset to the point of incoherence. Ms. Cline had overheard a conversation between Richard Bowen and Anna Silvestri involving a gun and made a connection between that and incidents of violence in the workplace and coworkers being shot. With the help of Barry Smoyer, Ms. Teran was able to get Ms. Cline out of the ladies' room and calmed down. Then, at Mr. Smoyer's direction, Ms. Teran called Ms. Silvestri and Mr. Bowen into her office to find out what had happened. Mr. Bowen did not have a gun at work and he had been discussing a gun show early that morning. Ms. Teran was satisfied that the discussion had been innocuous and reported her findings to Barry Smoyer. No other employee reported that Bowen had a gun or saw him with a gun. None, including Ms. Cline, ever complained that Bowen had threatened them with a gun. Alleged Retaliation Ms. Cline contends that USBI retaliated against her for reporting sexual harassment. Specifically she claims that her job duties were shifted from work on RODS, which she liked, to word processing, which she disliked and with which she had difficulty, due to some dyslexia. It is undisputed that Ms. Cline was a very competent graphics illustrator. She and Mr. Bowen and a couple of other employees in the unit were considered the core of the illustration function, and other employees in the unit preferred and were more skilled in the word processing and language component of the unit's responsibilities. However, the work assignments were not so clearly divided between "illustration" and "word processing." The production and modification of company manuals required both types of work. Monica Teran was interested in cross-training her staff to do a variety of tasks. There was a time, after mid-1993, when Ms. Cline's assignments involved word processing. She also continued to do a substantial amount of RODS work, as evidenced by handwritten logs maintained by the employees. Monica Teran never instructed the staffperson responsible for making assignments to remove Ms. Cline from RODS or other graphics work. RODS was not considered high profile or creative work since it primarily involved tracing technical components repetitively. There was a period when RODS work was put on hold. There was another period when temporary employees, such as George Roberts, were taken in to work exclusively on RODS. At no time during her employment with USBI was Ms. Cline demoted in job title or pay. In 1993 and 1994 her employment evaluations reflected a need to improve communications and attendance, but she was still rated "excellent," "good" and "acceptable" in all categories, and overall "excellent" and "good." There is no evidence to indicate that anyone tampered with Ms. Cline's computer or sabotaged her computer, as she claimed. On occasion it was necessary for Monica Teran or other staff to work at Ms. Cline's and other stations, to see if programs were loaded or the machine was set up properly. Although certain equipment, such as a printer, was located at an individual workstation, other staff needed access to that equipment. Job-Related Stress Ms. Cline's attendance did suffer and she did experience job-related stress. She went to an EAP counsellor and to a psychiatrist. She was on medication and there were problems with adjusting the type and amount of medication. Ms. Cline experienced sleep disorders; she reported falling asleep at the wheel of her car and had a minor accident. She also experienced other physical phenomena such as pains in her chest and arms, or numbness. Her psychiatrist diagnosed her medical condition as "adjustment reaction of adult life with mixed emotions, basically depression and anxiety." (T-415) Accommodation and Resignation Monica Teran's staff was located in two buildings: the modular unit occupied by Ms. Cline, Mr. Bowen, Ms. Silvestri and others; and another separate building which also included other USBI employees. Ms. Teran's staff was moved around routinely, as new employees were added or other work space needs arose. In Fall 1993 USBI offered to move Ms. Cline to the other building, allowing her to retain her same position and duties; she declined, and the company did not insist that she move. Later, Ms. Cline was offered a lateral position at the same pay and position level. Carol DuBray met with Ms. Cline to discuss this attempt to accommodate her. Ms. Cline also rejected that offer. She explained at hearing that she was afraid she would have been in line for a layoff, if she transferred. However, there is no competent evidence to support that fear. Ms. DuBray explained to Ms. Cline in their meeting that she would retain all benefits, including seniority. In fact, USBI has no departmental seniority policy. Seniority is based on the date an individual is hired by the company, rather than time within a department in the company. On November 15, 1994, Ms. Cline voluntarily resigned, citing "continuing stress brought on by sexual harassment, discrimination, retaliation and the flagrant disregard by USBI and its management in the handling of this problem. . . ." (Petitioner's exhibit no. 31) The Formal Complaints At the time she resigned Ms. Cline had already filed her complaint of discrimination with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). That charge is dated December 6, 1993. The charge of discrimination alleges violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, by sexual harassment and retaliation. It does not cite the Florida Civil Rights Act, Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. Pursuant to a worksharing agreement between EEOC and FCHR, the charge was sent to the Florida agency for initial investigation. That workshare agreement, which refers to the FCHR as the "FEPA," provides, in pertinent part: FILING OF CHARGES OF DISCRIMINATION In order to facilitate the filing of charges of employment discrimination, the EEOC and the FEPA each designate the other as its agent for the purpose of receiving and drafting charges. The FEPA shall take all charges alleging a violation of Title VII, ADEA, EPA, or the ADA where the parties have mutual juris- diction and refer them to the EEOC for dual filing, so long as the allegations meet the minimum requirements of those Acts. Each Agency will inform individuals of their rights to