The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Sheila A. Cunningham, was subject to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent, Florida Credit Union, on account of her race or due to retaliation for her opposition to an unlawful employment practice in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, who was at all times relevant to this matter an employee of Respondent, is African-American. There was no direct testimony as to the number of persons employed by Respondent. However, given the testimony describing a large financial institution with multiple departments, including a data scanning department and a call center, there is sufficient competent, substantial evidence to establish an inference that Respondent employs more than 15 full-time employees at any given time. Petitioner was first hired by Respondent on November 20, 2007. On February 2, 2008, she was transferred to the position of Courtesy Pay Credit Advisor (CPCA), a position held until her termination on March 21, 2014. From 2012 through the time of her termination, Jennifer Perez was Petitioner’s direct supervisor. Ms. Perez reported to Mr. Colson, who supervised the credit advisor department. Over the years, Petitioner received a number of certificates and awards for good performance in her position. CPCAs are responsible for collections on delinquent accounts of members by bringing the account to a positive balance within 60 days of delinquency. If a credit union member’s account is delinquent for more than 60 days, it must be written off, resulting in a loss to Respondent. Failure to timely write-off a negative account can subject Respondent to fines and negative audit ratings. A common way of bringing an account current is to arrange a loan with Respondent to pay the delinquent balance. Loan types include a “bounce-free” loan and a “work-out loan.” Both are designed to allow for payment of the negative account in installment payments. The bounce-free loan has only the negative account balance involved, while the work-out loan combines the negative balance with another existing loan. CPCAs receive additional compensation for such loans, known as “incentives,” of $10 to $15, though the record suggests that a dispute over an incentive of $40 was a triggering cause of the adverse employment action in this case. CPCAs are also responsible for “packing” loans, which includes taking the loan paperwork to the optical department to input and image the documents into Respondent’s system. The optical department periodically provides reports on loans for which documentation has not been submitted for input and imaging. Petitioner testified credibly that the optical department would occasionally neglect to scan loans that were submitted. However, there was no evidence to suggest that to be a frequent or pervasive problem. Respondent routinely employs one or two CPCAs at any given time. The CPCAs are assigned a “queue,” which is an alphabetical assignment of member accounts. The evidence suggests that Petitioner served as the CPCA for all delinquent member accounts for a period of almost one year, a practice that ended when Vikki Martello was hired as a CPCA on February 27, 2012. Upon her hiring, Ms. Martello was assigned the accounts of members with last names beginning with the letters A through K, and Petitioner was assigned the accounts of members with last names beginning with the letters L through Z. Ms. Martello was transferred to another position on July 11, 2013. Jennifer Munyan was hired as a CPCA on May 20, 2013, and was assigned the A through K queue. Since Petitioner’s termination, Ms. Munyan has handled all delinquent accounts. Petitioner mentioned several incidents over the course of her employment that she believed to be evidence of her poor treatment by Respondent. These incidents appear to have occurred more than one year before Petitioner filed her employment complaint of discrimination. They are cited here for purposes of background. Petitioner testified that starting in 2010 or 2011, Respondent began to hire younger credit advisors on the basis of their friendship with management. The new employees engaged in childish activities such as throwing paper clips and blowing bubbles. Petitioner indicated that they were “written up” for those activities. There was no suggestion that either the hiring or the write-ups were based on race. For a period of time, Petitioner was assigned what she believed to be a disproportionate share of holiday weekend shifts. Mr. Colson “corrected that and then that was okay.” There was no suggestion that the issues with scheduling were based on race. Shortly after Ms. Martello was hired on February 27, 2012, she was asked to accompany Mr. Colson and Ms. Perez to a branch office to train employees. Petitioner felt “that was not right,” and that she was being excluded from performing certain job tasks. She testified that Respondent’s assignment of training and other duties to persons other than herself led to a sympathetic nick-name of “invisible credit advisor.” Petitioner admitted that, in her opinion, Ms. Martello was an excellent employee. Mr. Colson testified credibly that Petitioner was not asked to assist in the new hire training since she was already behind on managing her accounts, and that “[t]here’s no compensation or award or anything for training another employee, it's just additional work.” There was no suggestion that the decision to have Ms. Martello assist with training was based on race. Petitioner alleged that despite her requests, she was not allowed to shadow other employees, particularly in the call center, so that she could learn the responsibilities of the member service representative position. She testified that in response to her requests, Ms. Perez would say “okay, we'll see about it, but nothing never happened. And I asked like three or four times and it was always we'll see about it.” Petitioner did not claim in her testimony that she was denied these opportunities because of her race. Petitioner generally claimed she was denied promotional opportunities because she was not allowed to train as a back-up. However, she failed to present any evidence of an open and available position for which she had applied, or for which she was denied. Furthermore, there was no suggestion that race played a role in any such denial. Respondent’s employees are informed of work performance issues in several ways, including informal discussions, e-mail communication, individual or group meetings, coaching reports, and annual evaluations. On March 19, 2012, Petitioner received her annual performance review. Although Respondent was complementary of Petitioner’s improvements in her work, and spoke favorably of her interpersonal relationships and work ethic, the review noted a number of “improvement opportunities and development areas” to be implemented over the course of the following year. Deficiencies in job performance included Petitioner’s practice of making initial contact with a delinquent member by letter, rather than the more effective practice of a phone call; the failure to provide sufficiently descriptive account notations; the failure to “charge off” loans correctly resulting in errors for others to correct; the failure to close checking accounts after workout options or loans were complete resulting in further delinquencies; and the failure to set up loan distributions correctly, resulting in unwarranted loan delinquencies and resultant customer complaints. The performance review also cited issues with Petitioner’s negative accounts extending beyond the required time frame, which was noted in Respondent’s quarterly audit report. The deficiencies noted in the performance review resulted in higher than normal charge-offs, and losses to Respondent. Petitioner improved her performance in some areas, but only for short periods of time. Mr. Colson did not issue Petitioner any coaching reports in 2012 because he believed that Petitioner’s mistakes were not intentional, that she had a positive attitude, that she had no attendance issues, and that “she seemed to like her job a lot.” It was Mr. Colson’s belief that with additional training and a cooperative approach, Petitioner’s performance issues could be corrected. On February 27, 2013, Petitioner received her next annual performance review. Petitioner was again complemented on her interaction with members, her teamwork, and her general positive work ethic. It was noted that Petitioner had responded well to coaching such that she rarely made mistakes in setting up automatic loan payments. The review noted, however, a number of areas for improvement, including some that had not been resolved from the previous year’s review. Of particular concern was the high number of missing loan packets, some of which were months past due; the failure to meet consecutive deadlines for submitting completed work; and the failure to begin work on accounts in an appropriate and timely manner. Petitioner was again instructed to make initial contact with delinquent members by phone or email, rather than by letter; and was advised of several of her accounts that were charged-off after missing the 60-day deadline. Finally, Petitioner was provided with a printout of the 142 overdrawn checking accounts in her queue, only 40 of which (28 percent), had been worked in the previous 60 days. Although some early-stage overdraft accounts carried a “high self-cure rate,” the low number of accounts worked was deemed unacceptably low. After receiving her 2013 performance review, Petitioner improved in some areas of her performance, but again only for a short period of time. Beginning on July 15, 2013, Petitioner, Ms. Martello (until she completed her transfer from the collections department), and Ms. Munyan (upon her assignment to the collections department) were provided with periodic email updates from Ms. Perez on the number of loan packets for which each was responsible that had not been submitted to the optical department. The updates and related correspondence between Petitioner and Ms. Perez revealed the following: July 15, 2013 Petitioner - 37 missing loan packets Ms. Martello - 4 missing loan packets July 19, 2013 Petitioner - 36 missing loan packets Ms. Martello - 6 missing loan packets July 30, 2013 Petitioner - 34 missing loan packets Ms. Martello - 5 missing loan packets August 5, 2013 Petitioner - 29 missing loan packets Ms. Martello - 2 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 1 missing loan packet August 14, 2013 Petitioner - 31 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 2 missing loan packets August 19, 2013 Petitioner - 38 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 