file charges with the other Agency and to assist any person alleging employment discrimination to draft a charge in a manner which will satisfy the require- ments of both agencies to the extent of their common jurisdiction. As part of the intake duties, investigators are to verify with the charging parties if they have filed a charge of discrimination with other agencies prior to filing the charge. For charges that are to be dual-filed, each Agency will use EEOC Charge Form 5 (or alternatively, an employment discrim- ination charge form which within statutory limitations, is acceptable in form and content to EEOC and the FEPA) to draft charges. When a charge is taken based on disability, the nature of the disability shall not be disclosed on the face of the charge. * * * H. The delegation of authority to receive charges contained in Paragraph II. a. does not include the right of one Agency to determine the jurisdiction of the other Agency over a charge. * * * DIVISION OF INITIAL CHARGE-PROCESSING RESPONSIBILITIES * * * D. EEOC will not defer or refer any charge for the FEPA to process that is not jurisdictional on its face with both Agencies. If it is apparent that one Agency might have jurisdiction when another does not, then the Charging Party will be referred to the appropriate Agency. * * * (Petitioner's exhibit no. 41) (emphasis added) A notice dated December 20, 1993, on EEOC form 212, states that the FCHR has received the charge and will initially investigate the charge. The FCHR did investigate the charge and the FCHR investigator's report is dated July 13, 1994. A document styled "Determination: No Cause" is dated August 25, 1994 and has the apparent signature of FCHR's Executive Director. An accompanying document, with the same date, is styled "Notice of Determination: No Cause" and informs Ms. Cline as complainant of her right to file her petition for relief within 35 days. The petition for relief dated September 27, 1994, was filed with FCHR, and cites the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as well as Title VII. The petition alleges sexual harassment and retaliation. FCHR transmitted the petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings on October 6, 1994. The amended petition for relief, filed on April 10, 1995, and referenced in the order and notice of hearing dated May 16, 1995 deletes any reference to Title VII and recites instead that the claims for relief are based on Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. The amended petition does not claim constructive discharge nor does it mention that Ms. Cline left the company approximately five months earlier. Sexual Harassment Policy and Summary of Findings USBI has, and during the relevant period had a sexual harassment policy which provides: The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's amended "Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex" include a section prohibiting sexual harassment as "unwelcome sexual advances, request for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of sexual nature when: submission to such conduct is either an explicit or implicit term or condition of employment, or submission to or rejection of such conduct is used as a basis for an employment decision affecting the person rejecting or submitting the conduct, or such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an affected person's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. Sexual harassment is unacceptable behavior by any USBI employee or outside vendor. Any form of harassment, like any conduct contrary to common decency or morality, cannot and will not be tolerated. The company will take whatever corrective action necessary to prevent or deal with acts of sexual harassment in the work place. (Respondent's exhibit no. 61) The policy provides names and phone numbers for persons to report sexual harassment and states that reports at that point will be confidential. Employees are informed of the policy through annual letters from the company head, through posters on the facility walls and through mandatory workshops for managers and their staff. USBI responded appropriately to Ms. Cline's complaints. Its response as to the photographs was effective; the sexually-themed banter, however, continued. The banter did not constitute sexual harassment of Ms. Cline, nor did it create a sexually hostile work environment. No one at USBI ever made a sexual advance towards Ms. Cline; no one suggested or requested sex from her or asked her for a date. No one touched her inappropriately. The sexual banter was never directed to or about her. The banter overheard by Ms. Cline, and the use of the "f word," were occasional, not daily or even weekly. The banter was not directed solely to, or about women; it was engaged in, and was overheard, by men and women, alike. The work quarters were close; the unit which included Ms. Cline was in a small "modular" building with work stations divided by movable partitions. By necessity, workers moved around the office to use various equipment. Coworkers of Ms. Cline did not find the environment sexually hostile, offensive or intimidating. No one else of the primarily female group complained about a sexually hostile or intimidating work environment. According to both a friend and her psychiatrist, Ms. Cline was more sensitive than most to profanity and off-color language. Without question, Ms. Cline suffered from stress at work. The stress was manifest in the myriad physical symptoms which caused absenteeism and loss of performance. USBI appropriately offered to Ms. Cline accommodations which would have allowed her to continue working at the same job level and salary but outside of the environment she found intolerable. She rejected the offers and voluntarily resigned. The resignation was not urged, directly or indirectly, by the company.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Ms. Cline's complaint and petitions for relief in this cause. DONE and ENTERED this 25th day of March, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-5634 The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Adopted in paragraph 2. Adopted in paragraph 1. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in part in paragraph 33; otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 60. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted by implication in paragraph 60. Adopted in substance in paragraph 48. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 50. Adopted in paragraph 52. Adopted in paragraph 53. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Subparagraphs are addressed as follows: Adopted in substance: a (but not the date), b, c, h, i, m, n. Rejected as unnecessary, immaterial or misleading: d, e, f, g, j, k, l. Rejected, as to the "escalation," as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence; adopted generally in summary in paragraph 17; but some of the specifics alleged were not established (for example, the "sucking" statement). Rejected as a mischaracterization of the incident, although use of the word, "fuck," was proven. 19.-22. Rejected as not credible. 23.-24. Adopted in substance in paragraph 17. 25.-28. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Adopted in part in paragraphs 39-41, but it was not proven that the stress was the result of a "hostile work environment," within the scope of gender-based discrimination. Rejected as unnecessary. 31.-32. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 33.-34. Accepted that she complained, but the dates and frequency were not established with competent evidence 35. Conclusion that the steps were "inadequate" is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. 36.-41. Rejected as unnecessary, immaterial, or misleading. 42. Rejected (as to characterization of "retaliation") as contrary to the weight of evidence and the law. 43.-46. Rejected as unnecessary, given the recommended disposition. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-4. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 48 and 49. 5.-6. Adopted in substance in paragraph 54. 7. Adopted in paragraph 1. 8. Adopted in paragraph 55. 9. Adopted in paragraph 3. 10. Adopted in paragraph 4. 11. Adopted in paragraph 5. 12.-13. Adopted in paragraph 4. 14.-15. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 34. Adopted in paragraph 6. 18.-21. Adopted in paragraphs 7 and 8. 22. Adopted in paragraph 9. 23. Adopted in substance in paragraph 59. 24. Adopted in paragraph 61. 25. Adopted in paragraph 10. 26. Adopted in paragraph 12. 27.-28. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 11 and 12. 29. Adopted in paragraph 13. 30. Adopted in paragraph 27. 31. Rejected as unnecessary. 32.-35. Adopted in paragraphs 14 and 15. 36.-38. Adopted in paragraph 19. 39.-43. Adopted in paragraphs 20 and 21. 44. Adopted in paragraph 22. 45. Rejected as unnecessary. 46. Adopted in paragraph 23. 47.-48. Rejected as unnecessary. 49. Adopted in substance in paragraph 25. 50. Adopted in paragraph 24. 51. Adopted in paragraph 26. 52. Adopted in paragraph 28. 53. Adopted in paragraph 29. 54. Adopted in paragraph 31. 55. Adopted in paragraph 30. 56. Rejected as unnecessary. 57.-62. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 43 through 46. 63.-64. Adopted in part in paragraph 47; otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 65.-72. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 32 through 38. COPIES FURNISHED: Patricia E. Lowrey, Esquire Mark B. Roberts, Esquire STEEL HECTOR and DAVIS 1900 Phillips Point West 777 South Flagler Drive West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Wayne L. Allen, Esquire 700 North Wickham Road, Suite 107 Melbourne, Florida 32935 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue presented by this case concerns the question of whether the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has exhausted all treatment for the Petitioner, John P. Wordsman, III, through available sex offender programs administered by the Respondent. See Section 917.20, Florida Statutes (1977).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner submitted a "Petition for Administrative Determination" to the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. In turn, the Department requested the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct a formal hearing to consider the matters set forth in the petition and this request was received by the Division of Administrative Hearings on January 13, 1981. A final hearing in this cause was scheduled for January 30, 1981, but was not conducted until March 3, 1981, to allow Petitioner to secure representation. In the course of the final hearing the Petitioner testified in his own behalf. The Respondent called as witnesses Lois P. Stevens, Staff Psychologist in the forensic service at the Florida State Hospital and Robert H. Alcorn, Jr., Director of the Mentally Disordered Sex Offender Program at the Florida State Hospital. Petitioner had two exhibits admitted. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1 was admitted into evidence. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, the Petitioner has been in the custody of the Respondent in keeping with the order of the Circuit Court of Duval County, Florida, and the authority of Chapter 917, Florida Statutes (1977). Beginning July 28, 1978, through the present, Petitioner has resided in the Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee, Florida, where he is undergoing treatment in a hospital program for the benefit of mentally disordered sex offenders. This program and similar programs in other institutions administered by the Respondent require a high degree of motivation on the part of the patient in order to achieve success. Although the Petitioner has made progress in the course of his stay, the Respondent has made a preliminary determination that it has exhausted all appropriate treatment for the Petitioner through the program in which he is enrolled and has additionally concluded that similar programs within the State of Florida do not offer other opportunities for progress. In that respect, the Respondent has exhausted treatment in the affiliated programs. The principal treatment modality in the mentally disordered sex offender program at Florida State Hospital is group therapy. The Petitioner has participated in the group therapy sessions during his current hospitalization but no significant change in his behavior has been observed during this period. His condition has been diagnosed as (1) sexual deviation, pedophilia, (2) homosexuality, and (3) alcoholism. The petitioner has been placed with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services following a plea or nolo contendere to the offense of sexual battery, involving an attempted rape. Referring again to the Petitioner's participation in the principal treatment modality, i.e., group therapy, Petitioner has worked in a group headed by a male psychologist, staff worker and subsequently, a group with a female staff worker. The change to the female staff worker was to assist the Petitioner in dealing with his relationship with females. His attitude toward females has been described as Victorian in that he had problems relating to women who fulfilled roles other than child bearing. Through the group discussions, the Petitioner has talked about his preference for homosexual life style and his problem with alcoholism. Wordsman has not discussed his problems with pedophilia. In the group sessions, his "feedback" under discussion of his life's circumstance is confusing and his motivation in those sessions is not genuine. In this connection, the Petitioner's attitude has been described as one of playing "head games," especially with his principal advisor and therapist, Lois Stevens. This attitude in essence means the Petitioner has feigned sincere participation. His explanation for this tactic is to the effect that he wanted the treatment but that he did not feel that he was up to the occasion of sincerely applying for it. The Petitioner does not wish to engage in specific topics in the group therapy sessions and is distrustful of people, to the extent that he would not confide in others. When pressed to give specific responses during the course of the group therapy sessions, the petitioner becomes stressful and will not give answers to the questions posed. The form of treatment in the sex offender program requires honesty in the responses of the participants and the Petitioner has difficulty complying with this standard. In the course of the group sessions and in dealing with the subject of his crime, the Petitioner would not give specific responses other than to say that he remembers events around the time period of the act; however, he indicates that he may have been on alcohol when it occurred. The only brief progress that the Petitioner has shown in relating to his problems in the group therapy sessions occurred immediately after he had been told that the staff was recommending his return to the committing court. At that juncture, he became more sincere in the first session, but immediately reverted back to a superficial and shallow manner of dealing with the treatment form. The Petitioner has been involved in other therapy activities to include music, leather and wood therapy, a program for alcoholics, and occupational therapy. Petitioner is an accomplished musician and has performed well in that form of therapy and in addition has made notable progress in occupational therapy. Notwithstanding the progress in these therapy areas, his failure to make satisfactory progress in the group therapy sessions, which sessions are the primary agent for change in the underlying condition of the patient, has lead the hospital staff to the conclusion that it has exhausted treatment of those conditions. Continued success in the other related therapy does not have a significant effect in alleviating his condition. This opinion is expressed in the most recent staffing summary of December 10, 1980, a copy of which has been admitted as Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. In addition to the staffing achieved by Florida State an interdepartmental screening was conducted of the Petitioner's condition and the question of exhaustion of treatment in the sex offender programs and it was the opinion of the unit directors of the sex offender programs within the Respondent Department's organization that the overall Department had exhausted treatment for the Petitioner in the sex offender programs. It is the opinion of the Department that the Petitioner continues to meet the definitions of sex offender within the meaning of Chapter 917, Florida Statutes. Wordsman feels that he has made progress in dealing with people around him and that he gets along better than he did before his commitment to the program. He has expressed concern that the staff is "out to get him" and that the group therapy sessions are not adequate to deal with his problem. He prefers to be placed in a program for behavior disorders with specific emphasis on drug abuse, in that he feels his problems arise when he becomes intoxicated. His reaction to the current program In which he is placed is summed up by his remark that he does net "understand what the staff wants from him."
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services finding that it has exhausted all appropriate treatment for John P. Wordsman, III, and that said John P. Wordsman, III, be returned to the committing court for further disposition. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of March, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of March, 1981 COPIES FURNISHED: Gerry L. Clark, Esquire Florida State Hospital Chattahoochee, Florida 32324 J. Craig Williams, Esquire 335 East Bay Street Jacksonville, Florida 32201
The Issue Did Respondent, Labor Ready Southeast, Inc. (Labor Ready), discriminate against Petitioner, Daniele M. Camp, on account of her gender in violation of chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2014)?1/
Findings Of Fact By Notice dated November 25, 2014, the hearing was scheduled for January 14, 2015, in Gainesville, Florida. The Notice of Hearing was mailed to Ms. Camp’s attorney, Fred D. Mongello, Esquire, at his address of record. The hearing convened as scheduled at 9:30 a.m., Eastern Time, on January 14, 2015, at which time neither party nor respective counsel had appeared. No evidence was presented by either party. The hearing was adjourned at 10:00 a.m. Neither party appeared prior to adjournment. Neither party contacted the office of the undersigned.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations deny the Petition for Relief of Daniele M. Camp. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of January, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 2015.