5 missing loan packets August 27, 2013 Petitioner - 42 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 4 missing loan packets September 3, 2013 Petitioner - 38 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 5 missing loan packets September 10, 2013 Petitioner - 42 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 5 missing loan packets September 16, 2013 Petitioner - 32 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 4 missing loan packets On September 18, 2013, Ms. Perez sent an email to Petitioner and Ms. Munyan advising them that credit union auditors were scheduled to arrive on September 30, 2013. Thus, Petitioner and Ms. Munyan were instructed to “[m]ake sure all of your loan packets are up to date, so that no one comes to us requesting something that cannot be located.” October 1, 2013 (for loan packets through September 27) Petitioner - 38 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 3 missing loan packets The October 1, 2013, update further advised Petitioner and Ms. Munyan that “[t]he auditors are here for the next three weeks. If they review any of these loans, it will be a problem that we do not have them scanned yet and if we are missing documents. Please get these turned in this week!” On October 12, 2013, Petitioner sent Ms. Perez an email stating that “I worked on some loan packets on 10/12. Please don’t send email until I turn my loan packets in on 10/16.” October 25, 2013 Petitioner - 20 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 7 missing loan packets November 4, 2013 Petitioner - 28 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 4 missing loan packets November 12, 2013 Petitioner - 33 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 5 missing loan packets On November 15, 2013, Petitioner sent Ms. Perez an email stating that “Optical have some loan packets that were turned in today, please don’t send out list until after 11/18/13.” November 22, 2013 Petitioner - 35 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 7 missing loan packets December 11, 2013 Petitioner - 41 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 1 missing loan packet December 18, 2013 Petitioner - 32 missing loan packets Ms. Munyan - 2 missing loan packets On October 9, 2013, Mr. Colson met with Petitioner and Ms. Munyan to discuss the results of an attorney audit that was critical of several collections practices. In particular, too many accounts were not being worked until the later stage of delinquency; too much time was allowed to elapse between contacts with the members; and workflow notations were not properly completed. A spreadsheet provided during the October 9, 2013, meeting revealed that Petitioner had 92 accounts in her queue, 57 of which had never been worked. Ms. Munyan had 90 accounts in her queue, 25 of which had never been worked. In November of 2013, Petitioner spoke with Ms. Perez regarding an incident in which Petitioner alleged that Ms. Munyan claimed one of her incentive credits. Ms. Perez advised Petitioner to come back to her if it occurred again. Ms. Perez discussed the incentive issue with Mr. Colson. They determined that, due to a high volume of negative accounts anticipated over the upcoming holidays, and in recognition of the priority on not missing an opportunity to resolve negative accounts, a policy for incentives when a CPCA had to handle incoming calls and loan requests from members who were not in the CPCA’s queue was warranted. On November 19, 2013, Ms. Perez sent an e-mail to Petitioner and Ms. Munyan setting out the policy for handling calls when the other CPCA was not available. Outgoing calls and loan initiation were limited to customers within the CPCA’s queue. However, if a CPCA was not in the office or was unavailable to handle a customer request, the other CPCA was instructed to accept incoming calls from members not in their queue. The CPCA who first entered notes of a customer contact prior to a loan being booked was to receive the incentive. On December 9, 2013, Ms. Munyan received a communication from a member with a negative account, entered the first notes of contact with the member into the workflow history, and sent loan paperwork for a bounce-free loan to the member. On December 10, 2013, Petitioner spoke with the customer and took additional application information over the phone. Later that same day, Petitioner went to Mr. Colson to approve a refinance loan for the customer. Mr. Colson approved Petitioner to proceed with the refinance loan based on the customer’s income, but did not know at the time that Ms. Munyan had already started the loan process. Since Ms. Munyan made the first contact with the customer, the incentive was credited to Ms. Munyan. Petitioner proceeded to make several entries on the workflow history asserting her claim to the incentive. Petitioner apparently discussed the matter within the office, leading to her testimony that “[t]he department was upset about it because I showed it to them.” In December 2013, having been made aware of the workflow history comments regarding the disputed incentive; having received complaints regarding Petitioner from the manager of Respondent’s contact center; and having continuing issues with Petitioner’s failure to submit loan documents to the optical department, Mr. Colson prepared a series of coaching reports to individually address the issues. It was decided to issue separate coaching reports for each issue of concern, rather than a single lengthy report, in order to keep the issues separate. Respondent has previously issued multiple coaching reports to employees under comparable circumstances. On December 20, 2013, Petitioner was called into a meeting with Mr. Colson. She thought the meeting was to discuss the disputed incentive. Instead, she was presented with the coaching reports. The first coaching report was issued for Petitioner’s notations into the workflow system related to her intent to claim the disputed incentive credit. Petitioner had previously received training on the information to be entered in the workflow system. During the training sessions, which were conducted periodically, and which included the distribution of printed materials, it was stressed that the workflow notes should not be editorial or contain side comments. Mr. Colson explained that, in the event of a legal dispute with a member regarding their account, the collection record, including the notations entered into the workflow system, would be made part of a court record. As applied to Petitioner’s notations, Mr. Colson was concerned about having to testify about notations in the collection record regarding incentives or commissions for working on a work-out request. Petitioner alleged that Ms. Martello and other unidentified credit advisors made similar notations in the workflow system without being written up, but provided no evidence to support her assertion. Mr. Colson knew of no other instance of a CPCA making notations in the workflow system related to an incentive dispute or other internal employee dispute. Mr. Colson believed that the notations made by Petitioner regarding the incentive dispute were not pertinent to the collection record, thus violating Respondent’s policy and warranting the issuance of the coaching report. Petitioner signed the first coaching report, with the comment that “I thought that I was doing the right thing on this acct.” The second coaching report addressed Petitioner’s act of taking a fee refund voucher to Respondent’s contact center department for approval. The contact center has staff on duty beyond Respondent’s normal 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. business hours. The fee refund had to be done on November 25, 2013, since that was the 60th day of the negative account, after which the account would have to be written off. The fee refund was for an amount that exceeded Petitioner’s approval authority. Despite the time frame involved, Petitioner did not get the fee refund voucher approved by the clerk of the collections department, which would be the normal course, before the 5:00 p.m. close of business. During the December 20, 2013, meeting, Mr. Colson discussed the practice of taking vouchers to the call center for processing after 5:00 p.m. Mr. Colson had been approached by the assistant vice president of the contact center regarding Petitioner’s multiple visits after 5:00 p.m. to his department “to have transactions done, fees refunded, things of that nature on members' accounts.” As a result, call center employees were being pulled away from their normal tasks to do transactions that were not a normal function of their job. Petitioner alleged that other credit advisors went to the call center to have such transactions processed, including Ms. Martello, Melonice Lindsey, and Howard Miller, but provided no evidence to support her assertion. Mr. Colson had no knowledge of other credit advisors who engaged in this activity, or any other improprieties regarding the processing of fee refunds. The second coaching report addressed additional issues related to the November 25, 2013, fee refund transaction, including the fact that Petitioner did not work on the sixty-day negative account when she arrived to work that morning, and that she did not enter any notation in the workflow history regarding the fee refund. Mr. Colson believed that the issues regarding the fee refund transaction warranted the issuance of the coaching report. Petitioner signed the second coaching report, with the comment that “I didn’t do this intentionally. I forgot to get voucher back from Katie to give to [Mr. Colson] to sign.” The third coaching report addressed the ongoing problem of Petitioner’s failure to provide loan documentation to the optical department for input and scanning, the details of which are set forth in paragraph 22 above. Petitioner signed the report with the comment that “[s]ome of these loans have been turned into optical. I will review this matter.” Petitioner alleged that other employees had fallen behind on submitting paperwork, but were not written up or terminated. Petitioner did not identify, by name or race, any of the allegedly comparable employees, or establish that they had a comparable history of failing to submit loan documentation. The only evidence adduced at the hearing established that Ms. Martello and Ms. Munyan were not comparable to Petitioner in the number or frequency of late-submitted loan packets. Petitioner stated that she had previously advised Ms. Perez of her intent to work on Saturday, December 21, 2013, to catch up on her loan paperwork. Mr. Colson was not aware of Petitioner’s intent to do so but, given the length of time that the problem continued to exist, would still have issued the coaching report to Petitioner. At some point after January 2, 2014, during Mr. Colson’s daily review of compliance reports, he noted an account that was over 60 days, requiring that it be written off. The account was assigned to Petitioner, and Mr. Colson saw from the workflow history that Petitioner did not begin work on the account until it was 58 days past due. Working her accounts earlier in the delinquency stage had been previously addressed with Petitioner. On January 6, 2014, Petitioner was given a coaching report and placed on a 60-day probation for deficient work performance related to the written-off account. Petitioner signed the January 6, 2014, coaching report with the comment that “voucher was paperclip to another voucher by mistake. I usually check these daily.” Petitioner testified that other employees failed to timely charge-off accounts but were not counseled, but provided no evidence to support her assertion. The only comparator for whom evidence was received was Khrissy Adams, a Caucasian woman, who was given a coaching report and placed on a 30-day probation for failing to timely write-off an account. There was no evidence of Ms. Adams having received previous coaching reports so as to warrant a lengthier period of probation, as was given to Petitioner. As part of the process established after the December 20, 2013, meeting and coaching reports, Petitioner was to submit her loan packets to either Ms. Perez or Mr. Colson for review before they were sent to be scanned. That review revealed that a large number of the loan packets contained significant errors in the consumer lending plan, which is the contract a member signs to obtain a loan. Many of the consumer lending plans had missing signatures, and some packets had no consumer lending plan at all. Furthermore, Petitioner indicated that some members elected to purchase loan insurance when the member had, in fact, declined insurance, resulting in unapproved charges to a member. The errors noted by Respondent were serious, potentially resulting in the loan contracts being invalid and unenforceable. The errors could have been violative of Regulation Z, which governs fair lending practices and, if there were a sufficient number of instances, resulted in a class action lawsuit against Respondent, exposing it to considerable cost. Due to the ongoing performance issues, as well as the severity of the issues related to Petitioner’s completed loan packets, the decision was made that termination of Petitioner’s employment was appropriate. Petitioner was thereafter terminated from employment on March 21, 2014. Petitioner identified no instance of any racially- disparaging comments directed at herself or any other employee by anyone affiliated with Respondent. There was no non-hearsay evidence of any employee outside of Petitioner’s protected class who engaged in conduct similar to that of Petitioner, but without consequence, upon which to support a finding that the employee was treated more favorably. Mr. Colson testified credibly that Petitioner’s race had no bearing on the decision to terminate her employment. Rather, Mr. Colson testified convincingly that the decision was based solely on Petitioner’s continuing and increasingly poor job performance. Mr. Colson felt Petitioner’s poor performance was not due to a lack of trying on Petitioner’s part; it was simply the result of a lack of ability on her part. Petitioner asserted that she was written up, placed on probation, and subsequently terminated from employment in retaliation for complaining that Ms. Munyan improperly claimed her incentive. In that regard, she testified that: I know that by me going to management . . . it really started all this, I think, because I’m thinking to myself, if I would have just kept my mouth shut, maybe I would have had my job, but other employees have went to Mr. Colson before with problems like that . . . . But my thing is, after I went to management I get written up out of retaliation. I got blind-sided. I didn’t know that was going to happen. And, to me, that’s retaliation. Petitioner does not claim that she was denied the incentive credit because or her race. Finally, Petitioner complained that some of her personal belonging were damaged or not returned to her after her employment was terminated, testifying that “[t]hey broke up all of my things and, to me, that was not right. To me, that was discriminative.” Even if there were some evidence that Petitioner’s belongings had been damaged on purpose -- which there was not -- there was no evidence that such damage was the result of racial animus. A review of the entire record of this proceeding reveals not a shred of evidence that any of the employment actions of which Petitioner complains were the result of racial bias or discrimination. The only testimony that can be reasonably read as suggesting some racial bias behind the employment actions at issue are Petitioner’s testimony as follows: and I know that discrimination do exist. I do know that’s a problem all across the board in America . . . [a]nd if I did not feel that I was discriminated against I would never have did all this . . . but my thing is I know there’s favorites at that credit union. I know that certain people get away with things. To me, I was discriminated against, I'm gonna say for the record, because of my race, because if I think that I know within my heart if the tables were turned, if I was white and went to management, I would still had a job because to me it just got blown out of proportion by me going to management. And as everyone can clearly see, it all started from there, because if it wasn't started from there, why would I have gotten written up in first place for my work that happened prior to, you know, that -- you know, that year? So, that's what started that. So my point is, is that if I wouldn't have never said anything, I would have probably still been working there. In the absence of some corroborative evidence, Petitioner’s statements alone cannot provide the support to sustain a charge of racial discrimination. Ultimate Findings of Fact There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing to support a finding that the decision to terminate Petitioner from employment was made due to Petitioner’s race. Rather, the decision was based on Petitioner’s performance in her job as reflected in the employee coaching reports. Furthermore, there was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that persons who were not African-American were treated differently from Petitioner, or were subject to dissimilar personnel policies and practices. There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing to support a finding that the decision to terminate Petitioner from employment was made in retaliation for Petitioner’s opposition to an unlawful employment practice. Rather, to the extent there was some retaliation involved, it was for bringing an internal employee complaint over a disputed incentive to management, a complaint that had no implication of race.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Respondent, Florida Credit Union, did not commit any unlawful employment practice as to Petitioner, Sheila A. Cunningham, and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2014-00645. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of May, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of May, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Sheila Annette Cunningham 1835 Northwest 27th Avenue Ocala, Florida 34475 Tammy Scott Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 R. Michelle Tatum, Esquire John E. Duvall, Esquire Ford and Harrison, LLP 225 Water Street, Suite 710 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue Whether Respondent, Sojourn Hospitality-Naples Bay Resort, discriminated and retaliated against Petitioner, Richard Puccini, on the basis of his sex, in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The record is comprised solely of Petitioner’s Exhibits 1 and 2, which constitute inadmissible hearsay for which no exception to the hearsay rule has been established.3/ Because no testimony or other admissible evidence exists, as to which such hearsay could be used to explain or otherwise supplement, there can be no findings of fact.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order in this proceeding finding that the Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent discriminated against him on the basis of his sex or retaliating against him and dismissing the Petition in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of January, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ANDREW D. MANKO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of January, 2019.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Gulf Coast Enterprise (GCE), discriminated against Petitioner, Terry R. Douglas, based on his race--African-American--or his disability-- hearing impairment.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Terry R. Douglas (Douglas) is an African- American male. He is hard of hearing and uses hearing aids (when he can afford the batteries) and relies upon interpretive sign language when it is available.1/ At all times relevant hereto, Douglas worked as a food line server under the employ of GCE, which is a division of Lakeview Center, Inc., an affiliate of Baptist Health Care. The stated purpose of GCE is "to operate a successful business which will provide meaningful employment to persons with disabilities in accordance with the requirements of the AbilityOne Program." AbilityOne is a program that creates jobs and training opportunities for people who are blind or who have other severe disabilities, empowering them to lead more productive and independent lives. GCE is an equal opportunity employer and does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, gender, age, marital status, disability, or any other category protected by law. Douglas had been previously employed by GCE in 2010 as a custodian but voluntarily resigned to pursue employment elsewhere. He briefly took a job in the Orlando area, then went to Memphis for about one year. When he returned to Pensacola he took a position with GCE commencing May 9, 2013, in the food service division. He was hired to work the night shift, from 7:00 p.m., until approximately 1:30 a.m. As part of being hired anew by GCE, Douglas filled out an "Employee Self-Identification Form" in order to advise GCE of his status within a protected class. Douglas identified himself as an individual with a disability but stated that there were no accommodations which GCE needed to provide in order to improve his ability to perform his job. When Douglas recommenced employment with GCE in May 2013, he went through employee orientation. He received copies of the Employee Handbook and various written policies addressing issues such as discrimination, harassment, drug-free workplace, etc. He was also provided training on the GCE Code of Conduct and Respect in the Workplace policies. Douglas' job entailed preparing and/or serving food at the cafeteria in Building 3900 at the Pensacola Naval Air Station (NAS). He was by all accounts a good employee, a hard worker, and gained the respect of his supervisor, Prospero Pastoral (called "Mr. Pete" by most employees). In fact, when Mr. Pete was going to take an extended vacation to visit his home in the Philippines, Douglas was selected as one of the individuals to take over some of Mr. Pete's duties in his absence. Douglas got along well with his fellow employees and co-workers. Douglas' supervisors were Mr. Pete and Paul Markham, the assistant building manager of Building 3900. Douglas had a good relationship with Markham when he first started working in food service, but (according to Douglas) they did not get along so well later on. There did not appear to be any overt animosity between the two men during the final hearing. In November 2013, Markham was advised by the kitchen manager that some food items (including several hams) were missing from the kitchen inventory. It was suspected that some night shift employees may have been stealing the food items. Markham was asked to investigate and see if there was any suspicious behavior by any employees. On the evening of November 22, 2013, Markham changed from his work uniform into civilian clothes just prior to midnight. He then drove to a parking lot just behind Building 3900 and sat inside his darkened vehicle. He had driven his wife's car to work that day so that his pickup truck (which employees would recognize) would not alert others to his presence. At around midnight, he saw two employees (Gerry Riddleberger and Andy Bartlett) sitting outside Building 3900 talking. He could see Douglas in the building through the window. A few minutes later, Douglas exited the building carrying a large black garbage bag. Markham got out of his car and walked toward Douglas. As he approached, Markham began to "chat" with Douglas about trivial things. He asked how he was doing; he asked where Ira (another employee) was; he made small talk.2/ Finally, Markham asked Douglas what was in the bag. Douglas responded that "these are tough times" and that "I have to take care of my family." He then opened the bag and showed Markham the contents therein. The bag contained numerous bags of potato chips and snacks, some bananas, packets of coffee creamer, and other small items. Markham asked Douglas to hand over the bag and he did so. He then asked Douglas for his badge and access key. When Douglas handed those over, Markham told him to leave the NAS and he would be hearing from the GCE human resources/employee relations department (HR). Douglas left the base and Markham waited around a while to see if any other employees were carrying suspicious items. Not observing any other suspect behavior, Markham concluded his investigation for that evening. The next day, Markham handed over the bag and Douglas' badges to HR. It was determined by HR that Douglas' attempted theft of the property constituted just cause for termination of his employment with GCE. The HR office notified Douglas of the decision to terminate his employment. Douglas thereafter visited the HR office to ask that the decision be reconsidered. Douglas was told that the process for reconsideration was to submit, in writing, his statement of the reasons and whether there were mitigating factors to be considered. Douglas submitted a four-page request for reconsideration to Kahiapo, director of employee relations, dated December 2, 2013. In the letter, Douglas admitted to the theft but rationalized that other employees were stealing food as well. He said he had seen Markham taking boxes out of storage and putting them in his truck, but did not know what the boxes contained. He said a blonde worker on the food line ate food from the serving line, but had no details about the allegation. He complained that other workers had been caught stealing but had not been terminated from employment. He alleged that a worker (Jeanette) stole a bag of bacon and only got suspended. Markham had no support or independent verification of the allegations. GCE had one of its employee relations specialists, Alan Harbin, review Douglas' reconsideration letter and investigate the allegations found therein. All of the allegations were deemed to be unfounded. There was a worker named Jeanette who had been suspended for eating an egg off the serving line, but this did not comport with Douglas' allegation. When Harbin's findings were reported to HR, Kahiapo notified Douglas via letter dated December 18, 2013, that his request for reconsideration was being denied. The termination of employment letter was not rescinded. The decision by HR was in large part due to the zero tolerance policy against theft adhered to by GCE. The GCE Employee Handbook contains the following: In accordance with the general "at will" nature of employment with GCE, generally, employees may be discharged at any time, and for any reason. * * * An employee may be discharged on a first offense and without prior disciplinary action if the violation so warrants. * * * Conduct that may result in immediate termination of employment includes, but is not limited to: * * * [12] Theft, pilfering, fraud or other forms of dishonesty. It is clear--and Douglas admits--that Douglas was guilty of theft. He attempted to steal a bag of food items from the building in which he worked. During his term of employment, Douglas never made any claim concerning discrimination against him or anyone else due to his race, African-American. He was never mistreated or treated differently than any other employee by his supervisors. Douglas did not have any problem doing his job. His disability, being hard of hearing, did not adversely affect his employment. He never asked for any accommodation to do his job or suggested to anyone that his disability interfered with his ability to perform his duties. There are simply no facts in this case upon which a claim of discrimination could reasonably be based.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations, upholding its determination that no cause exists for a finding of discrimination against Petitioner, Terry R. Douglas, by Respondent, Gulf Coast Enterprise. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of August, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of August, 2014.
The Issue This case concerns the propriety of Respondent's abolishment of Petitioner's position of Occupational Specialist within the Gilchrist County School System. In particular, it is to be determined whether Respondent has failed to meet requirements of law in that its action of abolishing the position was arbitrary and capricious and contrary to Petitioner's constitutionally protected rights to free speech and assembly.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the holder of a Rank 111 Teaching Certificate, issued by the State of Florida. The certification recognizes her as an Occupational Specialist. On July 8, 1974, she was granted a continuing contract of employment with the Gilchrist County School Board as an Occupational Specialist in the Trenton and Bell schools within the Gilchrist County School District. A copy of that contract may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 7, admitted into evidence. The contract by its terms states at Paragraph 9, "This contract shall not operate to prevent discontinuance of a position as provided by law." It is the discontinuance or abolishment of the position of Occupational Specialist held by the petitioner that occasioned the formal hearing in this cause. Since being granted the position of Occupational Specialist in permanent status, Petitioner has performed those duties described in the job description, a copy of which is Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, admitted into evidence. Those functions include career planning for students, considering their personal problems, preparing them for assessment tests and the execution of job application forms. In the school year 1981-82, Petitioner worked three- fifths of her time in Trenton High School and two-fifths in Bell High School. In her capacity, Respondent considered her to be acting as the equivalent of a guidance counselor. She has never been certified by the State of Florida as a guidance counselor. Around the beginning of April 1982, the superintendent of Schools in Gilchrist County, Ray Thomas, decided that the position of Occupational Specialist held by the petitioner should be abolished. At that time, and at all relevant times, this position of Occupational Specialist was the only position of its type in the Gilchrist County School System. The basis for the abolition or discontinuation of the position concerned anticipated revenue shortfalls or budget inadequacy for the upcoming school year 1982-83, pursuant to information from persons within the State of Florida responsible for educational funding. In arriving at his decision, Thomas sought comment from Robert Ervin, the principal at Hell High School and James Surrency, the principal at Trenton High School. Ervin was asked if the guidance responsibility at Bell High School could best be achieved by the provision of a full-time guidance counselor. Thomas gave the impression to Surrency that the basis for requesting the discontinuation of the position of Occupational Specialist pertained to funding. No particulars were revealed to the two principals on the question of the financial position of the school system facing the advent of the 1982-83 school year. Respondent's Exhibits Nos. 1 and 2, admitted into evidence, are the comments of the Trenton and Bell principals on the subject of the abolition of the position of Occupational Specialist. Ervin accepted the idea of abolishing the Occupational Specialist position based upon his belief that a full-time guidance counselor would be provided to his school, as contrasted to the half- time guidance counselor and two-fifths time work of the Petitioner during the school year 1981-82. In his remarks, Surrency indicates reconciliation to the idea of losing the three-fifths time that the Petitioner was spending at Trenton High; however, he indicates his preference to have the Occupational Specialist position remain if it could be afforded. In the school year 1981-82, Trenton had a full-time guidance counselor in addition to the work being done by the Petitioner. After receiving the comments of the principals and in keeping with his choice, the Superintendent of schools wrote to the petitioner on April 21, 1982, advising her that he would recommend to the School Board, effective the beginning of the school year 1982-83 that the position of Occupational Specialist not be filled and offering Bowdoin a leave of absence without pay for one year. A copy of this correspondence may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 3. On April 22, 1982, the recommendation of the Superintendent was presented to the School Board and in the course of that meeting, the Petitioner was represented by counsel. Action on this recommendation by the Superintendent was tabled. On May 3, 1982, the Superintendent wrote the School Board and modified his position on the question of Occupational Specialist from one recommending that the position of Occupational Specialist not be filled in 1982- 83 school year to one of recommending the discontinuance of the position for economic and curriculum reasons, stating that the duties of that position could be assumed or transferred to the guidance counselor at each school in Gilchrist County. A copy of this correspondence may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. On May 4, 1982, consideration was given to the suggestion of total abolishment of the position of Occupational Specialist and the School Board in a 3 to 2 vote determined to abolish the position of Occupational Specialist. This action was in keeping with Chapter 230, Florida Statutes. Prior to the vote, no specific information was imparted by the Superintendent or other school officials as to the financial benefits to be derived from the action or effect of the abolishment in terms of curriculum changes. The school board simply accepted the Superintendent's word that it was necessary to abolish the position for financial reasons. (The Superintendent, since taking office in 1981, has abolished other positions within the Gilchrist County School System, such as assistant principal at Trenton High School, general supervisor of instruction, food services supervisor, brick and block masonry teacher, librarian at Trenton High School and has left vacant teacher's aide positions.) At the May 4, 1982, meeting, Petitioner asked for and the Board agreed to afford a formal hearing to the Petitioner to challenge the abolishment of the Occupational Specialist position. Again, on June 1, 1982, a request was made in the Petitioner's behalf to have a grievance hearing before the board concerning the board's decision to abolish the job and it was determined that grievance hearing should be held on July 6, 1982. On July 6, 1982, the Board requested the Superintendent to prepare a list of vacancies which Mrs. Bowdoin might be certified for, the salary schedules related to those positions, a list of programs offered other than K-12 and the state certification requirements for those positions and the name of those persons filling the positions at the time. On July 20, 1982, the Board considered the level III grievance of the Petitioner in the presence of the Petitioner's attorney on the topic of an alternative placement of the Petitioner and the salary associated with that placement. On August 3, 1982, the Board entered a written resolution of decision pertaining to the level III grievance pertaining to the Petitioner, a copy of that resolution being found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 5. In this resolution, the School Board properly identified that the Petitioner could not be placed as a guidance counselor in that she did not hold a master's degree required for such position. In lieu of the position of Occupational Specialist which had been abolished by the School Board on May 4, 1982, by its August resolution, the Board offered the position of Teacher's Aide at Trenton Elementary School, with a substantial reduction in salary from approximately $15,000 a year to approximately $6,300 a year. This position of Teacher's Aide was reserved until August 16, 1982. Petitioner did not elect to accept the position of Teacher's Aide and has been unemployed since August 1982. In the course of an August 11, 1982 meeting, the Superintendent reported to the Board that the petitioner had "responded" at a level IV grievance procedure. On August 31, 1982, the Board was asked to consider litigation which had been presented to it by the Superintendent. On September 2, 1982, in an Executive Board session of the School Board of Gilchrist County, discussion was made of certain civil litigation brought by Petitioner against the Board. On October 5, 1982, an update was given to the Board concerning that case of the Petitioner versus the Board. Another update was made on October 5, 1982. On December 7, 1982, the Board was made aware of the fact that the case was to be considered in arbitration. (Various minutes of School Board meetings as described in this paragraph are more completely set forth in Respondent's Exhibit No. 8, admitted into evidence.) The matter was presented before the American Arbitration Association and the Arbitrator in his report absolved the Board of any violation related to the job abolition. The copy of that report may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 6, admitted into evidence. The date of the report is July 21, 1983. As stated before, the Bell High School in 1982-83, employed a full-time guidance counselor in substitution for an approximately half-time guidance and two-fifths time from Bowdoin the prior year. The Trenton school went from a 1981-82 school year in which a full-time counselor and three-fifths of Bowdoin's time was devoted to counseling activities to a full-time counselor, an aide working two-thirds time mostly in a clerical capacity and some assistance by a vocational teacher in school year 1982-83. Bad Bowdoin returned as an aide to the Trenton school in 1982-83, she would have been used in the guidance department in the same role as she had been given as Occupational Specialist. There was a revenue surplus left at the end of the 1982-83 school year and it was sufficient to have allowed the funding of the position of Occupational Specialist for the 1982-83 school year; however, that surplus was less than the 1981-82 school year by approximately 65,000. This funding difference in the face of providing essentially the same services in the school system, pointed out the more difficult economic circumstance that Thomas had made mention of in his initial decision to abolish the position of Occupational Specialist. In the 1982-83 School year, employees in the school system received salary increases. At the conclusion of the 1981-82 school year, there were approximately 900 students at the Trenton school which included grades K-12. According to Petitioner's Exhibit No. 11, excerpts from the standards of the Commission on Secondary Schools of the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, schools of a population of 750-999 need two guidance professionals. Therefore, the reduction of one and three-fifths counselors in 1981-82 to one counselor and something less than three-fifths in 1982-83 was contrary to the statement of standards. This excerpt is at 4.10.0, Figure 1, minimum personnel requirements. Respondent replies to that assertion through its Exhibit No. 9, which are excerpts of the standards for unit schools by the Commission on Secondary Schools and Commission on Elementary Schools of the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools. At Page 9, 9.16.0-9.16.2, Respondent argues that one guidance counselor suffices for any school with a membership of 500 or more students up to 999 students. Without determining which of these guidelines related to accreditation by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools is correct, it suffices to say that the changes that were made by the School Board in abolishing the position of Occupational Specialist as it might affect accreditation were made in good faith in that it can arguably be said that Trenton school, having 900 students, only needed one guidance counselor to meet conditions of accreditation. There were no curriculum changes made in the 1982-83 school year as a result of abolishing the Occupational Specialist position. There were curriculum changes but they were not the result of any influence provided by the abolishment of the Occupational Specialist job.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has employed respondent for many years. For the six years ending in 1968, she taught biology at Stranahan High School, where Harold Mouser was principal. Later, she left off teaching science and began working as a librarian, or media specialist. In this capacity, respondent worked at Parkway Junior High School, at Deerfield and at a facility called Southside which housed a center for emotionally disturbed children, when she began working there. Three or four years later, after the 1975-76 school year, the program for emotionally disturbed children was moved elsewhere, but respondent was allowed to remain with her library at Southside. Beginning in 1976, Southside was used for petitioner's Cyesis program, a program of instruction for pregnant school girls. At all pertinent times, Lorene Lasher was principal of the Cyesis program. The first year that the Cyesis center was located at Southside, Ms. Lasher directed respondent to teach a science class, in addition to performing her duties as a librarian. The following school year, 1977-1978, Ms. Lasher closed the library and turned it into a physical education room. She assigned respondent to teach science and mathematics classes, for the 1977-1978 and 1978- 1979 school years. Almost from the time the Cyesis program moved to South side, there was friction between respondent and Ms. Lasher. Things came to a head on October 17, 1978. That morning, shortly before school began, Ms. Lasher entered respondent's classroom. She placed some students' papers on respondent's desk, and demanded that respondent explain how she had marked the papers. Respondent, who was standing behind the desk, asked whether the complaining students had had permission to leave her classroom to speak to Ms. Lasher about the papers. During the heated argument that ensued, Ms. Lasher and respondent came closer together and respondent struck Ms. Lasher, breaking the skin above the lip. Ms. Lasher called out, "You hit me," and respondent replied, "You've been hitting me below the belt for two years," or words to that effect. Ms. Lasher summoned Charles Ramsdell, the guidance counselor, who, once inside respondent's classroom, asked her why she had hit Ms. Lasher. Respondent answered to the effect that Ms. Lasher had been hitting her daily, although not in a physical way. Students at the Cyesis Center in grades seven through twelve were grouped together in the same classes. Because of the students' various levels of achievement, individual folders were kept containing a program of instruction for each student. In addition, respondent and the other teachers at the Cyesis program prepared lesson plans for the class as a whole, for their own use and for the use of substitute teachers, if necessary. The first time Marilyn Shaw substituted for respondent she was unable to find respondent's lesson plans, for reasons which are not clear from the evidence. Respondent had prepared the lesson plans, which a fellow teacher had seen the day before. On subsequent occasions, Ms. Shaw had no difficulty finding respondent's lesson plans, which gave adequate guidance for a substitute teacher. Respondent regularly prepared satisfactory lesson plans while she was teaching at the Cyesis center. Except for wine infrequently, respondent refrains from drinking alcohol. She has never drunk any alcoholic beverages on school grounds, nor appeared in her classroom under the influence of alcohol or any other drug that affected her behavior. Before the media center at Southside was closed down, representatives of firms selling audiovisual materials called on respondent to show their wares. On one such occasion, Ms. Lasher learned that a salesman was with respondent and told respondent to bring the salesman to Ms. Lasher's office. Thereafter he went directly to Ms. Lasher's office whenever he visited Southside. A Mr. Lipane once dropped off some keys in the teacher's lounge for respondent after her car had been repaired. At the end of the school year he and other friends of respondent helped respondent pick up some things. By this time, students were no longer in attendance. Except for this occasion, respondent never invited any man to visit her at work. Sometimes petitioner's maintenance personnel worked at Southside. Respondent excused individual students from her class who needed to see the school nurse, the guidance counselor or some other school official. In keeping with school policy, respondent issued passes on these occasions. Also in keeping with school policy, respondent excused individual students who needed to go to the bathroom; a reusable pass was available to one student at a time for this purpose. Frequently, respondent sent a group of students into the hall just outside her classroom to do make-up work. She persisted in this practice even after Ms. Lasher had directed her to desist. From time to time respondent borrowed a master key from Ms. Lasher's office which she sometimes lent to other teachers before it was returned to Ms. Lasher's office. Respondent never returned a key other than the one she had borrowed. She never caused the master key to be duplicated or used it to enter the school at an unauthorized time. On or about June 17, 1977, Ms. Lasher and two other employees of petitioner entered respondent's office, after the end of the school year and found empty bottles that had once contained whiskey and wine. Respondent maintained a collection of bottles to which other teachers also contributed. The bottles were available for use by the art teacher. An art teacher once used bottles respondent had collected to make wind chimes. The 1977-1978 school year was the first year petitioner had had a homeroom for some time. She was unaware of petitioner's policy requiring that homeroom teachers distribute interim report cards on October 6, 1977, as a prerequisite to giving students failing grades for the semester; and she distributed none. She learned of this requirement at the end of that semester and complied with it thereafter. A schedule was posted in the school office, but it was not established that the schedule indicated when interim report cards were to be sent out. Every fifth week during the school year respondent had "bus duty." She failed to appear for bus duty on the afternoon of September 12, 1977. Instead she went to a workshop, for which she had obtained approval from Ms. Lasher beforehand. As soon as she arrived at the site of the workshop she telephoned Ms. Lasher's office and was told that somebody else was covering for her. On one other occasion, respondent was a few minutes late for bus duty because she was talking to a student. By the time she stopped by the office to get the clipboard all teachers used for bus duty, somebody else had been sent to supervise students awaiting school buses. At Ms. Lasher's instance, on October 12, 1978, Larry Wantuck, petitioner's math coordinator, met with respondent and Mr. Ramsdell, the Cyesis center's guidance counselor, to arrange for respondent to administer a "profile analysis" test to her students. Respondent was to administer the test over a four day period, and to grade the test papers afterwards with Mr. Ramsdell's assistance. She finished administering the tests on October 16, 1978. The following day, after her run in with Ms. Lasher, she was instructed to leave the school premises. When she left, she took the students' test papers with her to the office of the Classroom Teachers' Association. There she finished grading them on October 18, 1978. On October 19, 1978, she reported to petitioner's Lincoln Park Complex, as she had been directed to do. She left the test results in Mr. Wantuck's office, which was located at the Lincoln Park Complex, on October 19, 1978. On October 26, 1978, respondent happened to see Mr. Wantuck and asked him if he had found the test results she had left in his office. When he answered that he had not, they went together to his office and found them on his desk where respondent had left them. At the end of the 1977-1978 school year, respondent turned in her grade book and lesson plans for filing, in accordance with a school policy designed to make them available for reference to teachers in succeeding years. In the fall of 1978, she requested and obtained her 1977-1978 plan book, for which she signed a receipt. She gave the book to a fellow teacher who took it to the Classroom Teachers' association to be copied, in preparation for filing harassment charges against Ms. Lasher. Ms. Lasher asked respondent to return the plan book, and respondent did so a few days later, promptly after regaining possession of the book herself. After she had handed out alternating tests to seven students in her fifth period class, on or about October 12, 1978, respondent started out of her classroom headed for the bathroom. She had not shut the door behind her when Ms. Lasher ordered her to stay to supervise the students' test taking, which she did. At the beginning of each school year, many teachers at the Cyesis Center began recording grades elsewhere than in the official roll book because class composition was particularly unstable then. In the fall of 1978, respondent recorded grades, including grades for the student Cecil Hunter, on index cards. Even after she had entered Cecil Hunter's name in her official roll book and begun noting her attendance there, she did not immediately transfer from the card the grades she had recorded there. Occasionally respondent left her students unsupervised for a minute or two to go to the bathroom or to get a drink of water. If she was going to be gone longer, she would ask Ms. Bracewell or another colleague to look in on her students.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is: RECOMMENDED: That petitioner suspend respondent for the remainder of the 1979-1980 school year. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of September, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 904/488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Warner S. Olds, Esq. Suite 200 3067 East Commercial Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308 John L. Chamblee, Jr., Esq. 341 Plant Avenue Tampa, Florida 33606
Recommendation There are factors in mitigation which should be considered in this case to include the following: Carlson and Benedict had personal reasons for discrediting Beach and their actions show their anamosity toward her. The events which constituted the majority of the charges against Beach happened over one year before the Report was made to the Florida State Board of Nursing by Carlson. Beach worked at Lancaster Youth Development Center approximately seven years. She received good efficiency ratings for her employment from Carlson and Benedict for the period of time covered by the allegations relating to employment of unlicensed persons and unauthorized administration of medication, although, if their testimony is believed, they had knowledge of these matters. The testimony of the witnesses is largely unsupported by any physical evidence with the exception of the testimony of Rollings, whose testimony was rejected because of the changes which she had made from her original statements. Beach called and obtained authority to administer valium to a rape victim, who under any reasonable interpretation of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services policy, was entitled to treatment at the infirmary. Having sought authority to administer valium under these circumstances, it is difficult to conclude that she would have administered valium or any other prescription drug to Rollings or Campbell without obtaining authority. Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and factors in mitigation, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida State Board of Nursing take no action against the license of Adeline Beach. DONE and ORDERED this 31st day of May, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Julius Finegold, Esquire Florida State Board of Nursing 1107 Blackstone Building Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Smith and Johnson Post Office Box 508 Gainesville, Florida 32602
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner when her employment assignment with Respondent was terminated in November 2004.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 48-year-old African-American female. On or about September 10, 2004, Petitioner was placed with AT&T Wireless as a customer service specialist by a staffing agency, AppleOne. Petitioner's job duties as a customer service specialist included answering phone calls from AT&T Wireless' customers about their bills and assisting them with problems that they were having with their accounts. For the most part, Petitioner received positive feedback regarding her job performance as a customer service specialist. That feedback, which is reflected on the Advisor Evaluation Detail forms received into evidence as Exhibit P7, came from her supervisors as well as from quality assurance specialists. Petitioner testified that she generally got along well with her co-workers,2 but that she preferred getting assistance and taking instruction from men rather than women. After AT&T Wireless was taken over by Cingular, Petitioner and the other customer service specialists working for AT&T Wireless were required to attend a two-week training class regarding Cingular’s policies and procedures. The training class attended by Petitioner was also attended by her supervisor, Wendy Miller. Ms. Miller is a white female. On the first day of the class, Petitioner was having trouble logging into the computer system that was being used in the training class. Ms. Miller, who was sitting directly behind Petitioner, attempted to ask Petitioner a question about the problems that she was having and/or provide her assistance, but Petitioner simply ignored Ms. Miller. According to Petitioner, she ignored Ms. Miller because she was trying to pay attention to the teacher. As a result of this incident, Ms. Miller sent an e-mail to AppleOne dated November 30, 2004, which stated in pertinent part: It has been decided by Sandy Camp and myself to end [Petitioner’s] temporary assignment due to insubordination. She has been coached on her attitude for which she is not receptive to and several other people have mentioned that they do not want to help her due to her not wanting to listen. The last incident was today during our CSE class where she demonstrated insubordination and disrespect to me. In a later e-mail, dated March 7, 2005, Ms. Miller described the incident in the training class as follows: [Petitioner] was one of the reps not able to get into [the computer] system so I was attempting to assist her because she was sitting directly in front of me. I attempted to ask her a question and she turned her back to me & put up her hand as to say “don’t speak to me” and she completely ignored me even as I kept speaking to her. . . . . The descriptions of the incident in Ms. Miller’s e- mails are materially the same as Petitioner’s description of the incident in her testimony at the hearing. On the evening of November 30, 2004, Petitioner was called by someone at AppleOne and told that her assignment with Cingular had been terminated. Petitioner was paid by AppleOne during her entire tenure with AT&T Wireless and Cingular. Petitioner’s salary while she was working at AT&T Wireless and Cingular remained constant at $10 per hour. Petitioner’s entire tenure with AT&T Wireless and Cingular was approximately two months. Petitioner testified that she did not receive any other assignments through AppleOne after her assignment with Cingular was terminated. She attributed her inability to get other assignments through AppleOne to the fact that AppleOne "sided with" Cingular, who was its client, but there is insufficient evidence to make such a finding. In January 2005, Petitioner filed separate charges of discrimination with the Commission against AppleOne and Cingular. According to Petitioner, she was paid $400 by AppleOne to settle her claim against that company. Petitioner testified that she sold vacation plans and did other “odd jobs” between November 2004 and mid-February 2005 when she was hired by Sears as a home delivery specialist. Her job duties in that position include contacting customers to coordinate the delivery of appliances purchased from Sears. Petitioner testified that her initial salary with Sears was $9 per hour and that as of the date of the hearing her salary was $10 per hour. Petitioner testified that other customer service specialists had “problems” or “personality conflicts” with Ms. Miller, but she was unable to identify any other employee (of any race or age) who was similarly insubordinate or disrespectful towards Ms. Miller (or any other supervisor) and who received discipline less severe than termination. Petitioner’s actions toward Ms. Miller during the training class were disrespectful, at a minimum. Petitioner testified that Ms. Miller acted like a white supremacist, but there is no credible evidence in the record to support that claim. Petitioner also testified that AT&T Wireless and Cingular did not have any permanent customer service specialists that were as old as she, but there is no credible evidence in the record to support that claim. Petitioner presented no credible evidence regarding the race, age, or other characteristics of the person who filled her position at Cingular after her assignment was terminated.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order dismissing with prejudice Petitioner’s discrimination claim against Cingular. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 2005.
Findings Of Fact Leo Willie Johnson commenced work as a custodian at Citizens Field on September 23, 1985, under inauspicious circumstances. For reasons not germane to this proceeding he had been discharged as a school bus driver and was reinstated by the Superintendent. As part of the reinstatement he was transferred from the Transportation Department to a custodial position. Since he didn't want a full-time position and the Citizen's Field assignment was part- time, he was assigned to that site. (tr-16, 127, Exhibit #R-2) Citizen's Field is a football stadium owned by the City of Gainesville and leased by the Alachua County School Board (SBAC). There are two concrete bleachers, an east side and a west side, accommodating a total of 6500 persons. The fall months are extremely busy with frequent football games and some use of the field by the City of Gainesville. (tr-16, 39, 70, 73) On Mr. Johnson's first day of work he was given a brief orientation to the job by his immediate supervisor, Dave Waters, who has been in charge of maintenance of Citizens Field for 26 years. He was also given a "pep" talk by Kirby Stewart, who is Mr. Waters' supervisor and the individual in charge of health education, drivers education and athletics for the SBAC. Mr. Stewart told Willie Johnson the work would be hard but rewarding, since parents, students and administrators are quick to acknowledge how great the field looks. (tr-16, 17, 69, 70) Mr. Johnson's assigned work day was from 8:00 a.m. until 1:00 p.m. Monday through Friday, with a 10-minute break at 10:00 a.m. His duties included general cleaning and field maintenance: using a blower to remove papers and trash from the bleachers, sweeping the restrooms and walks, removing paper from the ground, raking, and similar functions. None of the duties required training or preparation on the part of the worker. (tr- 17, 38, 48) From the first day on the job, Leo Johnson's performance was substandard, and by his words and actions he made it clear that he was not remotely interested in fulfilling his duties. On September 23, 1986, he spent his entire work day using the blower to clean the east bleachers. He accomplished in five hours what an experienced worker could do in forty-five minutes and an inexperienced worker could do in two hours. (tr- 17-18, 71, Exhibit #P-1) On September 24, 1986, he spent five hours cleaning the restrooms, a concession stand and one locker room. In Dave Waters' opinion, based upon twenty-six years experience and the supervision of many different workers, these tasks should take a new man approximately two hours. (tr-18) On the third day, Leo Johnson spent four hours washing out two bathrooms and one locker room. He then sprayed out one restroom with a waterhose. At 12:30 Dave Waters gave him a short, fifteen minute assignment, but he laid down his tools and walked away. He returned after about fifteen minutes and Dave Waters told him that he must keep working until his work time was up. Mr. Johnson responded that there was too much work to do, that he didn't think the job would work out for him and that he would talk to Mr. Griffin in personnel about another assignment. He then left the work site. (tr-18-20, Exhibit #P-1) Tile next two days, Mr. Johnson was cut on sick leave. He came to work on Monday, September 30th, but left after two hours. He was out then until Monday, October 14th and worked four full days Friday, the 18th was a Homecoming holiday. He was not very productive that week as he had a portable radio plugged into his ears. Dave Waters asked him to remove the earphone so that he could give him instructions, but he replaced it later. (tr-21-23) Because of the concerns expressed by both Dave Waters and the employee, Wilfred Griffin (Career Service Specialist, and the School Board Superintendent met with Mr. Johnson on October 2, 1985. Mr. Johnson was told again the duties of his job and was told that he was expected to carry out those duties. Mr. Johnson complained about having problems with his feet due to having to stand in water. Later, when Mr. Griffin had the safety officer investigate to see if boots should be purchased, the report back to him was that the field had good drainage and there was no standing water. In addition, boots had already been made available to the workers. (tr-l28-129) At Mr. Griffin's direction, On October 7, 1985, Kirby Stewart asked Mr. Johnson to bring in a note from his doctor. Mr. Johnson replied that it would be "no problem". Thereafter, Kirby Stewart repeated the request on several occasions. The only thing he received was a note from the A.C.O.R.N. Clinic secretary that Leo Johnson was examined on October 8, 1985. (tr-74, Exhibit #P-7, and #P-17) On Monday, October 21, 1985, Mr. Johnson worked four and a half hours. He left the work site without permission for 30 minutes. When he returned and was told by Dave Waters that he was not to leave without permission, he replied that he would leave and sign out whenever he wanted and would not change his work pace for anyone. Later that same day, Kirby Stewart came to the work site since Dave Waters had called to tell him that Leo Johnson left. Mr. Stewart reminded Mr. Johnson about the doctor's note and he wanted to leave immediately to go get it. He and Mr. Stewart walked the grounds while Mr. Stewart pointed out areas where his work was not satisfactory. Leo Johnson replied in a loud and abusive manner that "I beat the transportation department, and now ... [he didn't finish the sentence]" (tr-25,26,27, 113-115, 118, Exhibits #P-7 and P-13) Mr. Johnson did not return to work until December 12, 1985. In the meantime he called in sick every day. He was reminded several times that a doctor's note was required and he responded that the doctor would call. The doctor did not call. He complained of headaches, backaches and swollen feet. Yet on payday, November 27th, he was observed by Mr. Stewart jogging into the Administration building to get his paycheck. (tr-27, 28, 82, Exhibits #P-7, P- 15) When Mr. Johnson appeared for work on December 12, 1985, Mr. Waters gave him the message that he must go see Kirby Stewart. He called Kirby Stewart instead, and was told that since he missed so many days Kirby Stewart needed to talk with him about whether he was physically able to work. Leo Johnson did not go to see Kirby Stewart. Mr. Stewart wrote a memo to Wilfred Griffin detailing the call from Leo Johnson and expressing his need for a resolution of the problems. (Exhibit #P-9) By January 6, 1986, after the holiday break, Mr. Johnson had the impression that he was dismissed. While the record is not at all clear who told him that, Kirby Stewart also thought that Leo Johnson was dismissed as of December 20, 1985 (tr.100, Exhibit #R-6(e)) On January 6, 1986, Leo Johnson called School Board member, Charles Chestnut III, to complain that he was discharged. Charles Chestnut called the School superintendent, Dr. MaGann, who said that It must be a mistake because he didn't know anything about it. Charles Chestnut had been involved in the earlier disciplinary action that the superintendent corrected regarding Leo Johnson. Mr. Chestnut had no personal knowledge regarding Leo Johnson's performance. (tr-174-177) Leo Johnson returned to work at Citizen's Field on January 13, 1986. He took numerous breaks and left in his car at one point during the work day. He was absent for approximately 20 minutes. When he was told to hoe the grass under the bleachers he dragged an iron rake around the area with the teeth up. He put away his tools early and left before 1:00 p.m.. (tr. 30-34) On Tuesday, January 14, 1986, Leo Johnson was also at work but took breaks frequently all day. (tr.34-36) On Wednesday, January 15, 1986, Leo Johnson came to work at 8:00 a.m. Between 8:00 and 10:27, he worked 92 minutes and took breaks totaling 55 minutes. He left at 10:27 after telling Dave Waters that he had a headache. (tr-37) Kirby Stewart saw him at the County Office around 11:00 a.m. and asked why he was there. He replied that the had come to see Wil Griffin because his feet were too swollen to work. (tr.89) On January 17th, Kirby Stewart wrote a memo to his supervisor, Jack Christian reiterating the numerous problems with Leo Johnson and stating that had Mr. Johnson returned to work that morning, he would have officially reprimanded him. (Exhibit #R-10) Leo Johnson never returned to Citizens Field, and on January 21, 1986 he was suspended pending a hearing on his termination. (Exhibit #P-14) Between September 23, 1985 and January 21, 1986, there were a total of 73 school board work days. Leo Johnson was at work for 8 full days, was present for 4 partial days and was absent for 61 full days. (tr. 90-91, Exhibit #P-15) Mr. Johnson was a regular, part-time career service employee of SBAC while he was assigned to citizen's Field. Wilfred Griffin, a Career Service Specialist had the authority to interview, recruit, hire, fire and counsel career service employees. While Dave Waters was responsible for directing Johnson's work in the field and Kirby Stewart was Mr. Johnson's supervisor for administrative purposes, Wilfred: Griffin had the most substantial authority over this employee. As revealed by the record, both Superintendent MaGann and a school board member, Charles Chestnut III, had hand in dealing with Leo Johnson. This complicated hierarchy contributed to confusion and delays but did not prejudice or result in detriment to Mr. Johnson. He used the 57 sick days he transferred from the Department of Transportation, plus the days he earned on the payroll for his time assigned at Citizen's Field and ended with a full paycheck for the month of January. Despite repeated requests by Kirby Stewart and Wilford Griffin, Leo Johnson never produced a doctor's statement explaining his protracted absences. At the hearing he produced a photocopy of an "Illness-in-line-of-duty-leave" form with two lines completed by a Dr. Guido, whom Mr. Johnson contended was a foot doctor. The form is dated and signed by Leo Johnson on January 15, 1986, but the form is incomplete and there is no evidence that anyone at the school board has ever seen it. (tr- 212, 213) Further, the almost illegible statement by the doctor appears to be a diagnosis with nothing about Mr. Johnson's ability to work. (Exhibit #R-9) The verification of his visits to A.C.O.R.N. Clinic provide no information about his ability to work. By letter dated February 25, 1986, Bonnie Coats, RN, the clinic coordinator, responded to Mr. Johnson's request for the dates and reasons for his clinic visits. They are as follows: 08/23/83 Physical Exam for Work 08/07/84 Physical Exam for Work 10/08/85 1. Dizziness Calluses of feet Muscle Spasm 08/22/85 Blood Pressure evaluation 11/19/85 Blood Pressure evaluation 11/26/85 Blood Pressure evaluation 12/10/85 Blood Pressure evaluation (Exhibit #R-5(b)) Leo Johnson had ample notice of his deficient performance, although none in the supervisory chain wrote up a Job Performance Warning Record. Dave Waters did not because Mr. Johnson simply was not on the job enough. (tr-58) Kirby Stewart intended to formalize his complaints in an official reprimand, but Mr. Johnson failed to return to work again. (Exhibit #P-13) Wilfred Griffin orally warned Mr. Johnson about his job performance, leaving the job, excessive breaks and absenteeism. He met with Mr. Johnson on six or seven occasions and shared with him the detailed written memos about his work from Dave Waters and Kirby Stewart. (tr-129, 130, 154, 155) As a career service employee Leo Johnson was subject to the rights and responsibilities found in the SBAC Career Service Employee Handbook. (Exhibit #P-18) Leo Johnson was thoroughly familiar with the provisions of the handbook.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of an unlawful employment practice as defined in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On April 10, 1989, Petitioner, Mark Cleveland, a male, applied through Job Service of Florida, for employment as a telemarketer with Respondent, Sears Roebuck and Company at the Sears store located in Pensacola, Florida. Petitioner had several years of sales experience with at least six months of experience in telemarketing. He also had a good speaking voice as evidenced by the fact that he is currently employed as a disc jockey at a local radio station. Clearly, Respondent was qualified for the telemarketing position. The telemarketer position would enable Petitioner to earn approximately $85.00 a week or $365.50 a month. The telemarketing section at the Pensacola Sears store consisted of virtually all women with perhaps three or four rare male telemarketers. Petitioner had two separate interviews with two different Sears employees responsible for filling the telemarketing positions. During the Petitioner's interviews with the two Sears employees, Petitioner was repeatedly questioned on whether he could work with all women or mostly all women and be supervised by women. Petitioner assured his interviewers that he could since he grew up with six sisters and in general liked working with women. Petitioner left the interview with the information that he would be hired after another supervisor reviewed the applications and that he would be called once the supervisor's review was complete. After several days, Petitioner, being excited about what he thought was going to be his new job, called one of the two women who interviewed him. He was informed that the telemarketing positions had been filled. Later that same day Petitioner discovered that the positions had, in fact, not been filled and that he had been told an untruth. The telemarketing positions were eventually filled by women. Petitioner remained out of work for approximately four months before he was hired as a telemarketer by the Pensacola News Journal. A Notice of Assignment and Order was issued on August 27, 1991, giving the parties an opportunity to provide the undersigned with suggested dates and a suggested place for the formal hearing. The information was to be provided within ten days of the date of the Notice. This Notice was sent by United States mail to the Respondent at the address listed in the Petition for Relief. Respondent did not respond to the Notice. On October 10, 1991, a Notice of Hearing was issued setting the formal hearing for 11:00 a.m., September 11, 1990. The location of the hearing was listed in the Notice. The Notice of Hearing was sent by United States mail to the Respondent at the address listed in the Petition for Relief. Respondent's address and acknowledgment of this litigation was confirmed when Respondent filed its answer to the Petition for Relief with the Division of Administrative Hearings. Even though Respondent received adequate notice of the hearing in this matter, the Respondent did not appear at the place set for the formal hearing at the date and time specified on the Notice of Hearing. The Petitioner was present at the hearing. The Respondent did not request a continuance of the formal hearing or notify the undersigned that it would not be able to appear at the formal hearing. After waiting fifteen minutes for the Respondent to appear, the hearing was commenced. As a consequence of Respondent's failure to appear, no evidence rebutting Petitioner's facts were introduced into evidence at the hearing and specifically no evidence of a nondiscriminatory purpose was introduced at the hearing. 1/ Petitioner has established a prima facie case of discrimination based on his sex, given the fact that Sears tried to mislead him into believing the telemarketing positions had been filled when they had not, the positions were all eventually filled by women and Sears' clear concern over Petitioner's ability to work with women. Such facts lead to the reasonable inference that Sears was engaging in an unlawful employment practice based on Respondent being a male, a protected class, in order to preserve a female work force in telemarketing. Such discrimination based on sex is prohibited under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and Petitioner is entitled to relief from that discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Commission enter a final order finding Petitioner was the subject of an illegal employment practice and awarding Petitioner $1,462.00 in backpay plus reasonable costs of $100.95 and an attorney's fee of $2,550.00. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of March, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 1992.
